

REPORT

REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION
WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE DECLARATION
ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES
AND PEOPLES
VOLUME II
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-FIRST SESSION
SUPPLEMENT No. 23 (A/31/23/Rev.1)
UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1977

2

i 7

- mý

1 7

I- -----

- -----

.....

gi; 44

T C T t -----

ýKý n 4 5 s 't ý5 x w- 4, ýy s ý2 2yýý- -å=

A i A Av-2

-7-x

7 -----

i- - - - -

-Z-Z

z7

2L-le

-11ý u

re

.....

TF -----

z zi Z-z. Z

im

= t =2 nj. w: W

English/French/SpanishT

CONTENTS

VOLUME I

(Chapters I to VI)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Chapter

I. ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE (A/31/23 (Part I) and Corr.1)

II. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DECOLONIZATION (A/31/23
(Part II))

III. QUESTION OF SENDING VISITING MISSIONS TO TERRITORIES
(A/31/23 (Part II))

IV. ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH ARE

IMPEDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
GRANTING

OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN
SOUTHERN

RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AND IN ALL OTHER TERRITORIES UNDER
COLONIAL

DOMINATION AND EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE COLONIALISM,
APARTHEID AND

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (A/31/23 (Part III))

V. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS BY COLONIAL
POWERS IN TERRITORIES UNDER THEIR ADMINISTRATION WHICH
MIGHT BE IMPEDING

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING
OF

INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES (A/31/23
(Part IV))

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
 INDEPENDENCE
 TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED
 AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED
 WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
 (A/31/23 (Part V))

-iii-

/_Original:

.
 -----Mae~

CONTENTS (continued)

Paragraphs	Page
Chapter	
IX. NAMIBIA (A/31/23/Add.3)	1 - 14 141
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	1 - 13 141
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	14 143
WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	146
X. SEYCHELLES (A/31/23/Add.4)	1 - 10 10
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	1 - 9 100
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ..	10 191
ANNEXES	
I. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	192
II. LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1976 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE * * * * *	200
XI. SPANISH SAHARA (A/31/23/Add.5 and Corr.1)	i. 1 - 4 203
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	1 - 3 203
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	4 203
ANNEXES	

I. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT	
204			
II. LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALGERIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	222
XII. TIMOR (A/31/23/Add.6)	I.....1	- 7	225
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	1 - 6	225
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	7	226

t

.....

4: -N ýf K

.....

or

.....

- tým E F,

7 t:

77 -c,

- - - - -

z z z

CONTENTS (continued) XXIII. GUAM (A/31/23/Add.8 (Part III)) XXIV. TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS (A/31/23/Add.8 (Part III)) VOLUME IV (Chapters XXV-XXXII) XXV. ANTIGUA, DOMINICA, ST. KITTS-iEVIS - ANGUILLA, ST. LUCIA AND ST. VINCENT (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part I)) XXVI. BELIZE (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part I)) XXVII. BERMUDA (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part I)) XXVIII. BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part II)) XXIX. CAYMAN ISLANDS, MONTSERRAT AND TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part III)) XXX. FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part III)) XXXI. UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS (A/31/23/Add.9 (Part III)) XXXII. INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (A/31/23/Add.10)

-vii-

.....

..... g

.....

.....

 ..

CHAPTER VII
 (A/31/23/Add.1)
 MEETINGS IN AFRICA OF THE AD HOC GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE
 SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 1029th MEETING ON 1 APRIL 1976
 CONTENTS

Paragraphs	Page	
A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.....	1 - 15	2
B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ...	16	6
C. OBSERVATIONS OF THE AD HOC GROUP	17	8
Annexes		
I. REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT ITS 1029th MEETING ON 1 APRIL 1976	17	
II. LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE	76	
III. LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE		
IV. LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1976 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ADDRESSED TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS	83	
V. MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ETHIOPIA, ON 3 MAY 1976 AT ADDIS ABABA .	85	

-----K1
 35
 tv
 t 377
 ----- u\$ luvvLwe -----4 t,
 zllily,1iEwmgpgua IMT

 MP -s 1 et--\$__55

T-7, _1

xek

J4. -----

.

11 Nom

.r47

Iv 3

kk

läa-

Colonial Countries and Peoples with respect to the Territories mentioned above. Bearing in mind the important changes brought about in southern Africa as a consequence of the emergence of the newly independent nations formerly under Portuguese domination, and in the light of recent developments concerning those Territories, the Special Committee requested the Ad Hoc Group to hold consultations in this regard with the following:

- (a) Leaders and representatives of the national liberation movements concerned;
- (b) Leaders and officials of the Governments referred to in paragraph 3 above and of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power responsible for Southern Rhodesia;
- (c) The Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Executive Secretary of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

5. In entrusting the foregoing mandate to the Ad Hoc Group, the Special Committee also agreed that, with a view to enlightening and mobilizing world public opinion in support of the accelerating process of decolonization, maximum publicity should be given, as appropriate, to all phases of the related work of the United Nations, including in particular the activities of the Special Committee and the Ad Hoc Group itself. To that end, the Special Committee agreed to invite its Chairman, also in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, to hold press conferences as deemed necessary, and requested the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat to give maximum coverage to those activities and to ensure the widest possible

dissemination of the relevant information through all the media at its disposal.

6. In deciding to dispatch the Ad Hoc Group to Africa, the Special Committee was

again guided by the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 and 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, to which reference is made in paragraph 1 above. The Committee also took into account the relevant provisions of resolution 3481 (XXX), referred to in paragraph 2 above, and in this regard was

especially aware of the considerable savings accruable to the Organization as a result of its decision to send the Ad Hoc Group to Africa, instead of holding meetings of the full Committee away from Headquarters.

7. The membership of the Ad Hoc Group, as constituted by the Special Committee on

the nomination of its Chairman, was as follows:
Chairman: H.E. Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the United Republic
of Tanzania to the United Nations
Chairman of the Special Committee
-3-

-----Øø
.....
ly-- -V I
.....
ý94ý99 VW z7-
- - -----, X ýup
. I
-----..... -----WUN=H

Chairman addressed to Somalia (see annex IV to the present chapter). In addition the Committee had before it a memorandum submitted to the Chairman of the Special Committee by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia on 3 May 1976 at Addis Ababa (see annex V to the present chapter). At the 1038th meeting, on 16 June, the Chairman made a statement relating to the two last-mentioned communications (A/AC.109/PV.1038).

13. At the 100th meeting, on 17 June, the representative of Sierra Leone introduced a draft resolution on the report of the Ad Hoc Group (A/AC.109/L.1096) on behalf of the Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Norway, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia. At the same meeting, following a statement by the representative of Mali (A/AC.109/PV.1040), the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution without objection (see para. 16 below). In so doing, the Special Committee, inter alia, approved the report of the Ad Hoc Group and commended the observations contained therein (see para. 17 below) for the consideration of the General Assembly. At the same meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the Ivory Coast, Australia and Fiji, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.1040).

14. On 18 June, a copy of the report of the Ad Hoc Group was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/12105). On the same date, the text of the resolution (A/AC.109/534) was transmitted to the Governments of the countries visited by the Ad Hoc Group and to OAU. On 21 June, copies of the resolution were transmitted to all States.

15. Having regard to the importance of the information and observations contained therein, the Special Committee took into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group in its consideration of a number of items on its agenda, including in particular the items listed below. An account of the Special Committee's consideration of these

items, together with the texts of the decisions taken by the Committee, is contained in the relevant chapters of the present report as follows:

Chapter	Item	Document
II	Dissemination of information on decolonization	volume I
IV	Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa	volume I
VI	Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations	volume I
VIII	Southern Rhodesia	(see p. 96 below)
IX	Namibia	(see p. 140 below)

-5-

..... t ý , I I I 1 4 , ý ý , , I 1 0 ý ý ý ý
 --- - I ý ,
 ----- ++
 ýýF r I J 1

 -----
 . -----
 - - - - -

 7 7 - - - - -

 7 7ý34,5 ---

 : -7ý

2, 21A,

----- -ýM- jMýz
.....
14

- :.rrr,
.....

i44 ýM tt ýt

7 ----7 -7--
.
Z-ii
.....

---777-, 7-7.....
mg

7W
.....
Itå
.....
----- wo i i i I
t- j
----- ,P, ---
----- ~ nRâR5
TTTTT",rvrrm
-----Msk
..... pir.....

-.777 77

-----j4.!
ng-, 4
gno*~

3. Expresses its profound gratitude to the Heads of State of Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia and the Governments and the peoples of those countries for the contribution they have made to the success of the work of the Special Committee through their active and

constructive collaboration with the Ad Hoc Group in the discharge of the tasks entrusted to it by the Special Committee;

4. Notes with particular appreciation the continuing and intensified efforts of the Heads of State of the front-line countries towards the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with respect to Southern Rhodesia and Namibia;

5. Expresses its appreciation of the assistance and co-operation extended to the Ad Hoc Group by the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and Executive Secretary of its Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa;

6. Requests the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Chairman of the Special Committee and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to prepare for approval by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session, a proposal to convene in 1977 an international conference in support of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, as suggested by the Ad Hoc Group, for the purpose of mobilizing world public opinion in support of those peoples;

7. Invites its Chairman to continue to maintain a close working relationship with the Governments of the front-line States and other concerned Member States, the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity and the national liberation movements, including the holding of consultations on a regular basis with their representatives as appropriate, so as to enhance further the capacity and competence of the Special Committee to contribute positively to the endeavours of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia to achieve the goals set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the Ad Hoc Group to the Security Council so that it may be made aware of the latest developments in the struggle for the national liberation of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and take such further measures as it may deem necessary to enable those peoples to achieve their independence.

i4 m2 4rýZ ý1
 I U-zI-M
 i4=
 LF
 --4L
 IP =lý! ý9 tz
 lø

 JI; i
 hit- il
 M4

 ~ l lle I I i -- ----

adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers in April 1975. The Ad Hoc Group was similarly impressed by the commitment of the liberation movements and their many efforts in concert with the African leaders.

(5) The Ad Hoc Group notes with deep regret that these concerted efforts on the part of the Heads of State have not been met with any positive response on the part of the minority regimes. It is all the more regrettable that they have not only abused the opportunity provided for negotiations but have also taken further steps in the meantime to entrench their illegal presence in the two Territories. Thus, as may be observed from the vivid accounts given by the representatives of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANC (Zimbabwe)) before the Ad Hoc Group, 9/ acts of brutality by the security forces of the illegal regime have been further intensified against the Zimbabwean patriots; in particular, in the east and the north-east of the Territory, incidents are rampant of the wanton beating, torture and killing of innocent villagers. At the same time, the illegal regime has continued to take steps to strengthen its armed forces, through the increased recruitment by force of Africans, whites and others within the Territory, and of mercenaries from abroad. The regime has carried out a series of armed attacks inside Mozambique, using jet fighters and bombers, helicopters, artillery and infantry troops, which have resulted in the killing of a number of Mozambican citizens on their own soil.

(6) The minority regimes have also taken measures to relocate and arbitrarily transfer African populations in Zimbabwe and have continued to establish homelands or bantustans in Namibia. It is obvious that all the actions taken by the regimes are designed to consolidate their illegal occupation of the respective Territories, rather than to respond positively to endeavours for a negotiated settlement. The sham elections and the so-called constitutional talks conducted in Namibia, as well as the superficial appointments of chiefs to "ministerial" posts in Zimbabwe, are nothing but futile attempts to perpetuate the status quo.

(7) During the meetings with the Presidents of the four front-line States and the leaders of ANC (Zimbabwe), the Ad Hoc Group was highly impressed by their numerous and painstaking efforts made jointly over the past year to reach a negotiated and peaceful settlement on the basis of majority rule. However, all reasonable and meaningful proposals which have been submitted by the liberation movement and which would have secured a negotiated settlement on the basis of majority rule have been totally rejected by the illegal racist minority regime. These developments, which prove beyond doubt the futility of continuing negotiations under the present circumstances, have been rightly deplored by ANC (Zimbabwe) and the Presidents of the four front-line States.

(8) The Ad Hoc Group is convinced that in view of these developments and the intransigency shown by the illegal racist minority regime, the road to peaceful negotiations has been deliberately blocked. The only viable alternative now open to the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of their liberation movement is recourse to armed struggle.

_/ See annex I to the present chapter, paras. 14-36.

-9-

rr~rrr *~ ~ ~ fl fl
~ L~.

= <«"!fl«~

r~--

4-, --

~ ~L

-'Vi - -

24! «ts. ~ .~S4wr!w ~24.44.*

fl _____ III

tf14~4 '~"~

VI ~ fl!" ,4~224l""22-"2242~e""24W1121124,-

21 _____ - 4,, ---2,~__

22fl

24.'"", -=='"

4241

A12IIV~12I~~ - ,22224~

1124~1112VV224,,~12,1 2 ~24~VW ~1"" 242424

---4-- 2424~

_____ '2'y241224r2t221,,41,11V

~"'" fl.' *flfJf124~::~

2424,rn2..r.~,~,1,,

24.V%42¶24 - -

fl4~~~2-'1-.24-- _____ ~

- ~4

4~24t4

- _____ .-<VWflIVl gfl 2222241111 24 ~

-z'~,.,#g zz»11,~s ~s~~~4-- 2424 1~ - ,

-- 14112411.4~' ~ g 24,4» 22412222'» 122222

"*4"224 _____ -'4 2~,

_____ ,2424~24~I2.- 1212424

2424 2411 24~ _____ ,,~2.,,,,2242

2242,24,,,

4-44 ~ ~ 24>~ .'~"' .~.»m»2~w.'!v»242»1%... ,V»

»22224

2» »2' 21222 fl22"~' _____ '.414.'!'.«.

-t 2421'. ~ 24

---4-'«--- _____ --'4

_____ ,2424«.~24~

_____ '«~«.2424~1' 4-41~

'«,»~1-4«. ~ _____ 41

»224~ .'24 '2212 _____ --

-124 -4, ~ 22
4 ~ -4 ~
,~, , 44221242442211224 '22 «4«41«422
42222 2 4'«., - »1.2!~ 4222412« 1, ',-4,
-4-4' 24
222422~, -
-4- 412«.4~4 ..-24 2424~
««2~»
244-12- ~,, ~«4«'2~ - '-2 --
~2424V1J'«-, '«4»' 2' 2224 '« - 2442244
- <122224~ «'»24 .21214-~4-24'.~11-11 244
2«t 24« 24,12... ~VuiflX222«.2 - -. 12412222'«.. 24
.1*40224« 4. ,,22221224212412112.«.r2 '.44..
««.24»244»«2424«'»
, 244 .1., 224...~2424~.«.«~
, 244 .1., 2422 22
224«~24, 224 »2~224 '«'42221«
.121114- - fl fl "'«24242424224 1411124"
»2212 ««22221
«2424212202««- 1,ff24ff122 24
24124 ~2441» <24 24'2421222224224122222242421
.11.21 11122241121
,~«122«214«,1142«2»122112241242«.««««-«-
.,««»42412hihh14224«1124421224242«12242212422«212212424««-
222241»21«..224111122222222212

(13) Although the Ad Hoc Group is concerned with the disunity within the political leadership, it was gratified to learn that the division has not been allowed to permeate the fighting cadres of ANC (Zimbabwe). The Ad Hoc Group was particularly encouraged to learn from its discussions with the four Presidents and the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee that the fighting cadres are determined to struggle in unity and solidarity and have succeeded in overcoming the differences that had divided them as the former components of the divided liberation movements in Zimbabwe prior to the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, which brought ANC (Zimbabwe) into being. The Ad Hoc Group wishes to emphasize that there can be no viable solution to the situation in Zimbabwe without taking account of the views and the position of the fighting cadres.

(14) At this particular stage of the struggle in Zimbabwe, it is of vital importance that the united leadership of the fighting forces be maintained. In this respect, the Ad Hoc Group is in full accord with the conviction of the four Presidents and the

OAU Executive Secretariat that everything must be done to preserve and consolidate the unity of the fighting forces. The Ad Hoc Group also shares the views expressed by the African leaders that every effort should be made to continue to support the united military command and encourage it to intensify its endeavours to consolidate its forces as well as to avert any possibility of schism within its leadership.

(15) The Ad Hoc Group deems it necessary to reiterate the declared position of the United Nations as to the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power for Southern Rhodesia, as affirmed in a number of resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The international accountability assumed by the administering Power under chapter XI of the United Nations Charter cannot be compromised. The solemn obligation accepted as a sacred trust by all the administering Powers to promote to the utmost the well-being of the people under their administration cannot be rescinded under any circumstances until the objectives of the Charter and the Declaration have been fully implemented.

(16) In the course of its discussions with the leaders of ANC (Zimbabwe), the Presidents of the four front-line States and the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU and his colleagues, the Ad Hoc Group found that the proposals made by the United Kingdom Government, 11/ while containing a number of positive elements, were not adequate to meet the urgent requirements of the existing situation in Zimbabwe. It was emphatically pointed out to the Ad Hoc Group that the proposals had come too late. Had they been made several years ago, they would have had an important impact and would have been received positively by those fighting for majority rule in Zimbabwe.

(17) Bearing in mind the present phase of the struggle, the Ad Hoc Group found that there were considerable misgivings, and in some cases outright Opposition, on the part of the nationalist forces with regard to some aspects of I/ See chap. VIII of the present report, annex, para. 44 (p. 116 below).

-11-

Y 2 i

;, 2

ý7

77,

,i

,L-z

XN

4, 42 e

Rgr

-7_ 7-

include majority rule and which is not on the basis of the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia. It is also firmly Opposed to "bantustanization". The international community must resort to all avenues to force the termination of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. South Africa's manoeuvres to divide the people of Namibia must be unequivocally condemned.

(23) The front-line States have expressed their unequivocal support of the liberation struggle of the Namibians under the leadership of SWAPO. It is felt that the liberation of Angola has created more favourable conditions for the freedom and independence of Namibia.

(24) South Africa's continued defiance of the decisions and will of the international community imposes on the latter the urgent responsibility of evaluating the type of effective action to be taken to realize United Nations objectives in Namibia. The Ad Hoc Group considers that, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa with paragraphs 9 to 11 of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, the Security Council should consider the adoption of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

(25) At another level, the Ad Hoc Group is in full accord with the position of SWAPO, as fully supported by OAU and the front-line States, that, faced with the obduracy of the South African régime, the people of Namibia have no viable option but to resort to the intensification of their armed struggle. The responsibility for these developments lies squarely on South Africa. The international community has the clear responsibility to provide all assistance to the legitimate struggle of the Namibians under the leadership of SWAPO, their liberation movement.

(26) The Ad Hoc Group was deeply moved by the fact that, despite the suffering they have already experienced under the repressive domination by the Smith regime, the representatives of ANC (Zimbabwe) were unanimous in calling for: (a) stricter enforcement of the existing sanctions against the illegal regime; and (b) broadening of the scope of sanctions to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. The Ad Hoc Group cannot but agree with this point of view, as such action would categorically set out beyond any

shadow of doubt the united will and determination of the world community to put an immediate end to the reign of terror and torture against the African majority in Zimbabwe. The argument advanced in some quarters that the implementation of such measures would require an enormous apparatus for their enforcement and supervision may very well be valid. Notwithstanding some of the practical and organizational difficulties which might be anticipated in that regard, the Ad Hoc Group is of the firm view that the far-reaching moral, psychological and substantive effects of such a concerted action by Member States would amply justify the course of action called for by the representatives of the Zimbabweans. Their courageous stance and their preparedness to subject themselves to a further, although perhaps shorter, period of hardship must be recognized as still another essential contribution towards the ultimate solution of the problem of Zimbabwe.

Intensified efforts should also be made to ensure scrupulous observance of existing sanctions by all States.

-13-

i 4- i- A- i- l- 4.- 4 ý- 4, 4,.ýj' 4- i- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 ää
 2-1. 1 'tý iy
 -3ý=1: tý_ s
 P Ti si
 2
 =72
 ý dt j7 7
 j
 Z7 1.3li
 -7 ýý5,111li
 - - - - - - - - -

 LA 4 -P
 siT WA
 sfl
 bli
 3ýg&Ocmcm=m=m~
 z ----- LI
 im
 gäll
 r7 25. _äý
 -SMF=
 - - - - - - -
 -20
 Del i
 1 -4 41 -,t

OAU Co-ordinating Committee, it appears that the procedures required by the organizations concerned in the preparatory stage of any programme are extremely complicated, time-consuming and cumbersome, in many cases taking a few years to finalize plans and to move on to their implementation. The Special Committee will wish once again to urge the organizations concerned to introduce a greater flexibility in the preparation and processing of assistance programmes beneficial to the peoples concerned.

(31) The Ad Hoc Group was also informed of the recent cancellation by the organizations concerned, owing primarily to the shortage of funds, of some of the programmes which had been approved by their respective governing organs or legislative bodies. The Ad Hoc Group considers this development extremely unfortunate and untimely, and deems it imperative that the executive heads of

those agencies should take urgent steps, as appropriate, with a view to making the necessary arrangements for reinstating the programmes. In this connexion, the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee submitted to the Ad Hoc

Group a memorandum on the current status of some of the assistance programmes by

the organizations concerned. Bearing in mind the mandate entrusted to the Chairman of the Special Committee in connexion with the item, the Ad Hoc Group agreed to recommend that the Chairman, in consultation with the Chairman of the

Sub-Committee on Petitions, Information and Assistance, should be invited to take

appropriate action on matters raised in the memorandum.

(32) It may also be observed in this regard that the suggestion put forward by the Chairman of the Special Committee during his earlier consultations with the President of the Economic and Social Council 12/ - to the effect that, in order to secure additional financing from extrabudgetary sources to assist the colonial peoples, the international organizations concerned should consider establishing a system of funds-in-trust - had received positive responses from a number of Governments. For example, a UNDP fund, the Trust Fund for Assistance to Colonial Countries and Peoples, amounted to some \$US 2.8 million by 1975 - an amount grossly inadequate in terms of the requirements, but significant as an initial step. In the same connexion, the Ad Hoc Group wishes to underscore once again the importance of the need to channel any assistance to the Zimbabwean people through the OAU Co-ordinating Committee. Accordingly, the donor Governments, in making contributions to any funds-in-trust arrangements in this regard, should be invited to take due note of this procedure, as suggested by OAU, in the earmarking of such funds for specific objectives.

(33) The Ad Hoc Group wishes to endorse the suggestion made by the representative of ANC (Zimbabwe) that, bearing in mind the constructive results achieved through the holding of a similar conference at Oslo in 1973, 13/ the 12/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement N (A/96-23/Rev.1), vol. II, chap. VI, annex I, para. 8.

13/ International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, held at Oslo from 9 to 14 April 1973. For the report of the Conference, see document A/9061, annex.

-15-

-----
-----
----- --

.....
.....

ANNEX I*
REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
AT ITS 1029th MEETING ON 1 APRIL 1976
Chairman: Mr. Salim Ahmed SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania)
CONTENTS

Introduction
I. Chronology of the Mission
II. Meetings with national liberation movements
A. African National Council of Zimbabwe.
B. South West Africa People's Organization
C. Others
III. Consultations with Governments
A. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
as administering Power
B. United Republic of Tanzania.....
C. Zambia
D. Botswana.
E. Mozambique.. . . .
F. Ethiopia
IV. Consultations with the Organization of African Unity
A. Administrative Secretary-General
B. Executive Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee for
the Liberation of Africa
V. Observations** .
Paragraphs
1-7 8 - 10
11 - 51 14 - 36 37 - 50
51
52 - 219
53 - 73
74 - 123 124 - 155 156 - 177 178 - 191
192 - 219 220 - 238 221 - 229 230 - 238 239 - :71
VI. Adoption of the report 274

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.1080.

** The observations of the Ad Hoc Group are set out in para. 17 of the Present
chapter.

275

-17-

. m O Q # @

pA -A I äle namnam

ro= !E

9 sätt
 z tsamst4tt

 opp m E~ =,
 ý4d455511, 77ý-7 wy;I
 ~myra T 7

 MYT Maj..m
 Sas
 sil of -"-fsis
 44. i 2ý
 enes som
 bi
 J=JJ ýim
 tri I oms
 - 2ýý F-la
 1ý
 -----Ikå sock, ý4 mm
 -2 N t
 5
 7i Z'ý ar 2, DII
 1 .4
 t oms
 -77-1 U-pvmgsosmog
 spå
 ---ÅMA om skm=Symmm-e-'ý,- wý -----ii tills! keram, 7-m PL-
 x
 mini sk mal
 7
 rotera en en
 ummsom
 klippt
 ----- y Mums
 cIr t
 4 n
 ý=ý ýý -w -.; -v- ý i 4 ý i .II. --- III.. b i i 4 1 1 1 1 y ~ --- ...

Members: H.E. Mr. Nicolas Mondjo
 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
 Permanent Representative of the Congo to the United Nations
 H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal
 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
 Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations
 Mr. Tom Vraalsen
 Minister Counsellor
 Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway
 to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Frank Owen Abdulah
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago
to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Jaks Petrić
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations

5. In deciding to dispatch the Ad Hoc Group to Africa, the Special Committee took into consideration the provisions of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, by which the Assembly authorized the Committee to meet elsewhere than at United Nations Headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings might be required for the effective discharge of its functions. The Special Committee also took into account paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3481 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, by which the Assembly approved the Committee's programme of work for 1976, a/ including the holding of a series of meetings away from Headquarters during 1976, together with the necessary financial provision to cover the activities of the Committee thus envisaged. Accordingly, the Special Committee was specially aware of the considerable savings accruable to the Organization as a result of its decision this year to send the Ad Hoc Group to Africa, instead of holding a meeting of the full Committee away from Headquarters.

6. In pursuance of the foregoing decisions of the Special Committee, the Ad Hoc Group travelled to London, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Gaborone, Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques) and Addis Ababa, between 13 April and 4 May. The chronology of the mission is given in part I below. An outline of the views expressed during the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group with representatives of the national liberation Movements is contained in part II below. An account of the consultations of the Ad Hoc Group with representatives of Governments of OAU is set out in parts III and IV below. The observations of the Ad Hoc Group which originally appeared in part V are reproduced in paragraph 17 of the present chapter.

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/30/23)

Vol. I, chap. I, para. 181.

-19-

i i t smålom k i a pik avs 14 ess 4 c41 t,
10 t. ý H 1 L-í i vär i tji 111 äai
t s-, att aLT TVVT I PcTc- 2 2 T Hi in
m aMS try ii-II-d-ol. - ii. I Säl
ý15 gäs, tt= SM HEFI
ýttslutmusm= 1,41
annullera
gale-"=e,414144441!C ä
-may--eeeeet.-ý 1i4;11;41111.mm:tt,,
----- ..ätlyd.

!!fyll f k i

--litt!js-ftiy- -4

stått i sprut L
 tifyl:lii-i- -- en att
 -S-151 jul i- de i t i
 t ýý 1- tý
 --- ---- I t t i
 -ý,rtrYYTT'ry=Ts,444tf4f-f

 min en MS- - - ýj ýý-4ÅJ
 -Lw nom=7
 7i
 -3f emmai ý?"T-t4 Y-ýw-T-Tc 4-ý 7 7 är. i tid 44
 Sä,
 so-.4PT-iäts SOMSäk- --- - -i i ina i rons rää i 0100 Mlin
 tmost:lsss3:
 - - - - -F- valv
 stoppopå,
 fåms 155USA i i i 71
 0
 ----- avitårstý'- S äv;
 -i ij Ii; jul m -111----- -ix
 Så7771 -t-ill,1221 i oms=
 ja 1122att
 -1,1. ;il;iiáy4i4i11i U- MO zi i I stat
 5-055 koll
 t'tioOS7,ejitte---7.:70100"" ttssjftll Interna
 W så ä lidit crýäöl 16 1 -d-oýoeetla77 ona
 -CMI! idiot, M
 lp=mo
 -----Z--i-ää
 "00 -- - -ära -0
 ----- 17 7 7 7
 t så +koli -----i ki i PCý essays? t 1414 m b
 iii2näHujutiujukju el tri 0401
 los
 gael
 ----- __=
 ä- E MiigsmimimýewiiiiiiiiiiiiiYpý,"-u i

I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSION

8. A brief chronology of the mission undertaken by &he Ad Hoc Group in the discharge of its mandate is given below:

A. United Kingdom

Tuesday, 13 April (London)

1 a.m.-1.30 p.m. Meeting with the representatives of the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office

B. United Republic of Tanzania Wednesday, 14 April (Dar es Salaam)

1 p.m.-2.15 p.m. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania
 Thursda, 15 April (Dar es Salaam)
 9 a.m.-12.45 p.m. Meeting with representatives of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANC (Zimbabwe)), the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) of Azania
 1 p.m.-3 p.m. Luncheon given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania
 7 p.m.-8 p.m. (Zanzibar) Meeting with the First Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania, President of the Afro-Shirazi Party
 8.30 p.m. (Zanzibar) Dinner given by the Director of International Relations of the Afro-Shirazi Party, member of the Revolutionary Council of the United Republic of Tanzania
 FridayE, 16 April (Zanzibar)
 10 a.m.-12.30 p.m. Visit to rural areas
 Saturday, 17 April (Dar es Salaam)
 8 a.m.-9.30 a.m. Meeting with the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa
 10 a.m.-12.15 p.m. Meeting with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania
 C. Zambia
 17 April (Lusaka)
 4 p.m.-4.30 p.m. Meeting with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Zambia
 5 p.m.-6.30 p.m. Meeting with the President of the Republic of Zambia
 -21-

.
 1w
 TI- '2
 pk I-i~ 4i7 âi

 AL 7
 w*--17- - - - - =-lgj
 _mzy
 ~iv -2n
 z7
 wt. iv
 P4E gt
 -tj-

 0 kom
 71
 nr
 ituiv,
 c7
 ---7 -2ý -2ýý

CO

E. Mozambique

Thursday, 29 April (Maputo)

9 a.m. Tour Of the centre of Maputo

9.30 a.m. Reception given by Mayor Alberto Massavanhane 10 a.m. Laying of a wreath at the Monument of the Heroes

10.30 a.m. Meeting with the Minister of Labour of Mozambique at the headquarters of the Frente de Libertaggo de r-uogambique (FRELIMO)

12.15 p.m. Reception given by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Ambassador

of the United Republic of Tanzania to Mozambique

3 P.m.-5 p.m. Visits to the villages of Mafalala and Chinhambanine

7.30 p.m. Reception given by the Minister of Labour of Mozambique FridaY, 3) April (Maputo)

1 p.m. Luncheon given by the Ambassador of India to Mozambique

5 p.m.-6.30 p.m. Meeting with the President of Mozambique

8.30 p.m. Dinner given by the Ambassador of the Congo to Mozambique Saturday, 1 May (Maputo)

9 a.m.-11.30 a.m. Dedication of Eduardo Mondlane University

10 P.m.-11.30 p.m. (Dar es Salaam) Chairman's consultation with members of the Executive Secretariat of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa

F. Ethiopia

Sunday, 2 May 'Addis Ababa'

7.30 p.m. Dinner given by the Charge d'Affaires, a.i. of Trinidad and Tobago to Ethiopia

Monday, 3 ay (Addis Ababa)

10.30 a.m.-11.45 a.m. Meeting with the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU

5 p.m.-6.15 p.m. Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia 6.30

p.m.-7.30 p.m. Reception given by the Administrative Secretary-Geeral of OAU

7.45 p.m. Dinner given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia

-23-

.

.

:7-T-7--77 7

7 7 7

----- Z.2

...

4 -1

wv~.

.....

.....

----- ti

..... z j

ity 7:

4ý

Aý7

----- - ----424

iz

.....

7 7

7.: 7 lj

le 1ý 7.1 3.1 -t

T7 77 777~ 777- i72 fý"yý

- ý744, --

7 ~7,

----- f= tri

----- 4,14 ilýi

.....

7

.....

-ä;2 ;ä- -----

rttLtý_ =

r T I IM

.....

=ý.....

t v -----

_;r-, 74

II. MEETINGS WITH NATIONAL LIBRRATION MOVEMENTS

11. The Ad Hoe Group held meetings with the following representatives of ANC (Zimbabwe), SWAPO and PAC, as indicated below:

- Dar es Salaam (Office of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee)
- 15 April Bishop Abel Muzorewa ANC (Zimbabwe)
- Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole it
- Mr. Rukudzo Murapa
- Mr. Lucas H. Pohamba SWAPO
- Mr. Maxton Mutongolume

Mr. Iyambo Indango
 Mr. D. D. D. Mantshontsho PAC
 Mr. E. L. Ntloedibe
 Lusaka (Hotel Intercontinental)
 20 April Mr. Samuel Monodawafa ANC (Zimbabwe)
 Mr. Daniel Madzimbamuto
 Mr. Edward Ndlovu
 Mr. T. George Silundika
 Mr. Moses M. Garoeb SWAPO
 Mr. John Ya Otto
 Mr. Peter Tsheehama

12. During the meetings held at Dar es Salaam, two members of the Office of the Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa were also present: Mr. Jean Bitchoka, Information Officer, and Mr. Ngandu Leta, Auditor. During the meeting held at Lusaka, Mr. M. K. Simumba, Director, OAU Sub-Regional Office, was present. The regional representative of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia also attended these meetings.

13. Given below is a summary of the views expressed by representatives of the national liberation movements and of the comments made by them in response to questions raised by members of the Ad Hoc Group during the meetings.

A. African National Council of Zimbabwe

1. Bishop Muzorewa and the Reverend Sithole 14. The people of Zimbabwe were highly politicized, well organized and determined to support the liberation struggle, despite the intensified repressive measures being taken against them by the illegal racist regime. Zimbabweans were leaving the

-25-

 --- -----611

14
 morir
 tn-,
 -4r I
 mi
 -- - - -
 n>,Ql

Zimbabwe as a whole. Continuation of this anomaly would certainly interfere with the liberation struggle, in particular with respect to logistic supplies for the front.

18. The so-called third force was not a creation of the people of Zimbabwe and was not recognized by OAU as such. The act of disregarding the recognized leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe) in the matter of the formation of the high command had introduced disunity between political and military leadership. The same high command was now referred to by the majority of ANC (Zimbabwe) cadres and the people of Zimbabwe as a "foreign high command"; these people

looked forward to a high command, which had the approval and involvement of their own recognized leaders, who commanded the support of the masses within Zimbabwe. The suggestion that the cadres had been united whereas the political leaders had been disunited had no foundation because political disunity implied disunity in the ranks of the cadres.

ANC (Zimbabwe) had already indicated to the heads of Government of the four frontline States the urgent need to establish concrete liaison between the high command and the political leadership.

19. As regards the position of the United Kingdom, Zimbabweans no longer considered the Territory as a "British colony". There was no United Kingdom presence in the country and there had not been one for the past 10 years. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had admitted that it had neither the power nor the intention to quell the rebellion by the use of force. Indeed, the concept of the United Kingdom having responsibility over the Territory as the administering Power was interfering with the proper carrying out of the struggle, since it was being utilized by the Smith regime to buy time and discourage those nations which might otherwise be willing to provide material aid. The true situation should be described as "two States at war": the illegal regime, on the one hand, as a colonial Power, and the fighting Zimbabweans, on the other, as a future independent State. There was no question whatsoever that ANC (Zimbabwe) was fighting for the country's independence and not for retrogression to a colonial status. Legitimizing the authority of the United Kingdom over the Territory also served as a protective shield of "kith and kin" over the minority whites, resulting in a psychological buffer for the latter against the inevitability of the Territory's imminent attainment of majority rule. Recognition that the United Kingdom had no legal responsibility concerning the Territory would undoubtedly have a positive effect on the white minority.

20. Support by South Africa was continuing and more arms and supplies than ever before were being brought into the Territory. Although it might be true that South Africa had attempted to make the Smith regime recognize the inescapable destiny of the country and the advantage of a negotiated settlement over a defeat after enormous human sacrifices, it was evident that South Africa wanted a settlement of its own which would guarantee the creation of a new, friendly and manageable buffer nation in order to preserve its policy of white supremacy.

21. ANC (Zimbabwe) had no intention of practising racial discrimination in reverse; those whites who remained in the country would be accorded the same rights and privileges as the African majority. It was encouraging to note in this connexion that some of the white population, particularly students and other young people, had come out in support of the eventual transfer of power because they had begun to

flr..>fln ..~IllflU 'nwTh'mThlrxrThrrTh mm Il mm,,,,, ,,,,,,mmm,,,
m~ ~ &V,~ ~ 4
~~~~~ ,, ~ ~~"



xmmmvvxxxmxm«,xx«xxxnmxxmuxx,,mm,,«xxxmx  
x~m,~..3Wm «~mx-  
x'mx ~.

~xt~m{t~htmmtmmmmxmxmxxxmx «x-xmxxxmxxx««  
mmmxxx, ~ «mS'. ,. ~ m,,x, mm--  
x-xmmx~mmx «mmm.  
xmmx  
-='- mmx

'--xtmx' «x aV«Zx'«»v'mmx~x»m mmmxx i , -«x  
mmm~ m«xx«sxx m xmm~m  
Sxxm<xmmmm<m<ammxmmm«m"<"  
«mx mmm  
I,mmxxx«xxxmxmmxmxmxmxxx ~,mm, ~ x «m'..  
«mm? ,,¶m'« mmm ««xx ----4, mm , m'mmmxx  
~xmx , «. xx«mmmmmmmm«mxxxThmxxxm~--m  
mmmm\*x.»mm..mmmmmmmm, «mm,..» m-vxm««xmxxxmxxxm , ~  
mm?«m«mmx«mm..-m, -,  
- mmmmm»x~x~mmmmmm»m ~mx,,x mx»  
S mm ma

« «mmmm-«  
»»«~~-  
»mmmm4mmmm«« ~  
mmm mm,, xxxx«~

xx??' ,xmxxx ~Immmlmm  
xx,,mmxmx~7xtmx-xmxxx«xmxxxmmmmmmxxxm =  
mmmm«mmmmmm~mxxmmmmmmmm~mSxmm-'~  
«~x~ ~ x««  
~~xM~mLxx«xxxx&Wxm«x  
~ 'x~x 4x~xxxx« - - -  
x~ - ~, mmxx -.  
mmxmmmm «mmm xxmmxxx  
Smxmmmmmmmmxmmm  
»~4«.mmx~mm -mmxxxx mmSmm  
,mx«~ ,,mxxxx«,m x,,mmx xxxmm~ mm ,~xm ~  
xx, mmm ,xxm«'mm-x  
S\_\_\_\_\_ mm...xx«'4x.,<xm«xxx«'  
mm xm-mm , -- ,éxxmxmxx« xx xmm~xmm.~x«  
mm...mm«mmx«9mm«mx-  
xx«xxx.m«««mmmm<.mmmmmm«m~m<.mmmmmm.mm4  
mmxmxm~~»-mm-mm~~ mmxxxmxxxmm  
xxxxmxxxmxxx¶xmx « rx..mx mm xmmmm-  
mmmmxxxm m mm xxx. xmmxxm,,mxmm,,mmmmxxxxm,

~mm,, ,<,,  
~ ~  
...mm»mmmmm,,xmmx,,mxm<mxmmmmxm,,xmm  
mm'mxx<  
r¶~x>xrmmmmmmm<mmmmmmmm ,mm- ,m,,m,,m,,xm,,~  
, <mxm- - -xx >mx~Vxmms --  
- .. .-  
mxxxmm,,  
(,mmmm mmx  
x . . <  
~mm-x,-x xx<<«m..-»mm»~  
ixxx<mm ,,~ -  
xxmmx ~xmmxmm-xixmx  
,mxxmmx<mxm<'«Thm?»>.   
mmmmxim »m~ -- mm-  
x~mxx mm  
,m mmmmmmmmm  
'«m<mmmm  
xmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmiIm'mm.x,,-amfl~mm~ mm xx -'-x mm  
xx<xx&,xx~'-' --  
.mmmmmmxxxmmmmmmmmxxxmxx .,-xxx xmmmm, mmmx  
-x--m mmx<mmm<mmxxx<<~. « ~'mm  
« x« x« -. mm4mi~x.x, .x-  
mmmmr  
mmm~«mm~xxmmmmmmmmxxx  
J«m..  
mmx.+xxmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.wm~~~  
«mmmmxxx<,»mx~-.  
.,xxmmxxmmmmxmxxm~ x  
smxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxxmxxx «  
mxxxxm cx «mmx  
mx~«mm~«mm mm<mm "'-mmm<m~4x<'x«mmmmmmxmmsmm mmmmmm4  
~ ~ mmmx<<<xtmmmm  
mm<.,Am ~xx,  
<mmmmmmmmmmmm>mm  
mmm mmm ~,«x,<  
xxxxx.»mm-x,-x-xxx.mxxx..mx.mm..mm...-  
.mmmmmmxm<mmx

26. In September 1975, the people of Zimbabwe had asserted their authority through the first congress of ANC (Zimbabwe) and elected their leadership, which had in turn sought the full implementation of the Manifesto; subsequently, through painstaking efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, it had found that the Manifesto was inapplicable to Ian Smith. It was now necessary, therefore, to intensify all complementary forms of struggle in military, diplomatic, economic, propaganda and other fields.

27. It was urged that the Special Ccmmitttee, in the circumstances, should take the following action:

- (a) Call for financial and material support of the Zimbabwean struggle;
- (b) Call for the complete isolation of the regime;
- (c) In concert with OAU, declare the Lusaka Manifesto no longer applicable to the racist regime; and
- (d) Organize an international conference in support of the Zimbabwean people following the pattern established by a similar conference held at Oslo in 1973. d/

28. The situation in Zimbabwe was becoming acute: the greater the momentum gained by the liberation struggle within the Territory, the more intensified became the repressive measures by the Smith regime. Under the continuing state of emergency,

a widespread network of informers had been instituted, resulting in indiscriminate imprisonments and detentions of a great number of innocent people. Torture and cruel and inhuman treatment of prisoners were rampant and, as revealed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), many of them had been killed or had become deranged. The Salisbury prisons for example had, to all intents and purposes, become torture chambers.

29. Within the National Executive headed by Mr. Nkomo, all the tribes were represented and no question of tribalism existed in ANC (Zimbabwe) within the Territory. Under the circumstances, the movement received the widest possible popular support of the Zimbabweans both within and outside the Territory. It was true that repeated attempts had been made by former ZANU political functionaries

Outside the Territory, who had always operated on a tribal basis themselves, to bring a tribal issue into the Territory with the malicious intent of disruptin the unity within the leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe).

30. There was cause for deep concern that divisive elements still existed within the political leadership, as they would undoubtedly affect adversely the morale of the fighting people of Zimbabwe. Mr. Nkomo, for his part, had faithfully d/ International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, held at Oslo from 9 to 14 April 1973.

For the report of the Conference, see document A/9061, annex.

-29-

-----                      -----                      eter 1i14111114 Mort! som I I  
.....                      .....                      -----                      y ro uvs må  
oeens-ma  
-50=cm  
37-77TNI lä i kä  
-ini  
-----mede  
Tv--  
jpyres+ ttoe~e---e-z-jn,4

-00  
sys.  
:S ý-ää -S- a -Cn az som las i . ..... MA  
Måsemma  
som  
L I i AS i Aj AL ..  
.....  
~TEI-T gy Te svar- -m.  
C9 ý. =1 I  
rest  
mummel  
^4444,541- attVässa  
mai I lsj  
in-ii i  
f mel"i  
ena  
-4 04404c5>11ý.ý.fcw==7JY i

were, of course, the usual propaganda activities aimed at mobilizing the settlers' support for the regime, but it was evident that no censorship could be completely successful. Furthermore, the white population was aware of the probable repercussions of taking any realistic course of action or attitude towards a negotiated settlement. There was the possibility, given the circumstances, that a major exodus of whites from the Territory might take place as the inevitable transition approached. Even at present, a great number of whites were finding their way out of the Territory, as evidenced by the fact that the r~gime had ceased to publish statistics on population movements to or from the Territory.

34. Since 1964, a massive conscription of black soldiers had been conducted by the Smith regime on a quota basis through traditional chiefs; failure to meet the quota had often resulted in severe individual and group punishments. It was not difficult to detect widespread dissatisfaction among black soldiers and once the oppressor's shackles were removed, there was no doubt that the soldiers would revert to their original allegiance, the march towards majority rule.

35. South Africa was in the forefront in furnishing the supplies required for the survival of the illegal regime. A convoy of military trucks continued to flow from South Africa every day, furnishing the regime with arms, ammunitions, equipment and other strategic materials. Other supplies, including petrol and consumer goods, were also being poured into the Territory. The recent attack by freedom fighters on the rail and road link between Zimbabwe and South Africa would be repeated to obstruct further inroads of South African assistance to the regime. It was a serious mistake to hope that South Africa might possibly change its policy and sever relations with the Smith r6gime.

36. The effect of the Security Council sanctions on the economy of Southern Rhodesia had been agonizingly slow. Although some appreciable increases in the price of consumer goods were noticeable, it could not be considered as representing a conclusive force which might ultimately strangle the Territory's

economy. In those circumstances, it was imperative that full and total sanctions be implemented without further delay. Blacks had suffered long under the repression of the Smith regime and would gladly face added hardships until victory was attained.

B. South West Africa People's Organization

1. Mr. Pohamba, representative in the United Republic of Tanzania

37. The situation in Namibia was deteriorating further, with intensified suppression and arrests of people opposing the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa. Most arrests took place without being followed by action in the courts and some of those arrested had been removed to South Africa. Through the so-called constitutional talks, begun at Windhoek in September 1975 (see chap. IX of the present report, annex, paras. 31-67 (pp. 154-161 below)), which were aimed at partitioning Namibia into bantustans, an attempt was being made to legalize the Presence of South Africa in Namibia. A few chiefs had opposed resumption of the

-31-

. . . . - - - - -  
-----  
-----  
40ý -----  
-----  
1; t-2;; 44. 47S b  
ryl 17vf-----2 1  
c . t  
ki- -cý- -----777 --7  
J:7  
ý;42 - ý7P  
P4  
-----

h4. All SWAPO leaders inside Namibia had recently been arrested on charges under the Terrorism Act of 1967, purportedly in connexion with the assassination of Chief Filemon Elifas. These acts were aimed at intimidating SWAPO and the people of Namibia into submission. But South Africa would not succeed.

45. There was no doubt that South Africa would eventually withdraw from Namibia. There was also no doubt as to the speediest method of compelling South Africa to withdraw from Namibia, and that method was through the use of armed force, which was also the policy of SWAPO. It was only through concerted armed struggle, irrespective of the cost involved - both human and material - that South Africa would withdraw from Namibia. SWAPO had accepted it as an inescapable reality.



46. SWAPO, nevertheless, would continue to be ready to hold talks with South Africa

to effect the transfer of power. The immediate pre-conditions to holding such talks were as follows:

- (a) Acceptance by South Africa of the territorial unity and integrity of Namibia;
- (b) Release of all political prisoners and the return of Namibians expelled or those in exile on political grounds; and
- (c) Invalidation of all criminal charges against freedom fighters, dead or alive.

47. Although there had been serious and repeated attempts by the Vorster regime to undermine unity and solidarity within SWAPO, it had been possible to neutralize all such moves. The future prospects for the liberation struggle were extremely encouraging. As a result of the victory in Angola, for example, SWAPO now had two operational fronts. For the first time, white farmers were experiencing a real danger to their security; real estate values were declining sharply, a reflection of the deepening sense of uncertainty.

48. The people of Namibia were in desperate need of external aid. SWAPO was deeply appreciative of the continued flow of assistance from a number of friendly nations, particularly Socialist countries. It wished to appeal to all countries to extend whatever material and moral assistance they could render in that regard. In the same context, SWAPO noted with deep regret the activities of the Federal Republic of Germany, which had continued to maintain consular, cultural and other relations with the Government of South Africa with respect to Namibia. These activities were in clear contravention of the true interests of Namibians and contrary to the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

49. SWAPO regarded the United Nations, particularly the Special Committee, as Partners in the liberation struggle, bearing in mind the special responsibility assumed by the world Organization with respect to Namibia. It was SWAPO's sincere

hope that the United Nations would live up to that responsibility by ensuring

-33-

..... - - - - -  
- - - - -  
w-z -i  
..... . -w  
::2. t t. k. t .....  
i t5 5.5  
A.  
!1 t - - - - -UMU ... ..  
.....  
1 -2 1-: C  
'7ý" rt 7t7 flyýVV71ý ý77,ý T'  
v -Z f 2 i

P7  
-z-;7  
i

TI.

4  
V6-,  
4 il -4r"  
zn.

..... 77 .....  
t 'Lý7 1-1 1ý15i

- - - = cm

EH- 7=1 I  
7v7  
7i :7-

.....  
2p- 7iý  
7 V ----- f t;j? ýt V

zz  
iw v

### III. CONSULTATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS

52. Pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by the Special Committee, the Ad Hoc Group held consultations with officials of the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power responsible for Southern Rhodesia, and of the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Ethiopia. An account of the views exchanged during those consultations is set out below.

A. United Kingdom, as administering Power 53. At the invitation of the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power concerned, the Ad Hoc Group, en route to Africa, visited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at London on 13 April and held consultations with the following representatives of the Office concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia:  
The Rt. Hon. The Lord Goronw-y-Roberts, Minister of State  
Mr. Norman Aspin, Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
Mr. P. J. Barlow, Rhodesia Department  
Mr. M. L. Tait, United Nations Department

Mr. M. Reith, Central and Southern African Department  
Mr. M. F. Parris, Rhodesia Department  
tr. D. Grennan, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State  
1r. A. C. Galsworthy, Private Secretary to the Minister of State

54. The views expressed by the representatives of the administering Power during the consultations are set out below.

55. Since the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and in the light of related developments during the preceding several months, including the policy statement issued on 22 March by DMr. James Callaghan, then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (see chap. VIII of the present report, annex, para. 44 (p. 116 below)), conspicuous changes had been discernible in the awareness of the white minority of the inevitable political reality of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and of its destiny.

56. Prompted by fear, anxiety and unrest, and in the absence of other viable alternatives to the ruling regime, the majority of the white population had been driven for the present to strengthen their support for the Smith Government. To them, the transfer of power in any form still signified an outright "surrender". But as the realization grew that a transfer of power was inevitable in any case, and that no assistance in resisting it was to be expected ultimately from any outside source, it was hoped that this attitude would change and the minority would realize the advantages of negotiating a peaceful transition to majority rule while there was still time.

57. The United Kingdom Government was not necessarily in agreement with all the

-35-

-----

..... ..

-----

-j, Z 3

-----... ..

-----Mm~

-----

65. Although the current role of the South African Government was less prominent than at the time of the Victoria Falls talks, held in August 1975 (see chap. VIII of the present report, annex, paras. 24-30 (pp. 112-113 below)), there still appeared to be a strong desire on its part to settle the precarious situation in Southern Rhodesia as quickly as possible.

66. The withdrawal by the South African Government of its paramilitary forces from Southern Rhodesia following the Lusaka Declaration of Unity of December 1974 (see para. 30 above) and its continuing failure to replace them constituted a considerable setback for the illegal régime. If the South African Government were unable to replace the transport facilities lost to the illegal régime as a result of the closure of the border of Mozambique, this would be a further source of discouragement to it.

67. The United Kingdom Government planned to work closely with the four African Presidents of the States bordering Southern Rhodesia on further measures towards the elimination of the illegal situation.

68. The United Kingdom Government hoped that all efforts would be directed towards bringing about the reunification of ANC (Zimbabwe).

69. All steps should be taken to ensure full compliance with economic sanctions.

70. Of the 280,000 whites in the Territory, only 6,000 or so were farmers and the vast majority were people whose attachment to Southern Rhodesia was relatively recent and not beyond severance if pressures built up. Approximately 80,000 whites were United Kingdom citizens and about 150,000 had a legal right of abode in the United Kingdom. If all concerned decided to exercise that right, the cost to the United Kingdom Government of resettling them would be considerable: on a basis of only £1,000 per head, the total would be £150 million.

71. It should be noted in that connexion that statistics for the year 1975 indicated a distinct increase in the outflow of white Southern Rhodesians although there had been an influx of several thousand settlers from elsewhere, and it appeared that the trend would continue.

72. Although difficult to predict, it was probable that within a foreseeable period - perhaps three years, if not earlier - there would be a black majority Government in Southern Rhodesia. Whether that would come about through violence or through negotiated settlement would depend on the efforts not only of the United Kingdom Government but also of the international community. As the President of the United Republic of Tanzania had predicted, an end would perhaps come to the illegal régime through efforts at a dual level, that is, guerrilla warfare and negotiations.

73. It might also be well to bear in mind the need to give adequate time to the white population to readjust its thinking and approaches.

-37-

..... - - - - -  
-----  
- 4 ýig z,-  
.....  
- - - - -  
-----  
----- i -jýýq i  
-----  
XA  
-----  
-----  
-----22,1 2' 2 S'u I I 1 1-----

Vorster Government had been told that, if it were to be taken seriously: (a) all South African military and paramilitary forces in Zimbabwe should be withdrawn at once; and (b) political leaders detained or imprisoned by the Smith regime should

be released unconditionally.

79. The African HEAd of State had soon realized that South Africa appeared to be serious about its intention to seek a negotiated settlement and had the power to exercise over the Smith regime: the troops had been withdrawn and the leaders released. Indeed, the United Kingdom, despite several approaches made in the same

direction, had been completely incapable of, if not unwilling to take steps towards, bringing about those changes. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had not even considered it appropriate to include an appeal for the release of the leaders in the final communique issued at the Conference of Commonwealth Nations held at

Ottawa in 1973.

80. In the light of those developments and in keeping with the Lusaka Manifesto of

1969 (see para. 25 above), the four African Heads of State had agreed to render their assistance to any process which might peacefully lead Zimbabwe to freedom and

independence. The position had been endorsed and supported by the members of OAU, as they were convinced that preference should be given to a negotiated settle::ent

over violence. The decision of the African Heads of State had been based on a simple and correct logic: if the goals could be achieved without bloodshed and loss of life, all efforts must be made towards that end; morally, no one had the right to ask young Zimbabweans to die for their cause until and unless all other means had been exhausted. To that end, inconceivable as it might have seemed a few

years previously, the Heads of State had found themselves discussing the modalities for such a transition with representatives of the illegal racist regime and of the minority Pretoria regime.

81. To the grave concern of those Heads of State, however, the political leaders so released, who had willingly agreed to form ANC (Zimbabwe) at Lusaka in December 1974, had soon begun factional, separatist moves along the party lines of

their original allegiance (ZAPU, ZANU, etc.). Despite all the efforts to re-establish a unified political leadership for ANC (Zimbabwe), the political leaders had been unable to agree on the course of action to be taken.

82. Notwithstanding those difficulties, the Victoria Falls talks had taken place in August 1975, with the dismal results known to all. In the meantime, the split within the ANC (Zimbabwe) leadership had deteriorated further. Needless to say, the Smith regime had taken full advantage of these developments. The illegal regime had used the opportunity to harass, and ultimately to attempt to liquidate, whatever pockets of resistance the freedom fighters had been able to establish Within the Territory, because during the period of negotiations, no attempt had been made to reinforce the nationalist forces. The regime had also taken every -Step to drive ANC (Zimbabwe) leaders to a further schism among themselves.

'83. As early as July 1975 it had been realized that the efforts for a negotiated settlement had failed and that the only alternative was the use of force. Recognizing the fact that, on the one hand, the talks designed to bring about a

- - - - - . . . . .  
4 ý4  
--44t,  
Zlý  
1-2  
4ý4  
.....  
. . . . .

88. The OAU had decided that all aid to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe should be channelled through its Co-ordinating Committee. At the same time, the big Powers had been told that any assistance they might extend to political groupings of Zimbabwe on a bilateral basis would be taken as being designed to advance their own spheres of influence, rather than in the true interest of the African liberation struggle. It was obvious that such assistance would only lead the country on the road to civil war. The big Powers should have learned by now that the only point of view acceptable to Africa was the African point of view; no other consideration could be tolerated. African issues should be viewed from the perspective of the Africans themselves.

89. At the Ottawa Conference of the Commonwealth Nations, the United Republic of Tanzania had considered putting forward the proposal that Commonwealth members should offer a home to Southern Rhodesians and that they should help the United Kingdom to compensate them. The rationale behind that proposal was that: (a) those "hard-line" racists headed by Smith, who were committed to maintain the status quo on an ideological basis, would continue to fight until the bitter end, while at the same time there was no doubt that they would leave the country when majority rule came; (b) those immigrants from England and other countries who supported Mr. Smiti on e-cnmi grounds would also leave when the time came; Cc) many within the group of white Southern Rhodesians who had been born in the country and who had no other home, would stay with the majority and attempt to find the role they could play in the birth of a new nation.

90. In the present circumstances, it was clear that the Smith aegire was supported even by the country's most "liberal" elements, as being the only alternative available to them as a means of safeguarding what they considered to be their national interest and security.

91. It was also clear, on the other hand, that most of the minority would obviously leave the country when the time came. The longer the liberation struggle, the less chance of their remaining.

92. Although the relocation of whites outside the Territory would definitely provide the quickest possible means for the transfer of power to the majority, the Labour Government considered that the British people would have difficulty in accepting such a proposal. The idea of compensating the racists might be considered offensive. Further, the Government was already confronted by a serious financial problem owing to raging inflation.

93. Notwithstanding such practical difficulties, it should be recognized that the exodus of whites was inevitable and unpreventable. That being the case, it might be advisable for the United Kingdom and some of the Commonwealth members to prepare themselves well in advance for such an eventuality and make plans for their adequate reception. As regards the financial difficulties confronting the United Kingdom, Portugal - a poorer nation than the United Kingdom - had managed to make provisions for far more numerous white citizens from its former colonies.

----- Z t 4.t  
.....  
-----  
.....  
-----  
7 z a 8-4-zr t 5 t249= --  
-----MERECC R7  
7  
-----ý777-\_-ýý7 -----P ý4  
-----... -----  
i osäll  
-----  
ag  
... -----  
77 \_fýroo  
-----41- PRIG  
----- I\*wnuäiy  
-----  
e 5  
-----g'ý=;  
- ýTM  
-----

Hon. Hassan Nassor Moyo, Minister of State, Office of the First Vice President,  
Member of the Revolutionary Council  
Hon. Ibrahim Makungu, Chairman LMinisterl of Fisheries, Member of the  
Revolutionary Council -Hon. Ali Mzee, Executive Secretary of the Afro-  
Shirazi Party, Chairman of

Harbours and Shipping, Member of the Revolutionary Council  
Hon. Said Natepe, Member of the Revolutionary Council, Director of  
International Affairs of the Afro-Shirazi Party

Mr. M. S. Mohamed, Principal Assistant Secretary, Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mohamed Fasih, Principal Assistant Secretary, Office of the First Vice  
President

Mr. Ahmed Maulidi, Protocol Section

The views expressed by the First Vice President are summarized below.

100. Having regard to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, the change for  
the better which had resulted from the victories scored by FRELIMO in  
Mozambique

and the Movimento Popular de Libertag~o de Angola (MPLA) in Angola had  
brought the

reality of the liberation struggle closer to Zimbabwe, Namibia and even South  
Africa. The United Republic of Tanzania was committed to the liberation struggle  
as

a whole and accorded first priority to Zimbabwe, which was at present the main  
preoccupation of what had now come to be called the frontline States of  
Botswana,

Zambia, Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania. Namibia was the  
chief

responsibility of the United Nations, including in particular the Security Council,  
which could take appropriate measures to force South Africa to abide by the  
deliberations and decisions of the world body. The position of his Government  
was amply reflected in its contribution, together with that of other countries, in  
assisting the oppressed people of southern Africa to exercise their right to self-  
determination, to enjoy freedom and independence and to regain their human  
dignity.

101. OAU had made abundantly clear in the Lusaka Manifesto (see para. 25  
above) the principle of majority rule for the countries of southern Africa. OAU  
had expressed its desire that this be achieved preferably by peaceful means and  
had worked

\*ceaselessly towards that end. Yet, Smith and his regime had deliberately  
indulged in foolhardy manoeuvres to sabotage every attempt without exception in  
order to buy time until some miracle saved him and to impose minority rule over  
the majority in blatant defiance of world public opinion. The situation left no  
alternative but armed struggle. The struggle would no doubt be increasingly costly  
in terms of human life and property, the longer it lasted. The United Republic of  
Tanzania :would prefer a shorter struggle, although as stated by President Samora  
Moises Machel "Ofiozarique, there were revolutionary advantages in a protracted  
armed Struggle, especially in the knowledge that victory lay with liberation.

102. Concerning the leadership essential to the success of the liberation struggle  
in Zimbabwe, it was unfortunate that the present political leadership of ANC  
(Zimbabwe) was divided. It ought to be stressed, however, that the division was  
not ideological but was due to an acute conflict of personalities. The masses of the



>4 n  
TV7r ~7nn1n ,... .7.  
~ ~ ~  
7.7 "~~~~~<7 7: 77.7.7.7 .7..S4 7  
~7.~7.77~ -7' ~... ~  
S~ ~ ~  
~. ~  
777.z '7~"> ~79~  
7.777 7.7~I7.~ ~ "7.~'. ~  
97..4777~9777~7....  
- '7.  
n ~~~~~ 774  
4.7799,7,7.7... , 79'999,77~7 ~  
~'~7 ~  
7.-.'7'~7. ~~~~~  
.77997.7.77~ 9.9.~7.9 fl44 ~  
,:7774 7.~77~ ~~~~~ '77 '---7.---.  
--r'---- ~  
e7'.9~ -7,!.  
~ ~ ~ ~7777~7 7  
~7777~7.47.7.77~77.7..77 77.7.7.7'.~  
~"'''>7,».777777,77777777777777~7.977.9.99... " ~~~~~  
~ 7797~ ~ '!'~ '!'.  
,,..~. ,,,, '!'~ '-.L9 7,99 7'997.7,~!  
~77~77.7.7.7.~77.77  
7 ~ 7  
7.47 7777777777 '9-7.7.7.7. 7~  
74,7~797.9999,7,,7.7.9,,,~77'7 7777' 777~47' 4 7  
7.7. 7777777774777.7  
7.',, ~ 7 '477777747.. 777 9.  
- 7. 477 474 779 ~  
977777777,7797.7.7n77n7~,,,~7  
'7 ~777'.~ --7-'  
7.97777799747.7774.777777.7.'77  
77.7.7.7.7. 7 7'- 7.-  
777~ 44<7.477774<7.4477 7.7,747.4..

7777777.77777777777777774744774777777  
,77'»~7. 7.' 7"7"777777.777.77.7.77777.77.7. 7  
7  
77.9~794"" 7-  
-777..7.,',:77997.....,7.  
,7..7..97777 ,777.4777777777974~ ~ ,9',,,,,,  
'7. -',7.7777.7.~. 7., '7.7,7477 '7  
.7., 4/774774747  
""77.7.~47.77..74' '77.477. '.7.7.7.  
' 77.9-97.=77',... '7  
7.~7'.4..... 47  
977 999~9,47 ':-"r' .7.7.7 .7,  
~477777"77~"7.9'7. . 7.777.7.  
777744~~'  
'7. 7""  
77~..7..7..9.7.,,,,77.,~,7.,9,7.77.,~7777.7.7.7.7.7.7. -  
9~'!.~:4  
774.  
~7.~777747477,.7.7.77~7'.77 ~ '!,,,,,,,~4'  
7.777~77777777.7.77.~  
~\*7~747777777777777777.77777  
7.7.7.7~77 -- '77.  
7.9777.77.7.7. ,7..7.97.7.7..77.7.7.7.7.777777 47 447777777777777777'  
'777477777  
7.77.,,7. ~7.,,'99'77.977 ~ 7,  
~'.777.7.7. 7.77.9777777797.7.7.~7.7.97 7.7.77  
7.7  
777.7777!,"7"" .777..7.7.~777..7.7. \_\_\_\_\_  
'  
7.7.7.97. ,- ~ '7\* '!.~77\*  
m74977.tw9.97777. 9~77.979997.47.7.~'.99~7... 7 7.7.  
94744477/7/94777 ~ 779 '77  
47777.79779979 .~  
-- 77,  
~ -47  
777477 7.7.7.  
,40,7 9~7 '~997.7.7.9  
S 7 '9  
9~<<-77~".7.,7.,'74/~'77.,7.77  
7 , 777.7'  
.74  
79777~9~7.7.7.7.. 774747.77.77.7.9.79779747.7.77.  
477.7 ~ 77~7.~9'77.. ,.  
7,97 47 \_\_\_\_\_ "'~7.'7.7.'7.~ 977.  
7  
~7""-!-~4 7

74 \_\_\_\_\_ , " 7.  
\_\_\_\_\_ 77477.9.77~ 777777.~~7.~7.7.77  
\_\_\_\_\_  
777.~.7.9~9m.7.~777~  
74 7. . 7.74. ,7.97.77974747~7.~~~'177 77 97777 7777777  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ 7 79747.  
744  
7.7. 7777.777777777777.7777  
997 '77%  
7777777777774777777777777.7 -7 -  
,7777.7.99-999.777.  
7.7.7.7.7.7.7.7.7977.7.7 7777.-,«9.«7'.9777 7777~7.7.777.  
~7 ~ ~ ~  
".7:' 7.7777~7.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
9,7.-, 77.7.7,7777,7.7. \_\_\_\_\_ '-7."  
47777v  
7;7;44;~777;47~777~77777,7,7777.,  
"77' 7' 7.7 9  
77777..7.7.997..7.7.7.7.9977.7.7.7...97.799777777.7 ~7.7., 7.9,9.. 777774  
>97~'.77'. 47.7.7749447 7.7.7  
\_\_\_\_\_  
777777777. 77.77.97..477.,7.7.7.7.7.7.,97.7.7.  
,,,9.,7.,7.77 .7,7. 9  
97.777~9.7'9,77.477,  
'7.7.7447... - '-''9-77777,777,  
9 7,77.77777.77777---~9~9.9- ~  
- 99977.7.~  
7447.9~7.7.7.7.7.4777777~ \_\_\_\_\_  
7444777 ~7.\*7 7'7.7.7.=7.'7.7.~  
~,'.777777~9777777977'77.977.' ~'~> 7' 77. ~  
77~ 77.777477777 ' 97.-7~,777 7.~7~7777.9  
'77777~.7~7.7.797.  
77 -'  
7~9~ ~"''X '~  
\_\_\_\_\_ 77 447'.77777 7~777  
77 77777  
7779777777 '!' 777~7.~ 47. 7.  
' ~7. 77  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ 77~7 7.97.,7.7.7.97.,7997.  
, 7.7,7.~7. 7~77.77.9 77  
44.47 ~  
777.7. 9  
.47777774,'!...' 977777.77777979,979777777

~7.7.77~7.77.~ ~ 7'7447,,~77777777,7 ~  
 '~.7.7 777777.7.7977.77  
 977.7.7.9-7.7.97.997.7.99  
 '999997.7.7.9,9777.777.7.777..  
 ~977.77 ~.777.7 7.~7.7.7.7. 7.  
 '.9,9~9777,77.7f177 777,9, '.77.7 .7777,77,7777.  
 747 7, 779799 99 9 99  
 99999 ,9777.97.7.7.  
 777777 '.4L.7,L77~w7r-7..97.77.-.7.-7...-...  
 777777797777.7.,79,9,,999,9,,9,~9,9,,9,79,9,,9,~9,7.,7979,9,,7.,~97777.  
 7, 777\7779,.,7777774~/77457777,7,,,I,7,77977,77.777777,77.7.77  
 77 777,77,,777777,~--.>77'997777.7.'7..  
 7.7.777977,77777777777977,7777.777.7~7~77777~77777777,  
 779797 7  
 .7477<777<7777777797477777744777777777777777777777777777777777777  
 777777777777  
 ~ ~7n7  
 7.979777979497.9.,49,,9.777799J779777977977779777.79477.79777777974797  
 977477779797~77.~477~7777  
 ~~97997~ , 7,

On a bilateral level, a continued supply of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, food, clothing and other essentials was required for the people, who had been forced to take up arms in a popular uprising for their freedom and for justice.

3. Consultations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

106. During the consultations with Mr. Kaduma, the following members of the Ministry were present:  
 Mr. E. W. N. Mwasakafyuka, Director, Africa and Middle East Division, Adviser on East and Central African States Affairs  
 Miss Tatu Nuru, Acting Director, International Organizations and Legal Affairs Division  
 Mr. A. Soud, Head of Section, East and Central African States Bureau  
 Mr. D. M. J. Kapya, Head of Section, OAU Affairs

The views expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs are summarized below.

107. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania viewed the question of Zimbabwe as a critical colonial issue to which a solution should be sought on a priority basis. The situation was distinctly different from that of Namibia, which was the special responsibility of the United Nations, as also from the system of apartheid practised in South Africa, notwithstanding the underlying common element - the domination of a minority over a majority. In that regard, his Government fully supported the work of the United Nations and the fight being waged by SWAPO, as also by PAC and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

108. The efforts for the liberation of Zimbabwe should be directed towards:

(a) intensification of guerrilla warfare by the ANC (Zimbabwe) Liberation Army; and (b) politicizing of Zimbabweans within and outside the Territory.

109. The split in the political leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe) did not affect its Liberation Army, which had not identified itself with either faction. Furthermore, OAU had decided that assistance should be given to the military forces of ANC (Zimbabwe) through the OAU Co-ordinating Committee. Thus, the extension of assistance was not contingent on the political unity of the leadership. As for the politicizing of Zimbabweans both within and outside the Territory, a Successful campaign was being effectively conducted and would be intensified. The United Republic of Tanzania had no doubt that the African population within the Territory was becoming increasingly ready for its total liberation.

110. For the time being, efforts were being continued to bring about the reunification of the political leaders of ANC (Zimbabwe) because, united, they would form a formidable bulwark against the illegal and racist domination of their Country. Even if it proved impossible to persuade the leaders, however, there Would always be other alternatives, such as the ANC (Zimbabwe) Liberation Army.

-45-

a F

-----

"MEL.-...

.,I

-----

hâ,

44

----- --ý9,5\_t - ~M ... .. . . . . .

-----

.....

ø W

-----

-----

.....

-----

-----

-J-

116. The situation in southern Africa had changed considerably in the two previous years. Although the Portuguese empire in that part of the continent had collansed,,

the most difficult task in the liberation of Africa lay ahead, namely, the achievement of freedom and independence in Southern Phodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

117. The success of the liberation strupgle had been the result of the dedication and commitment to the cause of freedom and independence of the peoples of the

Territories concerned. At the same time, the moral support given to the peoples by the Special Committee had been a significant contribution to the struggle.

118. Despite the achievements of the peoples of Mozambique and Angola, who had helped Africa to regain its dignity, there remained the onerous task of consolidating the independence of those countries, as well as the liberation struggle of the Territories still under colonial and alien domination. A bastion of colonialism had now been breached and every effort must be made to rout it from the continent.

119. What was now urgently required was concerted action to help Mozambique to overcome its economic problems resulting from the complete imposition by its Government of sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. Angola also needed assistance in consolidating its independence, reconstructing its ravaged economy and replenishing it with technical and other resources for its administration. The Security Council had condemned the wanton aggression of South Africa against Angola and had ordered the restoration to that country of all property taken away by the aggressor's forces, as well as indemnification for the property destroyed.

120. Although Mozambique and Angola were no longer colonial issues, those countries were important for the liberation efforts of southern Africa; their survival and strength were therefore vital to the work of the Special Committee.

121. The real problems of colonialism began after independence. The true friends of Mozambique and Angola were those who would ensure that the essentials were provided promptly to those countries, whose human and natural resources had been considerably depleted after five centuries of Portuguese colonialism. In the circumstances, there remained a grave responsibility on the part of the international community as a whole to ensure that all available assistance was rendered to those countries.

122. The position of the United Republic of Tanzania had been stated before: it was a peace-loving country and would work for peace in the world, but it must be peace in freedom and not in servitude. If, therefore, freedom could not be secured by peaceful means, it would be obtained by force.

123. That was precisely what was envisaged in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. If the racists did not leave voluntarily, the United Republic of Tanzania would continue to support the freedom fighters so that they might regain their dignity. i/ Resolution 387 (1976) of 31 March 1976.

-47-

-- -----äffi~

- -----M4

- -----ýjjý L %Z

1.14

lip-gip ri

-----

-----4\_'k

-----ttC am -----4=1131 J7r

TfT'2 - ýt~

Ft'

-----Mffi 5%

kZ

állillazi

11X

41,li11li1114,1 iiý '

-----A'v~ ..... -----

14~ U -ii

77

unnecessary bloodshed, and that armed struggle would be resorted to if the option of a peaceful solution were rejected by the racist minority regimes. Pursuant to the above, Zambia had tried to reason with the Salazar and Caetano regimes of Portugal to no avail. Zambia's quest for a peaceful solution was also responsible for its contacts with South Africa and subsequent meetings with Vorster and Smith.

129. As a result of representations made by Zambia on behalf of the four front-line

States, South Africa had withdrawn its troops from Zimbabwe and had also been instrumental in the release of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders who had been under detention for years. Attempts to have South Africa impose sanctions on the illegal regime had not gained the support of Vorster, partly because of his realization that if sanctions against the Smith regime succeeded they would ultimately be applied against South Africa itself.

130. Zambia's policy entailed the total rejection of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and all vestiges of capitalism. Zambia was also committed to the eradication of poverty, hunger, ignorance and other forms of human suffering, including, in particular, the exploitation of man by man.

131. Zambia's quest for a peaceful solution in consonance with the Lusaka Manifesto had been misunderstood or maliciously misconstrued in certain quarters to give the impression that Zambia had been seeking accommodation with the racists with a view to securing economic advantages. There was absolutely no foundation to these allegations. In fact, Zambia had turned down an offer from the racists to have the border opened; it had at no time received or asked for financial assistance from the South African regime. Zambia's actions were based on the position of principle, that is, to try to find a peaceful solution to the problem. Now that attempts at a peaceful solution had failed, armed struggle was the only answer. Zambia had tried to talk its way to Cape Town to no avail. Now it would have to support the fight all the way to Cape Town.

132. Zambia was not a racist State and had made it clear to the nationalists of Zimbabwe and Namibia that it would not support racism in reverse when majority rule prevailed; and if that were to happen, Zambia would fight against it in the same way it had fought against the white racists.

133. As regards the role the United Kingdom could play with regard to Zimbabwe at the current stage, the only one that could be foreseen was the provision of funds to compensate the die-hard racists so that they could emigrate.

134. As regards the current leadership crisis in the ranks of the Liberation Movement of AITC (Zimbabwe), Zambia had avoided meddling in the matter, as had been clearly demonstrated by the findings of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Chitepo. j/ Only the Zimbabweans had the right to choose

j/ A copy of the Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, released in March 1976, which was made available by the Government of Zambia to the members of the Ad Hoc Group, has been Placed in the files of the Secretariat and is available to members of the Special Committee upon request.

-4 9-

I Inramad

\_y- I z a  
f i p i 4 kon, s- Q i I I av ran~. fy i smutt 21i ST, Vi  
slyp= Miär z trio0 ny emu i Ego mera-ý'M'Mmr

. - - - -

C.A

!19w2"--OAI4 M i m I

n,

--toner

ýtýnsjoppsf joo 3..

19

.....

tji

ost

sýzissamý

tooc

MWM-ä

-glTtm==.

! 1 --- \_ist

tý' ý mc

.....

kvm

=7 ýk..... "MI

Fobi+

CA

ZUR,

ndtdnnLååt-ffiE-±5 Vi

ommassompo.l

som IE,\_ 7 T

pir

ymp

Amt mm rens rmlzeeee;ý ýä' mull

måtten , I ý!ý - - -ttott

m ýSM

-i-dstiIi2



OM  
-1ý --- mat  
1444li men  
1 ~7 ii! 0ý"PCMV~CTCS 2  
eter ---anal  
r sã  
Ä c ýwc ==1  
I ý5\_2 L J-t  
7ýitvt7,7sý-.ivoWAT5-01.  
TTY i= W f  
51 ä 5 IM  
SSSSSSSIITITIIIM tsss4sa ..... am-ä 005 anm,,.

Hon. C. Mwananshiku, Minister of Commerce  
Mr. P. M. Igonda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Ali Simbule, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Joshua S. Siyolwe, Director of International Organizations Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The views expressed by the Prime Minister are summarized below.

141. As a result of the increasing awareness on the part of the international community of the seriousness of the problems confronting the African continent in the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism, the forces of liberation had gained the necessary momentum at a crucial stage of their struggle towards the realization of their true and legitimate aspirations. The progress made and the success achieved to date were due to the courage and determination of the peoples concerned, supported by a number of progressive nations of the world which stood firmly on the side of the freedom fighters. No less important than that support

were the continuing efforts of the Special Committee in bringing all possible political and diplomatic pressures to bear on the racist minority régimes and in mobilizing world public opinion against those régimes.

142. As early as 1966, it had been envisaged that the liberation of the peoples under colonial and alien domination in Africa would follow three stages: (a) Angola and Mozambique phase; (b) Zimbabwe and Namibia phase; and (c) South Africa phase. Having completed the first stage successfully, all efforts could now be concentrated on the second and third stages, which were closely interlocked. It should be noted that some of the elements relating to the last two stages had already been implemented, including in particular the withdrawal of South African troops from Zimbabwe.

143. Zambia's resolute commitment to the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe and the actions it had taken in support of the peoples of those Territories required no elaboration. Zambia continued to stand ready to provide assistance at all levels in its efforts to secure freedom and independence for colonial Territories. Among other things, it had extended concrete programmes of assistance aimed at the Preparation of cadres for the future administration of the Territories, through the

Provision of places and facilities at the University of Zambia for the training of their nationals and through contributions to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (A/10331, paras. 22-28). Admittedly, the financial requirements for the extension of these assistance programmes were extremely heavy, with obvious implications for the national budget. But Zambia Would continue its endeavours irrespective of the cost involved in terms of human and material resources.

144. In the recent past, independent Africa, in co-operation with ANC (Zimbabwe), had made serious attempts to bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe by peaceful means. Those efforts, in both letter and spirit, were in accordance with the Dar es Salaam Declaration and based on the Lusaka Manifesto. The long overdue black majority rule could not be postponed indefinitely. Africa had already allowed a more than sufficient period of time and it could not afford to permit the Smith

-51-

-----

-----

J4

.....

J-ý -âý

Ji

149. As President Kaunda had already set out in a statement to the Ad Hoc Group (see paras. 126-139 above), Zambia's total commitment to the liberation of southern African as well as other countries still under colonial domination was well known. Zambia looked forward to the day when all colonies would be liberated and the Special Committee would no longer exist.

150. It was hoped that the liberation of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, which was the task of all peace-loving countries, would be achieved before long. Zambia would do everything possible towards that end, in close collaboration with independent neighbouring countries.

151. Zambia attached great importance to the work of the Special Committee. All the Zambian people were fully behind President Kaunda in his endeavours to assist the peoples struggling for liberation and were in the forefront in support of the objectives of the Special Committee.

4. Consultations -jIth the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

152. During the consultations with Mr. Silwizya, the following members of the Ministry were present:

Mr. P. M. Ngonda, Permanent Secretary

Mr. Joshua S. Siyolwe, Director of International Organizations Division

Mr. J. Maipambe, Deputy Director of International Organizations Division

Mr. E. W. Mbewe, Principal

The views expressed by the Minister are summarized below.

153. The independence of Mozambique and Angola had dramatically altered the situation in southern Africa. There was no doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Zambia was totally committed to the speedy and full liberation of Africa.

154. While it was clear that the racist minority regimes could not possibly survive an onslaught by the liberation movements, there still remained considerable difficulties standing in the way of the speedy achievement of freedom and independence in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Zambia, one of the four front-line countries, would, however, continue to work for the attainment of freedom and independence in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

155. It was hoped that, within the framework of the United Nations, in particular the Special Committee, the results of the constructive work of the Ad Hoc Group would serve as a basis for the formulation of specific and positive recommendations to be acted upon by the international community as a whole.

-53-

-----  
-----  
-----  
-1 i qäw laaaaaiý:y'-b.... . . . . .  
E4 i i i £9, 9,  
å 1,14 1 åka  
i 171ÄV  
-t 3  
44  
-----  
.....  
. .... . . . . .  
i ri tr in MIM, m i 1~  
..... .  
7 7, z.f  
t R: 4- i  
Ä 2...LA L.; J..1 2..1.-.  
.....  
i-I t t  
.....  
ä2  
JJ  
-----  
-----  
-----  
.....  
..... -4 4ý  
7,7f T,  
- - - - - 4 -x f- eý

159. Soon after the foregoing conditions had been met, the ground was set for the unification of the separate activities of the liberation forces of Zimbabwe.

Appeals had been made to the political leaders to bury their differences in order to attain their one and common objective: the liberation of Zimbabwe. The result had been the formation of APIC (Zimbabwe), which, despite the efforts of all concerned, had not been able to overcome the differing identities of its original constituents.

160. The Smith regime had, in the meantime, exploited the apparent disunity within the political leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe) by resorting to various devious tactics

in order to buy time for taking further measures to consolidate its illegal domination of the Territory. The Smith/Vorster collusion had continued to obstruct

the genuine efforts of the African leaders: it was clear that, while Vorster appeared to have been prepared to bring some pressure to bear on Smith, he had been unwilling to exercise the effective power he held over the destiny of the illegal regime. Thus, the South African supply line of arms, ammunition and other strategic material for the Smith regime had continued to be available in the prosecution of the latter's repressive war against the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, South Africa had been categorically opposed to the application of any economic sanctions against the regime fearing that they might one day be applied against South Africa itself.

161. Those Zimbabweans who had left their country to join in the active struggle for liberation had become increasingly disturbed and frustrated by the disunity within their political leadership. The Zimbabweans were eager to continue the struggle and wished to see a united position. This yearning for unity was particularly manifest among those Zimbabweans bearing the brunt of the fighting. If disunity within the political leadership persisted, it was conceivable to envisage the emergence of a leadership from among the fighting cadres which would, in the name of the united freedom fighters of ANC (Zimbabwe), assume the dual role of furnishing to the people the requisite political leadership and providing the necessary military guidance, as had been the outstanding achievement of FRELIMO.

162. The political leaders of ANC (Zimbabwe) should immediately realign themselves to give foremost priority to their basic and common aim - the elimination of minority rule - by subordinating to that noble objective any differences in their modus operandi. To the four Heads of State, it was most disheartening to continue to witness the total lack of responsive action on their repeated appeals for unity, as they themselves had taken a number of measures to bring about the desired result. The four Heads of State had done as much as was expected of them. Some had taken steps, at great sacrifice in terms of their national economy, in attempting to assist Zimbabweans. But the response from the political leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe) left much to be desired. They had yet to show the leadership which both the Zimbabweans and the international community expected of them.

163. As regards the recent report about possible changes in the "cabinet" membership of the illegal regime, it was self-evident that any reshuffling, for cosmetic

Purposes, to include some chiefs at the "ministerial" level would be a futile  
-55-

v id -----  
Uti, - 7 UTIT7,0  
t til 7ý  
!Juäel -, 491 LIC  
upp  
77=7  
CiU M- T nM ... j771 7- 1-ý; -t-ý  
7 ýtý Vis=  
7ýý datt lovå i  
.....  
ýel .....  
juvummýUPS!!l - ----- 1ý k-k  
-1 M.1,1~~~ klo, ~0 1 - - - .  
ser tssý- 5 -14  
1\*49.-t~ bo 5ý»\_\_.  
!ÄW  
2 2  
M\_~ 57 ý1.  
bäck,  
!IUIsAstjlljll iiiii  
r-4--é4ýL--2ý  
d-en  
. . . . . 4 , i i  
cm ffil  
fr  
.....  
7- 7=  
I t7\_1 M17k  
--kom EN.  
77  
414  
,t, --.u=nusuu-ý  
el, ägg g...  
oms  
-77

medicines, housing and other essential needs would have to be satisfied on an  
urgeLL basis. Botswana wished to appeal to the international community to  
mobilize all available resources to assist it in that regard. With respect to the  
funds and  
-other resources earmarked for assisting the people under colonial and alien  
domination, it would be essential that such assistance be provided to the people

concerned in close consultation with OAU. In particular, it was imperative that all aid to Zimbabweans be channelled through the OAU Co-ordinating Committee.

## 2. Consultations with the Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning

168. During the consultations with Mr. Masire, the following officials were present:

Hon. Daniel K. Kwelagobe, Minister of the Public Service and Information and Acting Minister for External Affairs

Mr. Lebang M. Mpotokwane, Private Secretary to the President

Mr. Mbiganyi C. Tibone, Secretary for External Affairs

fr. Samuel A. Mpuchane, Under Secretary for External Affairs

Mr. Joachim H. Hulela, Assistant Secretary for External Affairs

The views expressed by the Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning are summarized below.

169. Botswana, aware of its special geographic circumstances - completely surrounded by minority regimes - and the resultant limitations, had long realized that the desired changes in the region could best be brought about through providing an object lesson to the adversaries. Whether the social system and political actions of the latter arose from the genuine fear of being a minority or from the anachronistic colonial design of conquest and domination, Botswana had been convinced, and had still not completely abandoned the hope, that the minority regimes, by observing the example of Botswana, would one day learn to understand

the true meaning of a multiracial society built on the basis of mutual respect for human rights, equal opportunity and peaceful coexistence. As it had done during the past decade, Botswana would continue to demonstrate to the minority regimes those fundamental principles of human conduct.

170. It was with that firm conviction and in keeping with the aims and purposes of the Lusaka Manifesto, that Botswana had extended its full co-operation in the attempt by the heads of the front-line States to bring about an expeditious and peaceful settlement of the situation obtaining in Southern Rhodesia an. to prevent further harm and hardship for the people of the Territory as a whole. The tragic consequences of all-out racial war needed no elucidation. The situation obtaining in Southern Rhodesia was reaching a crisis level, with far-reaching

-57-

till i i i s i i i s      i i   I                      i I f I I i i i i t I a v T i I i i I   s  
lom 'Iýz  
I 19\_1 ý  
Upp      i  
t-jumma ~      ts      nio 3-7-ý 444                      \_Mej  
21  
~kown 31  
VW

Anstrattionatteriý  
 Oýcååta  
 stomp, äm.men  
 ..... ----to  
 läminýýt"o i ED!1 2~k2,  
 ... .. Ty  
 -4\_4 7,  
 Må- o-et,  
 ,;:2 ý.77  
 IS cp\_lir är=  
 mus,  
 jpA  
 m sp.....  
 f4 FF.3  
 , 1-0  
 -----  
 5T ýtt- bo din ä i W-ss  
 som zý,  
 WUý

workers to maintain the operation and providing housing and accommodation for them. Even if massive external aid were to be received to enable Botswana to operate the railway and to overcome those difficulties, during the two-year minimum period required to mobilize that aid to build the necessary infrastructure, the economy of Botswana would suffer irrevocable damage, as the country had no alternate route for its exports, owing to the fact that its capacity for surface transportation of goods was extremely limited.

176. As to the situation in Namibia, the liberation struggle would be intensified despite the massive military presence of South Africa in that Territory. The only way in which a peaceful settlement could be achieved in Namibia would be for the South Africans to withdraw from the Territory forthwith.

177. As regards the situation within South Africa, the South African Government appeared to be buying time rather than making a serious effort to resolve the country's problems. The concept of bantustan was an example of the Government's policy. That policy was unacceptable because it sought to perpetuate the apartheid system by seeking to allocate 87 per cent of the land to the white minority and the remaining 13 per cent - mainly reject land - to blacks.

-59-

4 s i- . . . . . -----  
 -----  
 -----  
 Fil  
 Irr





Namibian people, was the only organization - and instrument - capable of organizing the country as a united whole, guiding the people to their manifest destiny, developing an independent nationhood and successfully undertaking the task of national reconstruction. Under the leadership of SWAPO there would be no tribalism; there would be only one Namibia.

184. The international community must not only condemn South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia but must also denounce the manoeuvres of the apartheid regime calculated to divide the people of Namibia. Recent experiences in the international arena were rich in examples of what happened to "puppets created by those wishing to disregard the legitimate demands and aspirations of Peoples fighting for their liberation. South Africa should draw the necessary conclusions from those experiences and refrain from indulging in similar experimentations which were doomed to failure. South Africa must recognize SWAPO as the representative of the Namibian people. It must recognize, as Mozambique

\*and the international community had done, that SWAPO was the only organization able to lead, guide, unite, organize and genuinely represent Namibians. South

II I i i j i I L i i I i I I i I i i II

Ä 17 f. f.

44

glim~ OM

TA Wp

77

#blink opal ck

17 T

7=-

71ý

lä-

-Y-7 v4

~nor= Z,

21r

--Fr

OV äm

2

h ägg

17 -3,

ZZ.

ý1:71j; 9z v. a 7:7

-----

ý z f

11 iw

leg,

\_g\_

AH

vw

ý4.

13

2 -1

i Z:

. . . . .

9=4ýf my ýk ý4

-niL J,ý

k  
-AS  
z; r

4U z 7 z

187. The people of Zimbabwe, and particularly those bearing the main brunt of the war, would overcome the quarrels between individuals. For the people, the only quarrel - the principal conflict - was between them and the enemy, the illegal racist minority regime. The Zimbabweans would consolidate their unity and solidarity in the course of their armed struggle. And the fighters knew how to identify the enemy, namely, the régime itself with its military, police and administrative apparatus. For the armed struggle in Zimbabwe was not against people because they were white. It was not the pigment of one's skin which was at issue. It was the régime's structure which had to be combated and demolished.

188. The United Nations should endeavour to reinforce sanctions against the illegal régime, because the basis on which the régime continued its persistent, but futile, attempt to perpetuate the status quo - the Territory's economy - had to be eliminated. To that end, sanctions must be comprehensive and effectively supervised; the sooner the régime was isolated from the outside world and victory in the economic war was achieved, the shorter would be the period of armed struggle and suffering. Mozambique, for its part, had imposed total sanctions against the illegal racist minority régime, both as a fulfilment of United Nations resolutions and as a contribution to the armed struggle now raging in Zimbabwe. The responsibility of the international community was therefore extremely grave; it should continue to intensify its support for the all-out liberation struggle and economic war.

## 2. Consultations with the Minister of Labour

189. During the Ad Hoc Group's visit to the headquarters of FRELIMO on 29 April, Hr. Matsinhe, the Minister of Labour, stated that since its establishment in 1961, the Special Committee had contributed greatly to the cause of freedom for all the people under colonial and alien domination, serving as a spearhead of the progressive forces within the United Nations. The work of the Special Committee had had a decisive impact on the accelerating forces of liberation, as it had represented a continuing source of support and encouragement for the struggling peoples. Despite numerous criticisms levied against it by the enemies of liberty, freedom and justice, the Special Committee had continued to extend moral, diplomatic and political assistance to the peoples concerned. The independence achieved by Mozambique and many others represented a victory for the Special Committee. FRELIMO was particularly grateful for the active role played by Ndugu Salim, the Committee Chairman, and for his outstanding leadership during the past four and a half years. A son of Africa, with his wisdom and dedication, he had been a continuing source of inspiration to all the freedom fighters. FRELIMO, with its own history and experience in the liberation struggle, would continue to collaborate closely with the Special Committee in its work until the remaining vestiges of colonialism were completely eliminated throughout the world.

190. In reply, the Chairman of the Special Committee recalled the long and close working relationship which had existed between FRELIMO and the Special Committee and paid a particular tribute to the cadres of FRELIMO which had "made Maputo possible". The activities of FRELIMO had long been admired not only by the Special

-63-

..... . . . .

kärt~ 49

W--'

010ýýofficem

----- - ----

2z

MK- -x. z

3NE

-02-

le w

41

\_ci

... . . . .

doch~

\_Är iris!

-25 , i= Tr 7ý1ý lik

iäg

ýIC

--- ý\_ -- =

ÅL, 4ý ,W I 4ý I !T5ý\_

PRIMA 1491

#### F. Ethiopia

192. During its visit to Ethiopia between 2 and 5 May, the Ad Hoc Group held consultations with:

Brigadier General Teferi Bante, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council

H.E. Mr. Kifle Wodajo, Minister for Foreign Affairs

1. Consultations with the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council

193. During the consultations with Brigadier General Bante, the following members

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were present:

H.E. Mr. Kifle WodaJo, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Tesfaye Mekasha, Head, Department of International Organizations

Mr. Berhanu Dinka, Head, African Department

Given below are excerpts from the views expressed by the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council.

194. Ethiopia, as an active member and firm supporter of OAU, had followed closely and extended its full support to the efforts of other African leaders in the

search for a speedy solution to the critical situation obtaining in southern Africa,  
in

accordance with the principles embodied in the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es  
Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa.

195. It was deeply regretted that, as a direct consequence of the refusal by the  
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to respond positively to the approaches  
adopted by OAU - to hold a meaningful dialogue for the transfer of all powers to  
the majority - the talks so far had not brought about the desired results. It was now  
patent that there could be no recourse to a negotiated settlement and that the only  
alternative left for the people of Zimbabwe to attain liberation was through armed  
struggle, entailing the shedding of blood on all sides. The minority regime had  
closed all avenues of peaceful transition to majority rule.

196. In Namibia, a Territory which had been under extensive consideration by the  
United Nations since its inception, no appreciable progress had been made  
towards the full enjoyment by its people of their inalienable right to self-  
determination and independence. The international community could no longer be  
complacent about that situation. The measures envisaged under the United  
Nations Charter for the elimination of a threat to international peace and security  
should now be fully applied against the racist régime of Pretoria.

-65-

I jý

-----

t t

-----

ÅK.

-7F X-7

T

. . . . . r-E,

.....

iv -r I,ih-w le

7:i'72

-----

J4.

TT

jp

t

0 a

-4 iw QWT .....

r7

-----

im

-----

AL'ý

-----

202. As a founding member of the Special Committee, Ethiopia continued to support actively the Committee's endeavours to discharge its mandate effectively. In particular, it considered the activities of the Ad Hoc Group, as disseminated on a continuing basis through the world press, most appropriate and timely. The direct contacts and consultations of the Ad Hoc Group with the heads of the four front-line States not only clearly set out the correct, realistic picture of Africa in the proper and correct perspective but also served to focus world attention on the urgent need for decisive action to remove the present crisis before the outbreak of an all-out racial war.

203. The entirely new situation created in southern Africa as a result of the victory scored by the peoples of the Territories formerly under Portuguese domination had provided a most suitable opportunity and favourable conditions for the final elimination of the human tragedy in Zimbabwe and Namibia. At the same time, those developments represented a serious challenge to, and a unique opportunity for, the international community as a whole to play a constructive role in that process. While armed struggle - the only alternative left for the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia - was being energetically prosecuted, it was incumbent on the international community to move decisively to work out specific, complementary steps with a view to the expeditious termination of the minority regimes concerned, thus mitigating the suffering of the peoples in their liberation struggle.

204. The United Nations, in keeping with its recognition of the legitimacy of the peoples of those Territories to achieve freedom and independence by all available means, and taking into account the extenuating circumstances which existed as a result of the continued intransigency of the renegade minority regimes, should now endorse the necessity of intensified armed struggle by those peoples in order to realize their true and legitimate aspirations. Such an endorsement at the present critical stage would serve as an added source of encouragement and inspiration for the courageous peoples of the Territories, and at the same time, as a final, irrevocable notice to the illegal regimes as to the readiness of the Organization to see to it that the aspirations of the African majority were fully satisfied.

205. As regards economic sanctions against the Smith regime, it was regretted that the measures taken to stamp out its illegal, clandestine trade with other countries had not been adequate. The Security Council should thus consider taking more effective enforcement action to close the loopholes which circumvented full implementation of sanctions. In addition, the Council should now consider the adoption of all the measures envisaged under the United Nations Charter to expand the scope of those sanctions. Although economic sanctions alone could not win the war of liberation, such steps would immensely enhance the effectiveness and forcefulness of the armed struggle concurrently being pursued by the people of Zimbabwe.

206. On another plane, the United Nations should render assistance in the preparation of the building of future cadres to administer a new, independent

~22~22~AA  
 2Zr , ~ ~ 22  
 (A~  
 ~ V'A~A~  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (A,.. A- (A,) > (V  
 WA \_\_\_\_\_ - ~  
 ~A9~(A'(A' - , ~ , r,  
 rt2~' ~ ~A (A~--~-, - , , t((A A-  
 ~ ~fl~(AA( ~  
 - 2 2  
 ~  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 22,(A(' \_\_\_\_\_  
 > -4, A  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 (A', ~ (A~j(~AA'2. ~ (Af2~ \_\_\_\_\_ ~  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (A~  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 -m "(A \_\_\_\_\_ ~  
 , ~ >A--~  
 \_\_\_\_\_ ""-A(A !(AWAflfl(AA(A,' (A(AAfl4  
 -A--"' -'--'c - \_  
 A ~  
 42-A2hA(AflA(AhAfl',2Afl2AA 2',  
 , ~ (A~', (A,4~',',', A(A4A ', A(AA4, (A(AAA', t- .AA  
 (A ~  
 -(A  
 -' ~ A-' "" "" ~ "" A~ ~' ~ ~ AA -" --  
 ~n--" -==-- (Afl(A(A.AA..A', (AJA(A", '-((A.', A(A~  
 \_\_\_\_\_ (AA~rAmAAA", "" (A~ (A  
 (AA2A2ZAA2A22AA22JA(A  
 4 " ~ 2' 2' -' ;', ~ ~', ~',  
 >2  
 A ', '-2', "", '~', ~ ~  
 -A.S(AA', A(AAAA(A A((A(AA "" (Afl"- "" "" 'A'- - - - F  
 - ~ (A (A', ~, ~ ~', A', !', A(A', (AA(A(A', A', AA ', ~" .22(A  
 (A A~A.~A.A~ A~A", A2&', (A "" "" "" "" (A', , ,  
 .~  
 ', A'A"(A - A', (A', A', A(A(A 4~(- - A  
 AA(A.A(AA', (A'AA2r ~ A  
 '(A"(AAA(A-(A(A(A((A(AAA',  
 2A2A2 F  
 (A A 'A~ ((A A('A A '2,  
 A', (A(A(AA >A~A'flS(AA( -- '(AAAAAA('22A2'AA(

~ ~~~4>  
AA2A4(A 2(A2A - "" - - A-AF',~42rA'4~  
'AA(A(A ~ AAA-A( A ~  
A -- ,".-!""-'"-(A  
(A  
...~ A4,'

(A'A(A(A - AA(A  
'A',A~(A~A(AAAAA~r""A(A((('A A A~A(A",AAAAt±A=(AAA(A(A  
~ (AA~ ""2'2(A2,~2,~(A2~2  
A A.'

A~h',A',2~(A',2(AAA (A52(A --  
-- ((A "" "" ~~,~,"- (AA "" AA(A( -

~.  
(A(AA (A'. AA(A2AF ""2t --r----  
<Ar

-- ~  
A.(AA',.,A',A ~4,">)' -' >)r  
'(AA',(nA'(', '(AA((AA ""A-A-A', ""  
A',A(A (A(A(A A', (A>)~'(A-A~  
'-A.

-(A----- 'A((A',~,(A 'A- - A(2>'AA('A"22 (A' -  
(A', Th', (A'A-"A-'

(A(A',~. '2)>)', 2AA(AAA2AA2,(

-,e',',r"--'-',A ~,;>',rA(A~',AA,22(A',,,2A

--A (A  
AA""A", (AA. fl~ I  
AA2'~A' 'A2)" A(A2', (" " "" (A',', -'A  
-( (A2A "", ~2(2,A(A"A2  
A('A'A""A "" "" "" A ~A(""

(A AA~AA-', (" "" "" A" ~" ~'A""A(A(A-" ~  
(A.(A(A(AA(A', fl2, AA, (A, (2, ~, (A - A',', L', ('  
(((A(A(A(A(A(AA~', (A~', (A(A(A~A"(A(A(A.(A'-"  
A~A(AA', 2A', .A(AAA', A(AAAAA(AAA(A.(AAA(AA', AAA(AAA(AA

~A(A(A(AA(A~(AA'.A', ', A', AA(  
A',d', A(AA(A - " - "" "" -"----(A'-', (A ~ ""2(AAA~  
A>)>)  
(A, (A "(A222224fl'(A (AA(F'22~~(AA', A  
~A~', ~ - "" (A->)Afl(A(A(A (A~4(A' A A  
(2 ((AAA AA(AAA~F2A~', flA', ((A>  
FCFS'22A', ""AA', AAA

AA~AAAAAAAAAAAA"AA~AAAAAAAA'AAAAA "' (A""~'  
(A',AA~2(A',;(A""A'A'A(AA(AAA"AA(AAA'(A  
(("A )2<AA A 'A 'AFAAAAA(A',A  
- '~(A>)"(AA'A-A(A',(A', ~',(A(AA~~A  
((A(fl',(A(A ~  
>)(A(A(A(AA(A(A(AflAA(..4,A(A'.(A(A(A(A(A(A-m

211. The people of Djibouti had a fundamental and inalienable right to independence, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of OAU and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

212. The policy of the Provisional Military Government was one of unconditional and full support for the independence of Djibouti. The United Nations should address itself to the challenge of providing tangible guarantees so that the sovereignty and independent status of Djibouti and its territorial integrity would be respected by all. The United Nations, together with OAU, should exert every effort towards the creation of a united front of all political actions, within and outside the Territory which supported immediate independence, and the discouraging of all political groups and factions from arming their followers clandestinely. The United Nations should also ensure that any and all claims to the Territory were completely renounced in compliance with General Assembly resolution 3480 (XXX) of 11 December 1975.

213. Ethiopia considered any policy aimed at altering the independent status of the Territory as a potential source of conflict endangering the peace and security of the area.

214. Unlike Ethiopia, which had long made clear its complete and unconditional support for the genuine independence of Djibouti, as well as its withdrawal of any and all claims it might have had to the Territory, the other neighbouring State, Somalia, had persisted only in reiterating its support for self-determination and in promising not to annex the Territory. It was clear that a mere renunciation of the concept of annexation, which denoted aggressive military action, could not be accepted by the international community as a valid and genuine undertaking, since it did not preclude the possibility of the deliberate subversion by a State of the political processes of another Territory, which would amount to the same thing. The General Assembly, in paragraph 6 of resolution 3480 (XXX), adopted on the initiative of Ethiopia at the thirtieth session, had called "upon all States to renounce forthwith any and all claims to the Territory and to declare null and void any and all acts asserting such claims". Regrettably, Somalia had chosen to express reservations on that particular paragraph, by simply stating that the call for renunciation did not apply to Somalia. The implication was that, since Somalia considered Djibouti part of its own national territory under "foreign occupation", the call for withdrawing claims did not apply to Somalia's continuing policy of creating a so-called Somali nation. That declared



policy had intensified the fear of the people of Djibouti, as they were incapable of protecting themselves from the obvious designs of their ambitious and expansionist neighbour.

215. Ethiopia was in favour of allowing all bona fide residents to take part in the political process leading to independence. The problem was the establishment of a just criterion for determining who could be considered a bona fide resident. The population of the Territory was itinerant; during an economic boom the Population increased and at other times it decreased. Therefore, the definition

-69-

.....  
-----  
-7 T  
.....  
-----, .....,  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----mil

#### IV. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

220. In the discharge of the specific mandate entrusted to it by the Special Committee (see para. 2 (c) above), the Ad Hoc Group held consultations with Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua, Administrative Secretary-General of OAU, on 3 May at the organization's headquarters at Addis Ababa, and with Colonel Hashim Mbita, Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, on 17 April at the headquarters of the Committee at Dar es Salaam.

##### A. Administrative Secretary-General

221. During the consultations with Mr. Mboumoua, the following members of the OAU general secretariat were present:

- Mr. A. N. Chimuka, Director, Political Department
- Mr. M. A. Daar, Chief, General Political Affairs Section
- Mr. Dawit Egziabher, Chief, Decolonization Section
- Mr. V. Wege Nzomwita, Acting Chief, Sanctions Section
- Mr. F. Okoboi, Co-ordinator for Decolonization

The views expressed by the Administrative Secretary-General are summarized below.

222. Africa's desire for a peaceful settlement of the issues in southern Africa was set out explicitly in the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration. The efforts by the heads of the four front-line States to implement the principles embodied in those instruments, as mandated by OAU, had been completely frustrated, however, by the deceitful, dilatory tactics of the Smith regime.

223. It was therefore clear that the process of decolonization in southern Africa had now reached a most decisive and critical stage in that there existed no alternative but armed struggle in order that the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia might attain the goals set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The peoples of those Territories were more than ever ready to secure their freedom

and independence, at any cost, from the obdurate minority regimes. OAU was determined to assist the peoples concerned in that endeavour. In particular, its Coordinating Committee had taken every possible measure to help to organize the liberation struggle by the freedom fighters. OAU particularly commended the initiatives taken by the four front-line States in continuing to assist the peoples of the Territories. Although OAU and the States directly concerned would continue to intensify their efforts in that regard, OAU would welcome added assistance from those Governments which had always been in the forefront in supporting the cause for liberation.

224. Regrettably, the existing division in the political leadership of ANC (Zimbabwe) had adversely affected the waging of a guerrilla war, as Zimbabweans

both within and outside the Territory had been thrown into considerable confusion

-71 -

=5

12X

ids

- - - - -

-----..... .

ffis

Mark

eec så

ForREDECCTPNAK&tg-ýid2=3~ ýp?

ir

== Am- - - - -

i00 r \_Wsm . . . . .

;W4

Zrlf

så Vi åt

ts"vret=T

Buk

---- - -----07-5 mo 0 smo m-ss

Uwe~

i 177 7.

ilsk=\_

228. It was hoped that, while it might be possible that South Africa would provide

the Smith regime with the economic outlet now closed by Mozambique, it would not intervene militarily in Zimbabwe. The implications and consequences of such a military intervention would be far-reaching in view of the drastically shifted political balance of power in the region.

229. As to the proposed international conference to be held in 1977 in support of the fighting peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, OAU fully endorsed the holding of

such a conference under the auspices of the United Nations, to pledge the commitment and dedication of the international community in favour of the forces of liberation. As had been the case with the Oslo Conference held in 1973, m/OAU stood ready to assist in the organization of such a conference.

B. Executive Secretary of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa

230. During the consultations with Colonel Mbita, the following members of the Executive Secretariat of the Committee were present:

Mr. Metteden Lamine, Assistant Executive Secretary for Finances and Administration

Mr. Jean Bitchoka, Information Officer

The views expressed by the Executive Secretary are summarized below.

231. Despite the various decisions adopted during the past few years by OAU concerning Zimbabwe, and the efforts by the organization to implement the Lusaka Manifesto, there were now no prospects for the realization of a successful,

peaceful settlement with the Smith regime. At the same time, the chance for immediate reunification of the political leaders of ANC (Zimbabwe) appeared to be very slim.

232. In the circumstances, in the fall of 1975, the OAU Co-ordinating Committee had taken all possible steps towards, and had succeeded to a large extent in, bringing about unity among the freedom fighters. The militants, soon joined by the thousands of young people leaving Zimbabwe, were aware of the differences and difficulties existing at the level of their political leadership, but they had chosen not to recognize a divided leadership. Instead, they were determined to prepare jointly for the armed liberation of their country, while awaiting the re-establishment of unity among their political leaders. Thus, the fighting continued, and the militants fought as a united fighting force of ANC (Zimbabwe).

It was therefore only logical for OAU to give all moral and material aid to the fighters and to endeavour to secure a deeper understanding of the situation within the framework of the international community.

233. The freedom fighters, for their part, continued to accept the political m/ For the report of the Conference, see document A/9061, annex.

-73-

-----  
-----  
..... .. I

----- - ý1  
..... ----- IUý  
-Affi  
1-ý all  
in DID=~  
-iÅ  
-----4ff  
;i 14 1  
.....  
-----

238. As regards the situation in Namibia, it was becoming increasingly clear that there existed no other alternative to armed liberation struggle. South Africa, supported militarily and politically by some member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continued to engage in the armed repression of the Namibians. Against formidable odds, however, the freedom fighters of SWAPO had taken every possible step to lead and inspire the courageous Namibians towards their ultimate liberation. Their determination and commitment should be supported fully by the world community.

V. OBSERVATIONS n/

VI. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

239. The present report was adopted unanimously by the Ad Hoc Group.

240. In adopting its report, the Ad Hoc Group agreed that the Chairman should be authorized to report to the Special Committee on the work of the Ad Hoc Group upon his return to Headquarters, it being understood that the Special Committee would subsequently give consideration to the present report in connexion with the questions of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.

n/ The observations of the Ad Hoc Group are reproduced in para. 17 of the present chapter.

-75-

1 77  
-----  
-----  
----- - -Ki-, 1"-j  
-----, ...  
4,44,11,4  
-----.....  
.....  
to 9 14,11  
----- -04%,  
-----  
.....  
.....  
-----19

..... -----  
-----571  
-----uý 2F 7  
-----  
----- -TM ----- 7  
----- %  
.....

ANNEX III\*

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1976 FROM THE PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE  
OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE  
CHAIRMAN  
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. On the instructions of my Government, I should like to call to your attention the fact that the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee at its 1029th meeting on 1 April 1976 a/ contains several paragraphs relating to the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) - a question completely extraneous to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group.

2. These paragraphs refer to consultations held by the Ad Hoc Group with the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. The impropriety of including a discussion on French Somaliland in the report of a committee whose specific term of reference was the "questions of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia" is immediately apparent. Even more serious is the fact that the paragraphs in question contain grave distortions of the question of French Somaliland and present a one-sided and prejudiced viewpoint.

3. In his statement to the Special Committee on 1 April 1976 (see A/AC.109/PV.1029), the Chairman clearly defined the mandate of the suggested Ad Hoc Group then. The following is what the Chairman stated, inter alia: it has been suggested, in view of the important developments relating to Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, and in view of the importance of associating the Committee with and having it fully informed and apprised on the basis of first-hand information of what is going on in the area, /that instead of holding such meetings away from Headquarters, the Committee might consider dispatching this year a special mission to countries adjacent to those Territories, in order to discharge effectively the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly, namely, to seek the best ways and means of implementing resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to the Territories concerned."

4. The press communique released by the Chairman on 8 April 1976, further elucidates the terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group during its visit to Africa. In this communique, which is contained in OPI Press Release No. GA/COL/1686 of the same date, the Chairman stated:

"Availing itself of invitations received from the Governments of Botswana, Ethiopia, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, the Special Committee has decided to send a high-level

group of six of its members to the capitals concerned, in connexion with the

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/528.

a/ See annex I to the present chapter.

-77-

-----  
.....  
----- Mø,  
-----  
.....  
-----..... . . . . .  
. . . . .  
. . . . .  
..... ----- . . . . .  
-----, .....  
-----, . . . . .  
. . . . .  
mg  
fflp  
.....  
-----.....  
. . . . .  
..... . . .  
..... . . .

referred b/ and may wish to make further representations on this matter. We feel that it is a matter of urgency, however, to convey to you now our immediate reaction to the report in order to set the record straight.

10. Paragraph 200, which refers to consultations with Brigadier General Teferi Bante, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia, contains a patently false accusation against the Somali Democratic Republic. It states, among other things, that the key to the problem of the urgent need to enable the inhabitants of Djibouti to accede to independence without delay is Somalia's continuing claim to the Territory. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic rejects categorically such allegations as unfounded and slanderous.

11. We equally refute Ethiopia's baseless claims, as contained in paragraphs 210 and 216 of the report. The report also contains certain doses of both overt and covert threats against Somalia, which we regard as the mischievous products of a scaremonger. Ethiopia is a victim of its bad and puerile policy. If such an immature policy did not pay off, they have to blame themselves instead of using Somalia as a scapegoat. I should, in this regard, like to quote from an article by Mr. Jean-Claude Guillebaud which appeared in *Le Monde* of 9 June 1976, in which the writer has analysed the situation in the area. Commenting on the unholy alliance and conspiracy between the Ethiopian Government and Ali Aref - who

has been described as "Thieu in Djibouti" - against Somalia, the correspondent had this to say:

"On 18 October there was a new tactical error. Mr. Ali Aref, in search of African support, grasped the hand offered him by Ethiopia and went to Addis Ababa. For someone who only yesterday supported his "Afar brothers" in Ethiopia against the military regime of Addis Ababa, it's something like a trip to Canossa. He thoroughly scandalized the Afar leaders of Djibouti, even his own immediate advisers, who were indignant that one could thus betray the subjects of the sultan Ali Mirah who were severely repressed in June by the Ethiopian Army.

"In November, Senator Barkat Gourat forsook the government majority and set in action a 'parliamentary revolt' whose members were swelling in number week after week. Two ministers of Mr. Aref resigned on 17 November, two others resigned in May. Mr. Ali Aref, who triumphed again on 18 November by a voting in the Territorial Assembly, none the less felt his majority on the wane and strove - with the vibrionic aid and advice of the Ethiopian Consul to close the gaps. In what way? By hastily mobilizing the Afar people of the bush country against the town, which was devoted to the opposition. The manoeuvre was tardy, risky, and irritating ...

"One of the President's close advisers sighed: 'The Ethiopians at the same time made a bad blunder with the President. For example, they egged him

b/ Ibid.

-79-

I~IliIb~¶l

~

~

~Ra11 ~..

~

~ ~

5441« 414545454

fl

~ii~i2~2~

«..~»

--

-

r

\* 54» 41

54»j».

~

«~««~4- ~-fl~

~

44W54

1

.44144444154414»~

4 ~fl~41'r«

''' 454~» 54454

«-4444,44445444 4444444454«.  
45444454 ~ I>5454544<544'4I441»\*«41 4,,,-'fl -  
«  
-4--  
~« ~4-,««  
~R54 44.444- .544154414144144 54 5444 4141»S»S41 441«« '4-«-«---'-  
«~,»4-«  
41 444144444141 '4.  
54544  
\_\_\_\_4541441»  
.»»»,,.«.«. 4154,41«  
544 \_\_\_\_\_  
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5454~44 ""~«,««4fl,,  
441144«.«,«.  
\_\_\_\_ «'444'«'«' 4544441445444 ~4«444«4. 54  
»54»4fl5444»4544154154»  
5445445454<444fl«4.4.4.4~~"~ 4  
\_\_\_\_\_  
4««««'« ««««4.« ~ 4444 44,4«4«4  
\_\_\_\_\_  
'«5445454' «1 «,  
«'«'sk»  
- »<«.«44'««'»»4k «..'«»4,,»,»54»54.fl  
44. »54 »54.4«' ~4-41«'«4<«'44 '445441~  
54544  
\_\_\_\_\_  
'»'41 44««'«««  
~~YI« ~ 4'54~«««'«  
4 4»»»54fl4fl>44444444444444444444444444444444>45441 -\_\_44.14.14.14.4.  
«'««4  
<4544 ~fl445444~fl ~41«. - - - -  
\_\_\_\_\_  
.-«~14.4«.«.««-  
«'1 4454 «4fl ~1441««441  
«.54544~ 41,  
45454444454fl4 «.«41,.4 545454545454544444  
4444444445454544'» «~ '4 ~ 4~.2>«  
»>'~««« «44444,5441<«.<4.4«.1441  
~445454«~441' 1<454 >444 414 44 '< < 1<  
4<« <44.  
«.4.444.444>1,4541, 4  
>54 .<«.«.»,.«, ,, «454 ~ 4545454544444  
4444<' 4415454444444



4444 4.,  
4.«.«  
«4~454  
»~ \_\_\_\_\_»4414  
\_\_\_\_\_ «,«.54<,«.«,«.«<41544454»«545444flf4~54  
«.444 «444  
«.54<«<54<«<54<«<54<«<«4444<«5444 '«4«.«.«'<44.~«  
\_\_\_\_\_ ««4544.4. 54414444544 4~~441k4.k41k5441:5~«  
\_\_\_\_\_ «-»'44<445444'»' »<«44444.444444  
\_\_\_\_\_  
4.5454544454545454444545444545454445444544454» «444.44».  
<54»'<4»V«<« '««. 44544«  
««<'<4<54»«45454»»54««4««»41414.4»45454 «»<54«4454««4«4r44'54  
\_\_\_\_\_ 44544454444444>4414441««<>  
«  
»4.4.'fl,414.4.<«<4.'4.4.4.544.4454 <4.41 fl4444  
«««444444.  
41«'«'«'54<««<54<54<»«44'« 4 '4'4.5454454fl<44<444<141111411  
«.4444444444«.«. 444., 44444 4  
«<«44.54<4 «44<441454««  
44«44«.»54544.'«.«. '44»44«4«4.544.  
«454«44<4«44'4«4«4««'444'l<4«<44«««54«<544«<44«<44«<44-4.<  
«««44<'«'>'""'«'""'«'""'«'""'  
44.54<1,.4»44444«444«4«44544<«.«.«.«.«<1«<.  
441,445454 ,<,45441~4544141~5445441 4445454441 444454544 «<««' «««  
'>  
44«44«~444444«~«««44«~44454444154441414«45444441544«445444«.444444  
»444«~«445454

in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly was that of the Ethiopian delegation.

17. At no time did the Somali delegation, during the consideration of the item, be it at the committee level or in the plenary, show anything less than full and unswerving support for the resolution and for the process of enabling the people of the Territory of French Somaliland to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence without interference from any quarter.

18. With all these records and more available at the United Nations and elsewhere,

it is incredibly surprising to note that Ethiopia, whose negative attitude during the debate almost aborted the adoption of the resolution, and whose obvious alignment with the colonial Power had prompted the concern of everyone and specially the African countries, now claims that it was on its own insistence that the thirtieth session of the General Assembly adopted resolution 3480 (Xxx) on the Territory of so-called French Somaliland. It is rather presumptuous on the part of the Ethiopian authorities, whose perennial alliance with colonial exploitation in Africa is well known and amply documented, to try and take credit

for the enormous efforts made by the African Group, by its drafting committee, by the representatives of the people of the Territory and by the delegation of the Somali Democratic Republic.

19. The Ethiopian Government, in another futile attempt to confuse the issues involved, refers to the summary records of the Fourth Committee and once again chooses to misquote Somalia's representative as having explained after the vote "his Government's reservation".

20. These are fictitious allegations conjured up by the Ethiopian authorities who have obviously made a habit of continuously misrepresenting facts in an attempt to create doubts and confusion in order to hide their real intentions. Here is what the Somali representative said that day, as contained in the summary records of the Fourth Committee:

... his delegation ISomalia's/ maintained that paragraph 6 was substantially superfluous, especially in view of the declarations of the Heads of State of Somalia and Ethiopia in which they solemnly renounced any claims over the Territory, as recalled in the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. In any case, his country felt that the provisions of paragraph 6 were not applicable to it." d/

21. In addition to the above remarks, it should be noted that the constitutional provisions of each country are to be seen as matters of internal affairs, and thus outside interference is a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The real purpose for which Ethiopia had to introduce, and insist upon, paragraph 6 of resolution 3480 (XXX) was, and is, to use the terms of this paragraph as a Iffence and a kind of "precedent" with respect to the well-known territorial !/ Ibid., Fourth Committee, 2183rd meeting.

-81-

----- t !2 2 t 14-,  
7 7 7 7 77  
i 7  
ýEý:-7 7-7  
-----  
. . . . .  
-----  
;zi~; ;i iy 7-71  
-M.F4.p~  
2  
-----  
-----  
\_-. = ru,  
-----  
ei 12 i  
sjý  
P\_~  
T4 4ý-  
..... T-T'Vt-. -----

-----  
.....  
77 i  
7 7  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----T  
TT  
-----  
+ tag~  
-----  
-----  
\_V m me -.7- m 77 :7 r z  
Zt  
-n -7=.  
J:y  
-----  
----- '137r ---  
4 4 ýý1. 7 -157 1 r -1 [11  
13IIEU  
-----  
f i I t I  
-----  
-----  
-----

ANNEX IV\*

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1976 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ADDRESSED TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOMALIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

1. I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 14 June 1976 a/ concerning those paragraphs of the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee at its 1029th meeting, b/ which relate to the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti).
2. In taking note of the views of your Government with regard to the inclusion of those paragraphs in the report, I should like to make the following observations.
3. The paragraphs referred to occur in a section of the report which comprises a record of meetings with the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. Since it is a matter of fundamental courtesy that the record should faithfully reflect representations made during such meetings, there was nothing inappropriate, procedurally or otherwise in the inclusion of these paragraphs in the report.
4. In this connexion, your Government will, I am sure, appreciate that, by

including these paragraphs in the record of its meetings, the Ad Hoc Group acted in accordance with the established practice in the United Nations, which requires that the records of meetings should reflect truthfully what transpired at those meetings.

5. Permit me to assure you that nobody was more conscious than the Ad Hoc Group of the terms of its mandate. You will doubtless note that, in drafting its observations, contained in section V of the report, c/ the Ad Hoc Group adhered strictly to the terms of its mandate.

6. With regard to the specific question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti), I should like to draw your attention to my statement, contained in paragraph 219 of the report, which reads as follows:

t219. The Chairman, in reiterating the affirmation by the General Assembly and the Special Committee of the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence in accordance with the

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/529.

a/ See annex III to the present chapter.

b/ See annex I to the present chapter.

c/ The observations of the Ad Hoc Group are reproduced in para. 17 of the Present chapter.

-83-

S: .

.....

.....

stetllH"4 44

-t t y-r:I k x\*krMis »

yf

..... : 111...11- 7.

jys du I sol! s SS 0 ýjo idssomslusdo i i 2ýý

-maziskfý smf,

svarvas 4!,"Agee ar dens I vallmo

\_MW

---- rýýjzm

.....

l\_; als- ---

7.7

.....

inne! i

I -m0musi VMO som

scen

n- -TTT tT i - T

TT]

tid jäfjåMT\_ý i t-t

toskansk- l=fil

äsfäFie På i i tum mal

itta--144

PL-ss 1-1 .

icss 11

-;7 tý-tý

ýtý -11 i. jý

als

-----51

2ý Li  
till M ý\_ZIII  
att illevis fn-ssep csser i -14k40~--e. I &Lä  
.....  
.....  
rýt-týý M  
7 177 7 7  
ý- -, , ý; 7-A ~Me 71T 77  
Å4- --- ---- - -=7-; z t 4Mässå  
stomstottiizzlte I är s 7 7  
i 7  
.....  
L4-ýý'ý såv  
tänk  
=ost  
MV  
emu i i i i l,  
tilirazo om ssý .  
i pÅ i i ä i i i att! i I I =2 M Me-ger -p,  
- Iz  
.....  
Jr  
sås  
- 11 ä idioti -----=1177

ANNEX V\*  
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL  
COM4ITTEE BY  
THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ETHIOPIA, ON 3 MAY 1976  
AT  
ADDIS ABABA  
MEMORANDUM

Views of the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia on  
the independence and future of the Territor

1. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STATEMENT

1. The present policy statement does not intend to assert on behalf of the people of Djibouti their right to self-determination and independence. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to do so, because no one should attempt to appropriate the right to speak on behalf of the people when they themselves are articulating their desire and when they themselves are organizing for independence.

2. This policy statement only sets out:

(a) The position of Ethiopia, a neighbouring State, which shares with the Territory of Djibouti over 640 kilometres of a common frontier and whose two peoples are closely bound by blood and history, and who enjoy today as they always have in the past, a high degree of economic, cultural and security interdependence.

\* Previously issued under the symbol

-----  
I a m å t .....  
..... MAS i 1 4 t tymus i c ii i i  
å- z i  
4!Pleeeese4P  
Putti!  
N-r  
Ezgzamz5a52EmEaFEEk 77  
M-k- ýcm L"V  
ocýom3sosst4- 7\_Mi7 en AK~ ens vw  
T iklär omsyn MIAMI  
777- ---- \_rå  
- 11:7111;-2i 10 7  
mys! -T-E W,=  
FP7  
-----9 t  
-----r715 ----t w, i W-i4

10. Thus, the people of Djibouti have a fundamental right to self-determination and immediate independence.

11. This right is absolute and unconditional, and cannot be circumscribed by any claim to their Territory, asserted on the basis of ethnic affiliation, economic or security interdependence.

12. This right to independence also includes the right of the people freely to determine without any interference the conditions of their independence. No one can arrogate to himself this right which belongs to the people of Djibouti.

13. OAU, the United Nations and the international community at large, have the duty and the responsibility to assist the people in their struggle for independence. But it should be clear that this assistance cannot be at the expense of the right of the people to a free and unimpeded choice.

### 3. POLICY OF ETHIOPIA FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF DJIBOUTI

14. The policy of the Provisional Military Government for the genuine independence

of the people of Djibouti can be described as one of unconditional and full support.

15. This policy has been articulated on several occasions by no less an authoritative spokesman for the Provisional Military Government than His Excellency, Brigadier General Teferi Bante, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Council of Ministers. Suffice it to quote here important statements that he made on two occasions. 16. First, on the occasion of Africa Liberation Day on 25 May 1975, in a nation-wide address to the people of Ethiopia, he said:

"We now wish to address ourselves to the problem of Djibouti, which

is located in our region. The people of Djibouti have close historic, geographic, religious, demographic and economic ties with the people of Ethiopia. For these reasons, it is obvious that the general well-being and security of our two peoples are interdependent. The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, therefore, warmly supports the right of the people of Djibouti to determine their own future without external interference."

17. Second, in another important address to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, he reaffirmed the policy of the Provisional Military Government as follows:

"The only French possession in Africa that has not gained its independence is the Territory of the Afars and the Issas, popularly known as Djibouti. Ethiopia believes that the future destiny of this Territory should be based on the free choice of the people. If independence is their choice, Ethiopia will accept that, and will be happy to live with an independent

-87-

-----  
-----  
p 94 9 v Ur  
17-:7  
n -f:ý  
-ZE  
ti  
4,4r TrTI  
7  
-db I ;--i -X  
t t 7ýt  
-----  
-----  
----- -17  
Z-a  
~44  
-----  
3 ý47  
-----

#### 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN DJIBOUTI

23. Unlike most African Territories which became independent in the post-War years, the situation of Djibouti poses a special decolonization problem. The Territory of Djibouti covers an area of 23,299 square kilometres with an estimated population of over 285,000 persons. A good part of this population is concentrated in the administrative capital city of Djibouti. The population is divided between the two principal ethnic groups, the Afars and the Issas.

24. Moreover, residing mostly in Djibouti, there is a disproportionately large group of expatriate residents who come from the neighbouring countries as well

as a sizable European population. According to the latest United Nations estimate, this group accounts for 30.4 per cent of the entire population.

25. With the tradition of constant movement of people in the area, the size of this expatriate group has ebbed and flowed according to the ups and downs of economic activities in the Territory. This in turn has created a problem as to who can legitimately be considered a bona fide resident of the Territory, with full rights to participate in the Territory's political process. On the other hand, it has also opened a potential avenue of interference from without in the affairs of the Territory. Attempts had been made in the past to alter the demographic composition from the outside with the hope of influencing the outcome of elections in the Territory.

26. As of now, no visible resources which could sustain the expansion of its economy have been identified in the Territory. Furthermore, as the Territory does not dispose of any agriculture hinterland, most of its economic activities are based on the transit trade of Ethiopia, especially on the railway traffic between the cities of Djibouti and Addis Ababa.

27. The administration budget of the territorial Government of 2.5 billion Djibouti francs (\$US 11 million) is almost entirely dependent on subsidies from the French Government. It is obvious, therefore, that an independent Djibouti, more than any of the least developed of the developing countries, will require the most generous international assistance for the development of its economy as well as close economic co-operation with its neighbours.

28. Apart from the above limitations, another important factor which has acted as a constraint on progress towards independence has been the concern that the people as a whole had and continue to have with actual or potential claims to their Territory by neighbouring States.

29. One of the neighbouring States has never hidden its designs to absorb Djibouti into its national territory. This claim is asserted on ethnic affiliation, and constitutes a part of its larger claims on territories of other neighbouring sovereign States.

30. Unlike Ethiopia, which has made clear its complete and unconditional support for the genuine independence of Djibouti as well as its withdrawal of any and all

-89-

2X

lag

.....

4v

irt'

wi ý j11:25

årso

mar

L 2!7

Am

ffi äm~

.... . ----

åk



Al  
AK

- - - - -i99

. . . . .

. . . . .

=W .3ý

=M 4ý\_&;Effitt

mila-

iii~112i

37. True, there are differences among the politicians of the Territory regarding the procedures to be employed for the self-determination process, but these are more apparent than real. These differences are based mainly on personal rivalries and are amenable to political solution once external interference ceases. It can be said therefore that the people of Djibouti almost have their independence in their hands. If there is any single obstacle in the way of the independence of the Territory, it is the uncertainty which hangs over its security and territorial integrity after independence. This is the most central and crucial issue to which solution must be found immediately.

38. Given the above-enumerated positive developments in the politics of the Territory, the increasing introduction of violence into it from the outside has been a matter of surprise and concern not only to Ethiopia but also to other African States which have closely followed the Territory's progress towards independence. Surprise because violence, both intercommunal and that directed at the personnel of the colonial administration, is a relatively new phenomenon; and concern because at this stage of the liberation struggle there are sufficient indications that violence is being introduced to advance an objective other than the Territory's independence.

39. It is incumbent upon the African community of nations to ask certain pertinent questions at this juncture. Why has there been increasing violence in the Territory at this particular time? Who are the perpetrators of this violence, and for what objectives, and in whose service is violence being employed?

40. FLCS, the liberation movement based in Mogadiscio, has claimed responsibility for some of the violence, including the latest mass kidnapping of school-children. The Provisional Military Government believes that given the positive trends in the political situation of the Territory, the increasing introduction of violence at this stage of the independence struggle cannot be justified on rational grounds. Furthermore, the Provisional Military Government is convinced that such violence

at this time will not serve any purpose except to subvert the self-determination process of the Territory, polarize the people and possibly kindle an intercommunal war along ethnic lines, all the more so, as the group does not have any following within the Territory.

## 5. INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND THE TERRITORY OF DJIBOUTI

41. First, the Territory of Djibouti is inhabited by two principal ethnic groups. The majorities of these two groups, i.e., the parent groups, live in Ethiopia.

42. The entire Afar group on the Horn of Africa numbers approximately 630,000. Of this number, 130,000 live in the Territory of Djibouti, whereas the rest (500,000) live in Ethiopia.

43. All of the Issas ethnic groups are Ethiopians and have always lived in Ethiopia.

-91-

â- 4, p

J JE

Var

âky

=MOPS%

1ý\_ JC- ILý wo

sfs

MAV

. . . ..

omma

MUMS.

41

=ss jt= Zgt5eiqqiQ-tilo

040 mi

ýyn 0 \_\_4

del

st

21

79

ä6

\_r\_ ý77ý1

acceptable competing group, rivalries among the leaders have intensified. Since no one political group has developed an incontestable legitimacy by a long history of struggle, it has been convenient for each to claim that it has done more than the other for the independence of the Territory.

51. As has been done in similar situations, the only way to resolve such differences is by persuading those factional groups to see the advent of independence as an opportunity to work together rather than regard it as a bone of contention, and, where circumstances permit, to help organize free and democratic elections which would make it possible for -all political groups to face their

people through their political programmes. .,

52. If those leaders have been so far unwilling to ask for independence, it was because they have a genuine fear that their territorial integrity and sovereignty would be jeopardized by claims laid to their country by the neighbouring States. This fear is based on recognition of the fact that their Territory is not endowed with sufficient resources and could not therefore enable them to assure respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Djibouti.

53. Now that Ethiopia, for her part, has made an unequivocal statement renouncing any and all grounds for potential claims to Djibouti, an opportunity has, for the first time, emerged to allow the people of the Territory to consider independence as a viable proposition for the future of Djibouti. Even though the apprehension of the people of the Territory has thus been partially allayed, unfortunately it still remains a matter of great anxiety for those people that the other neighbour continues to be committed to a policy of expansionism by maintaining constitutional provisions which seek the realization of the annexation of the Territory, as well as by public declarations to the same effect by high officials of that neighbouring State.

54. From the point of view of OAU, the problem should be viewed as having two phases, one pertaining to the stage before independence and the other after independence. Having regard to the considerations set forth above, if OAU is to assist the people of the Territory to accede to and enjoy their independence, it cannot a priori say that it can only be concerned with the process before independence. As the history of the Territory during the last 10 years has amply demonstrated, the two phases cannot be separated. The prospect after independence, particularly the fear the people continue to have that others may not respect their territorial integrity, has played a part in delaying their demand for independence. Inasmuch as OAU should address itself to the question of transferring the powers of government to the authentic representatives of the people, it should therefore consider the challenge of providing tangible guarantees to the effect that the sovereignty and independent status of the Territory will be respected by all.

55. True, membership of an independent Djibouti in OAU and in the United Nations might provide some guarantee. In the view of the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, however, in the absence of any modicum of defence capability on the part of the Territory, such guarantees could not be sufficient by themselves, especially against subversion or against attempts to abolish the independent

-03-

-----

ýp x

-----

p4awiffliwFjlm7e

7f1 tr r -f f

i

.....

5W

är

%FE9

V

iýl 7

-----

ýw4

w

- 5

Itu.

\_Tå

i- 4 \_ä

,åL.

1,

9z i

z n tL

-CM

gé

mau

- - - - - \_jý

adopted by the Council of Ministers of OAU at its twenty-fifth ordinary session held at Kampala, c/ and of General Assembly resolution 3480 (XXX), which called upon all States to renounce forthwith any and all claims to the Territory and to

declare null and void any and all acts asserting such claims;

(b) Such other undertakings as may be required to respect the independence and the integrity of the Territory, to refrain from any and all acts designed to alter the independent statehood of the Territory, and to cease and desist from interfering in the internal affairs of the Territory, and particularly to abandon all attempts to change the demographic composition of the Territory.

61. In addition to such undertakings that the neighbouring States may be called upon to give, OAU and the United Nations should also provide other tangible guarantees as may be necessary and appropriate for ensuring the territorial integrity and independent statehood of the Territory, with a view to enhancing the sense of security of the people of Djibouti.

62. Considering the lack of visible natural resources for the development of the economy of the Territory, the international community should consider Djibouti as a special case requiring co-ordinated assistance for its development.

63. The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia would like to make it absolutely clear that it is prepared to provide any guarantees that may be required of it by OAU along the lines indicated above. The Provisional Military Government also welcomes such additional guarantees that OAU and the United Nations

may wish to provide in keeping with their paramount responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in our region. The Provisional Military Government believes that, if OAU were to take into account the characteristics of the Territory's problems, which are more than the usual problems posed by the process of decolonization, it would make a constructive contribution to their solution. If, on the other hand, OAU were to ignore some aspects of the problem and if it were to let developments take their own course, it would not live up in full measure to its responsibility to the people of Djibouti and it would leave a time-bomb ticking away on the Horn of Africa.

c/ See A/10297, annex I.

-----  
-----  
-----  
.....  
-----  
-----  
.....  
-----  
-----  
T dF  
.....  
-----  
at- \_ýo  
.....  
JE  
zZ.  
-----

CHAPTER VIII

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 1031st, 1033rd to 1036th, 1038th and 1040th meetings, between 12 May and 17 June 1976.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolutions 3396 (XXX) and 3397 (XXX) of 21 November 1975 on the question of Southern Rhodesia and resolution 3481 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of resolution 3481 (XXX), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, ... to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session". The Special Committee also paid due attention to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.
3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on developments concerning the Territory. The Committee also had before it a letter addressed to the Chairman, dated 24 May 1976, from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations (chap. VII of the present report, annex II (p. 76 above)).
4. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee took into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by it at its 1029th meeting, on 1 April 1976 (chap. VII of the present report, annex I (p. 17 above)), which visited Africa during April and May 1976 in connexion with the discharge of the mandate

entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly, with specific reference to the questions of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. At the 1031st meeting, on 15 April, the Chairman made a statement on the work of the Ad Hoc Group (A/AC.109/PV.1031).

Participation of the national liberation movement I/

5. In conformity with the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in accordance with established practice, the Special Committee, in I/ For a summary of the meetings with the national liberation movement held in Africa by the Ad Hoc Group, see chap. VII of the present report, annex I, Paras. 14-36 (pp. 25-31 above).

-97-

-----

-----

-----

-----

ýt 7rvýz

.....

-----

-----JLL -1 z i

-----

.....

5 Z-L4 -----

-----

Statements were made by the representatives of Norway, Australia and Fiji and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.1038).

11. In addition to adopting the above-mentioned resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, the Special Committee, at its 100th meeting, on 17 June, considered and adopted an li-Power resolution on the report of the Ad Hoe Group, to which reference is made in paragraph 4 above. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/534) and an account of its consideration by the Special Committee is contained in chapter VII of the present report (p. 2 above).

12. On 17 June, a copy of the second resolution referred to in paragraph 10 above (A/AC.109/531) was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/12098). On 18 June, copies of that resolution and of the first resolution referred to in paragraph 10 above (A/AC.109/530) were transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations for the attention of his Government. Copies of both resolutions were also transmitted to all States. A copy of the first resolution (A/AC.109/530) was also transmitted to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE 13. The text of resolution A/AC.109/530, adopted by the Special Committee at its 1038th meeting, on 16 June, to which reference is made in paragraph 10 above, is reproduced below:  
The Special Committee,

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),  
 Having heard the statements of the representative of the administering  
 Power, 2/  
 Having heard the statements of the representatives of the national  
 liberation movement, the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANC  
 (Zimbabwe)),  
 who participated in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item, 3/  
 Taking into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the  
 Special Committee at its 1029th meeting on 1 April 1976, L\_/

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial  
 Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (Xv) of  
 2/ AYAC.109/PV.1033 and corrigendum and 1036.  
 3/ A/AC.109/PV.1033 and corrigendum and 1035.  
 4/ Chap. VII of the present report, annex I (p. 17 above).

-99-

otät I I I i i -y a      ii- -y t.      Jý -t      t -1ý t  
 i  
 i. JL z m iv  
 \_7r  
 1 5,  
 7\*7, !=,f.  
 5 i  
 77\_-ié--TT  
 Ass 0-i; p: --åk  
 AL-,  
 Äý i  
 -mumsmums  
 \_Ag  
 r i a - iiiiiiiiiiiiiii- iiiiiiiiiiiiiii- T .....

'16 wp  
 \_ý11 ~la 1ý4  
 2,      vå      4  
 mm  
 ta ä  
 MIM  
 2 r 7E t milli  
 10 av SI lok åka -5ý om      3-1 i  
 g Fl ;7 oro      3 lom- 5 e  
 AcÄýíý  
 skovla  
 -r -:Ct      i- ISA  
 .. .....  
 \_teg,  
 T-r;-! !Tf t åk ylt i      1 4 i- 4 ýk      in  
 . . . . . - - - - -

- to secure by all the means at their disposal the enjoyment of that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the national liberation movement of the Territory, the African National Council of Zimbabwe, the sole and authentic representative of the true aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe;
  3. Strongly condemns the continued brutal and repressive measures perpetrated by the illegal racist minority regime against the people of Zimbabwe and in particular the wanton killings of Africans carried out by that regime;
  4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the discharge of its primary responsibility as the administering Power, to take all effective measures to enable Zimbabwe to accede to independence in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population and not under any circumstances to accord to the illegal regime any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty;
  5. Commends the relevant sections of the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee at its 1029th meeting, on 1 April 1976, to the administering Power for appropriate action;
  6. Firmly supports the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of their national liberation movement, the African National Council of Zimbabwe, in their struggle to achieve majority rule, and emphasizes the importance of maintaining a united leadership within the liberation movement;
  7. Demands:
    - (a) The termination forthwith of the executions of freedom fighters being carried out by the illegal Smith regime;
    - (b) The unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, the removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of Political rights, as well as the restoration to the population of fundamental human rights;
    - (c) The discontinuance forthwith of all repressive measures, in particular the brutality committed in "the operational area", the arbitrary closure of African areas, the eviction, transfer and resettlement of Africans and the creation of so-called protected villages;
    - (d) The cessation of the influx of foreign immigrants into the Territory and the immediate withdrawal of all mercenaries therefrom;

-101-

I ý, - \_ - ,

--\_ý 1- 1 T

a oms

17 stilla 13 i i 1- ä - - - - - 1 som t4 ly 1 1 t f !r i7



ih\_ý -----  
slå  
ren 01  
p y . . . . .  
om y 1M  
TF T-iiri o-na. tillät kost 10 MAMMAS ýii4ý \_ý4  
-AMS ffi=g ZZ7 YT  
. . . . .  
-fj på ---- -1 ,  
et et att: et lang t av-na  
SE  
idiot, . i171,  
dummiiz77o-, 4 9  
-unna; mede  
3ýýw ew  
vii; 01 ö ----- Äl 11 1 --  
- - - -  
MAJ  
46-ýt 2-.ri 52=  
- -----XT Yza 77-x.c. J  
CY -M Mer Vä  
04 t7\_ýjt- --7-- 1-1-r-ýý -----ipy ateíýee2ý ;12  
-0==ý: 7 1 - .. - - - - - 74 milo qF-~~ ýr-  
mamman  
:e z. n: i  
-lits=mommtms~ý,  
77 VT Ivo  
Kupp  
igigottetta  
äj  
77 ä ý0 i rrz li-l.- -:i Z  
attart-IL

Considit.:rin4 thlat jev, opnients in the r'aii in !'--cl r 1  
positive, concerted international action with a view to imposing maximum  
isolation on the illegal regime,  
Reaffirmina its conviction that the sanctions will not put an end to the  
illegal racist minority rggime unless they are comprehensive, mandatory and  
effectively supervised, enforced and complied with, particularly by South  
Africa,  
Noting with appreciation the decision of the Government of Mozambique to  
close its borders with Southern Rhodesia and to impose sanctions against the  
illegal racist minority regime in compliance with the relevant decisions of the  
Security Council,  
1. Strongly condemns the policies of the Governments, particularly the  
Government of South Africa, which, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the

United Nations and in open contravention of their specific obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, continue to collaborate with the illegal racist minority regime, and calls upon those Governments to cease forthwith all such collaboration;

2. Condemns all violations of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council, as well as the continued failure of certain Member States to enforce those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 25 of the Charter;

3. Condemns the continued importation of chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) into the United States of America, and calls on the Government of the United States to repeal speedily all legislation permitting such importation;

4. Calls upon all Governments which so far have not done so:

(a) To take stringent enforcement measures to ensure strict compliance by all individuals, associations and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to prohibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal regime;

(b) To take effective steps to prevent or discourage the emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of any individuals or groups of individuals under their jurisdiction;

(c) To discontinue any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime, inter alia, by forbidding the operation and activities of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist Board and the Rhodesian Information Office, or any other activities which contravene the aims and purposes of the sanctions;

(d) To invalidate passports and other documents for travel to the Territory;

-103-

j j 2

-----  
-----  
-i 7 1TU 77,77-,

... ..

i- t

7 T

=7 77-- 77,

;-ýi ýLn lfý-7

-----

j, --jýý,

.....  
7" 7 -JL

-fy

ý2 7:

J

i 4 b-i

7 7~.....

-----

J 7ýý

- 4,iaã

Kf-,

.....

i z 2

-----

-44,

7ý3

jrr t j7ý tý

z T

-----

----- .....

z

u4

-----

-----

TT

-----

.....

y

ANNEX\*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

Paragraphs

- 1. Land and people ..... . 1-5
- 2. African National Council of Zimbabwe since December 1974 .... 6 - 17
- 3. Efforts towards a political settlement .... .. 18 - 50
- 4. Armed liberation struggle ... .. 1 - 64
- 5. Brutality in Southern Rhodesia ..... .... 65 - 87
- 6. Economic conditions ..... .. 88 - 107
- 7. Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia ..... 108 - 137

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.1068 and Add.1-2.

-105-

----- j

-3 1

::z v-;

-----

!544 111 ffill!! 4 -----LT-I MT tv

t\_i7 7

Å7ý4- , rz

-----

j

Z 1 7 Z - 7

ý-1 4-A

.....

-----

-----

. . . . .

j  
1 \$4 i441 1-y' ----- -tr  
4 1

-----

IS- -nVk

4 17

-- - M-Tb"r

08 affi,

.....

-----21

-JÄÄ44ý '22ý1m gtz4.ý" .. i -1

-----

.....

-----wv

-3-7.

11 T! tTT

7 LP, ;4 i 444 iä.i4 ii '.AIJ

i 7 7 Zn

.....

-----

-----

P4 + mn

+ +

O-N-

N

Q) r-I

rl

U" \ 10

i

0 c:)

CO t+z +ý

CO

t

C\

o --- iHý

o G\ -

+ I +

o 0 0

mY- Q, U, \ O7\ r4ý CO

Coo

+

4-1

o

0

I 0

o 0  
0 en «,  
COc t- + C7\  
r-41 ý c 0  
\* 0  
en  
0  
cc \0  
--t  
0  
0  
ti\  
4.  
0Z  
4J 00  
-44 'No CO  
10  
CO  
74  
rco  
0~ --0 <f~ U,  
\$4  
rCi I Cd to.~ > 0.  
4-) C 1> ,  
~ I 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 > 0  
-107-  
o 0  
0 0 0  
\Di CO. t00 \D [!0 CO 1,0  
Ä- ä- AJ-- f 7T .....  
....  
IN  
gå gaggägyim ýCW:JL  
-Mim  
X  
W .....  
Åa ut-4r  
W jp  
pk  
~ miZiMä X4A. 15:MCss!7~aemgä== it  
Sia  
ap  
.....  
S,2 !lic  
OM

ig-om W  
----- :rei  
4 il W J  
ff ý1,- T, el,  
---i -7

7. Because of the differences in the interpretations of the agreement between the illegal regime and ANC (Zimbabwe), a constitutional conference was not held within the envisaged period of three months. Differences within the Council developed as

to whether the congress should be held before or after the constitutional conference.

The two main positions were articulated by Mr. James Chikerema and Mr. Joshua Nkomo.

Mr. Chikerema was of the view that holding the congress before the constitutional conference would split the Council because the council leaders in exile, the Zimbabwe combatants and the Zimbabweans in protected villages would not be represented at the congress. He also thought that the competition for leadership at the congress would undermine the unity and common front which the Zimbabwe leaders

had to present at the constitutional conference.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Nkomo maintained that the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity specifically stated that the congress must be held within four months and that only the congress could decide that there would be no congress. He also considered it

necessary that the question of leadership should be solved first so that APNC (Zimbabwe) would speak at the constitutional conference with one voice, representing

the unity of Zimbabwe.

9. On 2 July 1975, Bishop Muzorewa summoned all executive members of the Council inside and outside Zimbabwe to meet at Dar es Salaam to discuss their differences. At the meeting it was decided, inter alia, that the proposed congress should be postponed indefinitely and that the Executive Committee of the Council should

continue to operate under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa. The leaders further pledged to work together for the liberation of Zimbabwe, including preparations for the resumption of armed struggle if peaceful and diplomatic approaches were to fail.

10. The Dar es Salaam meeting appeared to have strengthened the unity of the Council. This was reflected in the agreement reached at Lusaka in August 1975 to meet with the illegal regime at Victoria Falls on 25 August (see paras. 24-30 below). The Council took advantage of the presence of many of its executive members at Lusaka in August 1975 to restructure its external wing, which would be responsible for the armed struggle. On 1 September, following the Victoria Falls meeting, the Council set up the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC), charged with the responsibility of dealing with all external matters and consisting

of 21 members, including the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, Mr. Chikerema and Mr. Jason Moyo. Mr. Nkomo agreed not to become a member of ZLC since he was to remain inside Southern Rhodesia.

11. On 7 September, Mr. Ukomo and Mr. Samuel Monodawafa, National Chairman of ANC (Zimbabwe), convened a meeting of some executive members of the Council at Salisbury, at which they condemned the setting up of ZLC and decided to convene a congress of the Council in order to restructure the Council, including its leadership.

12. Bishop Muzorewa subsequently declared that the date fixed for the congress was illegal. He accused Mr. Nkomo of collaborating with the enemy in promoting disunity by proposing to convene the congress, and expelled Mr. Nkomo and two other members from the Council. Several other members, whom he accused of collaborating With Mr. Nkomo, were suspended.

-109-

-----  
.....  
.....  
----- .....

42

.....  
-----44  
.....  
-----  
.....  
----- .....

----- .....

----- .....

-----  
-----ýs i  
-----

### 3. EFFORTS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

A. Issue of a constitutional conference 18. It will be recalled that the exact terms of the agreement reached at Lusaka

in December 1974 on the question of a constitutional conference were disputed from the beginning, d/ The Zimbabwe leaders were said to have understood that the illegal regime had agreed to: (a) the immediate release of all African detainees and prisoners; (b) the convening, without preconditions, of a constitutional conference; and (c) the creation of an atmosphere in Southern Rhodesia conducive to free political activities. On this understanding, the Zimbabwe leaders had agreed to an informal cease-fire which would be made it-lure when the date for a constitutional conference had been set.

19. One of the main differences between the illegal regime and ANC (Zimbabwe) concerned the venue of the constitutional conference. The illegal regime asserted

that the conference was likely to be lengthy and that it would be impossible for Mr. Ian Smith to be away from Southern Rhodesia for a long period. Thus, the illegal regime demanded that substantial discussions on all issues involved should be held in Southern Rhodesia, after which 't would be prepared to hold a meeting outside Southern Rhodesia to ratify agreements already reached in the Territory.

20. The Council maintained that the constitutional conference should be held outside Southern Rhodesia because some of its delegates, including Mr. Chikerema, whom the illegal had condemned to death asenta, and Mr. Sithole, who

was wnder the threat of detention, could not return to southern Rhodesia without the benefit of an amnesty. This was confirmed by the illegal regime, which informed the Council that "the law will take its full course" if men like Mr. Sithole and Mr. Chikerema were ever to return to Southern Rhodesia.

21. The Council offered to meet the illegal r6gime anywhere in the world except in Southern Rhodesia, because it feared that the illegal regime, if given the opportunity, would spare no efforts to eliminate some of the leaders of the Council. They even suggested Messina and Pretoria in South Africa, or Gaborone in Botswana, all within easy reach of Salisbury. Any of these sites would have enabled the delegates of the illegal regime to return to Southern Rhodesia whenever they wanted while attending the constitutional conference. The illegal r6gime rejected these proposals, however.

B. Visit of United Kingdom Minister of State to Southern Rhodesia

22. Towards the end of June 1975, Mr. David Ennals, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, visited Southern Rhodesia following trips to South Africa and Mozambique. While in the Territory, he met with a number of dI Ibid., paras. 82-88 and 97.

-111-

-----  
-----  
.....  
----- = I  
ri  
.....  
q- i H i M C,  
-1,111511111~  
k4 . . . . .  
ýjýTT7 -----  
--E2-4gm4f,-4  
sp  
..... ~  
----- --tt-,  
.....  
~ýPTTNV\_ !M T  
fy= T -----m 2,94m11,11ft+t+tý



PRX

L4"

PosPIS W 11

(a) ANC (Zimbabwe) and the Rhodesian Front Government should publicly express

their genuine desire to negotiate a constitutional settlement.

(b) Both parties should publicly state that the only genuine settlement for the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia is one that shall be based on the transfer of power from the minority to the majority of the people, "that is to say majority rule now".

(c) Both parties should state that in order to make the talks genuine and successful, the element of coercion must be absent: "Accordingly all the talks must be held on the Bridge, or elsewhere outside Rhodesia, acceptable to both parties."

(d) Both parties should agree that "the deliberations of the conference should be dealt with by the plenary session and not by committees. The plenary session may, however, appoint committees where necessary. Such committees shall also deliberate outside Rhodesia."

(e) Both parties should acknowledge that "there is no explicit or implicit cease fire".

The illegal regime also submitted a document containing a summary of the Pretoria Agreement of 9 August 1975.

27. The Council maintained that it had neither been a participant in the negotiations which led to the Pretoria Agreement nor a signatory to that document; its position had always been that all negotiations must take place outside Southern Rhodesia. The illegal regime claimed that Zambia had signed the Pretoria Agreement on behalf of the Council and thus, according to that Agreement, a joint committee or committees was to carry out the negotiations inside Southern Rhodesia.

28. During the meeting, the Council introduced what it considered was a compromise on the point in dispute concerning the venue of the committee meetings. It suggested that since some of the members of its negotiating team, including Mr. Chikerema and Mr. Sithole, would face arrest if they entered Southern Rhodesia, the illegal regime would have to grant them immunity while they were in the Territory to attend negotiating sessions. The illegal regime replied that the question of immunity had not been raised in the Pretoria Agreement and therefore could not be discussed as it would amend that Agreement.

29. Since no accord could be reached on this point, the meeting broke up. On his return to Salisbury, Mr. Smith addressed the Southern Rhodesian House of Assembly, where he announced that he would begin to seek negotiations with African chiefs and other moderate Africans in the Territory. Mr. Smith blamed ANC (Zimbabwe) for having wrecked the Victoria Falls meeting.

30. Bishop Muzorewa, in a press statement after the Victoria Falls meeting, said that "Mr. Smith torpedoed every effort of ours that would have led to a full-scale

conference". President Kaunda also stated that, in his opinion, "the ANC was quite right in demanding that Mr. Smith should allow all the ANC representatives back home to be present at the talks when they start in Salisbury".

-113-

----- ... ..  
----- --..... ..  
----- - - - - - - - - - -

10 to 15 years, with the following distribution of seats: one third to Europeans, one third to Africans and the remainder to those elected on a national basis from a common roll with higher qualifications. (The qualifications would be such that the majority of those elected would be Europeans.)

38. Each delegation rejected the proposals of the other, with the ensuing impasse and the rupture in the talks.

E. United Kingdom position in regard to the Smith-Nkomo talks

39. On 4 December 1975, shortly after it had been announced that Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo would meet formally at Salisbury, Mr. Ennals (see paras. 22-23 above) flew to Zambia. He is reported to have met with both Bishop Muzorewa and Mr. Nkomo at Lusaka. On his return to London, he issued a statement warning Mr. Smith that if he did not come to terms with the Zimbabwe nationalists there would be bloodshed in Southern Rhodesia and the whites would lose the war. It was reported that the United Kingdom Government did not wish to be involved in the Smith-Nkomo talks until some progress had been made.

40. In February 1976, Mr. James Callaghan, then United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was reported to have received information that Mr. Smith would welcome British participation and initiatives to help resolve the deadlock in the talks between Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo. After further contacts between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. Smith, the latter said in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, on 20 February, that he would welcome any British "constructive and realistic effort to assist in our settlement". He said that the situation in southern Africa was serious and that Southern Rhodesia had to change its "tactics".

41. Mr. Callaghan is reported to have informed Mr. Smith that the United Kingdom would be willing to assist in the talks if the illegal regime agreed to renounce its state of illegality and to revert to the status of a British colony and if it gave assurances to the United Kingdom that it was prepared to make meaningful concessions to the African population. Subsequently, Mr. Callaghan decided to send Lord Greenhill, the former head of the Diplomatic Services in the Foreign Office, to Salisbury to hold exploratory talks with Mr. Smith on the Southern Rhodesian problem.

42. Lord Greenhill visited Salisbury for two days at the end of February and met With both Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo. The supporters of Bishop Muzorewa in Southern Rhodesia refused to meet with Lord Greenhill and reportedly staged a demonstration Protesting his visit. According to the Reverend Max Chigwida,

Acting Publicity Secretary of the faction of ANC (Zimbabwe) led by Bishop Muzorewa, the Council perceived the United Kingdom's "current manoeuvres" as irrelevant. Lord Greenhill submitted his report to Mr. Callaghan on 1 March. No details of the report have been released.

43. On 20 March, Mr. Smith called on the United Kingdom to play an active part in the attempt to resolve the impasse in the talks. He stated that if he found the British role in the talks to be in the best interests of Southern Rhodesia he would

7 7

. ... .. ck

-17P

- ýlmgr

4r.

i 77ý

u-l- :ýLILLJ ýww jf

=mT

PL-ziilly

-9T xý

lä

2t

.3k

OF

<NIT ..... ..

-3u-

-10

t

s Y,, = ' ýZACý7fý 'ý --.w f

'11"ý' kMý

j

4P t ý.L

49. The ANC (Zimbabwe) reportedly decided to hold a consultative meeting at Lusaka on 16 April, with a view to the unification of its ranks inside and outside the

Territory.

G. Reaction of white ri nelements in Southern Rhodesia

50. The right-wing elements in Southern Rhodesia have been highly vocal since the initiation of steps to reach a settlement. An article published in the newspaper Property and Finance warned that Mr. Smith was preparing "the blackest political deceit ever perpetrated in the country's history ... after many months of secret moves with Nkomo". In November 1975, in an effort to strengthen their position, the right-wing groups joined the Rhodesian National Movement (RNM), which is a merger of the United Conservative Party and the Rhodesia National Party. The RNM has demanded that, since the three Southern Rhodesia constitutions adopted since 1923 had been placed before the electorate in referenda for approval,

whatever agreement Mr. Smith worked out with Mr. Nkomo should similarly be placed before the electorate as presently constituted for approval. This position is also supported by the Southern African Solidarity Congress (SASCON), a consultative organization of right-wing groups in Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Des Frost, the Chairman of the Rhodesian Front, has assured the white population that not a single member of the Rhodesian Front sitting in Parliament would contemplate acceptance of an agreement which would assure majority rule in the foreseeable future.

-11T-

.....  
----- i t ý2 t2 t  
.....  
2w  
lö  
..... . . . . .  
- - - - -  
08  
YTI  
-c ýU ----- . . . . .  
bý  
- - - - -Ams: -----u-u  
- - - - - \_e-3  
en  
-----t  
7.ý7-3- ~1 iär.  
if  
444944 \_c""m  
. fgii4  
..... UU

I'hot pursuit' of Zimbabwe guerrillas, with a resultant loss of life of Mozambican civilians.  
58. Further, the illegal regime has seized all Mozambican assets and finances in Southern Rhodesia in retaliation for the seizure by Mozambique of all Southern Rhodesian assets in that State.  
B. Organization of AfricanUnity  
59. With the attainment of independence of the former Portuguese Territories, the decolonization efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have been directed mostly towards the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Since January 1975, OAU has given increased attention to the liberation of African Territories still under white rule, with top priority to Zimbabwe and Namibia.  
60. At its twenty-fourth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa in February 1975, the Council of Ministers of OAU adopted a document calling on all liberation movements in African Territories still under white rule, inter alia, to:



777 ~7 om: --41  
pljyssof- j-pilt a mua,  
7 7 9ý ý7,Y  
Lä====- Morr=- -1 ----- vang pmy a -----o-mumsymndso.  
Tussymmo-- 4, -4s1 li=-tettnee-t,-,  
une c~... MUS. vi x i &1 - -4ssntttol i ocamastf!Yf när  
-MIS- ttý--s7is  
ee-eTllýý  
-\_. ý . -1 -  
loppol.-us-ýý-U.s  
týå=  
1 å- 2 1 i 1 ä 11 - .....  
-----wiskolissommlintor ock  
ien~ess ;å: i00-11 s- ýIIOM  
-----enwaitionerör  
--=littitilt- urfrf!! ý----AT171MTtsle=M=YO ts--  
0...sloosomstudstallastaerinstti'ifetf: 2 5: Mj Myn a  
i stnissys an. aT rot 11 i 1M om; å\_~; -- uýý7o -oms vTuvurr- --- - e- ---- -  
42 0,1  
t21 j 11 opos=lfjju en  
spi solstol, Mäss T1,0m00000spiV e om M  
t---ýzmvw -----.....  
WV=  
WMJ -----1 L ---ä.  
- ----- 10 smart  
utliftiTtitzloid-lumm,- tringel  
1.1.ue stf th Allt 12110  
vo-vnj-w sommlirivi IOL Mani  
ans el a pv=vmasmelsel;-:e I I om; mar swu= spä---. ý  
LåA wk  
M tii Män jul i r14 121 =M i scen 021 jgorra.sei i i-t stretta av  
P =PMp ..... veMM-MUM  
!,inri  
..... .. rEIEE7r11117077"71-==  
t stil i f ff  
1;1i:ili::11:117z11 ý 0. Ar ý0 - --- s^ssoosom2  
- .;åsäk;ä-ljtose.nyny.-w.-==  
ý -\_7577=

## 5. BRUTALITY IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

65. A report prepared by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia recounted shocking incidents of brutality perpetrated by the forces of the illegal regime on unarmed African civilians. f/ These revelations were confirmed by Nir. Niall MacDermont, Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, who said in Southern Rhodesia in October 1975 that he had received much evidence that violent brutality by security forces had been

perpetrated on African civilians. He went on to say that the illegal regime was reluctant to take any action to put an end to this brutality for fear of "undermining the morale of the security forces".

A. Brutality in the "operational area"

66. The illegal regime has declared certain parts of Southern Rhodesia, especially in the north-east and the east, as the "operational area" where fighting takes place between the Zimbabwe forces and the forces of the illegal regime. According to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, "many instances of deliberate assaults and of gross disregard for the life and property of inhabitants in the operational area by members of the security forces" have been reported. The Commission decided to investigate these instances and "only what has been corroborated" was included in its final report. The Commission's report reveals many instances of brutality committed in this area. The Commission also believes that "there are an unknown number of other cases which have not been reported". Ten of the cases of brutality investigated are summarized below.

67. After Zimbabwean forces had undertaken some operations in Mudzi District, Mtoko, about 160 kilometres north-east of Salisbury, security forces went to the village of Mr. Antony Dzvinamurungu to question the villagers. In the course of the questioning, two sisters-in-law of Mr. Dzvinamurungu, whose names were given as Winnie (who was pregnant at that time) and Praxedes, were assaulted by the soldiers. When Mr. Dzvinamurungu complained about this brutality, he was taken to the Mtoko police station, where he was repeatedly beaten, his hair pulled out and a pair of scissors placed against his genitals with a threat to cut them off.

68. On 19 April 1974, five helicopters, accompanied by an attack aircraft, flew over a section of the country in the north-east. The aircraft made two attacks on a group of seven children between the ages of 5 and 14 years, near some cattle in the field. Two children were killed and the others were injured.

69. In August, Mrs. Monica Deka and her daughter, of the Chesa African Purchase Area near Mt. Darwin, were picked up by the police and assaulted at the IiYaahoboko Base Camp. The assault "involved kicking, striking, shackling, blindfolding and the application of an instrument with electrical effects". No clear reason was stated by the police for this assault.

t/ The Man in the Middle: torture, resettlement and eviction, compiled by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia (Catholic Institute for International Relations, Salisbury, 1975).

-121-

.....

.....

4yi

tt

.....

19PEMMI- err

-----..... .. . . . . .

1111 lik

-----2-11

RE

T7

TI XT 5 1

7ý

, tjýtýEmil=

jgggggýt t

V7

-----

#### B. Brutality in the "protected villages"

77. In 1973, the illegal rggime ordered that people in the Zambezi Valley be resettled in what it called "protected villages". The eviction and resettlement of the population were apparently aimed at isolating the Zimbabwe guerrillas from any contact with the African civilian population.

76. By mid-1974, the illegal rggime had decided that the entire population of the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, estimated to be between 43,000 and 47,000, should be resettled into 21 protected villages. Shortly thereafter, 13,500 Africans from the iVdziwa Tribal Trust Land were moved into 10 protected villages. By January 1975, similar settlements had been created in the Mtoko, Mudzi and Ivrewa areas; it is estimated that over 100,000 people have been placed in the so-called protected villages.

T9. According to reports, a typical protected village covers an area of about 40 hectares, surrounded by a fence with gates which are guarded and locked during the night. The number of residents varies from village to village.

30. Many cases of brutality and sheer disregard of human life in the protected villages have been reported. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia examined conditions in these villages and their findings confirmed these reports. One of the witnesses, Dr. Hill, a European doctor who has visited the protected villages in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land, told the Commission: 'Conditions at Nyachuru Protected Village where 200-300 people are behind wires are appalling. There was no sanitation or running water, and apart from one asbestos shelter, people were living in the open ... It is like picking up animals and moving them from one field to another.'

81. People in the protected villages are reported to be very bitter. The experience of having been forced to abandon their homes and, in some cases, businesses, and of having to live on government-rationed food has played havoc with

normal family life. According to these reports, the villagers are allowed to leave protected villages to work in their fields which are near their former homes. Consequently, in most cases, these villagers have to walk very long distances Without food and have to return to the protected villages before curfew.

82. Health conditions are said to be very poor. Some villages have no toilet facilities and water is said to be insufficient and in some cases dirty. The COMmission reported that in the Zambezi Valley, "towards the end of 1974, there



Were reports from one border area of a strange illness which caused children to shake violently and sometimes to die. The visiting doctor ascribed this to the spraying of vegetation from the air with defoliants."

d3. During the 1974 rainy season, many of these villages reportedly had outbreaks Of typhoid. A spokesman for the Chiweshe villaes told the Commission:

-123-

2 p

-----

r t

-ö-, 0

-M

MOT

~g

uX000

z z

a M Ios-

11 MCC

.0 M . . . . . -7ý.-,- still!!

-ýx- -7 7

orm

\_37

:n

i TF

! omw;:

e e e -,4 r

..... ---4-4

av

träI morr 1-i- nk

~=MOM fals 1177 27 M

io2tw-o-t-it

ele7cTele\*eze 0-5 Sor 37 r--j

I Z CM t

SOMS

;cvC

i44 Z. Ä

Oår

C

9 ý1, ",r-r 7 1,1,

T-7

-J- \_i7

i c

IL Upp~

-i A

## 6. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

### A. General

88. It is not possible to obtain accurate figures pertaining to the economy of Southern Rhodesia. Most available statistics are provided by the illegal regime and are often misleading.

89. In his budget speech to Parliament, Mr. John Wrathall, the Minister of Finance, revealed that in 1974/75 Southern Rhodesia had an unfavourable balance of trade and a deficit on current and capital accounts of SR 15.7 million g/ (see table 3 below). According to Mr. Wrathall, the balance-of-payments deficit, made worse by "adverse leads and lags in payments" was the direct result of the severe drain on the liquid resources of the banking sector.

90. He also expressed the fear that both domestic and international economic factors would have a severe impact on the balance of payments in 1975/76, and said that "foreign currency allocations for imports have had to be markedly reduced, so much so that a few businesses may well be forced to suspend operations when current stocks are exhausted; others will be substantially curtailed in their operations. In blunt terms, Rhodesia faces a period of hardship, although one which should be of relatively short duration".

91. Southern Rhodesia's expenditure on imports rose by 42 per cent in 1974 but earnings from exports rose by only 26 per cent. here was also a net outflow on invisible transactions or \$R 131 million, mainly because of increased charges for external services such as freight, insurance and port dues. Mr. Wrathall noted, however, that the merchandise account had a surplus of \$R 52.4 million and that there was a net inflow in the capital account of \$R 63.3 million. Nevertheless these two favourable trends were insufficient to offset the deficit on invisible transactions (see table 3 below).

92. In 1974/75, the Rhodesia Railways again suffered a deficit, amounting to \$R 22.9 million or 15 per cent more than the deficit of the previous year. The illegal regime has had to continue to subsidize the Rhodesia Railways since, according to Mr. Wrathall, the alternative policy would be "a drastic upward revision of rates", which "would not be in the national interest". The illegal regime has decided to continue with large subsidization, together with a moderate increase in rates.

93. In 1974/75, the Tobacco Corporation continued to dispose of tobacco stocks to eliminate stockpiling, thus incurring further losses, which were partially offset by a subsidy of R 3.2 million from the illegal regime. Support given to the industry since 1965 now totals \$R 112.9 million.

&e In September 1975, Southern Rhodesia revalued the Southern Rhodesian dollar (Bee para. 106 below).

-125-

Jý' - - - - -  
cu ---. .... .  
- - - -----zm  
4ýs  
4  
lic- iiiir  
. . . . .  
'j C  
. . . . .  
giwi. 4EE  
.....

..... .

..... .

7 >ý

... ..

94. Wheat producers, who had also suffered losses in the year ending 31 March 1975, received a subsidy of \$R 2.2 million from the illegal regime.

95. According to Mr. Wrathall, losses in the cotton industry resulted from the sharp fall in world cotton prices during 1974/75. The illegal regime guaranteed a producer price of 22 cents a kilogram "to maintain confidence among growers, and to maintain stability". As a result, the Cotton Marketing Board received \$R 5.1 million in subsidies from the illegal regime to cover trading losses.

96. Mr. Wrathall expressed concern with the current trend of inflation in Southern Rhodesia, stating that, despite price control, inflation was rising at a high rate. The European consumer price index rose by 7.4 per cent in 1974/75, and 4.3 per cent in the first six months of 1975. The African consumer price index increased by 4.8 per cent between December 1974 and March 1975.

97. Mr. Wrathall stated that the Government had decided to reimpose a 10 per cent surcharge tax on personal and company income, which was expected to produce \$R 22 million to help offset an anticipated budget deficit of \$R 25 million. Lower tax scales would be introduced to enable persons earning more than \$R 5,000 annually to save \$R 100 a year, and company taxes would be raised from 40 to 44 cents of the Rhodesian dollar.

98. Mr. Wrathall also announced that the illegal regime planned to spend \$R 740 million on capital development for the three fiscal years 1975/76-1977/78. About 75 per cent of these funds were to be allocated to economic services with priority to transport, communications and power. Mr. Wrathall refused to give more details of the public sector investment programme because "sanctions surveillance, if anything, has been stepped up".

#### B. Gross domestic product and foreign exchange situation

99. According to statistics released by the illegal regime, the gross domestic product of the Territory in 1974/75 rose by 20 per cent in money terms, which is 9-10 per cent in real growth terms. This is viewed by the regime as an indication of economic improvement, especially when the 1974/75 real growth rate is compared with the 1973/74 real growth rate of 5 per cent. The industrial origin of the gross domestic product for the Territory since 1965 is shown in table 4 below.

100. The Economic Survey of Rhodesia, published by the illegal regime, attributes

this seemingly improved economic situation to recovery in the agricultural industry and to steady growth in the manufacturing sector (see tables 5 and 7 below). The Economic Survey notes, however, that in 1975/76, the rationing of fuel and fertilizers will affect the agricultural industry and the fall of some mining commodity prices will affect the unit value of mining output.

101. In the first four months of 1975, the output of the mining sector was at roughly the same level as that for the same period in 1974 and 4 per cent below the 1973 level. The value of the output of the mining sector in the first four

months of 1975 was a minimum of 9 per cent below those for the same periods between 1965 and 1974, despite the fact that lower prices for copper and tin have been offset by the higher prices of nickel and gold (see also table 6 below).

-127-

| A, ål. -A. |            | 3 45    |          |
|------------|------------|---------|----------|
| 2W tv-77.- |            |         |          |
| -----      |            |         |          |
| Ar w       | -7 T       |         |          |
| =51        |            |         |          |
| ie         | Ä          |         |          |
| ZI,        |            |         |          |
| k7         |            |         |          |
| -----      |            |         |          |
| z7         |            | '7      |          |
| ES         |            |         | kg       |
| -w -11     | Zý_        | -i      |          |
| -----      |            |         |          |
| ""CT ý 7   |            | m -Te.- | 97, ir1* |
| ar         |            |         |          |
| 3i224      | A-åk'4ý;AP |         |          |
| 4t,        | -b-        | -jr-    | ~ULV     |
| AL         |            |         |          |
| Q,         | z t        | If      |          |

Table 5

Southern Rhodesia: agricultural output, 1969-1974

(million Southern Rhodesian dollars)

European agriculture:

gross output

African agriculture: approximate contribution by rural households

171.5 168.4 208.2 233.0 247.3 311.8

67.7

55.8

75.7 86.5 64.1

00.6

Source:

Southern Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, August 1975.

Note: Some of the figures provided by the illegal régime in its Monthly Digest of Statistics, June 1974, were amended in the Monthly Digest of Statistics, August 1975.

Table 6

Southern Rhodesia: mineral output, 1969-1974

(million Southern Rhodesian dollars)

Period  
1969 1970  
1971 1972 1973 1974

Value  
87.7 98.7  
101.2 107.4 135.9  
165.2

Source: Southern Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, August 1975.

-129-  
Year  
1969 1970  
1971 1972 1973 1974

.....  
-----  
-----  
.....  
n=4U I  
.....  
-----  
-----f i I T I  
yM\$ \$4  
-----  
14  
.....  
.....  
-----i :7  
4-y-2 444-l Y-k  
-----

slightly darker, bread flour, which reportedly is obtained by "extracting more flour from a given amount of wheat and would save on foreign currency and subsidies".

106. In September 1975, Southern Rhodesia devalued its dollar by 8 per cent against non-South African rand areas and revalued its dollar by 10 per cent against the South African rand. This move was taken in response to the South African devaluation of the rand by 17.9 per cent. Southern Rhodesia collects most of its foreign exchange in South African rand. Thus, the Southern Rhodesian moves revalued the Southern Rhodesian dollar at R 1.34, compared with the previous rate of R 1.22. However, the Southern Rhodesian dollar is now valued at \$US 1.60, compared with the previous rate of \$US 1.73.

C. Employment

107. Information concerning the employment situation in Southern Rhodesia is contained in chapter IV of the present report, annex I (A/31/23/Rev.1, vol. I).

.....  
-----

---- c4

i i 14

3 1

-----U.7

z EU-

.4ý

âtq- -- 1 11 - I -

--1 1-~~~~.1.11

W-n, 4c

. . . . .

4 2

-----.....

.2 M, 11, 1. K 1 1, 1,1

-----.....

¥4 9

-----

postal, telegraphic, radio and other communications sanctions being applied against the Territory. Other proposals which were put forward but failed to receive the

unanimous approval of the Committee included- (a) a request that Member States deny landing rights in their respective territories to flights scheduled to include stopovers in Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers and/or goods to and from Southern Rhodesia; (b) a recommendation that the Security Council decide to request Member States which have consular services or posts in southern Africa not to renew or issue passports to their nationals whom they believe to be residing in Southern Rhodesia; (c) a recommendation that the Security Council decide to request Member States to enact legislation making it illegal for their citizens to travel to Southern Rhodesia; and (d) a proposal to extend sanctions to include South Africa.

113. On 6 April 1976, after considering the special report of the Security Council Committee, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 388 (1976), in which it decided that all Member States should take appropriate measures to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territories do not insure: (a) any commodities or products exported from, or intended for importation into, Southern Rhodesia; and (b) commodities, products or property in Southern Rhodesia of any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia. The Council also decided that all Member States should take appropriate measures to prevent their

nationals and persons in their territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia the right to use any trademark or from entering into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade name, trade mark or registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products, commodities or services of such an undertaking. The Council urged States not members of the United Nations to act in accordance with

the provisions of the resolution.

C. Decision of the Government of Mozambique to fulfil  
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia

114. On 3 March 1976, President Samora Moises Machel of Mozambique announced that, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and OAU, as of that day, Mozambique was applying full sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (A/31/61-S/12005).

115. To this end, the Government of Mozambique closed its borders with Southern Rhodesia; prohibited all forms of communication with that Territory; denied passage through Mozambique and its air space of any persons or goods to or from Southern Rhodesia; and confiscated all goods belonging to the illegal regime, to firms based in Southern Rhodesia and to the citizens of that Territory who recognize the illegal regime.

116. Prior to the action taken by the Government of Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia had dispatched the bulk of its exports and received the bulk of its imports through the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques). With the application of full sanctions against the Territory by Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia

-133-

----- . . . . . -----  
-----

S  
-1 7,7 i :+4 :7 7  
9

. . . . .  
-4-477

. . . . .

lj  
åå  
92  
7- -----4  
2ý -----  
77

-j,  
Uff= -----  
4 ý\_1 -1 t

A  
IXT - - 74 i WNW

-2- E  
-i2  
1,44, 4~  
4- H 7  
41

-----  
'y  
4,y

-j r- f f P Pi  
-----

airlines. It is particularly important to note that Air Rhodesia was able to make such a profit despite the fact that in 1974/75, there was a world-wide slump in airline traffic.

F\*. Status of the Byrd amendment

123. It will be recalled that, under the Byrd amendment (see Tn, . 9 above), United States firms were permitted to import chrome and other minerals from Southern Rhodesia. Between 1 January and 30 September 1975, the United States received 43 shipments of minerals from Southern Rhodesia (see table 8 below).

124. On 18 December 1973, the United States Senate voted to repeal the Byrd amendment. The House of Representatives did not act on the amendment until 25 September 1975, however, when it refused a proposal to repeal the amendment. As a result, United States firms continue to violate sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by importing minerals from the Territory without fear of penalties being imposed on them.

125. According to a report published by the United Nations Association of the United States, national security and economic considerations have been advanced against the repeal of the amendment. The supporters of the amendment maintain that metallurgical grade chromite is essential to the United States economy and to its defence needs in a national emergency. They point out that the only other major source of supply is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Consequently the United States should have an alternate source of supply for such a vital product.

126. A second argument is that United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia have caused a dramatic rise in chrome ore prices which has hurt the United States ferro-chrome industries by making their products too expensive to remain competitive. It is also said that the Southern Rhodesian ferro-chrome is important to the stainless steel industry of the United States.

127. Those in favour of the repeal of the amendment point out that the United States has stockpiled more than enough metallurgical grade chromite for its needs: since 1964 the stockpile has amounted to approximately seven times the national annual consumption, including civilian use, and is sufficient for 41 years of defence needs. In fact, between 1966 and 1971, the year the Byrd amendment was passed, the United States sold 204,491 tons of metallurgical chromite from the stockpile.

128. Supporters of the repeal also maintain that the United States does not have to depend on the Soviet Union for its metallurgical grade chromite, inasmuch as a number of other countries are also producers, including Brazil, Greenland, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.



129. According to the same report, the Byrd amendment not only affected the price of chrome but also "any material determined to be strategic and critical". As a  
-135-

tyv- w z w v » L i l z  
i ÉAN i ti J W jw4  
w-  
.....  
mj i;E  
ri A  
"Julr,  
KIM liv  
2 ==43 øxQA  
.....  
:m15x1fft  
T  
-n  
Ler t t---12 . . . . .  
TJ  
-----

the illegal r~gime and the unilateral declaration of independence i:i contradicti,-, to the resolutions of tl< Security Council.  
G. Eiphth report of the Security Council Committee  
135. The eighth report of the Security Council Committee k/ indicates that there are still widespread violations of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The report shows that between 16 December 1974 and 25 December 1975 the Committee had before it 153 cases of possible violation of sanctions. Of this number, 114 concerned imports from Southern Rhodesia: metallic ores, metals and their alloys, 69; tobacco, 18; maize, 24; cotton and cotton seeds, 13. Thirty-nine cases concerned exports to Southern Rhodesia: fertilizers and ammonia, 15; and machinery, including aircraft and/or aircraft spares, 24.  
136. The Committee also considered other cases, including possible violations of sanctions in the banking, insurance and related areas.  
137. Non-governmental organizations have been a useful source of information for the Security Council. The eighth report of the Security Council Committee indicates that 11 cases under consideration were opened from information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations.  
k/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Special Slment No. 2 (S/I1927/Rev.i).

. . . . .  
... ..  
El

Miiiiii\*22

. . . . .

- . . . . .

..... . . . .

.....

. . . . .

M M L: -... --.

KN

. . . . .

.....

. . . . . - - - - - . . . . .

-----

9IM 11111 11111

44>

CO ~ ~ 4 4>44> 4> 4

44.

f44

4>1

0 p> 4> .2 nu

4>4

0 0

41 4>> 4 4 >

-I~ -4.- W\t wN~-4

0 k

4>4

"-4 C

Q- 0<

i 0 4> 4<444

0 1< 4>4 W~ .> ~ , g g> 4> ~04 4»X .4. g> 4.> > ..:-> 4>> 0 P 4

>

-139-

H lj ..... enlIt44tylilk4!1114 -'4

i-ä:f I ä; 4

. . . . .

lo ää - - - - -1 4 1 11 77 77

- - - - -9 9,y 4t

of

eter

ätt slå-

yý2 z z z j - fort- 0

vi kosa

-----7 mir

lip; fi 11 - fIfSp 1 4 1 t I i t t I i I

v i .:- ~p lu: -p, ma mý

4 i i i 1114 11 i 111, teet

2 Mås

IVA\_ ýså äää-Mýý\_ýýM\_ä\_ å- af

som

4 114 g 111 Z 7111111 som

pli

-----  
-rum

SMA

.....

-----men a I e;

x:

I sm= splyfijte!4t!lier!lflil;ýý,;;

med

tie

f777

77~

.. tid

----- 1 i till I- - - - - i v v i den du mässa- svansarnas svi I I

k i i

0 i

ýsjönom

\*mimteater

ist i Mig

&m- w

\*4 zF4 T4 fk 4

i 511 få 9 i å sluss ar SOMW CUMM=m-ms-"

-f 4 U ~fl, va= rymp i 4

Pr fot mf i en 7 denn

Tjimf.äs= go isas, A m 'mý 4411

'ý

y T 3k 4 +Måtåi innernassiti t! tt t ttt kl t tt t

- - - - - . . . . .

ly

## CHAPTER IX

### NAMIBIA

#### A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Namibia at its 1031st and 1037th to 100hth meetings, between 12 May and 17 June 1976.

2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975 on the question of Namibia and resolution 3481 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of resolution 3481 (XXX), the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, ... to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session". The Special Committee also paid due attention to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Namibia and to the reports and decisions of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to present chapter) containing information on developments concerning the Territory. The Committee also had before it a press release issued by the International Commission of Jurists on 11 June 1976 (A/AC.109/532).

4. In its consideration of the item, the Special Committee took into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group established at its 1029th meeting, on 1 April 1976 (chap. VII of the present report, annex I) (p. 17 above) which visited Africa during April and May 1976 in connexion with the discharge of the mandate entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly, with specific reference to the questions of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. At the 1031st meeting, on 15 April, the Chairman made a statement on the work of the Ad Hoc Group (A/AC.109/PV.1031).

1. Participation of the national liberation movement I/

5. In conformity with the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and in accordance with established practice, the Special Committee, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), invited the national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to participate in an observer capacity in its consideration of the item. L/ For a summary of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group with the national liberation movement, see chap. VII of the present report, annex I, paras. 37-50 (PP. 31-35 above).

## B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

14. The text of the consensus (A/AC.109/533) adopted by the Special Committee at its 1040th meeting, on 17 June, to which reference is made in paragraph 10 above, is reproduced below.

1. Having considered the question of Namibia within the context of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and having heard the statements by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia 2/ and by the representative of the South West Africa People's Organization, 3/ participating as an observer, and taking fully into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee at its 1029th meeting on 1 April 1976, 4/ the Special Committee reaffirms its previous resolutions and decisions on the question and once again emphatically denounces the Government of South Africa for its persistent refusal to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia in response to repeated demands by the Security Council and in conformity with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. The Special Committee condemns in the strongest possible terms the efforts by the South African regime to bolster its illegal presence by creating an atmosphere of terror and intimidation in the Territory and by employing tactics, based on the inhuman system of apartheid and "bantustanization", which are aimed at destroying the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.

2. In its further efforts to destroy the national unity of Namibia, the South

African regime has not only continued to implement its policy of "bantustanization" in defiance of United Nations resolutions, but in 1975 resorted to the stratagem of convening a so-called "constitutional conference" of hand-picked representatives, which has proposed a form of self-government based on the principle of apartheid. 5/ The Special Committee, noting that this so-called conference, from which representatives of non-white political parties were expressly excluded, was not representative of majority opinion amongst Namibians, considers that it must be disregarded as a device imposed by the South African regime to give a semblance of validity to its own preconceived policies.

3. The Special Committee reaffirms that the only political solution for Namibia must be one based on the free and unfettered exercise by all the Namibian people of their right to self-determination and independence within a united Namibia, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 2/ A/AC.10g/pv.1037.

3/ Ibid.

/ CHAP. VII of the present report, annex I (p. 17 above).

5/ See annex to the present chapter, para. 31 et seq.

-143-

-----  
-----  
.....  
.....  
-----i LLA 'L  
.....  
-----  
-----

Nations Council for Namibia for the immediate and unconditional release of these prisoners, 6/ and also for the release of all other Namibian political prisoners in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976). It earnestly hopes that all members of the international community will support this demand, and commends all those who have already done so.

8. At the same time, it is the clear responsibility of the entire international community to render all possible moral and material assistance to the Namibian people under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization, their national liberation movement, in their struggle for freedom and independence. To this end, the Special Committee reiterates its request that the Governments of all States Members of the United Nations should, inter alia, apply the provisions of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia. 7/

9. Furthermore, mindful of the direct responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia and its people, the Special Committee strongly recommends that States Members of the United Nations contribute to the United Nations Fund for Namibia so as to provide greater assistance to the Namibian people in meeting present needs, particularly as regards the training of future

governmental personnel. The Special Committee commends the example of those countries which are already contributing to the Fund and expresses the hope that they will increase their contributions. In this connexion, the Special Committee notes with satisfaction the forthcoming entry into operation of the United Nations Institute for Namibia at Lusaka and the establishment by the United Nations Development Programme of an indicative planning figure for Namibia for the period 1977-1981. It appeals to all States to assist or increase their assistance to the Institute.

10. The Special Committee, conscious of the mandate of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the only legal authority of Namibia until independence, reaffirms its support for the activities of the Council and endorses the policies and programmes defined by the Council in co-operation with the South West Africa People's Organization to promote the causes of self-determination and national independence of the Namibian people.

11. The Special Committee decides to keep the situation and developments in the Territory under continuous review.

6/ See A/31/93-S/12079, annex. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1976 (SI/1976/Annex).

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/962/Add.1), para. 84. The Decree has been issued in final form as Namibia Gazette No. 1.

-145-

gtill 1. = 4MM. etec

0 Oedet Måna, i i t c--olm!

trista

.....

Måsmå i -t stumtä OPPM OMS~-- -----

- I . . . . .

i r T CC.. ä i 0 omme T -----

0 Sar-----

i va-syssomu-, ar 1 7 -7 jý'

m ii 7ý \_;;7attý. etern:: ýao

sm-setstll,-tsssm-ý å

-2 Mo 2

:VFSS ýääärr

p en

L, i i i om åkt i tytt!

a

-Y-l--eeeeee4zl.

----- -,riv

larmar ca=som ----- 1 sämnam med= msri:aet:elere-eeeeeta

=emastare t el I i startat

-----

-----7 t t ýSLI i i l 11 fj.ex ana 7 = 71,117 7 j 7

00

MM..£. humus .....

9 M

Oiývisý-sene7ieKeeeee,ýý ý-erna-sera=ýma-ammanee-----eeemeaaaa

b

4 P -- 4 k ýf

t7

MTI somsysTýiýýin

-slutsålt

-----

I I att j! vi i i id

sommistio.li:liallistsaitas

-----

boy s

ro i

sol

räljA rås vi r - I ra i

MJ ý\_ ý ý att tt t., T i i z,

i öJ

----- -- ----men

en 1~t

. .....

-n m MM svit 11 01 VäSå oms -D f I i I I i i i E i må m

I avi tio

T-Y-t'

Typ

zi

1 -1 fyk 141 11

J,

.. .....

2k- -a

## 1. LARD AND PEOPLE

### A.

1. Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa, lies along the South Atlantic Ocean between the 17th and 29th parallels of south latitude. It is bound on the north by Angola and Zambia, on the east by Botswana and on the south-east and south by the Republic of South Africa. The East Caprivi (also called the Caprivi Strip) an elongated piece of land in the north-east corner of Namibia, runs east as far as the juncture of Zambia and Southern Rhodesia.

2. The area of the Territory is approximately 824,296 square kilometres, including the area of Walvis Bay (1,124 square kilometres) which, although not formally a part of Namibia, is administered together with it.

### B. Land distribution

3. Under South African administration, Namibia has been divided essentially into two parts: a northern part comprising about one third of the Territory where most of the Africans live, and a southern part, known as the Police Zone, for European settlement.

4. Since 1968, in the implementation of the Odendaal Plan, a/ the South African Government has further entrenched the division of the Territory into separate areas

for black and white settlement. In accordance with the Plan, 40 per cent of the least desirable and least developed land has been allocated for the establishment

of 10 separate non-white homelands b/ and a total of 43 per cent of the land containing most known mineral deposits has been reserved for white occupation. The remaining 17 per cent of the total area, containing all unsurveyed lands and the two large diamond areas on the south-west coast, is to revert to direct South African control.

a/ For a summary of the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs (the Odendaal Commission), see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part 2.) (A/580Rev. I, chap. IV, paras. 18 et seqg.

b/ It is necessary for information purposes to refer throughout this paper to some terms commonly used by South Africans, such as "homelands" and bantustans", as well as to legislation, parts of the governmental structure and to the titles of various members of the illegal minority régime in Namibia. The use of such terms as "constitution", "Legislative Assembly", etc., without quotation marks does not in any way imply recognition by the United Nations of the illegal régime.

-147-

-----  
 --3 -Y  
 f  
 -----                      -----  
 z 1â1  
 -----  
 -----  
 é, 4 SIE2                      .....  
 .. ... ..  
 f2T -l: \_ýi  
 Æ x l-- Iv  
 4.k,-Å,  
 r7 -zý lk: air,  
 - ý12 g-L-  
 -T é 42

Ethnic gi  
 Total  
 Table 1  
 Namibia: ethnic distribution of population 1960 1970 and 1974 oup  
 1960            1970            1974  
 (census)      (census)      (estime  
 Whites  
 Non-whites  
 Ovambos  
 Damaras Hereros Kavangos  
 Namas Coloureds East Caprivians Bushmen Rehoboth Basters Kaokovelders  
 Tswanas a/ Others a/



526 004 73 464 452 540  
239 363 44 353 35 354 27 871 34 806 12 708 15 840 11 762 11 257 9 234 9 992  
762 184 90 583 671 60 352 640  
66 291 50 589 49 512 32 935 28 512 25 580 22 830 16 649 6 567  
4 407 15 089

Sources: 1960 data from the 1960 nonulation census; 1970 and 1974 data from the South West Africa Survey, 1974 (see S/11948/Add.1).

a/ Of the total classified as Tswanas in 1960, an unspecified number comprised extraterritorial migrant labourers or "others"; in 1970 and 1974, the numbers for Tswanas and "others" were given separately.

-1.19-

852 000

99 000 753 000 396 000 75 000 56 000 56 000

37 000 .32 000

29 000 26 000 19 000 7 000 5 000 15 000

Ae)

-----  
e T -----

w JC

TT

..... ----L i iT

Y

. .... . ....

t=gu

j

äj

.1. 4- 't.

jk 2,7

I-A

t,

.....

Ä

w=n~A--CM\_~~~~ IK-k

nt. A ýý\_tL

Fag

A E"ý 3

4., M

----- - -----

points of view" held by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (QAU) concerning "self-determination, independence and the maintenance of the

territorial integrity of the Territory". d/

15. On 27 May 1975, Mr. Hilgard Muller, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs,

transmitted his Government's reply to Security Council resolution 366 (1974) in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General. ei

16. In his letter, Mr. Muller recalled that "the basis of the South African Government's approach to the question of South West Africa is that it is for the peoples of South West Africa themselves to determine their own political and constitutional future in accordance with their own freely expressed wishes ... and without interference from South Africa, the United Nations, or any other outside entity. All options are therefore open to them - including that of independence as one State if that is what they should choose. In accordance with this approach any political group in the Territory is free to campaign for and propagate any constitutional change it likes and to participate without hindrance in any peaceable political activities, including the election of representatives to the proposed conference on the constitutional future of the Territory provided only that they do so within the requirements of law and order." f/

17. Regarding the question of South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory and arrangements for the transfer of power, Mr. Muller said that it followed, from the policy enunciated above, that South Africa would remain in and continue to administer the Territory "only as long as the inhabitants so wish". He also asserted that his Government recognized "the distinct international status of South West Africa" and that it did not claim one inch of the Territory for itself.

18. Mr. Muller added that, despite the increasingly hostile and uncompromising attitude of the United Nations towards South Africa, and despite the fact that South Africa rejected United Nations supervision in the Territory, his Government remained prepared to negotiate with a personal representative of the Secretary General, or to welcome African leaders or their representatives who might wish to visit the Territory or to learn at first hand about conditions there. It was also ready to discuss progress and developments with the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia or with the special OAU Committee on Namibia.

19. The Security Council considered Mr. Muller's letter at its 1823rd to 1829th meetings, between 30 May and 6 June 1975 (S/PV.1823-1829). Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, attended the meetings at the invitation of the Council. Most members of the Council expressed the view that the South African Government had not indicated its intention to comply with the terms of resolution 366 (1974), particularly with regard to withdrawal from the Territory and recognition of the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia; as a consequence, the Security Council

d/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, for April, May and 1976 (S/1701), annex.

t/ Ibid., S/117011.

f/ See paras, 31-67 below.

-151-

.....

25. Immediately following the assassination, South Africa sent police reinforcements to Windhoek and Oshakati, the capital of Ovamboland, and

detained 11 SWAPO and NNC leaders for questioning under the Terrorism Act, 1967. Numerous other arrests, particularly of lesser SWAPO members and of pastors of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Ovambo-Kavango in Ovamboland, were reported. A list of detainees compiled by the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, based on reports from SWAPO, the Lutheran and Anglican churches and the press, contained 32 names, including those of six African Lutheran pastors and 11 SWAPO officials, among them Mr. Skinny Hilundua, Northern Chairman; Mr. Axel Johannes, Acting Secretary-General; Mr. Reuben Hauwanga, Secretary for Information and Publicity; Mr. Aaron Mushimba, National Organizer; and Mr. Samuel Shivute, Regional Secretary for Northern Namibia. Four members of NNC were also listed, including Mr. Albertus Kanguishi, its Chairman.

26. On 18 August, a meeting of prominent church leaders, including Bishop Lukas de Vries, head of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, adopted a resolution in which they concluded that the situation in the Territory was rapidly deteriorating because of the acts of "terror" committed by the tribal police in Ovamboland and the increasing numbers and activities of the South African army and police, whose presence was dividing the people into two antagonistic groups: the pro-South African headmen and government-elected leaders and the anti-South African black population. Subsequently, Bishop de Vries sent a petition to Mr. B. J. Van der Walt, Administrator of the Territory, strongly objecting to the arbitrary arrest of officers and other members of the Church and appealing to him to ensure an immediate trial for the detainees and to prevent further unnecessary intimidation and injury by police and soldiers.

27. On 29 August, the United Nations Council for Namibia issued a statement alleging that the real purpose of the "renewed acts of terror and brutality" was to arrest and imprison all the real and suspected political opponents of the régime before the so-called constitutional conference began. h/

28. On 26 August, the Ovamboland Legislative Council unanimously elected Pastor Kornelius Ndjoba to succeed Chief Elifas as Chief Minister. In various statements, Pastor Ndjoba has vowed to be relentless in his campaign against organizations and people who "indulge in intimidation and stand for violence", and to maintain law and order.

29. According to SWAPO, after Pastor Ndjoba's election, arrests continued nightly in Ovamboland: at least three homes were destroyed by fire and at least five civilians were killed and others injured by South African forces.

30. In October, it was reported that all but three of the SWAPO and NNC leaders held at Windhoek under the Terrorism Act had been released (see para. 25 above), but that at least 18 people were still being held incommunicado in Ovamboland h/ Official Records of the General Assembly Thirtieth Session, Supplement 2 4(A/10024), vol. I, para. 214.

-153-

-----  
 -----M3ký A  
 -----

MICU'''

r grý ..... .....

tZZ:

-----gj

156 delegates representing all the "other Population groups" in the Territory as well as whites, was held in closed session at Windhoek from . to ]. Srte-r 1975. According to conference sources, the purpose of this phase was to decide generally

on the form of the Territory's future independence.

35. On 10 September, an 11-member sub-committee presented to the plenary meeting a draft declaration of intent which, according to press reports, had been drafted

by the two white delegates, both members of the ruling National Party of South West Africa. The Declaration of Intent was adopted with only minor modification on 12 September.

36. In the Declaration, the representatives, claiming that they were the "true and authentic representatives of the inhabitants of South West Africa", exercising their right to self-determination and independence: (a) condemned the use of force for any improper interference" to overthrow the existing order; (b) resolved to create a form of government which would guarantee "to every population group the greatest possible say in its own and national affairs"; and (c) called for the drafting of a "constitution for South West Africa" within a period of three years. No mention was made of independence or of a unitary State, majority rule or a central parliament. One article in the press suggested that, although the Declaration did not postulate sovereign independence for each of the so-called population groups, it did in essence envisage the attainment of independence by Namibia as a loose confederation of ethnic states with whites retaining the most valuable land areas. Thus, it appeared that the Declaration represented only a refinement of South Africa's official policy of separate development.

Position of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany

37. In September 1975, following the adjournment of the conference, 34 delegates representing all of the so-called population groups, accompanied by officials of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in an effort to obtain international support for the proposals embodied in the Declaration and recognition of themselves as the true and authentic representatives of the Namibian people.

Members of the delegation included Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, Mr. B. J. Africa, Chairman of the Baster Advisory Board, Mr. A. J. F. Kloppers, Chairman of the Coloured Representative Council, Mr. Peter Kulungulu, of Ovamboland, and Mr. Dirk Mudge, a white delegate (see para. 90 below).

38. At the time, SWAPO denounced the delegation as an "unrepresentative group" which was "clearly working in collusion with the enemy against the true aspirations and legitimate interests of our country". On 6 October, the Chief

Representative of the SWAPO observer mission to the United Nations, in a telegram addressed to the Secretary-General, urged him not to receive the delegation.

39. After two days at Washington, D.C., the delegation met with Representative Edward Beister, Jr. of Pennsylvania, a member of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Roy T. Haverkamp, Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs at the

-155-

varme

-----  
lut vi f"TY-95-yhus\*^

,jL

VA

ha~

-----  
Vy pyt

.....  
Y-y-,

ELM Asini @åk

ler il i

IM

Third hase

(a) Pr .c ,inrs

44. The third session of the so-called constitutional conference was held between 2 and 19 March 1976 to consider the initial reports of the four committees assigned to make recommendations on the following: (a) discrimination in employment and the abolition of pass laws (first committee); (b) economic advancement of non-whites with special reference to the possibility of granting African property rights in urban and rural areas (second committee); (c) the social advancement of non-whites in the areas of housing and public amenities (third committee); and

(d) education and educational facilities (fourth committee).

45. By the end of the session, preliminary reports had been tabled by all except the second committee, which informed the conference that it required additional expert assistance in drawing up a comprehensive development plan. According to press reports, the recommendations of the first and fourth committees were unanimously adopted by the plenary session; the report of the third committee had been tabled on the last day of the conference and was therefore not discussed (see paras. 55-56 below).

46. During the session, the conference also appointed two additional committees: a constitutional committee headed by Mr. Dirk Mudge, a member of the white delegation; and a finance committee, headed by Mr. Eben van Zijl, also white. According to press reports, the mandate of the constitutional committee is to arrive at "certain guidelines" on which the future political pattern of "South West

Africa" is to be based; the finance committee is to consider the financial implications of decisions taken by the conference and ways and means to meet current expenditures.

(b) Herero constitutional proposals

47. On 8 March, Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo submitted to the conference a document containing constitutional proposals on the basis of one man, one vote. According to one report, the proposed constitution would give each tribal or racial group its own representation in the legislature, and would thereby enshrine apartheid, although in a less rigid form. It would also provide for the establishment of a 100-member bicameral legislature, one house to represent East Caprivi, Kavangoland and Ovamboland, and the other the Police Zone and the Kaokoveld. The document also proposed that the South African Government recognize the constitutional conference as the true representative of the Namibian people and empower it to arrange within one year for democratic elections, under international supervision, for a constituent assembly and, pending the election, to grant the conference total legislative competence with respect to Namibia.

48. According to available information, the conference appears to have taken no action on these proposals.

-157-

-----,  
otäck, dumt  
sommuyó-o-II"  
-r'f ý-Uå - l= VIMM  
... ..  
-----  
812,  
41MAsm. m--m--'ýler-ansta  
WM, .....  
i MIM proden=O  
m I YTY..i  
KROMMM  
SMI ýMH  
---- -----mim  
- -----.4341  
141177-V  
pari  
M ----1  
-WM  
4ý41M  
--77 s-en lastrummets, mäsäktläE,ý  
rastar; y yl  
-0.0  
7tt  
- ----- !ORM ffi ii i

mopp  
d  
040 4 i 4 oi 4 0 4 k0f

~Offiffiffiffil ~t2 I  
Sititetati,,

replacement by a system under which every resident of the Territory would be issued a uniform identity card, denoting his ethnic group in code and carrying the phrase "citizen of South Africa" with "resident of South West Africa" in brackets if desired; (ii) retention of influx control; (iii) establishment of a minimum wage for unskilled workers within one year, amounting to R 54 j/ per month in cash if benefits (food, lodging, etc.) were included, or R 106 without benefits; (iv) equalization within three years of the wages of non-white professionals, artisans and other skilled workers with those of whites; (v) levying of an income tax on all residents; and (vi) introduction of a compulsory pension scheme for all workers. The committee recommended that none of its recommendations concerning wage increases should be made compulsory; compliance by employers in the private sector should be strictly on a voluntary basis.

(b) Third committee (preliminary recommendations on housing): all dwellings occupied by non-whites in the Territory should be equipped with ceilings, bathroom facilities, flush toilets and electricity and higher rents would be charged for any improvements made.

(c) Fourth committee: (i) consideration should be given to the gradual introduction of compulsory education for non-whites, depending on the availability of facilities; (ii) separate school systems for whites, Africans and other non-whites should be retained, although standards and curricula should be uniform; and (iii) priority should be given to establishing non-white schools in rural areas.

56. Available information indicates that the recommendations of the conference are purely of an advisory nature and have no binding effect either on the South African Government, the territorial administration or the private sector.

Opposition to the so-called constitutional conference

(a) General opposition

57. The conference has been widely criticized both inside and outside the Territory as yet another manoeuvre by South Africa to perpetuate separate development under the guise of allowing the people of the Territory to determine their own future. Similarly, the non-white delegates to the talks have been denounced as "stooges" of the South African Government by SWAPO and NNC and, in some cases, by the groups they claim to represent. The criticisms appear to have been fully borne out by the Declaration of Intent which failed to acknowledge the territorial integrity of the Territory (see paras. 35-36 above).

(b) SWAPO

58. SWAPO has consistently condemned the so-called constitutional conference as

1/ One rand (R 1.00) equals approximately \$US 1.15.

-159-

.....

..IM 112,

-----

-----.....

.....

Pw ø k w lp P n y ?

Wll - ---4M

ýmU -Z

----- 40ý -----..... ..

Lt

calling on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. In a statement to journalists, Mr. Jephtha Tjonzongoro, President of NNC, said that his organization had rejected the conference because its delegates represented only a minority of the population of Namibia; therefore, NNC could not agree to any settlement for independence reached at the meeting. He added that NNC would consider participating in future constitutional talks, provided the South African Government met certain conditions, including: (a) the release of all political prisoners; (b) allowing all political exiles to return to Namibia without fear of persecution; (c) revocation of the quasi-emergency regulations in effect in Ovamboland; (d) the immediate cessation of all moves to establish homelands; (e) recognition of the territorial integrity of Namibia, including Walvis Bay and East Caprivi; and (f) withdrawal of all South African police.

Okahandja Summit

64. Following the adjournment of the first phase of the conference, the Damara Advisory Council and other opponents of the conference, including the Damara Tribal Executive Committee, members of the Herero and Nama communities and representatives of the Voice of the People (a political party representing Namas and Damaras) met at Okahandja in what is known as the Okahandja Summit to issue a statement officially dissociating themselves from the conference and expressing their intention to strive for a unitary State based on a universal declaration of human rights. They also announced their intention to seek a hearing at the United Nations during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

65. On 22 September, eight leaders of the Okahandja Summit addressed a telegram to the Secretary-General urgently appealing for an oral hearing in order to "give personal evidence against the forces of the South African Government" (A/C.4/784/Add.1). The request for a hearing was subsequently granted by the Fourth Committee.

66. The petitioners failed to appear, and it was reported at the end of December that 10 of the members of the Okahandja Summit had just received their passports after a delay of more than three months since submitting their applications. The other members of the group had not yet received an acknowledgement from the South African Government concerning their applications.

Statement by the United Nations Council for Namibia



67. In its statement, issued on 29 August 1975 (see para. 27 above), the United Nations Council for Namibia noted that the so-called constitutional conference excluded the authentic representatives of the Namibian people and urged the international community to frustrate the South African manoeuvre and to exercise pressure on the South African racist régime in order to compel it to withdraw from Namibia.

-161-

-----  
låt;  
-----  
som  
yt -x;  
NIE  
7-77:sicnt-ý0- 7 7 U-ft  
17  
.....  
inrop  
.....  
A!!  
-----.....  
gp  
S.MI -----ý1. 05=51=  
-777 7  
-----7 7 -7 '11 N w l INNM,  
Y7= ý51 IICUUÄPW

73. On 16 May, Dr. Africa presented an eightpoint programe for the future, in which he called for the rejection of SWAP as the representative of the Territory s people; the use of the term "Namibian"t; the concept of a unitary State; and the principle of "one man, one vote". The programme also endorsed co-operation with

the South African Government and retention of Baster identity.

74. On 27 May, the Rehoboth Advisory Board formally accepted an invitation to participate in the constitutional conference.

75. While the constitutional conference was in session in March 1976, the South African Government introduced legislation in Parliament providing for the establishment of a Rehoboth legislative assembly with limited powers and for Rehoboth citizenship.

76. Introducing the bill, Mr. H. H. Smit, South African Minister of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Affairs, said that it had been proposed in response to Rehoboth demands for greater local self-government, and denied that it implied eventual sovereign independence. The bill has been condemned both by opposition members in the South African Parliament and by members of the Rehoboth community as



.....  
.....  
-----, .....

22. 1,

.....  
-----

82. Mr. Vorster also annulined that, in response to a request for strict control of the Angola border "in the interest of the people", no one in future would be allowed to cross into Angola without a special permit. According to reports, increasing numbers of Ovambos had again been crossing the border into Angola on their way to joining SWAPO camps in other countries.

83. On 24 September, in a statement relating to the constitutional conference, Pastor Ndjoba, Chief Elifas' successor, said that although he subscribed to seekirrp, a satisfactory solution to the problems of South West Africa, he would be leaving his people "in the lurch" if he abandoned his aim for full political independence.

D. Policy of a artheid

814. As part of its general campaign to win support for its policy towards Namibia during 1975, the South African Government, as well as the Government of the Territory, repealed or amended a number of territorial laws based on the principle of apartheid. These changes were generally heralded by the Western press as being of major importance and reflecting a genuine intention on the part of the South

African Government to move away from rigorous segregation on the basis of race in Namibia. As will be described below, however, a closer study indicates that the measures repealed were actually of marginal significance

Measures taken y te- Government of South Africa

85. In his letter of 27 May 1975 (see paras. 15-18 above), the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Secretary-..General that, on 9 April 1975, 1/ his Government had repealed or modified various proclamations affecting the Territory's African population "because they were obsolete or embodied unnecessary restrictive or what might be termed discriminatory aspects".

86. The proclamations in question included in particular the Extra-Territorial and Northern Natives Control Proclamation No. 29 of 1935, which provided that every Inorthern Native" (resident of Ovamboland, Kavangoland, East Caprivi or Kaakoveld) must carry an identification pass at all times and produce it on demand to any police officer or authorized person. Repeal of this proclamation was described in the Namibian press as eliminating the Territory's pass laws.

1/ Proclamation No. 105.

-165-

7            7  
7 7 7 7

-----

-----7ý -:7.

-----.....

-,7-7

-----:7 77--- -----

.....

-14

..... .....

13

If

.....

.....

W ~F' eec~ 74

E:7

14,

täÄUýý

-,3,guuityý

:-éoe!oob!mwýý

the basis of recommendations of a five-member commission of inquiry appointed to

study the question, the Executive Committee had decided to move for the elimination of "certain irritatir,- measures and practices" based solely on colour. As noted by Mr. Mudge, the changes to be made involved three categories of discrimination: (a) the admission of Africans to hotels, restaurants and cafes; (b) the segregation of people by race in public buildings; and (c) pass laws, influx control and freedom of movement. Mr. Pludge stated that legislation would soon be introduced to give to individual proprietors freedom of choice regarding the admission of Africans to their premises and that signs in public buildings specifying "whites" and 'non-whites" would be removed. He also noted, however, that although the Executive Committee was "in principle" in favour of greater freedom of movement, it was of the opinion that essential influx control should be retained.

91. On 30 August, it was reported that the territorial Government had taken the first steps towards implementing the above recommendations by having "whites only" and "non-whites only" signs removed from most of Windhoek's public buildings.

92. Subsequently, on 17 September, the Legislative Assembly voted to amend Liquor

Ordinance No. 2 of 1969, ostensibly to permit the admission of non-whites to previously restricted hotels, restaurants and cafes. An analysis of the legislation in The Windhoek Advertiser noted, however, that "although it appears on paper as if South West Africa will soon have hotels and accommodation establishments for all races, a close scrutiny of what was said in the Legislative Assembly yesterday tells a completely different story ... anyone who thinks that South West Africa is on the eve of multiracial hotels enjoying official blessing is completely wrong".

93. In support of its interpretation, the article referred to a statement by Mr. Adolf Brinkmann, a member of the Executive Committee, whom it quoted as having

said that, under the new legislation, no proprietor would be compelled to admit Africans to his premises, whereas in cases where a multiracial permit was applied for and granted, any additional conditions on the admittance of Africans could be imposed, the licence repealed or certain "privileges" amended or withdrawn. Mr. Brinkmann was also reported to have stressed that exclusive hotels for whites would remain, as the absence of such hotels could lead to friction. The amended legislation became effective in December 1975.

94. With respect to recommendations on influx control, press reports indicate that despite pronouncements to the contrary, regulatory measures have been generally tightened rather than relaxed.

95. On 18 June 1975, for example, Brigadier W. Louw, Divisional Commander of Police, issued a warning that police would begin to crack down on the so-called illegal employment of Africans in the white area with an eye to removing Unauthorized Africans to their respective homelands. Brigadier Louw said that illegal employment was of such magnitude that the efforts of police to control influx were being seriously hampered. He asserted that during the preceding 30 months, 9,000 Africans had been "repatriated" to their homelands at a considerable cost to the Government.

-167-

2

4

= -4

7

.. .....

Afi

P, 1-1

V.

----- . .....

-cif

----- .....

t14

77 -----\_M,

. .....

-----74 UKrÅ T-\_-VTýz

----- ---V

ot

----- .....

-----

ý\_YÄ

----- ----- .....

#### Deportation of Bishop Wood

101. On 16 June, Bishop Wood, the highest ranking Anglican clergyman in the Territory, along with Mr. Rolfe Friede, director of the Christian Centre at Windhoek, were ordered, under provisions of the Removal of Undesirables Act of 1920, to leave the Territory within one week. On the following day, Mrs. Wood

was also ordered deported. Security police raided Bishop Wood's home and office, confiscating tapes and private correspondence.

102. Although no official reasons were given for any of the deportation orders, press reports said that Bishop Wood had been accused by a member of the Legislative Assembly of having written inflammatory press statements and speeches for SWAPO. Bishop Wood, denying the allegations, said that he was not at all surprised by the action, as the authorities seemed totally unable to grasp the fact that white agitation was not behind African political activity.

103. Both Bishop Wood and Mr. Friede left the Territory on 22 June, following a service at the Lutheran Church at Katutura, attended by 600 Africans.

104. On 25 June, Mrs. Wood, who had refused to leave the Territory on 23 June as ordered, was arrested by the South African police and put on a plane to Johannesburg. In a statement handed to the police, Mrs. Wood said that she had refused to leave because her expulsion was arbitrary and was based only on her relationship to her husband. Mrs. Wood added that her forcible removal without cause would make South Africa appear ridiculous in the eyes of the world.

105. On 28 June, the Reverend Edward Morrow, the replacement for Bishop Wood, accused South African immigration officials at Windhoek Airport of having confiscated his credentials and other documents upon his arrival the previous week.

#### Suppression of political expression

106. On 23 July, it was announced that the South African Government had decided to invoke provisions of the Merchandise Marks Act to ban the distribution of "Free Namibia" and other political stickers, which were reported to be proliferating, especially in Windhoek. In disclosing the impending action, Mr. J. C. Heunis,

South African Minister of Economic Affairs, was reported to have clearly indicated that the ban was aimed at SWAPO.

#### Police action in Ovamboland

107. In June 1975, it was reported that one woman had been killed and two men seriously wounded in Ovamboland by police patrols conducting night-time investigations into the painting of political slogans on main roads in the homeland.

-169-

#### Military activities of SWAPO

113. SWAPO has issued only a few communiques on its military activities. At a press conference at London on 12 August, Mr. Moses Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of SWAPO, reported that between 9 April and 24 July 1975 the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), StPo's external military wing, had fought three battles with South African forces in Kavangoland and East Caprivi, during which some 200 South African troops had been killed or injured. Six soldiers had been captured and were being held as prisoners of war at camps within Namibia. PLAN had also captured a large quantity of South African military equipment and supplies, including eight Land-Rovers, four trucks, eight

mortars and 14 crates of FN rifles. Mr. Garoeb said that the battles had taken place on 9 April at Singalanwe, East Caprivi; on 18 July, when PLAN had blown up a military convoy; and on 24 July at Babwata, also in East Caprivi.

114. Subsequently, on 10 September, Mr. Andreas Shipanga, Director of Information for SWAPO in the United Republic of Tanzania, in an interview published in the Tanzania Daily News, stated that during the previous four months SWAPO had extended its power to the centre of Namibia, and had opened more operational zones in the western part of the country. Mr. Shipanga said that at the end of August, a large-scale confrontation between PLAN and South African troops had taken place near Lauban, in the south-eastern part of Namibia, at one of the strongest South African military camps.

115. On 13 October, the South African Defence Force reported that over the preceding week-end, a SWAPO patrol had attacked two border posts in Ovamboland, killing eight persons, including six tribal policemen. According to press reports, the raids were the first military action in Ovamboland in about 10 years and signalled the opening of a new phase in the struggle for liberation. In a statement issued at Dakar acknowledging the attack, SWAPO said that it had not been aimed at civilians, but at the "lackeys and political allies of Vorster" in Namibia.

116. Press reports have also attributed various other actions to SWAPO, including an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Mr. Tara Imbili, Ovambo Minister of Justice; landmine explosions in Ovamboland and East Caprivi; as well as the death of two whites in Grootfontein district. Inasmuch as the latter attack took place in daylight 16 kilometres from the Grootfontein air base, which is 378 kilometres south of Angola and 160 kilometres south of Ovamboland, press reports considered it an indication that PLAN has greatly extended its area of operation and indicated that, as a result, the white population was fearful that SWAPO was beginning a campaign to drive them from the Territory.

117. SWAPO has neither denied nor accepted responsibility for the Grootfontein attack. On 21 December, SWAPO spokesmen were reported to have said that the matter was still under investigation and that, although a state of war existed in Namibia, PLAN forces had received strict orders not to attack non-military targets, including civilians.

-171-

-----  
4 14,-----  
. . . . .  
-W4;  
qmý . . . . . 1  
-----

124. In November 1975, it was reported that the South African Government had decided to establish a no-man's land" 250 kilometres long by 5 kilometres wide along the Ovamboland/Angola border in order to facilitate the pursuit of terrorists by its troops. Creation of such a buffer zone was reported to involve

the evacuation of an undisclosed number of Ovambos and their resettlement elsewhere in the Territory at the expense of tribal authorities, and the devastation of the evacuated area in order to prevent SWAPO forces from concealing themselves.

125. As a result of South Africa's military presence in Namibia, SWAPO sources have charged that Ovamboland, Kavangoland and East Caprivi are "under military occupation", that "a state of terror" prevails and that many people have been killed or injured or have disappeared as a result of the demolition of villages and the resettlement of their populations in specially guarded villages.

G. South African invasion of Angola from Namibia

126. As early as October 1975 it was reported that South Africa, in defiance of United Nations decisions, had been using Namibia as the springboard from which to launch its military invasion of Angola, and that some 5,000 South African regular army personnel, including mechanized cavalry units, had entered Angola from Namibia, which had also been used as a staging and supply area for military operations against MPLA.

127. Following the MPLA victory in Angola, South African troops were reported to have been withdrawn from action and to have been positioned along the length of the Namibian/Angolan border, in some places to a depth of 50 kilometres. According to a statement by Mr. P. W. Botha, South African Minister of Defence, the troops were to stay in Angola until the new Angolan regime assured Pretoria that "it will not provide bases for terrorist strikes across the border into South West Africa".

128. In a letter dated 25 March 1976, the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that, inasmuch as his Government had obtained assurances that the People's Republic of Angola would not damage the hydroelectric station at Ruacana Falls or endanger the workers, it had decided that all its troops would be withdrawn by 27 March 1976 (S/12024). On that day, it was reported that the South African troops in Angola, comprising two battalions, had pulled back into Namibia. According to a statement by the South African Minister of Defence, the troops would remain stationed on the Namibian side of the border "until peace exists properly ... to protect the interests for which we are responsible".

129. According to Mr. Peter Katjavivi, European representative of SWAPO, 11,000 South African troops are now stationed on the Namibian border with Angola at six major military bases. Mr. Katjavivi said that although South Africa had tried to create the impression that its withdrawal from Angola had ended its international aggression, the fact that Namibia remained under South Africa's illegal rule was proof of that country's continuing aggression.



.....  
---  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----

.....  
-----i7 7-----

.....  
-----  
-----7 7-

-----:"7Z-271 7-v- r 5'ý=

..... i7  
-----  
-----

7 7 : 7-I\_~.77-77-77.- 777-7  
i-Dwi ýi

.....  
-----  
-----  
-----  
-----

.....  
- .7 i

IUý

I-----  
----- T t -

ttj

7 77,TV-77,-ý--T TV -rT

-----  
-----  
-----  
-----

-----  
-----  
-P-P  
.....  
-----  
t 7 T        7  
-----  
f4  
-----  
-----

### 3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. General

131. As previously reported, in 1965 South Africa ceased to publish separate economic data for Namibia and prohibited the publication of any data regarding the mining sector. As a result, over the past 10 years, information on the economy of

the Territory has been based on the data released from time to time by the South African Government and on secondary sources.

132. In 1975, however, South Africa published some selected data on the economy of

the Territory in the South West Africa Survey, 1974, which, italia, attempts to demonstrate the thesis that "in the foreseeable future, it /the Territory will be unable to sustain progress without the closest links with the Republic of South Africa"~.

133. Although, according to the Survey, the Territory's gross domestic product amounted to R 615.6 million in 1973, compared with R 142.2 million in 1960, the Territory's economy is still in its infancy and will, despite a number of favourable factors, continue to remain vulnerable and heavily reliant on South Africa.

134. In support of this argument, the Survey stresses the fact that the Territory is dependent on the output of vulnerable primary industries (mining, agriculture and fishing) for over 50 per cent of its gross domestic product, and that it is heavily reliant on imports of fuel, machinery, most consumer goods and a substantial amount of food. The Survey also contends that the manufacturing sector, which at present accounts for only 10 per cent of the gross domestic product, is unlikely to expand owing to the Territory's small domestic market, a shortage of raw materials, a high cost structure and the distances separating local industries from sources of supply and from customers.

135. As a result of these factors, the Survey states, the sustained economic and social advancement of the Territory's inhabitants can only be guaranteed by close association with South Africa's broadly based and dynamic economy.

136. A widely different appraisal of the Territory's potential for economic independence has been made by, among others, Mr. W. H. Thomas, senior lecturer in economics at the University of Cape Town. In a paper published in February 1975, Mr. Thomas noted that there was considerable room for expansion

in all sectors of the economy, except possibly fishing, where, in any case, the price trend would probably be upwards in the long run. As regards manufacturing in particular, Mr. Thomas considered that rapid improvement in output could be attained by the correct strategy of "selective industrialization" that is, the processing of products of the primary sector rather than "cost-inflationary import-substitution industrialization". (According to the Survey, the processing of food products from fishing and agriculture accounted for nearly two thirds of the total value of all manufactured goods in 1971/72 (R 79.0 million).) Mr. Thomas concluded that the process of sharing the existing economic wealth of the Territory was currently more

-175-

.....

-----

-----2 ;11 ::;w;;;ä.

1 T -ý=7

m m t

ä 4 ä

1 Jýi;

ý. , ýwtz

-----jL

W V L, T n

7a

t- 4,9i !""E i

-----

t

21 ZZ z,

. ....

.....

49

. ....

7 .7 ..7 7 7

4 ;

-----4-4

-\_4.- ýz

.w W 7 m 104 114,1041 91 Q, 11, 4, g ýA 4 Q 9 9 a Åý k 5ý i iy 4

il

production of lead and zinc. In 1973, Tsumeb produced 23,904 metric tons of copper, 51,619 metric tons of lead and 2,580 metric tons of zinc, and reported sales totalling R 58.6 million and net profits of R 13.1 million.

141. Subsequently, the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Ltd., (JCI) of South Africa, the major shareholder (52.5 per cent) in the Otjihase copper mine,

which is expected to be the third largest mine in Namibia when completed, announced that development work was continuing and that the mine would come into production, as scheduled, in 1976. It is envisaged that the mine will initially process 120,000 metric tons of ore a month, producing 30,000 metric tons of copper annually.

In October 1975, it was reported that preparatory work was virtually complete and that trial drilling had begun.

142. Although information on the diamond output for 1974 is not yet available, the

continuing economic recession is reported to have affected sales. According to the provisional financial statement of CDM for 1974) net profits fell from R 96.2 million in 1973 to R 80.3 million in 1974, despite the fact that tax payments

for the same period decreased from R 57.1 million to R 30 million. From 1971 to 1973, the company produced 1.6 million carats annually.

Uranium

143. Exploitation of uranium in the Territory is scheduled to begin in 1976 with the opening of the Rössing mine (also known as Marjorie Luow) near Swakopmund. Known deposits at the site, which are estimated at 100,000 metric tons of low-grade uranium ore (0.03 per cent), are said to be among the largest in the world. Production is expected to reach a maximum level of 1,000 metric tons of uranium oxide annually by 1980 and to continue for at least 25 years.

According to reports in the international press, during the 1980s the mine is expected to provide a significant portion of the world's uranium needs, particularly in view of the fact that the other major uranium-producing countries (the United States, Canada and Australia) have recently announced their intention to reduce foreign sales.

144. As the South African Atomic Energy Act, 1948, prohibits the disclosure of any facts relating to uranium, all information on the Rössing operation has been obtained from unofficial sources. According to the limited information available, the mine is expected to involve a total investment of £750 million and is being developed by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, Ltd., (RTZ) of the United Kingdom, in conjunction with South African and French interests, as follows: RTZ, 60 per cent; Rio Algom, an RTZ subsidiary, 10 per cent; the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) of South Africa, 13.2 per cent; Total-Compagnie minière et nucléaire (CMN) of France, 10 per cent- and the General Mining and Finance Corporation of South Africa, 6.8 per cent.

145. According to a recent unpublished study, the sources of financing for the mine remain unknown, as information has been suppressed by the South African authorities and by the foreign companies and Governments involved. The study contends, however, that the raising of capital to finance the mine is known to have been contingent on the signing of a sufficient number of sales contracts to ensure a profitable scale

-----  
-----  
A- 4  
i j,  
tz' ----- --lj,  
4 sý ;:-i; -----  
jý  
-----

which is expected to number about 850 by the time production starts, it is reported that a large proportion, possibly as much as 60 per cent, will comprise Africans recruited from South Africa, the remainder to be migrant Ovambo labourers. In contrast to the whites, who are being housed at Swakopmund itself, the non-whites

are being housed in a new, "non-European" township under construction at Arandis in the southern tip of Damaraland, approximately 65 kilometres from Swakopmund. The

township will reportedly cost an estimated R 4.5 million, and its principal accommodation is a 720-bed hostel being built at a cost of R 700,000. According to

press reports in June 1975, a number of houses with full services had been completed. Plans call for the construction of 50 houses of the "better type".

150. In July 1975, rioting erupted at the R6ssing mine, reportedly as a result of friction between Ovambos and the labourers recruited from South Africa, leaving 1 man dead and 15 seriously injured.

151. Following this development, Brigadier Luow, Divisional Commissioner of Police, announced that consideration was being given to erecting a temporary police station near the mine to maintain law and order, and that immediate arrangements were being made to house workers in separate hostels according to national groups and tribes. He said that the South African workers could be returned home if they chose, but that they would be replaced by an equal number of South African recruits. No reason has been given by the South African authorities for the recruitment of workers from South Africa. It has been reported, however, that work at the Otjihase copper mine (see para. 141 above) was falling behind owing to the difficulty in obtaining an adequate labour supply.

152. Later that month, SWAPO issued a statement accusing mine officials of failing to prevent the riot and condemning the compound housing system as "nothing but a second Robben Island prison".

#### Mining in non-white areas

153. Mining in non-white areas is controlled by the Government of South Africa, in which all mineral rights in Namibia are vested. In general, the Government follows a policy of encouraging white-owned mining companies to prospect in these areas. According to the Survey, between 1969 and 1974 prospecting permits

were granted to 21 private companies, which spent a total of R 577,095 on exploration.

154. According to available information, two companies operate important mines in homeland areas at present: the Klein Aub Copper Company, Ltd., of South Africa in the Rehoboth Gebiet, which is owned by private South African interests; and the Uis Tin Mining Company (SWA), Ltd., in Damaraland, which is owned by the parastatal Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR). Neither of these companies pays any share of its revenue or taxes to the local population.

155. Since the 1960s, the Bantu Mining Corporation of South Africa (BMC), a Stateowned development corporation, has also been authorized to operate in homeland areas. The BMC is nominally charged with promoting the "development and utilization of the mineral resources of black areas to the benefit of their

-179-

"~««",~

-,

4"

4~" ~"I» ~

13413 ~"~~~~~" ~"~~~~~" - "" "73134"r 3tW» - "" -" ~

"" 13 "13"1313 - "~~~~~"»"~~~~~"»."»."»."~~~~~ ""»."~~~~~"~~~~~"~j 4

~"~~~~~"i" ." -, "~~~~~" 13»13443 «"«13

~~~~~43"~~~~~ 44«.,',23 43«

li 4134444413,4 «34 4» -, 13"13

13 44 "" I" 4413.233. " "33.». ""33134"3.44 334 .4

~ ~"

4=134444,343»»

-- ~

IL » ~»

4 r,24y'fl

""4"~~~~~"." 4

44>

"13341" 44 4

134 13"" 3344

"" m 34 "~~~~~"4 4

1~44 ~~4343=»a~

"- " , " 34134

3441"~~~~~

3»334.,3("

44 44,44~4~4~

23-""S 33

"" ~"~~~~~"~133434»4443 fl134443

""444134,13434,_,3131313,,4,v,» ~VV133SW4r

I 44» 313 1343 ,4~t43,34,~ »41312344»34

4413333444434 »

134443444"~~~~~

44

3,1341 33443',,,

13 «1313

3""344~4~44444t - - _____S3»
 34,34434»»» «,.. »4&3~Z1~«» I
 -"13" 139313413 _____"4 444,
 4» "" ,~» »~ " ,,,,"4,4,"" , 13413
 "»*~t!&Ss~' 3343333333413
 ~ 313313"" »~4313?34~ 4» 4»~ _____
 34=»443344
 13 133133 33 34«34~3«"" 14133333331343 3394314
 - "t==""=44 "" "" ""= "441" ,44m434=m44
 4 >
 441334 " 4»',~3 3444444» ,44 -4.3 ~ --
 SX3433 4444 3433~~ 43 ~
 3343"~"
 _____ 4~23
 _____9344 ,«44,1344"«'3313" ».--.4=,4~,,4,4,« "-.
 _____333.3.34 3""3> 413113 ~'
 3433 4.44I44 33 ""~
 413~.4
 43443134 133»»
 «3413

 44~44~
 _____ »33» 4» ""»«»"""""" ""
 "1313313~>13 3344134,44, 343~44»13 - -
 _____444,344743443134,3313,,313>43,13,,3.13,4«,41313, 'i"
 333 33433""""""3» 1343

 .133=4=" .4=44».," ~~- "-14I44343443433134=~

161. The Survey reports that in recent years an increasing proportion of canned fish has been consumed locally, and that the industry is expected to meet domestic requirements before exporting the balance at substantially higher prices. The local price of canned fish is controlled by the Government, "to keep it within reach of the lower income groups".

D. Agriculture and livestock

162. Cattle ranching and karakul farming by whites remain the principal agricultural activities in Namibia, normally accounting for 98.5 per cent of total agricultural output. Of the 2.8 million head of cattle in the Territory, 500,000 are in Ovamboland, but owing to their generally inferior quality and to recurrent outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease, only a small number are marketed commercially.

163. Because of aridity, crop farming is of minor importance in the white area, which normally obtains the bulk of its maize and cereal from South Africa. The northern homelands usually produce sufficient amounts of grain for their own needs.

164. In 1974, Namibia's agricultural and livestock sales amounted to R 96.0 million, of which the principal sources were the following: beef, R 53.2 million; karakul pelts, R 27.6 million; fresh milk, R 2.1 million; and agronomy, R 1.0 million.

165. During the year, 275,769 head of cattle were marketed (507,000 in 1973) of which 212,478 were exported live to South Africa, and the remainder slaughtered by local meat-processing factories and butchers for canning and domestic consumption. Exports of karakul pelts dropped from 3.4 million in 1973 to 2.9 million, which went mainly to Western Europe and the United States. An average increase of 12 cents (South African) in the price per pelt reportedly compensated for the decline in exports.

166. According to the Survey, the South African Government, principally through the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) (see paras. 171-172 below), has begun systematic efforts to increase the over-all agricultural output of the homelands, especially in Ovamboland and Kavangoland, by encouraging measures to improve the health of

livestock; promoting livestock sales; and initiating irrigation schemes. The Survey reports that, owing to these efforts, the combined value of cattle sales in Ovamboland and Kavangoland increased to R 1.5 million in 1972 (R 238,856 in 1964) and that, to stimulate output further, animal breeding stations have been established in Ovamboland, Damaraland, Kavangoland and East Caprivi. The most important agricultural activities undertaken so far by BIC are the construction of a combination abattoir and canning factory in Oshakati (Ovamboland) at a cost of R 2.0 million and a 250,000-hectare cattle ranching scheme in Kavangoland, which holds 10,000 head at present. The Ovamboland factory, which came into operation in October 1975, is adjacent to a 104,000-hectare grazing area and is expected to provide employment for 300 persons.

167. The Survey also reports that efforts are being made to introduce irrigation farming in Kavangoland and Ovamboland and that since 1973 the latter has received regular water supplies from a canal system partially fed by waters from the Cunene river (see para. 179 below). Research into irrigation farming is also being

-181-

lit y t
..... .. :0:-villstnivi
114 i i;s soMS MA-P
åsåksål
i % 14
MAS

åtti

- _cw
---aae.12112117
011 ätt
» rom~ 4
=mott
all- sto,
Azo 41- W2A
=Mimmed
på yZAM fysecc rJIMM.5,1
moj
att kota
FT~Wräýäc 0 d- inikattki-.1
7USlyxyttse-a
mll-----eiéeeioee+nnemý- -C-M 0
yttallitilleýeele3tfllellrt-,
dovt f f efterarA
-----iilefee
."-ý-jplt~pTtTsf som
stido i 000 SOM I
11, 111- 111 ,11
.
-usentera.sýiOi4neeeencltlyps fy -77-,
OM -- - - åý*=1 i
s^.--ltsimss Sp; -----som? 77nÄsjlyllolljý-,ý'
i ffriý.!, W -t=
_:u44MUMUmsoms...-004!41on.:m-s=sstý292, M54M i
!ffEufimmEzmthfflmmm
J-SA, iistleee4eii Z-i.
r~N ss===554s7- >-.t t avi
ýeTýillätt4.utiistioýý41-511;eitkbibtåb lasta
R+t
lit ýcm- ý
I kli i ät
.
mus 1 1;
moj
i-ts st %% Upplåts!!!
4.1 eter,
- Mos*= - ri j: t4tsssa4pt II ----- . . .
fl-oliljtii
rä-säf ~11~14
-----MISS-fäf ~TTST
.....
iý4

s- som-ss nom-nccer -----
 ---- SM
 ----viii
 0 t 7 zn=sf i
 -----eeeeeteeeeee4i ..1 c = ;1=
 to 77 TV, 01 t 7 dāruti -

aid to the Baster community, one for business undertakings and the other for farming purposes. Between October 1970 and March 1973, RIDC granted R 742,684 in loans, mainly for farming purposes, including the purchase of breeding stock, fencing and land and the development of water supplies.

174. As previously reported, RIDC has met with great opposition in the Baster community. Among its objections are that RIDC, regardless of existing law and custom, has the power to acquire, own and dispose of land; hold shares in Baster businesses; and take immovable property and farms as security for loans. The Baster community also objects to the prohibition restraining its members from holding any shares in the corporation, and to the fact that the community has been denied any voice in its own development.

CDC

175. The CDC is charged with encouraging and promoting the advancement of Namibia's Coloured population in industry, trade and finance. According to the 1974 Survey, CDC issued few loans during its first five years of operation, but was expected to expend R 126,000 in 1974/75 because of the increase in the number of Coloured businessmen.

F. Water and power

176. The Survey notes that the Territory has natural limitations on its economic growth owing to the absence of indigenous fuel deposits and the scarcity of water. Two thirds of the total assured annual yield of surface and ground-water resources (500 million cubic metres) is already being utilized for human, animal and industrial consumption, and, on a limited scale, for irrigation. Owing to the increasing needs of mining and other industries, it is anticipated that by the year 2000 the demand for water will equal the resources available at present. The production of electricity is totally dependent on diesel oil and coal imported from South Africa, and the limited supply of electricity is already being held partly responsible for the low level of industrial development.

177. According to press reports, water and power development plans formulated by South Africa and currently being put into effect envisage the eventual expenditure of about R 1.0 billion for water and R 440.0 million for power before 1990. These plans are based largely on overcoming the shortages of power and internal water supplies through the tapping of the northern boundary rivers for water and

hydroelectric power, and their distribution throughout Namibia via a network of canals and transmission lines.

Water

178. Water is provided in the Police Zone through 177 domestic water supply schemes, constructed at a cost of R 138.8 million, with a total capacity of 38.4

million cubic metres. In the homelands, water is obtained principally from 1,400 bore-holes

-183-

-----URAN~ MzLd.-- ý V-Wý t=
-----,32 Måd,
.
.
9212,-!99!,
----- -k6
.
-125
47
".4-4 i i, å
Om
Tt

Cunene River Basin agreement. Despite a verbal protest from Portugal, South Africa

has continued to maintain and increase its presence at Calueque, which now officially numbers 150 troops (see paras. 112 and 126-130 above).

G. Public finance

184. As previously reported, since 1 April 1969, the principal taxes levied in Namibia, including all taxes on mines and mining, are collected directly by the Government of South Africa and paid into the so-called South West Africa Account

of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which is used to finance South Africa's expenditures in Namibia, as well as to make statutory payments to the territorial Administration, computed on a formula basis. The Territorial Revenue Fund consists

of the few taxes still collected by the local Administration (personal income tax, business licences, dog and game licences, wheel tax, motor vehicle tax and certain fines), as well as the statutory payment referred to above, and is used principally to finance expenditure on white education, health services and road maintenance.

185. Actual revenues and expenditures have risen steadily since 1969. As no tax increases have been imposed during this time, the increase in actual revenue solely

reflects greater productivity in the white commercial sector.

186. In 1973/74, total taxes levied in Namibia amounted to an estimated R 128.1 million, of which R 93.5 million accrued to the South West Africa Account and R 34.5 million to the Territorial Revenue Fund (see table 2 below). The total income of the latter, including South Africa's statutory contribution of R 39.0 million (not shown in the table), amounted to about R 73.5 million. Taxes on mining, principally diamonds, amounted to R 43.5 million, accounting for almost 35 per cent of the total taxes levied, and provided South Africa with 45 per cent of its income from Namibia.

187. According to the Survey, expenditure during 1973/74 by South Africa and the local Administration combined was estimated at R 171.3 million, of which R 89.8 million was provided by the South West Africa Administration, and R 81.5 million by the South West Africa Account. Of the deficit of R 43.3 million, R 23.3 million would be made up by the Government of South Africa from the Revenue Fund of the Republic and the remainder by the territorial Administration from its own accumulated reserves.

188. No official budget estimates are available for 1974/75 or 1975/76. According to press reports, the combined estimated total expenditure for 1975/76 by South Africa and the territorial Administration is expected to increase to R 275.5 million: R 171.0 million to be financed from the South West Africa Account and R 104.5 million by the territorial Administration. For this period, South Africa's statutory payment to the Territory is expected to amount to R 42.9 million.

189. Principal estimated expenditures for 1975/76 from the South West Africa Account include Bantu administration and development, R 38.9 million; water affairs, R 20.3 million; Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama affairs, R 11.9 million; and agricultural technical services, R 7.0 million.

-185-

t" M:M
----- kj
.....
2 3AA., T

4hlååå,ý44,

.

.....

.....

" _FWV_

.....

ZZZZ.-;

zZ
 f! i \$fl

eg~~

.....
 "A yQ 4,4 1 1 1 W I y,1 1 1

y*Iffi i EN

Table 2 (continued)

B. Expendu. a/

1972/73 1973/74

(estimate)

| | | |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| South West Africa Account | 97,248 | i 6478 |
| Bantu administration and development | 14,327 | 19,506 |
| Bantu education | 3,686 | 4,350 |
| Water affairs | 11,96 | 14,287 |
| Agricultural technical services | 6,872 | 6,552 |
| Agricultural credit and land tenure | 3,800 | 3,364 |
| Coloured relations and Rehoboth affairs | 5,737 | 7,335 |
| Transport | 3,269 | 3,057 |
| Other b/ | 47,631 | 58,007 |

Source: Republic of South Africa, Estimates of the Expenditure to be Defrayed from the South West Africa Account during the year ending 31 March 1974.

a/ No official information is available regarding expenditure from the Territorial Revenue Fund.

b/ Including miscellaneous, plus all items of expenditure that are less than R 3 mnillion.

4. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

191. According to the Survey, school attendance by Africans and Coloureds increased from 43,624 in 1960 to 138,890 in 1973 and the number of schools increased from 313 to 592.

192. Commenting on this data, a representative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) pointed out that, of the total number of African schools, 480 were primary schools, 7 were junior secondary schools and 8 were secondary schools. Furthermore, of the total number of pupils enrolled in 1972, 30.68 per cent were in substandard A, only 3.53 per cent were in standard VI (the last grade of primary school) and 0.05 per

cent were in form V, the last grade Of secondary school (see table 3 below). These percentages, she noted, deonstrated that only a fraction of the reported school population completed the entire course Of schooling, whereas the vast majority dropped out before completing primary school.

193. The Survey reports that teacher training and vocational training for Voth Africans and Coloureds are available at seven centralized, comprehensive boarding Schools, which also offer academic tuition up to matriculation level. C)f these institutions, which had a total enrolment of 2,664 pupils in 1973, two are located

-187-

....
 ~-----
 -----Elm

 !52:

 1.91

 7.1

CHAPTER X
 (A/31/23/P.dd. h)
 SEYCHELLES
 CONTENTS

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| Paragraphs | Pare |
| A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | 1 - 9 |
| 190 | |
| B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL CO\ITTEE | 10 |
| 191 | |
| ANNEXES | |
| I. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT | |
| 192 | |
| II. LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1976 FROM THE DEPUTY
PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN
IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE | 200 |

-189-

k 5 rtrttt tt
 ii Ä

.....
1 1,4
.....
.....
-er - --Zvo.....
YA
24,
ý7
----- z Zzz
-----.....
----- jjý
digkiý@i
---

5 y f-----

14 21
-C-S 0 oiýl S
P
.....
iii
-----r -----27- -----
-----lm tett ffi

-----49 ý5:-----jT -3-ý y..... - ----- 11-
-4-1 -----
- -----

7. The Special Committee subsequently took note of a telegram dated 25 February 1976 addressed to the Chairman by the Prime Minister of the Seychelles (A/AC.109/516), in which, inter alia, he expressed the thanks of the Government and people of the Seychelles "for the interest taken /by the Committee- over the years" with regard to his country's "march towards nationhood".
8. On 24 February, the text of the statement adopted by the Committee (A/AC.I09/515) was transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations for the attention of his Government.

9. The Special Committee was represented at the ceremonies marking the accession to independence of the Seychelles on 29 June by its Chairman, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations.

B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE 10. The text of the statement (A/AC.109/515) adopted by the Special Committee at its 1028th meeting, on 23 February, to which reference is made in paragraph 6 above, is reproduced below:

(i) The Special Committee wishes to record its satisfaction at the conclusion of the agreement between the Governments of the Seychelles and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the resumed Seychelles Constitutional Conference, held in January 1976, envisaging the entry into force of an independence constitution for the Seychelles, at midnight on 28 June 1976.

(2) The Special Committee wishes to pay a particular tribute to the Government and the people of the Seychelles on their achievements and to extend to them its warm congratulations and best wishes for peace, happiness and prosperity on the attainment of their independence. The Special Committee also wishes to pay tribute to the Government of the United Kingdom for the discharge of its obligations as the administering Power in relation to the Seychelles.

(3) The Special Committee expresses its confidence that the international community will render all possible assistance to the Government and the people of the Seychelles for the consolidation of their independence.

-191-

.....

4 i

.....

.....

i i 77

.....
ý-t. tt -tý t. zý 2ý t

.....

, i ý i, t 3. ý

0 ý7

.....

-rý- T*T-i,

.....

..... 1ý
.....

.....

..... 77

et Y "tý ý1,

ýýt

7,7 77

.....
.....

∴ ý-----

.....

.. - ý ý I
. , ý I ý . , :
----- 7T rrl i

.....
in 77...
.....

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

4.4

. 44ý4
-ss
.....
.....

, tfa7ý
ju x'L iy].; t 14

= ý
i i tam "4 i J g ;46 4 4--ý
T 777
koy#ýý409101ý ý11 ý11 i 0
c im i t 4 t t t
-- ? -- ii &A

, -
SEYCHELLES a/

1. GENERAL

1. Since 8 November 1965, when the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches were included in the 'British Indian Ocean Territory', the Territory of the Seychelles has comprised 89 islands, -having a combined land area of approximately

277.1 square kilometres. The Territory is situated in the western Indian Ocean, approximately 1,600 kilometres east of the Kenya coast. Mahé, the largest island, lies over 1,600 kilometres east of Kenya, 985 kilometres north of Madagascar and approximately 2,800 kilometres south-west of Bombay. Victoria, the capital of the

Seychelles and the only port of the archipelago, is on Mahé.

2. In 1973, the estimated population was 60,000. At the last official census, in 1960, the population numbered 41,425.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. 1970 Constitution

3. It will be recalled that, as a result of the decisions taken at the Seychelles Constitutional Conference at London in March 1970, a new Constitution was introduced in the Seychelles in October 1970. Briefly, it provided for an advisory Council of Ministers consisting of a Chief Minister and up to four other ministers, with three ex officio members (the Deputy Governor, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary) and was to be presided over by the Governor. External affairs, defence, internal security, the public service and the government broadcasting service and newspapers remained the direct responsibility of the Governor. Other government business, however, was entrusted to Seychelles ministers.

4. Under this Constitution, general elections were held in 1970 and April 1974. At the 1974 elections, both the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP) campaigned on a platform of early independence for the Territory. The SDP obtained 52.4 per cent of the votes and SPUP the remaining 47.6 per cent.

B. Constitutional Conference of March 1975

5. During 1974, a constitutional conference which had been agreed upon for November, was postponed until 1975. The Seychelles Constitutional Conference, which took place at London between 14 and 27 March 1975, considered: (a) the form of a possible constitution for an independent Seychelles; and (b) the form of a possible interim constitution. On the first item, a measure of agreement was reached on the

a/ The information presented in this section is derived from published sources and from information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations on 6 August 1975 for the year ending 31 December 1974.

..... - - - - , - ý ý ý ý

ý ý j: ý: j: I: tj týý t

.

..... . . .

----- ----

----- ----

----- ----

----- ----

.....

.....

.....

.

.....

-----,

.

-----,

.....

.....

.....

----- ----

.....

.....

.....

.....

-----,.....

----- 44x99q~ ~~

â~

11 ,1 1

Executive

10. There would be a cabinet collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly, consistaig of the Prime Minister, who would preside, and such other ministers as might be appointed. The Governor would appoint as Prime Minister the elected member of the Assembly who appeared to him best able to command the support of the majority of the elected members of the Assembly. Other ministers would be appointed by the Governor, in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, from among the elected and nominated members of the Assembly, but the total number of ministers (including the Prime Minister and assistant ministers) would not exceed 12. Portfolios would be allocated in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. Special responsibilities retained by the Governor would not be allocated to a minister, except at the Governor's discretion, or for the purpose of conducting business relating to such matters in the Assembly. In the absence of the Prime Minister, the Governor would attend and preside over meetings of the

cabinet. A security council would advise the Governor on questions of policy relating to those matters over which he would retain special responsibility. There would also be an advisory committee on government newspapers and broadcasting.

Judiciary

11. The Chief Justice would be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Prime Minister. The Governor, after consultation with the Chief Justice, would be empowered to appoint (and remove) puisne judges, magistrates, members of other subordinate courts and registrars and other officers of the courts.

12. The Constitutional Conference agreed that the interim constitution should be introduced not later than September 1975. The representative of the United Kingdom, Miss Joan Lestor, informed the Conference that she would recommend to her Government the appointment of an electoral review commission, as a possible means of resolving the differing views regarding the system of elections and the size and composition of the legislature. The commission would be asked to make recommendations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs before the end of 1975, with a view to further discussion at a renewed conference in January 1976. At that conference, it would be the aim of the United Kingdom Government to determine the outstanding provisions of an independence constitution, so that, subject to the approval of Parliament, the Seychelles would be enabled to proceed to independence, as desired by both political parties, not later than 30 June 1976.

13. At the end of the Conference, the two political parties issued the following communiqué:

"Following discussions in London between the leaders of the two Political parties and in the spirit of national reconciliation, the Seychelles Democratic Party have extended an invitation to the Seychelles People's United Party to join the Government on the introduction of internal self-government. In the same spirit the Seychelles People's Party have accepted the invitation.

-195-

ý414- - - - - - . - - . . - I I I I ý1.1 ' '

that the United Kingdom had agreed to give the Seychelles £10 million in capital aid for specific projects over the next few years, plus £1.7 million in direct budget support, to be paid in decreasing amounts over the next four years.

20. In a statement to the press before the signing of the agreement,

täCiv f ~T; I-t

11

EN 1 t

.....

.....

lijgj - ----.....

-- ---- -- ----

.....

-----,.....

.....

= -----siiktw- ----ý4,44

_ý441 --- -- --- ~ ,

1 1,1 11.1

-

- I-th=

I- I; 7

CH

. - - - - -

----- -14 tltltltltllu

-----

- -----

-----2ý57t

-----4ii

m 1:

J J

ý,7 - _~ _ý~ . :ýý .

~ iii iii-l-iiity-

.

----- -viv,
----- -000000w330*w

lo-m-

-----,..... - ---- - ----

-tt

.4 '14 - 4 --- ----- -U 4tccýtt

.....

.....

..... ~ 7-

~~ ~

... .. .

1- pwý v

31. The fishing industry is based mainly on hand lines and fish traps. Some 400 small (5-10 metres) open boats operate in the inshore areas of the main islands. A fleet of 10 larger vessels (10-13 metres) land fish from off-shore grounds. The estimated catch for 1974 was 3,500 metric tons, of which 100 metric tons of frozen fish were exported. Current cold storage space on Mahé totals about 100 metric tons. The administering Power reported that its first objective, to provide a sufficient supply of fish for the inhabitants of the Territory, had been achieved in 1974; its second objective is to produce more fish for export.

32. In 1974, there were 47 manufacturing establishments, with a total of 550 employees. A modern bakery and a small cigarette factory began operation during the year.

33. Approximately 25,000 people visited Seychelles in 1974 (20,000 in 1973). A 368-bed hotel and several smaller hotels or extensions were opened, increasing the total number of beds available for visitors to 1,300. Work is reported to be under way on another major hotel with a capacity of 352 beds.

4. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

34. A substantial reduction was reported in the labour force of the building and construction sector which was partially offset by expansion in other sectors such as the hotel industry, transport, agriculture and manufacturing. In December 1974, the number of employed persons totalled 12,954, a drop of 212 since January 1974. The number of unemployed during 1974 was further increased by 1,170 school leavers.

35. Assistance to children and mothers in need is provided under the Poor Relief Ordinance. The Government operates two homes for the elderly with room for 180 residents at a cost exceeding SeyRs 300,000 per annum. Needy persons receive a monthly allowance as follows: SeyRs 50 for a single person; SeyRs 70 for one person with one dependant; and SeyRs 80 for one person with more than four dependants.

36. In 1974, school enrolment was as follows: primary schools, 10,379 (10,275 in 1973); Junior secondary schools, 2,441 (2,052 in 1973); and secondary grammar schools, 781 (727 in 1973).

-199-

1-T

.....

.....

-t t -y t
a0,2k

v-T v-vlllv-7--,ý z -z -7 t -7 ---w 2

.....

7 7 7- 7 7 7---- 7,.....

T4 i
TT
Z 4, Z, 4.- -
f t: i

ev t

z- 9 7_ . i f x T 9 ýT 7-7
v 7 7

Enclosure

Final communiqué of the Seychelles Constitutional Conference held at London (19-22 January 1976)

The resumed Seychelles Constitutional Conference, working on the basis of position papers presented by the Seychelles Government as a whole, has ended today, 22 January 1976, with agreement on the principles and timing of an independence constitution for submission to Her Majesty's Government and Parliament.

The Conference has recommended that, subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government and Parliament, the independence constitution should enter into force at midnight on 28 June 1976.

In accordance with the wishes of the Seychelles delegation, which included the leaders and representatives of the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) and the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP), the principles of the independence constitution agreed at the Conference include the following central features:

- (a) Seychelles is to be a sovereign republic with the constitution as the supreme law;
- (b) The Prime Minister in office on the entry into force of the independence constitution will assume the office of President. Thereafter, the President is to be elected by popular vote simultaneously with elections to the national assembly. The President is to exercise full executive powers;
- (c) There will be a cabinet consisting of a Prime Minister and 10 ministers appointed by the President from members of the national assembly;
- (d) Following the recommendations of the electoral review commission, the national assembly is to consist of 25 elected members, 8 elected for the existing constituencies and the remainder by proportional representation from the party lists;
- (e) There will be provisions relating to citizenship, the protection of fundamental human rights, the judiciary, the public service, finance and pensions on lines agreed at the Conference.

In the course of the Conference, the leaders of SDP and SPUP confirmed their intention to continue the present coalition after independence and to hold elections in 1979.

The Conference agreed in principle to recommend the transfer of the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches to Seychelles sovereignty upon independence.

A tripartite meeting between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Seychelles and the United States of America will be held as soon as possible to conclude the necessary arrangements. The leaders of SDP and SPUP stated their intention to seek membership of the Commonwealth.

-201-

.....

.....

W2

7 7

.....

... ..

z -t i

----- - I

A-i

IL

but

.....

----- --- -- -- - -- - --

-----

"NN i

rM
."
ommi

CHAPTER XI
SPANISH SAHARA

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the item at its 1054th meeting, on 10 September 1976.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3481 (xxx) of 11 December 1975 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of this resolution, the Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence". The Special Committee also took into account General Assembly resolutions 3458 A and B (XXX) of 10 December 1975 concerning the question of Spanish Sahara.
3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I to the present chapter) containing information on developments concerning the Territory. The Special Committee also had before it a letter dated 17 February 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman (see annex II to the present chapter).

B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

4. At its 1054th meeting, on 10 September, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.1054), the Special Committee decided, without objection, to refer the question to the General Assembly and to authorize its Rapporteur to transmit to the General Assembly the relevant documentation in order to facilitate the latter's consideration of the question.

-203-

.

.
... ..
.....

.....
.....

.....

.....

ý - ~~~~~ I
___=~ - ý

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

i; i; W..
----- I-----

.....
.....
.....
.....

7- - ý 7:ý
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

INTRODUCTION a/

1. Since May 1975, the Territory known variously as Spanish Sahara, Western Sahara or Sahara has witnessed a succession of developments which began with the visits undertaken by the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Territory, to neighbouring countries and to Spain. The present paper summarizes developments relating to the Territory since that time.

1. ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS PRIOR TO THE MADRID AGREEMENT

A. United Nations Visiting Mission

2. In May 1975, in accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee at its

996th meeting on 27 March 1975, a United Nations mission composed of the representatives of Cuba, Iran and the Ivory Coast, and headed by the Permanent Representative of the Ivory Coast to the United Nations visited Spain, the Territory, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The function of the Visiting Mission was to assist the Special Committee in the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974, namely, to review the situation in the Territory.

3. In its report to the Special Committee, the Visiting Mission concluded that "Although all the concerned and interested parties are in favour of the complete decolonization of the Territory, they none the less remain divided as to the way in which that decolonization should be carried out and as to the final status of the Territory." b/ The Mission noted that the Spanish Government had reaffirmed its wish to decolonize the Territory in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions and was ready to co-operate with the States in the region and with the United Nations, to enable the population of the Territory to exercise its right to self-determination. Spain had originally announced plans to hold a referendum in accordance with requests contained in a number of United Nations resolutions, of which the latest was General Assembly resolution 3162 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973. Following the visit of the United Nations Mission, however, the Spanish Government considered that the people of Spanish Sahara had unequivocally expressed to the Mission their desire for independence. The Mission also reported that the Spanish Government had made known its wish to withdraw from the Territory as quickly as Possible, without leaving a vacuum.

a/ For general information on the Territory, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/10023/Rev.1), vol. III, chap. XIII, annex, paras. 117-125.

b/ The text of the observations and conclusions of the Visiting Mission, which were adopted by the Special Committee at its 1023rd meeting, on 7 November 1975, is contained in Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/10023/Rev.1), vol. III, chap. XIII, para. 11.

-205-

.....

-----ji

-----ucý
 ý- --ý-jý.VVVVVV =.. ----24*
 41

 71,
 tttt-lcýt~
 -PPý.
 !99
 --- --- ---- - - -----~7,17 7
 71~

 Zi
 --- -77
 --- ----
 7 ----
 IN

 441
 et~I i lim

population groups to decide their own future in complete freedom and in an atmosphere of peace and security in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly".

B. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice

8. On 16 October 1975, the International Court of Justice delivered an advisory opinion on the question of Western Sahara d/ in a response to a request by the General Assembly contained in its resolution 3292 (XXIX). In paragraph 162 of its opinion, the Court stated as follows:

"The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory ...

9. In a statement to the Security Council at its 1849th meeting on 20 October 1975, the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and said: "The Court has recognized and stated the existence of the Sahara's legal ties of allegiance with Morocco, and links of a territorial nature with Mauritania.

"Those two countries therefore rightfully claim that the Principle of national unity and territorial integrity should be applied in this case. Hence they are perfectly justified in requesting that the opinion of the Court should lead to concerted negotiations between themselves and the administering Power" (S/Pv.1849).

10. Similarly, at the same meeting, the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations interpreted the Court's advisory opinion as justifying his country's demands for "respect for its territorial integrity and the unity of its people". He added that his country "therefore hopes that the United Nations will take the steps required by the need for an urgent solution, with due regard for the d/ Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12

-207-

- ~ ~u a ~
m m m - _____ '-
-9 I
9<~~~~~
_____-9-' 9..99~9'999-~9999 119"
9; II 99191111 199~~9 -' "'~'9'
99999"Zt~'" 9'-
9"1-999-9"»~~9~~' ""99<III`rì 11119"991999999'97 99
I '49
- ~~-i9;~r19' ~ T' T"" 111111 991111-,
99 9 -
1"~4II

1= , II 19
ff~I 9 19 - 5191191591

,9ff9I999III1199I II 9
_____'9"
III 119 91~ 9I9I9199999III19999 91!

1199 „9""""19999991 19119 I,9I!~IIII 'Tà~ 91999
119 ~ ' i'
9999""I 1 ~"19119&
991)) f I"" 91>99999
1999191111111 9111111
9911 ' 1!!
9~9ff I99~99'9IIII99~9IIII

'III' 199991 ~"
I 1919~ì 119999- 1~' 111,1 ,99IIIIIIIIII9999999,III1~
9'9'9999~9Iiìi91~9~ì9994~iì
~ 9ff ìl ìIIIIIIIIiìiìi19
99491- 91 I 91 11111 19 II
1119199" 9199 99 "«'999'~,~,ff
99*~39i 1111111" ""1 111~IIIIIIIIII
111111111119199
9999 9 999919 99919 -' ~ 191 '4'" "49999999199199999'
9 9'99 99999ff~99 991 li911~" ff1'

9 999999

999
lìl~' , I
III
'9- ~j' 9519 1' i9=-I' 99""99'LJ-S"119'1~',ff~ ~
""91999,99~, 1999I99'99""9"99~" 99»'9 9 9""9 "" 99
iìiìlìt'199'9999'9'9-'999"9"
1-4999iìi9999 - 11999
1111 ,i191119111I 4994199~99991-
9999991999999999919iìiìi99999IIIIII911fffff9591919991IIIIII99I9ff ~< ~1-II~
m
~1,',,1, 11-1- 95"9" '19~
- 91999~ I
9- - _____ '~99111119S19

_____19I1,
____199,~99191999-,~9199 -
'199599519ff.999999II959999199IIII!~III
919119111919999111191999111111111111199911191 99949999',
-- Th'~9'1991~ff111 94ff~ ~
~ ~ 9 9 9 v 999111 """"9-
""""9'- =-~,9i 11111,9
- 99

999999~99919~99 4 1' 9i9~, ""iìi'i'9999i'i'i'i'i'i'i'9 191
19991991
- 99,99.,999999,,999999919' _____
91191>19999' ~
99999199 9999999 a19
S99199999 9" i9199~19 ~ 999-999999999999999999
~ 1 '~
99,9, 995999959 , 9I'~'999-
""""~99~" 1-91 9 4 19
11999

991 <9191 19999I11119a,
9->"-""~"
99 II I 9
191,1
""9;-," I' 11
999911119 99419 9999999999ff94ff99911191199999~

999 1,'1~1 I 199a1919119999999 999919 199a999' 99999119'
9,, t!1! "41!!
ì>&~94J'»" 19 9 I ""~ ',19,9,
19i9'IIIIII"IIIIII19""~""""9-~""""~""""""
9- =99-1111119-9
11199 199911919999999119911
III 9999519 19999999
999199119 99199111
9111119111 9199999111
99999999 "9=99999991'-9'
99919 9, 19 9191
"999 9199ff, 9 9191
941, 991119
999999199 1111111111111111119199997'99999195911
9-99991999994999 '-"--9999
9191995 99-""9~9999'I II
9-99
99I199991a9999919991999991999~
~
_____119911111" 11111999 9199919199999995999 999
9919199 191191 1 9919
9919 9919191 919 91999199.9991919191919I9999199I991
1999999 9-919 999911 991999
'I
9999919999999999
9,999999999999999119919999199,9,9919999919991999191919999999
i~U~' ~ ì 999199W ~I 99999119199999
9999199 9"9194991'1~99I'9991199991999 11I91919999119
999999949199959 999991I1991999999991999S9991999f119I9ff9S199999~14
'19919191191 ffÜ,9M~ 9i99999'11!9!99 » I 1!~ 199511 i1919ff "9'

16. A representative of the Frente POLISARIO declared at El Aaiiin that the Saharans would defend their frontier against an "invasion by Morocco". However, the representative added: "But we trust that Spain will defend our Territory against such invasion." The Frente POLISARIO issued a further statement in which it declared that it was leaving the responsibility of defending the Territory to the Spanish Government. "Spain", the statement added, "is responsible in its capacity as administering Power for the defence of our Territory."

17. On 18 October, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations stated that "owing to the statements made by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco threatening to conduct a march of 350,000 people to invade Western Sahara, a situation of international friction has arisen that threatens international peace and security". On behalf of his Government, he urged the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take up the question. f/

18. On the same day, the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations also addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that his Government protested "vigorously" against Spain's description of "the peaceful march announced by His Majesty the King" as an "invasion", which he said was a "misrepresentation of the facts". /

19. On 22 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 377 (1975), by which it requested the Secretary-General "to enter into immediate consultations with the parties concerned and interested and to report to the Council as soon as possible the results of his consultations in order to enable the Council to adopt the appropriate measures to deal with the present situation". The Council appealed to the parties concerned and interested to exercise restraint and moderation, and to enable the mission of the Secretary-General to be undertaken in satisfactory conditions.

20. The Secretary-General undertook a mission to the area, between 25 and 28 October 1975. During the mission, he met with King Hassan II at Marrakesh, President Moktar Ould Daddah at Nouakchott, President Houari Boumediene at Algiers and President Arias Navarro of Spain at Madrid. The Secretary-General subsequently sent Mr. Andre Lewin, his Special Envoy, to Marrakesh and Algiers, from

3 to 6 November, to brief both Morocco and Algeria on the position of Spain.

21. In his report to the Security Council on the matter, the Secretary-General stated that "the situation in the area remains grave. I consider it, therefore, of the greatest importance that any action be avoided which might further escalate the tension", h/ As regards the position of the different parties, the Secretary-General reported that the Government of Morocco could not accept the thesis that decolonization in Western Sahara must be kept separate from the situation which had arisen as a result of the "green march". He said that Morocco hoped that direct

contacts with Spain would "lead to an understanding", and that should those efforts not succeed, it appeared that Morocco would be prepared to consider other approaches in which the United Nations could be called upon to play an appropriate role. The Secretary-General described the position of the Government of Mauritania as basically similar to that of Morocco. Mauritania shared Morocco's view that a

f/ Ibid., S/11851.

j/ Ibid., S/11852.

h/ Ibid., S/1863.

4 4 -Qý A k 41 --1. -4
V-7

.....

jh

gr. 0--04

-27 C,

k

'59= z -7

åk

MP-w 45 --iV 4s

.....

ak -2t. å-u -.2t

717TE'ký äty

-1K

LL

x X 3

ir-e

-A- -TY

w T

.

du.

lp A -z; k K dk i

ýi 7

26. On 8 November the Secretary-General submitted a further report to the Security Council in which he gave an account of the results of the latest contacts by his Special Envoy with the four parties, and noted that it had not been possible to induce Morocco to halt the march and that Morocco still insisted on a trilateral solution among Spain, Morocco and Mauritania.

2. MADRID AGREEMENT

A. Negotiations leading to the agreement

27. During the crisis resulting from the "green march", contacts continued between Morocco and Spain, including a visit to Madrid on 24 October 1975 of Mr. Ahmed Laraki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco. According to a press report, Mr. Laraki said that his mission to Madrid was being undertaken in the spirit of Security Council resolution 377 (1975) "which called for continuing dialogue ... and for restraints for all parties concerned". Towards the end of October, diplomatic contacts among Morocco, Mauritania and Spain reportedly intensified.

28. On 9 November, in an address to his country, King Hassan II said that "I personally think and firmly believe that our march has fulfilled its mission and realized its aim and that ... it has achieved what all of us ... expected of it". The King, therefore, called on the marchers to "return to our starting point ... in order to tackle matters and issues by another method in new ways". On 14 November, the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations issued a press release announcing that "in conformity with Security Council resolutions 377 (1975) and 380 (1975), King Hassan II has decided, on the one hand to withdraw the marchers, and on the other, to enter into negotiations in agreement with Spain and

--auritania".

29. On 18 November, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a Declaration of Principles agreed on at Madrid on 14 November as a result of negotiations entered into with Morocco and Mauritania within the framework of Article 33 of the Charter and in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the situation created by the 'Green March' with a view to finding a solution to the resulting friction. In the letter transmitting the Declaration, the Permanent Representative stated that, under the terms of the Declaration, Spain proposed definitively to terminate its presence in the Territory by 28 February 1976 at the latest. It also proposed, in the interim, to transfer its powers and responsibilities as administering Power to a temporary administration which would be constituted by the appointment to the staff of the current Governor-General of two Deputy Governors to be nominated by Morocco and Mauritania respectively. The Jema'a (General Assembly), which would express the views of the Saharan population, would collaborate with that

k/ Ibid., s/1874.

I/ Ibid., S/1880, annex II.

-211-

7e - MC 7*__2ct_

åk

1 71

t z - å I i r I vi c s s ärsonomsnass torna

-M-en

äl -777 00 -f,

51 7

777-----22 -s -27... :s tio:

tju

.19

7~ 7

VS 0 å_=

1ý JE -ýE

ä JIL 1.0. t.

z711

20

4ý 4 1.

ås s

sa j-k. 5 i _ZL 1 ýs_ .lärv tvi " a ý_a 0

:g:Dets4sttsttttbt

T- 2 0 r -777,7777

99.ý>A

Uy

år

-r- 1 07

-----c- v

neZF

-m C~

-1-7 '2 ý_

_Mý7 41

7~77 7r

-,ýoii-ýon-ov-ss-ma

i, 4- iý, a

A- J- 4 -11 X

B. Position of Algeria

33. According to press reports, during the period of negotiations, Algeria sent two messages to Spain and sought contacts with that Government in an effort to head off a tripartite agreement and to ensure the right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and independence. In addition, on 4 November 1975,

the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which he said "all that remains for the /General/Assembly to do ... is

to decide upon practical procedures for permitting the people of the Sahara to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination" (A/10337-S/II1872 annex II).
n/

34. In late November, in an interview with the Spanish political weekly, *Cambio 16*, President Boumediene was reported to have accused the Spanish Government

of repudiating its obligations, violating international law and giving in to external pressures in agreeing to hand over the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania.

C. Position of the political parties in the Territory

35. In their statements before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, the representatives of the Front de Lib~ration et de 'Unit6 (FLU), the Mouvement de resistance pour la liberation des territoires sous domination espagnole (MOREHOB), the Front pour la lib6ration et le rattachement du Sahara occidental a la Republique islamique de Mauritanie (FLSRM) and PUNS all supported the Madrid Declaration. The representative of PUNS, for instance, said that the Saharan population had "never felt the existence of any national consciousness independent of Morocco". The representative of FLSBM said that the purpose of his movement was the restoration of lost Mauritanian unity and the destruction of the artificial barriers between the two parts of the country created by colonialism.
o/

36. The President of the Jema'a, speaking on behalf of that body, said that the Saharan people were most gratified by the agreement, as a result of which "reunion

was now possible". R/

37. The Frente POLISARIO, which the United Nations Visiting Mission had found to have considerable support among all sections of the population at the time of its visit, considered the Madrid Declaration as a manoeuvre between "the colonialist Power and the expansionists to frustrate the process of decolonization of the Sahara under United Nations auspices". Representatives of the party declared its determination to carry on an armed struggle to achieve independence for the

Territory. 2,

nf For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year Supplement for October November and December 1975 (S/11872), annex II.

o/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth

Committee, 2173rd meeting.

P/ Ibid.

a/ Ibid., 2170th meeting.

-213-

inalienable right to self-determination, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), of all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory; and requested the parties to the Madrid agreement to ensure respect for the freely expressed aspirations of the Saharan populations. In addition, the Assembly requested the interim administration to take all necessary steps to ensure that all the Saharan populations originating in the Territory would be able to exercise their

inalienable right to self-determination through free consultations organized with the assistance of a representative of the United Nations appointed by the Secretary-General.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF SPAIN AND PARTITION OF THE TERRITORY

A. Termination of the Spanish administration

42. In January 1976, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Olof Rydbeck, the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations, as his special representative to visit the Territory to explore the situation and to report thereon.

43. The termination by Spain of its administration in the Territory, scheduled to take place before the end of February, was effected in stages. As early as the end of October 1975, there were reports that the Spanish Government was planning to evacuate 5,000 Spanish civilians from the Territory by 15 November, and that 15,000 Spanish soldiers would remain there until an agreement had been reached by the parties involved in the Madrid negotiations. It was also reported that auxiliary indigenous soldiers were being disarmed and that a dusk-to-dawn curfew had been imposed in El Aaidn to head off any public disorder. Press accounts indicated that the Spanish military authorities had imposed a curfew in the population centres until further notice as "a precaution against a possible surge of violence by the Saharans against Spanish nationals and property".

44. With the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, Moroccan forces moved into the northern and eastern areas of the Territory and Mauritanian forces into parts of the southern area. In some places, these forces met with armed confrontation by the forces of the Frente POLISARIO, which had announced that it intended to continue the guerrilla war.

45. The process of Spain's withdrawal continued until the end of February 1976, when the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, in a memorandum dated 25 February, informed the Secretary-General that "the Spanish Government, in accordance with ... the Declaration of Principles signed in Madrid on 14 November 1975 ... has decided that it will definitively terminate its presence in the Territory tomorrow, 26 February 1976". t/ The Spanish memorandum added that a meeting of the Jema'a has been convened /on 26 February! at which the present Spanish Governor, who is acting as a member of the temporary administration, will inform the Jema'a of this decision of the

Spanish Government". According to the memorandum, the meeting "does not constitute the popular consultation provided for in the Madrid agreements of 14 November 1975 and in General Assembly resolution 3458 B (XXX) unless the necessary conditions are met, including, in particular, the presence of a representative of the United Nations appointed by you in accordance With paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned resolution".
t/ See also A/31/56-s/11997. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council Thirtieth Year Supplement for January, February and March 196
-215-

ä s i bli yps
adå
--- -----7
Mån
1
-- ---- TC!
----z ,r i
... ..
----- ----Såå
-----mm
sotor-lik.
- - - - - X_~~
sol,
i -n -----"oms tiol
mil, 51 iD
1., 2.,
ini Rem
rotts: Z 7
73 '177=

.....
.....
.... .. inner!
st: ä UJ
sovchos
täckg-m, MWPCO-jý
inst-Atttsymn zi
tro
äs
12 f zý rtý UP9uffiffffl i i I
ä Ri-

"The Spanish Government, as of today, definitively terminates its presence in the Territory of the Sahara and deems it necessary to place the following on record: (a) Spain considers itself henceforth exempt from any

responsibility of an international nature in connexion with the administration of the said Territory, in view of the cessation of its participation in the temporary administration established for the Territory; (b) the decolonization of Western Sahara will reach its climax when the views of the Saharan population have been validly expressed" (A/31/56-S/11997). u_/ 51. On 27 February, the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a message addressed to him by Mr. Khatri Quld Said a Ould El Jomasni, President of the Jema'a in which he said that "the Saharan Jema'a, meeting in special session today, Thursday, 26 February 1976, at El Aaiun, has unanimously approved the reintegration of the Territory of Sahara with Morocco and Mauritania in conformity with historical realities and with links which have always united the Saharan population to those two countries".

B. Partition of the Territory

52. With parallel 240 as the partition line between the Moroccan and the Mauritanian sectors, it was reported that Moroccan and Mauritanian civil administrations and military forces were being established in the Territory from January 1976. Prior to that date, Mr. Ben Souda, the Moroccan Assistant GovernorGeneral in the temporary administration, had been designated by King Hassan II as "Governor of the Sahara".

53. According to a press report, even before any measure had been taken to consult the people of the Territory on its future, a report from El Aaiun had indicated that Morocco planned to divide the north-western and eastern parts of the Territory into two provinces, with El Aaiun and Semara as their respective capitals.

54. The partition line was later formalized by the Moroccan-Mauritanian agreements on the Saharan frontier and on economic co-operation which were signed at Rabat on 14 April 1976 (see paras. 67-68 below). In accordance with the first agreement, Morocco and Mauritania agreed that "the State frontier between the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco shall be defined by the straight line linking the point of intersection of the 24th parallel north and the

13th meridian west, the intersection of this straight line with the present frontier of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania constituting the south-eastern limit of the frontier of the Kingdom of Morocco. From this last point, the frontier follows the present frontier of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania northwards Thus, the partition line lies south of the Bu Craa phosphate mines and north of Villa Cisneros which lies in the Mauritanian sector.

55. On 11 February 1976, Algeria's Council of the Revolution and the Council of Ministers issued a statement which sets out Algeria's position in regard to developments in the Territory as follows:

u/ For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtyfirst Year, Supplement for January, February and -arch 1976-(S/11997).

I JI C
 ýL - 2 -1, - A- tt F -ti 19 r z
 4+4,2~wý --
 T 7=
 -;Aj
 .. ----- MW"EZlYý -
 :4
 -7 ýr

 ýpnw 0 47
 -AU
 :5 wzv

 iZ- 17~
 MEL -It 4_11_fý
 :i. Ä . å Agg~

 ý77 T_!
 3ý T -7 3-t 1, 7 lyp

the Algerian border, in the Saguia El Hamra region of the Territory) had declared the creation of the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic". In that connexion, Mr. Ould Ziou, President of the Saharan National Provisional Council, is reported to have declared "in the name of the Almighty and with his help, to meet the will of the Arab people, to be faithful to our glorious martyrs and to crown our immense sacrifices, the flag of the 'Saharan Arab Democratic Republic' today floats over the Territory of Saguiet El-Hamra and Ouadi Dhahdad (Río de Oro)". Later reports indicated that the Saharan National Provisional Council was to be the legislative assembly.

61. On 7 March, following Algeria's recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic on 6 March, Morocco broke off relations with Algeria. The official Moroccan communiqué accused Algeria of being the "creator" of the Frente POLISARIO's "alleged Republic", and put "the entire responsibility for the present Situation on the Algerian Government". It also reaffirmed Morocco's determination "to oppose any interference, from whatever source, in its internal affairs". The Moroccan Government also maintained that the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic had not been declared in the Sahara but on Algerian soil.

62. On 7 March, the Mauritanian Government also broke off relations with Algeria over the issue of its recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. In its announcement, the Government maintained that "Algeria's attitude reduced to nothing the friendship and co-operation built up with Mauritania over a decade". The Mauritanian statement added that Algeria's stand on the Sahara question had "violated the elementary principle of respect for other nations' sovereignty, and

non-interference in their internal affairs".

Position of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

63. At an extraordinary meeting which ended on 1 March 1976 at Addis Ababa, the Council of Ministers of OAU considered whether the OAU should recognize the Frente

POLISARIO as a "liberation front", as had been recommended by the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, at its meeting in February at Maputo (formerly Lourenço Marques). However, against the background of the declaration by the Frente POLISARIO of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the Council adjourned without the adoption of a formal resolution on the question. Following the conclusion of the session, Mr. Peter Onu, Assistant Secretary-General of OAU, is reported to have declared that it was up to individual member States of OAU to recognize the Republic declared by the Frente POLISARIO. Mr. Onu is also

reported to have stated that "by declaring an independent democratic Arab republic, the people of the region had exercised their right to self-determination and there was little or nothing OAU could do about the matter".

64. By the end of April, the following 10 States were reported to have recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, GuineaBissau, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda and Togo.

-219-

k i i I f j i j i i i t i B T j i i m i i i 1 4 r in L i i i i
i I l f f 1 1 1 E 1 9 1 j ý 1 t N J R 1 1 1 1 j I L 1 i k I K 1 1 -- -1
1 1 1 f I I P 1 2 1 4 1 I 1 1 L I P 1 t M I i

9 t

£

Lä

ten - - - - - me-CM 'i lt

4*4

- - - - - PÅ,

1, J

åå - - - - -

7 -4 .

.....

tir å i-4

'V

U-2

42=

kr

ffi WEI

y_5, w

ga

- - - - - ji -,ii: u - 1

.....

37.;

-p

4ý

kA&

116 .

tum~

—.'pur

j;

m~ Vo

J: 7

= - - - - -

6, DECISIONS BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND THE CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

70. The thirteenth summit meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government

of OAU, held at Port Louis from 2 to 5 July 1976, adopted a resolution on Western Sahara by which it invited all parties concerned and interested, including the people of the Western Sahara, to co-operate with a view to achieving a peaceful solution of the conflict in the interests of peace, justice and good neighbourliness in the region with due regard for the charter of OAU and of the United Nations. The Assembly also decided to hold a special session at the level of Heads of State and Government with the participation of the people of the Western Sahara for the purpose of finding a just and lasting solution to the problem of the Western Sahara (see A/31/136-S/1214i, annex II, and A/31/138-S/12143).

71. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government which met at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, issued a political declaration containing the following paragraph:

of Non-Aligned its conclusion Countries,

a

"The Conference, taking note of the decision of the Organization of African Unity to hold an extraordinary summit on the question of Western Sahara and the situation which has resulted in the region, expressed its hope that this meeting would lead to a just and durable solution to this question." v/

1/ NAC/CONF.5/S.2, para. 35.

See document A/31/197, annex I.

-221-

-- 1- . - - ý

-1.0, moj y iJ

i i i f i 4.

t - t 1,! i,4 c - c l i i l l t k i i

i i Äss-.L:t 1.

7 -7.

11-flv.11ý2'71-172 7711 il
r T ý1 t V, T t: ý9 7 7 z :1 1ý Z t V1,2 r-y- V- 7
i i z Crr.. I -
r47 I
Y4ý4-1 it

om oms
ik
i t doms ~ýýwmmää om t O-M-må M 7, ". 3ý, ý7. 21
----- 011
f 1 1 - Al- 1ý -ý1- t- t =Aý
ävlvíst
1 ý1 ft K , - 3_ i 7r -OV-r= -M- 7 7 - ----
----77,
ýltudssovi 1=0 17 9, 1
7 v 'U
..... i
t - - - - -
46
too

--
1ý 11 5
j i-amn ämmanä- g,
ÅmA 4ý!11;jýÅ-Å-Ä-X-1ý-&ýÅ-IL"'-' AVSIA 'arkäl
==2,5y
-:Så, L93
4.-å L 2
4 ýz -y 4
.....
L
- fl;
- 12
-ý1 1 Jt ýä-z- I Ä Å i lina av
u. i öl l

Enclosure

Sir,

The steady deterioration of the situation in Western Sahara once again compels us solemnly to call your attention to the dangers inherent in such an explosive situation. Recognizing these dangers, Algeria has done its utmost not to lend itself to the arguments of violence and provocation. Thus, on 27 January 1976, the escort of a convoy bringing food and medicaments to the peoples of the Sahara who had been the victims of Moroccan aggression was engaged by the Royal Moroccan armed forces. The Algerian Government,

regardless of the cost to itself, endeavoured to limit the scope of the incident, which could have provoked a more widespread conflagration. If one follows the logic of Morocco's policy of aggression, the situation can only lead to an aggravation of the conflict, which is contrary to the interests of the Saharan people and has resulted in massacres of people and in the radicalization of the liberation struggle.

On 15 February 1976, the Saharan resistance, led by the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el Hamra y Rfo de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), inflicted heavy losses on the Moroccan occupation forces. That prompted the Royal Government to implicate Algeria in order to add confusion to the facts underlying the problem and thus to create diversions and make extrapolations which would mask the responsibility which Morocco shares with its other partners in perpetrating aggression in Western Sahara. An official declaration, issued at the highest level of the Moroccan Government, sought to confront Algeria with the alternative of war. Algeria takes this opportunity to underscore the dangerous escalation which is part of a meticulously prepared plan of aggression; those who have caused that escalation bear full responsibility for denying the legitimate rights of the Saharan people and for the threats which are jeopardizing the peace and security of the entire region.

The special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Olof Rydbeck, who has just visited Western Sahara, undoubtedly observed this dangerous process of deterioration which is developing and which it is urgent and imperative to halt.

Algeria, as a country which is concerned and interested and deeply committed to solidarity with peoples struggling for their freedom, reaffirms its desire to contribute to the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations aimed at the attainment of the aspirations of the Saharan people to freedom and dignity through the exercise of their right to self-determination in a free and genuine referendum.

Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA
Member of the Revolutionary Council
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the People's Democratic Republic
of Algeria

-223-

t t

ýtt t-4 r: -

- , , !! t

- , , - !! - --

.....

k

.....

..... 2 Z7ý

----- Htf

k 411

----- I

tÄý

77

äl

ý 1 I

J 1 TZ

7-q "17

V7,7~. -c 77

122

77;-7,7 77,

-s k-4 t

4,7 8

CHAPTER XII

TI iR

A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMIITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the item at its 1052nd and 1053rd meetings, on 8 and 9 September 1976.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 3481 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. By paragraph 11 of this resolution, the Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full

implementation or resolution 1514 (XV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence". The Special Committee also took into account General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975 concerning the question of Timor.

3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I to the present chapter) containing information on developments concerning the Territory. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 15 December 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman (A/AC.109/510); two statements issued by the Chairman on 28 May and 14 June 1976, respectively (A/AC.109/526 and 527), and a note by the Secretary-General dated 2 September 1976, transmitting, at the request of the Acting Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, a paper entitled "Indonesia's Position on Timor" (see annex II to the present chapter).

4. At the 1052nd meeting, on 8 September, the Chairman drew attention to a communication dated 2 September 1976 from Mr. Jose Ramos Horta, Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), containing a request for hearing. At the same meeting, the Committee agreed to accede to the request. The representative of Indonesia made a statement in that connexion (A/AC.109/PV.1052).

5. At the same meeting, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.1052). Mr. Ramos Horta made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.1052). With the Committee's consent, the representative of Benin made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.1052). Statements were also made by the representatives of the Congo, China and Iran (A/AC.109/PV.1052).

6. At the 1053rd meeting, on 9 September, statements were made, with the Committee's consent, by the Permanent Representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique to the United Nations (A/AC.109/PV.1053). Statements were also made by the representatives of India and Indonesia (A/AC.109/PV.1053).

-225-

1,1=1 te ert stýOtilitilliv:iiiti!!tze.: m o, t --- ----!trall

ommer: tomstállý

1 7 - - -w

.....

..... iiiit jä v

sil par

slita, Jaså!; 13111111!iiiiii !tii!Oilli I upp in, cr m c

ä

111.000

i vi 11 På t-t

-4t4

-----sil ----- ---H tom

så i I

..... dissi- =Tt n

-OSS 1lpyjacopp
Tvåmå I c i l'ýstottiftfotz 00c-tor a I
!Mumsmums=
-----stillusii-sstýalla -ý77=u
----- -enrisa- ;_oo 4ý
. I . . ý-1
+ -4ýÄ 0 konskonstiie44
141 -s 4 LM
-----mar !MYA- vi 't72 t i
i I i t 7 ~rel
---,nnnfol i n---=z=ovs tco
ýjpppfj soft=lint=koffsfof;zzll--;----z---ý
, ý,
-----flott 51W Merv I-olym i,;: ý. . - ý
-5 -o-o-S ý6 e -mätT 0111 ärfy

..... - -----mens:
i
lit 11 0 1 Splj !lyC i
-----777777ý7
- v m tt get:
slagg.4å.,ý-ý-5s
titlar i nypis, räv I
,ll2eeae4lll+l+llelell-ý c-ommstsst.,ý=-ccýåmr- st---tteetrteietý
i- Stått nio;
S-Vo
--- mmlleeeee44l=ca..!;ztttj iitiizee:=zzazzzi=tee4:7zeatkli
-----t i T
IM ----- 3
å77:-, .
-1 i pax 11 en of f at! -0 -i -1 _j r t
påmo-må- I pymp---- -
pox
som :iiitisty&4miy+4j1, poppfolm st I arterna t.,Attyylleelte ti!:11111
- - ý ýF - i- ý z z ý-7
i i i 4 ä ýt-,04 4^4 4 i-I-14 J 4 a 144 4,14
å-åot.tls M Våå Påp;jååA jodå 1i411i!blliät , tä*W Mi HUS MC SäärHoec
sloppopplym å -----W-o
listionstii fplliKA±iisitfteezltelzetell" 'W=ä- ! MOMMI ---- .
.....
2 mttst+ -----
- - - å o & I i & , - 11 i -54-44ýää ý - ý
000=1 j ý

ANNEX I*
WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

General
Decolonization initiatives by the Government of Portugal. Developments in the Territory
Efforts by the Government of Portugal to find a peaceful solution
Reported military intervention by Indonesia ...
Positions of Portugal, Indonesia and Australia Status of Oecusse Ambeno
Action by the United Nations
Recent developments

* ..
*
Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.1098 and Add.1.
-227-

Paragraphs
1-3 4-8 9 - 21 22 - 23 2h - 38
39 - 44 45 - 46 47 - 51 52 - 56

- - -
i t * * ,
141 t4
.....
.....
.
tg

.....
44
-17
2W
555
MMT
.....
----- -MMil
7 -f
... :
.....
.....
.....
7 jý -----
7 7 7 T
-----4 i44,4
-9 ä 4 4 4, i

 -----.....
 i f5
 -- ---- i gagg ug i l l l
 i f i i y

Government (see para. 9 below). APODETI refused to participate in the council, however, because it desired integration with Indonesia and wished to negotiate solely with Indonesia. Later, FRETILIN also declined to participate on the grounds that some of the proposed members of the advisory council had links with the former regime.

6. In March 1975, Colonel Lemos Pires had talks with each of the three Timorese parties in accordance with the recommendations of the Portuguese ational Decolonization Commission, with a view to establishing a time-table for the decolonization of the Territory. Subsequently, in May 1975, the Portuguese Government proposed that the three parties meet on Macau in order to draw up a decolonization programme. FRETILIN declined to participate, however, because it refused to recognize APODETI as a representative of the people of Timor and because, according to FRETILIN, the right of the Timorese to independence was non-negotiable". Nevertheless, the Macau talks were held from 26 to 28 June: a delegation from Lisbon, led by Major Vitor Alves, and representatives of APODETI and UDT participated in the talks.

7. The final communique⁴ of the Macau conference reaffirmed the right of the people of Timor to self-determination and announced that a draft constitutional law delineating a transitional government for Timor would be submitted to the Council of the Revolution for approval.

8. Subsequently, in July, the Portuguese Government promulgated Law 7/75, which provided for the formation of a transitional Government to prepare for the election of a popular assembly in October 1976. The transitional Government was to consist of a High Commissioner appointed by Portugal and five members, two of whom would be representatives of the Portuguese Government- the other three were to be chosen from among representatives of the political parties in the Territory. Law 7/75 also provided for the formation of a transitional government council, an advisory organ composed of two members elected by each regional council and four members nominated by each political party. The popular assembly, to be elected by direct, secret and universal suffrage, was to be responsible for determining the future status of the Territory. Law 7/75 envisaged that Portuguese sovereignty would be terminated in October 1978, unless some other agreement was reached between the Government of Portugal and the popular assembly.

3. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TERRITORY

A. Political parties

9. Soon after 25 April 1974, three political parties were formed in Timor. UDT, headed by Mr. Francisco Lopes da Cruz, advocated continued links with Portugal

and a gradual movement towards independence. At the time, UDT was composed of former Portuguese officials and was reported to have followers among the traditional chiefs who served as territorial officers, some villagers, some businessmen of Chinese origin and the Portuguese community. FRETILIN, led by Mr. Francisco Xavier do Amaral and supported by the more junior civil servants, -229-

.....

7 t f T I I T 4 f i T T 1 1 t I i T 7 1 t
t-i f 14
-k 4- iiiiii-iiiiI4Ijjiy,,:,,
7 7 T T
g - x
TAHUP

4\$ mil
5,4.2y
VI t
et!
..... -gg
7v7 ---- T,
t,4, -t 5 -5_ -----
---- -
=-==u5 r i - n
-c t
..
t
- - - - - 71 1 7
EN wi
7 &
..... bk~~

7 727
MYR,

demands for impaine independence in favour of the establishment of a provisional government in 1976 and independence a few years later.
17. Also in mid-September, UDT and APODETI forces that had taken refuge in Indonesia announced the start of a guerrilla war against FRETILIN. At the same time, UDT joined with KOTA and the Partido Trabalhista, to form a coalition called Movimento Anti-Comunista (MAC).
18. According to an assessment made by a team of the Australian Council for

Overseas Aid (ACFOA) which visited Timor in October 1975, between 2,000 and 3,000 people lost their lives in the civil war, most of them in the area around the central mountain zone. The ACFOA team estimated that fewer than 500 persons were killed at Dili itself. At the same time, thousands of people, particularly those living in the border areas crossed the frontier into Timor Barat to escape the war.

19. During October, the international press reported advances by pro-Indonesian troops as well as denials by Indonesian officials that Indonesian troops were involved in any military action against FRETILIN. By late November, the combined troops of MAC and APODETI were said to be near Dili.

20. On 28 November, FRETILIN declared the independence of the Territory and the establishment of the "Democratic Republic of East Timor", headed by Mr. Francisco Xavier do Amaral. According to Mr. Rogerio Lobato, military commander of FRETILIN, among the reasons for the decision to declare independence were Portugal's delay in starting negotiations on the future of Timor and Indonesian military activity on the border.

21. On 30 November, APODETI, UDT, KOTA and the Partido Trabalhista also proclaimed the independence of the Territory and its integration with Indonesia (see A/C.4/808 and Corr.1, annex, enclosure). On 17 December, the pro-Indonesian parties declared the establishment of a 'Provisional Government of East Timor' (A/31/42-S/11923, annex) c/ at Dili, headed by Mr. Reis AraJo, leader of APODETI. The "Provisional Government called on the people of Timor to help fight FRETILIN and appealed to Indonesia for military and economic aid.

4. EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION

22. On 20 August 1975, the National Decolonization Commission met at Lisbon in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to the problem. In order to obtain diplomatic support from countries neighbouring Timor, a special mission headed by Mr. Ant6nio de Almeida Santos, former Portuguese Minister for Interterritorial Co-ordination, visited Australia, Indonesia and Timor between 29 August and mid-September. During these discussions, consideration was given to the establishment of a joint force with Australia and Malaysia to keep peace in the Territory, but no agreement was reached. Mr. Almeida Santos also proposed a meeting with representatives of APODETI, FRETILIN and UDT, to be held on Macau on 20 September. The meeting failed to materialize because FRETILIN refused to participate and announced that it would only negotiate directly with the Portuguese

c/ For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, t't Year. Supplement for October November and December 1975 (S/11923), annex. -231-

4 + i

j2F 4

MM IA,-6 ö44,14911101114

.....

.

24

L z

~ -%i y _ý7

I ääää

.....

- - - - - ..

JJ Li

2i

_ZÄ

ýýZLN£Zmuzr-;--n z z

O-m

_ÄkmuaLåná 7-2i

4

x i

.....

mim,

pomp91-1 E

a å

.

.....

g g

reportedly led by Indonesians. The Portuguese officials had apparently been evacuated earlier in the month.

29. Although the new Indonesian offensive appeared to be geared to consolidating the control over Timor of the forces of MIAC and APODETI, Antara, the official Indonesian press agency, announced on 8 January 1976 that pro-Indonesian troops

controlled only one third of the Territory. At the same time, FRETILIN was said to be attempting to secure control of the Baucau-Dili route, one of the main arteries of communication in the Territory.

30. Later reports during the same month suggested that FRETILIN was continuing

to wage a guerrilla war against MAC and APODETI troops supported by Indonesian military units. On 14 January, Mr. Alarico Fernandes, a member of the Central

Committee of FRETILIN, said in a radio message monitored at Darwin that his party's forces had recaptured Liquiqg, Basartete and Maubara and had cut off the link between Baucau and the eastern tip of the island where there is an airport. Aileu, a mountain town, was said to be surrounded by FRETILIN forces.

31. According to Mr. Rogerio Lobato, Defence Minister of the FRETILIN Government"

some 10,000 people in Timor had been killed after Indonesian troops entered the Territory. He charged that Indonesia was dropping chemicals from planes, notably in the region of Baucau. He also said that Indonesian and pro-Indonesian forces had lost 1,500 men fighting against FRETILIN. These charges were subsequently denied by an Australian coffee planter who had lived for three years at Lospalos, Timor. In a statement to the Security Council on 1h April 1976, he said that he had seen no evidence of the use of chemical or biological methods of warfare or large-scale bombardment in the area (S/PV.1909).

32. On 27 January, there were reports that eight Indonesian warships and two aircraft had bombarded Betano, on the south coast, and that Indonesian troops had landed and were advancing towards Same. By early February, FRETILIN sources claimed that they had regained control over Same.

33. Subsequent statements from the Provisional Government" at Dili suggested, however, that it controlled areas in the southern part of the Territory previously held by FRETILIN. The 'Provisional Government" was reported to have dissolved all political parties in the areas under its control.

34. In February, Mr. Francisco Lopes da Cruz, Vice-Governor of the 'Provisional Government", said that more than 60,000 people, mostly women and children, had been killed in the first six months of the war. Mr. Lopes da Cruz reportedly admitted that there had been reprisals against supporters of the "Democratic Republic of East Timor', often as revenge for its acts while in power. Later, in a telegram dated 25 March 1976 addressed to the Secretary-General, Mr. Reis Araijs, "Chief Executive" of the Provisional Government , said that the 60,000 victims of the war since the outbreak of hostilities included more than 40,000 Timorese refugees who had fled to Indonesia. d/

35. Towards the end of March) Indonesian officials said that Indonesian 'Ivolunteers" who had participated in the fighting against the Democratic Republic Of East Timor" had been repatriated. According to Mr. Adam Malik, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, his country had been maintaining 1,500 volunteers in Timor. Mr. Ramos Horta, Foreign Minister of the 'Democratic Republic of East d/ Official Becords of the Security Council, 'hirty-first Year, Supplement for April ay and June 197 (/120bl), annex.

-233-

ää

72 Cvffipl--.ý

411v, jwmwý w

wie

AK-

Z5AL

Jv

?27

Åk

u. k: V7-

ag

niN

DM

zý

mer

--- ý25ý

-4c

zý-

77.....

7

.....
Äp

-32ESEM= Z,

.. .. .

Ma

zL

-W

B. Indonesia

41. As reported previously, j/ from the outset the Indonesian Government has emphasized that it would like to see the people of Timor exercise their right to self-determination, that it would in no way attempt to influence the choice of the population of Timor in respect to their future- and if the population of Timor, in exercising their right to self-determination, chose to unite with Indonesia, the Indonesian Government would be prepared to collaborate with them to that end.

42. During the meetings of the Security Council in December 1975, the Indonesian representative expressed the view that the prevailing situation in Timor at the time had resulted from Portugal's neglect of the Territory. Accordingly, Indonesia could not remain indifferent in the face of the prospect of chaos, and hundreds of volunteers had responded to the pro-integration forces in their fight against FRETILIN (S/PV.1864).

43. The Indonesian representative also stated that the proclamation of the "Provisional Government of East Timor; should be confirmed by the people in exercise of their right to self-determination and that the United Nations should be involved during the remaining stage of the decolonization process of the Territory (S/PV.1909).

C. Australia

44. The Government of Australia has called for an end to hostilities in the Territory and the withdrawal of outside forces. Australia has furthermore expressed its support for a genuine act of self-determination and the early resumption of international humanitarian aid to the Territory.

7. STATUS OF OECUSSE AMBENO

45. On 13 December 1975, the Portuguese enclave of Oecusse Ambeno in West Timor was reported to have officially merged with Indonesia. The ceremony involving the merger took place at Kupang, the capital of West Timor, at a special

session of the local legislative assembly. According to news reports, the decision to integrate with Indonesia was peacefully reached by all political parties in the enclave.

46. Brigadier El Tari, Governor of Timor Barat, said that he had accepted the merger and would report it to the President of Indonesia. Subsequently, however, when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations visited the enclave on 20 January (see paras. 49-50 below), he was informed by the local authorities that they were still awaiting a decision of the Indonesian Government on the petition for integration, which they had signed on 7 December 1975.

Z/ Ibid., paras. 23-26.

-235-

-,t t ,!!!!I!iI
L ý L [III- I
iiii iiLi i
- - - - -
- -
-L 4 4.
.....

-4ý-i zý 4. ýx-ý
.....
pir
77
- - - - -ýk4
u u w T T
77y
7 =rv~ -7 t -f

fl
lm
'222"le-g
lä-blå
egg~

9. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

52. On 12 April, a spokesman for the "Provisional Government' told the Security Council that, in line with a request of the Indonesian Government 'to ensure that the implementation of the right to self-determination is carried out properly', the 'Provisional Government' was planning to set up a 'Regional Popular Assembly', whose membership would include traditional chiefs and other prominent figures in society and religion. Direct elections would be held only in population centres such as Dili and Baucau where the people had some education (S/PV.1908).

53. On 24 May, elections to the 13 "District Assemblies" took place in the Territory. Each "District Assembly' was composed of from 15 to 20 members,

from which two were selected as delegates to the "Regional Popular Assembly", with the exception of Bobonaro "District Assembly", which selected three delegates because of its larger population. In addition to the 27 delegates chosen by the "District Assemblies", 10 prominent religious and political figures were appointed by the "Executive of the Provisional Government of East Timor" to serve in the "Regional Popular Assembly";;

54. On 31 May, at its first meeting at Dili, the "Regional Popular Assembly" decided to petition Indonesia to formally integrate the Territory with that country. Only seven States accepted the invitation to send observers: India, Iran, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Thailand. Among those invited which did not accept were Australia, Japan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore and the United States of America. According to the Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), the observers had no opportunity to probe the authenticity of the meeting as "an act of self-determination", because the proceedings were in Portuguese, explanations were sketchy and the observers had no opportunity to meet the members of the "Assembly". FRETILIN has denounced the holding of the "Regional Popular Assembly" as a manoeuvre of Indonesia to legitimize the invasion of Timor.

55. Recent reports from Timor indicate that the fighting continues, particularly along the northern coast of the Territory where FRETILIN claims to have retaken several villages, including one near Dili. FRETILIN reported that its "Central Committee" had held a second plenary session in the Territory at which it announced that it would continue the armed struggle (S/12133, annex, enclosure 1).

56. On 17 July 1976, the President of Indonesia promulgated Law 7/1976 providing for the integration of Timor into the Republic of Indonesia and the establishment of East Timor as its twenty-seventh province. The Indonesian Government has appointed Mr. Reis Aradjo Governor and Mr. Lopes da Cruz Vice-Governor.

-237-

. -17
4, t
Z i i V J i 7-1 r 5 k t s

-4fT-1

3- 't- V 7 v-v, =-v r v v

-:j -Z7 nr- yV-w

.....

ýý- JL Å

----- 7

T 'w m Tý r L r l 7 ýý ---

--

-n- 4,-----

7 7

v- r e -v-ný i

--1, 4 1 .ý 7 1- u -w T 7 -T. t 1:t - ----

--

7-7

21-ý-,---ý.-ý-ý.-:ý i

ý:r 1 JF 'E IF :7 t t

4 4 5- t C, 1 -4

t t -1, 44

1 1 jý.

4_ý

INDONESIA'S POSITION ON TIMOR

1. Prior to the outbreak of strife in Timor, Indonesia outlined its position with respect to the decolonization of Portuguese Timor as follows:
 - "(a) The responsibility for decolonization lies with Portugal as the administering Power;
 - "(b) Indonesia itself has no territorial ambitions;
 - "(c) Indonesia has always respected and upheld the United Nations Declaration on decolonization;
 - "(d) Indonesia hopes that the act of self-determination will be exercised in a democratic manner which permits all groups to express their opinions concerning the Territory's political destiny; "(e) If the population of Portuguese Timor, in a free and democratic exercise of its right to self-determination, should decide to become independent through integration with Indonesia, in view of the close links existing between the two peoples, Indonesia is prepared to agree to integration."
2. The Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente (FRETILIN), which was assisted by irresponsible elements in the colonial military forces which provided it with arms and military support, tried to impose its minority political

beliefs on the people by force. As a result, thousands were forced to flee to the Indonesian part of Timor to escape death, violence and persecution. Taking into consideration the turmoil in the Territory and the appeal of four indigenous political parties for assistance, Indonesia allowed volunteers to enter East Timor to assist the people of East Timor in restoring peace and security.

3. FRETILIN declared the "independence" of the Territory on 28 November 1975 and the other four parties countered by declaring the integration of the Territory with Indonesia on 30 November 1975. In response to the declaration of integration, Indonesia insisted that any decision should be the outcome of the exercise of the right of self-determination by the entire people of Timor. On 17 December 1975, the four parties together constituted the Provisional Government of East Timor, which was recognized by the Indonesian Government as the de facto authority in the Territory.

4. In an effort to co-operate in implementing the provisions of Security Council resolution 384 (1975) of 22 December 1975, Indonesia persuaded the Provisional Government of East Timor to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary General and to provide him with facilities necessary to carry out his mission. The Special Representative visited East Timor from 20 January to 22 January 1976.

5. On 31 May 1976, the duly elected People's Assembly of East Timor decided formally to request the Government of Indonesia to accept the decision of the people of East Timor for integration with the Republic of Indonesia. When the request for integration was presented to the Indonesian Government by a delegation

-239-

.....
 - - ----
 ----- ýý 1

CHAPTER XIII

(A/31/23/Add.7 (Part I))

GIBRALTAR

CONTENTS

Paragraph

| | |
|-------------------------------------------------------|---|
| A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | - |
| 4 | |
| B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | 5 |
| ANEX: WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT | |

P2e
242 242
243
-241-

z 3- z v u RV

. åsgimg

men

7

2,2,;

äiaamu"~"" A Ä 77

46,~

ido OM äffi

.....

J 6

.....

.7;ý2-ILU=r 71,

4. 4

"t- r-

ý7 -V 'zý

z g

.....

-- - - - -

.....

'1 Y

22

MC-=

;r 5W -

V -

.....

ANNEX*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

CONTENTS

General

Political developments

Economic conditions

Social and educational conditions

Paragraphs

1 -3 4 - 1o 11 - 19 20 - 28

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.1126.

-243-

Z :1 :Z

ýúý 4:7

=OMSE

cI MM=

par

ta

oms

.....

Om

.....
 111 tri Csoms upp ýj t7ýý
 l, . .i, Ä-s 0 rMYý
 T m F7773 _ý =t
 sing.
 -sr-;T
 oms
 käl 72
 iz"
 7r IN -W
 Z- a4e4ie44t1111

 -undieriyet:1411
 lf - - - - -
 -, X1C 1
 AL:::
 pr==
 5F -w ärr
 åäm

resolution 3286 (XXIX) of 13 Decemiber 1974, which urged the United Kindom.
 and Spain to conclude their negotiations, no satisfactory progress had yet been
 achieved. He contested the legal considerations based on the Treaty of Utrecht
 which had been raised by the United Kingdom and further pointed out that these
 considerations did not prevent the General Assembly from taking into account
 that the decolonization of Gibraltar contained two distinct elements. the territorial
 integrity of Spain, which he said had to be safeguarded, and the interests of some
 inhabitants who, although alien to the territorial problem, had to be protected. He
 therefore expressed the hope that the two Governments would be able to solve the
 dispute over Gibraltar through mutual agreement. c/

5. In reply, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United
 Nations said that for his Government, the wishes of the inhabitants of Gibraltar
 were of paramount consideration and that it was these wishes that were reflected
 in the preamble of the Act of Parliament which had brought Gibraltar's current
 constitution into force. His Government had suggested that the Spanish
 Government should concentrate on the human element of the problem, in
 particular on the attitude of the Gibraltarians themselves, and it believed that it
 was important for the two Governments to continue, by discussions, to seek the
 elements of a negotiable agreement which might be acceptable to all concerned.
 He said that despite the contact between the two Governments, the stage had not
 yet been reached where a common basis had emerged on which substantive
 negotiations could begin. However, the discussions had been useful and his
 Government would go on trying. d/

6. According to press reports, conversations took place at London, on 2 March
 1976, between Mr. James Callaghan, then Secretary of State for Foreign and
 Commonwealth Affairs, and Mr. Jose Maria de Areilza, Minister for External

Affairs of Spain. During the talks, which covered, inter alia, the question of Gibraltar, each side is reported to have reaffirmed its position.

B. Discussions on the future of the Territory

7. During the past year, the two political parties in the Territory, the Association for the Advance of Civil Rights (led by Sir Joshua Hassan, the Chief Minister) and the Integration with Britain Party (led by Mr. Maurice Xiberras, Leader of the Opposition), are reported to have held intensive discussions on the Territory's future. The discussions reportedly covered the economy and citizenship in the context of "more formal links with the United Kingdom".

8. In view of the forthcoming elections to the House of Assembly, which have been scheduled for September 1976, the two political parties were also reported to have discussed the elimination of the formal government/opposition structure and its replacement by a system of government by committees. According to the press, these discussions had been prompted by "the feeling that Gibraltar is too small a place

c/ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2367th meeting.

d/ Ibid., 2368th meeting.

-245-

-----,-----

iy 7 7 3 1 Y 4

T-57

----- å kli 4kl

-5

...

7 7, -----

sk

0,7 ~. . 4 @ 1 @ J- ..

.....

II Ä,

iyý 7,ffli T-4

Uffl

V

1 1, 1 7, 144

Ä,

ri;ýi; 4

2

i -i 1 1. lit r y -r u

M

-I M-iitwa-ý--7F j z ; ; ;

 7-7
 TiTTMT=iiiTTi
 I T T 't
 jNINV,
 47 uff
 aning= - - - -
 - - - - -

During 1975, a total of 2,433 merchant ships aggregating 14.7 million net registered tons entered the Port of Gibraltar. Of these, 1,787 were ocean-going vessels aggregating 14.4 million net registered tons. In addition, 2,384 calls were made by yachts.

13. The general economic picture was summed up in a report by The Financial Times (London) of 3 June 1976, as follows:

6" Gibraltar's small and open economy is very vulnerable to external influences, and although there has been a drive towards greater selfsufficiency, there is nothing dramatic that can be done. There is no agriculture or primary production. Light industries have not flourished and the economy continues to lean heavily on United Kingdom defence spending.

B. Laorts and exrts

14. During 1975, the value of imports (excluding fuel oils) amounted to £18.8 million. e/ The United Kingdom and other member countries of EEC provide the bulk of these imports. Other sources of supply include the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Morocco, Japan and the United States of America.

15. Exports of goods of local origin are negligible and the Territory depends to a great extent on entrep~t trade.

C. Revenue and expenditure

16. Actual revenue for the year 1974/75 totalled £8.8 million and exceeded estimates by £612,550. Recurrent expenditure amounted to £8.7 million, an increase of £867,428 over the original estimate. Public debt charges amounted to £426,466. The principal items of recurrent revenue and expenditure for the year are listed in table 1 below.

e/ The local currency is the pound sterling.

7ý 7 - - - - -
 ml ý_27z:4.

 ... 457-n 9 i - - - - - wý;
 wý;- - - - -
 ý - - - - -
 a vi
 7__ - - - - -
 -4ý

l i-i i v i i i i-i

jý ----- --

ac -4-4_-P-

.....

ÄÄ ýý4b44

't-k l ý-ý ý-_4 4 4 2t i i 4 t ä! t -4 tA i-----

.

-1 il

--t f Y Y t T 1 2 1

t

aý

l 7- -r

- ý5M

t7 -

ýtk

IA,

MI,

-----.....

----- 1 7~. 777 77 7ý- 7

----- --

_;.n 'P'717ý 3ý

114iTTTT

..... ..

limulaalo

l Ký -7

i 2 ffil M i

.....

.....

air increased by 8.1 per cent, compared with 1974, while the number of tourists staying in hotels (40,232) rose by 14 per cent. The average hotel occupancy rate was 44.8 per cent. It is estimated that 95 per cent of the tourists come from the United Kingdom. In 1975, British Airways and Gibraltar Airways had 10 scheduled flights per week.

19. During the period under review, expenditure by the Gibraltar Tourist Office amounted to Z171,663, including £97,310 (56.7 per cent) on promotion, and revenue amounted to £18,829. According to the administering Power, estimated expenditure by tourists totalled £4.0 million in 1975.

4. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

A. Labour

20. Since Gibraltar has no agricultural or other natural resources, opportunities for employment are provided mainly by the Official Employers (namely, the Government of Gibraltar, the Ministry of Defence and the Property Services Agency), as well as the wholesale and retail trades, the hotel and catering trades, shipping services and the building industry. According to the administering Power, unemployment increased during 1975. All unemployed workers are granted credits in respect of contributions under the Social Insurance Scheme. f/

21. Wages and salaries in the Territory were recently reviewed by an expert employed by the Governor. In his recommendations, he stated that general wage and salary levels should bear some relationship to those negotiated in the United Kingdom and that, as a guiding principle, the Gibraltar rates of payment should be approximately 80 per cent of those in the United Kingdom for corresponding grades of employees.

22. The principal wage rates payable to adults at the end of 1975 for a standard five-day, 40-hour week were: labourers, £22.86; skilled labourers, 923.29- titular grades, £23.72 to £25.48; and tradesmen, £25.92 to £26.36. The cost of living allowance amounted to £3.05.

B. Health

23. The government medical and health services consist of: hospital services; specialist medical treatment outside government hospitals; child welfare and school health services, domiciliary and out-patient treatment of persons coming under the scope of the District Medical Service: domiciliary medical service; port and airport health service, public health inspection service and laboratories.

f/ For a description of the social security system in the Territory, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 23 A-/9623/Rev.1), chap' XIII, paras. 29-31.

.....
-----.....
77=- - 7-7'----- -- ----7 7 F7ý5 7

9ffil

.....
..... II. ý- ý ýL 'I' -" " ý1ý ý-* I -,! -ý-, ý, . ,
. ý . lýýýý_ ýý , --
.....
Lý':E

-- -- ----- --
----- ----- -h~ iAM i
.....

CHAPTER XIV (A/31/23/Add.7 (Part II)) FRENCH SOMALILAND
CONTENTS

| Paragraphs | Page |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | 1 - 4 |
| 252 | |
| B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE | 5 253 |
| ANNEX. WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT | |
| | 254 |

-251-

-~-----
-44 tro - - -
--

.....
k_ÅÄ_ý_t t Itt si
-----7VY T
1 1 lj l, ii 1 1,
19 Å å å i
T &Äm' 17
-----4
7ý 77 i -2
Z"4
ýr- 7~ mi
-47 _AM_=
rx
-z. V V-I. ---j r
4ý4

=;44 ne -----
.....
4ý1 _- 'j-ý 2
1
J

B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

5. At its 1054th meeting, on 10 September, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.IO9/PV.1054), the Special Committee decided as follows: Considering the importance of this question and conscious of the limited time which remained before the opening of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly; bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 3480 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; welcoming the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to expedite the process of decolonization of the Territory, in particular the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of that organization 2/ at its thirteenth session in Mauritius; and taking into account the decision on this question by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries as reflected in the political declaration adopted by the Conference, 3/ the Special Committee decides to authorize its Rapporteur to transmit to the General Assembly the relevant documentation on the item in order to facilitate its consideration by the Fourth Committee and, subject to any directives which the Assembly may give in this connexion, to resume consideration of the question at its session in 1977.

2/ A/31/269.

3/ A/31/197, annex I, para. 37.

-253-

v 3 ;1
C.#- t4-1
4.4, 7 D-i. 3 r
.....
----- v4 l- -----
7 w å

.....
92
7 7 i 74 7 ---- --
.....
- - - - - i y i g ý : p ; ; i i

1 7

21 - - - - -

.....
i4 i il

.....

.....

.....

FRENCH SOMALILAND a/

1. GENERAL

1. Situated on the east coast of Africa between 39° 30' and 41° 00' east longitude and between 11° and 12° 30' north latitude, French Somaliland covers an area of 23,000 square kilometres, most of which is desert or semi-desert. The Territory has common frontiers with Ethiopia to the north, west and south-west, and with Somalia to the south. Its coastline is about 800 kilometres in length and runs from Ras Doumeira in the north to Loyada in the south. The terrain consists mostly of volcanic plateaux, bordered in places by sunken plains and lakes, some of which (Lake Assal and Lake Alol, for example) are below sea level. The Territory has no permanent surface watercourse. The climate is very hot during the major part of the year, averaging 29.440 centigrade at Djibouti, the capital. Humidity is high near the coast but decreases in the interior. Precipitation is scarce and irregular, averaging less than 127 millimetres annually.

2. The population is divided into the following four major groups: Afars or Danakil, comprising the Adohyammara and the Asahyammara; Issas, a Somali group comprising the Abgals, the Dalols and the Wardigs; Arabs, chiefly of Yemeni and

Saudi Arabian origin; and Europeans.

3. According to Le Rveil de Djibouti of 11 March 1967, the total population in March of that year was estimated to number 125,000 persons, classified as follows:

| | |
|-------------------------|---------|
| Issas | 58,240 |
| Afars | 48,270 |
| Europeans and assimilés | 10,255 |
| Arabs | 8,285 |
| | 125,050 |

4. Of this number, 28,430 Issas, 1,700 Afars, 2,600 Europeans and 5,120 Arabs were classified as foreigners.

5. According to the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, b/ the population of the Territory was estimated in 1974 at 104,000 persons, with a density of 5 inhabitants per square kilometre and a population growth rate of 2.3 per cent.

a/ For the new designation of the Territory, see Terminology Bulletin No. 240 (ST/CS/SER.F/240), issued by the Secretariat on 15 April 1968. For detailed information concerning this change, see also Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/23/Annex, para. 1) chap. XV, annex, paras. 6 and 7.

b/ United Nations publication, Sales No. 75.XIII.1.

-255-

-g --F

Z4,

Il mil imi I ø

2-A

.

y i

22=2

ly~sk

n:2

-2

14

9. For administrative purposes, French Somaliland is divided into the district of Djibouti and the four cercles of Dikhil, Ali Sabieh, Tadjourah and Obock. The Territory's Judicial organs are a High Court of Appeals, a Court of First Instance and a number of customary courts.

B. 1973 elections

10. The most recent general elections, held in the Territory on 18 November 1973 designated the 40 members of the Chamber of Deputies. The official polling results indicated that the lists sponsored by Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan, the President of the Government Council, had received 26,855 votes, representing nearly 75 per cent of those cast, against 8,536 for the other lists. The government party, namely Union et progres dans l'ensemble frangais (UPEF) thus won all 40 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Following complaints about irregularities in the polling, made by the opposition parties, E/ the French Conseil d'Etat confirmed, on 5 February 1975, the decision of the Conseil du Contentieux Administratif of Djibouti of 14 February 1974 invalidating the election of seven candidates. The partial elections held in March 1975 were won by UPEF, the members of which

later formed UNI. The LPAI did not take part in the partial elections.

C. Political groups

11. LPAI, whose platform centres on immediate independence, is the only legal opposition party. LPAI is a combination of several parties whose merger took place in the following stages.

12. On 28 February 1972, a new party, known as the Ligue populaire africaine (LPA), was formed as a result of the merger of the Ligue pour l'avenir et l'ordre (LAO), headed by Mr. Ahmed Dini Ahmed; the Union populaire africaine (UPA), headed by Mr. Hassan Gouled Aptidon; and the Rassemblement du peuple Issa (RPI).

13. Subsequently, in February 1975, LPA and the Action pour la justice et le progres (AJP) merged to form LPAI. The leaders of LPAI are Mr. Hassan Gouled, President, Mr. Moumen Bahdou, Vice-President and Mr. Dini, Spokesman. In

December 1975, the Mouvement populaire de liberation (MPL) was established in Djibouti by a group of young civil servants, mainly Afars.

Liberation movements

14. There are two liberation movements recognized by OAU: the Mouvement de liberation de Djibouti (MLD), with headquarters at Diredawa in Ethiopia; and FLCS, with headquarters at Mogadiseio in Somalia.

&/ After the November 1973 elections, the opposition parties complained of "electoral irregularities" on the grounds of what they called "control" and "padding the ballot box", "refusal to inscribe candidates on the opposition list" and an electoral system involving absolute majority in a single round of voting.

-257-

.....
.....
.....
4 4 '1

----- lim

w mýý_ løb

om -----~Pu~ M~Rff=
4,41" M,,M
..... i M¥M,

20. According to the French authorities, Balbala had gradually become an unregulated "shanty town" with no water or sanitation facilities and a population of almost 1,500 persons. Accordingly, Balbala had been cleared because of the health and public order problems it posed. On 13 April, Le Monde reported that an imprisoned member of PLCS had been killed on 10 April 197(during an escape attempt by one of his companions.

21. Then in May, during the visit of the OAU Fact-Finding Mission to Tadjourah (see paras. 50-51 below), the second largest town in the Territory, the territorial guard fired on some peaceful demonstrators and 1 person was killed and 14 injured. The OAU Mission was later informed that the killed and injured were members of the MPL and the police did not take orders from the High Commissioner but from the territorial Government. i/ Representatives of LPAI accused France, in a communiqu6 of 3 May, of being "responsible for that incident'. According to the office of the French High Commissioner, the local security forces had lost control of the situation. Subsequently, the French authorities resumed responsibility for the local police which had hitherto been under the local government.

22. On 4 March, the order prohibiting "any gathering of more than five persons

and any parades in public thoroughfares" was revoked and on 5 March the curfew, which had been in force since 4 February 1976 in the African quarters of Djibouti, was lifted.

23. The activities of LPAI in the Territory have been marked by the organization of large public demonstrations, of which the most successful were those held on 21 December 1975 and 11 February 1976. Despite the ban on gatherings of more than

five persons, LPAI managed to rally thousands of supporters. In an article in *Le Monde* of 13 February 1976, it was stated that the success of the LPAI demonstrations showed "a political maturity, a sense of organization and a seriousness which justify its will to present itself as a party ready to take Power

24. According to reports, in April 1976 the Government of Mr. Ali Aref was experiencing a crisis involving a number of resignations. On 7 May 1976, Mr. Ahmed Aouled Ali, Minister for the Civil Service, handed in his resignation after stating that "the Government of Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan no longer meets the aspirations of the great majority of the population". This resignation, preceded by the resignation of Mr. Mohammad DJama Elabe, Minister for Public Works, Transport and Tourism, was followed by the resignation of Mr. Abdellahi Ahmed Gad, Deputy for Djibouti. Of the 40 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies, 19 are now opposed to Mr. Ali Aref.

25. In mid-May, during his visit to Paris, Mr. Ali Aref was then quoted as saying that the situation in the Territory had become very disturbing and he charged that

i/ Report of OAU Fact-Finding Mission, op. cit., p.47.

-259-

. w-ý
.
ZZ
'nn
- - - - - 1
wr..
.
lr-iL IL
eý4 ----2K
.
lr eg mr
.

4. FUTURE STATUS OF THE TERRITORY n/

A. Statements by French and local authorities

30. In a statement released in December 1975, the Government of France affirmed that the Territory was destined for independence and specified the ways and means of obtaining that end. According to the statement, France considered that it

had a duty to ensure "the Territory's accession to international sovereignty by maintaining the integrity of its boundaries, ensuring its security and preserving the dignity of its peoples". To that end, France was ready "to guarantee its (the Territory's) integrity and security" and would endeavour to obtain the necessary guarantees from the countries directly concerned and from international or regional bodies.

31. The French Government also stated that, while assuring the people of the Territory of their right to self-determination, France would work out solutions designed to ensure that the new State would take its place in the international community under the best possible conditions and would pursue its development in friendship and co-operation with France. The French Government added that it was prepared to enhance the economic prospects of the future State by helping it to remain a maritime outlet for part of East Africa and by ensuring that communication and trade guarantees were preserved.

32. In the statement, the French authorities also called on the political leaders of the Territory, within the framework of local institutions, to define collectively the constitutional and democratic principles which would guarantee the rights of the minorities.

33. As to the date for the referendum referred to in the statement, Mr. Olivier Stirn, Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories, announced on 12 February 1976 that, if all the guarantees were obtained in time, it was not impossible that a referendum would be held in Djibouti before the end of 1976.

34. According to an article published in *Le Monde* on 12 March 1976, the policy of the French Government includes the following three points:

- (a) The arrangements for the referendum should be agreed upon among the various elements of the population, taking into account various views and political trends in the Territory;
- (b) The international organizations concerned, the United Nations, OAU and the League of Arab States (LAS), would be allowed to send observers;
- (c) The maintenance of a French military base would not be a pre-condition for the independence of the Territory, although France would be prepared to maintain

n/ The information in this section covers the period up to the end of May 1976.

-261-

-----... ..
-----

Mr. Ali Aref expressed the hope that a referendum would be held at the end of 1976.

The results of the voting would then be ratified by the French National Assembly and a Constituent Assembly would be established at Djibouti.

41. In March, Mr. Ali Aref said that he would request OAU to guarantee that

Somalia and Ethiopia would not make claims on the Territory after its accession to independence.

42. According to reports, in April 1976, a new opposition group was formed within UNI under the leadership of Mr. Barakat Gourad. This group, comprising 18 of the 40 members of the Chamber of Deputies was opposed to Mr. Ali Aref and said that it would not participate in the conference proposed by France under the existing circumstances.

LPAI

43. While recalling its decision in favour of "unconditional" independence, LPAI considered that the statement of the French Government concerning the ways and means of preparing for independence (see paras. 30-33 above) was ambiguous and requested clarification on many points.

44. In the view of LPAI, the December 1975 statement did not differ essentially from earlier statements by the French Government. According to LPAI, it was a delaying tactic, similar to those which preceded it and which, with the collusion of the so-called local government - which was an artificial, puppet government had brought into being a state of non-legality which was having the effect of delaying or preventing the country's independence.

45. Previously LPAI had refused to participate in meetings proposed by France to discuss constitutional matters because it wished to hold direct bilateral talks with France since it considered that the only parties qualified to discuss independence were the colonized and the colonizer, that is the people of the Territory and the French Government.

C. Reaction of the liberation movements

FLCS

46. FLCS considered that if the French Government wished to decolonize French Somaliland "a mere statement of intent does not suffice; it must specify when and how decolonization will be carried out".

47. According to reports published in May 1976, FLCS stated in a white paper presented to the special OAU mission which visited the Territory (see paras. 50-51 below) that it rejected the French policy which it considered could lead to war. It therefore specifically requested that the French Government cancel the proposed referendum; dissolve the present Government of the Territory; remove the barbed wire fence around Djibouti; release all political detainees and repatriate deported nationalists; and repeal the emergency law.

-263-

idiskTII.ztolot -vs7lsx2talas pappýsýs-,assl

.....
stoppluppymintanáy,
zi i

.....
s_så77-

2ý1
temps
k'41
771
i.771 771
-1
-1
-1
-----om m I
olm
Y-
dolt

53. On 17 March 1976, a spokesman for LAS announced at Cairo, that the League whole-heartedly supported independence for Djibouti. The League also asked its Secretary-General, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, to approach the Government of France regarding

the organization of a referendum as soon as possible. In addition, the League decided to send a fact-finding mission to Djibouti, composed of Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait and the Libyan Arab Republic.

5. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE JUNE 1976

54. On 8 June, the French Government made public the text of identical statements issued by UNI, LPAI and the opposition members in Parliament. In their statements, they announced that they desired a true independence for the future State whose sovereignty and territorial integrity would be respected. Therefore, they hoped that the independence proposed by France would be recognized by international organizations and the neighbouring States. After the attainment of independence, the leaders of the political parties in the Territory favoured agreements on co-operation between the new State and France.

55. The two parties and the opposition members also took note of the decision of the French Government to revoke article 161 of the Nationality Code and to issue official identity documents to all inhabitants in the Territory, including those who would continue to be recognized as aliens. With respect to the forthcoming electoral consultations, the two parties expressed their approval of the law guaranteeing an "equitable balance" of the population and of the plan that only persons born in the Territory would be permitted to take part in the consultations.

56. The parties said that in case of a change of Government, they would be in favour of forming a Government of "durable union" which they would support and in which they would participate.

57. On 29 July, following the resignation on 17 July of Premier Ali Aref, a new transitional Government was elected by 24 of the Territorial Assembly's 40 deputies. The new Government is headed by Mr. Abdallah Mohamed Kamil, the former government Secretary-General.

58. Eight of the 10 ministers of the transitional Government are former members of the parliamentary opposition group. Two ministers are leaders of LPAI. Six ministers are from the Issa-Somali ethnic group. Four, including the Prime Minister, are from the Afar ethnic group. Three political movements, UNI, MPL and MLD, did not participate in the new Government and rejected any dealings with the new ministerial team.

59. In his inaugural address, Mr. Kamil said that the responsibility of his Government, which had been elected as a government of union, was to establish a sovereign State with a Government transcending all ethnic groups. He said that the principal tasks the Government intended to undertake were: (a) to apply to the letter the general principles of equal opportunity; (b) strengthen and maintain domestic peace both in people's minds as well as in actual fact; and (c) to prepare

-265-

.....
-----ý

teggkLHä
aa
..... -----=ZT-7 7
... ..
-----ý Mýfl f t
74
tår,
44.4,,
.;4_4,40*1, 0~
pr
- kl
~' iy9
-liefflfffll
77rp
----- - ;44

----- ~ - ----- --
..... .. 77.-. -----
.....
----- - ;;;ý
~ 1. 1.1

6. POSITION OF THE 1'IETGHBOURING STATES

A. Somalia

63. The representative of Somalia has criticized the past electoral practices in the Territory and pointed out that there could be no genuine referendum under the conditions prevailing in the Territory. p/

64. As reported in the press, Somalia takes the position that to bring about genuine independence, it is necessary that France should create a truly democratic atmosphere. These include the dismissal of the colonial Government headed by Mr. Ali Aref and the Parliament, release of all political prisoners, return of nationals expelled from the Territory and repeal of all repressive laws. Once a democratic atmosphere has been achieved, constitutional talks should be held by France with the political groups who represent the majority of the people. Somalia has also called for these measures as pre-conditions to a referendum. In addition, it has called for the repeal of the electoral law now in force (see also para. 10 above), the introduction of new measures to enable all people in the city and in the countryside of the Territory to vote and supervision of the referendum by OAU.

65. It is the position of the Somali Government that in recognition of the paramountcy of the ideals of national liberation and freedom, it has always maintained that the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) is strictly one of decolonization and that any attempt to confuse the issue and degenerate it into a bilateral dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia is totally unacceptable. The Somali Government considers that the calls for "guarantees" and "renunciation of claims" are an attempt to compromise the independence of the people of the Territory.

66. During the debates on the subject in the Fourth Committee at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Somalia said that, since his country's attainment of independence in 1960, the attitude of successive Somali Governments with respect to the future of the Territory had not changed. Their sole wish was to see the people of the Territory free and independent in unity under the flag of their choice.

67. He also said that his Government had on numerous occasions stated, and reaffirmed, that it had no intention of annexing the Territory. Its only interest was to see the Territory fully independent. The representative of Somalia further said that the President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Somali Democratic Republic, in his address to the twelfth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU (see para. 49 above), had "reaffirmed Somalia's support for unconditional independence for the Territory, and had urged the Assembly to take the necessary action so that France's last colony could take its rightful place among the community of nations". a/ He added that his country

p/ See also Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year Supplement for January, February and March 1976 (S/12001), annex, and chap. VII of the present report, annex III (p. 77 above).

j/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2170th meeting.

-267-

ew - - - - -

7 7

Zl

m p.

70. On the solution of the problem, Ethiopia stated in the memorandum that it considered it OAU's responsibility to assist the Territory in the period both before and after independence. In the period before independence OAU should especially assist in the creation of a united front of all Political factions inside and outside the Territory and ensure that independence is attained in peace. OAU should also request from both Ethiopia and Somalia a specific undertaking of renunciation of any and all claims to the Territory of Djibouti, in compliance with the provisions of the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers at Ka-7pala (see n-ra. 60 above) and of General Assembly resolution 3480 (XXX), which called on all States to renounce forthwith any and all claims to the Territory and to declare null and void any and all acts asserting such claims. In addition OAU should request other undertakings as may be required to respect the territorial integrity of the Territory, to refrain from actions designed to alter its independent statehood and to desist from interfering in the national affairs of the Territory, and particularly to abandon attempts to change the demographic composition of the Territory.

71. It should be noted that during the debate on the subject in the Fourth Committee at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Ethiopia drew the Committee's attention to the statement made by the Chairman of the Provisional Administrative Council of Ethiopia on his country's policy with respect to the Territory. The Chairman had said that the Provisional Military Government did not believe that Ethiopia's policy posed any difficulty to the independence of the Territory. "Whatever historical rights Ethiopia might have had in this area she recognizes that these are overridden by the right of the people to self-determination and independence. He had stated, moreover, that there was no law or provision in Ethiopian legislation asserting any claim to the Territory. Ethiopia believed that the future destiny of the Territory should be based on the free choice of the people. If independence was their choice, Ethiopia would accept that and would be happy to live with an independent neighbour whose sovereignty would be assured by its membership in OAU. s/

7. FRENCH FORCES AT DJIBOUTI

72. According to the French press, the French forces at Djibouti consist of 7,000 to 8,000 men, classified as follows: (a) land forces consisting of two motorized regiments reinforced by an artillery regiment and a detachment of transport or tactical helicopters; (b) the Fifth Combined Overseas Regiment, equipped with AMC-13 tanks carrying anti-tank missiles; (c) the Thirteenth Half-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, equipped with AML-90 armoured reconnaissance units and anti-tank missiles. and (d) the Sixth Regiment, which has 155-millimetre tractor-drawn guns

s/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2172nd meeting.

-269-

.

.....

.

-- - ý,c

r

----- .. -----

I I

-----men s: x A t--

AM,7*1,

Eja -----fi

-----J -i- =;l M. Cý-----

-12 1.-----

ik

.

imma

K4 ý,1

-----.....

7-7, -5ý

Cli-t t t i21 2 J t

t k3 tii 3-1- - ----- 7

B. Public finance

78. Under a special agreement with the Fonds d'investissement pour le développement économique et social (FIDES), the expenditure of DF 376 million was authorized for development aid in 1975, when the French Secretary of State for Overseas Departments and Territories visited Djibouti in May 1975 and it was announced that steps would be taken to improve the Territory's roads, irrigation system, housing and port facilities.

79. According to the budget estimates of the territorial Government for 1975, income and expenditure balanced out DF 4,950 million. Estimated income was expected to amount to DF 2,700 million from indirect taxation and about DF 1,400 million from other contributions. It was anticipated that the new general income tax would provide a further DF 850 million in revenue, accounting for 17 per cent of income. The tax would consist of five elements: a sliding tax scale for salaries and wages; a tax on industrial and commercial profits; a company tax; an income tax on the liberal professions; and, lastly, a real estate tax. Incomes below DF 50,000 per month would be exempt from the tax, as would dividends and income from stocks and shares.

C. Transport and communications

80. Because of its geographical situation, Djibouti is both a stopping point on major international routes and a regional communications link. Its port and airport are therefore of special importance.

ir po0rt

81. Djibouti airport is served by Air France, Air Madagascar, Air Djibouti, Ethiopian Airlines, Yemen Airline, Yemen Air, Alyenda (Aden) and Somali Airlines.

82. Djibouti is also an important centre for military aviation. The French Army uses a number of commercial aircraft for both passengers and freight. A few small private aircraft are also available for rental. The airport, which has a runway of about 2,900 metres, is under the joint control of the military authorities and the Civil Aviation Department.

83. There are 10 other smaller airports at Ali-Sabeih, Dikhil, As Eylal, Yoboki, Tadjourah, Randa, Dorra, Obock, Moulhoul6 and Le Day.

Port

84. The commercial port of Djibouti comprises the following facilities: 2,700 metres of quays and piers, 26,000 square metres of private storage depot; 70,000 square metres of open storage area; and a duty-free zone of 14 hectares. The entire area is served by a railway. The cargo quays are equipped with refuelling and watering installations. The port is equipped with four tugs, an 80-ton floating crane and two smaller mobile cranes.

NU

-----Y;-- 7:

ý44446 i iJ

.....

-----.....

.....

----- -- -- -- -----

9. SOCIAL COTDITrIOiS

A. Labour

91. In 1974, the number of wage-earners was estimated at about 12,000, in addition to 1,200 civil servants, plus military personnel and territorial guards. The number of unemployed was estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000. In 1974, wage increases were authorized. The guaranteed minimum level for professionals was raised, graded salaries were increased through collective agreements in the private sector and civil servants received increases ranging from 6 to 20 per cent.

B. Public health

92. The hospitals and dispensaries in the Territory have a total of 877 beds: 577 at the Pelltier hospital at Djibouti; 104 at the anti-tuberculosis dispensary; and the remaining 196 distributed among 16 dispensaries and outpatient centres throughout the Territory. There are three pharmacies in Djibouti. In 1973, there were 24 doctors in the Territory, not including doctors serving in the armed forces.

93. Expenditure on public health for 1975 was estimated at DF 627 million.

10. EDUCATIONAL CONDITIONS

94. Primary school enrolment in the Territory was 9,980 in 1974 (7,177 in Djibouti). Enrolment in secondary and technical schools was 1,930 in 1974 (1,342 in secondary schools and 588 in technical schools). The Territory has a high school (lycée) for the last three years of secondary education and three secondary education colleges.