



U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa in Violation of the United Nations Voluntary Arms Embargo: 1963-1977

http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1978_27

Use of the Aluka digital library is subject to Aluka's Terms and Conditions, available at <http://www.aluka.org/page/about/termsConditions.jsp>. By using Aluka, you agree that you have read and will abide by the Terms and Conditions. Among other things, the Terms and Conditions provide that the content in the Aluka digital library is only for personal, non-commercial use by authorized users of Aluka in connection with research, scholarship, and education.

The content in the Aluka digital library is subject to copyright, with the exception of certain governmental works and very old materials that may be in the public domain under applicable law. Permission must be sought from Aluka and/or the applicable copyright holder in connection with any duplication or distribution of these materials where required by applicable law.

Aluka is a not-for-profit initiative dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of materials about and from the developing world. For more information about Aluka, please see <http://www.aluka.org>

U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa in Violation of the United Nations Voluntary Arms Embargo: 1963-1977

Alternative title	Notes and Documents - United Nations Centre Against ApartheidNo. 27/78
Author/Creator	United Nations Centre against Apartheid; Gervasi, Sean
Publisher	United Nations, New York
Date	1978-09-00
Resource type	Reports
Language	English
Subject	
Coverage (spatial)	South Africa, United States
Coverage (temporal)	1963 - 1977
Source	Northwestern University Libraries
Description	This paper was submitted on 30 May 1978 to the Seminar on South Africa's Military Build-up and Nuclear Plans held under the auspices of the Special Committee against Apartheid. A number of experts and leaders of anti-apartheid organizations attended the Seminar which focused on the full implementation and strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa, decided on by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.
Format extent (length/size)	16 page(s)

http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuun1978_27

27/78 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* September 1978

27/78 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS* September 1978

i01V(7stern

U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS TO SOUTH AFRICA IN VIOLATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS VOLUNTARY ARMS EMBARGO: 1963-1977

y

by

fk.IA Y 7 1979

Sean Gervasi

Africana

Note: This paper was submitted on 30 May 1978 to the Seminar on South Africa's Military Build-up and Nuclear Plans held under the auspices of the Special Committee against Apartheid.

A number of experts and leaders of anti-apartheid organizations attended the Seminar which focused on the full implementation and strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa, decided on by the Security Council on 4 November 1977.

Papers and statements presented to the Seminar are being published by the Centre against Apartheid at the request of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which invited complementary information or comments from Governments concerned.

Mr. Gervasi is an economist who has taught at the London School of Economics, Oxford University, the University of Paris and the City University of New York. He worked as consultant for the Unit on Apartheid, and has written several articles and books on southern Africa.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author.⁷

* All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted.

Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.

Introduction

There has been some controversy over the last year about the question of United States arms shipments to South Africa in the period after 1963, when the United Nations Security Council called for a voluntary arms embargo against that country. The purpose of the present paper is to examine evidence which will shed further light upon that controversy.

In July 1977, in testimony before the Sub-committee on Africa of the House Committee on International Relations, the author presented extensive evidence of the breakdown of the voluntary arms embargo against South Africa. The evidence, which was drawn from a variety of Government and industry sources, seemed to indicate that several countries, among them the major Western Powers, had virtually ignored the embargo. The United States in particular, according to

the evidence, appeared to have shipped large numbers of major weapons systems, or allowed large numbers of major weapons systems under its control to be shipped, to South Africa. Most U.S. violations of the embargo, furthermore, appeared to have taken place in the 1970s.

Since November of last year a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa has been in effect. Members of the United Nations have a legal obligation now to enforce an embargo. Before the passage of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), the prohibition of arms shipments to South Africa was a voluntary response to a Security Council request. The 1963 resolution did not create any legal obligations. Most Member States, however, instituted national embargoes and promulgated regulations to ensure that arms would not be shipped to South Africa.

The United States declared its intention to adhere strictly to the 1963 embargo from the very beginning. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson announced the U.S. intention to institute a national embargo in August of 1963. He made it clear that the U.S. intended "to bring to an end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa". 1_/ In the years between 1963 and 1978 official U.S. spokesmen repeatedly and emphatically stated that the United States was observing the embargo.

Consequently, the suggestion last year that the United States had not observed the arms embargo elicited a strong reaction from the Department of State. That reaction was partly an indication that the evidence was taken seriously. Extensive and detailed evidence on the matter had not previously been presented to the Congress, and the Members of the Sub-committee on Africa of the House appeared, for the most part, to have looked upon the evidence as credible. I/Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Representative, in the Security Council on the South African Question (United States Mission to the United Nations: Press Release No. 4233, 2 August 1963).

-2-

However, the evidence presented at the time to the Congress was only partial, so far as United States violations of the embargo was concerned. It was not possible in the summer of last year to marshal all the sources necessary to make an irrefutable case that violations had been systematic and extensive. Allegations made by the author were backed by certain evidence. Other evidence had to be held back. U.S. Government statements that the charges put before the Congress were false were left to stand. In an important sense, therefore, the whole matter remains unresolved.

Today, however, new evidence can be presented, and it will be set out in detail in later parts of this paper.

It is to be hoped that the Special Committee against Apartheid will give this evidence careful consideration. For the implications of the facts set out below are serious. The facts themselves make it clear that the United States Government allows its own arms sales regulations to be systematically violated. That in itself is a grave matter. In the present context, however, it raises even more serious issues. For violations of the embargo have taken place in a context in which the

major Western Powers have relied increasingly, albeit quietly, upon South Africa to "stabilize" the whole southern African region, and to do so by the use of force. The question therefore arises whether States have violated the arms embargo precisely in order to assist South Africa to carry out that task.

Extensive and systematic violations of the arms embargo suggest that that may be exactly what has been happening. This means, therefore, that Mr. John Stockwell may well be right in arguing, as he has done in his recent expose of the CIA, that certain U.S. Government agencies constitute a "State within a State", a State that lies outside the control of the U.S. Congress, that embraces by preference 'the violent option' in foreign policy and that strives insistently to drag the people and the Congress of the United States into one violent confrontation after the other. If the United States and other countries are arming South Africa to wage war in southern and central Africa, then that is very much a matter for the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Committee, by tackling the matter seriously and bringing to bear the full weight of its authority, can help to create a political atmosphere in which there may be some real prospect of bringing the "State within a State" under

21/ See *In Search of Enemies*, John Stockwell, New York, 1976. This book is an account by a former CIA officer of the U.S. clandestine intervention in Angola in 1974-1976.

control. Many of us believe that this has now become our most urgent task. We are not speaking here of a matter which is purely internal to the United States. We are speaking rather of agencies which, acting outside the law of their own countries and against the considered resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, are indirectly attacking and subverting the sovereign States of the African continent by arming South Africa and encouraging it to pursue aggressive policies which put the peace of the world at risk.

Summary of testimony before the House Sub-committee on Africa

The testimony presented to the Sub-committee on Africa of the House Committee on International Relations last July dealt with several issues. The first was the question of South Africa's dependence on foreign sources of arms. It is often said that South Africa is self-sufficient,

or very nearly self-sufficient, in the production of arms. However, this is not true. According to last year's Defence White Paper, Pretoria continues to import 55 per cent of its arms requirements. The defence import bill has been growing steadily for a number of years. And the defence import bill for 1977 was estimated last year at 1,200 million. /

The most important source of South African arms is the Western bloc of countries. These countries, and in particular France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy, have provided almost all the modern weapons systems now used by the South African Defence Forces. Thus, despite the voluntary United Nations arms embargo, a very large traffic in arms has developed between these countries and South Africa. These arms, however, reach South Africa by routes which are known to very few, so that South Africa has, in effect, been able

to build up a large "secret arsenal". And that arsenal has been built up through the accumulation of large annual imports of arms over a number of years.

Thirdly, it was shown that as a result of this "invisible" arms trade, the South African arms inventory was larger and more varied than had been generally realized. South Africa had, in fact, far larger numbers of certain weapon systems than the standard sources

indicated. It had also acquired many quite modern weapons which few knew it possessed. South Africa in fact had very large numbers of modern jets, helicopters, tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured personnel carriers.

Table A, which is taken from the testimony presented to the Sub-committee on Africa last July, gives an indication of the extent to which standard sources have underestimated the South African arms inventory. It contrasts the equipment listed in each major category by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) with the figures obtained from an examination of fresh evidence from Government and industry sources.

The recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee study gives an estimate of defence imports for 1976 of \$1 billion. See U.S. Corporate Interests in Africa, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by Senator Dick Clark, Chairman, Sub-committee on African Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976, page 56.

- 4

TABLE A ARMS INVENTORY: SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES
(end 1976)

According to IISS*

Currently in
service

combat aircraft helicopters tanks

armoured cars armoured personnel carriers self-propelled guns medium and light
artillery

92

161

1,050

250

not listed

n.a.

n.a. - not available

625

215 525 1,430 960

294 3.0

The Military Balance 1976-1977.

-5-

Fourthly, as a result of its ability to obtain arms through clandestine channels, South Africa had achieved a military capability which gave it an overwhelming advantage on the African continent. It was not merely a well-armed small Power,

as had often been suggested by military analysts. It had actually become a formidable "middle Power". Although it did not have a large standing military force, its strength in equipment was greater in many respects than that of "middle Powers" with large populations. South Africa, for instance, had more combat aircraft and helicopters than Iran, Brazil, Egypt or Japan. Its strength in tanks and armoured cars compared favorably with that of any of those countries.

The meaning of the "invisible arms trade", the author argued at the time, was that South Africa had been able to achieve an overwhelming military advantage in Africa at the very time that it had made its intention to defend apartheid abundantly clear. Thus the "invisible arms trade" had greatly strengthened a moribund system and encouraged the Afrikaner State to pursue an intransigent policy towards the rest of Africa.

Finally, with respect to United States violations of the arms embargo, it was pointed out that large quantities of United States weapon systems had somehow made their way into the South African inventory. The most important of these, items such as the Patton tank and the Commando armoured personnel carrier, were apparently being transferred to South Africa through third countries. In many cases, they were produced under licence or partially assembled in those countries and then sent to South Africa. The United States Government was nonetheless responsible for their being sent to South Africa. The arms in question were of United States design, utilizing many component parts made in the United States. Countries licensed to produce them were not free to sell them to other countries without the approval of the Department of State. Even in cases of licensed production, therefore, the United States had to be held responsible for the "invisible trade" in major military items.

In fact, in discussing its position with respect to the United Nations voluntary embargo, the United States Government had emphatically stated that it did not allow major military items produced elsewhere under licence to be sold to South Africa.

Thus, the author pointed out, the U.S. had apparently made an important contribution to the expansion and modernization of the South African Defence Forces. In particular the following major items had been sent to South Africa, directly or indirectly, after the institution of the 1963 voluntary embargo:

- Lockheed F-104G Starfighter jets
- North American F-51D COIK aircraft
- Agusta Bell 205A Iroquois helicopters (armoured)
- 1-47 Patton main battle tanks
- M-113A1 Commando armoured personnel carriers
- M-109 155 mm self-propelled guns

These weapons were an important part of South Africa's arsenal. South Africa had quite large numbers of some of them. All were operational. All were in service with the regular forces of the Citizen Force. And, more importantly, deliveries of some of those items of United States equipment were continuing.

The response of the United States Administration
The response from the United States Government was immediate.
On the same day that the testimony in question was presented, State Department spokesman Hodding Carter III issued a denial. He characterized the testimony presented to the Sub-committee on Africa as "false and tendentious". Carter told newsmen that "There have been no licences issued for the sale of arms or military equipment to South Africa in violation of United States laws and regulations implementing the arms embargo". 4/ He said the United States had authorized the sale of some spare parts for aircraft to fulfill contractual obligations incurred before the embargo. And certain items had been approved for sale under the stipulation that they were exclusively for civilian use. However, the charges made before the Congress were without foundation, he insisted. A few days later, Mr. Willijm Lewis of the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State also appeared before the Sub-committee on Africa His purpose was to discuss United States implementation of the arms embargo with members of the Sub-comr.ittee. At the beginning of his testimony Mr. Lewis made the following statement:
Before I review the history of our embargo, I would like to state that we have observed this enbargo faithfully since we announced it in 1963. Allegations heard last week by this Sub-committee that the United States has assisted South Africa in building a stockpile of sophisticated weapons including aircraft, tanks and artillery are utterly false. /
Later in his testimony Mr. Lewis stated:
In testimony last week before this Su-committee it was alleged that certain European firms were producing weapons under licence from United States firms for sale to South Africa. In order for an American firm to export the technoloj required for a weapon to be manufactured abroad, it must first either receive a. licence from the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State or export such technology pursuant to a Government-toGovernment agreement. The licences and agreements contain conditions that the weapons will not be sold to a thirdcountry without the explicit permission of the United States Government. Permission to sell such weapons to South Africa is never granted. _/
4. ssociated Press wire, Washington, 14 July 17 (U..-2outh Africa, 261, aC2) 1/ '-tatement by ili-. H. Lewis, Director (<',I)Bureau of African Affairs, Department of ;tlate before the -2ubconimittee on Africa, House Committee on IT.ternational []elations, 20 July 1077, 7ace 1. gIbid. page 5.

-7-

In the ensuing months news reporters, church organizations and

others sought to obtain further information on the matter. All enquiries were met with flat denials by official sources that there was any substance to the allegations made before the Sub-committee on Africa about United States violations of the arms embargo. It should be noted, however, that these denials were all couched in the most general terms. Specific issues were not confronted. In fact, no official spokesmen, except in the case of some inquiries by individual reporters, ever dealt with the specific issues raised in the testimony of 14 July 1977. There was never any debate about facts.

Ambassador McHenry's admission of February

It should be noted, however, that Ambassador Donald McHenry of the United States Mission to the United Nations made a statement relatively recently which would seem to undermine the official denials of the preceding months. In the early part of this year Ambassador McHenry had ordered a full and detailed investigation of the issues raised in the author's testimony of July. This investigation had dealt with the allegations in question point by point. Ambassador McHenry was therefore well informed.

It is therefore striking that Ambassador McHenry, some weeks later, should have made a statement supporting the view that there had been a breakdown in the arms embargo against South Africa. Nonetheless he did so. On 21 February 1978, the United Nations Association released an interview with Ambassador McHenry on the progress of the talks on Namibia. In the middle of that interview, in the course of describing the problems of diplomatic co-operation with South Africa, Ambassador McHenry stated that,

"We were put in the very difficult position of being relatively quiet on the situation in Soweto where 600 kids were being killed while we were speaking with South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia. And it's very difficult to follow that kind of approach. We were making changes in our arms embargo, being more lenient with South Africa while 600 children were being killed in Soweto." 2/

This statement would appear to be inconsistent with those made by Mr. Hodding Carter III on 14 July last year and by Mr. William Lewis before the Sub-committee on Africa a short time later. Ambassador McHenry clearly believes that there was at least a loosening of the arms embargo in 1976. He does not specify what changes were being made in the arms

L/ Personal conversation with Ambassador McHenry. United Nations Association, January 1978.
k" "McHenry claims progress in Namibia talks, hits UN stand on 'TAPO'. The Inter-Dependent, United Nations Association, New York, 21 February 1978.

-8-

embargo, but whatever they were they apparently allowed South Africa to purchase items which had at one time been denied them.

Confirmation of the disputed sales

In analyzing the question of United States military collaboration with South Africa it is important to recognize that the whole issue has been shrouded in secrecy for many years. This applies as well to the

sale of arms well before the institution of the voluntary arms embargo in 1963. It is generally well known that a number of United States weapon systems have been part of the South African inventory for a long time.

What was not known until recently, however, was that a very large number of United States weapons had been delivered to South Africa after the war. For instance, a variety of sources have from time to time listed the Staghound armoured car as being in the South African inventory. It was not known that more than four hundred of them had been delivered to South Africa.

Even more importantly, many weapon systems which were delivered to South Africa before the voluntary embargo began were not known to have been shipped there at all until quite recently. It was not known, for instance, that the Walker Bulldozer light tank was used by the South African Army, although nearly a hundred of them were delivered in 1951. These tanks are still in service, and some were used in the invasion of

Angola in 1975. It was not known until recently that South Africa had received large numbers of the M1-7 105mm self-propelled gun, an almost obsolete weapon but one of considerable importance in sub-Saharan Africa. It was not widely known either that North America had licensed the production of T-6, Texan trainer and light COIT aircraft in South Africa. Although South Africa has had these for many years, they were being used to fly military missions in Namibia as late as mid-1977.

Table B gives the most complete list available of major United States weapon systems delivered to South Africa before the institution of the arms embargo of 1963. It indicates the numbers sold and, in some cases, the date of delivery of each type of aircraft or weapon system. When one takes account of the weapons which were not known to have been part of the South African inventory before 1963 it will be seen that these shipments represented a significant United States contribution to the building of South African military power.

Almost all of the United States weapon systems delivered before 1963 are reported in standard sources. It should be noted, however, that for a long time many of them were not reported. In certain important cases standard sources first reported them only after the testimony presented to the Sub-committee on Africa last July, and after the publicity surrounding it.^{2/}

It is widely believed that these sources, which have close links to various Western military establishments, have avoided disclosure of South Africa's true military strength. The belief has been confirmed by parliamentary sources who have inspected the data available to them.

-9

TABLE B

Major United States weapon systems delivered to South Africa before 1963

Item

Numbers

Lockheed C-130B transport, North American F-4 (Sabre) 26
4 interceptors*

Douglas C-47 transport Douglas DC-4 transport
North American T-6 trainer and light COIN** M-41 Walker Bulldog light tank
Staghound T-17E1 armoured car M-3A1 White scout car M-2A1 half track troop
carrier M-7 105 mm self-propelled gun M-117 90 mm anti-aircraft gun

7

90 48

250

96

350

50

214 32

Approximate

date

July 1963

not available

until 1977

1951-1951

1949-1954 not available

1951

not available

Sources: The Military Balance 1976-1977, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Almanac of World

Military Power, Thomas Dupuy and Associates, New York, 1974; Foreign

Military Markets, South Africa Force Structure, 1976, Defense

Marketing Services, Greenwich, Conn.; Jane's Intelligence Systems, London, 1977;

Arsenal of Democracy, Thomas Gerassi, Grove Press, New York, 1977.

* These aircraft were produced under license in Canada by Canadair.

** One hundred and fifty T-6Gs were produced under license in South Africa.

- 10 -

The International Institute of Strategic Studies, for instance, first reported the M-41 tank and the M-7 self-propelled gun in the late summer of last year, several weeks after the information being prepared for the July testimony had been discussed with its representative.

Deliveries of weapons which took place after the 1963 embargo presented a much more difficult problem in July of last year. Knowledge of these was originally obtained through discussions with individuals

who had direct information about sales. Further investigation in the spring of 1977 indicated that a large number of sales of major items had taken place in the early 1970s. The evidence was quite clear. And considerable detail was obtained

from various sources about those sales. The evidence was discussed with Congressional staff, and it was concluded that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding; with testimony.

At the time of the dispute over whether sales had or had not taken place in violation of the arms embargo it was not possible to reply effectively to official denials.

There was no forum in which the evidence about clandestine sales could be

discussed. The Subcommittee on Africa had been given executive session briefings, but its members were not at liberty to say what they had learned. Few journalists were willing to go through the voluminous documentation which had to be examined, or to invest considerable time in checking sources. It was therefore thought best to await an opportunity to raise the issue again.

Now, however, additional evidence has become available which sheds light on the whole dispute. It indicates as well that United States sales of major weapon systems to South Africa took place after the imposition of the arms embargo in 1963. It indicates that these sales resulted in the transfer to South Africa of jet aircraft, COI aircraft, helicopters, heavy tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured personnel carriers. Some of these sales took place in the late 1960s. Most of them, however, took place within the last 7 years. Indeed, as Table D indicates, the bulk of those sales took place at that time.

One of this new evidence is summarized in Table C, which gives the dates of sale, or the dates on which delivery began, for each particular weapon system. It will be seen that Table C is very similar to the list of United States sales which was disputed by the Department of State last year. Table C also includes a number of weapon systems not referred to in the July testimony. Important new items known to have been sold to South Africa include Lockheed L-100 transport aircraft, 155 mm towed howitzers and a large number of COT aircraft produced under licence. 10/

10/ The first item was listed for the first time in the 3rd edition of Balance of Payments, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1972. The latter two are listed in Arsenal of Democracy, T. Gervasi, New York, 1972.

- 11 -

Table C

Major U.S. weapon systems delivered to South Africa after 1963

Item

Lockheed F-4G Starfighter FGA/interceptor

North American F-51D Cavalier COIN aircraft Lockheed L-100 transport*

Lockheed P-2E Neptune anti-submarine patrol Cessna 185 FAC/COEN aircraft

Aermacchi AM-3C Bosbok utility/COIN Atlas C4M Kudu utility/COI** Agusta

Bell 205A helicopter M-47 Patton I tank

M-113AI armoured personnel carrier V-150/200 Commando armoured personnel

carrier 11-109 155 mm self-propelled gun M-114 155 mm howitzer (towed)

Via

Federal Republic of Germany

Netherlands

Italy (lic.in SA) Italy Italy Italy

Portugal

Italy

Approx. date

1973

post-1967

post-1971 post-1965 post-1963 post-1967 post-1957 early 1970s 1971
1973

post-1971

1.972

post-1067

Sources: The Military Balance 1975-1976, The Military Balance 1977, international Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Arsenal of Democracy

T. Gervasi, Grove Press, New York, 1978; U.S. Arms

Deliveries to South Africa, Michael T. Moore, Transnational Institute, Washington, 1977.

* This is the civilian version of the Lockheed C-130 Hercules. However, it is listed in the most recent Military Balance as equipment of the South African Air Force.

* This aircraft is produced under licence in S.A. The Kudu, however, is based upon a Lockheed design, for the AL-60, and utilizes an Avco-Lycoming engine.

- 12 -

The sale of any of these weapon systems would have been a major breach of the voluntary arms embargo. The fact that all these weapon systems were sold to South Africa means that by 1971 there was no embargo so far as the United States was concerned. By that time the arms embargo had become little more than a screen hiding a deliberate policy of arming South Africa. And it was at that time, of course, that the previous United States Administration had embarked upon its policy of "closer association" with the minority regimes of southern Africa. It

will be seen again that few of these United States arms sales were direct. Most of them involved the transfer of weapons produced under licence in other countries. The M-11A1 armoured personnel carriers, for instance, were manufactured under U.S. licence by the Italian firm of Oto Melara. South Africa purchased them from that firm. The M-109 self-propelled 155 mm guns were also manufactured under licence by Oto Melara and sold to South Africa by them. The V-150 and V-200 armoured personnel carriers were manufactured in Portugal. South Africa purchased them from the firm of Bravia Cgaimite. Some of the Starfighter jets transferred through a dealer from the Luftwaffe to South Africa appear to have been made under licence in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Thus secret United States arms sales to South Africa have involved a new kind of triangular trade. Weapons licenced for production in other countries, and controlled by the Office of Munitions Control in the Department of State, have been transferred directly or through dealers from the foreign licencees to South Africa. Other countries besides the United States have thus become guilty of violating the 1963 embargo by virtue of their co-operation in these practices. Many important sales to South Africa, it will be seen, made use of Italian licencees as intermediaries.

_11' ee "U.S. widens ties to African 'Whites", Terence Smith, The New York Times. 2 April 1972, and subsequent press reports in 1974.

12/ Christopher Foss, in his *Jane's World Armoured Fighting Vehicles*, states that "According to Cadillac Gage, the United States has not supplied any Commandos to Portugal; however, Commando-t41ee: vehicles have been seen in large numbers in Portugal and it is reliably reported that the Commando is now being built in Portugal under the name of Bravia Cgaimite." (page 290) Commandos were listed as part of South African equipment in the 1974 and 1975 editions of the *Military Balance*. They were removed in later editions.

Commandos continue to be listed for South Africa by Defense Marketing Services. (See Table C) They were most recently reported as in service in South Africa in *Armed Forces of the World*, 4th edition, Robert C. Sellers, ed., Praeger, New York, 1977, page 191. The official U.S. position that "no one knows" about the presence of the vehicles in South Africa is therefore not very convincing.

- 15 -

The source of the new information for Table C is a book on the United States role in the world arms trade which is about to be published. The title of the book is *Arsenal of Democracy*. Its author is Lt. Tom Gervasi, a former Brigadier General in United States Army Intelligence who now writes and reports on military affairs. *Arsenal of Democracy* provides exhaustive information on the major weapon systems which have been and are being produced in the United States for sale abroad. It provides data on technical specifications, the history of sales, foreign deployments and many other matters for most United States weapon systems.

Arsenal of Democracy thus provides important and authoritative confirmation of the testimony presented in July of last year to the Congress on United States violations of the voluntary, embargo between 1963 and 1977.

Value of United States arms transferred in violation of the 1955 embargo

It has sometimes been suggested that United States violations of the arms embargo were not particularly serious, that a few items of no great consequence made their way through the net. Quite the contrary is true. It is not only, as can be seen from Table C, that the weapon systems transferred to South Africa were important ones. Beyond that, these sales involved expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars. Table D presents the quantities and prices and value of each weapon system transferred to South Africa after the 1963 embargo. It can be seen from that table that the total value of United States arms transferred to South Africa by clandestine channels was \$465 million. That is a very large amount of money by any standards, especially as most of these sales, accounting for more than \$3550 million, took place in the early 1970s. When one considers further that these transfers have been secret ones, the amount of expenditure involved becomes even more striking.

It should be noted, furthermore, that the prices used in making these calculations are moderate ones. There are enormous variations in the price of almost every traded item in the international arms market, even when dealers are not involved. Estimating a price in the particular transfer is therefore a difficult matter, when

the actual price is not known. The prices chosen for Table D have been in the middle range of prices used at the time of sale. This means, however, that the value estimates are likely to be on the low side, for shipments to South Africa have commanded a significant premium on the international arms market for some time. It is therefore quite likely that the values given for each sale, and for total sales, are quite low. The true amount of expenditure on these sales might well have been 40 per cent higher. However, the important point is not whether these sales are to be valued at price x or price y. The important point is that they took place and that they involved very large expenditures.

- 14 -

Table D

Value of United States major weapons systems delivered after 1963

Item	Number	Price	Value
F-104G Starfighter	56	2m	
F-51D Cavalier	50	150,000	7.5m
Lockheed L-130	16	5.5m	88m
TT eptune	12	7m4m	
Cessna 15	16	90,000	1.5m
Ai-3- Bosbok	4r	125,000	1.
Atlas C4M Hludu	160	75,000	12m
Agusta Bell 205A	25	im	25m
U-47 tan!	10	00,000	3 lm
-1-13A APC	414	'q'000	27h
Commando APC	320	125,000	40m
1-100 155mm SP	52	500,000	26m
,-14 1.55 mm howitzer	40	25,000	im
Total value			,465m

APP jD!',

Transfer of Lockheed F-104G Starfighters from the Luftwaffe to South Africa. During the early 1970s the Luftwaffe decided to retire some of its older Starfighters. Most of those retired had been made under licence in West Germany by Messerschmidt, Heinkel-Dornier and Focke-Wulf. In 1973 a dealer at Memmingen purchased 44 F-104Gs and 12 F-104Gs for transfer to South Africa. The transfer of these aircraft was under the control of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, for all United States weapon systems must be licensed for transfer. Licences are not supposed to have been issued for such items for transfer to South Africa after 1963. The transfer was thus in violation of United States policy, and that of the Federal Republic of Germany as stated publicly.

Manufacturers give construction numbers to each unit. These numbers are not the serial numbers given by air forces. The manufacturers' construction numbers for the F-104Gs transferred to South Africa in 1973 are:

2031 p032 "012

2047	4	r0!4
5047	',54	V()!
66o0		0 2 6
6604	'72	
6605	2Q75	
66o6	767r	
6607		'<'OP
06	% a I O) nll2	
6620	.q212	0..17
7009	0220	
9012	92:1	0123
R020	2']2.026	""009

'ot all the construct '.on numbers are kno .m.