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Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane was born in Durban, South Africa, in 1930. He took his B.A. at the University of Natal in 1958 and his M.A. at Natal and at the University of California at Los Angeles, where he received his Ph.D. in 1967. He has been a lecturer at the University of Zambia, a visiting lecturer at UCLA and SUNY, Binghamton, and since 1970 has taught at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. His articles have appeared in African Social Research, Current Anthropology, American Anthropologist, East African Journal, and African Review, and he has contributed essays to a number of edited collections. $6.50/f3-55

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SOUTHERN AFRICA
Volume XIV Number 2 March/April 1981
Typesetting by Liberation News Service.
Cover and layout by The Letter Space.
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Africa Policy Takes Shape

In March the previously "undefined" eagan administration's policy towards Africa came into sharp-and alarming focus. "Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war that we have ever fought, a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have and so forth?" President Reagan asked veteran newscaster Walter Cronkite.

Reagan certainly knew what his answer to this question was, for on March 15 the New York Times revealed that a party of five South African military officials was 'in the US. The five, who were in the US from March 9 through 15, met with members of Congress, an official of the US Defense Intelligence Agency and a staff officer of the US National Security Council. Although the government initially denied that any other administration official had met with the South Africans, one week later it was revealed that Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US delegate to the United Nations, met South African General van der Westhuizen on March 15. According to an administration spokesperson, Kirkpatrick did not know that the people she was meeting were military officers. An astonishing admission considering that the morning's newspaper had carried a report identifying van der Westhuizen as a South African military officer (it was later revealed that he is, in fact, head of military intelligence.)

As the military officers were trooping around New York and Washington another Pretoria representative was also making the rounds. Dirk Mudge, chairman of the South African-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (in Namibia), also visited the US in mid-March and consulted with Congressional leaders. Mudge met
informally on Tuesday, March 17 with the State Department's Namibia desk officer.

It was against this background that a March 19 story in the Washington Star reported that the new US administration was considering inviting South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha to the US after the April 29 South African elections. Although these reports were later denied, coming in the context of other events in March, these visits added more fuel to the growing controversy over the Reagan administration's Africa policy, and then, in late March, the administration sent the 1982 Security Assistance Act to Congress with a provision calling for the total repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment, passed in 1976, enforced a total ban on covert or overt US aid to rebel forces in Angola. While slightly amended in late 1980, the possible repeal of the amendment-coupled with statements supporting aid to UNITA that Reagan made in May 1980-has provoked strong statements from a number of US and African leaders.

Administration officials have attempted to justify the call for a repeal of the Clark Amendment on foreign policy grounds. It is "an unusually all-encompassing restriction on US policy options," State Department spokesman William Dyess said. The intent of the move, however, was fairly clear. Just one day after the move was announced, stories about a mid-March meeting in Morocco between Savimbi and a US emissary began to surface. In addition Savimbi was scheduled to arrive in the US in late March and, according to some press accounts, administration officials have expressed a willingness to meet with the UNITA leader. Coming in the wake of Reagan's earlier statements and actions, it is not surprising that Black Africa has begun to respond. Nigeria's nationalization of British Petroleum assets in 1979 in response to British policy in Zimbabwe was not forgotten when Shagari said US recognition of UNITA would be "very unwise." The Africa group at the UN underlined his point by warning that the trend in US relations with Black Africa is "bad." And on March 26, Congressional Black Caucus leaders called for the resignation of Jeane Kirkpatrick because of her meeting with van der Westhuizen.

Mozambique Expels CIA

Relations between the United States and Mozambique have hit a new low in the wake of the March 4 expulsion of six US diplomatic personnel accused of spying for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mozambique charged the six with complicity in the January 30 South African commando raid into Mozambique that took twelve lives. The US, according to Mozambique, was passing information to South African intelligence.

The Mozambican Ministry of Security named nine other embassy officials as members of a major CIA spy operation against Mozambique and Zimbabwean guerrillas formerly based in Mozambique, as well as South African exile groups. The nine embassy officials had all been reassigned out of the country before the January at tack.
In Washington the State Department responded with a statement claiming that two senior members of Cuban countk intelligence had instigated the expulsion after having "forcibly detained" one of the six diplomats, Louis Leon Oliver, in an effort to recruit Oliver as a Cuban spy.

Department spokesman William Dyes also blamed members of the Washington-based Covert Action Information Bulletin who he charged, were in Mozambique at the time of the expulsions and had identified the six agents.

Mozambique reacted angrily to Dyess statement, one ranking FRELIMO official describing the counter-charges as "a not so subtle attempt to present Mozambique as satellite of Cuba." The official added, "the response one can easily detect a certain dose of racism."

The State Department was also forced to retract its original claim that members of Covert Action were in Maputo in early March when it was learned that visiting Covert Action journalists had left Mozambique February 19. The embattled magazine staff denied identifying any U.S. embassy personnel as CIA agents during their visit. Covert Action charged that the State Department allegations were "nothing but a smokescreen to obscure the real issue, which is whether the CIA was fact engaged in espionage, subversion and interference in Mozambique's affairs as charged, and whether the CIA was in fact involved in the January 30 slaughter."

The Mozambican daily Noticias published a detailed account of how Lundahl, a pilot, had used his membership in a private flying club in Mozambique as a cover to conduct aerial surveillance of Mozambique and tried to recruit a Mozambican Airways pilot as an informant.

American intelligence agencies are known to have used small private aircraft in the past for spying purposes. In April 1979 three US diplomats were expelled from South Africa when police allegedly "discovered" a camera aboard the US ambassador's private plane.

The Reagan administration has suspended food shipments and a $5 million loan for additional grain pending a "review of bilateral relations" following the incident.

Military Build-up

The London Sunday Telegraph reported on March 22 that 100,000 South African troops are massed on the Angolan border in preparation for a major invasion of Angola. SWAPO sources in Namibia confirm that major troop convoys are moving up to the northern Namibian border.

SPECIAL REPORT

Guinea-Bissau Coup:

Many Challenges Ahead

The script sounds all too familiar. Shortly after nightfall, the tanks and armored cars rolled out of the barracks and troops seized the national radio station, the government offices and the homes of all the cabinet ministers. A few hours later, a radio bulletin announced that the government had been overthrown, the former president placed under house arrest, power assumed by a Revolutionary Council headed by the former Prime Minister. Chalk up one more coup to the colonial
legacy of division and instability on a continent where underdevelopment can be measured in both political and economic impoverishment.

But this coup last November 14 was different. It took place in Guinea-Bissau, one of the former Portuguese colonies that many people have hoped would write a new script for African independence and development based on Africa's shared historic experience. Their political leadership and national unity had been tempered in the long struggle for independence. Their peasants and workers had been mobilized into the struggle; armed with the ideological and organizational tools to make their own history rather than serve as the tools of individual ambitions and jealousies.

Making the coup even harder to accept and understand was the fact that all of the main figures in the drama had distinguished themselves fighting side by side against the Portuguese under the banner of one of the continent's most coherent political parties, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). Not only had deposed President Luis Cabral led the nation since its independence day, but his brother Amilcar had founded PAIGC and led it until his assassination in 1973 deprived Africa of one of its greatest leaders. Under the nom de guerre of Nino, coup leader Joao Bernardo Vieira had emerged as the party's most brilliant military strategist and war hero.

In the streets of Bissau, by all accounts, news that Luis Cabral had been ousted was greeted with dancing and singing. Among people around the world who had supported the struggle for independence in the Portuguese colonies, the same news was greeted with shock and dismay. A week later, Vieira dropped another bombshell, that made the shock almost unanimous.

Addressing a cheering crowd of more than 40,000 people in Bissau's Central Plaza, Nino announced that mass graves had been discovered containing the bodies of at least 500 political opponents of the ousted regime. And he accused Luis Cabral of sharing responsibility for the executions with Aristides Pereira, secretary-general of PAIGC and president of the Republic of Cape Verde.

Now, more than four months later, both the initial popular enthusiasm and the first shock and disbelief appear to have subsided somewhat, and Nino has confirmed that Luis Cabral will soon be released to a country of his choice. A wait-and-see attitude and a common perception of the grave difficulties facing the small west African nation have replaced the initial enthusiasm.

In Bissau, recent visitors report, the ijiass euphoria touched off by the coup and amplified by the timely arrival of several shiploads of rice has diminished. "There is no more dancing in the streets," one
longtime supporter and recent visitor said, but "people seem genuinely relieved, happy and hopeful." David Gallagher of Oxfam-
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Canada encountered abundant evidence of the severe economic and political difficulties that fueled discontent with Cabral's leadership. But he also spoke with many, people for whom the coup had apparently revived expectations that the party and the government that drove out the Portuguese can now lead a vigorous attack on hunger, disease; and illiteracy.
Internationally, veteran supporters of the struggle in Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde remain deeply divided in their assessments of the coup. Writing a few days after the event, noted Africanist Basil Davidson warned that "the aim and vision of the liberation struggle may not survive. If they are lost, the country could be expected to disappear, in due course, into the confusions of personal rule and racist obscurantism.
Similar concerns were voiced by Cohm Foy of MAGIC (the Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau Information Center) following a brief visit to the Cape Verde islands. Before the coup, the two republics had been moving toward a complete merger under the leadership of the PAIGC. Now, Foy states with regret, the party and the chances for unity have both been shattered. Cape Verdean party activists have formed a new political organization, while Guinea-Bissau's leaders simultaneously vow their continued allegiance to the PAIGC and denounce party leader Pereira and general secretary for Guinea-Bissau Araujo for dictatorial actions and complicity in mass murder.
"All the coup has so far succeeded in doing," Foy stated to Southern Africa, "was, to remove a few Cape Verdians from their jobs and, most importantly, remove the people's democratic control over their government and their party."
Others took a very different view both of the coup itself and of the degree to which "the people's democratic control" really existed prior to the armed takeover. They noted that even PAIGC leader Pereira admitted "the party had atrophied" in some areas. And they pointed to the widespread popular unrest ignited by food shortages, petty corruption and grandiose development projects of dubious real value.
"I think that the chance of this change being a very positive thing is there," commented a long-time supporter who has been involved in ongoing projects in Guinea-Bissau. "But it will take time before things can start to move again. They have declared that projects like the car factory, the four lane highway to the airport, and the peanut oil factory are scandalous prestige projects. They have also stopped the import of Volvos ... and declared the number imported a scandal. They have started to evaluate all the aid projects and all the cooperantes' (foreign technical advisors) work, as well as their salaries; to find out what and who they really need. All these things seem really to be good signs."
Based on his visit to Guinea-Bissau,
David Gallagher basically concurs. "My sense was that we're going to have to keep a close eye on the situation," he remarked. "But people convinced me overall that it could be a positive thing."

All Was Not Well

The one point on which there appears to be virtually unanimous agreement is that Guinea-Bissau's economy is a shambles. Even while castigating the "golpistas," MAGIC's Foy urges that "the first thing to recognize are the faults of the deposed PAIGC regime .... In Guinea-Bissau, all was not well."

Gallagher underlined that harsh verdict. "We knew something was wrong with the people's stores," he told Southern Africa. "For the last three months before the coup, there was no rice, cooking oil, or sugar. And there appeared to be a total lack of government activity to resolve the problem." Similarly, according to Gallagher, health care and education programs received scant government attention and funding: In the latest budget, peasant agriculture, medical services, and schools each received less than ten percent of government expenditures. After an auspicious beginning boosted by the assistance of Brazilian literacy expert Paolo Freire, Guinea-Bissau's literacy campaign "had stopped in its tracks," Gallagher said, leaving ninety percent of the population unable to read.

Even while these essential development programs stagnated, according to Gallagher, Luis Cabral and other leaders enjoyed "Volvos and fancy houses, overseas trips, etcetera, and Inuch collusion with subtly underlining aid projects."

Even though the/ government repeatedly proclaimed rural development its top priority, lavish industrial projects flourished. A four-lane super-highway to the tiny airport was planned at a cost of $50 million. Construction started on a huge peanut processing plant that could handle the total harvest of Guinea's biggest export in just one month. Citroen contracted to set up an assembly plant to produce 500 cars a year. All the parts would have to be imported from France and within two years the domestic market would have been saturated.

But if there is general agreement on the massive problems plaguing Guinea-Bissau, there is equally widespread controversy over responsibility and remedies for these problems. Foy is prepared to assign major responsibility to "the deposed PAIGC regime." But if that is the case, he insists, then as members of that regime Nino and

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his supporters must shoulder a good the blame themselves If they had oppo the direction Cabral's government was ting, he charged, why had they "n challenged him in the People's National Assembly before the coup nor in the p organs of which they were members?"

Likewise, Foy questioned the m shocking charge leveled by the Revolutionary Council against the oust regime-the allegation that Cabral a former security chief Buscardini (the on ranking minister slain, in the coup) we responsible for mass murder and repressi secret police tactics. Foy didn't dispute th fact that mass
graves had been unearthed. But he contended that "most of the bodies date from the 1978 abortive coup which was suppressed by Nino Vieira himself."

According to supporters of the coup, the other hand, Luis Cabral had insulated himself from criticism by stacking the party's Permanent Commission with people loyal to him. Mario Cabral, who had served as minister of rural development under Luís Cabral (no relation), insists that Nino and others made every effort to win changes in government policy through established channels. "I stood by my position of opposition always," Mario Cabral told Gallagher, "and sometimes I could see that (Luis) Cabral would have liked to have killed me on the spot.... Nino was the principal antagonist."

Attempts to take criticisms through the party structures were rebuffed with threats and charges of disloyalty, he added. "Vasco Cabral [minister of planning, wounded in the coup but nevertheless committed to participating in the new government] even asked [Aristides] Pereira for Cabral's dismissal. He was ignored and told to be careful not to be seen going against the party. All objections were dealt with in this way, going against the party."

And there the case finally rests, boiling down essentially to whether it can be believed that only a coup could bring a halt to the party's straying from its avowed democratic policies and development priorities. Long-time supporters of the PAIGC are reduced to comparing lists of names - Who is in? Who is out? Whose judgement can you really trust?

As someone who last traveled in Guinea-Bissau in 1970 when I met most of the principals while the war still raged, it seems evident that the simple answers just don't apply. Nor do handy labels - "counterrevolutionary," "leftist," "rightist," "neo-colonialist."

I would have no idea where to place Nino Vieira and Luís Cabral on a scale measuring from left to right. Neither runs the risk of being confused with Amilcar Cabral as a Marxist theoretician and ideologist. But I never heard anyone speak of Nino with anything much short of adulation as a revolutionary leader. To the people in the villages, the peasants who make up the vast majority of the population, he was a hero mentioned with the awe usually reserved for Amilcar Cabral. Back in 1970, the arrival of this slender 28-year-old was guaranteed to transform the always effusive greeting for a group of PAIGC militants into a major event - "The Nino is here! The Nino!"

Among those grouped around him are some, Mario Cabral for instance, who are widely respected for their political integrity and judgement. There are also others whose politics range from murky to suspect.

Great Expectations

The initial response to the coup suggests that Nino Vieira remains an inspirational figure to this day. "What is certain,"
reports one European who has worked extensively in Guinea-Bissau, "is that the population has great expectations, that now everything will be good, that the Nino has taken things into his hands and now they will finally be truly liberated and get the real independence. Being through so much suffering, as is the case during particularly the last eight or nine months before the coup, the hope for change and the potential for a new popular mobilization is certainly very strong."

Gallagher sees the same potential, the same great expectations. "Nino is such a figure to the people in the villages," he said, "in a nationalist sense, a populist sense." Gallagher cites nationalism and populism as "the two pillars" of support for Nino Vieira and the coup. But some observers use other terms to define the same sentiments. Noting that Luis Cabral and most of those ousted along with him were of Cape Verdean ancestry, Colm Foy spoke of "racism" and Basil Davidson of the danger of "racist obscurantism." On the night of the coup the threat of attacks on Cape Verdians loomed very real. One-time party leader Rafael Barboza, jailed since 1974 on charges of treason, came on the radio with anti-Cape Verdian diatribes. In the middle of his harangue, however, Barboza was hauled away from the microphone and back to his cell while an apology was broadcast. Since then, Gallagher reported, "There has been virtually no persecution of Cape Verdians."

Supporters of the coup do not deny that frictions existed between the two republics and the two peoples. But they insist that Guineans had real grievances and that, in Mario Cabral's words, "it was the way Cabral and Pereira dealt with the situation that angered so many Guineans."

"We have, for example, 800,000 people to their 300,000 yet we did not have proportional representation," Mario Cabral asserted. "On the contrary, the leadership around Cabral were mostly Cape Verdians and great Guinean heroes of war were being openly excluded from the political process. The law is such that to be President of Cape Verde you must be Cape Verdean but here, no you don't have to be Guinean, why should they be different? In Cape Verde there is no death penalty, but in Guinea there is. Why should they be so different if they come under the same party?"

To someone who had watched Guinean and Cape Verdian troops in the field together during the liberation war, news of such tensions is saddening but not necessarily surprising. Although linked together through several centuries of Portuguese colonial rule, the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde retain distinctive cultural and even physical features. In an army composed primarily of Guinean peasants, Cape Verdians frequently stood out. Not only were they always lighter-skinned and often somewhat more educated, they also tended in many cases to keep themselves outside the firelit circle of games and dancing that brought soldiers and villagers together in the evenings.

The same distinction could be seen among many of the leaders now prominent on both sides of the coup. Nino Vieira was unmistakably at home among the peasant soldiers and villagers-joking, playing cards, teasing, often the center of an eddy of
hilarity. Araujo, by contrast, seemed somewhat distant, offering a moving
testament of his commitment by confiding, "If I had my choice of what to do with
my life, I would have liked to be a lawyer in Lisbon." To some degree such
differences undoubtedly reflect personality and temperament. But particularly
when the pattern is duplicated with many of the personalities involved, it suggests
real differences of culture and experience.
Such factors may help make Nino Vieira the populist and nationalist hero
Gallagher describes. But translating the initial enthusiasm into a "new popular
mobilization" will require a coherent program and a drive to revitalize the two
organizations that once represented the mobilized masses of Guinea-Bissau—the
party and the army.
So far, the new government has expressed its program in terms of a return to the
resolutions of the Third Congress. Those include a concentration on rural
development through building village cooperatives. "The three or four people I
spoke with at rural development headquarters were just ecstatic, because of the
change," Gallagher said. "They were all saying, 'Now we can get going.'
Ultimately, however, they will only be able to go as far as the peasants can be
mobilized to take them. Which is where the party and the army come in. "Because of the centralizing," Gallagher said, "the party did wither in the
countryside. All the talk now is about how important it is to revitalize it."
Similarly, the army that once represented the political as well as the military
vanguard of the revolution had been largely demobilized, according to
Gallagher. Nino Vieira and coup leader Paolo Correia had reportedly resisted the
shift from a peasant army to a more conventional military. As
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SPECIAL REPORT,
Zambia: The High Price of Peace

A slumping economy has put him in serious
political trouble.
by 13loda Jacobs

For much of the past decade, international attention has focused on the "crisis"
nations of southern Africa: Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, along
with the Western alliance's good friend, South Africa., Meanwhile, Zambia to the
north has been literally in the background, away from the main events, acted upon
rather than acting—particularly with the severe buffeting its populace and
transportation system took from the Rhodesian military in recent years.
When Zambia was noticed by the
Gloria Jacobs is a freelance writer and teacher living in New York, and a former
editor of Seven Days.
American and European media as anything more than the "good neighbor" of
southern Africa, it was because President Kenneth Kaunda was being trotted out
as the regional "good liberal." Kaunda, the moderate, has consistently received
favorable press from- the West and thus it may come as a surprise to many to
discover that Zambia is in a severe economic crisis. It is a crisis which Kaunda
has reacted to with doses of "imperial power," cracking down on political opponents and trade unionists, and thereby increasing his isolation and lessening his support.

"If an open election were held today, Kaunda would be turned out," reports one recent visitor to the country. "That's why the electoral process is being closed up. Kaunda's actions have made it clear that change will not be allowed to come through constitutional means."

The possibility of a significant opposition, while unlikely in the near future, is no so surprising if one looks at the development of Kaunda's economic and political policies over the seventeen years since independence during which he and his United National Independence Party have been in power. In 1964 Zambia broke with the British colonial Central African Federation--then dominated by white-minority ruled Rhodesia--and the country has changed little in its post-independence years. The much-vaunted reforms of 1968-70 did little more than "exchange one 'master' for another," comments Tony Southall in an article in the Journal of Southern African Studies.

Old Reforms

The reforms made the government the majority shareholder in all major foreign-owned businesses, except banks; proposed cutting economic ties with South Africa and Rhodesia; and "Zambianized" small retail businesses. Kaunda hoped, through these moves, to incorporate state companies that would enhance social welfare by providing employment and low-priced commodities.

When it came to cutting ties with the "white south," the government was successful: imports from South Africa dropped from 21 percent in 1964 to 7 percent in 1973 and imports from whiteminority ruled Rhodesia dropped from 40 percent to almost nothing during the same period. But because the country's own ability to produce these goods was not developed, the imports from the south were replaced with imports from the industrialized West at higher prices. State funds have been pumped into paying for energy and food imports, transportation costs, and into providing subsidies to keep the costs of domestically produced food low. As a result, there is little money or resources left over for agricultural and industrial development that might conceivably have replaced these imports.

Meanwhile Zambianization of smaller businesses has led to stagnation, partly because control--of these firms has bee doled out on a political patronage basis* Patronage is seen by many as the heart of Zambia's current problems. But patronage

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and this nationalization are also the basis on which Kaunda has maintained his political support. By employing many more people than are needed in state owned industries, and through food price subsidies to keep prices down, Kaunda has been able to develop a base of political support in the urban population that benefits from these measures. Kaunda is also accused of using the nationalization to foster the growth of a new elite with neither the skills nor the inclination to develop the country's economy.
And it is this economy that may eventually erode Kaunda's political support, especially among the urban poor.

Copper Exports Lose Money

To add to the miseries of the economic situation, the price of copper and cobalt, Zambia's two major exports, have sunk to levels where the government has lost money in several of the past few years merely by keeping the mines open. With these two minerals normally providing 95 percent of the country's foreign exchange, Kaunda has had to plunge the country heavily into debt.

The economy is, in effect, nonexistent, a house of cards.

Propping up this facade are Western loans, led by those from the International Monetary Fund, which demands a heavy price for its aid. In 1978 the IMF granted a $322 million loan, but demanded in return a wage freeze, gradual elimination of subsidies on "consumer" goods such as food, and a freeze on public sector employment.

Before the IMF loan, wage increases had been limited to 5 percent per year from the early 70s; after the loan - there was a complete freeze. During the same period the official price index rose 150 percent, by leaps of 20 percent in some years. Many necessities couldn't be found at the official prices, but were available only on the black market.

Maize, the country's staple, has risen another 30 percent in price in the last month.

"Even those in regular employment find the logistics of life increasingly hard to manage," writes John Borrell in a recent edition of the Manchester Guardian. "At dawn each morning queues form outside the State-owned shops irregularly supplied with such essentials as maize meal, cooking oil and soap. People often return home empty-handed after an eight-hour vigil."

They have plenty of time to watch government officials drive their Mercedes' around the capital while they wait in line.

The country's 66,000 civil servants received pay raises at the end of 1980 which amounted to 32 percent for the lowest-paid employees and 137 percent for top officials. Since these raises must come out of a new loan being negotiated with the IMF (which will apparently waive its rule on wage freezes for Kaunda's political base in the government) there will be even less money for the rest of the nation.

And there's pitifully little for them already. The effects of the budgetary restrictions are being felt most severely among the urban poor, who have fled to the towns to escape the seemingly hopeless poverty of the rural areas. But life in the city is also deteriorating. With wages falling, costs rising, jobs disappearing, the urban areas are becoming among the most volatile areas in the country.
While social services were expanded in the years following independence "that movement has now come to an end," writes Tony Southall, "and the proportion of resources devoted to... health and education is now declining." There is significant malnutrition everywhere, and What health and education services do exist are generally being provided by missionaries.

In the rural areas, where 50 percent of the population remains, (the World Bank estimates that the balance between rural and urban populations will shift to the towns before the end of this decade) the situation is equally difficult, but perhaps less "flammable." A 1979 study, initiated by the government, showed that the rural population "was now significantly worse off than its counterparts in Tanzania, despite the fact that the latter's per capita income is one fifth of Zambia's," notes Southall.

Up until now Kaunda has been able to blame the disastrous state of the nation on the effects of the Zimbabwe war. While certainly the bombings of the copper transport routes effectively cut exports and imports, the problems are older and deeper than those generated by the war. Through nationalization Kaunda had hoped that Zambia would gain control over its own resources and, hopefully, distribute more benefits to the general population. But the system is now in a shambles. And Kaunda has consistently refused to consider alternatives to his policies and has dealt with differences by latelining it opposition and marginalizing or isolating those who disagree with him. Opponents are sent to distant diplomatic posts, or discovered to be "corrupt," or "plotting against the government" and are either jailed or sent to remote rural areas.

Kaunda's detractors point out that there is only a limited pool of skilled administrators in the country. "He's running out of good people," says one observer, "and increasingly surrounding himself with, those who won't challenge him. But they often don't know what they're doing either."

In recent years these people have become the essence of Kaunda's political base in Zambia, now that government policies are, in essence jettisoning the rural and urban poor. In 1978 Kaunda won 80 percent of the vote in an electoral poll in which 60 percent of the population participated. The leaders of the opposing slate were either ig. noted or blasted by the government controlled media and other political leaders were arrested and held "indefinitely" without charges. "In these circumstances of intimidation and innuendo it was remarkable that as many as 20 percent... were actually willing to oppose Kaunda," comments Southall.

Coup Attempt
In the past year both opposition and repression have intensified. October and November saw a bizarre series of events where Prominent leaders were arrested amid rumors of a coup. Soon after, Kaunda anover

SPECIAL REPORT
nounced he had prevented a South Africaninspired coup, to be carried out by Zambian dissidents and Katangese mercenaries. A state of emergency was declared and a curfew imposed. Discoveries of arms caches and further "proof" of
the coup followed. In December, the Times of Zambia editorialized, "Those who thought of it [the coup] as a mere political prattle have now been disabused of that notion. The plot did exist and, as the President promised, its sordid details have begun to come out."

In January the UNIP secretary general, Mainza Chona, announced that the party would be "ruthless with people trying to undermine it." Unless "anti-party elements" were removed, he said, there would be "bloodshed and suffering.' It wasn't lost on observers that the government was planning to announce its new austerity budget at the end of the month in hopes of winning a new IMF loan of about $637 million.

Among some of the first victims of the ban on criticism were seventeen trade union leaders, including mineworker heads, who were expelled from UNIP after publicly disagreeing with a party plan to decentralize the government. "What that plan did in effect," says one observer, "was to ensure party control over provincial areas, by limiting the vote to party members only."

The expulsion of the union leaders sparked a strike in the mines and banks. The miners, who constitute an industrial elite and who wish to remain a powerful political force felt especially threatened by the new voting plan, which they assumed, probably correctly, was aimed at curtailing their power.

The government managed to settle the strike and apparently keep the new plan while offering other inducements to the miners to keep them quiet, but 1200 coal miners turned around and called a wild-cat strike when a "district governor praised them for being more loyal to the government than the copper miners," reports Africa News. "Coal miners said they resented the governor's attempt to sow division in the trade union movement."

In February the government again attempted to quell some of this unrest by a high-level reshuffle that juggled a dozen top party and government officials. Although the new party chief Humphrey Mulemba and Prime Minister Nalumino Mundia are considered more acceptable to the trade unions than their predecessors, popular discontent is likely to continue. The IMF austerity budget currently being negotiated is said to include a sharp reduction in government subsidies on basic food stuffs, and a transfer of much of the money now spent on social welfare to industrialization projects. Already, just two days after one step in this plan was announced, the price of bread climbed up 25 percent. If the IMF accepts just these measures, and it is not at all clear that the IMF considers these measures enough, the cost will be increased hardship for the majority of Zambians who remain barely on the edge of survival. In addition, such measures are sure to increase popular opposition to Kaunda's government.

Opposition
The major question at this point is whether the miners, any other opposition group, or a coalition of several, can effectively counter Kaunda. On the right, the banking industry—-the only non-nationalized major industry—is deeply upset with
the government's incompetence. The threat from the miners is couched in more populist terms, but is essentially still an effort at controlling the spoils of the system rather than altering it. Neither group is "organized" politically beyond its original base. A more popular movement, concerned with the injustices the system has generated, has yet to appear.

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SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Confident Mugabe Quells Violence
by Steve Vegh
Hopes for the continued orderly integration of former guerrillas into a single national army were dealt a serious setback on February 9 with the worst outbreak of violence between partisans of Zimbabwe's two nationalist parties to date. Five days of fighting between former ZANLA and ZIPRA troops -the armies of ZANU and ZAPU respectively- left more than 300 dead around Bulawayo.

Unlike the previous less serious incident
last November, however, this latest round of sectarian violence began in a unit of the newly formed national army, raising questions about the effectiveness of the integration process. The danger that other new army units might also break ranks forced Prime Minister Robert Mugabe to rely on remnants of the old Rhodesian Army and
Air Force to restore order.
According to Western news services, the
violence was an escalation of an earlier barroom brawl between rival guerrillas of
the national army at a base near Bulawayo.
From there the fighting spread quickly to Bulawayo's sprawling Entumbane
township, and to the Connemara barracks sixty miles away.
By all accounts the fighting was initiated
by ZIPRA elements in the national army, who opened fire on former ZANLA
members and passers-by with weapons
taken from army depots.
Shake-up Angers Guerrillas
Nominally followers of Joshua Nkomo,
head of the minority PF-ZAPU party, the mutinous troops were angry at their
leaders' acceptance of a government reshuffle in January which relegate
to a lesser
ministerial post.
The troops are also said to be growing
bitter about what they feel is the betrayal of their interests by the ZAPU
leadership in exchange for high positions in the new
government.
In statements to reporters, Mugabe
charged disgruntled members of PFSteve Vegh, a long time liberation support
worker, was active in the student antiapartheid movement in the University of
Rochester, and is now living in New York.
Robert Mugabe. Firm leadership in the latest crisis.
ZAPU's military wing with responsibility for the fighting, saying, "They've never
[become] reconciled to the fact that they lost the election" of February, 1980.
"Now there are those who think they can reverse the defeat by taking up arms."
The recent violence, occurring only two weeks before the first anniversary of
ZANU's overwhelming victory in national elections last year, is sobering
testimony to the political and social tensions that continue to disrupt Zimbabwe's
war reconstruction and social transformation.
Some Western observers have singled out "tribalism" as the source of much of
Zimbabwe's political difficulties, "since Nkomo's political base is limited to the
Ndebele speaking inhabitants of western Zimbabwe. But most Zimbabweans,
while acknowledging an undercurrent of ethnic tension in the recent fighting,
point to divisions arising from the long liberation struggle and the guerrillas
uncertain futures as the real cause of the conflict.
A positive sign amidst the recent dissension, was the conduct of most former
ZIPRA commanders in the new army who remained loyal to the government.
Nkomo also retreated from his highly publicized
unhappiness with his new cabinet post during the crisis, stating that he and the
Prime Minister were "working well together indeed." The danger is that Nkomo's
conciliatory statements and the commanders' refusal -to sanction the revolt may
further lessen the party's hold over its discontented military.
The Military-A Problem
The two rebellious battalions have now been disarmed and trucked to widely separated camps outside the city. Nevertheless, the government is still faced with the problem posed by the remaining 22,000 armed former freedom fighters who have languished in assembly camps for over a year.
Sources close to the guerrillas of both parties say that many former bush fighters, particularly the ZIPRA troops, feel forgotten and left out. Many guerrillas, having left school at an early age to join the liberation struggle, are poorly educated and poorly trained for work in the public and private sector. They are said to resent the prospect of a return to the farm while those who stayed safely in school during the war received jobs in industry and government.
Poor living conditions and fears about the future are worsened for ZIPRA cadres, who must also contend with the liabilities, both real and imagined, of membership in a distinctly minor political party. Until the government acquires the resources to demobilize the guerrillas into constructive and desirable employment, tensions among the former guerrillas are likely to remain dangerously high.
Accelerated government plans call for all these men to be trained and integrated into the national army by the end of the year. Some observers question whether Zimbabwe, with a population of only seven million, can afford to support an army of what will amount to 60,000 men. Equally unlikely, however, is the prospect of speeding up the training program, although at present the former guerrillas receive a mere six weeks of retraining before being commissioned in the national army.
"Last Opportunity" for West
While by no means as serious as the proContinued on page 26
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The view from Katutura.

With the Geneva talks on Namibia ended, and South Africa still unwilling to relinquish control over the territory, the Namibian people are now faced with the prospect of more years of war and occupation. Jerry Herman, the southern Africa coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee, recently spent two months in southern Africa on a pastoral mission/fact-finding tour. One week of this tour was spent traveling around Namibia and the following is a report on what he found.

by Jerry Herman
Katutura-I had taken the call in my room at the ThUringer H. The caller explained that if I wanted to visit the Black township of Katutura I should pick him up the next day at a certain location.
The conversation, of necessity, was guarded, as all political discussion is in Namibia, a country caught in the tide of revolutionary struggle. I had just been given the directions for picking up a supporter of the SouthWest Africa Peoples Organization, who was to give me a tour of the Black* township of Katutura, which sprawls outJerry Herman is the southern Africa coordinator for the American Friends Service Committee.
side the virtually all-white capital of Windhoek.
The tour, surprisingly, included a meeting with three members of SWAPO, one of whom was Axel Johannes, a man jailed and hounded by the South African security forces to the extent that Amnesty International took up his case and initiated an international effort to free him from detention.

I was in Namibia on a pastoral and factfinding mission with an American Friends Service Committee delegation of four. One other delegate and I had decided to travel into Namibia to listen to and sample the feelings of the barely one million people in this country who populate a territory twice the size of California.

The south of the country is tough, scrubby land while the north is more fertile and thus more populous, dominated by two groups—the Ovambos and the Hereros. In the populated north, the war is more intense.

This land is as rich with minerals as it is barren of people. Uranium, platinum, lithium and gem diamonds are here in abundance, and exploiting Namibia's natural wealth is important both to the West and to South Africa.

The guerrilla war being waged by the military arm of SWAPO, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), is intensifying against the South African occupation forces, whose numbers have been estimated as high as 70,000. The war has been contained for the most part, to northern Namibia and southern Angola. This then, was the backdrop for our trip and was very much in our mind as we rented a Hertz.

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NAMIBIA

NAMIBIA

Volkswagen Rabbit and picked up our guide to Katutura.

Luck Shanties

We wound around inside the dusty township, visiting with a number of people and noted that each tribal grouping was restricted to its own area. The wooden door of each tiny brick house was stamped with the first letter of the tribe and underneath was printed the house number. A male hostel housing 5000 workers was set next to the highway that leads into the township. Nearby, too, was an area set aside for so-called coloreds, and on a straight stretch a bit north of the township was better housing for the more affluent Blacks. All of this was so much in contrast with the lovely and expensive white homes that sat above the hills surrounding Windhoek.

We stopped before a typical Katutura house, a small bungalow called a "luck shanty" with a wire fence surrounding it and a small garden of recently turned dirt to one side of the yard. Inside the neat house was a Black woman with a cautious but gentle smile who offered us a drink of soda.

The SWAPO organizer entered from the kitchen area. I could feel his confidence and determination as he talked about his work and his belief in SWAPO's ultimate success. It was only when we shook hands to leave that he smiled, a slightly detached smile and gave a little salute. He disappeared out the back.

Bishop Kauluma. A target for assassination

We drove to a similar house, where we parked and walked to the backyard. There two men were waiting, one with a shortwave radio. The other, a carefully
dressed, man, studied our every move. We were led through the back door and into a living room, where we were introduced to Axel Johannes, a man made into a legend by his suffering.

At first, the five of us sat there rather formally, but the mood was altered by Johannes. Without warning, his chair gave way, and he slid to the floor. We laughed as he pulled himself up. Our laughter dissolved into a round of very involved political discussion. Axel insisted that the struggle of SWAPO was a pragmatic struggle and that they would therefore not be able to nationalize the mining industry, at least not for a good while.

The political discussion touched on many sensitive issues including violence and the recent raids by the South African security forces into southern Angola. On this topic, all three denied that the attack had in any way impaired SWAPO's effectiveness. They asserted that SWAPO militants could and do infiltrate Windhoek with ease.

When asked why and how he, Johannes, had stuck with the struggle for so many years and suffered so much pain, he said that when he spent a long period in prison in solitary confinement, he had decided that if he was released he would take his family into exile. Instead when he returned, the love he felt for his people was so great that he could not leave; he knew he must stay and struggle with them.

The other two SWAPO activists related similar stories. David had just been released from a six-year stretch on Robben Island and reported proudly that both Herman Toivo Ja Toivo and Nelson Mandela were in excellent mental and physical shape. He also said that there is great respect by those inside prison for Sam Nujoma. The third man, SWAPO's internal minister of information, said that of all the territory's political organizations, only SWAPO had the strength to call a rally and mass 5,000 of their supporters in Katutura. The rally had occurred only a week before we arrived.

No Trade Unions

In another meeting hastily put together, I met with two labor leaders, Arthur Pickering and a man named Joe. Since returning, I have been told that both have been arrested. Arthur pointed out that in Namibia there is no viable trade union and that workers are prevented from organizing themselves. Joe added that on paper they can organize but that no union exists nor is there any likelihood that one will.

Both argued that what they need is pressure put on American companies so that organizers and workers will not be harassed and detained. Arthur gave an example of company tactics. He said that in recent weeks the uranium mine at Rossing which is owned by Rio Tinto Zinc, had issued workers pamphlets saying that they should not form unions. Instead, the pamphlets asserted, management would form a committee to handle their grievances. The unspoken, he pointed out, is that if you continue union activity you will be fired.

They described Rossing's discrimination tactics in their housing development, saying that they profess not to assign housing in a biased manner. But, he said, there are two areas for workers, skilled and unskilled. Both men smiled and said
in unison, "Guess who is skilled and who is unskilled and what the housing conditions are like in the unskilled sections."
The conditions inside the giant men's hostel at Katutura were described as atrocious by a pastor who preaches there. As many as 5600 men live there. About 4,000 have jobs and the remaining 1600 have come down from the north in search of work. The jobseekers are allowed to come because they provide leverage for businessmen when confronted by workers demanding higher wages. More disturbing, he bristled, is the social impact of the hostel. Women are not allowed there so the men from the north must leave their families behind. In Katutura they are alone and without work. There is an increase in alcoholism and many of the men turn to other women. It has turned an organized lifestyle into disorganization.

While we were sitting with the pastor, three ministers arrived from Ovamboland where the war is being fought. I asked about the strength of SWAPO among the people there. After a signal from the pastor that we were to be trusted, each answered that every member of their congregation is a SWAPO supporter. These ministers, fresh from the fighting area, saying in plain English that SWAPO had solid support among the people, was a startling reminder that the South African military was the only force standing between SWAPO's coming to power. Was there not, in what I was hearing, echoes of the American involvement in Vietnam?

A Namibian bishop said that many men come to him describing how they have been tortured at the hands of the police and the military. He had planned to pass on to me a recently compiled list of detained men. I had wanted to go north to Ovamboland, but the bishop thought it unwise because of the level of violence and the danger of land mines on the roads. I later learned that there are two ways to go north. One is to travel with the military and the other is to go with church people. The latter, I was constantly told, is the safest.

Church leaders in Namibia, by most accounts, are a courageous group. They have been consistent in denouncing the terror of the South African security establishment. In a recently discovered hit list, reportedly put together by the South African police, a number of prominent church leaders have been targeted for assassination.

I subscribe to the Windhoek Observer in the United States and one of the political columns I read regularly is Gwen Lister. I find her column candid and penetratingly analytical. In person, she is outspoken and courageous. When we met in Windhoek, she was far along on a pregnancy, which certainly did not deter her relentless analysis of Namibian politics. She felt the churches of Namibia were taking far too much of a back seat and should be much more aggressive in the struggle. The few Black businessmen in
Namibia have been, she argued, set up by Black investment corporations that are funded by white South Africans.
The male hostels are sickening, she exclaimed. They contain 5,000 people and to this must be added all their friends and relatives who come down from the north where the war is taking its toll. Here there are no jobs.
She went on to assert that the Security Act allows Rossing to hide much of its activity, even the names of the large shareholders. It is reputed, she said, that British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington is one of Rossing's large shareholders.
What about the Democratic Turnhallq Alliance? Where does its support come from? Lister believes that West Germany and South Africa are large financial supporters of the DTA. She described the Namibian National Front and SWAPO-D as having little mass support. SWAPO-D, she said, has a lot of white support and, she added caustically that Andreas Chipenga, SWAPO-D's leader, would do well with the chamber of commerce. The new conscription law, she said, will drive the young into exile and swell SWAPO's ranks. Some South African battalions now have Blacks, she said, but they are for the most part thugs. The same kind of people have been recruited to act as bodyguards for government-backed black leaders in Ovamboland. Conscription is also likely to worsen racial tension within the South African army. In Windhoek, barroom brawls between Black and white soldiers is already a nightly occurrence. She concluded by saying that with the DTA, things can only be disastrous as they do not represent the people.
When I sat over tea with a white government man-I might add a most likeable person-he admitted to having the tough task of doing public relations for the DTA, a government which lacked the support of the people. At least 90 percent of the population of Namibia are loyal to SWAPO, he readily admitted. However, he continued, the DTA plans to erode SWAPO's commanding lead in the next year.
During a relaxed moment, I asked whether the Afrikaner population was predisposed to genocide. He held his breath for a minute, then conceded that they are predisposed to discipline and fit into it easily. Then he stopped, thought a few minutes and changed the subject and began talking about the government's efforts to change and how foreign companies were building schools.
The Windhoek airport, if one could somehow disregard the number of white South African military men moving about, could have been a small airport in any American city of 40,000 people. Businessmen were arriving and departing, renting or returning cars from Hertz or Avis, quickly having coffee. I could not disregard the military activity or the Black work gangs involved in menial tasks out and around the tarmac. Once I noticed a number of these men studying a small cluster of young white soldiers carrying weapons.
MOZAMBIQUE
South Africa: New Aggression
When William Khanyile was a young man
he joined the African National Congress of South Africa as an organizer of Black
unions. For these two crimes he served eight long years on Robben Island and
suffered years of exile. His last post was in Mozambique, where as National
Executive of the South African Congress of Trade Unions he witnessed the
growing strength and militancy of the South African working class with pride and
excitement. But he would not live to see their final victory.
Khanyile and ten other members of the ANC died in a hail of rockets and
machine gun fire on January 30 when South African commandos in armored cars
drove forty miles into neighboring Mozambique to the industrial suburb of
Matola, near Maputo. There they destroyed three residences housing exiled
members of the ANC. A Portuguese national also died during the attack, as did
two of the South African commandos who were killed during an exchange with
defending Mozambican soldiers.
The ANC later announced that in addition to the eleven men killed, three men had
been captured by the raiders and taken back to South Africa.
The South African police have confirmed they captured three men who they
named as Lati Rantshekang, David Ntobela and Uujani Mauusa. The ANC has
expressed concern that the prisoners would be tortured and killed by their captors.
General Constand Viljoen, commander of the South African Defense Force,
defended the action on security grounds, asserting that recent ANC military
activities, including the devastating Sasol raids last summer and the Soekmekaar
and Silverton attacks were planned in the ANC houses. Matola, he declared, was
"the springboard for terrorism."

Raid Claims Challenged
But some observers question why South Africa would wait so long after the Sasol and Silverton attacks to retaliate for them. Rather, they argue, the Matola attack seems designed to strengthen Prime Minister P.W. Botha's hand in the recently announced upcoming national election, and to signal Washington that Pretoria is only too willing to fall in line behind Reagan's cold war foreign policy. The attack on MaVI came only two days after Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced a new "get tough" policy against what he termed "rampant international terrorism." Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC
The aftermath of aggression. An ANC member lies slain in the rubble of his
Matola home.
denied Viljoen's claim that his organization has bases inside Mozambique. "It is
common knowledge that your guerrillas train in various parts of the world and then
move into South Africa and train others there," he said. "But there is no staging
center in Mozambique."

Reiterating that the shelled houses were just residences, Tambo went on, "If
possessing guns is sufficient to turn a house into a military base, we want to
know, because most whites in South Africa keep guns in their homes."
Mozambique accused South Africa of trying to export its "explosive" internal
situation to bordering states. FRELIMO further charged that "the barbaric act by
the South African racist regime is an integral part of a concerted plan to weaken, terrorize and destabilize neighboring countries." The statement went on to affirm Mozambique's "solidarity and full support of the people of South Africa under the leadership of the African National Congress ... and of the persons who, because of racial and Continued on page 25

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MOZAMBIQUE

Maputo--Mavalane is a sprawling canico (cane) bairro,-or neighborhood-of Maputo. It begins just beyond the outskirts of what the canico dwellers call "cement city," a name that encapsulates the striking contrast between their reed shanties, packed cheek by jowl across the open, sandy land, and the attractive, treelined center of the city, graced by spacious brick houses and apartment buildings.

Mavalane, like the many other canico bairros, grew out of the Portuguese colonialists' need for a source of cheap labor, along with the steady pushing back of the African population as the whites claimed more and more land for their city. While the life of the Portuguese settlers became increasingly luxurious, life in the canicos deteriorated to sub-human conditions. With Mozambique's independence just over five years ago, the deterioration was halted, and slowly a process of development is taking place, transforming the live of the people of Mavalane.

Women leaders of Mavalane came together to talk to me, for three days, about the changes that they are experiencing, and with each day relinquished more of their shyness. They were certainly used to visitors; these came regularly to Mavalane, but generally they stayed only a few hours, or morning or an afternoon at the most.

No doubt they wondered, their face expressing their hesitancy, what they could possibly do for me once the welcome speeches and cursory interviews were over. While most journalists packed up their tape recorders and left at that point, I wanted to visit for three whole days. But by the third day they were used to me. The car was greeted by the delighted faces of the women crowding the doorway at the narrow steps of one of the few cement buildings- previously a Portuguese-owned shop-which housed the local FRELIMO structures and mass organization. Their grins were broad. "Oh, we are getting so used to you," one of the militants of the organization of Mozambican women, OMM, said as I was ushered into the small room which served as the office for both the women's organization and the youth organization. "Now that we know you, it is already the last day. We will miss you when you don't come again. You are our sister," and everyone clapped their hands and laughed in agreement.

As they talked, hour after hour, the small room became a stage with a fluctuating number of actors-between eight and twelve- and one member of the audience, myself. The inflections of their voices covered a wide range, but when the women wanted to place particular emphasis on an aspect of their tale, they would act out a scene for me.
While the range of subjects and stories was large, I steered many of my questions to one aspect: relations within the family and—most particularly—how OMM at the bairro level responded to any instances of marital breakdown. In the cities, social conditions have given rise to harsh, even brutal, relationships within the family. But in the rural areas, traditional attitudes against divorce are stronger than in the cities. The emphasis on the family, as well as women's roles within it, is strong everywhere in Mozambique. The family is described—in a recent article in the daili press as "the first cell of the party," and the woman is singled out as the prime dynamizer of this cell," the one responsible for nurturing good relations within it, among all its members.

Along with this goes a notion that divorce is a social problem. While legal for both men and women, it is generally discouraged by the party. This was particularly evident in conversations I had with people who were reflecting the more official OMM or FRELIMO viewpoint. Reconciliation is considered preferable and in the ideal family which is based on the new relations possible within a revolutionary society, divorce is an anathema.

In my travels through different parts of Mozambique, however, I found that the practice varied. In some communal villages, for instance, the party perspective prevailed. One member of a communal village tribunal in Gaza proudly pronounced: "Divorce has never occurred in this village."

Elsewhere, people in communal villages spoke of the problems that persist between husband and wife and how divorces, while infrequent, had helped resolve them. In Mavalane it quickly became evident that divorce is not frowned upon by the 16cal OMM, structures. When it comes to dealing with the realities of life in social situations inherited from colonial times, women gain support from the organization as well as the party. Where women are suffering because of their husband's maltreatment, there is no time for talking about reconciliation. Story after story told me by my new friends, showed that women of the community are given strong support in the resolution of marital discord, a resolution that often ends in separation and/or divorce.

Take the case of a young woman who had been married a few years and had two young children. Her husband became involved with a woman he met where he worked and ordered his wife out of the house, giving her a months notice. When the wife failed to leave, he gave her an ultimatum: "By the time I come home from work this evening, you must have left,
or there will be trouble." During the day the wife packed her suitcases and got the children ready. When her husband returned from work she was still there. He was angry. "I am waiting for you to help me to the bus stop," she told him. She tied her baby onto her back and picked up her suitcase. Her husband followed, carrying their older child. They walked in silence in the evening light to the bus stop, and when the bus came she got on and he, still silent, handed her the other child. The bus drove off.

After a few days, he turned up at the home of her parents, where she was staying. His mother had committed suicide, he explained to his parents, and he wanted her back home. Rather than giving him an answer, the parents took the matter to OMM, accompanied by their daughter. "I do not want to go back to him. He said I was useless and had to leave. Now I have left." The wife was adamant. When OMM called the husband into their office to hear his story, he repeated what she had told his inlaws. But his wife continued to insist that she would not return.

During the discussion the husband got up from his chair and a long, sharp knife tucked in his waistband was exposed. And so another angle to the story emerged, namely that he had threatened to kill his wife on a number of occasions. She was scared to go back. OMM realized that the man was not asking his wife to return because he repented and still loved her. There was another reason. They feared he would try to kill her. To clinch any doubts, when the woman and her brother visited her in-laws outside of Maputo a few weeks later, they found the mother to be very much alive. Now, after two years, the woman continues to live with her family, with the explicit support of OMM. Meanwhile, the case has been taken to appropriate state structures within the locality so that divorce can be discussed.

I was told of a young woman in her early twenties who, came to OMM with her problem. She and her husband were always quarreling: "We do not have a happy life together," she told them. The cause was money. "He gives me a little money, but not enough to cover all the expenses of the house." The OMM responsable for social affairs sympathized with her and together they worked out the best way to approach him. If the man was called to the office he would ask who told them. In such circumstances a man was likely to feel humiliated and get angry enough to beat his wife severely. "What do you think?" he would shout, "That OMM is your mother and your father, so that you can tell them these things?"

OMM's experience led them to take a different approach. And so, as in many such cases, the OMM woman visited the house one evening when the family was home, and for a while they spoke generally. Then the wife began to talk. "As you are here, Mama, I want to tell you that we are not having a good life together," and she repeated the money problem. The OMM responsable asked edhi husband: "Is what your wife is saying the truth?" He got very angry, but she
stopped him. "No," she said, "I am not here to quarrel with you. We must all try to put our lives in order." She talked to both of them, first telling the woman that she must respect her husband. "When you have problems you must not get in the habit of talking about it to your neighbors." But she was stern with the husband. "You too must respect your wife. Even if your salary is insufficient, it is for both of you. So you must discuss all the expenses and the budget together. This way your wife will know how much you earn and how it is being spent."
The talk helped the young couple get through an impasse. After a while the woman came to thank her for her help and said they had stopped quarreling. Soon af-

**MOZAMBIQUE**

The role of the OMM responsavel in these accounts, as in others, emerged as a very effective one. Not only did they show support and concern, they provided, very often, very tangible, alternatives. For example, finding the deserted wife a job in the hospital as above or, as on a different occasion, ensuring that the husband paid the equivalent of $60.00 a month towards the support of his children who had gone with his wife to live with her family in the rural areas. This amount, not small in Mozambican terms, was paid to the People's Tribunal each month, and it was this structure that forwarded it to the wife, thus ensuring that it actually was sent. Or, where no economic support was possible, making sure she could live with her parents. For the first time, women have an alternative, an organization that can be turned to which gives them the opportunity to opt out of an insufferable relationship and not be left destitute.

**Why Should I Feed Her**

There was another case. A young woman came to OMM and complained that her husband refused to give her any money for food and she was starving. She was totally dependent on him, having no family in the vicinity. While he ignored his wife, he paid much attention to his lover who had become pregnant.

The OMM visited their house to speak with the husband. "Is it true that you are not feeding your wife?" they asked him. Unabashed (and not untypically), he replied in the affirmative. "Why should I feed her, she has produced no children." "But," replied the OMM representatives, "she is still a human being and must eat." "No," he persisted, "she has produced no children, I do not have to feed her."

They tried to make the man see reason, but in vain. He kept on repeating the same argument, saying that now he had a woman who would produce his children and he would support her instead. Realizing it would do no good, OMM stopped arguing, and resolved the problem by finding the woman-who had never worked before and was illiterate-a job as a cleaner in a hospital.

A different example told to me concerned the party secretary of the bairro, whose behavior defied his position of authority and respect. Not long after independence he brought a young woman from the countryside to his home, telling his wife that she was a servant, and would assist her with her work. But the woman did little
domestic work, and her husband shared her bed at night. The wife's unhappiness soon prompted the concern of her neighbors and they took the Watter to OMM. Concerned members of the community went to visit him, and asked him what was going on. "I am surprised," he feigned. "You are not the first to ask me such questions. Does it mean that as I am the secretary of the party I cannot receive visitors in my own home? This girl is my niece."

When they asked his wife, she told them otherwise. Finally, when the secretary was trying to have the witnesses who had reported his actions punished by the militia, the matter was taken up by the other members of the party structure. For four days, they questioned him. For three days he denied the rumors. On the fourth day he confessed. "Why did you lie for such a long time?" he was asked, and told that he must report to the People's Tribunal the following day. The next day he was nowhere to be found. He had fled to his family in a neighboring bairro. One night he sneaked home but the militia was waiting for him, and he was taken to the police station and kept there; for a month. "He needed time to think about what he had done," the women commented. With the first flush of independence, many opportunists found their way into the structures of the party and as representatives of the people because they spouted FRELIMO principles and policy with apparent sincerity. But their actions caught up with them in time, and when they were found out, like this party secretary, they were dealt with severely.

When the man was released, he, his wife and the young woman, were called to the headquarters of the party to discuss the matter. He admitted that he had been wrong, but said that he and his wife had not had sexual relationships for a long time. "My wife is sick. I am a man. I must be able to live like a man."

His wife did not want to return to him, and her position was supported. No reconciliation was attempted and she went to live with her parents. Not all cases end in separation. In Mavalane, OMM has been able to help couples to reconcile their differences where there is some potential.

How little this option existed in the past was described to me by one of the oldest OMM members in Mavalane. Wrinkled and completely grey, Maria Masinga talked to me about her life when we visited her at her small house in the bairro. She had had no children, and hence early in her marriage, her husband had left her. She could find no work. To survive, she walked for three hours from Mavalane to a small field she had in the country to produce food to eat. She would sleep at the field and return home a few days a week. She was regularly hungry, and six years ago, just before independence, she got ill and could not make the journey to her field any longer. If it had not been for OMM, her fate would have been the same as many old women she knew: to die alone, of hunger. But now, whenever she did not have food, OMM made sure she ate. She worked with the OMM women on a number of projects, helping her neighbors, and she was proud of her membership. "If I could," she said, "I would stand up and be dancing all the time."
Stephanie Urdang is a member of the Southern Africa Collective who recently visited in Mozambique and is writing a series of articles about women.

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ANGOLA

South Africa's Secret War

Destroyed bridge in southern Angola is a mute testament to the intention of war. Angola is a country that has been forced, since independence, into a constant state of war. This was the principal finding of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes in southern Africa which met in Angola from January 30 to February 3, 1981. The commission, which was established after the Soweto uprising in 1976, met to hear evidence of South African aggression against Angola, the other frontline states, and the people of Namibia and South Africa.

The commission, which held its first session in Brussels in 1979, is composed of well-known individuals from a broad range of countries and political perspectives. The 27 panel members included the chairman, Sean MacBride, former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark, leading legal professionals from Europe, Africa, and the USSR, and representatives from several churches. Evidence was closely examined, and witnesses were often asked very detailed questions. Jennifer Davis was invited to attend as an observer on behalf of Southern Africa. This is her report.

Luanda—South Africa's secret war against Angola must be internationally exposed, and the Pretoria government and its military forces branded as international terrorists, said Nobel prize winner Sean MacBride, reporting the findings of the International Commission which had gathered to examine evidence of South African aggression.

South Africa has created a situation throughout southern Africa in which it not only constitutes a threat to international peace, but is constantly breaching that peace by actions such as its raiding into Angolan territory, and the recent attack on Mozambique. Chairman Sean MacBride—speaking before an audience of several hundred Angolans, including members of the MPLA party, and diplomatic and press officials—called for strong action against South Africa under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN charter.

The evidence had shown that South African "acts of aggression, torture, and the massacre of African people... equalled the worst done by the Nazis during the war," said MacBride, and the commission found an urgent need for international action, perhaps even military action.

A Cruel War
Attacks on Angola are being conducted at so intense a level that they constitute a "secret war," launched from the illegally occupied territory of Namibia, Commission members were told.

A small group of Commission members flew down to Cunene province in southern Angola to observe conditions in the major combat zone. Presenting their findings Ramsey Clark reported, "We flew ... to a town called Xangongo and then proceeded south by trucks and jeeps to maybe 10-20 kilometers of the Namibian border. We found there what could generally be called a state of war."

"There was a constant military presence and alertness of a defensive nature, networks of trenches and bunkers and reports of daily depredations by South African military personnel." In a page borrowed from the US military in Vietnam, the South Africans employ airborne troops in helicopter gunships backed by artillery and strike aircraft.

Clark described one such attack, reported while the group was in the area. "An automobile fired upon. Who was in it? Seven nuns." Assessing what he termed "the method in this madness" Clark pointed to the similarities with the American bombing of Cambodia which had also been kept secret from much of the world, although the Cambodians were aware of it. "It's hard not to be aware when you feel the concussions and bury the bodies," he said. South Africa's main goal is to drive the population from the area by terror and starvation.

"It is an area that can support herds of cattle, goats, hogs," Clark continued, yet "We saw dozens of carcasses of cattle-cattle that could! feed people and nourish children."

More generally the war presents an enormous economic drain on the resources of the new government, absorbing the strength of an army "that could be employed in social and economic development."

The attacks are designed, according to Clark, to destabilize Angola, as similar tactics have done in Lebanon. Finally, he said, the tactic was also aimed at preventing Namibians from fleeing to freedom.

"There is no respect for the rights of humanity in South Africa, there is no Joso Ricardo Delmundo at the commission head respect for the rights of nations," he concluded. Instead "there is a deliberate use of all the violent capacity of technology, in its most sophisticated forms ... against.... what they hope will be a people unable to defend themselves. However, there are people there able to defend themselves, and that has created this condition of continuing war."

Escalation

The Angolan government itself presented detailed evidence about the escalating intensity of the South African attacks. Witnesses from the Angolan Ministry of Defense and the armed forces (FAPLA), gave detailed evidence about attacks over the two year period since the Commission's first session.

In the eighteen months between June 1979 and December 1980 at least 400 Angolan civilians had been killed in South African attacks. There were "640 civilians wounded, 85 FAPLA soldiers killed, and unknown numbers of dead and wounded Namibian refugees" said the official Angolan report, which detailed the
extensive damage inflicted on agriculture, industry, transport and the whole social fabric in southern Angola.

9000 Mercenaries
The most vivid description of South Africa's deliberate policy of terror against the Namibian and Angolan people came from a deserter who had spent over four years in a special South African army unit specifically established to operate in Angola with Angolan mercenaries. His testimony highlighted the degree of collusion between the South African armed forces and so-called UNITA units. Black and white mercenaries he said, are used extensively in search-and-destroy type missions designed to create an empty desert along the Namibia-Angola border.

Jose Ricardo Belmundo, a Black Angolan, rose to the rank of captain in South African Defense Force Battalion 32, the "Buffalo Battalion," before deserting in January 1980. Wearing a distinctive camouflage uniform with Buffalo insignia, he told the Commission that the 32nd Battalion was comprised of men of many nationalities, including French and British nationals. But its major strength came from 9000 military personnel who had originally been FNLA soldiers. When FNLA and South African forces were defeated in Angola in late 1975, a large number of FNLA soldiers reentered with the South Africans. After being disarmed, Belmundo said, "They told us that FNLA had finished and that we had to serve in South Africa as mercenaries ... from that moment we were complete mercenaries inside the South African army."

Describing his own history, Belmundo said that he had been born in Angola in 1953. His parents fled Portuguese colonialism in 1961, settling in Zaire. "In 1973 I was taken with many other young men to the UPA (FNLA) base in Kinkusu, where I received training." In 1974 and 1975 he fought against MPLA troops with the FNLA, sometimes in collaboration with South African troops. The Buffalo Battalion was established so that FNLA troops could be kept together; it was not a normal army battalion but a special intervention unit, said Belmundo, and it was divided into several specialties.

41 1976 Belmundo was one of a group of 18 SOUTHERN AFRICA/MARCH-APRIL 1981

ANGOLA
32 men sent from the Buffalo Battalion for special commando training at a base near Durban. Later he was one of a group of eighty in an officer's training course in Pretoria. While there he met Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, Zambians, and other men from front line states, who were all being trained to carry out special insurgency operations in their home countries. Describing operations in which he had been involved Belmundo said, "During 1978 and 1979 we led small units in carrying out 'cleaning up' operations against the People's Republic of 'Angola ... we had precise instructions to destroy schools, hospitals, houses and to wipe out civilian population and kill cattle." In larger operations, or when penetrating deeper into Angola there was considerable air support, involving helicopter-born
troops and Impala, Mirage, and other aircraft. "When we got to within one kilometer of our objective the aircraft would bomb it. Then we would encircle ... houses were burned and destroyed."

When Buffalo units were operating inside Angola they did not use standard South African uniforms or equipment, but were given Chinese-made weapons, "so that the Angolan government would think we were UNITA."

Asked about the 32nd Battalion's relationships with UNITA, Belmundo responded that the two groups had different spheres of action, but were working for the same bosses. The 32nd operated mainly in Cunene province, with support from Ondangua air force base, and the 54th paratroop battalion. UNITA operated mostly in Cuando-Cubango. But when UNITA had operational difficulties it would contact South African military security personnel, and units from the 32nd Battalion would be sent to give assistance. Belmundo himself participated in such "bailing out" operations. He added that the South African army had instructors at UNITA bases such as the one at Mukusa, and that SADF personnel sometimes carried out joint missions with UNITA.

At a press conference following the Commission hearings Southern Africa asked Belmundo whether he knew of US mercenaries involved in the 32nd Battalion. His response was startling. Colonel Carpenter, the man who in 1975 led some of the South African forces into Angola, and was later responsible for setting up the Buffalo Battalion was an American veteran who had fought in Zaire and Vietnam. Belmundo added that he had not personally known *orpetor-as the American had gone back to South Africa by the time Belmundo became an officer.

Yet another US connection emerged during the Commission sessions. Belmundo testified that 155 mm cannons-supplied by the US Space Research Corporation-had been used by the South Africans as tactical weapons during attacks against Cunene province in which he had participated.

Belmundo left the 32nd Battalion in January 1980, only one month after being promoted to captain. He said contacts with Black South Africans and the viciousness of the attacks on Angola had made him realise * "that I was being used by apartheid for its own purposes." Much of the testimony he gave confirmed statements made to the British press in early February by a British mercenary, Trevor Edwards, who served in the 32nd Battalion in 1980.

Torture and Terror
Two major themes dominated the evidence presented to the Commission. First, the extent of South African aggression against the front line states, which focused mainly on the war against Angola, and second, on "aggression against people struggling for their liberation." Listeners during the sessions dealing with this second theme were visibly shaken by the unemotional, detailed and horrible testimony given by several members of both SWAPO and the African National Congress about their personal experiences. Rauna Nambinga, a young Namibian
nurse who had joined SWAPO in 1973, told the Commission that she had first been arrested on September 17th at the hospital where she worked. She was taken to Ogongo Detention Camp, where military and civilian police accused her of having supplied medicine and money to SWAPO freedom fighters; weeks of beatings and solitary confinement followed. Once, for a week she was not allowed access to a toilet. "The most terrible day I remember," she said in a still, small voice, "was when I was taken to a small room ... there were many pictures of dead people on the wall. They told me one ... was my brother, Usko Nambinga, so I must show them which one .... Because she could not comply she was again beaten and "from there I was taken to a room where there were snakes and I was told that if I was not going to start telling the truth I was going to be bitten .... I was in a great panic .... ." The beatings and brutality continued for some time. Eventually brought to trial, she was convicted of helping people who aimed t the violent overthrow of the government and sentenced to a jail term, which she served in South Africa. On her release in 1977 she returned to Namibia. In July 1980 she was again detained by military police, who again alleged that she was giving assistance to the freedom fighters. This time she was subjected to electric torture, prolonged hanging, and such-severe beatings that a military doctor who examined her told her that she had serious head and kidney injuries, and burst ear-drums. He gave her some tablets; which were almost immediately removed, and the electric torture resumed soon thereafter. Later she was moved, blindfolded, to a prison in which, for weeks on end, she was kept and forced to keep a blanket over her head. Eventually released after months of detention, she was then approached by three Young SWAPO militants at a hidden refugee camp in Angola. Herman Ithete, SWAPO Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs described a campaign of terror being waged against the Namibian people by the South Africans. He enumerated cases where groups of South African infantry deliberately went out on raping parties, listing dates, names, places. He described the operations of small gangs of kidnappers, code-named "Koevoet" squads, which specialize in the abduction of known SWAPO supporters. Again he read a long list of names of men and women who had disappeared without trace, and who, it was feared, might be dead. The Commission must begin a search for these people, Ithete said, and for those people who had been abducted from the Cassinga refugee camp when it was destroyed by the South Africans in 1978. Ithete described how the work of the "Koevoet" gangs is complemented by the operations of the so-called Special Constable Units and Tribal Home Guards, which specialize in hunting down civilians aiding SWAPO. He also referred to a new technique being used by the South Africans-the training of young women whose task it was to spy on and seduce SWAPO members, and
then poison or betray them. Two of these young women—testified before the Commission. They had been enlisted by the South African authorities, and trained in various bizarre sexual and other techniques, including the insertion of poisoned razors into their vaginas. They had been sent into Angolato seek out SWAPO camps—and had soon been discovered by SWAPO. Both are now in a SWAPO refugee camp.

War, terror and South African brutality have made many Namibians refugees. There are, according to Swapo and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, at least 50,000 Namibian refugees in Angola and South Africa's new plan to conscript all Black Namibian youths, into the army is bringing out a new wave of young people.

Along with several Commission members Southern Africa visited a major SWAPO refugee camp, several hundred kilometers inland from Luanda. Deliberately inaccessible to protect it from South African attack, the camp faces enormous problems. Some 25,000 people, mainly women and children, live in neatly organized tent villages. There is a SWAPO farm—but most food has to be trucked in, over a road that is little more than a badly rutted track. The site was chosen because it is relatively free from the ubiquitous malaria-carrying mosquito—but that means it is also far from easily available water, most of which also has to be trucked in, as there is yet no developed pumping system.

Yet everywhere we went there were the marks of thoughtful organization and great dedication. Nangolo Mbumba, the young principal of the school which holds almost 9000 young children and teenagers, gathered them all in a vast-circle and introduced us to them, explaining why we had come, and who we represented ... mostly the people of our countries, he told them and not the governments. There was one moving exception. A young Zimbabwean government member was with us, and students and teachers alike gave him a tumultuous welcome—greeting him as the living proof that freedom can be won.

Country Under Attack

Listening to the witnesses, traveling in the countryside, talking to people in the streets of Luanda, everywhere it was impossible to ignore the fact that Angola is a country under constant attack, and that the war is placing severe strains on the young state as it seeks to reconstruct its shattered economy for the benefit of the many rather than the few. Yet nowhere did I detect signs of wavering support for the struggle of the people of Namibia or South Africa; no one ever suggested that Angola was paying too high a price.

Speaking at a rally celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the beginning of armed struggle on February 4th, President Eduardo dos Santos expressed Angola's solidarity with that struggle, and with the people of Mozambique, who had just been subjected to a vicious military attack by South African military forces. We are united in the same trench, he told a crowd of thousands, we will not be discouraged by the racist attacks. We will continue our support for all forms of Namibian struggle, including the armed struggle.
Almost as he was speaking, General Charles Lloyd, commander of South African military forces in Namibia was issuing new threats against Angola's security. Warning that South Africa intended to escalate its fight against SWAPO he claimed that it was not South Africa's intention to damage Angola's infrastructure, but, he told a group of foreign journalists, there are some "beautiful targets" that have so far remained untouched only because of South African restraint.
Coupled with the overwhelming evidence of the existing high level of South African aggression, that statement can only be interpreted as a declaration of all-out war. Angolans believe that the election of President Reagan means South Africa has already been given a US go-ahead.
They are determined not to succumb-and it appears that they are already doing much better at defending themselves than was possible a few years ago. The Angolans and the various foreign journalists and observers who have visited the war zone all report that the defense of the south is now in FAPLA hands.
Commenting on South African efforts to annihilate the present state of Angola, Ramsey Clark told the Commission "their effectiveness will be tested by the will of the people."
The Angolan people seem determined to struggle on, but their warm reception of the Commission indicates the urgency with which they feel the need for greater international support. It is South Africa not Angola which ought to be isolated.
That was the final message of the International Commission, and the message that members are now committed to spreading in the international community.
SOUTH AFRICA
Botha Sets Election Date
by Mary Feyijinmi
newspapers, and introduction of a "Finger- these measures must be viewed as a conprint Bill" (which would require the creation of policies which led to the ban) South Africa Prime Minister P.W. Botha tion of a fingerprint record for all Black ning of the Post in 1977 and the harsh announced in late January that general elec- South Africans), concurrently with a surge legislative restrictions on Blacks in the urtions will be held on April 29. As justifica- of detentions and bannings, ban areas that were announced in 1980.
tion for the elections-eighteen months Other indications of just how reformist Certainly, however, these hard-line prior to their required date-Botha cited Botha intends to be include the recent raid measures were carefully timed to renew over thirty separate by-elections that are on Mozambique, and South Africa's un- conservative faith in the National Party's due to be held, most of them to fill seats willingness to yield to UN supervised elec- commitment to apartheid and, as a result, vacated by members of parliament who tions in Namibia.
short circuit conservative opposition within were appointed to the new President's Rather than a shift to the right, however, the National Party.
Council. The early elections will take the place of the by-elections.
The elections will also mark the first time
that South Africa's electorate (the whites) will vote for P.W. Botha. Botha was appointed to the premiership in 1978 and inherited the large majority won by his predecessor John Vorster. Another factor which many observers feel affected Botha's decision, is the conflict existing in the ruling National Party between the ultra-conservatives (verkramptes) and the somewhat less conservative reformists (verligtes). By holding early elections Botha hopes to inhibit the growing conservative opposition both within and outside of the National Party.

The South African press has been full of speculation about how strong this ultraconservative challenge actually is and the possibility of a split in the Nationalist Party; It is certainly true that Botha's reform rhetoric has been met by cries of treason from staunch apartheid advocates. At a mid-March campaign rally in Rustenberg, Botha was faced by a group of hecklers shouting "Traitor!" and "We reject you."

Yet the reforms the government has spoken about have barely gotten beyond the talking stage and, just before he announced the early elections, the prime minister again reiterated his strong stand in favor of excluding Blacks from the new parliamentary advisory body known as the President's Council (see Southern Africa, September/ October 1980). This sequence of events prompted the Johannesburg Sunday Times to comment that Botha "is more concerned with placating the right than with his image abroad."

In the past few months, the government has stepped up repressive measures; including the banning of two Black MARCH-APRIL 1981 SOUTHERN AFRICA 21

Mary Feyijinmi is a student at Friends World College who is currently working as an intern at Southern Africa.

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State Department Players

US academic Chester A. Crocker is only the latest Reagan appointee to be belched from the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. A longtime associate of the new Secretary of State, Crocker is Haig's choice for the State Department's Africa desk. He authored the new administration's transition team paper on Africa, and earlier served on the National Security Council staff as assistant to Richard T. Kennedy—another Haig confidant. Crocker will bring to state not a shift in perspective, but a style more subtle and intellectual than any so far in evidence. He is able to give the impression that he agrees with critics of the apartheid government by accurately pointing to the hypocrisy of Carter administration rhetoric.
But, behind the guise of his "positive engagement" argument in favor of increased US economic, political, and military links with the white minority government, Crocker would simply eliminate official criticism of apartheid and with it any US commitment to support of political rights for over eighteen million disenfranchised Blacks.

Crocker recognizes that international and domestic pressures may prevent the US from openly embracing the South African government. During the Nixon years he was responsible for implementing the secret National Security Study Memorandum 39, which stated that US policy towards South Africa should be to ease the political and economic isolation of the white regime, while maintaining a public stance of opposi-

The Congressional Team

The legislators who will shape Congressional African policy under the Reagan administration have been chosen for seats on the Senate and House subcommittees on Africa.

The Senate Republican majority voted Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kansas) chair of the Senate Africa subcommittee, while the Democrat ic-controlled House selected second-term Congressman Howard Wolpe chair of the House Africa subcommittee.

Kassebaum, who has no Africa experience, has been part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for two years and originally sought a seat now held by Jesse Helms on the Senate Latin America subcommittee. Wolpe, on the other hand, has been a member of the House Africa committee since 1978, holds a Ph.D in political science for work done on Nigeria, and has authored several articles and publications on African nations.

Though a Reagan supporter, some observers feel Kassebaum may not necessarily follow a rigidly conservative stance toward Africa. Coming from a grain-producing state, she is reportedly interested in export of American goods especially agricultural products, and will shortly leave on a fact-finding trip to Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Kassebaum's perceptions of Angola will be particularly important since they will undoubtedly influence the current Congres-

sional debate on the Clark Amendment (which prohibits covert US operations in Angola, including support for UNITA).

AFRICAN SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS

IN THE 97TH CONGRESS

SENATE

Republicans

Nancy Landon Kassebaum (Kansas)-Chair
Jesse Helms (N.C.)
S. I. Hayakawa (Calif.) Charles Mathias (Md.)

Democrats

Paul Tsongas (Mass.)
John Glenn (Ohio)
Christopher Dodd (Conn.)

HOUSE
Democrats
Howard Wolpe (Mich.)-Chair
Stephen Solarz (N.Y.) Gerry Studds (Mass.)
George Crockett (Mich.)
Dennis Eckart (Ohio)

Republicans
William Goodling (Pa.)
Arlen Erdahl (Minn.)
Olympia Snowe (Maine) Robert Dornan (Calif.)

Hearings are slated to begin April 1 on whether Congress will repeal the amendment, as the Reagan Administration has urged. Former Senator Dick Clark, author of the 1976 amendment, will testify at the hearings, as will a representative of the Presbyterian Church of the US and a yet-to-be announced representative of the administration.

During his prior tenure in the House Africa panel, Wolpe supported Carter's southern Africa policy, called for US recognition of Angola, endorsed increased and more effective aid to African countries and voted against the introduction of US military aid to Somalia and Morocco. A subcommittee head, he is expected to join with his four fellow Democrats on the panel in opposition to significant conservative altering of American policy toward Africa. All nine members of the subcommittee will participate in an official trip to Angola, scheduled for August.

The House Africa panel may be closest allied with the Congressional Black Caucus in this regard. Bucking November's conservative shift the Caucus increased its strength to eighteen members in the House with Walter Fauntroy (D.C.) chairman and William Gray (Penn) vice chairman. These new leaders have emphasized the Caucus' continuing commitment to activism on African affairs. Whatever influence these two congressional groups will have on Reagan's geopolitical gameboard in Africa, however, must first pass the Senate Republican gauntlet.

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tion to the state's repressive racial policies. Statements from some of the new administration's leading foreign policy makers, including Haig, UN representative Jean Kirkpatrick and even Reagan himself suggest a return to that strategy. And Crocker will be only too willing to oblige. Crocker subscribes completely to the Reagan administration world view which declares that the West is facing a global challenge from the Soviet Union over control of raw materials and geopolitical power. The president has publicly declared South African minerals to be "strategically essential to the free world."

With Haig at the helm and Crocker navigating, one can expect the Reagan ship of state to sail full steam into the troubled waters of southern Africa in a short-sighted effort to drop anchor in what it views as the resource-rich harbor of South African stability. Whether Crocker can stay off the rocks of world opinion and African resistance remains to be seen.

1980 Index
The index is organized on a country-by-country basis followed by a regional category and a separate section on US involvement in southern Africa. This index does not include article from the Action News and Notes and News Briefs sections for the magazine.

The first number in each entry refers to the issue and the second indicates page(s).

Volume XIII consists of nine issues from January to December 1980. Cross listings are extremely limited. The Special Supplement on Women is not included in the index although most of the articles appearing in it were also included in issue number 4.

Major articles in Southern Africa are indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS). Southern Africa is also indexed in the Alternative Press Index and is available on microfilm from University Microfilms.

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In sharp contrast is Schmidt's contention—that "apartheid is not simply a matter of racial discrimination. It is an economic system, legitimized by law and enforced by a powerful police state. Its primary purpose is to concentrate the nation's wealth and power in the hands of a white minority."

Where Myers views apartheid simply as a set of discriminatory racial policies, Schmidt sees it as a system of white political and economic privilege based on the oppression of the Black majority. For Schmidt, reform of particular discriminatory practices—such as the integration of toilet facilities or even factory floors—do not in any meaningful way undermine apartheid. In fact they may strengthen the apartheid system by ensuring the continued economic participation of foreign investors.

Implicit to Myers' view is the idea that discriminatory racial policies can be reformed within the existing political and economic structures of South Africa. In Schmidt's view discriminatory racial policies are a consequence of a fundamentally unjust economic and political order that can only be "reformed" through the total reorganization of South African society. Thus, while Myers concludes that whatever improvements are offered by Sullivan principle signatories are significant, Schmidt maintains such improvements are inconsequential given that they leave the basic structure of the apartheid system intact.

Black Opinion

The single most distressing aspect of Myers' work is that he fails to take seriously the views of those most affected by the continued presence of US corporations in South Africa—the Black majority. The short section Myers devotes to this crucial topic is disgraceful. Myers not only fails to adopt the strong position taken by the Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress against foreign investment, but also fails to note that it was the Black leadership inside the country that initially launched the campaign for the economic boycott of South Africa. Myers chooses—often not to cite the opinion of leaders like Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli or Ntato Motlama, formerly chairman of the Soweto Committee of Ten. And when he does cite important leaders like Steve Biko, he chooses ambiguous passages rather than those in which Biko clearly calls for an end to foreign investment.

Schmidt, on the other hand, takes seriously the appeals by Black South Africans for an end to foreign investment. She not only cites the views of some important Black South African leaders but also the views of Black American leaders, whose opinions are so often neglected.

Decoding Corporate Camouflage is essential reading for activists. The Sullivan principles are a clever and often all too effective ploy by US corporations to undercut demands for divestment. Schmidt's rigorous yet readable refutation of the principles is most welcome.

US Business in South Africa is, from the viewpoint of activists, a seriously flawed book which nevertheless contains a lot of detailed information not readily available elsewhere. Myers covers subjects not addressed by Schmidt-for
instance, government and business views towards sanctions. His work must, however, be approached critically. Mark Beittelf

South African Raid

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apartheid policies of the regime in Pretoria, leave South Africa and seek refuge in Mozambique.

Pattern of Aggression

The ease with which a South African armored column was able to penetrate Mozambican territory and withdraw relatively unhindered also raised questions about the effectiveness and loyalty of the Mozambican army (FPLM) command. Incredibly, news of the incursion failed to reach army headquarters until hours after the raiders returned to South Africa.

At a rally on February 15, Mozambican President Samora Machel put eight FPLM officers on public display, declaring that they would soon go before a military tribunal for their complicity in the January 30 raid. Along with Lieutenant Colonel Jossias Diacama, the head of the army's armored car division, the commander and deputy commander of Matola's guard force and five captains will be put on trial on the charges of treason and spying. Machel also announced that South African troops had invaded Pafuri, a small settlement where the Mozambican border meets South Africa and Zimbabwe. He reported that FPLM units drove off the attackers after inflicting heavy casualties.

The Mozambican president also warned that South African aggression was being escalated from more than a dozen new air and army bases now being established in northern Transvaal province.

Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe also strongly condemned South Africa's "unprovoked naked act of aggression" against Mozambique and fitted the raid into a larger strategy of regional destabilization. In his strongest attack on South Africa to date, Mugabe denounced the "murders committed by the bandits of the apartheid regime," and cited a litany of South African aggressions against the front line states. He included South Africa's support for anti-government MNR guerrillas in Mozambique; "the recent sabotage acts in our barracks by former Selous Scouts elements"; the promotion of the recent attempted coup d'etat in Zambia; the unprovoked attacks in Kazangula in Botswana; "and the continuing incursions into Angola by South African troops.

South African agents are also suspected of involvement in the bombing of a lawyer in Lesotho known to be close to ANC members living in that country.

Significantly, the Matola raid is the first time South Africa has openly attacked a neighboring country in force, in response to guerrilla activity within its own borders. It is not likely to be the last.

Zambia

Continued from page 8

Because of the lack of political connections among the population, the situation is open to "intervention by a well-organized group-such as the military," says one observer.
Fifteen thousand strong, the army is thought to be increasingly disaffected, in part because of their limited role during the Zimbabwe war. The army has, up to this point, remained firmly committed to Kaunda and the military had remained an unknown factor in Zambia. Nevertheless 'Kaunda has, in the view of one expert, "kept the military quiescent by sharing some political power and keeping them well-supplied with toys, like Soviet MIG fighters. But it may not last." El subscribe to Southern Africa MARCH-APRIL 1981/SOUTHERN AFRICA 25

Zimbabwe
Continued from page 9
blems posed by the former guerrilla forces, slow progress in Zimbabwe's land resettlement program is currently frustrating many government plans. Enos Nkala, minister of finance, publicly pinpointed Britain's meager aid policy toward Zimbabwe and Western financial support in general as a major impediment to purchasing white-owned land for distribution to rural Black families, in a January 30 speech in the House of Assembly.

Under the present aid arrangement, Britain will provide $165 million over three years-$103 million in grants and $62 million in loans. Nkala, however, attacked the arrangement. "It was understood by us that this support would be in grant form" and, the minister continued, "Either they take all of this money and get out of here or they give us all." Nkala's angry statement does not represent government policy, but it does indicate the extent of official unhappiness with US and British aid.

Zimbabwe's officials also stated that British aid for land reform fell far short of figures quoted during the Lancaster House talks. "Let it not be said that this amount is anywhere close to what we anticipated," said Mugabe, adding, "It is far from adequate."

The current British aid package allocates $44 million for land purchases, and is sufficient to resettle only 18,232 families out of the 700,000 targeted at the Lancaster discussions. Mugabe has cautioned London and the other Western parties to the Lancaster accords that only their original pledges of over one billion dollars toward resettlement persuaded ZANU and ZAPU to accept constitutional provisions restricting the nationalization and re-distribution of white-owned land. Whether the West honors these pledges will be seen at the March 23-28 donors conference, where they will have "one last opportunity" to show good faith, according to Nkala.

Fulfilling its promise of an impartial press, the Zimbabwean government named the first board of trustees for the newly created Mass Media Trust on January 30. The trustees include a lawyer, a doctor, a businessman, and the wife of a former prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. Under the Trust, the government will hold 40 percent of Zimbabwe's five major newspapers, removing distorting influences prevalent under the former South African ownership and replacing current editors by journalists knowledgeable in African nationalist politics. Media criticism of the government will be allowed under the Trust.
Guinea-Bissau
Continued from page 5
head of the ministry for veterans, Gallaghe said, Correia was "looking desperately fo a way to keep people and not lose the energy. He wanted the army to be very ac tive in setting up cooperatives and trainin programs."
Now with the war-time military leadet heading the government, the true test of th army as a political force will come. But th answer may take a while. "If the arm represents the peasants as a class, Gallagher speculated, "it's not clear wht level of class consciousness it represent! Most of the people I spoke with are n( theoreticians who could explain it to me i response to the questions a gringo woul ask. And they're still faced with the sarn situation of economic dependency and growing bureaucracy."
The challenge is'definitely there-an at ticipated shortfall of 70,000 tons of rio dependence on foreign aid for 75 percent the budget, the withering effects of ti Sahelian drought, and the political ar diplomatic repercussions of the coup. final verdict on the coup will have con from the people themselves, through the response to the call to rise and meet th. challenge. A.M.I

South Africa White Rule/Black Revolt
Ernest Harsch
This is the story of South Africa's Black majority-from Dutch colonialism to the apartheid regime; from the early Khoikhoi and San struggles to defend their lands, to the Soweto rebellions of 1976 and beyond. This book examines the organizations and movements that have arisen in the struggle-the African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, Black Consciousness movement, Black student and labor movements, and others. Harsch traces the development of the racist system of apart- heid-how the white rulers established a state based on the class and national oppression of the Black majority; and how the industrialization of the country has given birth to a Black working class with the power to shake apartheid, and South African capitalism, to its foundations.
352 pages plus 16 pages of photographs; includes maps, bibliography, and index; $6.95.
Pathfinder Press 410 West St., New York, NY 10014 (include $.75 for postage and handling.)

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Publications Received Closing Date: 2/10
Southern Africa & General


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don: Heinemann Educational Books (P.O. Box 978, Edison, NJ 08817), 1979. 160pp.$7.50 pb. Note: Covers the lives of nine important Eighteenth and Nineteenth century African leaders.

Angola

South Africa


First Special Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid by Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations. UN Document A/35/22/Add. 1. New York: United Nations (available from UN Publications, address above), 1980. 82pp. No price listed. Note: This is a mimeographed version of this report and will be issued in printed form in Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Fifth Session, Supplement No. 22A.


Zambia
Thoughts In A Train
For Black South African writers, creative writing is an integral part of the struggle against apartheid. Black journalists have declared themselves "militants and activists" while Black writers in South Africa are demanding that Black literature identify with the struggles of the oppressed.

Despite continual harassment by the state, the publishers of Staffrider magazine along with Ravan Press recently produced an important collection of writings titled Forced Landing: Africa South: Contemporary Writings, edited by Mothobi Mutloatse. Forced Landing was banned shortly after its publication last year and Southern Africa was fortunate to receive a copy.

Forced Landing is, above all else, South Africans writing about themselves and, as such is an important part of contemporary Soiti Africa. We reprint here one of the many excellent stories from this collection.

By Mango Tshabangu

danger nor pattern. Fear of snarling policemen was out for the two young Black boys. Nevertheless, this overwhelming fear th

When we ride these things which cannot take us all, there is no like of which they'd never known was always around thei doubt as to our inventiveness. We stand inside in grotesque posi- whenever they walked through the rich suburbs of Johannesburg-one foot in the air, our bodies twisted away from arms squeeze-

They could not even talk about it. Somehow, they were sure theing through other twisted bodies to find support somewhere, both had this strange fear.

Sometimes it is another person's shoulder, but it is stupid to complain. There was a time when they impulsively stood right in the middle so nobody does. It's as if some invisible sardine packer has been at of a street. They had hoped to break this fear the like of which work. We remain in that position for forty minutes or forty days. How they'd never known. But the attempt only lasted a few seconds an far is Soweto from Johannesburg? It is forty minutes or forty days. that was too short to be of any help. They both scurried off, hatir No-one knows exactly.

themselves for lack of courage. They never spoke of it.

We remain in that position, our bodies sweating out the unfreedom. In search of the truth, Msongi became very observant. He'd bee of our souls, anticipating happiness in that unhappy architectural noticing the shut windows of their train every time he and Gezaj shame-the ghetto. Our eyes dart apprehensively, on the lookout for happened to be in ours. On this day, it was a week since Msongi's argument was that the fee test their insane conditions. For, indeed, if we were not scared of moral was in the surroundings and Qt in them. The place was full of fear ridicule we would regard crime as a form of protest. Is not a man with Vicious fear which, although imprisoned in stone walls
and ele a hungry stomach in the same position as a man whose land has been
trifled fences, swelled over and poured into the streets to oppre taken away from
him? What if he is a victim of both! even the occasional passer-by.
Msongi and Gezani were mere
We remain in that position for forty minutes or forty days. No-one walking
through this fear. It was like walking in darkness and fee knows exactly. We, the
young, cling perilously to the outside of the ing the darkness all around you. That
does not mean you a coach walls. It sends the guts racing to the throat, yes, but to
us it is darkness yourself. As soon as you come to a lit spot, the feeling bravery.
We are not a helpless gutless lot whose lives have been pat- darkness dies, Why,
as soon as they hit town proper, and mixt terned by suffering. Tile more daring
among us dance like gods of fate with the people, the fear the like of which
they'd never knoy on the rooftop. Sometimes there is death by electrocution but
then it is disappeared. No, Msongi was convinced it was not they who hi just hard
luck. . . He was a good man, Bayekile. It is not his fault fear. Fear flowed from
somewhere, besmirching every part that he did not five to face a stray bullet.
them, leaving their souls trembling; but it was not they whose
We remain in that position of forty minutes 6r toriy days. No- afraid.
one knows exactly. They did not have stone walls or
electrified fences in Sowet
We move parallel to or hurtle past their trains. Most often my im- They were not
scared of their gold rings being snatched for th pression is that is it they who
cruise past our hurttling train. Theirs is had none. They were not worried about
their sisters being peeped almost always empty. They'll sit comfortably on seats
made for that for their sisters could look after themselves. Oh, those diamoi
purpose and keep their windows shut, even on hot days. And they sit toothpicks
could disappear you know ... Those too, they did n there in their train witching us
as one watches a play from a private have. They were not afraid of bleeding, for
their streets ran r box. We also stare back at them, but the sullen faces don’t
interest us already. On this day Msongi stared at the shut windows. He look
much. Only the shut windows move our thinking, at the pale sullen
white faces and he knew why.
On this day it was Msongi and Oezani who were most interested He felt
tempted to throw something at them. Anything,’ in the shut windows. You see,
ever since they’d discovered empty cigarette box, an orange peel, even a piece
of paper; just
Houghton golf course to be offering better tips in the caddy prove a point. At
that moment, and as if instructed by Msor
* business, Msongi and Gezani found themselves walking through himself,
someone threw an empty beer bottle at the other train the rich suburbs of
Johannesburg. Their experience was a strange The confusion: they ran around
climbing onto seats. Th one. There was something eerie in toe surroundings. They
always jumped into the air. They knocked against one another as th had fear, the
like of which they’d never known. Surely it was not scrambled for the doors and
windows. The already pale faces h because of the numerous policemen who
patrolled the streets and no colour to change into. They could only be distorted as
fear snarled in unison with their dogs at Black boys moving through capable of doing that as well. The shut windows were shattered those gracious thoroughfares. wide open, as if to say danger cannot be imprisoned. The trio Msongi and Gezani were young no doubt, but this writer has passed swiftly by, disappearing with the drama of the fear the writer already said that bravery born of suffering knows no age nor of which Msongi and Gezani had never known.

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The Compleat Divestors' Guide
Elizabeth Schmidt's Decoding Corporate Camouflage and Desiax Myers' US Business in South Africa, offer two strikingly different approaches to their analysis of the role of US business in South Africa. Decoding Corporate Camouflage is a concise critical treatment of the Sullivan principles. Schmidt's book, published by the progressive Institute for Policy Studies, offers both a good introduction to the principles for the uninitiated and a concise discription of the role of US corporations in support of apartheid, for the well-versed activist. US Business in South Africa, in contrast to Schmidt's book, is a lengthy, densely written treatment of the 'subject. Myers' work is based on research conducted under the auspices of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, a non-profit organization set-up to monitor the operations of US corporations for institutional investors. This book covers much more than the Sullivan principles, but does so with much less focus or clarity than Schmidt's work. Schmidt's book is of particular interest to activists whose calls for divestment have been met by arguments from corporate and institutional representatives who, while conceding that apartheid is abhorrent, go on to say, "We believe the best approach is for US corporations to remain in South Africa and promote the end of discriminatory practices through the adoption of the Sullivan principles." Myers' book, on the other hand, will be heralded by many as "the objective study" of US business in South Africa. It is important that this myth of objectivity not be left unchallenged by activists. Sullivan Principles Schmidt develops her criticisms of the Sullivan principles along two lines. First, she examines the principles on a point-by-point basis. Companies have failed to make significant progress, Schmidt finds, even in those limited areas which they, as signatories, have agreed to improve. Second, and more importantly, she persuasively argues that the principles were adopted by the corporations as a strategy to "mollify their critics at home and continue to do a profitable business in South Africa. Schmidt
concludes her study by answering institutional and corporate representatives who argue in favor of the Sullivan's principles. As long as Blacks are denied citizenship and economic justice, she argues, "employment reforms will remain a sham."

Myers, by comparison, offers such insights as: "Despite Sullivan's desire that companies not use the principles as protection against criticism, there is little doubt that this was at least somewhat on the minds of several of the signers."

Covering much the same material as Schmidt, but relying more heavily on management's accounts of its own achievements, Myers concludes that "response to the codes is measurable and sometimes' impressive. A number of signers have taken tangible and often dramatic steps toward improving opportunities for black workers." 'While drawing no explicit conclusions, the information Myers offers certainly argues that the Sullivan principles, while a moderate step, are a move towards significant change.

Continued on page 25

Towards Socialism in Tanzania
EDITED BY BISMARCK MWANSASU AND CRANFORD PRATT
Written by both Tanzanian and non-Tanzanian scholars, the essays in this volume assess the success of the country's transition to socialism. The book, which includes vigorous statements from both Marxist and non-Marxist viewpoints, provides unique access to the fundamental issues of debate on Tanzania's future. '. . compelling and rewarding reading. Pratt's concluding chapter offers an excellent analytical summary of the problems and progress Tanzania has experienced ... his review of the theoretical and ideological considerations of the debate succinctly identifies the practical realities which Tanzania faces.' Choice

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MARCH-APRIL 1981/SOUTHERN AFRICA 29'

The Student Movement:
An Assessment
W_$-TnjaI
LIL I
by Josh Nessen

US student opposition to apartheid has a history going back to the early 1960s. In one of its first actions, SDS sat'in at the Chase Manhattan Bank to protest that bank's loans to the racist state and in the sixties' there were anti-apartheid demonstrations at Cornell, Princeton, Harvard and other universities. As the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau escalated in the early 1970s, there were massive demonstrations in support of the liberation movements, notably 50,000 people at the first African Liberation Day in 1972. Opposition to covert US military intervention in Angola was also building in 1975 following South Africa's US supported invasion.
The real spark for the US student movement, however, was the Soweto uprising of 1976 when hundreds of students faced up to the guns of the apartheid regime and the liberation struggle inside South Africa took a major step forward. Throughout the school year 1976-77 numerous student groups formed and began calling for divestment of their school's corporate stocks linked to South Africa. In that year, the successful occupation at Hampshire College and the sit-in at Stanford University were catalysts to the spread of the movement to dozens of campuses throughout the country. Though protest activity and regional coordination is not at the level it was several years ago, there is still a significant campus base and new groups are in formation.

* An Assessment
Recent developments in both southern Africa and the US make it imperative that we clarify our goals, our "successes," and our shortcomings. Through this assessment we can determine how to further advance our work. As a starting point in this assessment I will try to examine the extent to which the student movement has succeeded in achieving its goals.

To what degree have we forced corporate withdrawal from South Africa and curtailment of bank loans?

* Partial or total stock divestment at nearly two dozen schools plus mass student pressure at many others has had concrete effects. Corporations such as Polaroid and, most recently ITT, have curtailed operations in South Africa. Since 1979, US corporations have withdrawn nearly $56 million in direct investment from South Africa, a figure almost equal to the amount of new US investment over the same period. The rising liberation struggle is the main cause of the pull-out, but corporate executives have also cited the domestic pressure from activist groups.

For a full report on student activities, a newsletter is available from:
Student Coordinator
American Committee on Africa
198 Broadway
New York, NY 10038

Has the student movement helped to rejuvenate the student Left in this country?
The process of organizing against apartheid has been part of renewed student activism on many fronts. Our work is increasingly being linked with the struggle against institutionalized racism on campus, and the white supremacist backlash now sweeping the country. At the University of Tennessee the struggle against racism has always been linked to liberation support work. Last spring eighteen Black students were arrested by riot-equipped police following a building takeover. The takeover was in protest of an Administration attempt to depoliticize the Black Cultural center which had been a center of anti-apartheid and anti-racist organizing.

The anti-apartheid movement has also sought to strengthen its ties to the the two issues drawing student support, the antinuclear and anti-draft movements. Common programs have developed not only around demands for divestments of South African, military and nuclear related stocks, but in opposition to the
Western purchase of Namibian and South African uranium for weapons and nuclear power fuel, and against military intervention in Angola and South Africa. In sum, the student anti-apartheid movement has had some success in achieving its goals, in part because of its increasing political development; students viewing stock divestment not as an end in itself, but as one means to support the liberation struggle in southern Africa. As the examples cited above show, organizers have consciously attempted to link anti-apartheid work to other issues vital to students and the wider community.

The student movement has also helped create pressure to hamper direct bank loans to South Africa. Of course this has not been the outcome of campus work alone, but has involved joint efforts with community and other groups. Last year in Boston, for example, activists from Dartmouth and other schools participated in several demonstrations against the First National Bank of Boston with a community-based coalition, that included anti-nuclear groups.

How has the student movement helped to curtail US government intervention in southern Africa and helped to build support for the liberation movements? Pressure from student groups, among others, was at least partially responsible for the maintenance of sanctions against Rhodesia and, through a variety of methods, students have also raised material support for the liberation movements. The Princeton People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa, for example, holds annual "runs for liberation" in which students pledge money to runners who then run up to 22 miles. These events have featured liberation movement speakers and, over the last two years, have raised $8,600.

State and local legislative actions have also been of importance for student activists, and over twenty initiatives for divestment have been launched with student backing. Most recently, the Michigan state assembly passed a divestment bill that had been supported by students in some of the state-run universities.

To what extent has the student movement helped delegitimize corporate power in this country, especially on campus? Successful divestment actions, as well as the process of building campus support, have undermined corporate claims of blamelessness while bringing the issue of corporate complicity in apartheid to millions of Americans.

Student actions have been directed at a key ideological pillar of US capitalism, the university, controlled by the same white male elite that runs corporate America.
leaflets exposed the head of the Board of Trustees, as the chairman of a holding company deeply involved in South African lending. The effect of such leaflets, demonstrations, educational forums, and sit-ins has been to unmask power relations within the university and put its representatives on the defensive.

A testament to the seriousness of this challenge is the amount of time and money that university, corporate, and South African officials have devoted to dealing with the student movement.

Student actions, notably at Harvard, have successfully countered this counterliberation strategy. When Helen Suzman, a white South African member of parliament, appeared on campus recently, she was consistently hounded by the Harvard anti-apartheid committee and exiled Black South Africans.

Looking Ahead

Of course it is important to acknowledge that the movement has its weaknesses. Most anti-apartheid committees did not initially deal directly with racism on campus, and not all are doing so now. As a result, unity with Black student groups is not what it could be.

In addition, it took several years for an explicit position in support of armed liberation movements to be generalized in the divestment movement. Some organizers argued that explicit political support of liberation movements would alienate potential supporters. Another reason was the liberalism of many campus activists themselves. Though ideologically the proMpm has been largely overcome, in practice WtDents need to increase their political and material support for the liberation struggle.

Besides these political shortcomings, the movement has had to continually deal with the built-in obstacles of student turnover and trustee refusals to divest.

Nevertheless, the movements political development and events in southern Africa help explain its ability to maintain a strong campus base, despite the lack of formal regional structures. In addition painstaking basic education work by activists and several national tours of southern African militants have helped maintain campus consciousness.

National Tours

The student movement has been bolstered by a number of national tours by South African and Namibian militants.

For the last two years, Dumisani Kumalo—an exiled South African journalist—has spoken on numerous campuses and played an important role in state legislative actions. Tozamile Botha, a Black South African trade unionist who led a major strike against the Ford Motor company also toured the US and Canada last fall. Botha appeared at over 25 campuses; and his account of protest activity in South
Africa and the denunciation of the Sullivan code was a boon to campus organizers. Complementing these tours was that of Ellen Musialela of SWAPO who built widespread support for SWAPO at a critical time in the Namibian struggle. A regular student newsletter and organizing conferences held last spring have helped maintain cohesion in the student movement. These conferences, held at Western Michigan University and Columbia University focused on ways of linking antiapartheid work to other struggles. Of course, the continued viability of the movement will depend on the ability of grassroots committees to link up to other progressive student and community groups while raising their own demands. Only by dealing with racism and other daily concerns will the anti-apartheid movement be able to mobilize enough support to counter South Africa's well financed propaganda effort, and serve as an effective voice against apartheid. 

SOUTH AFRICA'S RIOT POLICE were sent to the Black township of Gugulethu on March 3 scattering Black children who were demonstrating to protest the re-arrest of two student leaders involved in last year's school boycotts. Shortly afterwards in nearby Capetown, 300 chanting Blacks protested with fists raised outside the Supreme Court where the trial of eighteen people allegedly involved in last year's protest in Cape province opened that day. In addition to the school boycott, the Cape was also the scene of a long bus boycott and several militant strikes. Student representatives Oupa Lehulere and Kent Mkalipi were the subjects of the protests by the Black children in Gugulethu. After being detained for months without trial, they were finally acquitted in February, only to be detained again. Black students called off their class boycott at the beginning of this year only after authorities agreed to free student leaders by early March.

More than two hundred delegates of the Azanian People's Organization (Azapo) gathered at the Stein Lutheran Center near Pietersburg, on January 24 and 25 to discuss the goals, ideology, and leadership of the three-year-old Black consciousness organization. The occasion was Azapo's third annual congress and, by the time delegates went home, they had replaced the officers of the organization, created seven new secretariats, and approved a number of documents dealing with Azapo's stance on education. The principle focus of the conference, however, was a discussion on whether there was a place for whites in the liberation struggle. The Azapo delegates ended by unanimously reaffirming Azapo's opposition to the inclusion of whites-or, multiracialism-in the Black liberation struggle. Azapo, one of the few legal Black political groups in South Africa, was formed in 1978 in the wake of a large scale government crack-down on Black consciousness groups in late 1977. From its inception the organization has defined the unconditional transfer of land from the white regime in power to its indigenous owners as a central focus. By the time Azapo held its inaugural
conference in 1979, however, the organization had accepted the assumption that the Black liberation struggle is also a race-class struggle with Blacks being oppressed as a class and that workers had a central role to play in this struggle. The late January conference elected 28-year-old Khehla Mthembu the new president, and replaced most of the other elected officials. The election of virtually all new officials, according to Mthembu, is aimed at "preventing leadership from becoming an institution and preventing bureaucracy on all levels."

According to Andrew Lukele, a representative of the newly formed Black Consciousness Movement in Exile, the main topic of debate during the two day conference was over the inclusion of whites in the Black liberation struggle. At the end of the conference the delegates reaffirmed Azapo's stance in opposition to the inclusion of whites. According to press reports, later confirmed by Lukele, the delegates also discussed the concepts of race and class and the role of the Black worker in the liberation struggle.

In the past Azapo members have generally agreed on two basic points—that the struggle for land repossession is an overriding factor, and that there is no place for whites in the Black liberation struggle. Having reaffirmed Azapo's stance against multiracialism, delegates did go on to discuss whether Azapo should accept an analysis of society that was based upon race-defined class divisions in society. Some delegates initially opposed the use of terms such as class, arguing according to the Rand Daily Mail, that such terms represented a "foreign ideology" and that Black Africans should develop their own terms to define their struggle. The conference ended the discussion eventually by agreeing that the South African struggle was a class struggle in which, according to Lukele, class was defined by race.

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The discussion of class and race also led to a debate over what role Black workers should take in Azapo. Some delegates felt that, given Azapo's stance on the race/class issue, the organization's leadership should be made up primarily of working class Blacks. Others felt, however, that it was not necessary to explicitly state that Azapo's leadership be working class.

The debates over multiracialism, race class distinctions, and the role of works class Blacks in the organization are all indications of Azapo's increasing conception of development—or interpretation—an ideology which, until now, has been loosely defined as "Black Consciousness. The central question in this discussion what type of ideology Black consciousness provides for the liberation of Black Sou Africins.

ZIMBABWE'S "COMMUNII"
schools," originally intended to maintain the newly independent nation's separate white-on schools, have been scrapped by educator, minister Dzingai Mutumbuka. Only months before the "internal settlement" elections were held in April 1979, the white minority government sold a total 41 primary and eight secondary school campuses to white parents associations at fraction of their actual value. The purchaser paid for upkeep on the buildings by charging fees, thereby effectively barring Bla
But the bulk of the expenses for the "private" schools continued to be financed out of public coffers— including teacher salaries and special program grants. Mutumbuka announced that the original purchase price of the schools would be repaid to parents, and the facilities return to the state system under the government "education for all" program.

Opening a conference on education Salisbury in February, Mutumbuka criticized the "immoral" gap between the excellent schooling provided the children of white commercial farmers and miners, and that for Black children, many of who "never saw the doors of school."

Correction
The article entitled "The Shooting Wa in our January-February 1981 issue list the SWA Territorial Force (in Namibia) having a strength of 8,000 people. We have since learned from the London-based Committee on South African War Resistor that this figure is not accurate. The January 1981 publication "The Sot African Military Occupation of Namibia quotes a Windhoek Observer article September 8, 1980 as saying that the SM Territorial Force's strength is 20,000 troops.

Primary school enrollment topped one million in 1980, and the government expects that figure to double by the end of the decade. State planners hope to build 500 new schools in the countryside over the next five years, and graduate three thousand teachers each year to staff them. Adult education for the nation's estimated 1.6 million illiterate farm and factory workers is also being expanded.

Land redistribution, a major goal of Zimbabwe's pre-independence freedom movement and Prime Minister Mugabe's current government, is now threatened by lack of funds promised by the West. While the government is instituting three different types of agricultural development programs on Tribal Trust Lands, such lands make up less than half the available land in Zimbabwe. Any redistribution program that is to provide for the thousands of landless Zimbabwean families depends on the purchase of white-owned farms. To compensate the present owners under the Lancaster Constitution requires millions of dollars in aid which the government was promised but has yet to receive. Zimbabwe's first economic development plan, to be unveiled at the upcoming international donor's conference, underscores the importance of the land purchase program. According to Bernard Chidzero Zimbabwe's minister of economic planning, most of the nearly $2 billion to be sought at the conference would be directed into rural development schemes "as a matter of urgency." "Failure by the international community to act on that question [of land redistribution] would be a failure of the conference itself," he warned.
In a New Year’s eve radio address, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe noted Britain's failure to provide financial assistance that would allow his government to purchase the land that has, since the beginning of the colonial period, been exclusively in European hands. "While land is abundantly available," the Prime Minister said, "no funds are readily available for purchasing it. We have brought this predicament to the notice of Britain as a warning that we cannot, as a people's government, accept our lack of funds as a permanent impediment to our right to acquire land."

Some observers, especially those in London, took the Prime Minister's statement as a signal that if the Thatcher government is not forthcoming with the needed aid, Mugabe will seek to amend the constitution so that compensation will not be required for lands seized by the government. If that is the case, then the donor conference, slated to take place in Salisbury in late March, is probably the last chance that Britain and other Western countries will have to provide Zimbabwe with the originally promised funding that will make a continuation of compensation possible.

BLACK NAMIBIANS SUFFER from a high incidence of disease and poor health which, according to a recent study by the German Development Institute, is inextricably bound to South Africa's apartheid policies. Most health problems facing Namibia's Black majority are related to poverty and are a direct result of racial discrimination, urban segregation and a general lack of health facilities for Africans. While acknowledging that statistical information illustrating health conditions is difficult to come by, since South Africa does not cooperate with the World Health Organization, the study was able to outline some of Namibia's most significant and serious health problems. German researchers discovered, for example, that Black Namibians are ten times as likely to contract tuberculosis as whites in the territory. In fact, TB has assumed "alarming proportions" among Black Namibians. According to the report, it is a "typical poor-man's disease" exacerbated by malnutrition, crowded living conditions and lack of treatment facilities. Researchers also point to the prevailing system of migrant labor as part of the explanation for the high TB incidence rate.

Migrant laborers who contract TB while working in "white areas" are forced to return to the bantustans where they are cut off from adequate health care facilities as they simultaneously spread the infection further. The spread of venereal disease, another growing problem, is closely linked to the migrant labor system as well.

The report also found that the present Black infant mortality rate is seven to eight times higher than that for whites. A major contributing factor to this is a common practice by white employers which prevents Black domestic servants from
bringing their families with them to the white urban areas where they work. The children are forced to live with relatives or friends in the rural areas, where they must survive in crowded living conditions that offer little food, shelter or clothing. The most prominent and debilitating addictive disease cited in the report, however, is alcoholism. Alcohol consumption is directly promoted by the South African regime and some workers even receive payment for their labor in alcohol.

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Hospital facilities for whites, Blacks, and "coloreds", as in South Africa, are completely separate. In 1978, there were between 5.5 and 7.5 hospital beds per thousand Blacks and between 9.6 and 9.8 beds per thousand whites according to the report. In addition, less than 20 percent of all doctors practice in the bantustans and the few health posts that do exist in the rural areas are mostly run by churches.

The Institute, in summarizing its assessment of public health in Namibia, grimly concluded that the health situation for the Black majority is not only stagnant at present, but is even worsening in many areas.

At least part of the reason for the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa is not strategic, but economic. The country's vast reserves of natural resources are the backbone of an economy that is growing by leaps and bounds—and whose rewards are going to South Africa.

Recently released economic figures for Namibia, even after accounting for inflation, show a tripling of Gross Domestic Product since 1970. The GDP grew to approximately $1.4 billion in 1979 (the figure for 1970 was $417 million). These figures do not include the economy of the port city of Walvis Bay because of South African claims that the port area is an integral part of the Republic.

Of the Gross Domestic Product, 49 percent is the result of mining, while almost another 10 percent comes from agriculture, forestry and fishing. A large part of the mining industry's contribution to GDP comes from Rio Tinto-Zinc's Rossing uranium mine which is now producing 4,700 tons of uranium oxide, with annual sales estimated at $364 million. The mining industry as a whole provides two-thirds of Namibia's total exports by value and fifty percent of the South African backed government's revenue.

Mining, agriculture, forestry, and fishing combined, are all based on the extraction and sale of the country's irreplaceable resources, and together account for almost three-fifths of the total economic production. Manufacturing, which accounts for as much as seventy percent of Gross National Product in some of the world's major industrialized countries, and almost a quarter of the GNP of South Africa, is only responsible for five percent of the Namibian total. As a result, with an economy that is based on the exploitation of finite natural resources and a minimally developed manufacturing sector, Namibia is paying not just politically, but economically for every delay in its independence.