ASPECTS OF URBAN CHANGE IN WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA,

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DURING THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE.
DAVID SIMON
Linacre College, Oxford.
Thesis submitted to the University
of Oxford for the degree of
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January 1983.

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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on contemporary urban change in the capital city of Namibia during the decolonization period. While primarily geographical, analysis is broadly based within the social sciences, employing techniques ranging from archival search and newspaper content analysis to participant observation, sample surveys, and computer analysis.

The central aims are to determine, analyze and evaluate changes contingent on the political developments implied by decolonization. These are approached through the existing literature on Third World and colonial urbanization, urban form and post-colonial development. By virtue of size, structure and functions, the colonial capital city is an appropriate subject for analysis of politico-economic, social and spatial changes, since many of the characteristic structural tensions manifest themselves most clearly here. The transition period is distinguished as having commenced with the installation of an Administrator-General in Windhoek in September 1977.

Original methodologies are derived for identifying appropriate research foci, which are then pursued in turn. Major topics covered include the position of Windhoek as local authority within the reorganized government structure; mobility after desegregation of residential areas; the housing situation, including attempts to adapt policy to new circumstances and remove apartheid symbols like the contract workers' hostel; the urban economy — including trade patterns, employment conditions, unemployment and the 'informal' sector; and access to education, health and public amenities.
A final chapter synthesizes the various issues, evaluates their overall significance and offers prospects into independence. In most spheres there has been mainly cosmetic or incremental, rather than significant structural or attitudinal, change. Existing political structures are inimical to this end, although a number of legislative measures do have potential for important longer term change. Experiences elsewhere suggest that the new post-colonial order may not be as radically different, at least in the city, as anticipated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis could not have been successfully completed without the goodwill and assistance of numerous people, all of which is gratefully acknowledged. My studies in Oxford were made possible by the award of a Rhodes Scholarship; Ron Davies set my sights on Windhoek and provided fieldwork funds by asking me to join his HSRC-sponsored research project into contemporary urban change in Harare and Windhoek; while Linacre College and the Oxford University Graduate Studies Board, assisted with travel expenses. Countless people of all persuasions in Windhoek gave of their time and knowledge: businessmen, officials, politicians and members of the public. The Municipality, especially the Town Planners under Arthur Clayton and Barry Watson, provided facilities, free access to normally inaccessible material and willingly endured endless questioning and interrogation. Werner Claassen undertook the 'informal sector' interviews thoroughly, and Kenneth Abrahams investigated alcoholism among his patients.
In Oxford, my thanks to Paul Griffiths, Glynis Edwards and Clive Payne of the Computing Service, and technical and secretarial staff in the School of Geography, notably Peter Masters, Jack Landon, Julie Prowse and Sheila O'Clarey, for forebearance, advice and assistance. Margaret Loveless drew Figures 1.2 and 1.3; Jayne Lewin Figure 6.9. Peter Webster typed the final product on the word processor, and Edward Wates helped proofread. David Browning, Colin Clarke, Gillian Cook, Hugh Corder, Ceri Peach and Max Price commented helpfully on parts of the draft. The analysis and remaining faults are my own.
My greatest debts are three: to John House, my supervisor, for time invested, thoughtful reflection and advice, and prompt and incisive comments on draft chapters; to my parents, Ruth and Wolfgang, for a lifetime of support and encouragement; and especially to Sheryl, for everything since joining hands, perhaps unwisely, with a thesis-ridden student. This study is dedicated to all the people of Windhoek in the hope that it might contribute in some small way to a more thorough understanding of the past and present, and hence a better future.

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NOTES
1. Currency. During the German occupation (1884-1915) the Mark (M) was official currency; thereafter the South African Pound Sterling (L) and since South Africa became a Republic in 1961, the Rand (R); Ri = 100 cents. Namibia is part of the Rand monetary area, hence values in this study are generally given in Rand (fl = approximately R1.75 in 1980, but approximately R2.00 in 1982).
2. Numeric notation. Numbers are listed in groups of three digits, separated by a space, while decimal points are used. e.g. 1 789 365.12 is one million, seven hundred and eighty-nine thousand, three hundred and sixty-five, point one two.
3. Abbreviations of Names Commonly Used in the text
AG Administrator-General
CBD Central Business District
CPI Consumer Price Index
DTA Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
FM Financial Mail (Johannesburg)
FT Financial Times (London)
HNP Herstigte Nasionale Party
CHAPTER 1
THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT: COLONIAL SOCIETIES, CITIES AND PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION
1. INTRODUCTION
The political map of Africa has changed dramatically since World War II. For this continent, penetrated, colonized and exploited by European powers since the last century, has largely regained its independence. Opinion is polarized, however, on the structural impact of this traumatic process of change:
"Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder ...
the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature ... Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together - that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler - was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannon ... At whatever level we study it ... decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men. Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete and absolute substitution."
(Fanon 1967:27-28)
"In place of colonialism as the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside ... the rulers of neo-colonial States derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people, but from the support which they obtain from their neo-colonialist masters ... Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress."
(Nkrumah 1965:ix-xv)
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Both positions contain elements of truth, but generalization is difficult, since the experience of many countries lies somewhere between these two poles.
Indigenous (modernizing) elites have rarely succeeded in fundamental change, whatever their political platform. Even Tanzania's radical 'socialist transformation' has fallen foul of a new 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' class (Shivji 1976; Stren 1982). The existing international economic order and global power balance remain substantially unaltered, in a dominance-dependence relationship between the First and Third Worlds. Fanon's assertion about the suddenness and disorderliness of decolonization, based on his Algerian experiences, does apply elsewhere in Africa, most recently in Portugal's former 'overseas provinces' of Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique. But equally often, for example in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, there has been an important, fairly orderly and clearly definable transition period, yet one neglected by most researchers.

It is precisely on this period that the present study focuses. Namibia is the last non-sovereign territory in Africa apart from Western Sahara, thereby providing the final opportunity for detailed study of adaptation and change to the new circumstances implied by decolonization. These processes are analyzed here with particular reference to Windhoek, Namibia's capital city. The central objectives are thus to determine, analyze and evaluate urban change in Windhoek during the transition to independence. These are approached, in the first instance, through the extant theoretical and empirical literature on Third world and colonial urbanization, urban form and change. Original methodologies are derived for identifying appropriate research foci, which are then pursued in turn. The various themes are synthesized and evaluated collectively in the final chapter. Section 5 below sets out the thesis structure in more detail. The paragraphs which follow here attempt a concise exposition of the intellectual and practical context of this undertaking, suggesting, in particular, the appropriateness of a capital city as a tool for analyzing politico-economic, spatial and social changes during the decolonization process.

Cities are more than mere bricks and mortar. They are cultural artefacts par excellence, which thus simultaneously reflect and shape the values and norms of their builders and inhabitants. Colonial cities, being alien implants, have known origins and segregated spatial forms clearly indicative of the relationship between colonizers and colonized. They have been much studied in a variety of cultural milieux (e.g. Chapelier 1957; Larimore 1959; De Blij 1962, 1963, 1968; Schneider 1965; Halliman and Morgan 1967; McGee 1967; Southall 1967; Collins 1969; Davies 1969; Bellam 1970; Abu-Lughod 1971; Martin 1973; Clarke 1975; Fetter 1976; King 1976; Oram 1976; Kay and Smout 1977; Reed 1978). With a new post-independence order, the structure and function of post-colonial cities are certain to change, yet this has been little researched in detail (e.g. Vorlauffer 1970, 1973; Sada 1972; Tiwari 1972; Abu-Lughod 1975, 1976, 1980; Soja and Weaver 1976). Far less still is known about the short term impact of decolonization on individual cities (e.g. Mascarenhas 1966, 1967; La Fontaine 1970).
Capital cities are generally the largest, and have the most complex functional structure, being administrative, educational, cultural,

-commercial, military, religious, service and frequently industrial centres. Most importantly, they are by definition the national political centres and seats of government, making them 'transactional crossroads' between domestic and external relations (Gottmann 1977). While thus the most open to outside ideas and influences, paradoxically they most symbolize national, culture, values and aspirations. Changes in the social formation are thus likely to find their major and most rapid expression in the capital city, and it is for this reason that Windhoek was selected. This is a detailed and disaggregated study over the period 1977-1981/2, employing a variety of research techniques and methodologies. Continuous fieldwork, from mid-1980 to mid-1981, was intended to coincide with the United Nations-sponsored elections and independence, but repeated delays in the international negotiation process have perforce limited analysis to the transition period.

South West Africa (SWA) is the territory's colonial name. Except in official nomenclature and references to early colonial history, this study adheres to 'Namibia', the name which originated with the liberation movement and has now been almost universally accepted in anticipation of independence. Although the official title is currently South West Africa/Namibia (cf. Zimbabwe/Rhodesia during that country's transition period), government officials freely refer to 'Namibia' when abroad. Most whites inside the territory and South Africa (SA) still know it as 'South West' ('Suidwes' in Afrikaans; 'Sfidwest' in German).

In social scientific terms, Namibia is one of the least researched areas of Africa. Isolation, the lack of local higher educational institutions, political constraints on foreign researchers entering what the international community regards as South Africa's illegally occupied colony, deportation by South African authorities of critical churchmen and researchers, low priority attached to Namibia by most South African academics, restrictions by the authorities on divulgence of virtually any social, economic or financial statistics until very recently, the need for permits to enter urban townships and tribal reserves in the north, and in recent years the guerrilla war in that area, have all contributed to this situation. Only in the last three or four years, with official acceptance of the inevitability of independence, and transfer of much authority from Pretoria to the transitional government in Windhoek, have more data become available and restrictions been relaxed. A mounting volume of publications has appeared through the liberation movement, SWAPO, and sympathetic foreign aid or research institutions, in attempting to lay foundations for post-independence planning. By their very nature, however, these are based entirely on secondary sources or estimates and
there is a great need for empirical research. A further problem is the selectivity and (often implicit) political bias of much available material. This problem dates back to the earliest German and missionary records - even those of the accepted authorities like the historian, Heinrich Vedder, have increasingly been shown to contain numerous factual errors, distortions of source material, misrepresentation of hearsay as fact, and implicit racial or ethnocentric value-judgements (Kienetz 1975; Lau 1981). For this reason, detailed citation of sources is

provided here, and bibliographies, containing only works cited, appear after each chapter. They do not necessarily pretend to be exhaustive, but should facilitate the reader's task in view of the variety of fields covered in this study.

The described circumstances require a more detailed presentation of the context of this research than would otherwise be the case. This chapter concentrates on conceptual issues of Third World colonial urbanization and urban form. The literature is surveyed, theoretical perspectives defined and colonial cities distinguished as a separate type. It concludes with an exposition of the research methodologies employed, topics to be analyzed and structure of the thesis. This study aims to make a contribution, however slight, to these areas as well as to a greater understanding of the contemporary process of change in Windhoek itself. Underpinning this research are a number of key concepts, which therefore require elucidation.

2. DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS
(a) Colonization is understood to be a form of domination and exploitation of an area and its people by an alien group, involving permanent settlement by a significant number of the latter in the colony. Horvath (1969:73) usefully distinguishes it from 'imperialism', under which few, if any, settlers move permanently to the colony.

(b) Decolonization is the reverse process, of restoring political authority from the colonial state to indigenous leaders within the framework of state sovereignty. As Wasserman (1976:4) points out, this relates only to a formal transfer of authority, i.e. the capacity to legitimize political decisions, as distinct from political power, which is the ability to influence decisions. Nor does it say anything about political influence or popular social control of government. He further defines 'consensual decolonization' as that form containing a large measure of agreement among the participants that the outcome is to be independence.

While the South African authorities forced SWAPO, the major Namibian liberation movement, to launch an armed struggle in 1966 through their consistent denial of requests for independence, all the major parties to the dispute have accepted the ultimate goal of independence since 1977 (see Chapter 2). Although the guerrilla war continues, and has probably played an important direct or indirect role in changing the South African view, the protracted international negotiations are now deadlocked over how and when, rather than whether,
independence is to come about. An eventual solution is certain to be diplomatic rather than military, so the Namibian situation fits the consensual definition. A great preponderance of the literature focuses on the central role of nationalist movements in achieving decolonization, as implied also in the quotation by Fanon above. However, decolonization occurred rapidly and similarly in countries where nationalist movements differed widely in organization and development. Hence Wasserman (1976:1) suggests

that wider historical conditions, and especially the adaptive reaction of colonial political and economic interests to the growing ascendancy of the nationalist elite and the threat of mass disruption, deserve more attention. Furthermore, Wasserman stresses the pre-emption of mass mobilization and preservation of as much of the status quo as possible by integrating the indigenous elite to safeguard the existing political economy (neo-colonialism). This thesis attempts to illustrate the aptness of this conception to the unfolding process in Namibia.

(c) The transition period forms the central focus of this research, and refers to the period leading up to independence during which the latter is accepted by the major parties as the immediate outcome of their bargaining. The formal commencement of this period in Namibia can be given precisely as the assumption of office in Windhoek of the first Administrator-General on 1 September 1977 (see Chapter 2).

(d) Culture is taken as comprising the set of social institutions of a definable group of people. An institution e.g. religion, kinship, or government, is a recognized form of activity by the group, governed by a definite set of rules, values and norms. The institution is thus the relevant unit of analysis in cross-cultural studies (King 1976:41-57).

(e) Pluralism. The colonial context of this study implies a culture-contact situation i.e. a plural society (e.g. Ngavirue 1972). The term originated with Boeke and Furnivall in the Dutch East Indies, and has been the subject of much debate (e.g. Kuper 1967; Kuper and Smith 1969 with reference to Africa). Legassick (1971) summarizes the various definitions suggested in this volume thus: "Pluralism exists when diversity of culture and institutional practice occur within a given society, and where such divergences cluster to demarcate distinct and often virtually closed social sections."

He points out that this says nothing about how or why cleavages are produced, what holds the society together, or whose interests are served by preserving the 'differential incorporation'. Smith's (1969) use of the term is similarly lacking, being restricted to political and civil disadvantages suffered by one or more groups - implying that removal of these obstacles eliminates pluralism. Rex (1973) asserts the mark of a 'race relations situation' to be ascriptive allocation or
closure of mobility. His suggested research agenda for plural societies (Rex 1973: Chapter 19) has much in common with this study:
1. economic interests and expressed intentions of each group as pronounced by their leaders;
2. roles assigned by members of one group to another as a result of these interests, in comparison to the group's self-assigned roles;
3. the power situation - both tangible and intangible e.g. access to government or ideas;
4. changes in intergroup relations and role expectations over time;
5. comparison of different sequences to ascertain grounds for possible generalization.

Structure - Functionalist social anthropologists generally equated 'culture' and 'society' but the study of plural societies has shown a distinction to be necessary (King 1976: 41-43).

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(f) Racial classification. Official racial terminology has been adhered to for simplicity in the use and comparison of demographic and socio-economic data and racially segregated residential areas. This does not imply acceptance of their validity or of any innate characteristics applied thereto. Nor do popular categorizations by coloured and black people always correspond to them. The official definitions correspond to those in South Africa, and distinguish at the broad level between 'White', 'Coloured', ' Asiatic', and 'Black' (formerly 'Native', 'Bantu' and 'African'), each of which has various sub-divisions (Horrell 1978). For most purposes this is the level used here, as pre-1970 censuses did not use a finer classification. There is thus an important difference from terminology in Britain and elsewhere where 'coloured' or 'black' are generic terms for all people not: white.

The racial classification is arbitrary, often based on phenotypic criteria rather than self-ascription, although it is possible to seek reclassification. Overlap is great, with many known instances of siblings being classified differently or people passing themselves off as higher status group members (Watson 1970; Budack 1981 ). Such classification is a fundamental aspect of life in South Africa and Namibia, in view of the differential political, economic and social incorporation of the races in society. Being dominant, whites have the highest status, followed by coloureds, Asians and blacks, although there are almost no Asians in Namibia. In Namibia, 'White' comprises 'English', 'Afrikaans','German' and 'Other'; 'Coloured' - Coloured and Rehoboth Baster (and Nama since 1971 ), and 'Black' - Herero, Damara, Nama (until 1971), Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivian, Tswana, Bushman and 'Other'. Municipal data still include Nama as 'Black' for consistency, and this practice is followed here.

3. CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO URBANIZATION, CITIES AND THE POSITION OF COLONIAL CITIES
a) Urbanization
This term has been used with numerous connotations in different contexts and disciplines. For present purposes it is useful to distinguish conceptually between the purely demographic aspect and related economic or socio-cultural changes. Among the earliest such distinctions were those by social anthropologists concerned with detribalization and urban drift in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 1956). These were based on length of stay in towns and different concepts of 'detribalization' i.e. severance of allegiance to the chief, and of rural economic ties, but the variety of terms and cut-off points suggested illustrates the problem. Friedmann (1973:56), followed e.g. by Fair and Davies (1976), distinguishes 'Urbanization 1' - the geographic concentration of population and non-agricultural activities in urban environments of varying size and form - from 'Urbanization 2' - the geographic diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organizations and institutions (see also Sit 1981). The second definition is problematic, however, since it implies acceptance of the diffusionist and modernization paradigms: synonymity between 'urban' and 'modern', the role of cities as essential modernizing cores, and a causal relation between urban form and socio-cultural change. While some diffusion clearly does occur, there is little evidence to support its widespread effect, especially in the Third World (Gilbert and Goodman 1976; Marnham 1980:11). Unless otherwise stated, this study follows King (1976:24) and Cross (1979:8) in restricting use of 'urbanization' to the purely demographic process. Modern urban research in the social sciences has drawn heavily on ideas originating in the USA from the 1920s to 1950s. Louis Wirth's (1938) original urban-rural dichotomy, based on three key variables of size, density and heterogeneity, was modified into a cross-cultural folk-urban/traditional-modern continuum by Redfield and Singer (1954). No account was taken of migration or other flows, so that these were not true theories, but descriptive relations between population concentration and spatial form and function (e.g. Dewey 1960). Urban social ecology was also an important research area (see Chapter 5). Development meant economic development, a process seen as causally related to urbanization (Hoselitz 1958). This was characterized by the 'demographic transition', with cities as centres of economic development and innovative diffusion. These ideas were later elaborated into essentially linear stage theories or models of urban growth and national development ('modernization') e.g. by Hirschmann (1958), Myrdal (1957), Williamson (1965) and in spatial terms by Friedmann (1966). These notions were subsequently applied without modification to the 'developing countries' of the Third World on the assumption that the only difference was in chronological time. The economic historian,
Rostow, for example, suggested a linear model of economic development determined by a Western-style urban revolution and attainment of 'take-off' into sustained economic growth (Rostow 1960) - an idea also implicit in Friedmann's (1966) model. Modernization theory, because of its grounding in supposedly value-free 'positive' neo-classical economics, contains an implicit ideological element which becomes far clearer in the colonial context. From this perspective, the central development problem is how to promote natural 'diffusion' from the city so that it overcomes the 'resistance' of rural areas occasioned by the local inhabitants' attachment to traditional 'folk' lifestyles (Cross 1979:18). Metropolitan culture is thus all-important, providing a new value system for the 'natives', who would supposedly adapt passively. Empirical research, however, sharpened by an awareness of the changing needs and priorities of newly-independent countries, has shown just how different the process of Third World urbanization is from the experience of industrialized countries (e.g. UNESCO 1956; Mitchell 1954, 1969; Larimore 1959; Mayer 1961; Wilson and Mafeje 1963; De Blij 1962, 1963, 1968; Abu-Lughod 1964, 1971; and McGee 1967, 1971). This is due in large measure to the nature of available technology: whereas it evolved gradually during the Industrial Revolution, apace with internal migration and urban industrial growth, it is readily transferable in sophisticated form today, especially to the chief cities of a colonial or ex-colonial system. The demographic transition is taking a very different form, with relatively high birth and low death rates in large cities where modern medical facilities are available (cf. low birth and high death rates in European towns at a comparable stage). Migration is preceding rather than accompanying or following industrialization and at a rate beyond the cities' absorptive capacity, resulting in large scale urban unemployment and 'informal' squatting (McGee 1971). There is little evidence of significant diffusion or peripheral economic development, with industry and wealth concentrated in a few main urban centres (Gilbert and Goodman 1976). The distinctiveness of colonial cities, and their importance to developing a theory of Third World urbanization, form a central focus of attention below.

Marxist thought provides a diametrically opposed ideological perspective and theoretical framework. Marx saw the development of urbanization - the spatial concentration of labour power - in terms of the needs of capitalism to obtain surplus value from proletarian labour. In the colonies, however, which were primarily sources of raw materials and captive markets for manufactured exports rather than centres of capital accumulation, the same groups that were seen as the dynamic elements of Western capitalism did not arise; for example there was rarely a significant entrepreneurial bourgeoisie (Cross 1979:22). Many social scientists tended to regard the First and Third Worlds as separate and basically independent entities. Their essential unity as parts of a world system was first highlighted by Latin American 'Dependency Theorists' and other neo-Marxists. Focusing on metropolitan-colonial rather than intra-colony relations,
they emphasize the causal factors and interrelationships governing the rise and
tenrechment of the world capitalist economic system and holding the Third
World in a distorted, externally oriented and dependent relationship of unequal
exchange, even after the attainment of formal

political independence (neo-colonialism). Urbanization is thus not an autonomous
process but purely a function of dependent peripheral capitalism (e.g. Frank 1967,
1969; Rodney 1972; Chilcote 1974; Amin 1972, 1974, 1976; Castells 1977;
Gutkind and Waterman (eds) 1977; Rogerson 1980).

There has been mounting criticism of dependency theories on both conceptual and
empirical grounds across a range of disciplines. Recent critiques focus on the
extreme positions of Frank and Amin - in particular the determinism, sweeping
statements lacking empirical substantiation, definition and application of key
concepts (e.g. world values, unequal exchange), equating peripheral
capitalism with distorted capitalism, denial of national economies as valid units
of analysis, and the fact that empirical analysis contradicts their assertions
(Browett 1980; Smith 1980; Schiffer 1981). Notwithstanding Ettema's exhortation
(1979), Harriss and Harriss (1979) and Forbes (1981) suggest that pure
dependency theories are in their twilight, despite having had little impact in
geography to date on account of the latter's conservatism.

Nevertheless, the world view of this perspective is now well-established
and has also helped focus attention on neglected aspects of national scale political
economy, class relations and modes of production, especially in the Third World,
including Southern Africa. Several geographers have avoided the major pitfalls in
case studies of individual countries (e.g. Slater 1975; Britton 1980). Illustrating
the changing metropolitan-colonial relationships over time, they represent a
major advance over earlier, purely

-morphometric, studies (e.g. Taaffe, Morrill and Gould 1963; Adams 1972). The
moton of the various metropolitan powers differed and changed over time, but
"Typically, spatial structures have evolved which
mirror the impoverishment of remnant pre-capitalist societies in the face of
European penetration, and their subsequent marginalization from, or
subordination to, new -modes of capitalistically organized productive activity
controlled by metropolitan interests. An inherent feature of underdeveloped
economies is therefore the fact that the national economic, social and spatial
entity is a composite, and expression of, the historically specific way in which the
integration of capitalism with traditional societies
occurred."
(Britton 1980:252)

Such a global perspective is indispensable to this study of Namibia. Dependent
external orientation as a direct result of colonial penetration and subsequent
policies is a fundamental characteristic, both inter-regionally and nationally, in the
political, economic, social and spatial spheres. This forms the subject of Chapter
2. Improving national integration and reorienting ties away from South Africa will be central problems facing Namibia after independence (Green 1981).

b) Urban Areas

It is evident that no single definition is equally suited to all purposes, and it is thus essential to ensure appropriateness and ease of application to a particular task. Three broad categories of definition may be distinguished: physical (or morphological), functional (or operational, including administrative) and social. All overlap to greater or lesser extent but vary over time and space, and are seldom co-incident, as is well illustrated for Kampala by Munger (1951:29-49) and EEC countries by Hall et al. (1979). Castells (1977:10-11; 77ff) points out that there is no unique or absolute definition of 'urban' except in a particular social or cultural context at a given time, for which empirical relationships between significant dimensions would have to be established. Seen in this light, the urban-rural dichotomy a la Redfield and Wirth loses its absolute or universal meaning and explanatory power, especially where (arbitrary) statistical thresholds are used.

Some of these problems are simplified in Windhoek's case: it is a purely European creation in the development of which indigenous groups had no say; it is the primate city and thus undoubtedly urban; and it is physically discrete. While it would satisfy the USA's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) criteria, with a population approaching 100 000, its character and functional mix are hardly 'metropolitan'. The 45 964.835 ha area under jurisdiction of the Municipality of Windhoek is several times larger than the built-up urban area covering 5 805.153 ha in 1979 (Figure 1.1), although the population difference between them is minimal. For most practical purposes, then, the latter is used here, although municipal and census data generally cover the former area.

Occasional reference is made to the Windhoek Magisterial District. This is a vast regional administrative area encompassing sparsely populated farmlands in addition to Windhoek itself (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). It is clearly necessary to distinguish conceptually between static typologies of cities and dynamic theories of urban development. However, attempts to form a theory of Third World urbanization are inextricable from analysis of the nature of Third World and colonial cities, which display remarkably uniform structural features despite their geographical and cultural diversity. McGee (1971:13-18) is critical of both the 'modernization' and 'dependency' views of these cities. They should be seen, not as prime catalysts of change, but more broadly, as reflections of processes operating at the societal level. At the same time, the deterministic
view of cities as capitalist structures, decaying as part of the inevitable decline of capitalism itself, must be rejected. "Both sides overstate their case because their assumptions ignore the reality of the Third World urbanization process."
(McGee 1971:13)
What follows in this section will focus initially on structural features of city types before attempting to incorporate colonial cities more fully within theories of colonial development.
b(i) Typologies
Sjoberg's (1960) classic sociological work on the pre-industrial city represents an advance on previous urban classifications based on size or major economic function alone. He distinguishes three types of society: folk (pre-literate), pre-industrial (feudal) and industrial. Only the last two have urban centres, which he classifies on the basis of economic, social, political and ecological variables. His pre-industrial city corresponds closely with Childe's (1950) criteria for designation of urban centres. The essential factor enabling transition from folk settlements was irrigated grain cultivation - which provided storable food surpluses for the
population, and especially non-productive specialists (artisans, scribes, etc.). These cities first arose along Mesopotamian rivers 3000-4000 years B.C., and were characterized by slowly evolving, largely animate energy-powered technologies in cultivation, health and sanitation, which limited their size to between 25 000 and 100 000. Specialists represented the emergent literate elite, who came to control and manage the various activities. These factors embody Sjoberg's three pre-conditions for pre-industrial cities: a favourable ecological base, relatively advanced technology, and complex social organization (Sjoberg 1960:27).

These cities may gradually have grown in size, along with technological improvements. Spatially, government and religious functions dominated the centre, around which people lived and worked. Commercial activities generally took place in or from the home, so there was no central business district (CBD). Social stratification was rigid, and the spatial distribution of social classes opposite to that in industrial cities, with prestige related to proximity to the centre (e.g. Mumford 1961; Mabogunje 1968; Abu-Lughod 1971; Hull 1976). By contrast, the industrial city is characterized by the use of sophisticated technologies based on inanimate energy. Mobility and urban growth are no longer constrained, the division of labour and market system are highly specialized, education freely available and the class system fluid. The nuclear family has replaced the extended family, with the various age groups differently distributed in the city. Status is now determined by distance from the centre, which forms the CBD.
Sjoberg (1960:7) denies that his use of technology as the independent classificatory variable is deterministic:
"Technology is not some materialistic, impersonal force outside the socio-cultural context or beyond human control; technology is a human creation par excellence."
Nevertheless, his construct has been widely criticized both empirically, in terms of the accuracy and geographical location of cities used in evidence, and conceptually (e.g. Horvath 1969). Concern here is solely with the latter. Colonial cities are widely regarded as being a separate type, with common structural features not accounted for by Sjoberg's typology. Sjoberg himself subsequently attempted to include them as an 'industrializing' form, in transition from pre-industrial to industrialized cities (Sjoberg 1965). While some Third World cities are indeed industrializing, this is not general: nor can they be regarded as merely a transitional form. Their distinctiveness arises from the culture-contact situations in which they occur, where the societal groups concerned have different levels of socio-economic, political and technical organization and development (King 1976:25). If a significant number of colonists settles permanently without exterminating the indigenes, some form of plural society results over time. In the words of Horvath (1969:76), "The colonial city is then the political, military, economic, religious, social and intellectual entrepot between the colonizers and the colonized."
This is true of both ancient and modern civilizations, but a feature of the latter to date (with only few exceptions) has been that industrialization occurs primarily in the metropolitan country, despite urbanization occurring in both. This is the essence of what Castells (1977) calls 'dependent urbanization'. Problems regarding dependency theories have already been discussed; besides, this notion does not account for the experiences of the so-called 'Newly Industrializing Countries' like Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore or South Africa.
Technology alone is inadequate as an explanatory variable, since both animate and inanimate energy-powered forms occur widely in colonial cities, and it says nothing about how the changeover takes place. Lehmann (1980:33) points to this problem even in explaining Mesolithic and Neolithic changes from hunting to agriculture, suggesting capital as the key factor. The critical feature of colonial cities is domination of the colonized by the colonizers, and Horvath (1969) uses this as his independent variable. The nature of the relationship between these groups mirrors the overall balance of power and other social forces, which also find expression in the colonial city's spatial structure.
Larimore prefers to view the Africanization of employment in post-independence East Africa as part of a wider transition process from Sjoberg's pre-industrial to industrial city.
"...fuelled by the global dissemination of nationalism as a shared cultural value of the urban-industrial community."
In this she sees nationalism as being functionally a form of secular religion, though this is not entirely convincing (Sjoberg included)

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cultural values as essential variables along with inanimate energy and technology).
The relationship between social process and urban spatial form is neither uniform nor static, having taken a wide variety of forms throughout history, and indeed even between any two or more groups over time. This will change as the power of the respective groups rises or declines. Theoretically we can conceive of as many forms as there are colonial culture-contact relationships, since no two cultures are identical. Thus there are likely to be British, German, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch or French culture-specific 'ideal-type' cities, each worthy of analysis (Sutcliffe 1981), as are their modifications to local circumstances (e.g. De Blij 1963; Hamdan 1964; Griffin and Ford 1980; Winters 1982). In practice, many colonial and colonized societies have broad similarities - e.g. the European powers during the Scramble for Africa, and the people they colonized, respectively (see Fetter 1979). Yet former Portuguese colonial cities (e.g. Luanda and Maputo) possess morphological features distinguishing them from those established by Britain (e.g. Lusaka and Harare) or Germany (e.g. Dar es Salaam and Windhoek). In the pre-colonial cities of North Africa, where the respective British and French colonial town planning legislation was virtually identical, local factors proved sources of significant spatial differences between them. These included the period when initial Western structural additions were made, the proportion of colonists in the total population, and their political attitudes (Abu-Lughod 1975:242).

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In order to generalize about the form of such cities, it is thus useful to conceptualize the determinants of colonist-colonized relationships. They are not immutable over time and give rise to different societal forms according to the particular permutation of operative factors. At least five such determinants have been distinguished:

i) motives for colonization: e.g. trade (mercantilism); agricultural settlement; strategic acquisition.
(ii) pre-existing settlement: e.g. sparse distribution; scattered settlement; or urban.
(iii) the nature of imperial/colonial settlement: e.g. imperialism (few if any permanent settlers) or colonialism (significant numbers of permanent settlers).
(iv) relationship with the indigenous population: e.g. extermination (USA, Australia); assimilation (Hispanic America) or neither (Algeria, South Africa). This last category in effect means segregation.
(v) physical form/structure of the evolving colonial city,
(a) with pre-existing settlement: this was
destroyed; occupied; incorporated in a new planned city; added to by
accretion; or
ignored;
(b) with no pre-existing settlement: city was
built for colonists only; for all together; or for all in segregated quarters (see
Horvath
1969; McGee 1971; King forthcoming).

As Horvath (1969:76-77) shows, the external colonial relationship gives rise to a
social stratification system different to that characteristic of the pre-industrial city. The colonial settlers from the
metropolitan country form the elite, who, in contrast to pre-industrial and
industrial elites, retain their position by politico-military force, and obtain
their authority or legitimacy from the colonial power abroad - to which they owe
allegiance - rather than from within the country. They are also culturally and
ethnically distinct from other population groups. This is analogous to post-
independence neo-colonialism under an indigenous elite. Where the indigenous
population has not been exterminated they form the second, and generally largest,
segment of the urban population. Of these only a minority typically obtain formal
education, enabling them to occupy a few lower professional or lower-order
administrative positions. This is the sub-group forming the new elite after
independence. The majority of indigenes remain uneducated, performing
manual or semi-skilled jobs. A third, 'intervening', group results from
interracial or intercultural unions and occupies a position of intermediate
status between the elite and indigenous groups. Most authors distinguish this
group from a 'stranger group' migrating
(voluntarily or not) from a country other than the colonial power (Kuper 1967).
The latter may not always exist, but the distinction has validity, for example, in
terms of the differential incorporation of coloureds and Asians respectively into
South African society. Within each group there are divisions based on tribe,
ethnicity, language and religion which may also cut across the groups to differing
extents. Ethnicity, however, remains the key mode of reference group
ascription, class formation and hence differential incorporation,

especially where racial differences provide a visible vehicle. Ethnicity is not
the passive or innate characteristic assumed by many social anthropologists (see
e.g. Okamura 1981). It is probably true to say that colonial cities are distinctive in
yet another way, namely that the discontinuities between groups are institutionally
organized and maintained on the basis of ethnicity. These discontinuities have
three distinct characteristics:
1. extreme interracial social distance;
2. the presence of special mechanisms, both within and between strata,
for maintaining and bridging these divisions;
3. non-alignment between structure and culture, as the respective divisions generally do not coincide (Kuper 1967).

Due to the structure of colonial societies, the planning authorities and local vested interests were synonymous. Comprehensive development planning was thus possible long before it occurred in the metropolitan countries, where much conflict between these groups existed (King 1976:24). Colonial-founded cities should thus provide us with a clearer geographical expression of contemporary urban and social values, especially once 'planning' emerged in the 1880s (e.g. Sutcliffee 1981).

Systematic segregation of the indigenes from colonists was ubiquitous (where the former were not exterminated) and one of the dominant structural characteristics of colonial cities, irrespective of whether or not they existed before the colonists' arrival. It is the extent to which such practices have been legislatively and ideologically institutionalized which distinguishes South Africa and Namibia (see Chapter 5).

Spatial segregation represents a strategy for maintaining social distance in a situation of incomplete dominance: Wade (1964:243-281) vividly illustrates the rise of urban segregation in the southern USA as a response to the demise of slavery by 1860. Similarly no segregation was required in the early days of the Cape Colony. Colonial control over the rest of sub-Saharan Africa was established only in the late 19th Century, after the abolition of slavery - hence the segregation ab initio. This distinguishes African colonial cities from their earlier Caribbean counterparts (e.g. Clarke 1975).

In terms of the criteria outlined, South West Africa was established as a German agricultural settlement colony where no previous urban settlement, other than chiefs' kraals, existed (Kienetz 1975). Although there was no original intention to wipe out the indigenous population, the German Schutztruppe did embark on a conscious extermination campaign against the Herero during the 1904-1907 revolt. Racial segregation has existed since the earliest days of German rule (see Chapters 2 and 3).

In conclusion, it should be noted that neither pre-industrial nor industrial cities are homogeneous types. Kansky (1976) seeks to discern East European socialist cities as a separate class in terms of their formative social processes and planning strategies. His preliminary theory of socialist urbanization hinges on the role of central planning under direct Soviet military and Communist Party influence, and conflict between state goals and private (individual) objectives. All typologies necessarily contain an element of subjectivity and arbitrariness; they are static, have little explanatory power, and should thus be regarded essentially as heuristic devices. The utility of the colonial city
construct, as will emerge in the following chapters, lies in facilitating identification and analysis of Windhoek's basic structural components and local variations.

b(ii) Theories and Models
Our principal interest, however, lies in an analysis of developments as independence approaches and is ultimately attained, when certain of the distinctive parameters of colonialism are expected to change. It is thus necessary to incorporate a dynamic element into the analysis moving, albeit only very tentatively, from typologies towards a theory of colonial (urban) development. A few appropriate suggestions will be made here.

The initial requirement is for adequate explanation of how and when colonization occurs and colonial cities arise. This has been discussed above, and will not be repeated in detail here. The foremost considerations are generally prestige, military or economic gain on the part of the colonizing country, leading to occupation and the establishment of imperial or colonial control (e.g. Fetter 1979). The indigenous population is thereby subordinated in a dominance-dependence relationship, of which the colonial city is a symbolic spatial manifestation.

Brett (1973) suggests three critical elements for analyzing the territorial political-economy which highlight the structural inequalities of colonialism:
1. the structure and size of economic production;
2. the nature of distribution of the social product;
3. the location of control over social processes.
Changes in each of these is measured in terms of growth, equity and autonomy. Tensions within the colonial structure generally arise from the inherent inequalities of access to resources, education, skills and the whole gamut of individual or group opportunities, even though the colonial power may co-opt a limited indigenous elite to strengthen its hold. It is important here to distinguish between real and perceived discrimination. Although real (relative and/or absolute) deprivation usually exists from the outset, it only becomes politically relevant once the subordinate groups perceive it and use it as a rallying point of resistance. This political activity can provide valuable insights into the critical structural or processual variables perceived in a given situation, as well as how the process of perception occurs. At the same time, one must guard against the self-defining approach that the only real or true elements are those popularly perceived (‘the problems’).

Tension (‘the crisis’) only lessens once the offended groups have improved their relative position, thereby reducing or eliminating their disadvantage or even assuming an advantage. The actual course of events and nature of the change involved will depend on the extent to which the aggrieved parties are able to assert their claims, and the degree of resistance from
the dominant group. This in itself is a function of what they perceive as being at stake, or in Brett's words (1977:60), the groups' "relative ability to gain control over free-floating resources; more precisely it will depend on the terms under which they enter into exchange relationships with each other."

Wasserman stresses the need for proper account to be taken of the colonial elite's role during the transition process, in particular their attempts to retain the status quo as far as possible by forestalling mass mobilization and installing a quiescent indigenous elite:

"An analysis of the colonial elite's composition, alignments and bargaining activities is essential to an understanding of the terms of the bargain called independence." (Wasserman 1976:1)

Furthermore, "the political quiescence and subordination of the masses is a necessary condition for the attainment of independence as well as a goal of the decolonization process." (Wasserman 1976:6-7; see also 'decolonization' in Section 2 above) In the context of colonialism, then, the turning point is reached only with the granting of independence, either peacefully, or as is more common, after a period of military conflict until the position of the colonial power becomes untenable. Legal and internationally recognized independence heralds (with South Africa the notable exception) the assumption of political control by indigenes ('majority rule') - and, more precisely, by the formally educated modernizing elite.

This represents the start of a new phase in the development of a country and its cities, characterized by

"changing the locus of control of [decision-making and of] the establishments comprising the cities' economic bases." (Larimore 1969:54)

This indigenization of personnel, while differing in rate and extent, has been the main common element in the wide range of political programmes of newly independent states. It has occurred especially in the public sector, where it is more easily and rapidly achievable, and in the upper levels of commerce and industry.

Political independence is more meaningful if complemented by domestic control of the economy. Even large transnational corporations can normally be obliged to comply with government regulations (e.g. on wage levels, staff indigenization, repatriation vs. local reinvestment of profits) without inordinate concessions if the political will exists.

Murphree (1978) analyzes the position and potential future role of whites in independent Black Africa in terms of a trichotomized typology of White Sojourner (short term expatriate contract worker), White Immigrant (long term white resident) and White African (born and socialized in Africa) cross-cut by class and occupational distinctions. Only if genuine accommodation and cultural
pluralism are permitted within a broader national identity, is the White African's, as opposed to the Sojourner's, continued presence likely:

"He is likely therefore to remain as a member of a small, self-perpetuating culturally discrete sub-section of the population with its concomitant structural location relatively high on the socio-economic scale. Politically powerless, he may be able through a range of social and cultural contributions to demonstrate the utility of his continued presence and thus achieve a new symbiotic relationship to the rest of the society, mitigating to some extent his ever-present vulnerability to the operationalization of race."
(Murphree 1978:171)

Analysis of the colonial city itself within the broader process begins with the segregated and discontinuous physical, economic and social structure outlined in the section on classification above. It is then necessary to ascertain and evaluate the social, economic or political factors acting to bring about or impede change (e.g. Rex 1973; Abu-Lughod 1975; Winters 1982). With the rapid decolonization of Africa in the early 1960s, a fair body of geographical literature sought to examine spatial aspects of colonial cities before any structural change occurred (e.g. Larimore 1959; Thomas 1962; De Blij 1962, 1963, 1968; Halliman and Morgan 1967; Southall 1967; Collins 1969; Davies 1969). In the context of locational and political problems facing capital cities in reorienting their focus away from the metropole to their own territories, it has however been pointed out that "if these capitals symbolize the colonial past, they equally symbolize the nationalist movement since they were the seats of the struggle for liberation and independence."
(Hamdan 1964:244)

Together with the existing infrastructure and economic investments, this seemed to indicate that most capitals would retain their function after independence, irrespective of location. Some have, however, been moved to more central locations in view of political considerations, or to foster development in deprived regions (Best 1970; Mlia 1975; Gibbon et al. 1980). Given Windhoek's central location and small size there appears little likelihood but that it will continue to serve as capital of independent Namibia.

b(iii) Synthesis: a Conceptual Framework The conceptual and empirical issues discussed above, and which inform this study, have been synthesized into a dynamic model of colonial urban development (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). The time period of concern can be divided into three distinct phases, the relative duration of which will vary according to local circumstance:

(i) conventional colonial rule;
(ii) the transition period leading up to independence, which is possibly accompanied by the relaxation of some colonial constraints;
(iii) the attainment of independence, and concomitant developments.
Phase (ii) forms the central focus here and is situated closer to the 'post-colonial' pole of the time continuum. The two essential territorial polities are the Metropolitan Colonial Power (MCP) and Colony, separated by International Space, through which the various influences operate and are mediated. The Colony has been divided into concentric rings representing National Space (CNS), Regional Space (RS) and City Space (CS). Interaction is not unidirectional, although the relative strength of the metropolitan and colonial influences vary over time and according to the stage of colonialism. There is likely

FIGURE 1.2
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF COLONIAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT
METROPOLITAN COLONIAL POWER
V1
ACTORS! INSTITUTIONS
PERCEPTIONS / ATTITUDES
IV
POLICIES / PLANS
It
SPATIAL AND
L
ACTORS/ INSTITUTIONS PERCEPTIONS /ATTITUDES
POLICIES/PLANS
"p
SPATIAL AND
J4-
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
<=>(CAPITAL, ENTREPRENEURSHIP)
&MANUFACTURED GOODS
T"
STRUCTURAL IMPACT
v
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
(LAND & LABOUR)
PRIMARY PRODUCTS = (RAW MATERIALS)
'
PRELIMINARY PROCESSING
STRUCTURAL IMPACT
TIME PHASES OF
Pre colonial 4 COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT --Post colonial
to be strong initial resistance from the indigenous inhabitants to metropolitan intrusion, but after subjugation (the necessary condition for colonialism), metropolitan influence is generally at its zenith. Soldiers, administrators, traders and settlers (the 'actors') set up imported government machinery and other 'institutions' based essentially on metropolitan norms, perceptions, attitudes, plans and the goals of their colonial policy. On the economic side, scarce factors of production, especially capital and entrepreneurship, as well as manufactured goods for the local market, are typically imported. These all have a profound spatial and structural impact at all three geographic scales, although concern here is essentially with colonial urban space. (Taylor 1981 analyzes all three scales in the post-colonial context.) Colonial influences, treated here under the same set of headings, have their own respective attitudinal, spatial and structural feedback on the MCP. Locally abundant factors of production, essentially land and labour, are exploited in production of cash crops and other raw materials. These are then supplied to factories and markets in the MCP, sometimes after preliminary local processing. Positive or quiescent feedback means in effect co-operation, on which the colonial nexus thrives and is reinforced. Over time, however, nationalist resistance from the indigenous population typically rises, frequently led by a formally educated elite trained in the MCP. As conflict mounts, metropolitan anti-colonial sentiment may reinforce the nationalist cause. Once negative feedback so outweighs the advantages as to make continued colonial rule untenable, control will be surrendered during a process of decolonization leading to eventual independence (either nominal or real). Figure 1.3 presents an enlargement of the Colonial Space, with the colonial capital as its core. This representation may not necessarily reflect physical location, but the capital is by definition the political, administrative, social and usually economic centre. Radiating from, and impinging on, it are various identifiable elements of the colonial political economy and social formation. There is no unique number, and each could be further subdivided or indeed aggregated, since they are all ultimately interwoven. Like the model's other elements they are subject to change over time, particularly during the transition.
period. It is clearly impossible to pursue each in depth, and the methodology employed to isolate the most significant elements in the context of transition is outlined below.

4. ASSIGNMENT OF RESEARCH PRIORITIES AND METHODOLOGY

Given limited time and resources, it became necessary to focus research on specific topics. The problem consisted of ascertaining the facets of the complex urban web most likely to undergo rapid change and those most significant to the local population, while retaining the overall perspective necessary to integrate the various topics. This was done in the first instance by means of a detailed literature search and deductions from the conceptual issues discussed above, while recent local knowledge was gleaned from journals and newspapers. This still proved inadequate alone, so a detailed newspaper content analysis was carried out as a means of establishing those issues of greatest public concern in Windhoek during the relevant period (i.e. national and non-Windhoek issues were ignored). Given the overt political control over most Namibian papers, little congruence of coverage could be expected, so the independent weekly Windhoek Observer was selected. Selection of categories proved relatively easy. Articles were classified by dominant issue, although an element of subjectivity was unavoidable in some cases. The number of column-centimetres was measured for each relevant article over the 16-month period 17th March 1979 to 19th July 1980, and the results appear in Table 1.1.

Fourteen categories were distinguished, each subdivided into a 'normal' component, for articles which bore no connection to changing socio-political circumstances, and a 'change' component. By far the largest category was 'Political', but this did not reflect a general trend, since virtually the entire category was devoted to coverage of a spectacular hand-grenade attack in Windhoek, and the ensuing trial. The three next most significant categories overall were 'Planning and Resource Allocation', the 'Urban Economy', and 'Residential Change' respectively, although in terms of column-centimetres devoted to change, the ranking was 'Residential Change', 'Urban Economy', and 'Planning and Resource Allocation'. Next overall came 'Crime' (mainly 'normal'), 'Local Government Organization' (exclusively 'change'), 'Aesthetics' (exclusively 'normal'), 'Access to Services and Amenities' (largely 'change'), 'Social Problems' (largely 'change') and 'Traffic/Transport' (largely 'normal') respectively, while there were a few small categories.

Essentially 'normal' categories i.e. 'Crime', 'Aesthetics', and 'Traffic/Transport', were then omitted, together with 'Politics'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.1</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS:</td>
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</tbody>
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17 March 1979 - 19 July 1980 (cm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential change</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning/Resource alloc.</td>
<td>1227</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban economy</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban symbolism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social problems/disorder</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (esp. terrorism)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3538</td>
<td>3538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to services/amenity</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic/transport</td>
<td>.357</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/cultural</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3632</strong></td>
<td><strong>8831</strong></td>
<td><strong>12463</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Windhoek Observer (weekly); analysis by author.

(already discussed) and 'Social Problems', which also did not reflect a general trend, being almost totally devoted to the question of prostitution over a very short time period when combative legislation was promulgated. Other social problems e.g. alcoholism, are dealt with under 'Health' in Chapter 8. Very surprising was the low score on 'Education', in view of its known sensitivity and politico-cultural role as a means of socialization. Both intuitively and from experience elsewhere, it was realized that education would require full study. Indeed, it suddenly became the focus of political attention during the second tier ethnic government election campaign late in 1980 and has subsequently remained in the limelight. For these and other organizational reasons it proved by far the most difficult sector to research. Although 'Legislation' is a vital issue, providing the enabling link between the wider politico-legal milieu and urban change, direct legalistic analysis was beyond the present study's scope. Although legislative change was monitored systematically, evaluation was far more meaningful in terms of its effects on the various topics being studied, and it is thus dealt with in the relevant chapters below. 'Urban Symbolism' is a minor category warranting little specific attention. The thrust of fieldwork was directed at the seven major categories: 'Residential Change', 'Planning and Resource Allocation', the 'Urban Economy', 'Local Government Organization', 'Education', 'Access to Services and Amenities', and 'Social/Cultural' aspects. These correspond broadly to 'sectors' of the urban functional structure, but it is critically important to be conscious of their interrelationships and interdependence. The divisions are artificial,
albeit as systematic as possible, and successful elucidation in fact finally requires reintegration of the various sectors. It is apparent, moreover, that in considering such a process of change we are concerned with a dynamic rather than static situation. 'Planning and Resource Allocation' dealt largely with long term urban expansion, transport and similar topics not of immediate short term importance. Relevant aspects have been included under e.g. 'Housing', which it became necessary to treat separately from 'Residential Mobility'. 'Education' has been included in a chapter together with health and amenities, while 'Social/Cultural Aspects' were finally omitted as a separate topic because they lacked a unifying spatial theme. Relevant elements have been included in various chapters.

Given the novelty of this study, its contemporary nature and the different aspects under scrutiny, a wide variety of fieldwork techniques had to be developed and adapted. These ranged from archival search to collection and collation of all available secondary material (which was often scanty), taking newspaper cuttings, conducting interviews with leaders and prominent personalities across the political spectrum and the range of institutions relevant to each sector, seeking permission to collate statistics from numerous private and official sources, conducting three interview surveys, and much intensive field observation. The scope of this work was greatly increased by the paucity of previously published material or available data on Namibia in general and Windhoek in particular. Nevertheless, the success of this project owes much to the co-operation of many officials, as well as Municipal staff, community and political leaders, businessmen and numerous private citizens.

Many of the issues of concern to us are unquantifiable, being attitudinal, often implicit rather than explicit, sometimes apparently irrational and subject to rapid change. Deep local knowledge proved of great value here, as did perspectives from Social Anthropology - in particular, the value of participant observation in studying the individual within a group as well as the group or institution itself. It frequently became necessary to abandon (temporarily) my observer's analytical framework and adopt the 'folk' or actor's model of society held by an interviewee, so as to understand the individual, his attitudes and misgivings in his context. The dangers of imposing one's own system of reference onto that of the research subjects are well known but often overlooked (see e.g. Lloyd 1974:4-5). Hence care is necessary in compiling questionnaires and conducting interviews, not to predicate responses. In retrospect, the balance obtained between macro- and micro-scale, between society, social group and the individual, was most rewarding.

5. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
Before examining the individual sectors it is instructive to outline the structure of this thesis, which largely reflects the identified priorities. Chapter 2 traces the
demographic, historical and politico-economic contexts to this study in Namibia, thereby establishing the empirical validity of the model presented above. Care has been taken to convey not only facts and chronologies but more particularly to highlight relevant motives and consequences, and the interrelationship of conventionally compartmentalized fields of study. The third chapter is devoted entirely to Windhoek. Its origin, growth and development are related to wider contemporary events, and the reader equipped with the necessary detail for a ready appreciation of the subsequent empirical chapters.

In each of these, the initial section provides a detailed baseline against which change since the transition period began in 1977 is then measured. Relevant legislation is also summarized. Chapters 4-8 analyze different aspects or 'sectors' of the urban social formation for evidence of change over the same period of time. While obviously interdependent, their content was isolated using the systematic methodology outlined in Section 4 above, and frequent cross-referencing is provided in the text. The emphasis throughout is on both the structural or institutional framework and interplay of the relevant 'actors' as well as on how individuals at the micro-level are affected and react.

Chapter 4 reviews changes in the polity: the reorganization of government institutions during the transition to independence and especially the envisaged role of Windhoek's local authorities, which form the link between national policy and local action. The former provincial-style South West Africa Administration has been replaced by a quasi-autonomous three-tier structure. Moves away from racial discrimination have necessitated a reformulation of the envisaged apartheid solution for local authorities, but this is shown to be a rearguard action aimed at retaining the status quo virtually intact.

Chapter 5 focuses on one of the most readily identifiable aspects of change - residential mobility across former racially exclusive boundaries after the statutory abolition of segregation. The overall process of movement is catalogued and results of a sample survey among those involved analyzed. The rate of movement has been steady but relatively insignificant overall. Notwithstanding a minority of problem cases, most migrants report little antipathy and feel comfortable in their new surroundings.

In Chapter 6 the immobile aspects of accommodation and housing markets are covered in each of the three former racially exclusive areas. The major part is devoted to analysis of the process and impact of removing influx control on blacks. Conflicting attitudes of the various 'actors' are discussed, and attempts by the authorities to develop housing alternatives more appropriate to the changing circumstances, outlined. While the necessity of a new approach has been appreciated, institutional, political and attitudinal problems have thus far prevented significant success.
Chapter 7, on the urban economy, forms a crucial link in elucidation of the political economy of transition in Windhoek. Major foci are the city's economic structure; results of a sample survey of firms regarding economic conditions and possible changes in their spatial patterns of trade; employment conditions; labour organization; unemployment; and the petty commodity or 'informal' sector, which is shown by empirical research to be primarily an adaptive survival strategy.

Chapter 8 presents data on the racially differentiated education and health systems and public amenities, and evaluates prevailing conditions in the light of changing circumstances. These white-controlled social services are shown to be most resistant to political demands for integration and equalization of access to them, and 'Health' in particular, also largely inappropriate to the major needs of the target population.

Chapter 9 provides a synthesis and evaluation of the issues and conclusions emerging from the various 'sectors'. While there may not have been any fundamental or structural changes in Windhoek's social formation, the transition period has provided an opportunity for some incremental reform which should lessen the trauma of independence. This is not to argue, however, that it has been wholly, or even largely, positive. Prolonged uncertainty over the future, coupled with costly and divisive attempts by the existing authorities to impose a neo-colonial solution (to modernize racial domination?) behind a veneer of change have been the dominant features of this period. In consequence, the system has been unable to satisfy the expectations it has created, and current tensions will only be overcome by more thoroughgoing changes to the status quo. Based on experiences in other former colonies, suggestions are made as to their likely or necessary course.

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CHAPTER 2
NAMIBIA: THE EVOLUTION OF A COLONIAL DEPENDENCY
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite its remoteness and aridity, Namibia has received disproportionate world attention over the last 25 years due to its peculiar political circumstances and strategically important mineral resources. It is a large, sparsely populated territory covering 823,144 km², excluding the 1,124 km² Walvis Bay enclave. Parts of the area were first made a German Protectorate in 1884, but after World War I, when Germany forfeited all its colonial possessions, South West Africa (SWA) was granted to South Africa as a 'C' class mandate by the League of Nations. South Africa still retains control, despite prolonged internal and external agitation for independence.

What follows is not intended as an exhaustive exposition, but rather as a synthesis of important themes to provide the overall perspective necessary for this study. Despite its short duration, the period of German colonial rule (1884-1915) had profound consequences in all spheres of human activity, many of them persisting till the present in such varied forms as the transport network, urban layouts, land ownership patterns, educational structures, labour regime and social attitudes. It will thus be necessary to focus on colonial motives and consequences during both the German and South African occupations in some detail, as they were crucial in shaping many of the problems facing politicians and planners as Namibia approaches independence and

Windhoek assumes the role of national, rather than colonial, capital city. This chapter has three major divisions, devoted respectively to historical, demographic and politico-economic aspects of Namibia's contemporary structure. Topography and climate have been two fundamental environmental influences on the evolution of Namibia's human geography. For much of the territory is desert or semi-desert, despite its location astride the Tropic of Capricorn, between 170 and 290 S latitude. The Orange and Kunene Rivers, along Namibia's southern and northern borders respectively, are the only perennial rivers. Precipitation ranges from virtually nil (except fog) along the Namib desert coast, to around 100mm p.a. at the Escarpment edge, to 200mm p.a. in the southern interior, and a maximum of 600-650mm p.a. in the extreme northeast. Detailed physical
geographical analysis is provided by Wellington (1967) and Africa Institute (1980). The former distinguishes three major physiographic regions (Namib Desert, Kalahari Sandveld and Plateau Hardveld) and the latter four (Namib, Eastern Semi-Arid Zone, Northern Bushveld, and Central Plateau). Windhoek lies in the last-mentioned region of each typology (see Chapter 3).

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
a) The Pre-colonial Period
Prior to the arrival of European settlers in the Nineteenth Century, the area was inhabited by at least five distinct population groups, the Khoisan ('Bushmen' hunter-gatherers and 'Hottentot' nomadic pastoralists), Damara, Ovambo and Okavango, Herero and Nama. Relatively little is, however, known about their origins or migrations into the territory (see Vedder 1938; Wellington 1967:130-137; Bley 1971:xxi-xxii; Kienetz 1975:Chapter 4). Their social systems adapted to the environment, in particular the need for periodic migration in search of water and better pasturage. Although each politically independent ethnic group controlled its own territory, and frequently spheres of interest beyond, the boundaries were not immutable; despite periodic friction and clashes the various groups had frequent diplomatic and trade contact, and could move between areas by mutual agreement, especially in times of hardship (SWAPO 1981:2). The history of European contact with this region dates back to Diego Cao’s landing on the coast in 1484, and until the establishment of mission stations after 1807, consisted of sporadic landings and exploratory journeys (e.g. O’Callaghan 1977:15-17).

From the 1830s onwards a number of 'Orlam' Nama groups moved north across the Orange River, bringing with them the horse and the gun. They evolved a predatory existence by raiding the Herero to the north for cattle, and established control over a large part of the southern and central Transvaar, as the land north of the Orange River was known (Kienetz 1975; Lau 1981b). The effects of these changes played an important role in the period of German acquisition. The Orlams required guns, tobacco and other 'European' goods, in return for which game was slaughtered, cattle raided, and ivory and ostrich feathers sent south in large quantities (Calvert 1915:6). In 1865-1866, the 'Basters', people of mixed descent displaced from the Cape by the Land Beacons Act of 1865, settled in the area around Rehoboth, south of Windhoek.

These activities, together with the increased level of settlement (especially at mission sites) and the resultant greater population concentrations and overgrazing, led to environmental change and increased desiccation in this fragile ecosystem (Kienetz 1975), as well as the undermining of the self-sufficient indigenous economies (Moorsom 1977).
Britain eventually annexed Walvis Bay in 1878 in an effort to secure the profitable trade routes against Portuguese expansion south of the Kunene River, but saw no advantage in claiming the large, sparsely populated interior (Kienetz 1975:310-314; Wellington 1967:163-165).

The German merchant, Adolf Lfideritz, had obtained rights to Angra Pequena, and mineral and trading rights in the vicinity, from the Nama leader, Joseph Fredericks of Bethany, in 1883. When Bismarck, the German Chancellor, finally acceded to appeals by Lderitz and the colonialist lobby to declare L6deritz's acquisitions along the coast a German Protectorate in 1884, the colonial era in SWA began.

b) German Colonial Rule 1884-1915

The Germans were meticulous record-keepers and commentators on both public and private affairs; and many government officials subsequently published their diaries or memoirs. Fortunately, many official and missionary society documents have survived the intervening wars. This section draws substantially on three outstanding and well-documented recent works - Bley (1971), Kienetz (1975) and De Vries (1978).

Kienetz analyzes German attitudes towards, and perceptions of, the colonial question in general, and the subsequent acquisition and settlement of SWA in particular.

"The rise of modern German colonialism can only be understood in terms of the peculiar socio-economic context of the 19th Century, specifically in terms of the impact the phenomenon of mass emigration had on German sensibilities ... it appears very doubtful if a German colonialist movement would have been possible without the experience of mass migration."

(Kienetz 1975:16-17)

Emigration occurred for reasons associated with the Industrial Revolution in that country and the consequent rise of the colonialist lobby at the expense of the anti-colonialists. 6m Germans left the country over the 100 years before World War I, 90% of them for the USA (Kienetz 1975:49-73).

Interpretations of German motives for colonization vary, but debate within the colonialist lobby centred on the desirability of protected trade colonies ('Handelskolonien'), to be obtained by private initiative with government protection, which would create employment and thus reduce emigration, or overseas settlement colonies ('Besiedlungskolonien') where emigrants would retain social, cultural and economic ties with Germany (Wellington 1967:226-227; Kienetz 1975:49-74; De Vries 1978:4-9; Iliffe 1979:88).

Germany was the last major European power to acquire colonial possessions, and thus had no experience in their government. As a result, much was borrowed, ironically enough, from British colonial history and legislative practice (Kienetz 1975:84-85). This was to have significance in
subsequent SWA history (see below). Sudholt (1975) gives detailed insights into early German 'Native' politics.

The crucial event precipitating German military involvement was the so-called 'Okahandja Coup' of October 1888, when Maherero, the Herero paramount chief, revoked the 'protection' treaty signed with Germany and ordered Goring, the imperial commissioner, to leave SWA forthwith. A small military force was sent from Germany, later reinforced with the arrival of Major Curt von Francois and more troops in 1890. From 1893, when von Francois attacked Hendrick Witbooi's Nama at Hoornkranz, German authority was to be established by military conquest. "Progressive land alienation after 1890 also meant the gradual transformation of SWA from a protectorate to a crown colony. Similar transformations took place in the other German colonies, in all of which Bismarck's program of chartered company rule was either never effected or soon disbanded." (Kienetz 1975:86-87)

Britain had become anxious over possible German expansion in the interior (Wellington 1967:171) but nevertheless recognized the land between the Orange and Kunene Rivers as a German sphere of influence at the Berlin Conference of 1885-1886 (Bley 1971:xxv). Thus in 1885 Britain proclaimed the Bechuanaland Protectorate and British Bechuanaland crown colony (Wellington 1967:172; Colclough and McCarthy 1980:12).

"The resolution of this dispute by Bismarck and the British foreign office not only overruled the local contest between the traders but also sealed the fate of South West Africa over the heads of the Africans, who were now being relegated to a subordinate position." (Ngavirue 1972:112)

It was only at the 1890 Anglo-German conference that boundaries were agreed and all of SWA became a German Protectorate (Wellington 1967:172; Prescott 1979:8-9).

The period 1890-1914 is covered in detail by Wellington (1967), Bley (1971), Drechsler (1980) and Bridgman (1981). After the 1893-4 Nama war, Theodore Leutwein, the first Governor, instituted a comprehensive German political system. The 1904-7 Revolt was marked by General von Trotha's now-notorious extermination campaign against the Herero, and subsequent punitive measures. These included land expropriation and the introduction of stringent 'native' regulations, including restrictions on land and property ownership and the need to carry passes outside the reserves. The new labour laws bore close resemblance to those imposed by Britain in South Africa, which have been subsequently refined (Chapter 5). The Revolt was undoubtedly a turning point in the territory's history, with profound long-term consequences.
Bley (1970:181-279) identifies four major social and psychological effects of victory on the European settlers: increased extremism (especially regarding blacks), growing political organization leading to limited self-government, hostility towards the missionaries, and growing totalitarianism. The effects of their attitudes towards mixed marriages, native regulations, and education, in particular, will emerge in the following chapters. By the end of German rule, the various tribes had been subjugated and confined to rural reserves or on farms as labourers. Iliffe (1979:168-202) reveals a strikingly similar process in German Tanganyika.

The direct German colonial government system contrasts with the indirect form exercised by Britain in neighbouring Bechuanaland (see Colclough and McCarthy 1980:19) or Rhodesia, where the numbers of whites were also extremely small.

Schmidt (1922) distinguishes three settlement periods (pre-1894, 1894-1904, and 1904-1911), the breaks being defined by the Nama War and the Herero Revolt respectively. Four settlement types are discerned in terms of their dominant characteristics, namely military stations, trade and traffic settlements, farm settlements, and mission settlements. Windhoek embraced the first two. The growth in number and size of central places, their features and type of inhabitant are clearly shown, as well as the progressive rise in the area of white farmland (and concomitant white population densities), which was especially marked after the end of the Herero Revolt in 1907. By the end of the German period the communications infrastructure was already well developed (Gann and Duignan 1977:188; Calvert 1915:9-13; Section 4 below) - much of it built with black migrant labour from the Cape (Beinart 1981).

Agricultural settlement was already seen as the necessary basis for colonization by the early 1890s. Emphasis fell predominantly on nucleated smallholder settlements rather than extensive stockfarming, largely as a result of security considerations and especially the Germans’ central European farming notions which were totally inappropriate to ecological conditions in most of the territory (Kienetz 1975:384ff). Even though larger farms of between 2 000 and 10 000 ha were granted after 1907, overgrazing and environmental deterioration have increased in recent years.

A corollary of the German political stress on agriculture was that until after 1905, when the struggle for self-government arose, German farmers were portrayed as being the only essential and characteristic element of the settlers in SWA. Labourers and artisans were not included in social or political life, while military and civil service personnel were deemed temporary residents: only in 1912-1913 did it begin to be realised that the majority of Europeans in SWA were neither economically self-supporting nor members of the farming community.” (Bley 1971:76)
Already in German times the contract migrant labour system had been established and refined (Bley 1971:226-249; Moorsom 1977a). Treatment of black workers on farms was exceedingly harsh, with food rations totally inadequate even for minimum nutrition in most cases (Bley 1971:252-253). The attitude that the blacks were 'born slaves', 'lazy, and in need of constant supervision, harsh punishment, and 'education for work' was rapidly ingrained and widespread in both SWA and Tanganyika (Bley 1971:227,224; De Vries 1978:81; Iliffe 1979:150). This gives the lie to claims of 'paternal responsibility' for blacks so often made by German colonists (Bley 1971:253; Wellington 1967:230-234). Such claims should be seen as manifestations of, and justification for, their social attitudes of racial and cultural superiority, many of which persist amongst whites in Namibia today.

The relationship between the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) and colonialism during the German occupation (De Vries 1978) is of contemporary relevance too, given the great influence of mission and church in Namibia today (see Venter 1978). Throughout the early period the two were close, often overlapping, as missionaries frequently misunderstood their spiritual role, promoting the extension of the Motherland's power and culture as the means by which to achieve a more rapid extension of the 'Kingdom of God'.

"Mission theology degenerated into a moralism and spiritualism which was indistinguishable, from the strivings of colonialism."

(De Vries 1978:51)

Education and mixed marriages were two areas of enduring difference between mission and settlers, but only the generalized slaughter and unmitigated excesses of the Herero Revolt shook the mission from its acquiescence and brought the two into open conflict (De Vries 1978:79-82, 100-104, 171-177). The mission had been in the forefront of rapid cultural and religious change but "The bitterness of the African over this cultural change was not because of ingratitude - he enjoys the technical advantages that have come from the colonial period. It was because he was given a taste of the Europeans' cultural discoveries without being allowed to drink deeply of this overflowing cup."

(De Vries 1978:196)

The German colonial period came to an abrupt end when South African troops invaded SWA after the outbreak of World War I, forcing Governor Seitz and his Schutztruppe to surrender at Khorab, near Tsumeb, on 9th July 1915.

c) South African Occupation 1915

c(i) The Pre-World War II years. Immediately after the invasion a number of important publications sought to cast the German occupation in a poor light - in terms of general attitudes and the lack of
development (Calvert 1915) or more specifically the treatment of blacks (British Government 1918 - the 'Blue Book'). The latter reached rather hypocritical conclusions since there was much in common with the British record in South Africa (Wellington 1967:231). The German Government responded immediately, refuting much of the evidence, citing counter-evidence of British treatment of blacks in English colonies, and claiming the 'Blue Book' to be part of a campaign to deprive Germany of the return of her colonies after the War (Reiches Kolonialamt 1919).

In the event, Germany lost her colonies for good, and the League of Nations allocated them to various Allied countries in 1919 under the Mandate system. SWA thus came under approved South African control as a 'C' class Mandate, on behalf of Britain (Wellington 1967:255-269). Schoeman (1975) and Wellington (1967:270-272) discuss the period of military control between the 1915 invasion and the establishment of civilian rule under the Mandate in 1920. The German population were allowed to continue in their occupations, apart from military, police and administrative staff, who were repatriated after World War I. Controls on blacks were relaxed, and they were also provided with temporary reserves on vacant farmland in their former tribal areas. The first of a new wave of Boer farmers began moving into the territory - and immigration, particularly by people with capital, was officially encouraged. Overall economic conditions were good by 1919, but already the heavy reliance on diamond revenues was explicitly recognized.

From 1920 onwards, numerous pieces of South African legislation were made applicable to SWA: in terms of Article 2 of the Mandate, SA was permitted to govern SWA as an integral portion of itself, subject to adaptations to local conditions, and subject to the terms of the Mandate. General Smuts, the South African Prime Minister, affirmed in his 'Windhoek Speech' of September 1920 that, "In effect the relations between the South West Protectorate and the Union amount to annexation in all but name." (Bertelsman 1979:11)

It was the active pursuance of this policy until at least the mid-1970s, which generated the international wrangle over the territory, as we shall see below. From 1922 Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands, although constitutionally South African territory, were administered from SWA, of which they form an integral spatial and functional part. Only in 1977, when Namibian independence seemed more likely, was administration returned to SA (Prinsloo 1977).

White settlement on land and estates previously held by German concession companies or repatriated personnel, became official policy. Demand for land was high, but conditions hard. The major diamond mines were immediately brought under the control of the Anglo-American Corporation, under the name of Consolidated Diamond Mines of SWA (CDM), thereby securing the territory's chief resource for South African and British capitalists and eliminating the
competition with Germany which had lowered the pre-War diamond price (Innes 1980:544).

In terms of the De Wet Commission report of 1921, a form of government based on the South African provincial system was introduced, and automatic British citizenship granted to the German population in 1924, as aliens were to have no political rights (Wellington 1967:272-275; Bertelsman 1979:12-13). Notwithstanding some minor friction over language rights and schooling, South Africa's treatment of the Germans has been very good, in keeping with their status as whites (see Bertelsman 1979 for details). They still play a major role in commerce and industry in the territory, but have been almost exclusively replaced in administration by Afrikaners, who, by virtue of continual immigration until the early 1970s, have long been the majority white ethnic group (Table 2.1). This does cause some resentment among both German- and English-speaking whites, who feel disadvantaged by it.

In contrast to the treatment of its white charges, SA has systematically repressed blacks in the territory. They were excluded from administration and decision-making - in fact the dominant consideration for whites with regard to 'Native Affairs' was to ensure adequate labour and thus continued subordination. The Administrator, in his 1920 Report (cited by Wellington 1967:275) actually stated that

"The Native question is synonymous with the labour question."

Reserves were created in the Police Zone (the area south of the 'Red Line' drawn by the Germans to demarcate the northern reserves from the rest of the territory) where roughly 67 000 of the approximately 200 000 'Natives' enumerated in the 1921 census lived. They were not to be allowed on land desired for white settlers, and, unable to subsist on their own reserves, would be available as labourers. Pass Laws to restrict their movements outside the northern reserves were introduced in the Native Administration Proclamation, No. 11 of 1922, supplemented by curfew orders for blacks in white areas (Proc.33 of 1922, the Curfew Regulation Proclamation). The Masters and Servants Proclamation, No.34 of 1920, controlled employment conditions. These were less harsh than their German predecessors, but nevertheless extremely restrictive and discriminatory (Wellington 1967:275-283). It is not surprising that 'Native Affairs' had already become a bone of contention between the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission and South Africa.

In 1922 the Bondelswarts Nama revolt against the increasing restrictions placed on them was brutally suppressed, while an imminent rebellion by Rehoboth Basters bent on independence was only prevented by a large show of force in 1925 (Wellington 1967:285-290). In the same year the South West Africa Native Labour Association (PTY) Ltd., (SWANLA), a monopsonistic labour
recruitment organization run jointly by employers and government, was set up.
This removed the ability of workers to seek alternative places, types or conditions
of employment as they were simply allocated jobs (Gottschalk 1978;
It is necessary to devote some attention to administrative and legal structures,
since they underpin the status quo existing in 1977. South Africa's provincial-
style government was introduced by the South West Africa Constitution Act,
No.42 of 1925, creating an 18 member Legislative Assembly, Executive
Committee and an Advisory Council to function under the Administrator. Full and
final authority rested with the South African government, which also retained
control over

defence, security, police, foreign affairs, customs and excise, auditing, transport,
the interior, information, immigration, currency, and banking - as is the case in
South Africa itself. The highest court in Windhoek is a division of the South
African Supreme Court, with appeal to the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein
(Horrell 1967:19). 12 Assembly members were to be elected by adult whites with
at least 12 months' residency in the territory, while the remaining 6 were the
Administrator's appointees - one of whom was to be thoroughly
acquainted with the 'reasonable wants and wishes of the non-European races in
the territory'. The South African representative to the League, in response to
questioning on the issue, claimed that,
"it would be undesirable to press the Native beyond his capacity for absorbing
European political institutions, but
that he should be allowed to develop quietly and according
to such capacity as he had."
Racially discriminatory education was well established, the vastly inferior black
version often being justified in totally patronizing and culturally determinist
fashion by the authorities. This had the desired effect of maintaining a large,
uneducated black labour force (Wellington 1967:292-349,394-398; O'Callaghan
1977; Melber 1979). Education has been systematically developed as a
discriminatory pillar on which the entire exploitative system is based.
Comparison with the concerns of German schooling (Bertelsman 1979:17-21,73-
80,103-106) shows just how wide the gap was, and largely still is.
A prolonged drought 1929-1934, coinciding with the Great Depression, had a
strongly detrimental effect on the SWA economy. Innes (1980:548-550)
ascribes the great economic stagnation of the interwar

period also to conscious underdevelopment by SA. South African moves to make
SWA a fifth province were furiously countered by local Germans, who, by the
mid-1930s already held hopes, fanned by the rising wave of Nazi nationalism, of
reunification with Germany in a new Reich. The South West Africa Commission
(1936) which investigated the performance of the existing administration,
reported the poor economic conditions, general 'backwardness of the Natives' and the need for improving their education; and general failure of the existing form of government. In thus recommended SWA's government as a fifth province of the Union in future. Discussions with the League were interrupted by the Second World War (Wellington 1967:299-319).

c(ii) Consolidation and Incorporation Since World War II. Remote as the War itself was to SWA (apart from the internment of many Germans as Nazi sympathisers), the events of its immediate aftermath, in particular the establishment of the United Nations Organisation to replace the League, contained the seeds of the subsequent dispute over the territory's future status. Principally on the grounds that the UN was not the League's legal successor, SA resolved against signing a trusteeship agreement on SWA with the Trusteeship Council - which, would have exercised closer supervision than did the former Mandates Commission. The underlying South African motive was undoubtedly its long-held desire for the territory's full incorporation into the Union (Wellington 1967:327-329). When the General Assembly finally refused South Africa's request for incorporation in December 1946, the government replied that it had no alternative but to maintain the status quo and continue the administration in terms of the Mandate.

The status quo was not maintained, however. Prime Minister Smuts himself said in Parliament that the Mandate no longer existed, and SWA more nearly approximated a colony than anything else (my emphasis). He simultaneously announced plans to have SWA representatives in the SA Parliament, which he claimed was permitted by the Mandate. This was subsequently implemented by the National Party government elected in 1948: the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1949 (later amended in 1951) altered the SWA Constitution and provided for 6 elected MPs, to be elected by whites only, and two government-nominated Senators (Wellington 1967:327-329; Horrell 1967:19; Cockram 1976). Apart from furthering the cause of incorporation, this had an ulterior motive: to strengthen the position of the National Party (NP) in Parliament, where it had only a slender majority. Afrikaners, now the largest SWA white group, supported the NP.

In July 1950 the International Court of Justice ruled that SWA was a Mandated Territory under the League Mandate, that SA had full obligations as set out therein, and could only modify the international status of SWA with the consent of the UN. Protracted negotiations and disagreements between the UN and the SA government continued over several years (Goldblatt 1961; Wellington 1967:331-340; Dugard 1973:128-166).

After World War II the Namibian economy expanded, buoyed by major new mineral prospecting and exploitation by the Anglo-American Corporation, America's Newmont Mining Co. and others. Seen together with contemporary political manoeuvres, Innes (1980) concluded that the post-war transition from stagnation to capitalist penetration
centred upon an intensified Namibian dependence upon South Africa and the establishment of conditions for increased exploitation of labour. The increasingly strict application of South African policies of apartheid (racial 'separation') after 1948 implied severe restrictions on blacks (Olivier 1961). In contrast to the 'liberal' school of thought, which perceives apartheid as an ideological irrationality in conflict with economic growth and development, the 'radical' critique sees the two as mutually reinforcing (e.g. Wolpe 1972; Rich 1978). Black reaction and nationalism also increased after World War II. In 1946 and 1947 Herero Chief Hosea Kutako and Rev. Michael Scott petitioned the UN on behalf of Namibian blacks. Their grievances focused on legislative racial discrimination practised by SA, the contract labour system, poverty wages, and alleged torture and repression by the South African Police, which all violated the Mandate (Ellis 1979:8). Lack of progress in remedying the situation in the 1950s gave rise to political parties with liberation as their aim. Namibian students and workers in South Africa were instrumental in this process, probably influenced by the greater political awareness and organization of the Freedom Charter era there. It is significant that in 1954 SA again amended the SWA Affairs Act of 1949, removing 'Native Affairs' from local jurisdiction in favour of the SA Dept. of Bantu Administration.

The Ovambo People's Organisation (OPO), launched in 1958 by contract workers in Cape Town (including Shipanga, Toivo and Kerina), was renamed the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1960, when an attempt to merge with the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) failed (see Ngavirue 1972; Serfontein 1977; Totemeyer 1977 for details on the rise and growth of black and white political parties). Party politics in Namibia have been marked by persistent but futile attempts to create a broad, unified movement. Tribal affiliations were - and still are - a significant factor in politics, probably because the bulk of the population remain rural and rather isolated, and also because of the the tribally-oriented and divisive policy pursued by South Africa.

The South African response attempted to stifle mounting opposition by harassment and detention of black leaders on the one hand, and by further implementation of apartheid policies on the other. The Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, appointed in 1962, recommended in its report in 1964 that a Bantustan (or homeland) policy be implemented on the South African model - in terms of which each black ethnic group would be assigned a geographic area, based on existing peripheral
reserves, within which to exercise their 'political rights' and eventually achieve 'independence' (Figure 2.1). Future economic and political development was to be based on past development, with no significant restructuring. Thus SA control would increase still further and the reserves, already non-viable for many years due to inadequate land-base, poor infrastructural and economic development, overpopulation and the consequences of migrant

labour, become even more dependent on labour service in the white-controlled core region.

The inability of rural areas to support their population can be imputed from recent urbanization trends in Namibia, which show that, despite all restrictions and control measures, blacks have migrated to towns in increasing numbers (Simon 1982; also Section 3 below).

The Odendaal Plan was condemned abroad as 'balkanization' or 'divide and rule' which violated the Mandate (Wellington 1967:376-403; Horrell 1967:34-42; Innes 1980:576-578). A sequence of subsequent legislation embodied the bulk of this policy, which did include some infrastructural development, but also administrative reorganization and further incorporation with SA. Major laws were the South West Africa Constitution Act of 1968, the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act of 1968, and the South West African Affairs Act of 1969. During this period, which represented the zenith of colonial intensification, SWAPO eclipsed SWANU as the major and internationally recognized liberation movement.

In 1966 the International Court of Justice ruled on submissions made by Liberia and Ethiopia that SA was violating the Mandate on a number of counts. It found that the plaintiffs had no 'locus standi' in the case so the substantial issues were not in fact debated (Wellington 1967:372-376 and 423-444; Cockram 1976:Chapter 11; Dugard 1973: 239-375).

The outcome of this case proved to be a watershed in Namibian history. Firstly, in August 1966 SWAPO launched its armed struggle - a guerrilla campaign to liberate the territory by force, as, in their view, all peaceful means had failed (SWAPO 1981). Secondly, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2145 (XXI) in October 1966, terminating South Africa's Mandate and putting the UN in direct control - thus making continued South African occupation technically illegal. This was confirmed by the Security Council in March 1969, and in 1970 the UN Fund for Namibia was launched to finance the UN Council for Namibia, the organ charged with administering Namibia (International Defence and Aid Fund 1980:13). South Africa contested the UN's termination of the Mandate, but in its advisory opinion of June 1971 the International Court of Justice confirmed its validity (Dugard 1973:447-516; Cockram 1976).

South Africa has consistently maintained, firstly, that the UN has no legal qualification to carry out the supervisory functions formerly applicable under the
League, as it is not the legal successor thereto, and secondly, that it (SA) has advanced the material welfare and social well-being of the territory's inhabitants. She cites expenditures on infrastructure and development, and claims the homeland policy to be the optimal method of self-determination by each ethnic group. The arguments of SA's critics have been outlined already, not least the continued allegations that policies pursued in Namibia have aimed to suppress rising black opposition, incorporate the territory into SA as far as possible, and exploit its wealth to the benefit of SA. In December 1971, six months after the International Court verdict, a General Strike occurred among 12,000 contract workers in Windhoek and other urban centres, in protest at poverty wages, degrading living conditions and their continued exploitation by the entire contract system (see Wilson 1972 on similar conditions in South Africa). Although they did win some concessions, notably the replacement of SWANLA with Labour Bureaux (a technicality), and somewhat improved pay and conditions, the strike was put down, and the leaders tried in court (Winter 1977: Chapters 10-15; Kane-Berman 1972; Gottschalk 1978; Moorsom 1977b, 1978b:124139; Cronje and Cronje 1979:77-89).

Thereafter SA speeded up implementation of the homelands policy, and adopted increasingly repressive internal measures against blacks, especially SWAPO members. As the guerrilla campaign in the north escalated, virtual martial law - including curfews and wide powers of arrest - was introduced into Ovamboland by Regulation R17 (Ellis 1979:9).

The Portuguese coup of April 1974 and subsequent Angolan civil war were probably the most important events of the decade in southern Africa, for they changed the entire course of history in the region. There were three main effects for Namibia: firstly, SA lost in Portugal one of its staunchest allies against 'the communist onslaught'. Secondly, the evacuation of Portuguese troops, and instability north of the Kunene River due to the civil war, opened the way for increased SWAPO guerrilla infiltration into Namibia. Thirdly, and possibly most importantly, black morale in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe received a tremendous boost, and hopes for the speedy attainment of independence rose (e.g. SWAPO 1981:214). The debacle of South Africa's invasion of Angola and her eventual withdrawal from the stalemate with Cuban forces in early 1976 showed that SA was not totally invincible. Events within Namibia now moved rapidly: in September 1974 leaders representing each of the 11 ethnic groups met in Windhoek (with SA support) to discuss the territory's future. This gave rise to the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in September 1975, called to work out, on a consensus basis, a new constitution to serve as the basis for independence (Africa Institute 1980:6). The stress throughout was on the maintenance of ethnicity, and only explicitly tribal/ethnic representatives could attend. The broader-based or nationalist
parties, including SWAPO, were thus excluded, and they condemned the exercise as futile and merely an instrument to maintain apartheid (Ellis 1979:10).

The UN responded by setting its own conditions for independence in January 1976. In August of that year the Turnhalle Declaration of Intent was issued, envisaging independence on 31st December 1978. In April 1977 the Conference petitioned the SA government to establish an interim government based on their constitution, which provided for 11 ethnic second-tier governments, each sending delegates to the central government - where decisions would be taken by consensus (Africa Institute 1980:6). Each ethnic group would thereby effectively have a veto. This was of particular importance to the whites, represented by the National Party which, like its South African parent, has won every election since 1950.

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The five Western Powers (USA, Canada, UK, West Germany and France) stressed to SA the necessity of an internationally recognized independence based on UN Resolution 385, and a long process of negotiations was then initiated. The Western Five and South African officials reached a compromise agreement in June 1977, in terms of which the Turnhalle was to be disbanded and South African-sponsored elections held for a Constituent Assembly under UN supervision on a universal adult franchise. The UN would appoint a Special Representative to operate by agreement with an Administrator-General appointed by SA as the interim authority. All discriminatory legislation would be repealed and other appropriate measures taken prior to independence, envisaged for 31st December 1978. SWAPO agreed, subject to certain conditions regarding the withdrawal of South African troops during the election, and the prior release of political detainees. (Ellis 1979:11-12; Africa Institute 1980:10-13).

After the necessary enabling legislation had been passed, Justice M.T. Steyn was appointed first Administrator-General (AG) on 1st September 1977. With the return of Walvis Bay to the jurisdiction of the Cape Province, and the repeal of a number of discriminatory laws, a new phase in Namibian history began. This study is concerned with changes and developments from this time onwards as they affect Windhoek.

A simultaneous split occurred in the National Party which was to have major significance for internal Namibian politics. Dirk Mudge broke away to form the Republican Party. This became the key element in the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), established in November 1977 as an alliance of eleven single-ethnic parties, one from each ethnic

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group. Their policy aims at removing racial discrimination, while retaining strong emphasis on ethnicity and cultural identity (DTA 1980; National Party 1980; Africa Institute 1980). Independence did not materialize as planned, because talks broke down. Negotiations have continued intermittently since then, on the basis of UN
Resolution 435, passed in September 1978. This is an updated version of Res.385, incorporating the recommendations of the Waldheim Report on implementation of the UN plan. (Africa Institute 1980:13ff; Ellis 1979-13ff; SWAPO 1981).

3. POPULATION GROWTH AND SPATIAL STRUCTURE

Table 2.1 shows Namibian population growth since 1907. Data from the latest census, in August 1981, are not yet available. The coverage and breakdown of successive censuses was not uniform, while underenumeration of blacks and coloureds in both rural areas and larger urban centres is certain (Simon 1982). Walvis Bay has been included in all demographic data presented here.

In 1970 whites formed 11.8% of the population, coloureds 5.9%, and blacks 82.3%. Table 2.2 gives a breakdown into urban and rural population components by race, and their respective growth rates 1951-1970. By 1970 24.9% of the total population were urban, which is not low by African standards (cf. 10% in Botswana in 1971: Colclough and McCarthy 1980:178). Despite the entire apparatus of controls on movement, domicile and employment of blacks, they formed over 50% of the total urban population by 1970, although they were still 84.5% rural (Simon 1982).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>CHANGE %ANNUAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1951- GROWTH 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.2
CHANGES IN TOTAL POPULATION 1951-1970
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1960-'51-'60</th>
<th>1970 '60-'70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>28 774 57.63</td>
<td>53 680 73.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>21 156 42.37</td>
<td>19 784 26.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49 930 100.00</td>
<td>73 464 100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>6 626 38.38</td>
<td>12 254 51.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>10 640 61.62</td>
<td>11 711 48.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17 266 100.00</td>
<td>23 965 100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>34 856 9.50</td>
<td>57 423 13.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>332 029 90.50</td>
<td>371 512 86.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>366 885 100.00</td>
<td>428 535 100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.Pop.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>70 256 16.18</td>
<td>123 357 23.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>289 4.5</td>
<td>363 825 83.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>343 081 100.00</td>
<td>420 647 76.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


FIGURE 2.1
NAMIBIA: POLITICAL BOUNDARIES
INSET: CAPRIVI STRIP Andara

The 1970 population distribution by Magisterial District is shown in Table 2.3. These are administrative units, being the areas of jurisdiction of separate magistrate's courts - see Figure 2.2. Each homeland forms a separate Magisterial District. Comparative data from earlier censuses are not given here, because changes in District boundaries complicate data analysis. Nevertheless, it can be clearly seen how sparsely populated the southern part of the territory is in comparison to the north, particularly as much of the population in the south is concentrated in the towns (see Rep. of SA 1978, Table 1), while in the north almost all the people are rural peasants.

SWA Administration (1978) and Simon (1982) analyze the urban system; its spatial structure and racial composition are illustrated in Figure 2.2. Virtually all the significant centres are concentrated in what was until very recently exclusive
white socio-economic space i.e. outside the homelands. The same is true of the economic structure and transport network (Section 4 below). The homelands are thus underurbanized and lacking in facilities, services and formal sector economic opportunities commensurate with their population. Rural overcrowding is severe in parts.

Windhoek, the capital and commercial centre, is primate, having been virtually three times the size of the next-largest town, Walvis Bay, in 1970 (61 707 and 21 930 respectively). Since then Windhoek has grown rapidly (population estimated at 85 000 in December 1980: Town Planners, pers. comm.), whereas Walvis Bay has declined (see below), so that the ratio will now be even greater. From regional-centre level

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TABLE 2.3
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION 1970
BY MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT/HOMELAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bethanien</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>2 585</td>
<td>4 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushmanland</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damarland</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11 884</td>
<td>12 632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Caprivi</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26 051</td>
<td>26 199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobabis</td>
<td>4 752</td>
<td>1 043</td>
<td>17 606</td>
<td>23 401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grootfontein</td>
<td>4 797</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>16 867</td>
<td>22 098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereroland East</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11 320</td>
<td>11 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hereroland West</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8 883</td>
<td>8 948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaokoland</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12 664</td>
<td>12 773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karasburg</td>
<td>2 297</td>
<td>1 692</td>
<td>5 105</td>
<td>9 094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karibib</td>
<td>2 006</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>7 395</td>
<td>9 984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavango</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>54 436</td>
<td>54 846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keetmanshoop</td>
<td>4 817</td>
<td>4 902</td>
<td>12 217</td>
<td>21 936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luderitz</td>
<td>5 135</td>
<td>2 962</td>
<td>8 736</td>
<td>16 833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltah*he</td>
<td>1 074</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>3 705</td>
<td>5 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariental</td>
<td>4 499</td>
<td>3 737</td>
<td>12 984</td>
<td>21 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okahandja</td>
<td>2 098</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>8 530</td>
<td>11 046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omaruru</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4 433</td>
<td>5 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjiwarongo</td>
<td>3 944</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>11 363</td>
<td>15 895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outjo</td>
<td>2 800</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>10 542</td>
<td>13 495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owambo</td>
<td>1 017</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>304 300</td>
<td>305 561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboth</td>
<td>1 232</td>
<td>12 928</td>
<td>9 366</td>
<td>23 526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swakopmund</td>
<td>3 220</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>3 750</td>
<td>7 641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsumeb</td>
<td>5 376</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>13 189</td>
<td>18 731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walvis Bay</td>
<td>8 281</td>
<td>3 843</td>
<td>11 389</td>
<td>23 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>29 690</td>
<td>9 145</td>
<td>36 821</td>
<td>75 656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>89 917</strong></td>
<td><strong>45 156</strong></td>
<td><strong>626 489</strong></td>
<td><strong>761 562</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

downwards there is a fairly log-normal distribution of towns in the urban hierarchy, both in terms of population and functional centrality. The centres form discrete population concentrations, separated by wide expanses of bush or farmland. However, urban size is small: 21 of the 34 centres analyzed by Simon (1982) had fewer than 4,000 inhabitants in 1970. There is thus scope for more future urbanization without major diseconomies of scale, pollution etc. But again, the need for guaranteed water supply will provide a constraint in the south and west. New urbanization should, by rights, be spread more evenly, particularly in the northern areas of dense population concentration.

4. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

a) Openness

Like most Third World countries Namibia has a very open and export-oriented economy, which is heavily dependent on its umbilical cord to and from South Africa. All major communications routes are oriented towards that country (Figure 2.1) while the bulk of its imports and exports are channelled through it. Namibia is, in the words of Green (1981:9-10), "...a textbook illustration of an economy which produces what it does not use, and uses what it does not produce."

Economic production has centred on four key primary sector industries: mineral extraction (diamonds, uranium, copper, tin, wolfram, zinc etc.), fishing, meat (especially beef) production, and karakul sheep pelts. There is little secondary sector development, except for some processing of these primary products: copper refining, fish canning and processing, meat processing, and pelt curing (see Wellington 1967; Thomas 1978).

These commodities are all subject to the usual primary sector hazards of climatic uncertainty, especially drought, and price fluctuation. Fish catches have crashed
in recent years due to over-exploitation; the world market price for all three of Namibia's chief exports (diamonds, uranium and copper) are currently depressed, karakul prices on the London market have been low since 1979, and the chronic drought being experienced over the entire territory since 1979 has severely affected crops and cattle herds, and put increasing pressure on subsistence producers. In addition, the lack of economic diversification makes the entire economy extremely fragile and vulnerable. It against this background that prevailing economic conditions in Windhoek's urban economy must be seen (Chapter 7).

b) Spatial Structure

Four regions can be distinguished in Namibia's space economy (Figure 2.3; also Africa Institute 1980:50). Windhoek is the principal focus of the Central Region, which contains roughly 30% of the national population on 30% of the land area (cf. 56% and 35% respectively in the Northern Region; 8% and 20% in the arid Southern Region, and 6% and 15% in Namib Region). With commerce, light industry and services centred in Windhoek (Chapter 7), extensive ranching on the central plateau, and several mines round Windhoek and on the Namib fringes, it is the wealthiest region.

Much of the Northern Region's population depend on semi-subsistence
agriculture in overcrowded Ovamboland and wage remissicons from migrant labour, although its economic heartland lies in the white-owned ranches and mines of the Otavi-Tsumeb-Grootfontein triangle. Small stock (esp. Karakul sheep) are the Southern Region’s economic mainstay, with limited irrigated agriculture at Hardap and Stampriet. The ports of Walvis Bay and Luderitz are experiencing a severe decline following collapse of the pelagic fishing industry, for long one of the Namib’s main income and employment generators (WAi 1981; FM 1981; Namibia Information Service 1981). Diamond and uranium mining are of prime importance. Virtually without exception, Namibia’s mines lie outside homeland boundaries and many in remote inhospitable environs. Ore is exported in unreduced form, thus providing Little scope for local processing-led development. Of major significance is the spatial structure of the Namibian transport and communications system (see Figure 2.1). Although upgraded, and in the case of roads, substantially expanded, during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the present system was largely inherited from the Germans in 1915 (De Kock 1973). There are two east-west rail links - from Walvis Bay to Gobabis, and from Luderitz to Keetmanshoop, and a central north-south spine from Tsumeb to SA. The German rail system was connected to the South African line at Upington immediately after the SA occupation (Calvert 1915:9-13). As such it links the points of entry (the ports and SA) with the major economic nodes and administrative centres.

Many areas, especially the homelands, are peripheral to this system, and thus not effectively integrated into the national economic space, a factor further restricting their development potential. The transport network has been systematically used since 1915 to increase Namibian dependence on SA as the chief source of imports and export route - a process paralleling financial and, political incorporation (Wellington 1967:299-319,327-329,331-60; Green 1981:23; Innes 1980; WA 16/7/81:1-2). The railways are still run as an integral part (the 'SWA System') of the SA Railways; Windhoek and Keetmanshoop are served by South African Airways on its domestic routes; while Namib Air, only recently purchased from SA owners, operates scheduled and charter flights internally, with a daily link to Cape Town.

c) Sectoral Balance and National Product
Namibia's economic structure can be adduced from the respective sectoral contributions to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in recent years (Table 2.4). The mining industry, and in particular the commencement of production at Rössing Uranium mine, is mainly responsible for what real growth there was over the 1977-1979 period, despite its share of GDP having fallen from 51% in 1978 to 49.1% in 1979. Manufacturing accounted for a mere 4.1% compared to 23% in SA (SWA/Namibia Information Service 1981a).
'General Government' includes all government institutions of first, second and third tiers, except government enterprises, which are considered part of the private sector. Despite having risen in recent years, it thus understates government's total contribution. 'Electricity, gas and water' are all provided by state enterprises, so
this sector should be added to ‘General Government’; secondly, government
capital expenditure, particularly on construction projects, rose dramatically, to
stand at R157m, or 44% of Gross Domestic Fixed Investment in 1979
(SWA/Namibia Information Service 1981a:12). Total 1980/81 government
expenditure was estimated at R520m (roughly 40% of GDP), compared to
anticipated revenue of R432.1m (SWA/Namibia Information Service 1980).
Total expenditure in 1981/82 was budgeted at R970m, as against projected
revenue of R514m, with the shortfall to be made up by transfers from SA and new
loans (SWA/Information Service 1981b, 1981c). Although much of the increase
for 1981/82 represents government functions taken over from SA, the overall
position clearly shows the dominance of public sector activity in Nambia in terms
of administration, services and infrastructural investment. Nevertheless the
government claims (SWA/Namibia Information Service 1981b:3) that it sees its
chief role as creating the right climate for a free enterprise system, rather than
taking direct responsibility for employment provision and growth (see also
SWA/Namibia Information Service 1981c:3-6).
GDP at current prices was R1 200.4m in 1979, and R1 329.9m in 1980 i.e. R1 000 - R1 200 per capita. This, however, belies the fact that the greater proportion of the population live in rural semi-subsistence or as migrant labour in the towns and mines. Virtually all whites, a significant proportion of coloureds, and only a very small proportion of blacks - broadly corresponding to the urban bourgeoisie and agricultural elite - are well-to-do and this is reflected in great inequalities in the structure of consumption.

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d) Ownership and Control

The structure of ownership also reflects the dominance of South African and foreign firms. In mining, the diamond monopoly, CDM, belongs to the Anglo-American Group, Rossing Uranium to Britain's Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), and Tsumeb Corporation to a consortium including Newmont Mining and American Metal Climax (AMAX) of the USA, and SWACO of SA. The pelagic fishing industry is controlled by South African interests, as are major meat processing concerns. Undistributed profits are thus repatriated if not reinvested locally, and SA benefits from export taxes on many of the major exports, which are marketed via South African parent firms (Murray et al 1974; O'Callaghan 1977:66-69; Innes 1980:559ff.). Only in commerce are a significant proportion of firms domestically controlled.

Namibia's links with SA have several other indirect but important effects which feature prominently in local entrepreneurs' perceptions (see Chapter 7). Fiscal and monetary policy designed for South African conditions have a strong effect in Namibia, where conditions are often very different.

i) Thus, although Namibia fixes its own tax rates, they cannot, in practice, be higher than in SA because of their disincentive effect on skilled personnel (many of them South Africans) who are in critically short supply and who would then return to SA, all things being equal. Tax rates were thus lowered for the 1981/82 fiscal year, following a similar move in SA.

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ii) Inflation is imported from SA in particular, where demand-pull inflation is currently high, but in Namibia the same is not true (it has already been shown that government, rather than private, spending is the major source of the current growth there). The main impact of this in Namibia is thus cost-push inflation, due to high import levels from SA, the additional transport cost component involved, and the higher unit cost because of low bulk orders.

iii) The absence of border control or exchange control with SA enables free movement of material and financial assets. Over recent years the capital outflow, both from individuals and corporations, has been significant, due to the political uncertainty and wider scope for investment in SA. This trend will surely continue, if not accelerate, until the political future becomes stable or controls are instituted. Overall, there is also debate as to whether SA really is subsidizing Namibia, as she claims, or vice versa, as held by many critics (e.g. Herrigel 1971; Innes 1980;
Green 1981). From the budget data discussed above, and statistics presented in the Van Eeden Commission report (1980) and Africa Institute (1980:58), it certainly appears that there is a large transfer of funds to Namibia, particularly if the cost of the guerrilla war is included. But SA bases its claims almost entirely on public sector data. Claims to the contrary date back at least to the 1935 Report of the Economic and Finance Commission appointed by SA (Wellington 1967:301-303). The critics point to repatriation of corporate profits from mining, agriculture and fishing, Namibia's trade dependence on SA, and capital outflows. They thus concentrate on non-governmental sectors.

There is no simple answer. Indeed, it seems that it would not be possible to arrive at a definite conclusion at this stage - as many critical statistics and facts remain hidden. In addition, a large proportion of the transfers from the SA government in the 1981/82 financial year are regarded as reimbursements for government functions (especially police and defence) taken over from, SA in 1980/81 (Govt. of SWA/Namibia 1981 ). But this in no way detracts from Namibia's strong political and economic dependence on SA - which has been amply demonstrated above. Thomas (1978) provides the most detailed and well-regarded study of the territory's economy, together with alternative post-independence scenarios ('no change', 'moderate social democratic', and 'socialist') and their likely implications.

e) Conclusion

Overall, then, the Namibian economy is well integrated with, and heavily dependent on, South Africa, while the nature of much existing economic development and climatic constraints mean that development potential in many areas is relatively limited. The economy is further hamstrung by the lack of diversification, and vulnerability to changes in the world market prices of its main exports.

This is the broad national context within which Windhoek has evolved and developed, and which must inevitably colour policies and programmes adopted after independence. While not suggesting historical, environmental or economic determinism, the factors discussed necessarily provide both constraints and possibilities for national reconciliation, integration and development. It is equally important, moreover, to see people in the context of place, time and social situation, and hence group interest, when evaluating the consequences of their policy decisions (Chapter 1). Appropriate methodological perspectives were discussed in the previous Chapter. In the following Chapter attention is focused in some detail on the evolution and structure of Windhoek itself - the immediate context of this research.
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CHAPTER 3
FROM KRAAL TO CAPITAL: THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF WINDHOEK

1. INTRODUCTION: EARLY OCCUPATION; SITE AND SITUATION
Windhoek's central location and strategic value had been exploited long before the German Schutztruppe under Major Curt von Francois established a military station there on the 18th October 1890. Although this date is accepted as the foundation of the modern city, archaeological records of palaeolithic human activity there date back 5 000 years (Mac Calman 1965:215). The Red Nation (Gai -//Kxaum) Nama occupied the area during the early Nineteenth Century (Pendleton 1974:22). According to the Rhenish Mission 'Berichte' (Reports) cited by Schmidt (1922:14), a Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) member, Schmelen, arrived in 1823 and was the first to work among the Nama. In 1842 the well-known RMS missionaries, Hahn and Kleinschmidt, actually established a mission station in the valley. They had followed the Orlam leader, Jonker Afrikaner, who settled there in 1840 after moving north from the Orange River. Vedder (1938:176-180) suggests that this was at the behest of the Red Nation, who sought to stem the threat posed by southward migration of the Herero. Although the reliability of many of Vedder's assertions has recently been questioned (Kienetz 1975:8; Lau 1981), it is generally agreed that the Afrikaner Orlams occupied this area between 1840 and 1850 and again between 1870 and 1880, when Windhoek was abandoned ahead of a strong Herero attack. Rivalry between missionaries was also strong. In 1844 the Wesleyans displaced the RMS, who subsequently reoccupied the site in 1871 (Schmidt 1922:14). Apart from periodic visits by Witbooi's Nama and Maherero's Herero, Windhoek was unoccupied during the 1880s and on 16th May 1885 Jonker actually ceded sovereignty over the district, as then defined, to the Deutsches Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG) (Schmidt 1922:19). In addition to finding a central location for his military station in 1890, Von Francois thus judiciously filled the strategic vacuum between the contemporary positions of the Nama and Herero, Schmidt (1922:40) underlines how important this was to be.

Windhoek's importance derived primarily from two characteristics of its physical environment. It dominates a valley roughly 18 x 10km at an elevation of approximately 1 700m, the only easy north-south passage through the central massif formed by the Khomas Hochland, Auas and Eros Mountains. The maximum elevation is the 2 485m Moltkeblick peak. Furthermore, hot springs in a rock fissure of volcanic origin provide permanent water (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:22-23), an essential prerequisite for human settlement in this harsh environment. These springs are the origin of both the Nama and Herero names for Windhoek (Ai -//gams, firewater, and Otjomuise, steaming place, respectively - Pendleton 1974:22). The most likely explanation of the name Windhoek (lit. 'windy corner') is a contraction of Winterhoek (lit. 'winter corner'), which is the name given to the area by Jonker Afrikaner as it resembled the mountains around Tulbagh in the Western Cape from where he originally came (Vedder 1938:181-187; Pendleton 1974:22).
Windhoek's climate is fairly representative of the central plateau. Average annual rainfall is 370.3mm and the maximum thus far recorded was 780.9mm in 1909. Average daily temperature ranges from 30°C to 17°C in summer, and from 21°C to 7°C in winter (Municipality of Windhoek 1978:7-8, 1980:Chapter 2), although more extreme readings are not uncommon. Average humidity ranges from 50% at night to 25% by day in summer, and 40% at night to 18% by day in winter. Vegetation is typical thornveld.

2. COLONIAL BEGINNINGS
   a) Military Settlement and 'Political Momentum'
   The area occupied by modern Windhoek is actually two valleys separated and dominated by a steep ridge on which the German fort and lookout posts were built after October 1890. The old mission station had been in the smaller valley, Klein Windhoek, and it was here that the Germans first set up base, having repaired the abandoned buildings. The locus of authority shifted to the ridge once the fort was complete, and the Commissariat transferred there from Otjimbingwe in December 1891. The oldest known map of Windhoek was drawn for the DKG in 1891 (Figure 3.1). Although not strictly to scale it shows the old mission site with garden, Jonker Afrikaner's nearby house, and the earliest plots of cultivated land in Klein Windhoek, as well as the fort, canteen and Sperlingslust outpost on the ridge overlooking Gross Windhoek. In the same year the positions of the military commander and Commissioner (Reichskommissar) were fused into that of Landeshauptmann. Von Francois held the position until in 1894 its title was changed to Governor and Leutwein took charge (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:12).

In 1892 Klein Windhoek was set aside for settlement by small-holders under the auspices of a newly-formed settlement syndicate. Initially 50 plots of 3-4 Prussian morgen each were marked out, and on 25th August 1892 the first four settlers received land there. On 14th February 1893 there were 8 altogether, while another 13 plots had been reserved for former soldiers (Schmidt 1922:24). Numbers gradually increased, and produce - mainly vegetables and milk but later also fruit and even wine - was sold to the main settlement. There was, however, a lack of grazing in the valley, and the water supply restricted the amount of possible cultivation (Mossolow 1965:132-134).

Schmidt (1922:29) stresses the importance of 'political momentum' as the chief determinant of settlement in a colony. Much of Windhoek's early growth was due to its administrative and military functions. Its entire population in 1893 was about 160 whites and 300-600 Africans, but already it occupied a position of disproportionate socio-political importance (Bley 1971:77). Most of the whites...
were troops and civil servants, so that the fort and administrative buildings were the centre of activity. This role was emphasized during the Nama and Herero rebellions of 1894-1896, although Windhoek was not the scene of any fighting. The unusualness of Windhoek as a colonial capital centrally located in the colony has already been mentioned. Several defeated groups, notably the Khauas and the Swartboois, were forcibly resettled there (Schmidt 1922:52-53; Bley 1971:77). Together with the hired Berg-Damara and Herero, they provided labour for the whites. The first postal agency was opened in 1894 (Schmidt 1922:56) and the first proper town plan and orderly making of streets commenced in 1895,

reflecting the settlement's growth. This was a crucial event in imprinting German cultural values onto the townscape because, as will be shown below, modern Windhoek is still profoundly influenced by the layout adopted at this point (see also Chapter 1).

This formalization is the essential difference between the two maps dated 1892 and 1895 (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Note how most of the buildings are situated along the line of hot springs, and also the dominant position of the 'Kaserne' (fort) and Sperlingslust beerhall (formerly a guardpost). The main north-south axis, Kaiserstrasse, was already laid out in the valley and it became the focus for commercial activity, a role it still fulfils today. Very little construction had occurred in Klein Windhoek.

By 1896 there were 160 whites excluding soldiers in Windhoek. Despite this small size it was by far the largest white settlement and as Bley (1971:77) points out, in contrast to the warm welcome accorded any white elsewhere, "a more discriminating social life grew up in Windhoek based on the social hierarchy of a German provincial town."

Even among whites, not everyone had direct access to the Governor; distinction was made between newcomers and 'Old Africans', and German-style clubs sprang up. Some friction arose between government employees, who formed the bulk of the consumers and received their provisions direct from the government, and private traders who were thereby cut off from much of their potential market.

There was,
however, a close relationship between lower-level civil servants and settlers during the 1890s, not least because many of the former planned to establish themselves on farms after completing their service contracts. As mentioned in Chapter 2, artisans and labourers were not included in social and political life until at least 1905, despite forming a large proportion of the white population. During 1896 tremendous friction arose between Leutwein, who favoured an accommodation of sorts with the Herero, and some Windhoek settlers who, physically remote from the hostilities and militarily secure in the capital, desired a rapid and effective military solution (Bley 1971:77-79).

Further white immigration to Windhoek occurred in 1897 when many settlers were forced off the land by the great Rinderpest epidemic. Construction of the railway line from Swakopmund commenced in September 1897 and was completed in June 1902 (Schmidt 1922:53). This link henceforth improved military logistics and commercial supply, thus fostering further urban growth and facilitating the conduct of the 1904-1907 war with the Herero and Nama. The heliographs to Swakopmund and Keetmanshoop were constructed by 1901. Windhoek's growth was impeded by the Revolt, but until the outbreak of hostilities, the white population enjoyed economic prosperity.

The first school for whites was established in Windhoek in September 1894 with one teacher giving classes at the Governor's residence. A proper school was built in 1900, and had 18 pupils in the following year (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:14). Compulsory education was introduced in 1906, and Boers (Afrikaners) had the right to establish their own schools. The Holy Cross Roman Catholic Convent was opened in 1908 and the first Kaiserlichen Realschule (secondary) in 1909 with 12 pupils. The missions played a prominent early role in education for all races, although schools were segregated even before the establishment of colonial authority. This is an important point in terms of Mission - State relations as discussed in Chapter 2. Instruction for blacks was generally provided in the mother-tongue by the RMS, although Cape Dutch (Afrikaans) was widely used until proclamation of the German Protectorate, when German was imposed. The first mission schools for blacks and whites were established in Windhoek in 1894. Originally the missions had provided the only education for blacks but the Government gradually increased its control between 1890 and 1913. Racially
discriminatory budget allocations for education were already instituted in the territory. Thus from 1909 onwards 9 000M were provided annually for blacks, and in 1914/15 alone, 329 000M for whites (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:14; O'Callaghan 1977:95-96; Katzao 1980:22-34). In 1902 the 'Native church' was built in Windhoek (Schmidt 1922:57). Today this is the national headquarters of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (formerly the Rhenish Mission Church), one of the most important black religious organizations.

Estimates of Windhoek's population at the time vary. According to Schmidt (1922:65) and Municipality of Windhoek (1952:40) the white population in 1903 was 630, of whom 610 were German. Pendleton (1974:31) gives a figure of 610 whites, 119 coloureds and 1 935 blacks, making a total of 2 664. (However, his total figure of 3 324 does not tally with these components.) Bley (1971:78) also gives 610 whites but excludes soldiers. Bahr (1970:44) gives a total of 457 whites of whom 100-200 were soldiers.

Klein Windhoek was the only farming centre in the territory to have a ready market nearby - and thus a secure existence. Given the valley's suitability for market-gardening and the growth of Windhoek, its population was also increasing and its character thus changing from a purely agricultural settlement into a typical suburb. Although settled homestead owners were still greatly in the majority there, it had begun to divert some of Windhoek's growth by 1903 (Schmidt 1922:67; Mossolow 1965 for details on the entire German period).

Perhaps the single most noteworthy stimulus to the colony's economy in the period between the Herero Revolt and World War I was the discovery of diamonds in 1908. Although the diamond area is far from Windhoek itself, the spin-off commercial activity and increased politico-economic importance of SWA as a whole, led to further growth in the capital, especially after the completion of the Keetmanshoop railway line in 1912. The town plan was extended in 1906, 1909 and 1911, to include a greater area and take account of these new developments (Mossolow 1965:136). In 1909 municipal status was granted separately to Windhoek and Klein Windhoek.

b) A German Colonial Town

Concomitant with further growth came construction of several important public buildings in 1910-1911, notably the Roman Catholic hospital in Stibel Street, the new Government Buildings, colloquially known as the Tintenpalast (lit. 'Ink Palace'), and the German Lutheran 'Christuskirche'. The Tintenpalast, Christuskirche and fort are adjacent to one another on top of the ridge overlooking the main valley - a symbolic unity of Church and State (Plate 3.1). Juxtaposition of government
buildings is in fact a characteristic of German colonial town planning, standing in
marked contrast to the more
dispersed distribution in Portuguese and British colonial cities (see e.g. De Blij
1963:29, 42, 59; De Blij 1962:60; Collins 1969; Smout
1977:57, 69). The scale of, and relative area occupied by, government buildings
also tend to be significantly smaller in German than in British-designed cities,
which is somewhat surprising in view of Calvert's assertion (1915:78) that the
German bureaucracy was so much heavier:
"The system of Government is an elaborate machine not at all
suited to a thinly populated country like German South West
Africa."

These issues relate to the conceptual aspects of culture-specific typologies of
colonial cities raised in Chapter 1, and need far more detailed research than falls
within the present scope. For example, a comparative study of former German
colonial capitals (Windhoek, Dar Es Salaam and Lomé) would be instructive, especially as Dar, at
least, had a population similar to Windhoek's at independence. We shall merely
emphasize again the long term impact of colonial planning and land-use policies
in all parts of the Third World, be they cities
Collins 1969; Christopher 1976; Smout 1977), Asia (McGee 1967; King 1976;
Reed 1978) or South and Central America (Griffin and Ford 1980; Clarke 1974,
1975).

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PLATE 3.1
Symbolic unity of Church and State: the Lutheran Christuskirche and the Alte
Feste overlook the main valley. The Tintenpalast
is obscured behind the Feste.

PLATE 3.2
German Imperial architecture survives as an Historical Monument amid the
modern buildings in the heart of Kaiser Street's commercial area.

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Another universal feature of African colonial cities was the physical residential
separation of indigenes and settlers. Where urbanization preceded the European
conquest, segregation very often took the form of new white residential areas or
separate towns beyond the old walled towns, which remained for the indigenes
(Chapter 1). Where cities were established by the colonists, they normally
reserved the best land for themselves and relegated the indigenes to the periphery.
In Manila the Spanish reserved the central area, 'intermuros', for themselves and
the outer area, 'extramuros', for Asians (Reed 1978). A similar pattern was
followed throughout colonial Africa. Unless specific local environmental factors
dictated otherwise, the settlers generally monopolized the high ground or
coastal belt, which was cooler, aesthetically more pleasant, and removed from the
perceived health hazards of the frequently overcrowded, unsanitary conditions in
which the indigenes lived. This was particularly true of cities developed in the late Nineteenth Century, as were most of those in East, Central and Southern Africa, when the Garden City movement with its slogans of 'health, air, light' was at its height (King 1977/8). The 'native quarter' was frequently adjacent to the industrial area, obviating the need for transport to work (see e.g. Larimore 1958:85-86; Kuper, Watts and Davies 1958; De Blij 1963:31; Southall 1967; La Fontaine 1970: 19-24; Davies 1972, 1981). The white area was typically large and low density, and the black (or coloured) small, high density (Hance 1970: 254-255). The towns of SWA were no exception and the need for such 'locations', as they are generally referred to in Southern Africa, was explained.

"... in the interests of cleanliness and the potential for stricter control ..."
(Schmidt 1922:90).

In Windhoek it was situated just to the west of the city - beyond the railway line, on a ridge in the valley floor. Its precise origin is unclear, and may well have arisen through spontaneous settlement for reasons connected to the strife between white and black at the time (Pendleton 1974:24). Both Schmidt (1922) and De Blij (1963:20) merely say it 'developed', but a 1903 map of Windhoek (not reproduced here) suggests that the locations were already forming by then. Accommodation consisted of a mixture of traditional style huts and shacks, and conditions were poor.

The various features discussed are clearly visible on the maps of 1909 and 1916 (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). White residential areas had spread around the Kaiser Street axis parallel to the river but housing quality and social status were commensurate with elevation on the hill below the Government - Church complex. Officials and entrepreneurs sought to get away from the noise and dirt of the commercial area, especially after the advent of the railway (Schmidt 1922:103). Thus their houses spread up the hill and round into Klein Windhoek, which by now had a much better road link to Windhoek proper. Most houses were now larger than the first dwellings, and built of stone rather than wood. On the whole they stood on one side of the street only, giving an open appearance, with much room for future growth. The architecture was unmistakably German, but in contrast to the many elaborate and spacious homes, most commercial premises were simple single-storey buildings with large yards and storage space. They were centred mainly along Kaiser and Stdbel Streets. Virtually all types of

FIGURE 3.4
WINDHOEK IN 1909
a 4m 1 000
L4Zc
ORIG. 1110 000
COURTESY-NATIONAL ARCHIVE, WINDHOEK
commercial and professional activity were represented, and Windhoek had undoubtedly the most European character of all the centres in SWA. Schmidt (1922:102-103) emphasizes that the fort's situation, coupled with the original military motive for settlement in Windhoek, dictated the layout and character of the whole town, as well as its future development. Although topography obviously dictated the alignment of many roads, it is interesting to note how irregular the overall layout was. Streets frequently ran at odd angles to one another, necessitating awkward intersections; streets were of variable width, although the main arteries like Kaiser and Tal Streets were broad; and city blocks are of irregular shape and size. This is another characteristic of German-planned cities (cf. De Blij 1963:18) standing in strong contrast to the grid-iron, rectangular structure of Spanish and British-designed cities (Smout 1977; Davies 1969; Halliman and Morgan 1967:119; Griffin and Ford 1980:398-399; Clarke 1974, 1975). Most roads were of unsurfaced gravel so that dust from wagons, horses and early cars was unpleasant. The large open space at the southern end of Kaiser Street is the Ausspannplatz ('outspan square ') for ox-wagons, an essential feature of early southern African towns, and functional precursor of the modern parking area. By 1912/13 Windhoek's population totalled about 7 000, of whom 2 861 were white, including soldiers, 59 coloured and 4 126 black (Pendleton 1974:31). The doubling of the black population reflects in particular the effect of the 1904-1907 wars, when Herero and Nama had been precluded from owning cattle and land. Deprived of their bases of economic reproduction, they were forced to seek work in the growing urban areas, especially Windhoek. A small increase probably occurred in the following two years, but overall this was the position at the outbreak of World War I, which heralded the start of a new phase in Windhoek's history under different colonial masters.

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ERA
a) Colonial Consolidation

In 1916 the German Municipal Council was dissolved by the South
African military authorities, and the military magistrate in Windhoek was appointed Commissioner to control all municipal affairs. A municipal superintendent was put in charge of the locations, and these areas were never administered as an integral part of the city. Local authorities were again provided for by a proclamation of June 1920, and the former municipalities of Windhoek and Klein Windhoek unified into a single body (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:14). Only whites were allowed to vote in Municipal elections and this is still the case today; however, an Advisory Board was created under the Location Superintendent in 1927. Half of its members were elected and half appointed (Pendleton 1974:26).

Major South African enterprises began opening branches in Windhoek and other SWA towns immediately after the Occupation. Among the first was the National Bank of South Africa (later amalgamated with Barclays Bank DCO) in August 1915 (Lempp 1964:9). This commercial and financial penetration has continued up to the present, although a number of new German and South African immigrants set up local businesses as well.

The power station in what is now the Southern Industrial Area came on-stream in 1924, providing the city with electricity for the first time. Between the World Wars, Windhoek's population continued to increase significantly, despite the overall stagnation of this period which significantly affected Windhoek too (Bahr 1970:45) and prevented any significant private construction (Lempp 1964:136-138). Unfortunately the first two censuses held by the South Africans in 1921 and 1926 omitted blacks, and the second, coloureds as well (see Table 3.1, from which 1926 has thus been omitted). Pendleton (1974:31) cites a figure of 4 752 blacks in 1927. By 1936 the city's total population exceeded 10 000, and whites still outnumbered blacks and coloureds combined.

The map of 1930 (Figure 3.4) reflects prevailing economic conditions and thus shows relatively little spatial development since 1916, except for some infilling. The Main Location to the west of the city was formalized and reorganized in 1932. Streets were laid out and the area subdivided by ethnic affiliation. According to Pendleton (1974:25) the inhabitants apparently accepted this, and some informal ethnic subdivisions had already been operating.

The rise of Nazi sympathy among many Germans during the 1930s caused serious tension and led to large scale internments, thereby disrupting civilian life. After World War II, however, a major new period of growth and development commenced in Windhoek, paralleling the improved agricultural situation and large new South African investments in the territory (see Chapter 2). Former internees returned and many new immigrants from Europe, displaced by the war, including a large proportion of the Jewish community, went into
FIGURE 3.6
WINDHOEK IN 1930
business or the professions. The history of many important local firms is outlined by Lempp (1964). Over this period the white and black populations grew very rapidly, and total population rose from 14,929 in 1946 to 20,598 in 1951. Curiously, however, the number of coloureds declined over both the 1936-1946 and 1946-1951 periods (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 1947 saw the establishment by the Municipality of Pokkiesdraai, a third location specially to accommodate additional Ovambo contract labourers needed by the expanding economy, and it had over 1,700 inhabitants by 1955 (Pendleton 1974:27). Earlier in the 1940s, the idea of building a new township to replace the Main Location had been mooted, as conditions there were bad and the land it occupied was needed for further expansion of the white residential area. Such close proximity of different races was deemed undesirable and probably a potential political threat (Pendleton 1974:27-28). These plans were shelved, however, and only revived in the mid 1950s, when urban growth was further advanced and the progressive implementation of apartheid by the National Party, who were now in control, required separate locations for blacks and coloureds. The map of 1951 (Figure 3.7) shows the spread of white homes, especially between Kaiser Street and the Main Location, and also in Klein Windhoek, where rising land values had prompted much subdivision of small-holdings and land speculation. Agricultural production here had thus declined rapidly. Extension of the business area along Kaiser Street is also evident, especially round the Ausspanplatz and the northern section of Kaiser and Stubel Streets
later located beyond the town to the north. No hard data from this period were obtained, as the Factories Act (Ord.34) was passed only in 1952, and firms had not yet registered (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:67).

The earliest land-use and related data to hand are those collected in 1952 for the first Development Plan (Municipality of Windhoek 1952), and comparison of the figures for white and black areas vividly illustrates the inequitable land allocations, intensities of the use of space, and functional land-use intensities (Table 3.3). The proportion of vacant land is low in the Location primarily because of the far higher residential land usage there than in the rest of Windhoek. When seen together with the small area per dwelling - less than 10% of the figure for white areas - it implies major under-allocation of land to blacks and coloureds. Note 3 to Table 3.3 explains the apparent lower occupancy ratio for these groups. Dwelling size in the Location was well below acceptable standards. This physical overcrowding, together with the accompanying social effects and unsanitary conditions, were major factors in the decision to build
new locations (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:96). The high percentage of land occupied by roads there resulted from the grid-iron layout adopted in 1932. Apart from being wasteful it was deemed socially undesirable, and thus largely avoided in planning the new locations (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:69-70, 99).

All the land in the Location was owned by the Municipality, and leased to tenants for a small monthly rental. Houses were erected and owned by the occupants and, as Pendleton points out (1974:26), these frequently represented the owner's most valuable assets, which could also be sold, rented out and inherited. As such they were of major importance to the people, despite their relatively poor structure and appearance, being typically wood and corrugated-iron shacks.

Public ownership of land has also been a consistent feature of Windhoek's history in the white areas. While very significant, it was not absolute, as 26.6% of land was privately owned residential and commercial/industrial property in 1952. The 73.4% in public ownership was split between the Municipality (56.2%), SWA Administration (9.9%) and SA Railways and Harbours (7.3%). These figures included a large proportion of the available residential land, as most employees were provided with free or subsidized housing as part of their service conditions (see Chapter 6).

(1) The entire location was served by only 68 water standpipes and taps, 120 latrines, and 16 showers, i.e. 1 per 119, 67 and 505 inhabitants respectively (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:71).

Windhoek had increasingly grown into the major educational centre in the territory, attracting many pupils from the outlying districts to the secondary schools in particular. Thus 77% of primary, but only 42% of high school pupils were day scholars in 1952. At the same time, however, a significant number of children from Windhoek and other areas attended schools in SA. As a result, changes in the number of school children were not proportionate to, or entirely dependent upon, the growth of Windhoek's population alone (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:49).

In 1952 there were 8 white schools in the city, with a total enrolment of 2 638. Only one, the government-run Windhoek High School, was entirely a high school; while the Privately-owned Holy Cross Convent and Deutsche H6here Privatschule (DHPS) had both high and primary sections. There were 6 schools
for blacks and coloureds in 1952 with a total enrolment of 1 082, but it is not clear from the data which, if any, were high schools.

Windhoek's rapid growth, coupled with the need to serve the wider population as well, meant that health services and facilities were totally inadequate by 1952, particularly for blacks and coloureds. Apart from two maternity homes for whites with 27 beds between them, the 39-bed State-aided European Hospital and 95-bed Catholic Hospital had average daily occupancy figures of 36.36 and 65.85 beds respectively in 1952. Both buildings dated from 1910 or earlier. For blacks there was a 14-bed Red Cross maternity clinic, opened in the Main Location in 1951, and a dilapidated 235-bed State-aided 'non-European' Hospital near the railway station, which had a daily

average of 227 occupied beds in 1952. This included 87 long term mental cases i.e. only 148 beds were available for ordinary admissions (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:46-47, 71). But by this stage improved facilities were under active consideration.

b) From Segregation to Apartheid

The late 1950s saw accelerated growth throughout the city. In the central area new hotels, cinemas and bank buildings appeared, as well as a small theatre complex, the new State Hospital complex in Windhoek North and a new industrial area north of the city. Planning policy since then has directed most new industries there and placed restrictions on the activities which may be carried out in the Southern Industrial Area. Construction of Katutura Township for blacks commenced about 6km northwest of the town centre, near the new industrial area, in 1957 (Clayton 1974:28). This gave rise to strong opposition from a large part of the Main Location's population, particularly the Herero. They had not been consulted at the decision-making stage, resented the political motives underlying the implementation of apartheid and closure of the Location, the unnecessarily great distance to the town and high transport cost thus involved. Another problem was the loss of privately owned houses, for which small compensation was to be paid at the Municipality's discretion, and their replacement by more costly rented accommodation in Katutura. Although this was of a 'permanent' nature and higher standard, the people resented being made utterly dependent upon the Municipality (Pendleton 1974:28; SWA Review 1970:3). This lack of private property ownership has in fact led to a number of serious problems which the authorities are only now trying to rectify (Chapter 6). Ironically, 'Katutura' means 'place where we do not stay' in OtjiHerero (Pendleton 1974:2).

The resistance campaign heightened late in 1959, with a march and demonstration outside the Administrator's residence on 3rd December. He refused to discuss the issue, and on 8th December a boycott was mounted against all
Municipal services and facilities. A protest meeting in the Location on the night of 10th December led to a confrontation with the police, who opened fire, killing eleven people and wounding over 40. Amid popular protest and official allegations of political incitement, a Commission of Enquiry was held, which essentially concurred with the authorities (Union of South Africa 1961; SWA Review 1970).

Ironically, this incident hastened the move to Katutura, as several thousand Location inhabitants fled during the shooting, and, fearing inter-ethnic conflict, refused to return. Instead they sought and obtained permission to occupy the completed houses in Katutura, which at that stage was still under construction (WA 1959). The rate of construction was speeded up (a total of roughly 3 000 houses being built) and encouragement given to other people to move voluntarily. A strong cleavage arose between those who moved to Katutura, and those refusing to do so, who viewed the former as sell-outs. Even when the Location (henceforth referred to as the Old Location) was officially closed on 31st August 1968, many Herero under Chief Kapuuo staged a passive resistance campaign (Winter 1977:Chapter 6). Despite a recommendation to the contrary (Municipality of Windhoek 1952:99) the Klein Windhoek Location was also closed. Thus ended one of the most traumatic political episodes in Windhoek's history, often referred to, even today, and one which contributed directly to the rising momentum of newly-formed nationalist political parties, notably SWANU and SWAPO.

Pendleton (1974) provides a detailed exposition of conditions in Katutura in the late 1960s, as well as social relationships and networks among its inhabitants. Originally coloureds moved to Katutura as well, but with the opening of Khomasdal as an exclusive coloured township just south of Katutura in 1966, they were pressurized to move there. Some, in fact, had requested separate housing, but a number of coloureds have always resided in Katutura. In contrast to blacks, coloureds could purchase their new houses, albeit subject to very restrictive conditions. About 1 000 houses were built. Housing is better and more varied than in Katutura, and plot size larger (Chapter 6).

With the demolition of the Old Location in 1968, Windhoek had fulfilled the requirements of SA's Verwoerdian apartheid geography, becoming a city divided against itself, with three discrete racial settlements separated by a statutory buffer strip (Figure 3.8). As in South Africa, the less formal 'Segregation City' had been replaced by the institutionalized and structurally simplified 'Apartheid City'. This aimed to provide a broadly sectoral arrangement of racially homogeneous residential areas to avoid interracial contact, minimize the need for cross-travel to or from work and enable future urban expansion in opposite directions (Municipality of Windhoek 1952; Davies 1972, 1981; Western 1981). However, in contrast to Western's findings in Cape Town, whites did not
gain real estate directly: the Location was razed, and the land, which was Municipal property, lay derelict until recently.

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FIGURE 3.8
WINDHOEK IN 1961
(COURTESY OF MUNICIPALITY OF WINDHOEK)

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Black were, moreover, seen legally as temporary urban residents, in Windhoek only to provide labour, and subject to 'repatriation' to their respective homelands on completion of their contracts or when no longer economically active. These provisions were contained in the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation (No.56 of 1951). The full range of relevant laws and restrictions are discussed in Chapter 5. In view of their status, blacks were not deemed to have the right to trade in urban areas. Licenses were issued at the authorities' discretion and all commercial premises were Municipal property. This, and the converse aim of assisting white-owned business explains the total commercial underdevelopment of the townships. These restrictions did not apply to coloureds, although residence permits were (and still are) required by new immigrants from South Africa. Whites form the social, economic and political 4lite, although there has been significant upward economic mobility among some coloureds in recent years. The bulk of blacks form an un- or semiskilled labouring proletariat, many of whom live on or below the breadline. There was also an important legal distinction between 'resident' and 'temporary' (i.e. migrant) blacks in terms of rights and privileges in the urban area. This will be discussed in more detail below. The rate of population growth can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Between 1951 and 1960 the number of coloureds more than doubled, while that of whites almost doubled and total urban population rose some 80%. By 1968 the coloured population had more than doubled again; blacks and whites also increased rapidly, and Windhoek boasted over

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50 000 inhabitants for the first time. Population growth was especially rapid between 1968 and 1970, but slowed somewhat during the early 1970s. However, the white population growth rate has in fact declined in each intercensal period from its peak during 1951-1960. These trends reflect the economic climate and state of the job market fairly closely. The recession of the early 1970s, following the 1968-1970 boom, did much to reduce population growth rates of all race groups, particularly through net migration which was more important for coloureds and blacks than whites (Municipality of Windhoek
However, the rates of natural increase of all races have also declined since 1970. In 1970 whites represented less than 50% of the city's population for the first time. Between 1970 and 1975 the proportion of both whites and coloureds declined, reflecting the rapid net migration of blacks in spite of all the controls and restrictions, and reversing earlier trends (Bdhr 1970:49; Simon 1982).

Some caution is necessary, though, in that the data used here are likely to have a fair margin of error. On the one hand underenumeration of coloureds and blacks is fairly certain in both the national censuses and municipal surveys (UNIN 1978; Thomas 1981; Simon 1982), although Municipality of Windhoek (1976:2-4) suggests a high degree of accuracy for the municipal surveys and over-counting of coloureds in the 1970 census. This view is contested by some municipal officials and social workers in Khomasdal (personal comment). On the other hand, migration data are limited (as no border control exists between South Africa and Namibia) and have been estimated by subtracting natural increase from total change. (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:5,8. This publication contains much detailed demographic data for 1975).

As a result of this growth, more residential accommodation was urgently required for all races. 1 699 new houses were built in Katutura in 1968 and 167 more in Khomasdal Ext.1 (Table 3.4). Windhoek's morphology also changed dramatically with the planning and proclamation in the same year of the new middle class white suburb of Pioniers Park in the south-west of the city. This was filled so rapidly, with 960 homes erected during 1968-1970, that another new adjacent suburb, Academia, was developed and proclaimed in 1970. This was followed by upper middle class Eros Park (north of Erö) in 1972 and middle class Olympia in the south-east in 1973, while many new houses were built in Windhoek as well. Ludwigsdorf (Klein Windhoek Ext.3) was proclaimed in 1976, but white housing construction virtually ceased after 1975 due to increased political uncertainty. Conversely, many new dwellings have been erected in both Katutura and Khomasdal every year since 1975, but inadequate to prevent a growing backlog in the face of rising aspirations and an increasing population (see Table 3.4 and Chapter 6). Figure 3.9 and Plate 3.3 show the urban structure in 1981, which reflects the recent growth.

4. TRANSITION: A NEW DISPENSATION?

We are fortunate in having a far better social and economic data base for Namibia as a whole, and Windhoek itself, in the mid 1970s than any previous date. On the one hand, the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference published some national statistics used in their deliberations, and on the other, the Town Planning Section of the Municipality of Windhoek prepared a number of excellent reports in 1976-78 based on the 1975 census, some of which have been cited
above. These provided an incomparable baseline against which to measure the process of change since 1977, and for the sake of greater clarity the data on residential patterns, social structure, schools, the urban economy, urban planning and resource allocation etc. will be discussed in the relevant chapters below.
At the end of the 'conventional' colonial period (Chapter 1) and commencement of the transition process in 1977, Windhoek was a small city, even in terms of colonial capitals, with an official population of only 75 000 - 80 000. Even more unusual is the fact that only since 1970 have whites been in the minority, and this certainly reflects the degree of control and influence they exercise over the political economy. Windhoek's chief national and regional functions have been as political-administrative, communications, commercial (especially wholesale and distribution) and somewhat of an educational centre. As such it is a distinctly primate city, three time the size of Walvis Bay, the second largest town (Simon 1982). But even so, it has only a very limited manufacturing base, due to the small local and national population thresholds, the large area and dispersed population, diffuse resource distribution, high cost of electricity and water and also the nature of Namibia's relationship with SA (Chapter 2). The city did, nevertheless, display a number of typical colonial spatial, structural and social features, in particular the rigid racial stratification and residential segregation which had been extended and formalized during the 1950s. The earlier white 'non-white' spatial dichotomy was replaced by a white-coloured-black trichotomy with statutory buffer strips. politics, education,

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residence, recreation, social status, economic opportunity and even freedom of movement were racially determined. Official government policy maintained that blacks were in the urban areas only insofar as they 'ministered to the White man's needs' (Stallard Commission report, cited in Rich 1978) and thus that rigid controls on them were essential, although many people, including the Municipality, had long come to accept the permanence of at least a large proportion of blacks in Katutura. It is to a detailed analysis of the numerous structural and functional changes within Windhoek, and between the capital and its national territory, which have occurred during the run-up to independence, that we turn in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 4
WINDHOEK'S POSITION AND ROLE WITHIN THE STRUCTURE AND REORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT.
Government reorganization is the first of the 'sectors' defined in Chapter 1. The legislative and executive functions of public administration give government a key role, linking many aspects of human activity at the national, regional and local scales. This chapter is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the process of government reorganization since 1977. Rather it sets out the elements essential to an appreciation of the institutional framework within which Windhoek as local authority and capital city operates, and builds upon relevant aspects raised in the foregoing chapters. Of particular importance is the progressive establishment of autonomous central administrative and legislative authorities distinct from the South African government, and proposed changes in the relationships between the three tiers of authority as these affect local government, especially in Windhoek. The emphasis necessarily falls on the Municipality itself: its present structure and functions, proposed changes in them, perceptions and attitudes of the actors, and their power or ability to influence change both inside and outside the public sector. It will be shown that the existing structures are overwhelmingly
conservative and that proposals for change aim essentially at retaining the status quo as far as possible. Coupled with structural contradictions in the emerging government system, this makes the entire scheme unworkable. Apart from the sources cited, much invaluable information was obtained during interviews with officials in all tiers of government.

1. THE POSITION UP TO 1977
As discussed in Chapter 2, progressive incorporation of Namibia with South Africa occurred until the start of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1975, thereby reducing the autonomy and powers of the SWAA and its all-white Legislative Assembly. Full fiscal integration was investigated by the Holloway Commission in 1951, but no direct action was taken, even after the recommendation of the Odendaal Commission into SWA Affairs that such administrative and fiscal reorganization occur. It has been suggested that the delay was due, in particular, to the effect such changes would have on the territory's disputed international status (World Court hearings were in progress at the time) and the complexity of administrative problems they would create (South West Africa/Namibia 1980:13). The SWA Affairs Act of 1969 incorporated the recommendations of both the Odendaal Commission and the 1966 Committee of Experts, providing the machinery for creating self-governing homelands, and transferring responsibility for numerous functions from the SWAA to the South African government, thereby relegating the SWAA in importance to the equivalent of a South African provincial administration (SWA/Namibia 1980:13-15; Leistner 1972:13-14).

These changes had little bearing on local authorities (municipalities and village management boards) however, as they had never existed outside the white area. They continue to exercise a fairly wide range of powers, including the provision of essential services, planning and carrying out of limited commercial activities (see below).

2. REORGANIZATION SINCE 1977
The background to the appointment of the first Administrator-General as the highest executive authority in Namibia on 1st September 1977 was given in Chapter 2. Despite the subsequent breakdown in the international settlement negotiations, significant reorganization of the territory's administrative structure has occurred. The thrust of these changes has been to create an autonomous 'Central' government in Windhoek with the transfer back of responsibilities removed in 1969, and the granting of further powers. This is intended, from the South African viewpoint, to be the future acquiescent government of an independent Namibia. While this plan seems unlikely to be realized, in that SWAPO is certain to dominate or have outright control of the future government,
national-level structures more appropriate to the government of a sovereign country are being created, and in this sense the transition period is preparing the ground for further change after independence. The Administrator-General is empowered to govern by Proclamation, but remains responsible to the South African State President, who is still effectively Head of State. On 1st May 1978, 10 Directorates, each

under the control of a Director-General, were established to take charge of the functions transferred from Pretoria, as well as infrastructural departments (e.g. Water Affairs, Agriculture and Forestry) which were not the responsibility of the white Legislative Assembly or bantustan authorities created in terms of the Odendaal Plan. This amounted to an upgrading and interim grouping of what had previously been SWA branches of South African government departments. They nevertheless remained technically South African departments controlled by the Prime Minister's Office, and all their personnel were still South African civil servants.

Despite denunciation by the UN and SWAPO, South Africa proceeded unilaterally to hold elections for a 50-seat Constituent Assembly in December 1978. These were won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) with a large majority over the AKTUR Alliance of the National Party (which monopolized the white Legislative Assembly) and several smaller parties (Africa Institute 1980). The elections were boycotted by SWAPO and the various centrist parties of the Namibian National Front (NNF), and many allegations of intimidation and coercion were made (Ellis 1979; SWAPO 1981). Nevertheless, South Africa has consistently held the Assembly to be 'the democratically elected representatives of the people of SWA/Namibia', and sought to increase their authority domestically, and claims to abide by their wishes in matters relating to the international negotiations. Herein lies the origin of the present government structure.

Following the approval of a motion to this effect by the Constituent Assembly, Proclamation AG 21, of 14th May 1979, transformed the Constituent Assembly into the National Assembly, which was to be the supreme legislative body in the territory (South West Africa 1979; Africa Institute 1980:28). Existing members would remain, and an additional 15 seats could be created for 'democratic parties' not yet represented. Henceforth, Acts of the National Assembly became law subject to the AG's approval. An advisory body consisting of senior Assembly members, and known as the Administrator-General's Council, liaised between the AG, National Assembly and Directorates. Fiscal responsibility was transferred to the territory as from the 1980/81 financial year, hence the AG, rather than the SA Parliament, now approves the annual
budget. To this end the SA government’s South West Africa Account, set up in 1969 to administer the government functions taken over by Pretoria, was replaced by the Windhoek government’s Central Revenue Fund.

"In reality, all these changes come down to a return to the pre-1969 financial dispensation but with a separate and fully-fledged Central Government rather than the SWA Administration as the central institution."

(South West Africa/Namibia 1980:15; my translation).

Major structural changes occurred early in 1980. On 1st July the Government Service Act, No.2 of 1980, became effective, creating a separate and non-racial SWA/Namibia Government Service, which civil servants in the territory are encouraged to join (South West Africa 1980a). The Directorates were simultaneously transformed into eleven full government Departments under the control of Secretaries, while the AG’s Council became the Ministers Council. This executive arm of government was subject only to the AG. A few functions, notably Nature Conservation and Tourism, were transferred from the SWAA to the Central Government as additional Departments. Figure 4.1 illustrates

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(Representative Authorities) Ifor I
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FIGURS 4.1
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the complex government structure, in terms of which the Central Government forms the first tier, the various Representative Authorities the second (see below), and local authorities plus Peri-Urban Development Board, the third. 1 Government Departments are grouped for liaison purposes with the corresponding Committees of the National Assembly. Since the establishment of the SWA Territory Force on 1st August 1980, the SWA Police on 1st April 1981, and transfer of further executive powers to the Ministers Council on 14th September 1981, South Africa now retains control only of overall Defence, Constitutional matters and Foreign Affairs (South West Africa 1981a; Suidwester 2/4/81; Republikein 6/3/81; WA 6/3/81, 27/8/81, 1/9/81; WO 12/9/81).

In accordance with DTA policy, which stresses the importance of ethnicity (see Chapter 2), the Representative Authorities Proclamation, No. AG 8, of 1980, provided for the establishment of a separate Representative Authority for each of the eleven officially recognized ethnic groups (South West Africa 1980b). These were to function at second tier level and, in contrast to the homeland authorities and SWAA which they replaced, on a non-geographic basis, i.e. they were responsible for all members of their respective ethnic group throughout the territory. The functions allocated to these
The Peri-Urban Development Board is a statutory body established by Ordinance No. 19 of 1970, in order to control and manage small human settlements (per-urban areas) not capable of autonomous municipal status. Bodies included primary and secondary education, cultural promotion, health services, social services, including pensions, supportive agricultural and forestry services, sub-economic housing, and traditional law. Individual authorities can, however, decline direct responsibility for one or more of these, and negotiate for another Authority or the Central Government to carry it out on an agency basis. This was designed to assist the smaller authorities; thus for example, the Administration for Whites, which was the first to be created, on 1st June 1980 (South West Africa 1980c), runs health services, for the Nama, Herero, Tswana, Coloured and Bushman Authorities. This arrangement was claimed necessary to guarantee the maintenance of ethnic identity as a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence. Nevertheless, it has given rise to numerous problems and conflicts, not least because of the division of functions between first and second tier, which, while designed to create strong Representative Authorities, has split individual functions e.g. agriculture, education and health, so that each tier is responsible for aspects of them. This will become clearer in the respective chapters below. Where the Representative Authorities are controlled by Parties opposed to the DTA, as is the case with Whites, Damaras and Basters since the November 1980 ethnic elections, the conflict is exacerbated. Furthermore, there is a fundamental contradiction between the removal of discrimination and the institutionalization of important functions along ethnic lines, particularly as the groups vary widely in size and socio-economic status. Existing discrepancies are thus inevitably widened, given the budgeting procedures (see below). The now-defunct SWAA's assets and apparatus went to its legal successor, the Administration for Whites, without any wider consultation, and despite the fact that whites are by far the wealthiest and best provided-for group. The Administration for Whites also inherited a number of the SWAA's functions, notably supervision of local authorities. While understandable in terms of the pre-existence of the necessary staff and mechanisms, it is inherently unjust for this ethnic authority to control local government of all races, without alternative possibilities. Events since December 1978 have seen the continued bolstering by South Africa of the DTA-controlled Central Government at the expense of the right-wing National Party (NP), which monopolized the SWAA. After the NP's defeat of the DTA Republican Party (RP) in the White ethnic poll of November 1980, the former attempted to reassert itself and impeded desegregation and progress in the international negotiations. The DTA, suddenly faced with 3 hostile Representative Authorities, lost momentum, and the South African government seemed for a time to be pandering to the NP, its own sister party. Various attempts to unite the NP and the RP have failed. Since the change in NP
leadership in mid-1981, however, the Party has lost stature. The DTA is also losing support, though mainly from other ethnic groups, by virtue of its poor performance and continued ethnic emphasis (WA 28/7/81:1, 29/7/81:2, 8/2/82:1-2, 16/2/82:1-3; WO 26/9/81:23)

In terms of real power, it is necessary to stress that although many top level Central Government civil servants are pro-DTA, the rank and file white officials, who still outnumber other races in the bureaucracy, are mainly NP supporters. They oppose much of the change that has occurred, and have been able to retard progress by non-implementation of new legislation, and exploitation of the Representative Authorities' powers, according to frequent complaints by DTA leaders (Guardian 7/11/81; WA 29/10/81:1-2, 17/11/81:4-5, 26/11/81:1, 17/2/82:1; WO 21/11/81:19).

3. THE MUNICIPALITY OF WINDHOEK

a) Structure, Function and Role

The position and role of local authorities have been little affected to date by the changes in administrative structure outlined above, although proposals contained in the reports of 2 recent Commissions of Enquiry will, if implemented, alter the situation markedly. There is currently a great deal of uncertainty over the future within municipal ranks, both for political reasons and because the interim financial arrangements preclude normal forward planning.

Municipal powers and functions are governed by the Municipal Ordinance, No. 13 of 1963, as amended. Its provisions apply essentially to the white and coloured areas, as black townships are administered by municipalities on an agency basis for the Government in terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation, No. 56 of 1951, and other statutes. Until the transfer of executive authority to the National Assembly and Ministers Council, control over black urban areas rested with the SA Department of Co-operation and Development.

Municipalities in Namibia closely resemble those in South Africa, and indeed, most British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa before independence (e.g. Ashton 1977; Greenwood and Howell 1980). They are responsible primarily for the provision of essential remunerative and non-remunerative services (water, electricity, sewerage, health control, cemeteries etc.); planning; building, buying or letting property; and running limited commercial activities. Electricity is purchased in bulk from the South West Africa Water and Electricity Commission (SWAWEK) and sold to consumers, while water supply is provided by the City Engineer's Department in co-operation with the national Department of Water Affairs.

The Windhoek Municipality's structure is as follows (City of Windhoek 1977a, 1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1981a). Where not self-explanatory, functions of the respective sections are given in parentheses.
(2) Known at various stages as the Department of Plural Relations, Dept. of Bantu Administration and Development, Dept. of Bantu Affairs, and Dept. of Native Affairs.

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Departments
1. City Secretary
2. City Treasurer
3.- City Engineer

Sections
a) Administration b) Valuation c) Khomasdal (management of Khomasdal) d) Personnel e) Traffic f) Internal Audit g) Work Study h) Civil Defence i) Legal

a) Architecture and Works b) Cemeteries c) Parks and Recreation d) Building control (approval of plans)

e) Fire Brigade f) Ambulance Services g) Surveying h) Garage/Workshops i) Road Planning and design, and Traffic Engineering

j) Town planning (development control, research)

k) Water works (including sewerage and purification)

4. Director of Katutura (formerly Non-White Affairs)

5. City Electrotechnical Engineer (electric wiring, street lighting, electricity supply).

6. City Health Officer (inspections, trading licences/registrations, dairy and meat products, pest control, sanitary services.

From the wide variety of functions performed it is evident that the Municipality's activities have an important effect on the life of Windhoek. Council policy is thus of direct concern in the context of socio-political change, particularly with respect to the provision of services and facilities, and the basis on which access to them is granted. This will be examined in detail in the relevant chapters below. Another important feature of the Municipal structure is that Khomasdal and Katutura are administered as separate areas, as required.

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by apartheid policy. A whole Department manages Katutura on a completely different basis from the rest of the municipal area, while Khomasdal is treated as a section of the City Secretary's Department, a position consistent with its legal status, being more akin to that of a white area (see Chapter 6). It was originally administered direct from the Municipal Offices in the city centre, but as Khomasdal grew, separate offices were built there. Katutura also has separate
offices, most of which lie outside Katutura's boundary, probably as a security precaution.

The Town Clerk is the most senior official, with responsibility for co-ordination and overall management. The Heads of Department meet in committee with him weekly, and their resolutions form the basis of liaison with elected councillors. Municipal administration runs on the British committee system. Only white ratepayers and residents are entitled to vote and stand for Council. Twelve councillors are elected on a winner-takes-all basis in single-member wards for 5 year terms of office. Councillors elect their office-bearers annually, but there is generally little public debate on this, as compromise arrangements are normally made beforehand by lobbying. In addition to Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairman, there is a 5-member Management Committee (with a 6th alternate member) as the Council's executive, a Town Planning Committee (6 members), Traffic Committee (5 members) and Environment Committee (4 members). One councillor is also elected to act as chairman of the Katutura Advisory Board, and one to represent the Council on the Khomasdal Consultative Committee (see below).

The Management Committee meet weekly, after the Heads of Department meeting. Many important matters, particularly relating to sensitive policy issues, are discussed and settled here, as these meetings are closed to the public. Matters with direct financial implications or requiring major policy decisions must be referred to the full Council, which meets monthly in public session. It was thus of inestimable value for this study that access to Management Committee documents was granted, as this provided additional information on specific relevant topics and the attitude of the various Departments to them.

Although the position of Mayor is symbolically important by virtue of its public relations function, the most powerful Councillor is undoubtedly the Chairman of the Management Committee. He liaises with officials and councillors and is probably able to exert a fair amount of influence over his colleagues. Informal lobbying among councillors (not only by the Committee chairman) takes place before Council sessions, in an effort to avoid what is seen as 'divisive', 'personal' or 'political' debate in public. The significance of this practice is increased for two important reasons, namely that Council affairs are not run on formal party-political lines, and that councillors, numbering only 12, know one another well. The present incumbents had already served as a team for 8 years by March 1982 as a result of the continued postponement by the AG of new elections (see below).

The pretence that Council proceedings are 'apolitical' in view of the first reason, is fallacious, since the political leanings or affiliations of each councillor are well-known, and were observed to determine their voting behaviour to a large extent on more contentious issues. Nevertheless, the present councillors are all conservative and have acted
consistently to retain the status quo as far as possible within the Council's powers. On the very few occasions that dissention has occurred over political issues - most notably the granting of permission in 1981 for construction of a multiracial senior secondary school in the new suburb of Hochland Park (see Chapter 8) - the decisive factor has ultimately been, not the merit or justification of the matter at hand, but the authority of the Central Government to impose its own decision on the Council anyway. There is a desire by councillors to avoid conflict with the Government which could ultimately undermine the Council’s standing and autonomy in the future administrative dispensation if the Council were seen to be reactionary and unco-operative.

(3) Three by-elections took place between 1973 and 1978, however.

Seven or eight councillors are known National Party supporters: two, indeed, are listed by Wilkins and Strydom (1979) as being members of the elite secret Afrikaner Broederbond society which is the key NP decision-making body in South Africa and Namibia. It is symbolically significant that one of these two was Mayor for an unprecedented three consecutive years (1979-1981) during this period of political flux and uncertainty. Three councillors, significantly the one English- and two German-speakers, support the DTA, while one or two seem uncommitted but certainly no less conservative than the others. Overall, both linguistically and politically, councillors represent a good cross-section of Windhoek’s white population, although only one is a woman, and their actions to date can justifiably be said to have safeguarded their constituency’s perceived sectional interests.

Virtually all councillors are professionally employed, being in business (2), valuers/assessors (2), a lawyer, insurance agent, medical doctor, school principal, minister of religion, senior nature conservation official, high-ranking Railway policeman and Railways Superintendent. Several have long experience as councillors - in one case 26 years by 1981/2. Nevertheless, the observation made with respect to operation of the committee system in post-independence Lusaka, that councillors are essentially amateurs, lacking detailed understanding of technical issues, and...

... as a result, important and costly projects are sometimes approved without adequate consideration because councillors cannot comprehend the issues involved, whereas relatively minor, routine matters are hotly debated because they are within the councillors’ own personal experience."

(Greenwood and Howell 1980:169)

is frequently valid here too. This is a drawback of the committee system, important as it is to have direct public representation and participation in municipal affairs. The result, in practice, is to increase the importance and influence of the role of top officials, as councillors rely on their evaluation of
projects or issues as reflected in Council agendas. Full Council tends, in effect, to be a rubber stamp, albeit with some significant exceptions, and most of the real work occurs in the Heads and Management Committees, the members of which thus wield effective power. While most senior officials are also conservative and probably also NP supporters (at least one is a Broederbonder), there is a significant group of professionals (engineers, planners etc.) who have to deal with the practical problems of Windhoek being a rapidly growing Third World capital city at first hand on a daily basis. They are thus more aware of the need for change and tend to be more liberal and receptive to the issues discussed in the chapters which follow.

b) Advisory Bodies
While the city's affairs are administered and run by the white Municipality, there are two advisory bodies, one each in Khomasdal and Katutura, for coloured and black people respectively. These bodies have their origin in the apartheid policies which aim ultimately to create separate 'towns' for all races. They lack any executive power, and make recommendations to the Windhoek City Council Management Committee, which the latter is free to accept or reject, although in recent years an explicit attempt has been made to accede to the wishes of these bodies wherever possible. In reality this holds only when there is no conflict with the Council's or white interests, the more because agendas are drawn up by white municipal officials in the respective departments. In consequence, both bodies complain regularly at their monthly meetings of having been bypassed on important issues (such as housing construction policy or tenders) and demand that they be given a more meaningful say (e.g. City of Windhoek 1980b:5-6, w.r.t Khomasdal; City of Windhoek 1981b:5 w.r.t. Katutura).

The first Khomasdal Consultative Committee was established on 27th April 1967 by the Administrator of SWA in terms of the Establishment of Management Forms in Coloured Towns Ordinance (No. 34 of 1965) and Government Notice No.151, of 15th August 1966. It is a five-member, nominated body responsible to the Coloured Representative Council (superseded in 1980 by the Executive Committee of the Administration for Coloureds), three members being appointed by the latter and two by the Municipality. One Windhoek councillor represents the Council at meetings. The Committee's members have, certainly in recent years, been prominent coloured ethnic political leaders, mostly members of the Coloured Representative Council, and adhering broadly to DTA policy. Differences are personality-rather than policy-based, and feuding is rife. Although certain of them, notably Mr. A.J.F. Kloppers snr., have significant personal followings, a large proportion of Khomasdal's population are disillusioned with this political 'circus' of the small ruling clique (WO 28/2/81; WA 27/2/81, 6/3/81, 22/5/81, 5/11/81:1, 29/1/82:1, 8/2/82:3). Additional evidence is the very low percentage poll in the November 1980 second tier coloured ethnic
election (Abrahams 1980:14-21; South West Africa 1980). This feeling extends to
the Consultative Committee, by virtue of its composition,

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and my respondents felt strongly that only an elected Committee with meaningful
powers would have credibility, although most favoured direct representation on
the City Council (see section 5 below).

By contrast, both the Committee itself and the City Council continue to envisage
separate municipal status for Khomasdal - formal steps to achieve this having
commenced in 1977 (City of Windhoek 1977a:7; 1979a:9). It is also customary
for the Mayor to refer to the 'co-operation received', 'responsibility shown' and 'progress made towards self-
management' by the Committee (City of Windhoek 1977a:7; 1978a:8-9; 1979a:9;

The twelve-member Katutura Advisory Board was established in 1960, shortly
after the first large group of people moved there from the Old Location (Chapter
3). It replaced an equivalent body which existed there since 1927 (Pendleton
1974:26). As in the Old Location, representation is on an ethnic-section basis.

Katutura is divided into spatially distinct ethnic areas (Chapter 6). The
Chairman is a Windhoek City Councillor (formerly the location superintendant). Until 1977,
when the Board was fully elected for the first time (City of Windhoek 1977a:23),
six members were elected and six appointed by the Municipality to represent its
interests, or those of smaller ethnic groups who did not succeed in gaining an
elected representative. Katutura is now divided into twelve single-member wards,
and members serve five-year terms (formerly one-year).

The Board was divided into three Committees (Social Affairs, Labour Matters and
Financial Affairs), each with a white municipal official as secretary, but during
1980 a single Management Committee was formed

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(City of Windhoek 1980:25). This meets monthly before the full Board but has no
executive power. Board members are frequently ethnic/tribal elders, and only a
minority of members have much formal education or professional training. They
are on the whole conservative, and lack an understanding of the practicalities of
issues they discuss, with the result that frequent explanations and prompts are
required from the Chairman or senior white officials present. This accentuates the
patronizing attitude the latter display towards members during meetings.

Protracted, ill-informed discussions result, and one gains the impression that
decisions often reflect the influence of the officials rather than the convictions of
members themselves. The Municipality has attempted to improve the situation by
providing some courses and tours of municipal facilities for Board members. The
annual Mayoral reports generally refer to progress made by the Board, but its lack
of readiness for self-management, e.g.

"The Katutura Advisory Board is still making good progress in this direction [i.e.
towards separate Municipal status].
But one must observe the differences in local problems between Katutura and Windhoek to understand that the representatives of Katutura will still need to gain more experience.”

(City of Windhoek 1978:9; my translation) The one or two members who became too outspoken in the past were removed, respondents frequently alleged. Although members are undoubtedly well aware of their people's plight, and have tried to defer or reject increased house rentals and service charges proposed by the Municipality (City of Windhoek 1980c:7; 1981c:17-19) a large proportion of Katutura residents, particularly those who are better educated or politically active, reject the Board as an ineffectual 'tame' instrument, being used by the white Municipality to impose its will on Katutura. Direct representation on the City Council is the most commonly cited alternative.

4. MUNICIPAL FINANCE

Municipal finance is a particularly important area, as it simultaneously determines the viability of local authorities and the ability of central or regional governments to exercise leverage over autonomy and policies. The latter has been one of the main focuses in the literature on post-colonial African public administration (see below), while the emphasis on political economy in foregoing chapters implies a further need to examine municipal finance in view of the public sector's prominent role in Windhoek.

In accordance with the law and municipal structure the three areas are also kept financially separate. White Windhoek and Khomasdal each have a Revenue Account from which to finance their activities. The Municipality is empowered to draw up and approve these annual budgets, but final consent is required from the SWAA and its legal successor, the Administration for Whites, which inherited the supervisory role over local authorities. Katutura is financed out of a Native Revenue Account by the Municipality acting as agent for the Government (South Welt Africa/Namibia 1980:15). The Windhoek Municipality nevertheless remains responsible for making good any deficits on the Khomasdal and Katutura Accounts, and stringent efforts are thus made to restrict expenditure to the level of projected revenue. A balanced budget policy is also pursued with the Windhoek Account, and an additional rate levy must be introduced if a deficit persists for more than one year, unless it is financed out of accumulated surpluses (City Treasurer, pers. comm.). The three budgets are now also compiled on 45hive different bases. Whereas the traditional British-style 'line item' system had previously been employed throughout, the Windhoek Account has been progressively switched to the more goal-oriented USA-style 'management performance' system since 1978. There are no plans to convert the other, less complex, accounts (City Treasurer, pers. comm.).
1979/80 operating revenue and expenditure for the three accounts were as follows (in Rand):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>20 645 147</td>
<td>19 283 791</td>
<td>+ 1 361 356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomasdal</td>
<td>1 263 079</td>
<td>1 181 648</td>
<td>+ 81 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katutura</td>
<td>7 575 289</td>
<td>7 699 165</td>
<td>- 123 876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: City of Windhoek 1980d).

When related to Windhoek's estimated total population for May 1981 of 32 500 whites, 16 000 coloureds and 42 100 blacks (City of Windhoek 1981d:18), which correspond closely to the populations of Windhoek, Khomasdal and Katutura respectively, these figures reveal severe per capita inequalities in resource allocation and distribution between the three areas. Their widely differing socio-political and economic fabric are further illustrated by the relative importance of the major items of gross operating revenue and expenditure in the three accounts (Table 4.1).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.1</th>
<th>MAJOR ITEMS OF GROSS OPERATING REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WINDHOEK, KHOMASDAL AND KATUTURA ACCOUNTS 1979-1980 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCOUNT</td>
<td>ITEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>Assessment rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire, ambulance, civil defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roads, stormwater drains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House rental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomasdal</td>
<td>Service charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-remunerative services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing levy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House rentals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katutura</td>
<td>incl. hostel fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liquor sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bus service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a) A high proportion of houses in Khomasdal, and virtually all in Katutura, are owned by the municipality (see Chapter 6).  
b) This includes non-tariff services subsidized in the rents.  
c) This includes water, electricity and refuse removal.
Policy with respect to service tariffs is that water, sewerage and refuse collection should be provided on a no profit - no loss basis, while the profit from electricity sales is used to relieve the rate burden (City of Windhoek 1980d:1b). Profit levels from these sales are lower in Khomasdal and Katutura because of the lower consumption levels, which thus raise the unit cost of provision. In view of the sub-economic rentals applicable in Katutura, in particular, services other than electricity are highly subsidised there, a factor which reduces the Katutura Account’s revenue, and as currently the cause of much concern (Chapter 6).

The Municipality runs a bus service only from Katutura to various parts of white Windhoek for black commuters. A private firm runs a service from Khomasdal, but such a service has been deemed uneconomic in the city itself. The importance of municipal liquor sales in Katutura is remarkable, and the surplus on this item (some R100 000 in 1979/80) went far in reducing the overall deficit on the Katutura Account. Black townships’ Administration Boards in South Africa rely on liquor profits to an even greater extent, and it was significant that beer halls formed one of the chief targets of destruction during the riots of 1976.

The revenue contribution of assessment rates to the Windhoek Account is severely reduced by the large (and increasing) number of Government-owned properties in the area. Central Government pays no rates, and the second-tier authorities only 50% (Chapter 7). The rates’ contribution in Katutura is negligible, but both there and in Khomasdal it can be expected to rise slowly, and the contribution of rentals to decline, as home ownership increases (Chapter 6). Fire and ambulance services, planning, legal and accounting services are provided for the entire municipal area from the Windhoek Account, which is reimbursed by Departmental levies on the other two accounts. The Administration for Whites provides subsidies to all three accounts for traffic control and roads - items which benefit the territory’s population at large rather than only Windhoek’s.

The relative importance of the major items changed little over the period 1977-1980 (cf. City of Windhoek 1977b, 1978b, 1979b), save for a 5% decline in Windhoek’s assessment rate contribution which was probably the result of government purchases of commercial properties (see above) and a decline in the value of rates in real terms. Revaluation of properties took place during 1980/81. In other words, socio-political change had no notable impact on current financial allocations.
A more significant change occurred in capital expenditure, primarily as a result of the Municipality's dependence for capital loans on higher tiers of government which have been directly affected by restructuring. From October 1944 until the functional reorganization of March 1969, this money came from the SWAA's Territorial Development and Revenue Fund, the principal and most flexible source of development capital and emergency assistance. Considerable sums were lent, particularly for 'non-white' housing, as only Windhoek and Swakopmund were theoretically able to raise open market loans, and this was very unlikely in reality. R49.3m in loans to local authorities was outstanding on 31st March 1970. Although this Fund lost importance after 1969, local authorities were still funded from its Local Authorities and Miscellaneous Loans Account (Leistner 1972:17-19). Capital loans were made at a subsidized interest rate of 1%, which enabled greater progress to be made on road and low-income housing than otherwise possible. After the government restructuring of 1980, considerable uncertainty arose within municipalities, especially Windhoek, as no clarification on their position and capital funding could be obtained (Windhoek Town Clerk, pers. comm.; City of Windhoek 1980a:23; 1981f:II-I4). The normal 3-year forward planning horizon had to be abandoned (City of Windhoek 1981a:18), and it was only in May 1981 that the Administrator-General finally announced that the Administration for Whites would provide capital loans, as the SWAA's successor, until the position of local authorities in the new dispensation was finalized (Republikein 4/5/81; City of Windhoek 1981f:14). In the event, a public sector financial crisis, induced by the burden of supporting the burgeoning bureaucracy, restricted Windhoek's allocation for new projects during 1981/82 to R850 000, out of a total request of R25m (City of Windhoek 1981a:7). A major arterial road system and other projects thus had to be abandoned, and the money was used to construct additional houses and serviced plots in Khomasdal, where the need is greatest (see Chapter 6). By contrast, overall 1980/81 capital expenditure amounted to R10.8m, R4.4m of which was spent in Katutura, mainly on housing. R7.6m of this was loaned by the State. The Windhoek Account's loan debt of R36.5m, formed 44.5% of the total capital outlay during 1980-1981, compared to R29.7m (81.5%) in Katutura, and R6.6m (71.4%) in Khomasdal. The burden of the latter two is relieved by subsidized interest rates as mentioned above; while the strength of the Windhoek Account is reflected by the fact that no rate increase was necessary for the 7th consecutive year. (City of Windhoek 1981a:6). Part of the expenditure in Katutura was provided by the Ministers Council for an 'Emergency Housing Project' totalling R3.3m over the 1980/81 and 1981/82
financial years, in addition to the 'normal' housing construction programme (Chapter 6). The Ministers Council also resolved in 1980 that all future capital loans were to be at an interest rate of 8.5% (i.e. approximately the market rate), in view of a scarcity of funds, and a desire to remove the longstanding reliance on subsidies (Suidwester 9/9/80; City of Windhoek 1981e:RR3; also Chapter 6). Both these developments were the direct result of socio-political policy changes. Furthermore, the uncertainty, delays, vacillation and the underlying high-level political manoeuvring over capital funding for local authorities, have caused significant friction between the Municipality and Administration for Whites. Uneasiness has heightened within the Municipality that local authorities are progressively losing autonomy, and paying the price for inefficiency and maladministration in the higher tiers of government (see e.g. City of Windhoek 1981a:1,7):

"...What is actually difficult to accept is the indifference which apparently exists in first and second tier authorities with respect to the problems of municipalities. This is especially so regarding municipalities' capital requirements. There is money for all sorts of purposes but not for the strengthening of municipal infrastructure which must be created to serve as the basis for the major part of the whole country's physical development."

(my translation).

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5. PROPOSED CHANGES TO MUNICIPAL STATUS
(a) Initial Proposals
In October 1977 the Khomasdal Consultative Committee formally requested 'the Administrator-General to grant it separate municipal status, a move supported in principle by the City Council and the SWAA, subject to adequate research being done into "the practical and financial implications of such an important step"' (City of Windhoek 1977a:7).

There had been prior discussions with the Municipality, the officials of which supported the creation of 'sister-towns' and offered wholehearted cooperation. This was explicitly stated in a detailed memorandum drawn up by the Windhoek Town Clerk in June 1977, setting out the basis of an agreement between 'the City Councils of Windhoek and Khomasdal' on the assumption of municipal status by the latter (Municipality of Windhoek 1977). It dealt primarily with the take-over of assets and liabilities, completion of current projects, provision of administrative services by Windhoek, personnel and financial matters, and implied that there would be few problems, apart from the need for minor legislative changes.

Separate municipalities for the three racially and spatially segregated areas are the logical consequence of National Party and government policy, and it is thus hardly surprising that the white Municipality supported these moves for
economic as well as political reasons. The representativeness of the Khomasdal Committee has already been questioned. Of particular significance, moreover, is the fact that the formal application for separate status was made less than two months after the AG's assumption of office, just when the first racially discriminatory legislation was being abolished (see Chapter 5), and the move was thus almost certainly intended to beat the UN-supervised independence process the AG's arrival was supposed to herald.

In the event, the AG made a few minor amendments to Ordinance 34 of 1965, enabling him to appoint a committee to investigate the desirability or otherwise of creating a separate municipality. The members were Windhoek's Town Clerk, City Secretary and City Treasurer, the Khomasdal Consultative Committee Chairman and two government officials from the Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations. The report, tabled in November 1978, suggested popular support for the Consultative Committee and its action to exist in Khomasdal, despite resentment that it is not an elected body. The report rejected the idea of a single municipality for the entire urban area on the grounds that one population group would always be in the minority against the other two, and that it would not permit the maximum say of each in its own affairs. Khomasdal was considered a potentially viable entity, on the basis of an estimated population of 10 700, annual operating budget of Rm (both items being larger than some existing SWA municipalities), 880 tenant families, 503 property-owning families, the existence of 3 primary and one high schools, a teacher's training college, 12 businesses, 2 petrol stations, one hotel and available adjacent land for future expansion.

The shortage of suitably qualified coloured personnel could be overcome by employing whites in the interim, while training courses for potential Councillors was deemed essential. There would be a proportion of the population unable to afford rates and service charges, but "...Khomasdal's income and financing ability will depend on the willingness of its management to take unpopular decisions to tax the community and make necessary and timely tariff adjustments. This level will in turn be dictated by the ability and willingness of the community to pay."

(SWA 1978:6; my translation).

On account of the relatively low income level of Khomasdal's inhabitants, the Committee foresees that Khomasdal will initially have to get by without certain tarred roads, a swimming bath and library of Windhoek's standard, parks etc.

(SWA 1978:7; my translation).

In consequence, the needs of the better-off inhabitants would not be
satisfied, and these (coloured) people would press for the right to use (white) Windhoek's facilities, or even live there. But "If these demands were to be acceded to, Khomasdal might bbe reduced to a permanently less well-off community and therek~y the argument for Khomasdal's right of existence as a separate local authority with a say over its own affairs would be nullified". (SWA 1978:7; my translation and emphasis).

Nevertheless the report felt able to say "The fact that Khomasdal's finances have been administratored separately since its establishment, and that it has till now remained self-sufficient, is adequate indication that Khomasdal will be able to function as a financially viable entity." (SWA 1978:5; my translation).

Certain functions and services would inevitably have to be provided for the whole urban area, by virtue of interdependence and Khomardal's inability to support its own skilled planners, legal advisors, treasurers etc. An overhead planning and co-ordination committee was suggested for the three future municipalities. Practical issues set out in the 1977 Memorandum were still valid, but would need detailed consideration if the go-ahead were given. The report concluded that Khomasdal should be declared a separate municipality as soon as possible, to be administered, like all others, by the SWAA in terms of the Municipal Ordinance of 1963, with the necessary amendments.

The quotations above reveal the inherent contradiction within the report, in that financial viability is claimed while admitting the inadequacy of facilities and infrastructure which would enable Khomasdal to become self-sufficient. To regard 12 businesses, most of which are small grocers and corner cafes, and 500 mainly low and medium-low income houses, as an adequate rate tax base, is unrealistic. Several small existing municipalities e.g. Aus and Witvlei, have, in fact, recently been deproclaimed precisely because they were increasingly unviable. Khomasdal was not designed or developed as a potentially self-sufficient unit, but as a racial dormitory for part of Windhoek's workforce. Conditions in Khomasdal are detailed in Chapters 6 and 8; it is difficult to see how separation at this stage would benefit the majority of Khomasdal's inhabitants. The underlined quotation above provides concrete evidence that the nub of the issue was the maintenance of racial, rather than socio-economic (class), exclusivity, because only by retaining some better-off coloureds in Khomasdal could its self-sufficiency be claimed and white Windhoek thus spared the cost of supporting and upgrading Khomasdal as would inevitably be required after independence. The structure of separate financial accounts for Windhoek, Khomasdal and Katutura, and
the concomitant requirements of balanced budgets and payment for services provided by other 'Windhoek' departments, seem to have been designed to avoid this problem in the past - although there are undoubtedly some significant subsidies for Khomasdal and Katutura in the existing system. The Khomasdal issue received priority, with much correspondence between the AG's Office and other parties concerned in an attempt to have the Report officially approved by the respective bodies, and the necessary legislative amendments provisionally formulated by March 1979. Of particular interest was the insistence by the Dept. of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations head office in Cape Town that the envisaged municipality should possess at least the minimum level of services and facilities for viability. Similar studies by the Yeld Committee in South African coloured townships had revealed the general absence of satisfactory facilities, most of which require large capital outlays which would be beyond the means of poor fledgling municipalities if not provided beforehand. To overcome this (it was suggested that revenue from rates on industrial and commercial property in the white city be allocated to Khomasdal in terms of a fixed formula e.g. gross salaries/wages or pro rata purchasing power, which could be reviewed at 5-year intervals) letters from Chief Director to Windhoek Regional Representative, Dept. of Coloured, (4) This Committee was investigating the possibility of separate municipal status for coloured townships in South Africa during 1978/9.

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Rehoboth and Nama Relations dd. 22/12/78 and 2/2/79). These suggestions were rejected by the Khomasdal Consultative Committee, Windhoek's Town Clerk, and the City Council's Management Committee on the grounds that Windhoek's coloureds had not been exploited, and were prospering, despite the lull in the construction industry, their traditional sphere of activity. The report was, however, approved by all the bodies concerned, including the SWAA, and referred to the AG.

b) Elaborating the Plan

Notwithstanding the objections raised above, Khomasdal and Katutura are certainly in a better position than the coloured and black townships of other municipalities in the territory, by virtue of their size and development. Conditions in smaller towns are frequently worse. The SWA Municipal Association resolved at its special congress in August 1979 (called to discuss the opening of urban residential areas to all races - see Chapter 5) to appoint a Committee of Experts to investigate the issues broadly and in-depth before the AG and politicians made their decisions. It was felt that any arrangement in respect of Khomasdal ought to be based on nationally-applicable principles, and should not be primarily a 'political' one.

(5) This is a liaison body for SWA municipalities, each of which sends delegates to its conferences.
The 8 committee members were Windhoek's Town Clerk (Convenor), City Secretary, City Treasurer, and Legal Advisor, and 4 officials from other municipalities. The Director of Katutura and Secretary of the Peri-Urban Development Board were later included.

The Committee used the earlier Memorandum and Report as points of departure, and recommended that local government be autonomous with respect to the functions constitutionally delegated to it. 'Homogeneous local communities' (in terms of their nature, needs and financial capacity) should form the core-units of local government irrespective of size, wealth or geographic proximity. Those communities which are financially and administratively viable units should become 'autonomous municipalities', while a 'General Local Authority' should administer the others on behalf, and at the expense, of the government.

Local authority functions should be divided into obligations (e.g. water provision, environmental health services) to which communities are entitled; additional powers (as set out in the 1963 Municipal Ordinance, e.g. electricity) and agency functions, which may be provided by local authorities at the financial cost and on behalf of the authority with primary responsibility for them. Other proposals relate to the limiting of external control measures, legislation against corruption, arbitration procedures etc. (SWA Municipal Association 1979a).

In the report, as well as other documents and discussion, frequent reference was made to 'regionalization' concepts (i.e. the idea of regional configurations being devised, taking physical and human homogeneity into account) and their relevance to urban regions. This is of little validity, though, seeing that even Windhoek, the primate city, occupies a small, clearly defined area and officially has under 100,000 inhabitants. The stress on 'homogeneous' local communities over geographical proximity and economic factors was thus clear, though more subtle, reference to race, and shows the consistency of thinking with the earlier reports. This change in terminology was necessary because the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act, No.3 of 1979, became effective just before the Committee's appointment (details in Chapter 5). At the Municipal Association's special congress on 28th November 1979, called to consider the Report, Windhoek's Mayor said "... I see in the Committee's recommendations the greatest possible opportunity for each group to find its richest expression in the neighbourhood in which it matches the lifestyle, economic demands and ability of the dominant group. I would still have preferred closed neighbourhoods because I am so convinced that each group could then be happiest in its own town. I also believe that a person is happiest living among his own people and that that minimizes the danger of conflict. For me it is not an argument to say that, on account of economic considerations, there will then
be resentment if the White town performs better than the others. There are nice houses in Khomasdal and Katutura, and modest, even poor, little houses in Windhoek. Poverty has nothing to do with where you live."
(Municipal Association of SWA 1979b; my translation)

In explaining the Report, the Committee's Convenor said "I have heard many comments from many people on these proposals. The nicest was that the system rests on Christian principles and must thus be good. The criticism was that the Committee hadn't made that clearer. This criticism is justified . . ."
(Municipal Association of SWA 1979b; my translation)

After some discussion, the Congress approved the Report unanimously and resolved to bring it to the attention of the AG and other interested parties. The AG's response, as earlier envisaged, was to appoint two Commissions of Enquiry in January 1980. The first was a Commission of Experts on Legislation for Local Authorities, charged with drawing up concept legislation for a local government system in SWA/Namibia, including its funding, and taking into account the principles contained in the Municipal Association's Report. Its chairman was the Town Clerk of Windhoek, Mr. A.C. Arnold, who had compiled, or been instrumental in compiling, all three earlier documents. Other members were the Khomasdal Consultative Committee Chairman (Mr. D. Bezuidenhout), an expert in municipal administration at Pretoria University, who had assisted in discussion of the Municipal Association's Report (Prof. J.H.S. Gildenhuys), Chairman of the Katutura Advisory Board's Management Committee (Mr. J. Huiseb), the Secretary of the Peri-Urban Development Board (Mr. B. Profitt), Mayor of Otjiwarongo and Chairman of the PUDB (Mr. J. Terreblanche), and the Director of Katutura (Mr. L. Venter).

The Commission received submissions from a variety of bodies and individuals including the SWAA, individual town planners, municipalities and many private schools seeking exemption from rate assessment. Its report was submitted to the AG during 1980 but has not been published, having become politically too sensitive because its central proposals conflict with the policies of the DTA-controlled Central Government. The Municipal Association discussed the Commission's Report during a closed session of its 1980 annual congress (Municipal Association of SWA 1980:19; Republikein 10/9/80; Suidwester 10/9/80; WA 10/9/80:2). It is largely consistent with the earlier reports, and envisages a General Local Authority for unviable municipal areas, and three separate municipalities in autonomous urban
centres - one each for the predominantly white, coloured and black geographic areas. This is justified by the homogeneity argument, but with an express denial that the municipalities would be racially defined, since all residential areas are now legally open. All residents of a municipality would be entitled to vote there, but the idea is to make conditions in the townships more attractive, in order to minimize the flow of blacks and coloureds into white areas. A division of assessment rate revenue is envisaged on a per capita population basis (Windhoek Town Clerk, pers. comm.). This proposal is significant in that it was originally suggested in early 1979 by the Department of Coloured, Rehoboth and Nama Relations, but rejected by the Municipality and Khomasdal Consultative Committee.

Another particularly important point is that the Commission proposes the 3 separate municipalities to be geographically, rather than explicitly ethnically, defined. While clearly quasi-racial, it does, nevertheless, directly contradict the categorical statement in the 1978 Committee Report that the only justification for having separate municipalities was in retaining racial rather, than socio-economic, exclusivity.

An anomalous situation has now arisen in that residential areas are open to all on a freehold basis (Chapter 5), and the Arnold Commission explicitly says that all residents of a given municipality would be eligible to vote in municipal elections there. Nevertheless, the Windhoek Municipality has not been including races other than whites on the updated voters rolls (municipal official, pers. comm.), so that no practical effect could be given to this. There is some pressure to hold new local elections, because they have been postponed annually since 1978 by the AG while, the 'new dispensation' is implemented. Rumours in March 1981 of imminent elections were quickly denied, as they would have been for whites only, and besides, the Arnold Report had not yet been implemented (Suidwester 11/3/81, 12/3/81; Republikein 12/3/81, 13/3/81; WA 18/3/81).

The second Commission of Enquiry, chaired by Dr. F.J. van Eeden, investigated financial relationships between Central, Representative and Local Authorities in the new dispensation. Its report was submitted to the AG in September 1980, and made available in April 1981, together with a Ministers Council White Paper in which the latter's reactions were set out (South West Africa/Namibia 1980,1981; Republikein 20/3/81, 3/4/81; Suidwester 3/4/81). Although much of its content is not, directly relevant to local authorities, this report clearly overlaps with that of the Arnold Commission. The Van Eeden Report accepts the three-fold municipal split, and foresees a more important role for local authorities in the new dispensation. In addition to rates, general sales tax (GST) is seen as a logical source of revenue for local authorities and one which would ease the present financial pressure on them.
In view of the spatial concentration of commercial and industrial premises in specific parts of an urban complex, and the large proportion of public housing in certain areas, an objective allocation formula, based on pro-rata incomes or consumer expenditure, would be required (cf. the Arnold Commission's per capita formula). The rate of tax would be determined by the Central Government. This additional revenue and the indirect multiplier effects of government activity would more than compensate for the fact that no rates are payable on government buildings; and rates on second tier authorities' property should also be scrapped. The only other possible revenue sources are income such as tariffs from municipal functions, and loans. Full compensation must be paid for all functions performed on an agency basis for other authorities. From a redistributive point of view the sales tax revenue should keep pace with local authority needs, while capital loans for specific economic infrastructural projects would be made for all authorities from a proposed 'finance bank', and for social infrastructure (low-cost housing, schools, hospitals) by the central government direct (South West Africa/Namibia 1980:51-56, 68-69).

The Ministers Council accepted many of the Commission's proposals, but rejected allocation of sales tax revenue to local authorities, the status quo of which should be provisionally maintained. Capital loans should be seen in the context of national priorities and thus the Central Government, through the Dept. of Constitutional Development, world provide such funds to local authorities in the meantime (South West Africa/Namibia 1981:5-6). Professor A. du Pisane (Dept. of Political Science, Pretoria University) and Mr. J.H. Cronje (Windhoek City Treasurer) were appointed to resolve certain conflicts between the reports of the two Commissions and study the implications of redistribution of revenue from rates as proposed (South West Africa/Namibia 1981:6; City of Windhoek 1981a:11, 33-34). Their report is still awaited, and the situation thus in limbo. As a result of these delays, Khomasdal's Consultative Committee again pressed the Windhoek City Council to apply for Khomasdal to be declared a separate municipality. In fact, this would require changes to both the 1963 Municipal Ordinance and 1965 Establishment of Management Forms in Coloured Towns Ordinance, as no provisions for election of councillors exist (City of Windhoek 1982:J1-J5). In view of this move, as well as continued restrictions on entry of coloureds and blacks to certain facilities controlled by municipalities, the Ministers Council announced its intention to take over control of local authorities from the Administration for Whites on 1st April 1982. This sparked furious reaction from the Municipal Association, who claimed they had not been consulted. The take-over was later postponed till July, apparently because the necessary arrangements
had not yet been completed and the AG’s consent not yet obtained. A motion by some Windhoek City Councillors at the Council's April meeting, requesting the AG to retain the status quo, failed dramatically (WA 16/3/82:1-3; 19/3/82:1,7; 2/4/82:1; 29/4/82:3; WO 20/3/82:29; 8/4/82:17; 1/5/82:43). Inter-tier relations are thus strained and will become more so as an international settlement approaches and the various groups seek to strengthen their respective vested interests in the face of uncertainty and perceived threats to the existing order.

As part of the author’s survey of residential mobility since desegregation (Chapter 5), respondents were asked their views on local authority status in Windhoek. The respondents were of all races and most were present or recent residents of Khomasdal. The overwhelming majority (80%) favoured one municipality, only 7% favoured 3, while 13% didn't know or refused to answer. Their reasons were as follows (Table 4.2). Up to three per respondent were recorded and they were not ranked in any particular order, thus enabling simple aggregation. Of those who responded, 1 2 gave one reason, 1 6 gave two, and 11 gave three; an average of 2 per reply.

The major response categories, all in favour of a single municipality, were Nos. 11, 14, 2 and 6, which correspond to the arguments raised in this chapter. These results underline the doubts expressed earlier about how representative the Khomasdal Consultative Committee’s views are, and show a good level of awareness, at least among the better educated public.

TABLE 4.2
REASONS CITED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THEIR VIEWS ON MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REASON</th>
<th>NO. OF MENTIONS IN FAVOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Financially iable</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Financially Unviable</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Would Ease Racial Tension</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Would Raise Racial Tension</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Would Train Staff Faster</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Unnecessary Duplicatation of Facilities</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Give Each Group More Political Autonomy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Give All More Say in Common Area</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Would Eliminate Cross-Subsidization</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 All Would Share In Wealth They Help Generate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 One Administrative Unit Is Best</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Kh'dal &amp; Kat. Not Balanced</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Econ. Areas 3 0 3  
13 Decision Should Be Taken By  
Experts 1 0 1  
14 Other* 17 2 19  
TOTAL 73 4 77  
N.B. : The second reason, 'Financially Unviable' refers by implication to the alternative e.g. 1 municipality is favoured because 3 would be unviable.  
* Of the 17 in favour of 1 municipality, 11 felt that separation would merely represent a continuation of apartheid policies; 1 said it would enable whites to shirk their responsibility; and 2 felt it would keep the community together.

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6. CONCLUSION  
The question of government structure and functional reorganization is particularly complex, but nevertheless crucial, in that it determines many of the parameters of socio-political change relevant to this study. This chapter has focused on the position and role of municipalities, especially in Windhoek, within the evolving process. A fair amount of baseline material on the structure and function of Windhoek Municipality, the relationships between officials and public representatives, and financial arrangements was presented in order to show the systematic institutionalization of racial separation, and attempts to modernize it in the face of changing circumstances. The attitudes and perceptions of the parties involved are of particular importance. Separate townships were built for blacks and coloureds for political and ideological reasons, and run on separate accounts under different systems. The evidence presented suggests that, while this financial arrangement may have facilitated the administration of subsidies for low-income housing and some services, the primary motive was to ensure that white Windhoek was not burdened with financial responsibility, for these dormitories. The logical conclusion of this policy would be to separate their administration entirely, and the respective advisory bodies were viewed as embryo councils. It is thus natural that the request by Khomasdal's Consultative Committee (the representativeness of which is highly questionable) for separate municipal status should be supported, particularly coming, as it did, at a time when international negotiations on Namibian independence seemed near to success, and a start was being made in removing racial discrimination. A future government would be unlikely to support such moves. The first investigative Committee set up by the AG in 1978 based its justification of separate municipalities on racial exclusivity being maintained, so that the better-off coloureds would not be able to move into white Windhoek, and could uplift Khomasdal in time. The fact that later reports, especially the Arnold and Van Eeden Commissions, which post-dated the removal of racial restrictions
in urban areas, continue to justify the creation of separate municipalities with only slightly modified terminology, reveals the true motive. Protagonists of the scheme profess their preference for racial exclusivity while claiming the plan to be based on Christian principles - especially ‘do unto thy neighbour as thou would'st have done unto thyself’. This is the same language used over the years, both in South Africa and Namibia, to justify apartheid. Claims of financial viability for Khomasdal and Katutura are unrealistic if present conditions are to be improved. There has been no suggestion that certain predominantly white and homogeneous suburbs, notably Pioniers Park and Academia or Klein Windhoek, which have better commercial facilities, existing infrastructure and services, and many middle to upper-middle class home owners providing a good tax base, should become separate municipalities. Regional concepts of homogeneity have also been used to justify separation, yet Windhoek is a small, physically compact, and well-defined city of roughly 100 000 people, and in no way comparable to a metropolitan region. Besides, the cost of duplicating all facilities is very high and far beyond the capacity of a small city, approximately half the population of which are low income earners.

The present government structure is proving financially and administratively unworkable, not least because of a top-heavy bureaucracy. These proposals would, if implemented, add to this and duplicate at third tier level the maladministration existing in the Representative Authorities. Tensions have existed between the tiers of government since this system was introduced, primarily as a result of conflicting viewpoints. The effect has been to suspend implementation of changes affecting local authorities, while the uncertainty has adversely affected planning and smooth operations (WA 18/11/81:2; 23/11/81:5; WO 21/11/81:18). The NP-controlled municipalities (including Windhoek) and the Administration for Whites are now seeking to decentralize and split existing local government autonomy along broadly racial lines, as proposed in the Commissions' Reports. On the other hand, the DTA-controlled Central Government, in an effort to be seen to be moving away from discrimination, is stalling on implementation of the Commissions' Reports and attempting to bring local authorities under its control. It seems unlikely that much will change before independence, and it is equally unlikely that the future government will favour municipal fission. Experience elsewhere in Africa, most recently Zimbabwe, has shown that after independence township advisory bodies are generally abolished, the City Council becomes predominantly black once municipal franchise is opened to all races (as a reflection of the urban population composition) and that attempts are made, with varying success, to integrate the various parts of urban areas. Ultimately, the results reflect the nature of
government policy, in particular the degree of centralization implemented, and hence attempts to undermine or bolster the position and role of local authorities (e.g. Howell 1974; Ashton 1977; Gargett 1977; Greenwood and Howell 1980). Whites are now a minority in Windhoek (Chapter 3) and there is every reason to expect that similar trends to those observed elsewhere will occur here. Some administrative problems will undoubtedly arise in the short-term, for lack of experienced personnel, if many senior white municipal officials leave. However, the United Nations Institute for Namibia has been training Namibians for such an eventuality.

Katutura, which contains roughly half the capital's population, has not featured significantly in this chapter because the authorities deem it still ill-prepared for autonomy. Although housing policy in Katutura contains elements not yet applied in Khomasdal (Chapter 6), the overall situation and paucity of service infrastructure there suggest that Katutura is the area likely to experience the greatest changes in the city after independence.

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CHAPTER 5
STATUTORY DESEGREGATION AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY

1. INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

One of the most characteristic features of plural societies is the residential (segregation of their component ethnic or racial groups. While the degree of segregation differs widely, it results from interrelated economic, demographic, political and cultural factors. Where these converge, they have the effect of reinforcing any existing cleavage, particularly if there are readily visible racial differences which serve as a vehicle for group ascription and discrimination (Okamura 1981).

This chapter presents an empirical study of racial mobility in Windhoek after the removal of statutory residential segregation in 1979, as it is one of the most readily and rapidly observable aspects of social change. Analysis is at both the macro- and micro-scales, focussing initially on spatial and temporal dimensions of the mobility process, and subsequently on how individual households have taken advantage of, or been affected by, the changing circumstances. Preliminary sections situate the study in the context of the existing literature, the nature of segregation in South Africa and Namibia, and relevant post-1977 legislative changes.

Residential location patterns form an integral part of the social mosaic at a given point in time, reflecting differential access to economic, social and political resources - 'the bases for accumulating social power' (Friedmann 1979:101). It is thus unsurprising that social scientists have long sought to understand various aspects of residential and social segregation and urban ecology. Contemporary interest can be traced from Park, Wirth, Simmel and others of the influential Chicago 'Ecological' School in the 1930s, through more recent American and British sociology on the one hand, and social anthropologists of the 'Manchester School' in particular, working in Central and Southern Africa, on the other.

A prolific literature sprang up in the USA during the 1950s and has continued ever since, trying to develop and standardize various indices for the study of segregation (e.g. Duncan and Duncan 1955; Shevky and Bell 1955; Taeuber and Taeuber 1955; Lieberson 1963, 1980; Rose 1970). Despite their drawbacks the most widely used measures are the Index of Dissimilarity (D) and the Index of Segregation (S), which reflect differences in the relative proportional distributions over a series of spatial sub-areas of two given groups, and of one group versus the rest of the population, respectively. Nevertheless, the complexities of segregation can only be adequately reflected with the use of more than one such index (Robinson 1980). These measures have been extensively applied by the 'spatial sociologists' in Britain, studying the distribution and behavioural characteristics of immigrant cultural/racial minorities, most notably the Irish, West
Indians and various Asian groups (Peach 1975; Peach, Robinson and Smith 1981; Jackson and Smith 1981). The central hypothesis of such research is that

"the greater the degree of difference between the spatial distributions of groups within an urban area, the greater
their social distance from each other."
(Peach 1975:1)

It seems pertinent to warn against a tendency to reduce segregation studies (in the broadest sense) to 'positive' statistical exercises at the expense of structural, causal, perceptual and behavioural analysis.

During the 1960s urban economists devoted much attention to housing market behaviour. Early trade-off models of rent versus distance from the CBD developed by Muth, Alonso and Wingo, subsequently required modification to account for racial discrimination (Maasdorp and Pillay 1977). Goodman (1972) shows vividly how tenement construction and then urban renewal in the USA were used to further vested economic and political interests at the expense of the poor, and particularly blacks e.g. by ghetto creation. Maasdorp and Pillay (1977) suggest a similar dynamic in segregation through enforced relocation in South Africa. For present purposes, however, much of the British and USA literature is not directly relevant as it concerns aspects of segregation without the legal and institutional framework that has come to dominate housing (and, indeed, all aspects of life) in South Africa and Namibia. Furthermore, blacks form the majority in southern Africa, not a minority as in the USA and UK. Sada (1972) shows the inapplicability of Western residential land-use models to Nigeria in terms of indigenous (pre-colonial) land tenure and cultural systems. While it

is true that in South Africa (and until 1979 in Namibia too) an effective free market in housing operates for whites, and to a lesser extent separate ones for coloureds and Indians, blacks have not been permitted freehold rights in property. Government policy regards them as temporary urban sojourners and seeks to restrict their urbanization. Black accommodation provision has thus become almost exclusively a public sector function, and one of the chief characteristics of black urban townships ('locations') is thus the complete range of income groups living side by side in monotonous rows of tiny, low-income, 'matchbox' houses. With the removal of legal impediments, it is thus to be expected that those able to afford better will tend to move into areas compatible with their socio-economic status, subject to cultural/racial constraints. This process has recently begun in Windhoek. Some of the USA and British experiences, particularly relating to black suburbanization from inner city ghettos, and the reaction of white residents to 'encroachment', (e.g. Schelling 1969, Schnare 1976, Rose 1976, Woods 1980) may thus provide some insights
into the likely future trends, particularly as the present Namibian Government
claims to be a committed supporter of free market economics (SWA/Namibia
Information Service 1981:3-8).

Ethnic and racial segregation is also one of the dominant characteristics of
colonial and post-colonial cities (Chapter 1). Where urbanization pre-dated
European colonization the bulk of the indigenous population were generally
restricted to the ‘native quarter’ within the walls and later to some peripheral
overspill areas, while the new European settlement sprang up around or apart
from it. Where the Europeans established cities and towns they

reserved the prime areas for themselves, relegating the indigines to a specifically
reserved section (‘location’, ‘township’), almost always
on the urban fringe. Only rarely was the city for occupation by all, and
sometimes, as in Sydney, indigenous people were excluded altogether (King,
forthcoming). Precise policies varied widely, some being more formally instituted
than others, but the net effect was similar, irrespective of who the colonial masters
were (e.g. Larimore 1959; De Blij 1962, 1963, 1968; Halliman and Morgan 1967;
Lloyd et
al. 1967; McGee 1967; Southall 1967; Collins 1969; Davies 1969; La Fontaine
1970; Martin 1973; Clarke 1975; Fetter 1976; King 1976; Oram 1976; Kay and
Smout 1977; Reed 1978).

Unfortunately, almost all such city-wide geographical studies end just
before or at independence, so that little detailed attention has been given to post-
colonial residential change and desegregation in specific cities or countries.
Important exceptions are Mascarenhas
(1967) and Vorlaufer (1970, 1973) on Dar Es Salaam, Tiwari (1972) on Nairobi
and Sada (1972) on Lagos. A few good regional overviews of post-colonial
urbanization touch briefly on individual cities e.g. Abu-Lughod (1976), McNulty
(1976), Soja and Weaver (1976). Much of the empirical work in this period has
taken the form of factorial ecologies (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1969, 1980; Berry and
Rees 1969; Brand 1972; Gradus 1976; Weinstein and Pillai 1979). A spatial
variant of the multivariate factor analysis technique, this method suffers from
the distinct disadvantages of being static, and of representing only statistically
significant factors (combinations of parts of several variables) rather than any
discrete variables. They thus tell us
nothing of the underlying process of change, and may frequently not

even be easily interpretable or correspond to the known urban pattern
(Joshi 1972). Indeed, Abu-Lughod’s study of Cairo (1965, 1971) is the only
example known to me of a comparative use of factor analysis for more than one
date. Johnston (1977) and Hart (1978) discuss further problems in using this
technique, related to the nature of many
census-type variables, their interrelationships (e.g. closed number
sets, non-linear interrelationships), the standardization procedure, and interpretation. Nevertheless, these studies may still pro ride very useful indications of residential structure, and show the differences from Western cities, especially where the State is an important location decision-maker, as Gradus (1976:59,64) and Hart (1978) suggest.

Abu-Lughod has judiciously used factorial ecology mainly as an illustrative tool in her analysis of North African capitals (1971, 1980). Her work also provides a comparative perspective between Cairo, Tunis and Rabat-Sale, which had all been independent capitals for at least 20 years at the time (Abu-Lughod 1975, 1976). Whereas only the small indigenous elite had been spatially mobile in colonial times, a greater intra-urban shift has occurred since independence, creating class, rather than ethnic, segregation.

2. SEGREGATION AND APARTHEID: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

As suggested earlier, it is the degree and extent of institutionalization of racial segregation which has distinguished South Africa and Namibia from other countries. Segregation has been a continuous feature of South African and Namibian society since European settlement began in the 17th and 19th Centuries respectively, but its systematization is generally accepted as having occurred since the late 19th Century as economic association between the races increased (e.g. W. Davies 1971:2-6). Although there are certain differences between their respective processes of implementation, there has been little detailed study of Namibia's experience, and the South African case provides a useful baseline.

The origin, evolution and refinement of segregative legislation in South Africa are detailed by Davenport (1969, 1971), Horrell (1966a, 1978) and Rich (1978), while Davenport (1971), Maasdorp and Pillay (1977), Saunders (1978) and Gordon (1980) discuss the rise of 'locations' in this context. The underlying reasons are numerous and complex, and there has long been disagreement on the subject between the 'Liberal' and 'Radical' Schools of historiography in South Africa (Wright 1977). The former emphasize the role of racial/cultural differences, white fears of domination by superior numbers of blacks, and 'irrational' ideology which meshes these with Calvinist religious philosophy, but conflicts with the maximization of economic growth. The Radicals point to the primacy of rational economic motives (the subjugation and land dispossession of blacks, and their confinement in rural reserves as a reserve army of cheap labour for the mines and industries in the white area), which political action has actively sought to promote and achieve i.e. there is a close and functional relationship between them. Rich (1978) argues that the pressure for
segregation arose essentially in the urban context, in reaction to primarily economic forces perceived to threaten the superior position of whites, and not overwhelmingly in the rural context as claimed by most 'Radical' writers.

Apart from early local regulations, the first relevant national legislation was the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, No. 21 of 1923, subsequently tightened by amendments in 1930 and 1937, then superseded by the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, as amended. Regulations issued under this Act governed the residence of blacks in urban areas, imposing influx control (the notorious 'pass laws') and defining those people entitled to permanent urban residence rights, black employment in towns; the establishment of black townships; and the administration of urban black affairs. After the National Party's accession to power in 1948 the systematization of racial separation in all spheres of life emerged in the official apartheid philosophy and policy. One of its cornerstone laws, and one of central importance, both in terms of its provisions and the hardship it has caused, is the Group Areas Act, No.41 of 1950, which aims to create racially homogeneous and exclusive urban residential areas by restricting ownership and occupation of accommodation to members of the race for which a given area is proclaimed. Although a fair degree of segregation had already existed, implementation of this Act has led to large scale removal and relocation of people of all races in the last 30 years, causing tremendous suffering and hatred. Several important studies exist on the Act and its direct and indirect effects on individual cities (Kuper, Watts and Davies 1958; W. Davies 1971; R. Davies 1972, 1981; Maasdorp and Humphreys (eds) 1975; Maasdorp and Pillay 1977; Western 1981). Physically, the effect has been to simplify the urban spatial structure from the 'Segregation City' towards an ideal-type 'Apartheid City' model, as suggested by Davies (1972, 1981), Western (1981:84-120) and Chapter 3 above. Western (1981) also examines the rending, dislocation and consequent traumas of a particular community. A myriad of other legislation affects urban residence e.g. the Bantu Laws Amendment Acts, Nos. 76 of 1963 and 19 of 1970, which tightened provisions compelling urban blacks to reside in Townships; and enabled restrictions to be placed on the number of domestic servants resident on their (white) employers' premises (see e.g. Horrell 1966a:26).

3. LEGISLATION AND APARTHEID IN NAMIBIA
a) Refining Control Till 1977
The origin and development of urban segregation in Windhoek itself was discussed in Chapter 3, where it was demonstrated that, even before the South African occupation in 1915, measures adopted by the German administration were similar to those applied in South Africa. The
South West Africa Constitution Act, No.42 of 1925, as amended by the SWA Affairs Acts of 1949, 1951 and 1954, provided for South African legislation to be applied in the territory by proclamation of the State President or the Administrator (Horrell 1966b). This was commonly done immediately after promulgation of legislation in South Africa itself. What follows is not a complete checklist of all the laws of urban racial control, but merely a pointer to the major statutes of relevance to this Chapter.

Two early proclamations governed influx control and restrictions on blacks in urban areas, namely the Native Administration Proc., No. 11 of 1922, as amended by Proc. 11 of 1927, which sought to control movement out of the northern Reserves by means of pass laws; and the Curfew Regulation Proc., No. 33 of 1922, which introduced a curfew for blacks in white areas (see Wellington 1967:275-283). The Prohibition of Credit to Natives Proc., No.18 of 1927, curtailed the ability of blacks to borrow money.

The frequently amended Natives (Urban Areas) Proc., No. 34 of 1924, was repealed and replaced by the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation, No. 56 of 1951 (See Schedule to this Proc.) . The former was based on the 1923 Act in SA, and the latter on the 1945 Consolidation Act. This extremely wide-ranging legislation encompassed inter alia:
- the establishment of black urban 'locations' (Section 2)
- restrictions on the acquisition of land in urban areas by blacks (Section 7) or in 'locations'/townships by whites (Section 8)
- compulsory segregation of blacks in 'locations' unless specifically exempted (Section 9)
- restrictions on the rights of blacks to remain in urban areas for more than 72 hours, and provision for removal of those remaining illegally (Sections 10-12) or those superfluous to local labour requirements (Sections 25 and 26)
- imposition of a curfew (Section 27)
- powers of local authorities within proclaimed 'locations', including registration of all occupants, and the right to refuse registration to new arrivals under several broad conditions (Section 22)
- prohibition of white interests in property in 'locations' (Section 35).

The Group Areas Act as such was never implemented, probably because of the sensitive nature of the territory's international politics and because it was not really necessary: the whites didn't feel threatened as residential mixing in predominantly white areas was virtually non-existent. This can be attributed to four factors:
i) Blacks had been confined to separate 'locations' in terms of Section 9 of Proc.56 of 1951; while Section 6(3)(b) implies the intention to provide separate coloured residential areas in the future.

ii) Custom or convention - coloureds had lived in the Old Location in Windhoek together with blacks in the past, rather than elsewhere, given prevailing social attitudes.

iii) Restrictive clauses in title deeds of buildings and establishment conditions of erven (plots) in white areas, in terms of the Town and Land Division Ordinance, No.11 of 1963, as amended by Ordinance 36 of 1967. These precluded sale or transfer to, or occupation by, any black, coloured or Asian, except for bone fide domestic servants of registered owners/occupants, with the requisite permission from the local authority. This did not apply to older parts of the city; only to areas and plots created since World War II. In the new suburbs of Olympia, Eros Park and Klein Windhoek's Ludwigsdorf extension, even domestic servants were precluded from living on the plots without express permission from the City Council (letter from Windhoek's Town Clerk to Secretary for South West Africa, January 1978). To bring all title deeds into line with the 1974 Town Planning Scheme the City Engineer was empowered to approve amendments to existing title deeds, on behalf of the City Council, to incorporate a condition of racially restrictive ownership (Clayton 1974:3). Soja and Weaver (1976:261) report the use of such restrictions in East Africa after segregation as official British policy was abandoned in the 1920s.

iv General acceptance that racial separation was national policy. It has been suggested that this is why no complaints about 'Non-Whites' living even on the older, unrestricted plots were received by the Municipality before legislative change commenced (Town Clerk's letter, op cit). Nevertheless, the Municipality had on a few occasions attempted 'as a precautionary measure' to declare Windhoek exclusively for white residence, and Khomasdal for coloureds, in terms of Article 240(20) of the Municipal Ordinance, No.13 of 1963. It had been requested to desist, however, so as not to aggravate the Government's position at the UN, and later not to affect 'detente' efforts (Town Clerk's letter, op cit).

b) Legislating for the 'New Dispensation'

Since October 1977, when the Administrator-General assumed office, a number of significant legislative changes in this sphere have occurred (see 'South West Africa' in bibliography)

1) Proclamation AG4 of 1977 which repealed, inter alia, the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Ordinance (No.19 of 1953) and the Immorality Proclamation (No.19 of 1934), as amended in 1953 and 1954.

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2) Proclamation AG.5 of 1977, the General Law Amendment Proclamation 1977, repealing, inter alia, many sections of the Native Administration Proc. (No.11 of 1922), the Native Administration Amendment Proc. (No.11 of 1927), and the Prohibition of Credit to Natives Proc. (No.18 of 1927). In addition, a number of amendments to the Natives (Urban Areas) Proc., No.56 of 1951, were made, most notably
- Section 9: removal of the burden of proof by blacks of exemption from the provisions of this Section.
- Repeal of Sections 2(f), 10, 11, 12, 25, 26 and 27 (the 72 hour, influx control and curfew measures).
- Substitution of Section 22 with a new version limiting a local authority's powers to the provision of accommodation in 'locations'

3) Proclamation AG.8 of 1977, the Marriage Amendment Proclamation, which regularized procedures in respect of inter-racial marriages.

4) Proclamation AG.12 of 1977, the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Proc. 1977. This provided mainly for the alienation (sale) of erven in 'locations' to blacks (Sections 2 and 7) and for the registration of title deeds and mortgages (Section 6). Previously only leasehold was permitted. The levying of rates on such property was provided for by the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act, No.12 of 1980, (Sections 17 and 19).

5) The Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act, No.3 of 1979. It became effective on 11th August 1979 (WO 11/8/79:3) and is the single most important law concerning residential mobility because it removes all restrictions based on race in connection with residential areas and certain public amenities, and prohibits the imposition of any such restrictions. The other proclamations mentioned above, in particular AG.5 and AG.12 of 1977, simply made the situation more uniform for each race in its respective area. This was also the first relevant Act of the National Assembly (as opposed to simple Proclamation by the Administrator-General), and the opposition to it from the right-wing National Party alliance (AKTUR) and Herstige Nasionale Party (HNP) in the Assembly, plus considerable public reaction against it, provide evidence that the attitudes of most whites had not changed noticeably despite changing circumstances (WO 23/6/79:10; 18/8/79:21; South African Institute of Race Relations 1981:646-7). As a result, the clauses on discrimination in public amenities and appropriate penalties were held over, only coming into effect on 1 July 1980, in terms of Proc. AG.21 of 1980.

7) The Abolition of Racial Discrimination (Urban Land and Public Amenities) Amendment Act, No.21 of 1981, which broadened the Act's scope to include all urban land as opposed to residential areas only, and improved the procedure for tracing contraventions. This is relevant here, because a number of flats and rooms, especially in central Windhoek and the Southern Industrial Area, are located on erven zoned primarily for commercial or other use, and might thus have "previously fallen outside the Act's scope.

8) The Second Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Proclamation 1980. This removed restrictions on the occupation or ownership of property in black urban areas by whites, which had existed in terms of Section 35 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proc. of 1951.

4. BLURRING THE EDGES: RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY
A serious housing shortage exists in all racial and economic sectors in Windhoek (Chapter 6). In addition, the legislative changes discussed have removed formal restrictions on blacks moving to urban areas, and on the parts of urban areas in which particular races may live. However, a proportion of whites are certain to leave the territory during the transitional phase and after independence, as a result of opposition to political change, fear for the future, or Namibianization of the civil service. It is thus of considerable academic and planning importance to study the short term effects of the legislative changes, in terms of residential mobility.

Windhoek's population is highly mobile. A large proportion of the whites are South African citizens on short to medium term transfer or contract in Namibia, as public or private sector employees gaining experience in local branch operations. Many blacks retain rural linkages, and until very recently, black mobility and urban instability were artificially maintained through influx control and the contract labour system (Chapter 2). The coloured population has grown very rapidly in the last decade, due to high birth rates and rapid in-migration (see below). As a result it was necessary to restrict this analysis to 'racially significant' cases i.e. people moving out of the area prescribed for their race group and into areas previously closed to them. Residential segregation has, however, never been absolute, since many domestic servants and institutional employees live on employers' premises, as in South Africa (Whisson and Weil 1971; Hart 1976).

a) The Baseline
Official census data on Namibia are not published at the intra-urban level. Similarly the 1975 Municipal Census Report (Municipality of Windhoek 1976) does not include data on blacks or coloureds living outside Katutura and Khomasdal respectively. However, the Housing Report (Municipality of Windhoek 1978b:V.1, pp.2-3; V.2 Table 5) shows a total of 3 086 blacks (2 273 men and 813 women) to have been living outside Katutura in
May 1975. This is 9.3% of the black population. They were almost all contract workers accommodated on their employers' premises, nurses in the Katutura Hospital hostel, pupils in the Augustineum School hostel in Khomasdal, and domestic servants. 1 829 of them fell into the first category; the balance of 1 257 was split between the other three. The same Report (V.1 p.8; V.2 Tables 22,23) shows that 889 (9.8%) of the total coloured population lived outside Khomasdal in 1975. 747 of these were women, chiefly nurses and domestic servants. They were fairly well distributed throughout the city, with the heaviest concentrations in Pioniers Park, the largest suburb (166), and Windhoek North, which includes the Hospital complex (114). Hart (1976) has shown the distribution of live-in domestic servants in Johannesburg to be dependent on the ability of whites to support them, and on the proportion of youngish families with children living in large detached houses. De Kock's (1979:35-37) analysis of the distribution of housing types in the white areas of Windhoek is broadly consistent with that of the coloured domestic servants noted above.

A Gini Index \( G \) was calculated using unpublished 1975 Municipal census data (Table 5.1). This was used to enable direct comparison with the index calculated for several South African cities (Kuper, Watts and Davies 1958; W. Davies 1971; R. Davies 1972). These authors erroneously refer to it as the Index of Segregation \( S \). Whites in Windhoek are very highly segregated from the rest of the population \( G = .952 \), and although Davies' data for Durban in 1970 lacks an overall figure for direct comparison it seems likely to be very similar, judging from the individual components (Table 5.1). It should be noted, however, that the Windhoek data used here differ from those in the Housing Report in that they give a total black population outside Katutura of only 659, due probably to the omission of contract workers and pupils. Nevertheless, as almost all members of other races living in the white areas are not autonomous households, the effective segregation was almost complete. This Index is thus merely a rough guide against which to measure the future impact of desegregative legislation.

<p>| TABLE 5.1 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEGREGATION OF WHITES FROM BLACKS AND COLOURED IN WINDHOEK 1975*</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X. = Cumulative % of whites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Y. = Cumulative % of blacks and coloureds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Co-efficient segregation index</td>
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<tr>
<td>( = \frac{1}{2} \frac{Y}{X} - \frac{1}{2} \frac{Y}{X} )</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 000</td>
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<td>24 925.11 - 15 404.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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10 000
= .952
Other cities:
1. Port Elizabeth
2. Durban
(White/Non-White) 1946: .874 1951: .888 1960: .942
White/Coloured) White/Asian) White/Black)
Sources: 1) W.J. Davies 1971 p.148.
2) R.J. Davies 1972 p.802.
*Note: The data for blacks and coloureds have been combined for comparative purposes, and because the Katutura figures do not distinguish coloured from black.

b) Applications for Residence Permits 1976-1979
It was possible to gain an impression of the number of people living legally outside their respective racial areas before the promulgation of the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination Act in mid-1979, as they had to apply to the Municipality for permission. Once legally in the area, matters relating to behaviour etc. of blacks fell under the Police, rather than Municipal jurisdiction. Blacks required permission in terms of Section 9 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proc., No.56 of 1951, in addition to the Town Planning Scheme, health regulations and title deed restrictions which affected coloureds and whites.
Analysis of applications processed by the Municipality reveals no cases of whites living permanently in Katutura or Khomasdal, and none are known from any other source. The results below apply to blacks other than domestic servants seeking to reside in areas reserved for whites, for the period January 1976 to the end of June 1979, when the new Act made such application irrelevant (Table 5.2). In accordance with government policy the number of blacks permitted in white areas was kept to a minimum. The Municipality's Director of Non-White Affairs was empowered to decide on domestic servants, but all other cases, including permission for more than one domestic servant per plop had to be dealt with by the City Council itself (City of Windhoek 1976: item F.3). No equivalent data on coloureds were obtained.
The numbers involved were thus fairly small, and since domestic servants, for whom no data were obtained, were excluded, virtually all the premises involved were located in the central or industrial areas.
The major criterion explicitly applied by the Municipality was how essential the application was, and then the likely effect (e.g. complaints from neighbours), adequacy of accommodation in terms of the health regulations, availability of public transport etc. Although their policy appears consistent, at least in terms of the proportion approved - which was roughly 50% in all years except the relevant part of 1979 - I found some difficulty in distinguishing between certain cases where permission had been granted and others not.

c) Municipal Attitudes to Change

Most informative as to the Municipality's attitude, is the interdepartmental correspondence on the subject of blacks and coloureds living in the white areas without permission over the same period. There were regular debates between the Legal Advisor, Director of Non-White Affairs, City Secretary and Town Clerk on how best to combat the phenomenon, with the matter frequently being referred to the Heads of Departments, Management Committee, and back. During 1976 and 1977 the possibility of empowering the municipal Inspectorate to report or lay charges for contraventions encountered during the execution of their normal duties direct to the Police, or alternatively, the legality of using the Inspectorate to issue summonses for such contraventions in their capacity as limited Justices of the Peace ('Vredesbeamptes'), was discussed. Information was also obtained from municipal meter-readers.

The Municipal inspectors deemed a systematic survey inappropriate on time and cost grounds and the unreliability of information likely to be obtained. Nevertheless, they estimated from experience that roughly
25% of home-owners in Klein Windhoek, and 20% in both Windhoek West and Pioniers Park were guilty of accommodating coloureds or Basters on their properties. This excluded cases of extra-marital cohabitation. Overcrowded servants' quarters, use of garages as sleeping quarters, shacks, accommodation on building sites or supply depots, and even sharing of houses by white and coloured families were reported, and roughly 80% of complaints from the public about disturbance of the peace, accommodation, and unseemly behaviour and the like in white suburbs related to the presence of coloureds or Basters. The 'problem' was far more widespread than generally believed, a fact they attributed to the lack of previous action. Resolute action was thus proposed, but uncertainty existed as to the most appropriate method, as additional staff would have been required. There were even some cases of coloureds living in central city flats, where no action could be taken. Residents complaining to the Municipality were to be asked to take up the matter with the Police. There was frequent reference in the discussions to wider political developments: some City Councillors felt the time inappropriate for action of this kind as it had a bearing on race relations, while others felt action to be the Municipality's duty as it was responsible for introducing the restrictive title deed clauses in the first place; besides the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference had expressed itself in favour of retaining ethnic residential segregation (City of Windhoek 1977a: item J.2). Repeated uncertainty was also expressed by members of the Management Committee and other officials as to whether the Municipality was legally bound to take action on these transgressions. Together with the overall procrastination, this seemed to reflect a certain reluctance to act, much as they would undoubtedly have liked to. Legally there was an obligation, except for discretionary powers in respect of enforcing township establishment conditions in the newer suburbs (City of Windhoek 1977b: Annexure T). By late 1977 the administrative problems, from the Municipality's point of view, had increased: abolition of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Proclamations meant that people of different races could now legally cohabit or marry - yet they couldn't reside in the same suburb! At the same time a noticeable drift of coloured people into the white city had been detected, especially to flats and old plots in the central area without title restrictions. They knew that they would not be prosecuted as a result of developments in the Turnhalle Conference. Complaints from angry whites were being received, not only about specific instances of this trend but the potential threat this infiltration posed to property values and hence their investments. 16 complaints had been received by 25th January 1978, and 25 cases confirmed by 14th March, ten of them being in contravention of various restrictions. Despite advice to report such cases to the Police, complainants were unwilling to get
involved’. Moreover, the Municip'fity was aware of political developments and did not want to take a course of action that would conflict with policy being formulated by higher authorities (letter from Town Clerk to Secretary for South West Africa, January 1978). An urgent meeting was thus convened with top officials of the South West Africa Administration on 25th January 1978 to clarify the matter, and it was finally decided to await new legislation being prepared by the Labour Committee of the

AG. Little further happened before the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination Act became effective in August 1979, although an incomplete survey on 17th May 1979 suggested at least 33 plots to be occupied by 'Non-Whites'.

It must be stressed that the above discussions and correspondence were not public information, and are thus invaluable indicators of real attitudes. Notwithstanding the fact that many of the inspectors, officials and City Councillors undoubtedly supported the policy of residential segregation (something many still do today) and hence the need for action to prevent infiltration by other races, there was awareness of wider and changing political circumstances and a desire to avoid conflict with them. This is true especially of many professional staff (e.g. planners, engineers), as evidenced, for example, by the broadly positive outlook of the town planners in their report on the potential effects of desegregation (Municipality of Windhoek 1979). The position was complicated by conflicting legal provisions after the removal of discriminatory laws began in late 1977 - something which is a recurrent problem throughout the transition period being studied here (and will be referred to again elsewhere). It provides strong evidence that a system of comprehensive restrictions and controls cannot be dismantled piecemeal.

In public, however, the City Council adopted a negative and pessimistic attitude towards these and related developments, reflecting the racial and political conservatism of most Councillors and many officials (City of Windhoek 1978:6; 1979:4; WO 16/6/79, 22/3/80:6). Thus, in reviewing the previous year, the Mayor, Councillor S.G. Beukes, a member of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond (Wilkins and Strydom 1979:A6), said

"The opening of residential areas to all races was certainly a step which served political purposes and which belongs in a country with a [racially] equally composed government. It is actually my considered opinion that its practical implications are so unfavourable that they have completely neutralized the political advantages."
(City of Windhoek 1979:4; my translation)

Citing the severe housing shortage, while many serviced erven remained unsold, he claimed (without reference to the economic conditions or wider political
uncertainties inhibiting new home construction) that most people were hesitant to invest in a mixed suburb, and concluded that "This step has already been to the detriment of local authorities, and will continue to be so for a long time." (City of Windhoek 1979:4; my translation)

The South West Africa Municipal Association, an all-white body representing municipalities in the territory, convened a special congress on 23 August 1979 to discuss the opening of residential areas. In view of the topic's sensitivity and the fear of reaction, the delegates voted narrowly to bar the press. Most delegates, including Mayor Beukes of Windhoek, expressed themselves vehemently against desegregation, the more because they had not been adequately consulted. The Association's representations had, moreover, been ignored. Debate was very emotional, dealing with perceived threats of 'lowered standards' and hygiene, overpopulation in the suburbs, and discrimination against whites, and the few delegates taking a more positive view were not well received. Such fears are typical of white colonial attitudes (Chapters 1 and 8). Discussion centred around possible steps in this regard, and adoption of measures "to ensure that the least possible damage is done to urban areas as a result of integrated residential areas." (WO 7/7/79:19; 25/8/79:14; Municipal Association of South West Africa 1979)

The thrust of this line was that by making 'Black and Brown towns' more attractive the number of people from them seeking to live in 'White towns' could be minimized. A study group was set up to investigate the wider implications (Chapter 4).

d) The Sample Survey
d(i) Methodology: Details of electricity and water connections and disconnections kept by the Municipality proved the most accessible source of information on residential mobility. Additional information was, however, required for this study, and the Municipality agreed to the inclusion of a short questionnaire with the normal connection/disconnection forms to be completed by applicants in the Municipal offices. Full coverage was thus obtained. Separate forms for connections and disconnections, containing family details, ethnic group, name of employer, original and final addresses, and reasons for moving were compiled by the Town Planners before my arrival in Windhoek so as to obtain the relevant information as soon as possible. Implementation commenced in August 1979, within a very short time of the new legislation becoming effective on 11th August, and few racially significant cases appear to have been missed as a result. Some blacks and coloureds are known to have purchased houses in the
white areas from 1978 onwards, often using surrogates, but they probably did not take occupation before August 1979. Some flat dwellers had moved before this. The unit of analysis or 'case' here is the household unit. While there is an obvious overlap in the connection and disconnection forms, it was necessary to monitor both sides of the process in order to record in- and out-migration. However, it is important to note that this method records only the first of four categories of residential mobility which could be distinguished in Windhoek. These are:

1) Owner-occupiers or tenants who have their own electricity/water connections.
2) Tenants or sub-tenants who have their meters or sub-meters monitored by landlords and not by the Municipality.
3) Long term guests and hostel/institution dwellers who have no such individual meters.
4) Squatters, and occupants of caravans, tents etc.

Category (2) is especially important in the former white areas where many garages and outbuildings have been converted into accommodation as a result of the housing shortage (Municipality of Windhoek 1978b); and category (3) in Katutura and KhomasdA. where relatives, friends and lodgers share grossly overcrowded conditions (Chapter 6). Some people do live permanently in caravans (especially in Khomasdal), but personal knowledge of the area, official records and examination of large scale aerial photographs failed to reveal significant squatting, either on the urban fringe or adjacent to standard dwellings in the townships. This can be attributed primarily to strict control. An incomplete survey by the Town Planning Section in June 1975 found 69 squatter families in Khomasdal, but all shacks have since been demolished. There are up to 2 000 squatters on smallholdings in Brakwater, a few km. north of Windhoek, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Peri-Urban Development Board. Control there is difficult (Interview with PUDB officials 10/9/80). There was no method of quantifying categories (2) to (4), and while the number of racially significant moves into them seems from personal experience to be potentially significant, it is unlikely to be as high as anticipated in terms of the accommodation available. The strongly conservative attitudes of most whites are such that, with relatively few exceptions, they are unwilling to accept people other than whites as tenants or sub-tenants on the same properties where they themselves live. Moreover, any squatters in the townships are likely to be almost exclusively coloured in Khomasdal or black in Katutura, and thus not relevant here.

Racially significant connections and disconnections were separated from the rest for analysis. They formed a small but significant proportion both of Windhoek’s total population and the total number of moves recorded (about 3 000 connections and 2 000 disconnections by December 1980).
Thus 11 disconnections and 43 connections had been recorded by the end of 1979, rising to 86 disconnections and 195 connections by the end of May 1981, and 113 and 265 respectively by the end of 1981. The rate of movement has thus been remarkably steady, averaging 9 per month (Figure 5.1).

In order to balance the information recorded on these forms, and obtain deeper insights into perceptions, attitudes and the problems of the individual households involved, a series of personal interviews using structured questionnaires was undertaken from March to May 1981. A 25% sample (45 cases) of the 180 connections anticipated by the end of May 1981 (195 were actually recorded) was selected on a stratified random basis, first by suburb and then by race, so as to ensure the most representative spatial and ethnic coverage possible. This was done using the distribution of 170 connections to February 1981. Interviews were conducted a minimum of 2 months after the move in order to allow for settling in and the filtering out of chance initial impressions. Several households have moved more than once during the period of analysis, so the actual number involved is smaller than the number of connections recorded. Hence the interview sample is not precisely 25% in each area but greater than 25% of households involved overall. Figure 5.2 shows the spatial distribution of connections recorded (i.e. destinations of moves) by suburb as at February and December 1981, as well as the number of interviews conducted (items A, C and B respectively). It was impossible to interview outmigrants (based on the disconnection forms) since the recording procedure used meant that I received the forms after they had left Windhoek.
Ideally the neighbours of racially significant cases should also have been interviewed, but pressure of time precluded this, especially as interviews had to be conducted after normal working hours (i.e. 6 8.30 pm. on weekdays) because in many families both spouses work. Weekends were specifically excluded on practical grounds. The response was good, with only 2 refusals (which were then replaced, as were

\[225\]

**FIGURE 5.2**

**SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RACIALLY-SIGNIFICANT MOVES IN WINDHOEK, AUGUST 1979 - DECEMBER 1981**

A: No. by Feb. 1981

C: No. by Dec. 19B1

8: No. interviewed

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those where the households had moved again or were untraceable). Many valuable insights were gained, as the method adopted realized the main advantages of both participant observation and structured questionnaires. Care was taken to ensure open-endedness of questions, so as not to predicate replies. Interviews were conducted in English, Afrikaans, German or a combination of these, although the initial introduction was never made in Afrikaans unless I was certain that this was the respondent's home language, so as to differentiate myself from officials or police, who always use Afrikaans, the lingua franca. Nevertheless, some initial suspicion did exist on occasion, and a few respondents later confessed to having given me inaccurate information at first - something I was usually aware of, as, unbeknown to them, I had the municipal forms as a control. Virtually everyone appreciated the practical value of this research, a major factor behind the exceptionally positive response.

Since the analysis below is based solely on connection forms, a preliminary check was carried out to compare the frequency of reasons cited for moving in the connection and disconnection forms, because important differences could have arisen. Statistically the difference was not significant at the 1% level using the chi-squared test. The interview results were also compared with summary statistics derived from the original forms, in order to check the sample's representativeness on additional variables. Figure 5.1 shows that the dates of connections in the sample correspond closely with those of

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the overall population, apart from the final period i.e. the second quarter of 1981; while the major reasons for moving cited by respondents were not significantly different.
d(ii) Spatial Distribution, Characteristics and Housing Conditions of Migrants: The SPSS Package on Oxford University’s ICL 2980 computer was used to derive frequency distributions, summary statistics and tests of significance where appropriate. Table 5.3 shows the spatial distribution of the origins and destinations of moves recorded on the connection forms from August 1979 to (a) the end of February 1981 (on the basis of which the sample was selected) and (b) the end of December 1981 (end of the period of analysis). For the purposes of this analysis, the Municipality’s ‘major planning areas’ have been used as the spatial units, since their boundaries generally coincide with those of distinct areas or suburbs. The two areas comprising Klein Windhoek (030 and 040), and the 5 comprising Windhoek Central (070, 080, 090, 100, 110) were combined, however, since no relevant objective divisions exist there. The last five form the old town, containing the least desirable ‘white’ housing, and where few title deed restrictions applied. Area 070 contains hostels and flats for Administration employees (whites), but also some private housing adjacent to areas 080 and 090, and was thus included. Area 140 is entirely the property of the SA Railways and the Municipality, and was excluded from the central area because the housing there is subject to Railways policy and administration, which may conflict with the situation elsewhere.

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TABLE 5.3

MOVES RESULTING IN WATER/ELECTRICITY CONNECTIONS
AUG 1979 - DEC 1981
B Feb.’81 8 Dec.’81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Destinations</th>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Destinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. m N. f</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>34 20.0</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>43 16.2</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eros</td>
<td>3 1.8</td>
<td>12 7.0</td>
<td>4 1.5</td>
<td>16 6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eros Park</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>2 1.2</td>
<td>1 0.4</td>
<td>5 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klein Windhoek</td>
<td>12 7.0</td>
<td>16 9.4</td>
<td>18 6.8</td>
<td>29 10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avis</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>1 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxury Hill</td>
<td>3 1.8</td>
<td>5 2.9</td>
<td>5 1.9</td>
<td>5 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek Centl</td>
<td>34 20.0</td>
<td>54 31.8</td>
<td>51 19.2</td>
<td>86 32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>2 1.2</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>4 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek North</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>2 1.2</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>3 1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek West</td>
<td>16 9.4</td>
<td>15 8.8</td>
<td>23 8.7</td>
<td>30 11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiderhof</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>4 2.4</td>
<td>1 0.4</td>
<td>9 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympia</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>2 1.2</td>
<td>2 0.8</td>
<td>2 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioniers Park</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>4 2.4</td>
<td>2 0.8</td>
<td>5 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>3 1.8</td>
<td>2 1.2</td>
<td>4 1.5</td>
<td>6 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khomasdal</td>
<td>30 17.6</td>
<td>30 17.6</td>
<td>64 24.3</td>
<td>41 15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katutura</td>
<td>11 6.4</td>
<td>13 7.6</td>
<td>15 5.6</td>
<td>14 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek South</td>
<td>1 0.6</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
<td>3 1.1</td>
<td>0 0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hochland Park 3 1.1 0 0.0 3 1.1 0 0.0
Southern Ind. 6 3.5 6 3.5 B 3.0 9 3.4
Unknown 10 5.9 0 0.0 18 6.8 0 0.0
TOTAL 170 100.0 170 100.0 265 100.0 265 100.0

TABLE 5.4
AGE OF RESPONDENTS

Cohort No.
24 2 4.4
25-29 12 26.7
30-34 7 15.6
35-39 10 22.2
40-44 6 13.3
45-49 2 4.4
w50 3 6.7
missing 3 6.7
TOTAL 45 100.0

TABLE 5.5
RESPONDENTS’ MARITAL STATUS

Status No.
Single 11 24
Married 31 69
Divorces 2 4
Widow/-er 0 0
Cohabiting 1 2
TOTAL 45 100

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It is immediately apparent that the distribution of moves is spatially uneven, with significant numbers going to only a handful of areas, namely Eros, Klein Windhoek, Windhoek Central, Windhoek West, Khomasdal and Katutura. Furthermore, while most areas showed small or no net gains (i.e. destinations less origins) only Klein Windhoek, Windhoek Central, Windhoek West and Suiderhof made any significant gains, and Khomasdal and ‘Outside’ has large net losses. With the exception of Khomasdal, the differences between origin and destination totals remained fairly steady throughout 1981, as did the percentage of origins and destinations in all cases. This implies that no significant change in circumstances occurred during June - December 1981. The single exception arose because a new 122-unit group housing scheme was occupied on completion in August/September 1980, drawing a significant number of coloured people who were on the waiting list and had been living temporarily elsewhere in Windhoek. Apart from that, Khomasdal is a net loss area.
The observed mobility patterns can be largely explained in terms of the physical, social and economic characteristics of the various suburbs on the one hand, and the demographic and socio-economic
characteristics of the people involved, on the other. Details of the respective suburbs are provided in Chapter 6 (see also Municipality of Windhoek 1978b; De Kock 1979). Broadly similar patterns are emerging in Harare, with the southwestern suburbs closest to the black townships experiencing the heaviest influx, and a scattering in the affluent northern suburbs (Davies 1979; Harvey 1979). One important factor governing the mobility pattern in Windhoek is the spatial distribution of public sector housing, which accounts for roughly 38% of all housing in white areas. Many authorities reserve their houses for whites, and even when this is not true, the racial skill structure of employment ensures that virtually no members of other races gain access to them. The importance of this to maintenance of 'orderly conditions' was explicitly recognized by the Municipal Association of SWA (1979) and the Municipality of Windhoek (1979). These houses are most heavily concentrated in Academia, Pioniers Park, the Railways Area, Windhoek North, parts of Windhoek West and City West (area 110). However, only 11% of the sample were public sector employees. Another important supply-side factor influencing the rate and spatial distribution of racially significant moves is the availability of loan finance for house purchase or construction. There are three chief sources:

1) the Municipality and Administration for Whites (formerly the SWAA) - see Chapter 6 for details.
2) Commercial banks - for a maximum of five years. 3) The South West Africa Building Society (SWABS), the only one in the territory. This is the most important source of bonds for present purposes. The SWABS was constituted from a number of branches of South African building societies on 1 April 1979, and uses a set of criteria to evaluate loan applications which are independent of race. These relate to the income of the household head and family, their credit record, reliability, age and characteristics of the property in question (value, condition, potential demand in case of resale).

The number of bonds granted to blacks and coloureds is as follows:
1 April 1979 - 30 March 1980: 15 (9 in white Windhoek, 4 in Khomasdal, 2 outside Windhoek.)
(data supplied by SWABS)
Evaluation is difficult as it is not know what proportion of the total bond allocation or total black and coloured applications these
represent, but demand for them has apparently been steady despite high interest rates. The SWABS evaluation procedure does, however, have two indirect racial effects:
1) The income criteria mean that poor people (mainly blacks and coloureds) have difficulty raising a loan from this source, and thus rely on the Municipal/Administration system.
2) Different suburbs, by virtue of their respective character, status, housing standard etc., experience different demand conditions. Houses are usually easiest to sell in the best areas - and thus bonds for them easier to obtain than elsewhere, because of reduced risk to SWABS in case of default. Conversely, the demand for a luxury house in Katutura, for example, is small, so bonds are rarely granted there. As potential applicants in Katutura are almost certain to be black, this affects them adversely.
Tables 5.4 to 5.9 detail characteristics of the sample population. The mobility pattern shows, unsurprisingly, that significant numbers of more economically mobile blacks and coloureds have moved from Katutura.

TABLE 5.6
RESPONDENTS: ETHNIC GROUP

TABLE 5.7
COMPOSITION OF MIXED MARRIAGES
Husband Wife
1. White (Ger) Coloured
2. White (Afr) Baster
3. White (Eng) Coloured
4. White (Ar) Coloured
5. Black (Her) White (Swedish)
6. White Ger Coloured
7. Black Ova White (American)
8. Black IDam White (American)

TABLE 5.8
FAMILY SIZE AND TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS AFTER MOVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Nuclear family</th>
<th>Total Occupants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Cue, %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Average ratios: Nuclear Family 157 0.80 Total Occupants - 197 = Total Occupants 197 Nuclear Family - 157

### OCCUPATIONAL

#### TABLE 5.9

**STRUCTURE OF RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Household Head</th>
<th>Second Earner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Owner, managerial, administrative</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Professional qualified</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical, skilled qualified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Clerical, secretarial qualified</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Semi- and unskilled manual</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi- and unskilled non-manual</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Temporary admin. skilled</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Not working/ no second earner</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>45 100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>145 100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* of 31 employed second earners 2 of 45 spouses/ second earners

#### TABLE 5.10
and Khomasdal into better accommodation in other parts of the city. Although the black middle class is very small, the number moving out of Katutura has been lower than anticipated, and most of the blacks in the sample were politically active exiles returning to Namibia, and a few local businessmen. This trend is due in part to suspicion or mistrust of whites, and the fact that some wealthier Katutura residents have now opted, instead, to build their own homes in Katutura; but primarily due to widespread reluctance to give up houses presently occupied as they hope to acquire them at very low cost. The origin of this hope is an apparently undocumented promise made by the Municipality at the time of the Old Location’s closure that occupants would be given their houses after a certain period of rent payment. The Municipality frequently denied the truth of this, but recent public affirmations by prominent black politicians (WO 10/5/80, 23/5/81) and the introduction by the Central Government of such a scheme for ownership (Chapter 6), raise some doubts. There is also the question of political pride: some blacks feel it injudicious to move under present circumstances, preferring to maintain group solidarity. After independence, migration from Katutura will probably accelerate; indeed, several residents are known to own houses in other suburbs already. Even if most blacks have no such status-related desires, and a socialist government programme argues against it, the demonstration effect is certain to attract many members of the emerging indigenous elites as has been the case elsewhere (Mascarenhas 1967; Tiwari 1972; Vorlaufer 1973; Soja and Weaver 1976; Abu-Lughod 1976). Pendleton (1970) found that 85% of conjugal relations among blacks in Katutura were ethnic group endogamous because of strong external determinants and categorical social relations. However, as a result of

the legislative changes racially mixed marriage/cohabitation is far more common than generally believed and 8 cases were included in the sample. Virtually 70% of respondents are married (Table 5.5), which explains the nuclear family size data in Table 5.8. The fact that there are more single and divorced respondents than nuclear families of
A one member (Table 5.8) implies that several of the former have children. These are women in every case. This is a fairly common phenomenon among races other than white, little social stigma being attached to unmarried mothers in the urban situation (see e.g. Pendleton 1975:139-141). Furthermore, most nuclear families, especially single persons, do not live alone, but share accommodation with relatives, friends or subtenants. This is expressed in the ratio of total occupants to nuclear family members. 82% of respondents are aged 44 or under (Table 5.3).

It can be seen from Table 5.9 that qualified professionals form the single largest occupation category among respondents, accounting for a third of the total; however the semi- and unskilled non-manual group is only 1 person smaller. There are also significant numbers of qualified technical/skilled personnel, and semi- and unskilled manual workers. Second breadwinners rank markedly lower on the occupational profile; however, if the 31% of households with no second breadwinner or with voluntarily unemployed adults (e.g. mothers) are excluded, the profiles are quite similar. Only 3 households had 3 or more breadwinners - adult children living at home or non-nuclear family members sharing the accommodation. If a household unit included a male adult he was designated the household head: Namibian society is still very male-oriented, to the extent that I was asked by wives on several occasions to return later to speak to their husbands rather than them. There was no involuntary unemployment in the sample, and data on incomes were not obtained. Car ownership was 78%.

A clear picture thus emerges that the people moving into areas previously close to them are almost all economically better-off than average in Katutura and Khomasdal, being lower-middle to middle class, predominantly coloured or Baster, under 45 years of age, and with families in many cases. In fact, only 22 of the 265 households recorded by December 1981 had no coloured or Baster member.

Examination of people's accommodation conditions before and after moving shows a significant improvement (Tables 5.10 to 5.13). Almost half the sample now occupied detached single-storey houses, mainly in former white suburbs but also in Katutura and Khomasdal, while nearly 30% moved into flats. These are concentrated primarily around the central area, along Gobabis and Klein Windhoek Roads in Klein Windhoek, in Eros, and Windhoek West, reaching their maximum density within 2km of the city centre (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:50-51) see Figure 6.6. However, racially significant moves into flats are not randomly distributed. The bulk are concentrated in 9 or 10 specific blocks, all of which are in Windhoek Central or the northern extension of Kaiser Street beyond this area. This is the least desirable residential area of the city, although conveniently situated for
shopping and work for people without private transport. Moreover, the blocks in
question are, with one or two notable exceptions, not of high standard, being some
of the earliest in Windhoek and generally

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TABLE 5.11
NUMBER OF LIVING ROOMS AVAILABLE BEFORE AND-AFTER
MOVES*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Tot Rooms</th>
<th>Cum</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Tot Rooms</th>
<th>g</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>98</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mi sing 6 0
TOTAL 45 110 100 45 165 100 100
* ie. excluding kitchen, bathroom, toilet.
2 of 39 valid cases.
Wilcoxon Matched Pair
25 -ranks mean: 14.90 6 +ranks mean: 20.58
MnN'TI-I Y RFNT
Signed Rank Test: Cases: 39
Z: -2.440
2-tailed P: 0.015
Ties: B

TABLE 5.12
OR MnRTrArF PAYMFNTS BEFORE AND AFTER MOVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency (Rand)</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>.8. After</th>
<th>Cum %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001 - 019</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>020 - 039</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>040 - 059</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>060 - 079</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>080 - 099</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 119</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 - 139</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140 - 159</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 --179</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180 - 199</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.Sub total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Wilcoxon Matched Pair Signed Rank Test: cases: 20 ranks mean: 9.67
Z: -3.243
2 +ranks mean: 4.00 2-tailed P: 0.001
ties: 3
MONTHLY RENT

TABLE 5.13
MODES OF OCCUPANCY BEFORE AND AFTER MOVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>BEFORE</th>
<th>AFTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occup.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-tenant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*of 41 valid cases
2eg. long term guest, paying relative, lodger

TABLE 5.14
RESPONDENTS’ REASONS FOR MOVING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Freq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Acceptable environs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To smaller premises</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To larger premises</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To costlier premises</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To cheaper premises</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To rented premises</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Buying own premises</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. To employer’s accom.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Move/transfer to Whk.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Expiry of lease</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Closer to work</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Closer to facilities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Greater safety</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Problems in old area</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Returning to old area</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Other*</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See text for details.
not very well maintained. Most of the flats in them are bachelor or 2-room units. As a result, there is considerable movement by tenants within a particular block, as larger flats become available. The number of connections recorded in Central Windhoek is thereby somewhat inflated. It seems from the evidence, and interviews with some tenants there, that the (white) proprietors have no objection to people other than whites living in them, but this may well be due to the difficulties experienced in finding white tenants. Most whites have enjoyed a significant rise in real incomes over recent years, and are thus able to afford better housing outside the city centre.

Five of the six maisonette occupants are all in the new housing scheme in Khomasdal already referred to, and had previously lived in former white areas. They were interviewed to establish whether the reason for moving back to Khomasdal reflected their experiences in these areas (see below). The proportion of owner-occupiers more than doubled, while the 'Other' category (long term guests, boarders, lodgers) declined by 75%. This category is a good indicator of overcrowding and the shortage of accommodation, especially in Katutura and Khomasdal. Mainly because of the decline in this variable, the proportion of tenants shows a slight rise.

Table 5.11 shows that the number of living rooms in their new homes is significantly higher than before moving. The number of living rooms per household unit rose from 2.82 to 3.67. Monthly rent or mortgage payments have also increased (Table 5.12), reflecting the improved accommodation and also the fact that rentals are not subsidized, as is the case in Katutura and Khomasdal. The increases are statistically significant at the 1% level, using the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs test. Many households still have members not belonging to the nuclear family - generally relatives or flat-mates (Table 5.9) who may contribute towards the rent/mortgage payments.

d(iii) Migrants' Perceptions, Attitudes and Problems: An important element of this survey focused on related behavioural aspects: people's reasons for moving and their subsequent experiences, attitudes and feelings. Respondents were asked why they had moved where they did, and a maximum of three replies allowed. The results appear in Table 5.14. The categories were drawn up to correspond with those on the connection/disconnection forms (despite imperfections in their wording) with a few additions. Broadly speaking, categories 1 to 12 are 'normal' reasons, while 13 to 15 are more directly related to socio-political aspects - although there is obviously much overlap. The reasons cited have simply been summed, as they were not ranked explicitly in terms of importance by respondents. 24 gave one reason only, 20 gave two, while only 1 gave three. This gives a total of 67 reasons or an average of 1.49 per respondent. The largest category was 'Other', which contained over 25% of the total. 7 of these were 'normal' reasons, e.g. divorce, marriage, better situation,
unavailability of accommodation in Khomasdal, or health; while 10 consisted of various socio-politically related issues, such as returning from exile; the need to leave South Africa to marry across the 'colour line'; better opportunities in Namibia for qualified coloureds, especially children's education; work permit problems

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experienced by a coloured family from SA while living in Khomasdal; or the need to be at a Church headquarters in central Windhoek because of promotion. One respondent cited the restrictive conditions imposed by the Municipality on alterations to, or resale of, the house bought from them in Khomasdal a couple of years earlier. This is the subject of much ill-feeling among many coloureds (Chapter 6).

The only other significant categories were 'moving to larger premises' (23.9%), 'move/transfer to Windhoek' (16.4%) and 'closer to work' (11.9%). Notwithstanding that a fair proportion of the moves/transfers were related to changing socio-political circumstances (better opportunities etc.), it is clear that 'normal' reasons were far more important. Many respondents stressed the chronic shortage of housing in Khomasdal as one of the major factors behind their moves, adding that they had no particular desire 'to live among the whites'. Their names were frequently still on the waiting list for Municipal housing in Khomasdal, and they planned to return there should any become available. This indeed occurred in the case of the 5 respondents in the new housing scheme. Such sentiments were usually, but not always, expressed by lower-middle class people, and those native to Windhoek or Namibia. Anumber of respondents saw no reason to live in poorer quality houses in Katutura or Khomasdal simply for 'solidarity' when better was available elsewhere; besides, living elsewhere would soon be in vogue. However, conveniently situated accommodation (especially flats) was obtainable in central Windhoek for monthly rentals of R50 to R95, which they could well afford, particularly as the move generally generated a saving on travel costs. A small but significant

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number of coloureds have also recently moved to Katutura where the housing shortage was not as critical, and some of the better new houses there were obtainable for rent or, occasionally, purchase. Perhaps the most unexpected phenomenon revealed by this study is the large number of formally educated and qualified coloureds coming to Namibia from South Africa to take advantage of higher salaries, better work, social and educational opportunities in the territory since the abolition of statutory racial discrimination. In the sample alone there were ten such household units (1 from Port Elizabeth and 9 from Cape Town) plus three racially mixed couples from Cape Town and vicinity who had come to marry. Eleven of these 13 households live in former white areas, and expressed no desire to live in Khomasdal, although
some (mainly single women) had lodged there initially on arrival in Windhoek. A recent study of Khomasdal suggests that a total of 470 such household units (18% of Khomasdal's population) lived in Khomasdal alone (Municipality of Windhoek 1981:12).

Coloured migration is not new, but was previously restricted mainly to semi-skilled artisans and labourers from the North Western Cape near the Namibian border, working in the construction industry. Much jealousy and ill-feeling on the part of 'local' people in Khomasdal is directed against this group, who are frequently accused of usurping available jobs and houses at the expense of others, and generally being a bad influence on the community. As an influx control measure, coloureds from SA require permanent residence permits in order to work, but this is seen as discriminatory, and causes much resentment because no other group any longer faces any such restrictions.

Although aimed essentially at unskilled migrants, everyone is affected, and many people refuse to apply for permits because of the discrimination and alleged political manipulation by the DTA-controlled issuing authorities. Because of the skilled labour shortage, jobs are easily obtained even without a permit, but the authorities have clamped down recently (WA 9/3/82).

98% of respondents said that their reasons for moving had been fulfilled, but only 82% admitted to being happy in their new neighbourhoods. 16% were happy in some respects, and 2% unhappy. 82% said they planned to remain at their present addresses for the near future, 16% would move elsewhere in Windhoek, and 2% would return to their original suburb.

An attempt was made to measure respondents' assimilation in their new area, as this seems intuitively to be related to their happiness and future plans as just outlined. Three questions were asked on the frequency of interaction with their neighbours, the number of friends (not casual acquaintances) made in the neighbourhood, and whether their circle of close friends and relatives was mainly the same as before moving. The results of the first two are presented in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, while 62% of respondents said their social circle had not changed significantly, and 36% said it had. The level of interaction thus varied widely. Those with most neighbourhood contact tended to be those in the Windhoek Central flats, and Katutura, and were also generally happy there. Interaction with neighbours and happiness in Khomasdal's group housing scheme were lower than anticipated. Virtually all the respondents there complained about the

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TABLE 5.15
INTERACTION WITH NEIGHBOURS
Category  No.
Frequent visit 11 24 Occasional visit 7 16 Never visit 1 2
Frequent talk 4 9
Occasional talk 16 36 Never talk 6 13
TOTAL 45 100
TABLE 5.16
NUMBER OF FRIENDS IN NEW NEIGHBOURHOOD

smallness and shoddy finish of the units, the fact that people were living cheek by jowl and thus lacked privacy, particularly as all their neighbours' activities were both audible and visible. The occupants had only 2 or 3 friends each in the housing scheme, and while two did visit neighbours frequently or occasionally, 3 talked only occasionally. The vast majority of house occupants in Windhoek's former white suburbs were happy in those neighbourhoods, although most had no friends in the immediate neighbourhoods and did not visit their neighbours, speaking only occasionally or never, and sometimes not even knowing their names. This is a common middle class behaviour pattern irrespective of race, and one facilitated by high car ownership levels. 78% of respondents had one or more cars in the family. Predictably, those families without, were concentrated in the central city flats.

A small but significant proportion of the respondents did, however, have bad experiences for race-related reasons, and these do seem to be spatially concentrated in a few areas. It was predictable that such incidents would occur primarily in the central city, where, in addition to higher interaction levels in blocks of flats, many groups of non-residents gather to drink or find entertainment, and also in predominantly Afrikaans lower-middle to middle class areas such as Suiderhof, Pioniers Park, Academia and Windhoek West. This was to some extent true, except that respondents in Windhoek West, which is adjacent to Khomasdal and has one of the highest concentrations of coloureds and blacks, reported no unpleasantness at all. The three respondents in Academia and Pioniers Park also felt happy there, having not experienced any problems, although assaults by whites on members of other races in Pioniers Park were reported occasionally in the press. It is difficult to ascertain whether the small number of racially significant cases in these suburbs is the result of any objective criteria such as bond availability and house size/type, or purely subjective attitudes and scepticism of the reception they would probably encounter. Conversely, some incidents occurred in Klein Windhoek, a higher income suburb with many English-, Afrikaans- and German-speaking whites.
In most cases the incidents occurred in the period immediately after statutory desegregation of residential areas, or when respondents first moved into their present abodes, and then declined or ceased with time. Where adults only were involved, problems were generally restricted to odd swearing, calling of derogatory names etc. in the blocks of flats where interaction is of necessity greater. One or two cases of deliberate and explicit harassment, e.g. through loud music late at night, or repeated banging on ceilings, were reported. In the suburbs disapproval generally took the form of strange looks or pointed ignoring of the people concerned. A couple of respondents had experienced problems in negotiating leases of flats or rooms once the landlord discovered they were not white.

The presence of children, by virtue of their greater interaction, spontaneity and play in the neighbourhood, frequently brought prejudices and antagonisms into the open. The worst cases were experienced in Suiderhof by one present and one former resident household. Both couples' children had been repeatedly sworn at, called 'Kaffirs' and the like, and even subjected to harassment on their bicycles, and stoned on occasion, by their Afrikaans neighbours' children. Despite the one respondent's attempts to avoid trouble, his children eventually retaliated, and the parents became involved. This had been going on for over two months at the time, but the respondent was determined to remain there, having taken a mortgage on the house, and said the neighbours would simply have to adapt: 'We don't want intimate relations - just common decency and 'dagse' [saying hello] - it doesn't cost anything!' Their German neighbours on the other side were, by contrast, friendly and distanced themselves from such behaviour.

As a group, racially mixed couples where one spouse is white, have undoubtedly had the worst experiences, becoming a focus of resentment by those opposed to socio-political changes, epitomizing what such people reject. Windhoek Magistrate's Court records show an average of one mixed marriage per month since their legalization in 1977. Cohabitation is also common. With the exception of two exiled Namibians who had married foreign women while abroad, all mixed marriages in the sample originating in Namibia and South Africa were of white men and coloured or Baster (and very occasional black) women. This is consistent with the generally intermediate social and economic status of coloureds between whites and blacks. The first local marriage between a black man and a white woman occurred only in October 1981 (WO 17/10/81:1,3,7). The white partners are sometimes reviled for 'betraying their volk' or 'fostering racial assimilation', while the other partners are regarded as sluts if female, and cocky upstarts if male. Assaults on, and
harassment of, racially mixed couples were common for the first year or after the abolition of the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Proclamations, especially in central city arcades and hotels, or public places (WO 18/8/79:9; 8/9/79:6; 12/4/80:21). Although fewer now, they do still occur (WO 30/8/80; 2/5/81). Several of the mixed couples in the sample had been harassed in some way on several occasions, and it was again worst for their children, if any, who would frequently be taunted and molested at school. Some spouses also experienced initial resentment from their respective families, but were generally accepted once they determined to marry. One such couple had to move no fewer than 7 times in 2 years for race-related reasons. The husband is an employee of the SA Railways, which, at the time, adhered rigidly to the South African apartheid policy and thus refused him, or his several colleagues in the same position, Railways housing. After much difficulty he had recently been allocated a house, much to the chagrin of the colleagues, although it was only on a temporary basis. Apart from this, however, all couples were accepted by their employers and workmates without discrimination, as their private lives were seen as of no direct relevance. Although they generally did not find it easy to make new friends, they were fully accepted by existing friends. In public places, though, it was often a different story (see Chapter 8). Mixed couples live mainly in former white suburbs, but those in Khomasdal seem well accepted. I know of only one such couple in Katutura: a white woman married to a Herero man. She was fully accepted, although somewhat of a curiosity at times, but did have a language problem. Since she understood but did not speak OtjiHerero,

her husband's relatives and friends were sometimes reluctant to come to their home as their English was not good. The couple's young daughter had an even greater communication problem with her peers.

e) Further Statistical Analysis
The range of information collected from respondents suggested that multivariate analysis might be useful to explore the relationships between variables. However, the fact that many of the variables were categorical rather than continuous, and nominal rather than ordinal or a higher level, ruled out the applicability of multiple regression and factor analysis. The latter, in any case, has other drawbacks (see above). In addition, multivariate techniques generally require large data sets in order to yield stable results. Nevertheless, limited use was made of the logistic model in the GLIM (Generalized Linear Interaction Modelling) package. This models the log of the odds of a dependent variable being in one of two possible categories rather than the other, given the observed independent variables' values, and is thus
essentially a log-linear equivalent of multiple regression, where the dependent variable is dichotomous.
The nature of this technique and the small number of observations demanded that there should be no more than 3 or occasionally 4 categories for each variable, including one for missing values. Only those variables the values of which could meaningfully be dichotomized or trichotomized were included, thereby losing some of the detail in

the original data. The following 18 variables ('factors') were used, with the number of valid categories in brackets:

XI Respondent's age (2) X2 Respondent's marital status (2) X3 Respondent's family size (2)
X4 Respondent's ethnic group (3) X5 Ethnic group of respondent's family (3)
X6 House type (2) X7 Present mode of occupancy (2) X8 Former mode of occupancy (2)
X9 Present Planning Area (2) X10 Former Planning Area (2) X11 First reason for moving (2)
X12 Second reason for moving (2) X13 Third reason for moving (2) X14 Fulfilment of these reasons (2)
X15 Happiness in new area (2) X16 Change in circle of friends (2) X17 Prospect for near future (2)
X18 Mode of transport available (2)

A number of models was fitted to each valid dependent variable, several of which yielded good fits, in that the final scaled deviance obtained was small, with a large number of degrees of freedom (df). However, the results were unstable in each case, as evidenced by the high values of both the final Parameter Estimate and Standard Error obtained once the log model had been converted to the multiplicative

form for easier interpretation. Significance and stability (the two characteristics being sought) require that, relative to the first category, the ratio of the Final Parameter Estimate to Standard Error should be greater than 2, while the 'Fitted' values should approximate the 'Observed' values very closely. The best-fitting model was one with X17 (Prospects for near future) as dependent variable:

Steps (GLIM procedure) Results
YVAR = X17N
FIT XI + X2 + X3 + X4 Deviance = 28.00 (df=39)
FIT + X6 Deviance = 24.94 (df=38)
FIT + X7 Deviance = 10.59 (df=37)
FIT + X9 Deviance = 4.501 (df=36)
FIT + XII Deviance = 3.821 (df=35)
Final Scaled Deviance : 3.821 df = 35
Final Parameter Estimate : -t. q Error - 161

Thus, although the fit was good, with a deviance of 3.8, the other conditions were clearly not met - a fact reflecting the small number of observations. As a result, even large changes in the Deviance obtained during fitting of the model are of relatively little significance. It is thus impossible to draw any strong
conclusions from the analysis or to use the results predictively. The above model, for example, can only tell us qualitatively that demographic variables (X1, X2, X3, X4), accommodation characteristics, particularly X6 and X7, and the area of residence (X11) seem important in explaining the respondents' good prospects for the near future. This accords well with the earlier discussion of respondents' attitudes. What this exploratory use of GLIM does suggest is that the technique appears to hold potential significance for the analysis of large socio-economic data sets of a similar type, not conforming to the requirements of better-known techniques.

5. CONCLUSION
Statutory residential desegregation evolved in response to socio-political pressure, despite consistent opposition by most elected white representatives at both local and national levels. The degree of segregation was extremely high as a result of legislative control, and it has been shown that over the first 2.5 years since its abolition, a small but steady process of in-migration to former white areas has occurred. The distribution of these blacks and coloureds is not random, reflecting particular ecological features of the city e.g. the distribution of flats and public sector housing; perceived social attitudes held by most existing residents in particular suburbs; and socio-economic circumstances of potential migrants.

Windhoek Central, Windhoek West and Klein Windhoek have been the main recipient areas, although significant return migration of coloureds to Khomasdal has occurred for reasons not attributable to problems experienced in the old white areas. Coloureds comprise the vast majority of racially significant migrants, and while some blacks have moved, the only whites record Cas living in Khomasdal and Katutura are a few partners in mixed marriages. Notwithstanding some serious problems experienced by respondents, particularly in parts of the central city and Suiderhof, they appear to have encountered little lasting hostility or resistance on the whole. None of the calamities predicted by racial bigots has occurred.

Preliminary attempts were made using multivariate analysis to investigate the interrelationships between explanatory variables. The results thus obtained, and especially the discussion on respondents' attitudes, show that demographic characteristics are at least as important as housing characteristics and location in determining their future prospects. One fundamental conclusion is that, positive as the survey results on the whole were, the legislative changes have benefited only a small, relatively well-off, minority to date. This trend has been recorded in other Third World cities after independence and the dangers of simple replacement of racially exclusive spatial organization with its

While a significant proportion of the racially significant cases in Windhoek are not members of the political or professional elite, and many are new immigrants from SA, they are nevertheless economically above average in their respective race groups. It may be possible in the future to test the applicability of racial 'tipping point' theories evolved in the USA (Schelling 1969; Schnare 1976; Woods 1980), but there is an important difference here in that the white population is likely to decline after independence, thus making more better-quality housing available to the indigenous population (and inevitably the international diplomatic elites) for very different reasons. Thus far the numbers of racially significant migrants is too small to have a significant impact on the general character of any suburb. It is too early to say how far this process of change will go, but unless steps are taken to reduce the differences in density, income, housing quality and public services between these areas and Katutura and Khomasdal, the existing tensions and conflicts will persist, if not worsen. This involves a fundamental political choice between laissez faire and social intervention and action - one which is assuming great importance even in the USA, where the racial ecology is the reverse of that in southern Africa, over the issue of black suburbanization from inner city ghettos (see e.g. Rose 1976). For the moment, however, no significant change on this score is likely.

REFERENCES
(1977b): Management Committee Agenda, 9 May.
(1978): Report by His Worship the Mayor, Councillor
(1979): Report by His Worship the Mayor, Councillor

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Windhoek Observer (1979): 16 June; 23 June; 7 July; 11 August; 18 August; 25 August; 8 September.
CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF HOUSING

There are nice houses in Khomasdal and Katutura, and modest, even poor little houses in Windhoek. Poverty has nothing to do with where you live."
- S.G. Beukes, Mayor of Windhoek (Municipal Association of SWA 1979)

So complete is the social segregation accompanying geographic racial compartmentalization in Windhoek, that even prominent white public representatives are completely oblivious of the circumstances in which over 60% of the capital's population live. The conspicuously few 'nice houses', particularly in Katutura, serve merely to highlight the generally poor conditions. To residents of Khomasdal and Katutura, poverty has everything to do with where you live. Structural inequalities of income, employment opportunities, amenities, education, and health services coincide with the housing conditions which form the subject of this chapter.

Although obviously interdependent parts of the urban system, the three former racially exclusive areas of Windhoek, the Central city and suburbs (whites), Katutura (blacks) and Khomasdal (coloureds) are treated separately because of the different circumstances and policies pertaining to each. The chief focus is on Katutura, where the most important changes are occurring, and the largest number of people are affected. Boaden (1978) suggests that apartheid has aggravated the housing problem by restricting 'free market housing' access to whites, thereby fostering black dependence on subsidized public housing. Save

for developments analyzed in Chapter 5, little change has occurred in the white areas. Many issues discussed here reflect planning and policy decisions initially recorded under 'Planning and Resource Allocation' in the newspaper content analysis; while the relevant legislation is identical to that in Chapter 5.

1. THE CENTRAL CITY AND SUBURBS

a) Distribution of Housing Types and Demographic Characteristics

Table 6.1 shows the population distribution by area in 1975. It is immediately apparent that the largest concentrations occur in Central Windhoek (areas 070, 080, 090, 100, 110), Pioniers Park (210) and Klein Windhoek (030 & 040), each with over 4 000 inhabitants and together accounting for 43.4% of the white area's population. Area 090, the Central Business District (CBD), has very few residents itself. Windhoek West (170) has almost 4 000 inhabitants, while Eros (020),
Windhoek North (160), Suiderhof (180) and Academia (200) each has over 2,000. Together these contain another 43% of the population. Conversely, Windhoek South (130), which includes Eros Airport and a motel/caravan park complex, and the Northern Industrial Areas (150) have very small resident populations.

In all areas except the CBD, the sexes are well balanced. The CBD is characterized by a large proportion of single women living in bachelor or 2-roomed flats, and has been one of the main areas of coloured immigration (Chapter 5). The table also reveals the population's overall youthfulness, with more than 75% under 40 in
-two-thirds of the major planning areas. Figure 6.1 gives the overall 1975 white age-sex structure. The age structure of other races moving into these areas corresponds well with this (Table 5.4). Both determining, and determined by, the population's spatial structure and distribution, are distributions of the various housing types? (Figures 6.2-6.6; Table 6.2). Occupancy rates and related information appear in the Census Report (Municipality of Windhoek 1976a). Not surprisingly, detached houses are concentrated in the residential suburbs furthest from the city centre, where erven (plots) are large, unit land values lower and aesthetic quality highest. Most of these houses, especially in the newer suburbs, are single-storey, and have 4-6 rooms each. The distribution of separate rooms (Figure 6.4) reflects that of detached houses, except in the central and Southern Industrial areas, where many are situated above shops or on industrial premises. In the suburbs, rooms are mainly outbuildings or converted garages occupied by domestic servants and sometimes tenants/subtenants. Attached houses stand chiefly on the fringes of the Central Area, Eros and Klein Windhoek, often dating from the German or early South African periods. Flats have a similar distribution, but with greater concentration in the central areas. In contrast to attached houses, however, flats are with few exceptions World War II or later developments, but do not occur in the newest areas (Academia, Eros Park and Olympia), built when the housing shortage was less acute (Municipality of Windhoek 1976a:59). Suites of rooms are concentrated on the western fringe of the central area, in Windhoek West, Eros and Klein Windhoek (Figure 6.5). These are
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION (RESIDENT WHITES) Source: Municipality of Windhoek (1976b:0) FIGURE 6.1

TABLE 6.2
NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BY SIZE AND TYPE OF DWELLING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Dwelling</th>
<th>Number of Dwellings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detached housing</td>
<td>17 35 180 2 36 1 0 569 189 8 6 259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached housing</td>
<td>6 0 0 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flats</td>
<td>217 567 653 254 78 1 2 3 1 814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roo</td>
<td>760 69 10 4 0 1 0 844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suites of rooms</td>
<td>1 47 125 63 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1) Figures apply to Whites, Coloured and others private dwellings in this area.

DISTRIBUTION OF DETACHED HOUSES.
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACHED HOUSES.
DISTRIBUTION OF ROOMS.
DISTRIBUTION OF SUITES OF ROOMS.
DISTRIBUTION OF FLATS.

Sources: Municipality of Windhoek (1976a)

-100 FLATS

LEGEND
* OND

ONLY WHITE RESIDENTIAL ACCOMODATION PAYMENT IS NOTED ON THE WHITE RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND COLOURED ON THE COLOURED AREA (220).
Sources: Municipality of Windhoek (1976a)

generally second dwellings, being converted garages, outhouses or custom-built cottages, many of which were constructed during the late 1960s as a result of the
serious housing shortage at the time (Chapter 3). They occur chiefly on larger
erven, but are noticeably absent in
the newer suburbs of Pioniers Park, Academia and Olympia, which were
developed only in this period.
Numerically, detached houses are by far the most important
accommodation type (Table 6.2), providing houses for over 80% of the white
area's population living in one of the five types considered here (Table 6.3). Flats
are the only other significant type.
From Figure 6.7 it is clear that rental is the most common form of payment for
accommodation, being particularly dominant in the central areas, and suburbs
with significant public sector housing
concentrations, i.e. Railways, Windhoek West, Windhoek North, Avis, and
Pioniers Park. Much of this comprises detached houses, and rentals are heavily
subsidized, so that many public employees live better than would otherwise be
possible. The authorities concerned argue that
cheap housing is a 'fringe benefit' in lieu of the higher salary that would otherwise
have to be paid in order to keep civil servants in the territory. The spatial
distribution of owner occupants and bond-holders reflects that of privately
owned detached (and to a small extent attached) houses, as other types are
almost exclusively
rented. Free housing is provided by some employers e.g. the
Administration for Whites (area 070), and Otjihase Mine (Academia and
Olympia). The large proportion of free housing in the Northern
Industrial Area is misleading as it has only 4 residents altogether.

NABR N 6.YP
NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BY SIZE AND TYPE
BLACK RESIDENTIAL AREA (KATUTURA. AREA 2-30)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Occupants</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Detached houses</td>
<td>23 878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Attached houses</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Flats</td>
<td>3 909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rooms</td>
<td>1 001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Suites of Rooms</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>29 757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from Municipality of Windhoek T19767: Windhoek Municipal
Census. May 1975, 9.2 Results.

NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BY SIZE AND TYPE TYPE OF
NUMBER OF ROOMS PER DWELLING

| Detached(l) housing | 0 | 0 | 3 302 | 0 | 3 302 |
| Attached(l) housing | 408 | 406 | 0 | 0 | 814 |
Single(2) 623 four person rooms
qarters 1246 one person rooms
Contract 139 four person rooms
workers 9 five person rooms
hostelC2) 187 fifteen person rooms
58  - nineteen person rooms
50  - twenty person rooms
Note 1) The total number of rooms of all types in thea,
dwellings is one plus the number of rooms given in
the table.
Note 2) The figures here are for number of rooms available,
though not necessarily occupied.
Sources Municipality of Windhoek k1976a1 : 59)
1975 80
70
60
50 AGE 40I
30
20 10
0
2,0 1,8 1P 14, 12 10 10 12 V. 16 18 20
PERCENTAGE OF POPU LATI ON
(RESIDENT BLACKS) FIGURE 6.10
-269-
TABLE 6.3
r Tn TTAI ADrA
ULLUP NI
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De Kock's (1979,1980) factorial ecology study suggests that most of
Windhoek's whites are middle and lower-middle class, as reflected by the
preponderance of areas with this status. Moreover, the presence of
flats and housing schemes has a strongly negative effect on neighbourhood
status, as areas where these are common had lower status than anticipated.
However, this study suffers from a problem common to most factorial ecologies:
it does not reflect known reality in all areas. For example, many areas with large
concentrations of flats
apparently have middle class status, the same given to a large area of the
wealthiest parts of Luxury Hill.
(b) Changing Conditions 1976-1982
Housing construction virtually ceased in 1976 as a result of the recession and
political uncertainty, only picking up again during 1980 (Table 3.4). After the
transition period began, and a political
solution seemed imminent, housing demand rose quickly. More officials
moved in from South Africa and elsewhere in the territory as government
functions were transferred from Pretoria, and the commercial climate then
improved. By mid-1978 estate agents were describing the housing shortage as 'acute' and 'critical', and anticipating worse to come once United Nations and diplomatic personnel arrived immediately before and after independence (WA 9/8/78; 9/9/78; 5/10/78). In the absence of new construction, rents and purchase prices climbed steeply, with even poor-quality accommodation reaching exorbitant levels. House prices have risen 20-25% every 18 months, and rents have frequently been raised 25-50% at a time (WA 15/8/80:7; 5/10/81:6). Furthermore, the credit squeeze was such that by early 1981 only 1/3 of housing loan applications could be met by the Building Society (Suidwester 26/3/81). These trends were still strongly evident in early 1982. The situation was exacerbated by regular purchases of houses and blocks of flats by the State for the growing bureaucracy, instead of construction of new ones, thereby reducing the private sector housing stock (WA 19/8/80; 5/10/81:6).

By 1980 construction slowly picked up again. A 31-unit housing scheme in Eros Park was launched by a local estate agent and funded under a 90% bond scheme by the SWABS. The standarized 3- and 4-bedroomed houses sold for R46 400 - R48 400, considerably less than a one-off house of the same design (WA 15/8/80:7). Construction work on a similar-sized scheme of single-storey 2- and 3-bedroomed town-houses in Klein Windhoek began early in 1981, again for middle-income people (WO 21/2/81:34). In September 1981 the Municipality introduced a minimum building value of R50 000 on 18 erven in Olympia, to promote an 'exclusive atmosphere' (City of Windhoek 1981o; WO 30/10/81:17). Four new houses for top Municipal officials were under construction at a total cost of R221 000 (WO 27/9/80).

The demand for residential erven in Ludwigsdorf (Klein Windhoek Ext. 3) also picked up to the extent that a fairly successful public auction of plots there, in Olympia, and the newly proclaimed Hochland Park suburb (on the site of the former Old Location) was held in February 1981. During 1981 a total of 194 private houses and 1 block of flats was built in the municipal area (including Katutura and Khomasdal) at a cost of R5.7m and R460 000 respectively. Growth was particularly rapid in Ludwigsdorf and Eros Park (statistics: Municipal Town Planning Section; WO 6/2/82:30). Another housing scheme of 45 extendable homes in the R40 000 bracket, on erven ranging from 900-1100m² in Suiderhof, was initiated in December 1981 (WA 10/12/81; 26/1/82:7).

Little attention has been paid to the lower income group, who have been particularly hard-hit by escalating housing costs. In view of the overall housing shortage, a number of calls have been made by property brokers and building society officials for some form of subsidized housing to be provided, for example with a loan from public authorities or private sector employers, or reducing costs via smaller plot and house sizes (WA 10/2/81; 26/2/81). At the same time the Central Government announced a scheme to
promote home ownership among its employees and move away from subsidized tenancy of government-owned houses. This was aimed at increasing stability and attracting and keeping staff by increasing their stake in the territory. Employees would be able to raise 100% loans from the SWABS, guaranteed by the Government (Suidwester 3/3/81; Republikein 2/3/81).

Probably the most important development to facilitate an improvement in the housing situation was the amendment by the Municipality during 1981 of the Town Planning Scheme, to simplify the residential density categorization, and especially to permit erection of 2nd dwellings on erven, subject to simple conditions. The latter had previously been possible as a concessionary use only, with the result that anomalies arose, the workload of the Development Control Section became excessive, procedures were lengthy, plans were subject to frequent objection by neighbours, and most people side-stepped the legal procedure by designating their building alterations/additions for non-residential purposes, then simply using them as dwellings. Most existing second dwellings, of which there are many (Chapter 5), were thus technically illegal.

The Municipality's decision took into account the economic and social motives for construction of second dwellings, the availability of additional erven and funds for new house construction, and the likely environmental and economic impact of higher residential densities. Second dwellings were defined separately from outbuildings and their maximum surface area related to permissible erf surface coverage limits. The City Engineer was delegated powers to approve applications within the stated guidelines, but others had to be referred to the Council for consideration (City of Windhoek 1981a:27-40; 1981b:7-8; 1981c:4; 1981d:6-7; 1981e:2-3; 1981f:19-22). The measures apply to all areas, including Katutura and Khomasdal, but it is as yet impossible to evaluate their impact. They represent a significant attempt to make building standards and planning procedures more appropriate to local circumstances and move away from rigid 'Western' values, the problems of which are dealt with by King (1977/8).

It is very difficult to discern the precise extent to which developments outlined here are purely the result of cyclical economic conditions as opposed to socio-political change. While the recession in the late 1970s and the rapidly escalating costs of construction and building materials have clearly been important, the role of political change and uncertainty seem crucial. As shown above, the property market picked up suddenly in early 1978 despite poor economic conditions. The unrestricted flight of capital to South Africa and abroad (notably West Germany) has exacerbated an already tight bond market and forced interest rates up beyond their 'pure' economic
level. The influx of officials and private commercial firms to set up offices in Windhoek ahead of independence are political factors, as are the additional demand generated by the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act of 1979, and the more recent departure of some whites.

2. KATUTURA

a) The Apartheid Master Plan

"The intention was to establish a model township, designed on modern lines, and providing for a respectable mode of life and healthy conditions. The houses were to be larger than those in the old location: They were to be built on larger plots, and subdivision of plots or building of more than one house on one plot as has been practice in the old location, was not to be allowed."

-South African memorandum to the International Court of Justice, quoted in Municipality of Windhoek (1973:1). Even if this motive is taken as sincere (and the factors discussed in Chapter 3 make it very questionable), it became clear from the outset that Katutura was to be developed as an underdeveloped urban dormitory indistinguishable from any black township in South Africa. According to the Municipality's deputy Director of Non-White Affairs (now the Director), this was the result of conditions and 'a specific concept' imposed by the Government which was in many respects unacceptable to the City Council:

"Today it can be said with justification that the Katutura Native Town is, with the exception of the few prestige buildings, the creation of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development."

(Municipality of Windhoek 1973:2; my translation)

The 'prestige buildings' referred to are the beer hall, a rudimentary cinema, the municipal offices and one or two other similar buildings. Responsibility for the provision of urban black housing was delegated to local authorities in terms of the Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951 (Chapter 5). Applicants had to satisfy conditions stipulated in Section 10 of the Proclamation, regarding their right to remain in the urban area for longer than 72 hours. Conditions prevailing in 1968 are outlined by Pendleton (1974:38-42). By May 1969 a total of 3,931 houses had been built - enough to accommodate the population removed from the Main and Klein Windhoek Locations. There were also barrack-like Single Quarters for up to 1,100 single men (both from out of town and Windhoek) in a fenced-off and policed compound, and an Ovambo Hostel compound which could hold 3,600 migrant contract labourers. The latter were not considered permanent urban residents, and were subject to even more rigid control.
than other blacks (see Chapter 2). The compound had been deliberately sited at the entrance to Katutura to emphasize the occupants' difference from the 'permanent' population, and to facilitate control (Figure 6.8; City of Windhoek 1978c: F12). Employers paid the entire hostel fees and food bill for their workers i.e. the Municipality in effect provided these on an agency basis for employers. Both the Single Quarters and Hostel have since been expanded.

FIGURE 6.8
LAYOUT OF KATUTURA

The shortage of 83 houses which already existed in May 1971 has increased steadily ever since, peaking at 936 in April 1977, before an accelerated construction programme began reducing it slightly (Municipality of Windhoek 1978a: Table 2). It has risen markedly again more recently. Three other municipal sources state explicitly that 4 116 houses already existed by December 1968 (cf. 3 931 cited above). This implies that no additional family housing was built for the seven years to December 1975, and the real shortage was thus undoubtedly higher than indicated in Table 2 of the Housing Report (Clayton 1974:28-29; City of Windhoek 1980h:F1; 1981n:RR3). Table 6.4 gives the May 1975 housing inventory, while annual construction since then appears in Table 3.4. The housing shortage is calculated on the basis of a 4.5 occupancy ratio (Municipality of Windhoek 1978a), but as official Katutura population figures are almost certainly an underestimate, the real shortage was undoubtedly higher.

As in South African black townships houses were built of breeze-blocks without ceilings, internal doors or wall-finishing, and had outside toilets (Plate 6.1). Water and sewerage were provided but electric wiring was installed only if a fee and deposit were paid. By 1968 only about 50 houses had electricity (Pendleton 1974:39), but the figure has risen considerably since then (see below). Many tenants have made their own improvements to their houses, which are either detached or attached (Figures 6.2 and 6.3) and available with 2, 3 or 4 rooms. Total floor area was less than or equal to 56m2, and design uniform. As proposed in the first Windhoek Development Plan (Municipality of Windhoek 1952) the grid-iron layout of the Old Location was replaced by a radial crescentic street pattern to economize on space taken up.

PLATE 6.1
Katutura - typical appearance of the older sections. toilets, unmade roads and street debris.
Note outside
Katutura - improved houses in newest 'Soweto' extensions (1975-).

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by roads and relieve some monotony (see Figures 6.8 and 6.9). Gordon (1980:11)
points out that key features of township layout, in
particular the buffer strip, tarred perimeter road, and single access road to
Katutura which also bisects the township, location of the police station at the
entrance, and the total absence of cul-de-sacs, so common a feature of modern
urban layouts, reflect the dominance of Government ideas on 'internal security'
and the facilitation of controlling potential unrest.
Since Government policy precluded the sale of land to blacks the whole
of Katutura remained municipal property, and the township was never fully
surveyed. Plots of 250-270m² were merely demarcated in blocks, the corners of
which had been surveyed. 1 There was no elite suburb
like Harare's Marimba Park for high income blacks (Kileff 1975). The main
housing goal was to provide the maximum number of units at minimum cost, at
the expense of other aspects of housing 'quality'
(Boaden 1978, 1979). Houses built since 1975 are larger (57m²) and of higher
standard, with electricity and inside toilets in the standard ('Type 9-') version. The
'Type 9+' version also has ceilings,
plastered walls and internal doors. These are situated in the newer extensions of
Katutura known colloquially as 'Soweto' after Johannesburg's vast
townships. They are thus relatively good by Third World standards, but with 1980
construction costs of R10 600 each, are no longer 'low cost' (McNamara 1980;
Plate 6.2). There are also a few 'luxury' houses like those in the white suburbs.
The maximum number of
(1) cf. plot sizes of 440m² in Khomasdal, and 900m² elsewhere in the city.

-280-
a
CL Z4 -<O to 0rL m 0 a Z 0 os 0
FIGURE 6.9
KATUTURA: IDEALIZED ETHNIC SEGREGATION PATTERN 1976
(THE NORTHWEST SECTION HAD NOT YET BEEN BUILT)

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occupants officially allowed per house type is: 6-room (14), 4-room and Type 9
(9), 3-room (7), and 2-room (5). In reality these limits are generally exceeded.
Although people could originally purchase houses when Katutura was built, only
a handful did so. This was later stopped too (Pendleton 1974:39). Blacks thus
became municipal tenants against their will, which subjected them to further
official control and potential
harassment (Figure 6.7; also Chapter 3 for resistance to relocation to Katutura).
Rents are subsidized by means of a housing levy on tenants' employers; current
rentals are shown in Table 6.7. The levy is
justified in terms of providing the Municipality with an assured minimum income for administration and recovery of costs, and to keep rentals closer to the former site-fees in the Old Location, in view of the fact that increased rentals had been one of the chief grounds for people objecting to relocation to Katutura (Municipality of Windhoek 1973:2-3). On the other hand subsidized rentals increase the tenants' dependence on 'The System', since unemployment rendered them liable to default and eviction.

The ultimate apartheid policy goal was to separate the various ethnic/language groups into their own wards within Katutura, as shown in Figure 6.9. Houses are thus numbered by block e.g. D3/4 means Damara Section, Block 3, house no. 4. The plan was never fully realized, but the majority of people do live in their respective sections in the older parts of Katutura, since that is how they were allocated houses on arrival from the Old Location. There was also a 'Mixed' Section. The 1975 population pyramid shows a male bias of

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-20-30 year-olds, reflecting the Single Quarter residents, and a small female bias in most other age cohorts (Figure 6.10). However, the contract workers are excluded, and they would skew the male side much more heavily in most age groups.

Many of the older building were deteriorating rapidly, facilities and infrastructure were greatly lacking, and residents were subject to tight control, especially pass inspections, on entering or leaving Katutura. The Municipality was acutely conscious of mounting criticism, especially since demolition of the Old Location in 1968 had removed the basis of comparison with conditions there, and aware that cost considerations had forced Katutura to be designed and built cheaply, without many facilities found in balanced communities. Comparison was now made with the better conditions in white Windhoek, and standards being demanded were above what existing rents and tariffs allowed. Criticism from abroad had the effect of rousing local opinion within the higher tiers of Government and the Municipality's own ranks, in favour of improving conditions so as to avoid adverse publicity - particularly in view of the delicate international constitutional situation (Municipality of Windhoek 1973:2-5).

Of particular importance was the Ovambo Hostel, opened in 1963. Its appearance and condition were very bad, causing various social evils and malpractices; control of its occupants proved problematic, the kitchen was overtaxed, additional capacity was needed, and it had become a sym(lic stigma of oppression (Municipality of Windhoek 1973, 1976c). As a result it was decided in 1969 to build a better and larger new compound, with an eventual capacity of 15 000, adjacent to

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the existing hostel, and to demolish the latter. Construction began in
1974, and on completion of the initial stages (the only ones to date) in September 1979 had cost R10m. There are 4 468 beds, mainly in 4-bedded but also a few 2- and 1-bedded rooms in 18 2-storey and 6 3-storey blocks. The compound has centralized kitchen facilities, a rudimentary dining hall and an outdoor amphitheatre.

While undoubtedly a physical improvement, no attempt to get away from the discredited and socially unacceptable hostel compound system is evident; on the contrary, control has been streamlined and enhanced.

Entry to the compound is through a row of guarded turnstiles in the prison-like wall where documents are checked (Plate 6.3). The gates are equipped with water cannon in case of trouble. The office block is adjacent to the entrance, no longer inside; individual blocks are easily isolatable; non-Ovambo tribal police are used to keep control, and 'indunas' (appointed compliant workers) supervise each block. The occupants regard it with the same hatred as its predecessor. Most importantly for this analysis, the hostel was overtaken by events even before its completion: the abolition of influx control and contract labour in 1977 rendered its chief role redundant (see below).

b) The Effects of Removing Influx Control
b(i) Legislation: Abolition of the pass laws, the hated influx control on b tacks in urban areas, is undoubtedly one of the most important changes of the transition period, not only by virtue of its symbolic value but also in terms of its practical implications and the number of people affected. The Ovambo homeland government also ceased applying the labour regulations developed in 1972 after the contract workers' strike. At a stroke the statutory controls on rural-to-urban migration were removed, enabling prospective job-seekers, and their families, to move freely from the homelands. In reality some harassment continued, and certain impediments remained (Cronje and Cronje 1979:39-41). Urban authorities, in particular, expressed fears that migrants would swamp the towns, aggravating the existing housing shortages and unemployment, with negative results for all concerned.

Essentially the pass laws required black adults over the age of 18 to carry a pass (permit) in the Southern Sector in order to leave or enter a reserve, move between Magisterial Districts or remain in an urban township for more than 72 hours, unless a registered resident of the township (Gottschalk 1978). Horrell (1978:487) lists the numerous laws which, with their amendments, governed the pass system:
1) Native Labour Proclamation 1919.
2) Masters and Servants Proclamation 1920.
3) Vagrancy Proclamation 1920.
4) Native Administration Proclamation 1922.
5) Native Passes (Rehoboth Gebiet) Proclamation 1930.
6) Extra-Territorial and Northern Natives Proclamation 1935.
7) Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation 1951.

Numbers 4 and 7, the most important, were repealed in October 1977 (Chapter 5). The duty of employers of contract labourers to provide accommodation and food for them lapsed at the same time (City of Windhoek 11978c: F13).

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b(ii) White Attitudes: Reaction from most whites was overtly negative, given that influx control had been a cornerstone of policies to retard black urbanization and retain white urban dominance and political power (Simon 1982). The Turnhalle Conference had also resolved to retain some form of control (City of Windhoek 1977:3). Interlocking with objective considerations, such as the likely increase in urban unemployment and larger housing shortages, were explicit and implicit negative value judgments on the nature of blacks and the threat these new developments would hold for the existing order and maintenance of vested interests. The terminology used by Windhoek's Mayor, Rev. Yssel, is instructive by way of example:

"This [i.e. the abolition of influx control] implies that family housing will assume greater importance than in the past, when houses were provided only for 'local' inhabitants. . . . It may be necessary for the City Council to revise all planning for Katutura in line with the changing circumstances.

In the meantime it is predictable that tensions can develop between local inhabitants and immigrants and even between all groups and the authorities. The consequences of an unordered community are numerous. Many people depart for places they perceive to have better living conditions, and so geographically fertile parts are frequently abandoned and cities overpopulated with fortune-seekers. This results in social parasites establishing themselves on the periphery of the cities. They are not prepared to work and to eat the exalted fruits of the ground on which they live, although it is fertile and overflowing with possibilities. This brings with it the age-old problem of urbanization and accompanying poverty, crime, idleness, dissatisfaction and eventually political revolution.

I want to warn against the squatter problem with which many countries around the world are already struggling. If the condition is tolerated it causes

1. Crime and a threat to established interests.
2. Exhaustion of resources such as water and power.
3. Unemployment.

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4. Leisure degenerating into idleness (lit. 'wasting free time').
5. Overpopulation and the tenfold problems arising from it.
6. Squatter environments become a hideout for political activists, and foreign/strange ideologies are hatched there.
7. Family life is adversely affected and illegitimate people with no parental bonds born.

We hope that we are not creating unnecessary problems which originally were of low intensity."

(City of Windhoek 1977:3-4; my translation)

Early in 1978 there were disturbances in Katutura, apparently as a result of friction between rival SWAPO supporters (many being Ovambo migrant labourers and workseekers living in the overcrowded Hostel, and some in the Single Quarters) and DTA supporters (many being Herero and Damara 'permanent' residents in Katutura and especially in the Single Quarters) (see SWAPO 1981:238-9). Many officials, including the Director of Non-White Affairs in Katutura, attributed the trouble to ethnic feuding between Ovambo and Hereros (see his report in City of Windhoek 1978a). General economic conditions, especially unemployment, were certainly also a factor, although their precise importance is hard to gauge. Nevertheless the Mayor for 1978, Lt.Col. Van Taak, again referred to the abolition of influx control as the chief factor contributing to the state of affairs:

"Amid financial pressure [the results of inflation and the depression] the position of the urban Black man has been weakened to such an extent by the summary abolition of influx control and the consequent influx of unemployed that circumstances existed for a time, which, coupled with political tension and whipping up [of emotions] led to riots, and gave us, as a local authority, more crime than ever before."

(City of Windhoek 1978a:1; my translation)

However, the conservative Director of Non-White Affairs was less pessimistic, saying that the negative effects which had been generally expected to manifest themselves strongly and immediately, did not do so, apart from increased use of the Labour Bureau, and the existence of slum conditions in part of the old Hostel - this for reasons related to non-completion of the new Hostel and removal of Ovambos from the Single Quarters after the riots. Although a situation was gradually developing which could cause problems, corrective measures were still possible (Report of the Non-White Affairs Dept. in City of Windhoek 1978a). According to City of Windhoek (1978c) the slum conditions arose after Ovambo women and some additional Ovambo men moved into the Single Quarters illegally and 'misbehaved'. There had always been 100-200 'detribalized' Ovambo men there. Herero leaders complained to the Municipality that these and other
Ovambos were causing trouble and 'terrorizing' the Katutura population at large. The situation deteriorated, and early in March, after talks with both the Herero chiefs and SWAPO, the Administrator-General asked the Municipality to move the Ovambos from the Single Quarters to the Hostel. About 480 people (not all Ovambos) were thus transferred to a section of the old Hostel not yet demolished. Many unregistered people were occupying the Hostel in early 1978, contributing to overcrowding and the unrest (see below).

Measurement: It is of course impossible to measure the effects of abolishing influx control directly, since no system of documenting internal migration any longer exists. A number of indirect indicators have been attempted - none of them very reliable. For example, use of Labour Bureau applications, while showing an increase, ignores the fact that many job-seekers never register, as it seems futile to them. They prefer to await potential employers outside the Bureau, or solicit from door to door in town. The method generally used by the Municipality is to compare the housing waiting list in Katutura before and after the abolition. In other words, the net effect is assumed to be the difference between projected and actual backlogs:

"If it weren't for the abolition of influx control the backlog of houses would have been eliminated in 1980. Instead there is actually still a shortage of 613 houses."

(City of Windhoek 1980a:11; my translation) This assumption is unreliable even though the demand for houses relative to single accommodation undoubtedly did increase. Firstly, it takes no account of any change in the rate of natural increase (as opposed to migration), since municipal projections are based on constant growth rates over fixed periods, albeit with high, medium and low variants, and on fixed proportions of the population in each housing type (Municipality of Windhoek 1976b, 1978a). Secondly, it ignores the effect of rising aspirations and some incomes, which may result in splitting of extended families and a drop in the ratio of occupants per dwelling, although lodgers may be taken in, thereby restoring the overall ratio.

I suspect that the additional influx has not been quite as large as feared, although the war and drought in the North have certainly accelerated it. Many families previously split by contract labour and the pass laws have been reunited, boosting demand for houses as opposed to single accommodation, a fact recognized by the Municipality (see above). However, a number of immigrants are temporary, coming to visit relatives or friends for varying periods of time. Similarly many families practise oscillating migration, retaining a house, with some but not all members in town at most times, and ensuring that the rent is paid even if the nominated tenant is no longer there himself. To some extent this occurred even under the former system of controls (cf. Moller 1974). Besides, not all migrants have families, many being
young and single, while some married men may initially come to Windhoek alone.
It may seem surprising that there is excess capacity in both the Hostel and the
Single Quarters, where occupancy rates have been
falling steadily (Tables 6.5 and 6.6). In fact, the conditions and regime governing
them are such that in practice even single people
would generally prefer to lodge elsewhere, using them only as a last resort. As
will be shown below, recognition by national and local authorities of both the
direct and indirect impact of removing influx control and property ownership
restrictions has led to changes in
emphasis and planning policy for Katutura. The practical efforts to date have,
however, been very small, being of longer gestation, and subject to financial
cutbacks and political considerations.
(2) although, even proportionately, on nothing like the scale experienced in
Harare, Zimbabwe.

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NO. OF OCCUPANTS
TABLE 6.5 IN THE KATUTURA HOSTEL

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Source: Municipality of Windhoek (1978): Housing Report V.2 Table 4; and
 supplied by the Town Planning Section, Windhoek Municipality.

update statistics
TABLE 6.6
NO. OF OCCUPANTS IN THE SINGLE QUARTERS

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October 2,241 2,096 2,309 2,363 2,464
November 2,222 2,177 1,892 2,416 2,417
December 1,745 2,231 1,935 2,314 2,526 2,921
Average 2,386 2,204 2,399 2,220 2,484 2,477

Three-month averages
Note: The average number of Ovambo occupants was 211 in 1977; 188 in 1978, having fallen off rapidly from July; only 27 in 1979; and 4 in 1980.
Source: Municipality of Windhoek (1978): Housing Report V.2 Table 3; and update statistics supplied by the Town Planning Section, Windhoek Municipality.

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c) Re-evaluation and Policy Change
   c(i) Crisis in the Hostel: Abolition of the influx control system meant that
1) the Municipal Labour Bureau no longer had control over entry to the urban area; and had to register contracts of any worker who found accommodation.
2) employers were no longer obliged to provide their contract workers with accommodation and food.
3) there was thus no compulsion for contract workers to stay on their employers' premises or the hostel as previously.
4) lower legal Hostel occupancy rates since 1977 (Table 6.5) have also meant lower revenue and higher unit costs for its operation.
(City of Windhoek 1978c:F13; 1980b:58-60)
Problems of control were experienced in the Hostel in late 1977 and early 1978, according to municipal authorities, because of large scale occupation by unregistered migrants, who also tried to obtain food without cards. Staff were harassed, and, fearing for their safety, they were armed for protection. Urgent representations on the situation were made to the Administrator-General (City of Windhoek 1978b:11-12). This coincided with the disturbances in Katutura already referred to. The Hostel was estimated to have about 2,000 illegal (mostly unemployed) Ovambo occupants in addition to the roughly 4,000 registered workers - it was thus overcrowded, and the Municipality and employers of registered occupants had to bear the extra costs involved (City of Windhoek 1978c). They realized that the basis of accommodation provision for blacks would have to change for political, economic, safety and practical reasons as the situation was rapidly becoming explosive (see also McNamara 1980). As an immediate step, 50 Special Constables (tribal police) were drafted into the Hostel to force out unauthorized
occupants and 'restore order'. Reaction from legal occupants was apparently mixed and some allegations of harassment were made (Republikein 1/8/80; WA 12/8/80; WO 23/8/80, 30/8/80).

c(ii) Exploring Alternatives: In June 1980 the Administrator-General's Council commissioned two broad high-level investigations, the first into possible ways of improving conditions in Katutura in the light of unemployment and over crowding, and the second into alternative low-income housing strategies. The first report, compiled by two Security Police members, examined the possibility of erecting temporary accommodation for unemployed and homeless people which could later be converted to permanent housing, and other possible steps. It accepted that abolition of influx control is not the cause of unemployment, merely the means by which the unemployed gain mobility and thus come to Windhoek, where job prospects appear best. The need to provide housing and jobs was stressed, particularly as a means of winning over the support of the unemployed, many of whom are SWAPO supporters by virtue of their situation, it was suggested, rather than inherent loyalty. The importance of this programme's explicit political content should not be underestimated.

 Provision of new housing for the unemployed was found unacceptable because of opposition from the existing Hostel residents who demanded first option, and various types of temporary accommodation (including squatter shacks) were rejected in favour of permanent housing. Control was to be exercised by residents and Municipal staff, under white supervision. The unemployed would then be accommodated in the Hostel, where control could be exercised. At a wider level, the report recommended instituting a form of influx control - but specifically excluding the possibility of a pass system - for all inhabitants of the territory (my emphasis), which ...

(Eimbeck and Wagener 1980:14; my translation)

No further elaboration was offered, save that it should be linked to a central national labour bureau where each employer, employee and job-seeker would have to register. It thus aimed at extremely rigid and centralized control, open to all the abuses and shortcomings of the old system, but with no indication of how it was to be implemented.

The second report, compiled by a working committee under a prominent local architect, was a seminal document which marked a major departure from the conventional wisdom prevailing in Namibia and South Africa (McNamara 1980). Not only did the committee comprise officials and a private consultant, but it stressed throughout the need to see housing provision in the new order as part of a broad process involving the residents rather than merely as a product. Katutura's economic and...
social problems could therefore not be solved in a compartmentalized way, as had so often been attempted in the past, and any alternative housing strategy for Hostel dwellers had to

"... form part of an overall housing, economic, development and educational policy that has as its aims the creating of a viable community in Katutura." (McNamara 1980:3).

The strategy would furthermore cater for the entire spectrum of housing modes, including public housing, private sector development, assisted self-help housing, informal housing and ‘reception area’ accommodation for new rural-to-urban migrants. The committee consulted prominent residents and social workers in Katutura from the start.

Until now almost all urban black housing has been provided by the public sector (the Municipality acting as agent for the State, with the necessary loan capital provided), attempting to maximize output of relatively good, but necessarily uniform, houses at minimum cost without consideration to wider issues - cf. Hutton (1972) for similar issues and policy changes in post-colonial East Africa. More and cheaper houses have to be provided within the reach of all target groups but no previous experience of self-help projects exists in the territory. The strategy's concepts are not new, however, having been developed and applied elsewhere in Latin America, Asia and Africa (e.g. Andrew, Christie and Martin 1972, 1974; Turner 1972; Dwyer 1975; Tipple 1976; Hake 1977; Martin 1977; Roberts 1978; Lloyd 1979, 1980; Karanfolvic 1980; Pinsky 1980; Bapat 1981; Ward 1981; and particularly Turner's (1980) comprehensive participatory planning framework).

The report's proposals, which included detailed cost analysis, were directed at long as well as short term goals. The former envisaged creation of a broad housing strategy to promote home ownership and self-help, with detailed proposals for low-cost housing, while the latter included:

1) extending existing houses to provide additional space, especially rooms for rent - to provide the occupant with an extra source of income, and demonstrate the value of home ownership. This could be valuable in accommodating Hostel or temporary migrants who have no, or low, incomes. Construction of the rooms could be by self-help or municipal tender.

2) Breaking down the 'concentration camp' scale of the Hostel, and integrating the occupants with the community, from whom they are currently isolated. Occupants would be able to rent rooms in Katutura or in the Single Quarters and boarding houses, while some
Hostel blocks would be converted into rented single rooms. The gate control would be removed; a variety of food provided on a voucher system in the catering block, while other blocks would become hostels for the nearby school, adult education centre etc.

3) Erection of private boarding houses, consisting of the owner's home plus 20 single rooms with communal facilities, built round a courtyard. These were intended as an improvement on the Single Quarters, long barracks of mainly 4-bedded rooms which at present lack kitchen facilities, and house single men in degrading conditions.

Although the report suggests that there are no problems in the Single Quarters, conditions in them and police harassment have been the subject of frequent complaint, even in the press (Republikein 13/7/79; WO 28/3/81, 9/10/81; WA 5/11/81). Many windows were broken, rooms were filthy and overcrowded, and certain areas had a pervasive stench of excrement - probably the combined result of inadequate maintenance and poor attitudes of the occupants.

Consultation and community participation at all stages were seen as vital prerequisites for success in the strategy, which would also require development of supportive facilities, and 'normalization' of Katutura's administration. A key area highlighted by the report was the fact that housing had thus far been available to tenants at subsidized rentals on account of low interest (1%) capital loans to the Municipality by the Administration. As a result people had been living 'above their means' in many cases i.e. in accommodation not otherwise affordable, thus creating resistance to lower standard/cost schemes, while at the same time reducing the funds available to the authorities for additional house construction.

Existing rentals are given in Table 6.7. It was thus suggested that subsidies be phased out except on planning and infrastructural services (McNamara 1980). Existing housing was not actually 'low cost' and thus beyond the purchasing power or unsubsidized rent-paying capacity of many occupants. A Type-9 house cost R10 600 in 1980. True low-cost housing is designed to rectify this.

The report did not mention, though, that the net rental (i.e. excluding the R15 levy) payable by tenants of 'Type-9' houses is several times higher than the subsidized rentals white employees of (3) Harris (1972) argues for abolition of subsidies on similar economic grounds, suggesting that subsidized rentals provide an effective income transfer to relatively well-off people, many of whom live in low standard council housing in Nairobi.

TABLE 6.,
KATUTURA HOUSE RENTALS 1980/81
Type
1. 6-roomed house
2. k-roomed house
   (old type)
3. 3-roomed house
   (old type)
4. 2-roomed house
   (old type).
5. 4-roomed house
   (Type 9-)
6. 4-roomed house
   (Type 9+)
7. Single Quarters
8. Hostel

Current Rentals
R 9.00 R 6.30 R 5.50 R 4.60
R19.10 R30.80 R 4.10 * 3.60

Previous Rentals
R 6.20 R 4.10 R 3.60 R 3.20
R16.80 R28.60 R 3.10
R ?

Note: These figures are net of R15.00 employer's levy, and apply to houses without electricity in types 1 - 6. Add R1.50 for houses with electricity.


TABLE 6.8
STRUCTURE OF KATUTURA EMERGENCY HOUSING SCHEME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Projected Cost, Rate of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 5 Boarding houses</td>
<td>R 225 000 Economic rate (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Additional rooms on 450 existing houses</td>
<td>R 450 000 Economic rate (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Purchase of erven and construction of 449</td>
<td>R1 750 000 Subsidized rate core houses (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Water, sewerege and electricity for 449</td>
<td>R 898 000 Subsidized rate erven. (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>R3 323 759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: An additional 0.5% interest is levied as an administrative charge in each case.

Source: City of Windhoek (1) Minutes of the monthly City Council Meeting 3 December 1980:28
the Municipality, Administration and other public bodies pay for their employer-owned houses, which are much larger, better and in better areas. Besides white salaries are generally far higher than those of blacks. This extreme subsidization should be eliminated if the intention is to create a uniform system.

Employers have, furthermore, expressed increasing objections to the housing levy system, which is also a form of subsidization for black employees. This currently stands at R15 per month, and for Hostel dwellers, employers generally pay the daily R1.15 food bill as well (this was formerly compulsory). As emerged during the economic survey (Chapter 7), businessmen frequently cite these as reasons for paying their workers low cash wages i.e. the levy is not regarded as a 'fringe benefit', but in effect deducted from gross wages. Free/cheap housing for white employees is, however, justified as being a fringe benefit, necessary to attract and retain skilled staff in view of the serious shortage. During discussions of alternative housing to the Hostel and Single Quarters, officials have frequently raised the question of whether employers can fairly be required to pay for 'luxuries' (i.e. better accommodation) (e.g. City of Windhoek 1978a:6). There is talk of abolishing the levy, although the Municipality regards this as an important guaranteed source of income for the Katutura account (Chapter 4). Given that real wages of unskilled workers have in fact fallen over recent years (Chapter 7), abolition of the levy will have to be accompanied by at least as great a wage increase if the effects are to be mediated.

Implementation: the Katutura Emergency Housing Scheme: On 15 September 1980 the Ministers Council approved most of the McNamara Report's proposals with only minor amendments, and formally requested the Municipality to act as agent for the Government in implementing them (City of Windhoek 1980c: Annexure M). Implementation was to be over 18 months in view of their top social and political priority, and R3.32m was made available over and above the normal capital funds which provided for 450 new ownership houses at a cost of R4.32m over the period April 1981 - August 1982. Approval was granted by the Katutura Advisory Board and City Council (City of Windhoek 1980b:28) and Mr.McNamara's firm were appointed consulting architects. In mid1981 it was announced that no further loan capital could be provided by the Administration for Whites, in view of the financial situation. As a result the Emergency Scheme would be the only one running in 1982. It comprised several complementary elements (Table 6.8).

Loans were to be available to anyone, irrespective of age, marital status or income. Significantly, no change in the Hostel's status was envisaged at this stage - in fact the Ministers Council memorandum and subsequent documents make no mention of it at all, save to say that the Emergency Scheme should reduce numbers there. This is remarkable since the Hostel was the original raison d'etre for the
vestigations. Some top officials reject the feasibility of altering the Hostel in part, as proposed by McNamara, because of the centralized kitchen system, need for control, etc. It should thus be
(4) These did not contradict the Police report; the latter's influx control and employment proposals were held over, pending new Labour Legislation.

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retained or entirely abolished (Deputy Director of Katutura, pers. comm.). Another interesting point is that with the changing dispensation, many occupants of the pre-1975 houses began spontaneous alterations and additions, even before the Emergency Scheme was announced. A survey in 1981 found 1 739 such houses - 42% of the total of 4 116 (A. Parkhouse pers. comm.; Plate 6.4).

Work on the Emergency Scheme commenced immediately.5 The consulting architects undertook background research, planning and marketing, while the Municipality prepared erven for the initial core-housing phase. These are located in Extensions 1, 12, 16, and 17 (the shaded areas in Figure 6.8) - where construction under the 'normal' scheme is to occur simultaneously in order to mix the housing types. The first 450 erven were ready by mid-1981, ahead of the rest of the project, a fact which led to tension between municipal planners and the consultants. The former were anxious to stick to the original timetable, in view of rocketing building costs and the fact that uncertainty over the initial number of core houses to be built, coupled with the essential non-uniformity of their design, was raising the contractor's tender price to such an extent that 'Type 9' houses would be cheaper before the end of 1981. This would destroy the self-help incentive of the scheme, thereby defeating its purpose. There was also considerable scepticism, even suspicion, of this new approach on the part of key white officials in Katutura whose co-operation was vital. They disapproved of the accompanying
(5) Unless otherwise stated, data in the remainder of this sub-section were collected in the field, and extracted from McNamara (1981) and Municipality of Windhoek (1981a).

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'non-housing' aspects of the project and the resultant delays which inevitably arose. Furthermore they claimed that the inhabitants of Katutura were 'not ready' for such a project, being very apathetic, and would not respond actively. Such views must be seen in the light of the administrative structure and cultural/racial prejudice. Firstly, the idea of meaningful consultation and planning with the prospective home-owner on equal terms, which is essential to the scheme's success, runs directly counter to the officials' experience and modus operandi, which has till now been an imposed top-down and patronizing system with virtually no recourse for residents. As a result, the vast majority of Katutura residents have no confidence in it, describing it as one of the main sources of their oppression and the current state of Katutura, and hence they
keep contact with it to an absolute minimum (= their apparent 'apathy').
Against this background, and bearing in mind that the administrative structure has not yet changed significantly, the problems to be overcome for the project to be successful, are formidable. Apart from the novel methods, this is also the first home ownership scheme for blacks, who until recently could not purchase on a freehold basis. The confidence and approval of the community is essential, and to this end initial consultations were held with social workers, nurses, teachers and other leaders of various ethnic, political and voluntary cultural interest groups. Feedback appeared generally positive, once people accepted the project team's sincerity, as the need for such a scheme was readily appreciated.
Project offices were built in Katutura, where information was provided, and interviews and 'interpretative' planning sessions conducted (City of Windhoek 1981g). Background research into income levels, present conditions, housing preferences and related 'non-housing' aspects was required beyond the immediate house design and construction, and this caused some disagreement among the parties involved. Participants in the scheme have the option of building the entire or part of the house themselves, arranging their own construction, or having the core or entire house built by municipal contract. They also select their erf and design their own house with the architects, using one of four designs for the basic 'wet core' (i.e. bathroom with toilet, shower and basin plus one large room with sink) and a combination of alternative possible additions. The entire house can be built at once, or in phases from the wet core outwards, in accordance with the participants' needs, income level and preferences. Loans are made available at an interest rate of 1.5% for purchase of the erf, building materials or wet core, and at 8.5% for additions to the core or the completed erf and house, as the case may be. The repayment period is 40 years. The total cost of erf and house may not exceed R12 800 on this scheme, while the minimum cost (wet core only) is R3 800 if built on contract and R2 800 if selfbuilt. The only preconditions for participation are a R200 deposit, and the generally accepted rule that no more than 25% of household income should be spent on housing. Priority is being given to people on the Katutura housing waiting list (1 275 in April 1981) although others are not excluded. Press coverage has been favourable (WA 16/9/80, 5/12/80, 31/7/81, 25/9/81, 16/10/81). Initial response was slow, although interest later gathered pace. Of 650 people interviewed by mid-May 1981, 66 had committed themselves to participate, 13 of them electing to build their own houses. The initial pilot phase is being limited to 100 units. Although analysis suggested that the
cheapest version under the scheme was affordable by 95% of Katutura's population, the participants were generally earning more than R350 per month, and required large houses. The first phase thus appears to have by-passed the poorest people, even though their need for it has been demonstrated. The reason for this is not clear.

A number of problems arose, e.g. design of core houses in relation to existing building standards; delays in finalizing the rate of interest to be charged; and the need to integrate the self-help project with the available alternatives. Applicants often wanted loans to purchase existing houses, or some alternative possibility which was administered differently and for which the project had no responsibility. This is referred to again below. By the end of May 1981 the existing municipal contract for conventional house construction had been extended to include the pilot 'Emergency' scheme of 100 units, and building commenced in October (WA 16/10/81).

c(iv) Attempts to Integrate a Housing Policy: Single Quarters and Houses: The question of what to do with the Single Quarters was discussed at length by the Municipality early in 1981 (City of Windhoek 1981h, 1981i, 1981j, 1981k). The present system, whereby rentals are collected from individual occupants, is unworkable, and conditions there are very bad (see below). There are 146 blocks, each consisting of toilet, bathroom, 5 four-bedded and 2 one-bedded rooms i.e. 3 212 beds. During 1980 average occupation was only 2 466 or 76.77%. Several alternatives were proposed:

(i) letting each room to an individual, who could then take in tenants and collect rent from them.
(ii) holding employers responsible for paying all their employees' rentals, which could then be recovered from wages.
(iii) converting the single quarters into family accommodation.
(iv) converting the single quarters into boarding houses - each block becoming one such unit (similar to (i)).
(v) return to pre-1975 system, where occupants paid no rent i.e. the housing levy only was charged.

It was resolved to try a combination of (iii) and (iv) with some blocks on an experimental basis, while reserving at least 2 400 places for single men under the existing arrangements. Employers are to be encouraged to rent whole blocks for their employees while women are to be catered for in some separate boarding house blocks. Rentals would be in line with those currently charged for the respective types of accommodation. Implementation would take time, however, in view of the financial situation and necessary alterations.

Purchase of existing houses: The Natives (Urban Areas) AProc. AG 12 of 1977, enabling the sale of property to, and registration of title deeds by, blacks (Chapter 5).6 Home ownership has been increasingly seen as important by the Central Government and Municipality, and attempts are thus being made to promote the idea among Katutura
This is not permitted in South Africa, although an attempt was made recently to get round this ideological constraint by means of a 99-year lease system (Boaden 1979). No evaluation of its effect is yet available.

 Residents. Firstly, it is seen as desirable to give people a material stake in society in order to help promote socio-political stability (the classic propertied middle class buffer). Secondly, it would reduce the hold and authority of the Municipality over the people, one of the major causes of resentment and the 'township' syndrome (Chapter 3). Thirdly, it would give people a sense of pride and greater incentive to maintain, improve or extend their homes and surroundings instead of neglecting them. Many of the older houses have deteriorated badly and municipal maintenance is very inadequate.

 In recent years the Municipality has undertaken a programme of rapid electrification of the old houses, after application by the tenants. About 300 are being wired annually, and, subject to the availability of funds, the job could be completed in about 1984 (City Electrotechnical Engineer, pers. comm.). Tenants could buy their houses as follows.7 a) Those built before 1970: the price equal to the average of the original construction and 1976 replacement costs, plus the cost of electrical installation where applicable.  
 b) Those built after 1975 (which all have electricity): at construction cost. In both cases the amount was payable over 30 years at 1.25% interest and a 5% deposit. Transfer was to be effected on payment of the entire amount. The serviced erf was priced at R3.56/m2.

 It should be noted that although Proc. AG 12 of 1977 permitted the sale of immovable property to blacks, Katutura was not yet surveyed or proclaimed as a Township. It was thus only in 1979 that the sale of erven could commence, although houses could be sold immediately.

 C) Luxury houses. These were a recent innovation for higher income blacks. The Municipality negotiated a loan from the SWAA (which provided municipalities with their loan capital) in its name, and built the houses. The prospective owner became the tenant, and could purchase the house as in (a) and (b). There were no maximum costs or minimum salaries for these schemes and the rate of interest charged was that obtained from the SWAA on the original loan (1%) plus 0.25% administrative levy. In August 1979 scheme (c) was broadened by the SWAA to include all races on a uniform basis, in line with DTA policy. It replaced the luxury house system, becoming a self-build scheme for prospective home-owners and introduced differential loan sizes, interest rates and
repayment periods based on the annual income of the household head (Table 6.9). The degree of subsidization was thus reduced. People with incomes over R6 200 p.a. and applications for loans above R20 000 would be referred to the Building Society for consideration at the going rate (City of Windhoek 1981b:F6-F15).

The response from Katutura residents has been poor, with only 110 applications being received by the Municipality by December 1980. 86 were for the purchase of existing houses, and 24 for the self-build scheme. A 45% stratified systematic sample (i.e. 50 cases) of the application forms was taken to ensure the same proportion of each type as in the total. There were 38 purchase applications and 12 for construction. The former category is composed of 8 for 'Type 9+', 8 for 'Type 9-', 17 for 4-roomed, 4 for 3-roomed, and 1 for a luxury house. 86% of the sample had been approved, 6% rejected, while 8% were still pending. Their spatial distribution was random. The average loan size was roughly R8 000 and 84% (i.e. 42) of the sample household heads had incomes of R5 000 - R6 000 p.a. or less, i.e. less than R500

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TABLE 6.9
SWA ADMINISTRATION LOAN SCHEME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual income group</th>
<th>Interest rate</th>
<th>Maximum loan</th>
<th>Repayment period (years)</th>
<th>No. of children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R3000-3249</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>R12 800</td>
<td>34 37 40 40 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3250-3499</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>R12 800</td>
<td>31 34 37 40 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3500-3749</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>R12 800</td>
<td>28 31 34 37 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3750-3999</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>R12 800</td>
<td>25 28 31 34 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4000-4249</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
<td>34 37 40 40 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4250-4499</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
<td>31 34 37 40 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4500-4749</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
<td>28 31 34 37 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4750-4999</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>R15 000</td>
<td>25 28 31 34 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5000-5149</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>R17 200</td>
<td>31 34 37 40 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5150-5299</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>R17 200</td>
<td>28 31 34 37 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5300-5449</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>R17 200</td>
<td>25 28 31 34 37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5450-5599</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>R17 200</td>
<td>- 25 28 31 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5600-5749</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>R20 000</td>
<td>- 25 28 31 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5750-5899</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>R20 000</td>
<td>- - 25 28 31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5900-6049</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>R20 000</td>
<td>- - - 25 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6050-6199</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>R20 000</td>
<td>- - - - 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of the City Council

-309-
monthly. By the end of May 1981 only 10 houses had been registered in their owners’ names (Deputy Director of Katutura, pers. comm.). This lack of enthusiasm, despite the level of disillusionment with the present rental system, can be attributed to several causes essentially the same as cited in Chapter 5 for the small number of blacks moving out of Katutura. Particularly strong was a feeling that this plan represented a further political trick and attempt at exploitation, because people claimed that when the Old Location was closed, they had been promised transfer of their houses once rent payments had covered the original construction costs. They felt a future government would be more favourably disposed towards them, and resolved to bide their time. Many residents of the older houses said, furthermore, that the price demanded was exorbitant, given their condition.

The Emergency Housing Scheme operates on interest rates of 1% and 8% (plus 0.5% administrative levy), which differ from those applicable under the other scheme. Because of this and the need for co-ordinating the alternative housing modes available (see above), the schemes were standardized by the Municipality in April 1981 (Table 6.10; City of Windhoek 1981b:F6-F15, 1981m:19-20). Schemes A-C would be developed on the same basis, with the same set of extendable plans etc. All future housing erected by the Municipality would be for ownership only

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(Scheme B), in line with Government policy, and a core-housing element might be included once the current Emergency Scheme has been completed. Before effect could be given to this, the Ministers Council resolved in May 1981 that all funds granted after 1 July 1981 would be for a maximum loan of R20 000 per house at 9% interest, including the administrative levy, and repayable over 40 years (City of Windhoek 1981n: Annexure RR). This wipes out the difference between the schemes in Table 6.10, and would seem to hit the lowest income earners hardest by removing the entire interest rate subsidy. In this sense it is regressive and will effectively reduce the range of options open to the lower-paid.

A further decision related to the sale price of existing Katutura houses:
(a) the 1 940 houses built from 1960 to 1968, which have current tenants since 1968 or earlier, to be credited to the occupants and the erven sold for R891 each.
(b) the 2 176 houses built from 1960 to 1968, but with current tenants since after 1968, to be sold at construction price plus cost of erf (R891), less R1 per month for the period of rental.
(c) houses built after 1968 to be sold at construction cost plus cost of erf.
Interest was to be paid at 1.5% over 30 years, but certain loan sizes under (c) where charged at 4% interest (City of Windhoek 1981n: Annexure RR).

This move has the potential to benefit many families, and may prove the biggest spur yet to home ownership in Katutura. Its importance must, moreover, be seen in political terms: on the one hand it lends credence to popular claims of promises made when the Old Location was closed, and thus will be seen as justifying the slow response to earlier home ownership proposals, while on the other hand it is clearly an attempt to bolster the popularity of the DTA government, which has been steadily losing support, and to foster a propertied urban black class. The thrust of these steps, however, like the others reviewed, by-passes those most in need of a new dispensation - Hostel and Single Quarter dwellers, poor residents and recent migrants, many of whom now lodge and are forced to pay high rents in view of the housing shortage. Only in the original municipal scheme for selling houses were most participants really low income earners. But response
to this scheme has been poor to date. The most recent estimates from the Emergency 'low-cost' Scheme suggest the final house cost to be in the region of R13 000 - a reflection of the participants' income. This is 20-30% more than the cost of a 'Type 9' house.

The irony is that it was conditions in the Hostel and Single Quarters, in the context of freer rural-urban migration, which provided the impetus to investigations and proposals for low-cost and core housing. However, it must be stated that there was, until very recently, a fair degree of ignorance of the housing alternatives available, and a hesitancy to come forward, on the part of the residents. Major problems have been the lack of communication (which is being tackled by the Emergency project team), the frequent changes to the ownership schemes, plus people's feelings towards the authorities. The current nature of the schemes may thus reflect the characteristics of the few who have responded. It seems, nevertheless, that priorities have quietly, almost imperceptibly, but tangibly, changed. If they are followed through to their logical conclusion, the original proposals will create a lower-middle to middle income black property class. This, in fact, would realize a major goal of the original Security Police report. Despite all that has been said, the situation in the Hostel and Single Quarters, in particular, has not changed. The Hostel is still regarded by the authorities as a seedbed of SWAPO resistance, and its occupants harassed on various pretexts (e.g. WA 24/6/82:1).

3. KHOMASDAL
(a) The Apartheid Plan
Khomasdal occupies an intermediate position between Katutura and the former white areas of Windhoek, both locationally and in terms of the design and standard of its physical structure. These in turn mirror the intermediate socio-economic status of coloureds as a group. In terms of planning procedures, however, the system is no different from that in the white area - so that Town Planning layouts need approval by the territory's Township Board before areas can be proclaimed Townships; erven are fully surveyed, beaconed and individually numbered. Land and home ownership have always been permitted, although the bulk of housing in Khomasdal was built by, or on contract from, the Municipality on 440m2 erven for lease at subsidized rentals. There are several house sizes, built to standard design, as in Katutura, but larger and better. The most common ('Type Al') has 3 bedrooms, a lounge/dining room, kitchen and bathroom with toilet, having a total floor area of 72m2. The 'Type Al+' version has ceiling, plastered walls and electricity/hot water system in addition to the standard design. All types apparently complied with health and building
regulations. By the early 1970s the Municipality sought to encourage private ownership and new construction, for which purpose loans at 1.25% interest were provided by the SWAA under municipal administration (Clayton 1974:30-31).

As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 the coloured population has grown rapidly since 1960, when Khomasdal was first planned. After the initial construction programme ended in 1968, however, little new housing was built until 1975, except for 76 units in 1970-1 (Table 3.4). A worsening and now critical housing shortage has existed since 1968, and by mid-1981 only 13 people had built their own homes (Khomasdal Assistant Manager, pers. comm.). Some public authorities, parastatals, and a few large firms own houses for free occupation or subsidized rental by their employees; overall, though, 85-90% of households in Khomasdal are tenants (Figure 6.7). The housing inventory in May 1975 is given in Table 6.11 (see also Figures 6.2 to 6.6). Figure 6.11 and Table 6.1 show the 1975 sex structure to be well balanced overall, but with slight female bias in the 10-19 age group (apart from a large male population aged 5-9). 88.5% of the population were younger than 40.

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TABLE 6.11
NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BY SIZE AND TYPE COLOURED AND BASTER RESIDENTIAL AREA (KHOMASDAL, AREA 220)
Source: Municipality of Windhoek (1976a: 58)
1975
FEMALES
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION (RESIDENT COLOUREDS)
FIGURE 6.11
NUMBER OF DWELLINGS BY SIZE AND TYPE TYPE OF NUMBER OF ROOMS PER DWELLING DWELLING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+ TOTAL
Detached housing 1 91 360 350 78 32 0 0 0 912
Attached housing 4 30 27 6 1 0 0 0 0 68
Flats 6 23 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 36
Rooms 57 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 60
'Suites of rooms 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
MALES,GE 4.0 30

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b) Developments 1977-1981
Since property rights and the necessary planning concomitants already existed, and there were no specific socially unacceptable housing forms like the Hostel or Single Quarters in Katutura, there has been no significant change in the situation. There is only 'more of the same' i.e. growth of both the housing stock and waiting list. The various township extensions can be seen in Figure 6.12. No lowcost 'Emergency' housing scheme has been implemented despite the fact that proportionately the housing shortage is worse here than in Katutura.

As mentioned in Chapter 5 there is no restriction on coloured rural-to-urban migration within Namibia, but immigrants from South Africa do require permanent residence permits. These must be applied for once in the territory, and are not as rigidly enforceable as was the former pass system for blacks. The permit system was originally introduced to stem the influx of coloureds from the Northern Cape: it was apparently previous practice for some construction firms to collect large numbers of semi- and unskilled workers there when new contracts were awarded in Windhoek because they were prepared to accept lower wages. On completion, however, they would not return, but add to local unemployment while demanding houses and frequently resorting to crime. This behaviour is a subject of frequent complaint by officials and many Khomasdal residents who regard themselves as 'local' and support the permit system as a means of protecting their jobs and facilities. It could not be ascertained to what extent this was a genuine feeling or a product of legitimizing propaganda by ethnically based politicians and the authorities.

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FIGURE 6.12
LAYOUT OF KHOMASDAL
Source: Map supplied by Town Planning Section, Windhoek Municipality.

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In recent years the permit system has not been very stringently enforced, and many immigrants do not possess permits - hence the recent moves to tighten up (WA 9/3/82). It is regarded by most immigrants as being totally discriminatory in that coloureds are the only group subject to controls. The system was formerly administered by the SWAA but has now passed to the Dept. of Civic Affairs and Manpower which issues the permits on recommendation of the second tier coloured Representative Authority. Herein lies the other major grievance against the system - that it is abused politically by the DTA-affiliated Labour Party. Applicants are generally given personal interviews and their views canvassed; people with jobs for which there is no 'local' taker have often experienced permit problems as a result. Ethnic coloured politics are governed by personal antipathies and feuds rather than differences of principle, and are thus discredited in the eyes of a large proportion of the population.
In 1979 the SWAA economic house ownership scheme was made uniform for people of all races with annual incomes in the R3 000 to R6 199 range (see Section 2 above and Table 6.9). In an effort to reduce the housing waiting list and force greater ownership the Municipality resolved in May-June 1980 to restrict rented houses to people earning under R3 000 p.a., and remove all others from the list (City of Windhoek 1980f:1-2). After numerous complaints of the hardship this would impose, the upper limit was raised to R4 800 (City of Windhoek 1980f:2). No existing scheme-built houses intended for rent are to be sold, in order to preserve the rental stock for those in low income brackets (Khomasdal Deputy Manager, pers. comm.). In line with the May 1981 Ministers Council decision on housing loan finance, all future schemes will be for ownership, not rental (see Section 2).

A high density group-housing scheme of 122 attached units was built during 1980 (Khomasdal Extension 6 - see Figure 6.12) as a further attempt to reduce the waiting list, while reducing construction costs and increasing the variety of housing types available. It was apparently modelled on part of the giantMitchells Plain project for coloureds in Cape Town. These units were intended for sale to occupants, but there was considerable resistance to their design and finish, and the Municipality was forced to let all but 7 of them (City of Windhoek:1980d:45, 1980e:55). Many of the occupants earn above-average salaries, being semi- or skilled personnel, and most claim to have moved there simply because of the lack of alternative accommodation. The units are regarded as far too small and derogatorily referred to as 'voelnessies' (birds' nests). Proximity to neighbours, shoddy finish and rapid deterioration, the lack of privacy, and inadequately maintained street lighting in the long narrow roads are also major complaints (see Chapter 5). In view of the unexpected negative reaction, plans for more such housing were shelved (City of Windhoek 1980f:3-5) and the 100 new houses built under the ownership scheme during 1981 were all small detached houses in Khomasdal Extension 4 (WO 6/12/80; WA 9/12/80). Despite attempts to reduce costs by, for example, not tarring roads and reducing erf size to 204m2, these houses cost over R15 000 each (cf. approximately R10 600 for a new house in Katutura). The rooms are small, and even during construction, many future residents expressed dissatisfaction with what they derisively called 'vinknessies' (finch nests). Altogether 128 houses were built in 1981 (City of Windhoek 1981p:11). The strongly expressed preference for detached housing, both here and in Katutura, has surprised officials and planners. It seems to be primarily the effect

(8) During 1982 it broke away from the DTA after internal feuding.
of two factors. Firstly, this is what people have grown accustomed to over time, because irrespective of size or standard, virtually all public housing built in these areas has been detached. Secondly, there is a marked aspiration to better and larger houses - indeed, most people of colour compare their lot with that of whites (the demonstration effect), who generally live in detached dwellings on larger erven. It can furthermore be said that a significant number of people, particularly coloureds in Khomasdal, earn salaries sufficient to enable them to build or buy their own conventional houses instead of relying on rental of municipal dwellings. There is a strong implicit and explicit expectation that the local authority is duty-bound to provide anyone putting his name on a waiting list with housing. The Municipality is conscious of this fact, and, particularly in view of the current shortage of capital funds for new construction, now endeavours to promote private construction initiative and home ownership, as in Katutura (see below). Nevertheless, no self-help core-housing scheme had even been suggested by the end of 1981 for those unable to afford conventional houses.

It is also important to see the people's attitudes as the product of earlier official policy, where full ownership was not specifically encouraged, and at a time when far fewer people could afford private homes. The official conventional wisdom did not permit self-help on a low-cost basis, as building standards were set relatively too high, and public provision of standardized bulk-built units deemed preferable. The 'shelter' function of housing was emphasized virtually to the exclusion of wider considerations. Some residents and politicians in turn see the 'new' policy as an attempt by the authorities to evade their responsibility, particularly in view of their past record and attitudes. As examples, two particular sources of grievance are often cited. The first is that tenancy agreements signed before 1973 supposedly contained a clause to the effect that the houses could be sold to tenants after 5 years, in which case rental payments would be deducted from the purchase price as if they had been instalments. This type of contract was recalled and replaced in 1973, apparently without this provision, which was taken to imply that the Municipality was no longer prepared to sell its houses. The extent of this grievance was also noted in a recent municipal study of housing conditions in Khomasdal (Municipality of Windhoek 1981b:8). There was no legal requirement to surrender the old contracts, though, and some tenants refused. The reason for this recall could not be ascertained, but a copy of both contracts supplied by a tenant who had retained the original version was examined. While undoubtedly restrictive, e.g. with respect to the taking in of lodgers or sub-tenants, Clauses 19 and 20, which relate to the sale of the house to the tenant, appear unamended. In fact there is no stipulated
time factor - purchase can occur 'at any time during the term of this rental contract'. The only significant changes relate to the composition and amount of rent (R14.32 and R17.87 respectively). There seems thus to have been some misunderstanding on the part of the tenants, the origin of which could not be traced, but it seems significant that their idea is very similar to the political promise of eventual ownership in Katutura discussed earlier. It may have originated in the same way. The second grievance relates to Clause 12, on alienation of the property, in contracts of home purchasers. This provision stipulates that the property may not be alienated or placed under bond for the first 5 years, and that the Municipality is entitled to retain the title deeds for that period. The Municipality also has the right of first refusal ('voorkoopsreg') should the purchaser wish to alienate the property within 5 years - at the original purchase price. Should the Municipality not exercise its right, it is entitled to payment of an amount calculated on the difference between the rate of interest at which the purchaser obtained the municipal loan, and 8% (the approximate market rate), over the actual term of financing and the amount of the loan. These are very restrictive conditions which people find objectionable, especially seen in conjunction with Clauses 9 and 10 which stipulate that no alterations/additions may be made without written municipal approval, and that high quality paint must be used, that the original colour must be retained; and that only the purchaser, his spouse and dependent parents/children may live there without written permission. One or two informants who bought their houses before 1979, when they could still buy only in Khomasdal, have found it necessary to buy a second, larger house in former white areas, at considerable cost and inconvenience, as they could not extend or sell those in Khomasdal.

Even were the Municipality to agree to extensions being made, a bond from the SWABS would be necessary (unless self-financed), as the Municipality does not grant a second loan on the same house. However, Clause 15 prevents registration of bonds against these houses. The Municipality justifies these conditions on the grounds that the houses were built with public funds obtained at low interest, which was passed on to the purchaser in his purchase loan (at 14%). It is wrong in principle for private individuals to profit financially from this government loan by selling the house unrestrictedly on the open market within a reasonable period (five years). Secondly, this condition ensures the continued availability of the house to the
intended target group i.e. low income earners (City Engineer, pers. comm.). The same provisions apply to other housing types sold to white Municipal staff. In view of the new Ministers Council policy of abolishing subsidized interest rates announced in May 1981 (see above) the justification for part of this restriction has fallen away - and it remains to be seen whether the necessary contractual amendment will be made in new contracts.

By mid-1981 there were 437 privately owned housing units out of a total of roughly 1,600 i.e. just over 25%. 417 of them were old houses, 7 in the 1980 group-housing scheme, and 13 were privately built; while 4 more awaited bond registration (Khomasdal Deputy Manager, pers. comm.). As in Katutura, attempts have been made, with little success, to persuade employers to provide their employees with housing (City of Windhoek 1981q:1-3). 412 new erven in Extension 5 are being surveyed to provide for immediate further housing needs (City of Windhoek 1980b:67).

The scale of the overcrowding problem is readily observable, and is well illustrated by two surveys undertaken during 1981. The first, by the Private Sector Foundation, covered 490 rented housing units, and found an average occupancy rate of 18.2. All those interviewed expressed the desire to own a house, although 15% saw no hope of doing so. 90% said that if they could they would buy the house they currently occupy; 96% wanted to continue living in Khomasdal (A. Parkhouse, pers.comm.). The second, extrapolated from a survey of 90% of households conducted by the Municipality's Town Planning Section, showed an overall average of 10.9 occupants per house, although several cases of 30 or more were recorded. The average coloured family size is 7, according to the 1975 census, which strongly suggests that two or more families occupy most houses. This second study established a marked difference between a small higher, and a larger lower (working class) income group. The former generally owned their houses, and had an average occupancy rate of 7 (4,249 people in 607 units). These houses were in better condition, the neighbourhoods were better, and the incidence of social problems far lower than among the second group. The latter lived almost exclusively in rented
accommodation, and numbered 13 181 in 991 housing units - an average of 13.3. Among this group the incidence of alcoholism, unemployment, TB, 'flu and gastro-enteritis, poor personal hygiene and bad health conditions in the home was alarming (Municipality of Windhoek 1981b; Chapter 8 below). The studies gave very similar income distribution data (Table 6.12). The slightly higher bias in the Municipal one is explicable in terms of its wider coverage. The data suggest that over 2/3 of the population could afford to purchase existing conventional houses on the present basis if they were found desirable. There is, nevertheless, need for a lower-cost alternative, as the poor have thus far been by-passed in the ownership drive (cf. Katutura). Only 49 applications for housing loans under the 1979 SWAA scheme were received by the Municipality over the period September 1979 to September 1980. Eleven were for self-construction, and the balance for purchase of pre-built units. None was refused, but a few were still pending. Analysis of a 51% sample (25 forms) showed that 24 applicants were male, 23 married and 2 widows/widowers, and that the average number of dependants was 3.4 (mode = 3; range = 1 to 7). Applicants had been resident in Windhoek for 12 years on average (mode = 12; range = 1 to 38), and their annual incomes were distributed as shown in Table 6.13.

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TABLE 6.12
KHOXASDAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION SURVEYS 1981
Range Private Sector Municipalitr
Foundation
< R300 p.m. 28% 29.5%
R301-R500 p.m. 47% 40.5%
R501-R700 p.m. 15% 18.0%
> R700 p.m. 3% 12.0%
Unknown/ not disclosed 7% 0.0%
TOTAL 100% 100.0%
Sources:
(1) A. Parkhouse pers. comm.
(2) Municipality of Windhoek 1981b.
Table 6.13
INCOMES OF LOAN APPLICANTS
i”7 IO
Source: computed from loan applications.
Range Household Household
p.a. Head
NoO
R3001-4000 6 24 6 24
R4001-5000 8 32 6 24
R5001-6000  9  36  7  28
R6001-7000  2  8  1  4
R7001-8000  0  0  1  4
R8001-9000  0  0  2  8
R9001-10000  0  0  1  4
R10001-11000  0  0  1  4
TOTAL  25  100  25  100

4. SYNTHESIS
It has been necessary to analyze the changing situation in former white Windhoek, Katutura and Khomasdal separately, in view of their different legal and practical circumstances. While there has been little convergence over the short period under review, some important structural and planning changes have occurred which at least bring the three areas under a more uniform planning system. The range of housing alternatives is being increased, especially in Katutura, and stress placed on home ownership. There has been official recognition of the permanence of urban blacks, the urgency of abolishing the Hostel and Single Quarters in their present form, and the need to plan for accelerated population growth after the abolition of influx control. Action to date has been inadequate. Municipal planning policy is no longer based on racial differentiation, rather on a distinction between low, medium and high income groups. This is more realistic and flexible, particularly in Khomasdal, for example, where considerable socio-economic diversity has been shown to exist. Nevertheless, it remains true that the income groups correspond very largely with race, and with the formerly racially exclusive residential areas. The recent Guide Plan (Municipality of Windhoek 1980) which covers the period until the early 21st Century, provides for geographically distinct, economically homogeneous areas, with most low and medium zones extending from Katutura and Khomasdal respectively, and additional ones in the south of the Basin. Low income areas are designed for a gross density of 14/ha, medium for 7/ha, and high for 3.5/ha or lower (roughly the figures for Katutura, Khomasdal and former white suburbs respectively. 11 This is consistent with conventional Western urban planning principles, and will maintain a large measure of racial exclusivity save in elite areas (see Chapter 5), something unlikely to be acceptable if independent Namibia pursues a more socialist line. No consideration has yet been given to the possibility of economically diverse residential areas, for example. One important symbolic and practica spatial change to have occurred is the abolition of the statutory buffer strip separating the former
racially exclusive residential areas. A land-use plan for the strip was drawn up in 1979, to maximize the utilization of land available for urban development. It provides for a variety of uses, most notably additional schools, sports fields and roughly 800 residential erven in Extensions 15, 17, 18 and 19, as indicated on Figure 6.8 (City of Windhoek 1979a, 1979b). Part of the core-housing project is situated here. Approval was granted by the Administrator-General and Township Board during 1980, and implementation is well advanced.

It is the first time in Africa that such a buffer strip has been removed before independence, (cf. De Blij 1963; Mascarenhas 1967), and by promoting physical integration of the urban segments, could have a symbolic unifying value. However, the new highway between Katutura and the Northern Industrial Area, the riverbed between Katutura and Khomasdal, powerline servitudes and the planned institutions in the buffer strip will prevent full integration, and, depending on the layout of access roads, may provide a more effective barrier than did 300m of open ground before. This was explicitly appreciated when the AG's approval was sought (City of Windhoek 1980g: Appendix E).

Virtually all white officials now accept that Namibia is a Third World country, but few apparently appreciate all the concomitant problems and the necessity of major structural adjustments: the burden of the past seems stronger. By the same virtue, it remains to be seen whether the residents of Katutura and Khomasdal accept the changes as meaningful and are prepared also to help themselves within the evolving framework. More thoroughgoing political change will almost certainly be necessary for this.

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CHAPTER 7
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE URBAN ECONOMY
1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter forms a crucial link in elucidation of Windhoek's contemporary political economy, building on the foundations laid in Chapters 2-4. One strand of analysis common to both Neo-classical and Marxist/Neo-Marxist philosophies is their primary stress on the economic dimension of human activity, sometimes to extremes of unrealistic determinism. While avoiding such a narrow perspective, it is hypothesized that any change in the socio-political formation in Namibia is certain to have identifiable impact in the structure and function of Windhoek's economy. For example the nature of ties with South Africa and spatial patterns of trade might already be changing, while legislation abolishing pass laws, influx control and racial discrimination should affect employment conditions, wage levels and the organizational ability of labour. Capitalism has been the dominant force in shaping Windhoek's economic structure, although spatially modified by planning regulations and the rigid apartheid requirements discussed earlier.

(1) The Neo-classical paradigm is based on assumptions of 'rational economic man', the free market mechanism, and private profit motive, which combine to produce the most effective utilization of resources and spatial distribution of activities and land-use. People earn what they deserve. Government intervention should be minimized, except in cases of market imperfections. The Neo-Marxist analysis claims that all human behaviour is overtly or implicitly dictated by economic considerations, and that Man is by nature exploitative. Extraction of surplus value from exploited proletarian labour power is thus the norm, and class conflict endemic under capitalism. Declining profit ratios and worker organization combine over time, leading to the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. Central economic and spatial planning are essential for attainment of socially optimal solutions.
Nevertheless these two were by no means antipathetic. Whether independence will see the eclipse of capitalism by a more socialist or mixed economy, as predicted, remains to be seen.

Although peripheral within the southern African regional space economy, Windhoek's role as a 'transactional crossroads' between domestic and external relationships (Gottmann 1977) in administrative and especially commercial terms, gives its economy more than purely local importance: changes within Windhoek at once reflect and determine conditions in its hinterland. In addition to changes in the range and scale of activity in each major sector of the capital's economy, labour practices and employment conditions, it is thus necessary to examine more general economic conditions and changes in the economic relationship between Windhoek and the rest of Namibia. Central to any such analysis is the problem of determining the extent to which observed trends reflect cyclical economic fluctuations rather than the changes being studied. The standard approach to evaluation of economic policy is to estimate what the trends would have been in the absence of such a policy, and compare them to those actually observed. Given the poor data base and the nature of the Namibian economy, this is not attempted in any directly quantifiable way here, although economic indicators and businessmen's perceptions are examined as proxies. Business cycles in Namibia generally reflect those in South Africa with a lag of approximately six months, although there are several important distinguishing factors.

Climatic conditions and the lack of economic diversification leave Namibia extremely vulnerable to periodic droughts and fluctuations in world mineral prices. Their combined effect since 1979, coupled with increased transport tariffs from South Africa, and political uncertainty over the territory's future, have been noted in earlier chapters. Economic downturns tend therefore to be severe, while upturns, again because of the lack of breadth or depth to the economy, are generally less marked than in South Africa.

After brief consideration of relevant legislation, this chapter examines in turn a selection of economic indicators, private and public business performance and organization, labour conditions in both private and public sectors, labour organization, unemployment, and the informal (petty trading) sector. Changes since 1977 are analyzed in an attempt to discern socio-political from cyclical effects.

2. LEGISLATION AND THE URBAN ECONOMY

The most socio-politically important legislation since 1977 is of only indirect import here - namely the abolition of formal influx control (including the pass laws) and legal racial discrimination (Chapter 5). Removal of restrictions on property ownership by blacks in 'locations' was effected by the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Proclamation AG12 of 1977 (which retained the ban on their acquisition of urban land outside of 'locations'), while the Second Natives (Urban Areas)
Amendment Act of 1980 enabled whites to own property in black urban areas. Only with promulgation of the Abolition of Racial

Discrimination (Urban Land and Public Amenities) Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1981, could anybody unrestrictedly occupy business premises throughout the urban area. By mid-1981, only one or two white-run businesses had been established in Katutura.

A number of minor legislative changes of uncertain effect include:
1) Amendments to the Apprenticeship Ordinance, No. 12 of 1938, by the Apprenticeship Amendment Proclamation, 1979, governing procedures and contractual matters, and Proclamation AG60 of 1979, which increased the conditions and qualification requirements for prospective apprentices.
2) The Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Proclamation, 1978, prohibiting affiliation or granting of financial assistance by a trade union to any political party, or vice versa. While affecting all concerned, this measure was presumably aimed chiefly at preventing formal links between the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) and SWAPO at a time when organization at several of the large mines was being attempted -(See Gordon 1977; SALB 1978; Cronje and Cronje 1979, Moorsom 1979).
3) Export and import control relating to strategic and a wide range of other commodities, in terms of Government Notices AG6 and AG7 of 1981.
4) Amendments to exchange control regulations governing the Rand monetary area (thus not affecting the flow of funds to or from South Africa) in terms of Government Notice No. R357 of 1981.
5) One of the more significant measures was the Registration and Incorporation of Companies in South West Africa Proclamation, No. AG 234 of 1978, which required firms operating in the territory to be locally registered or incorporated, instead of remaining branches of their South African operations, as virtually all had done thus far. This was an important step towards uncoupling the territory's economy from South Africa, and providing an additional State revenue source, by rendering corporate tax payable in Namibia (See Section 2 below).
6) Another major change was the extension of personal income tax liability to all 'population groups' and the introduction of new tax rates for the 1980/81 tax year. This was achieved through the Income Tax Amendment Act, No.1 of 1981, and Government Notice No.11 of 1981. Previously only whites, coloureds, Basters and Namas paid income tax. The revenue accruing from the groups now included is, however, expected to be minimal (SWA/Namibia 1980:50). Although widely acclaimed in the press (WA 26/2/81, 27/2/81; Suidwester 27/2/81; Republikein 27/2/81) as a further step away from
discrimination, and providing personal tax relief, the imposition of a uniform, rather than progressive, rate is in fact retrogressive, adversely affecting low income earners.

3. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In order to explore prevailing economic conditions, data were collected on a wide range of social and economic indicators for the period since 1977 (Tables 7.1 - 7.3). They are not all equally

TABLE 7.1
SUMMARY OF SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS

A. Road length (km.) and % tarred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wdh Kat Kh’dal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>299 (86) 58 (13) 29 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>386 (69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Av. daily water consumption (M7) and % change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>824</td>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Ave Kh'da Ave</td>
<td>Ave Wh'dh Sumption Ave (kWh) (’000) Kt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>143,572</td>
<td>11,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,5081</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>147,657</td>
<td>12,305</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,5081</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>151,262</td>
<td>12,605</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,5081</td>
<td>423</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>158,289</td>
<td>13,191</td>
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<td>1,5081</td>
<td>423</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ave Vehicle Ownership % of total White Black Asian Coloured Baster Other 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan.'77 % Feb.'78 % Feb.'79 % Feb.'79 % Feb.'79 % Feb.'79 % Feb.'79 % Feb.'79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1628 175 6407 6865 12 2556 865 % Feb.'79 67 8 0 5 0 19 4 571 3018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Business Licence Total</td>
<td>% Annual Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regis &amp; New Wdh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh'dal Transfer Wdh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh'dal Renewal Wdh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kh'dal stration Wdh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>1978/79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133 20 65 0 1 260</td>
<td>52 68</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>1978/79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32 995</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 332</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 131</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 329</td>
<td>3491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 907</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381</td>
<td>7942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 067</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 822</td>
<td>3048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>408</td>
<td>8156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 208</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 10 | 1 781 |
| 310 | 7 441 |
| % Mar.’80 | % July ’81 |
| (66) | (9) |
| (9) | (0) |
| (0) | (5) |
| (0) | (20) |
| Total | 32 995 (1000) | 35 332 (100) | 37 131 (1000) |
| 4 329 | 3491 |
| 1 907 | 9       |
| 381 | 7942 |
| 52 | 68 |
| 65 | 0 |
| 5 | 21 |
| 38 067 | 100 |
| 4 822 | 3048 |
| 8 | 66 |
| 408 | 8156 |
| 65 | 0 |
| 5 | 21 |
| 38 208 | 100 |

<p>| 10 | 1 781 |
| 310 | 7 441 |
| % Mar.’80 | % July ’81 |
| (66) | (9) |
| (9) | (0) |
| (0) | (5) |
| (0) | (20) |
| Total | 32 995 (1000) | 35 332 (100) | 37 131 (1000) |
| 4 329 | 3491 |
| 1 907 | 9       |
| 381 | 7942 |
| 52 | 68 |
| 65 | 0 |
| 5 | 21 |
| 38 067 | 100 |
| 4 822 | 3048 |
| 8 | 66 |
| 408 | 8156 |
| 65 | 0 |
| 5 | 21 |
| 38 208 | 100 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Wdh</th>
<th>Kh’dal</th>
<th>F. Hotel Bed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>175</td>
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Kh’dal:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Wdh</th>
<th>Kh’dal</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>1,599</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,555 (+2.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,542 (-4.4)</td>
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F. Hotel Bed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Occupancy (n)</th>
<th>Annual % cEn-ge-</th>
<th>Pbom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>164 (0)</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>120 (+2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>106</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Annual % cEn-ge-:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>(-20)</td>
<td>(-14)</td>
<td>(-12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>(-10)</td>
<td>(+13)</td>
<td>(+13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In Windhoek Magisterial District (not significantly different from Municipal area data)
2. Public authorities, parastatals, etc.
3. Excluding 1 hotel in Khomasdal.

SOURCE Abstracted from Tables 7.1A - 7.1F in Appendix A, which should be referred to for precise data and fuller explanation.
TABLE 7.2
PLANS APPROVED BY THE MUNICIPALITY OF WINDHOEK.
AND BUILDINGS COMPLETED, PER CALENDAR YEAR I
1976 - 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Plans Approved</th>
<th>Buildings Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>32 995 (100)</td>
<td>35 332 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 131 (100)</td>
<td>38 067 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38 208 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>408 (69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32 995 (100)</td>
<td>35 332 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 131 (100)</td>
<td>38 067 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38 208 (100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Plans Approved</th>
<th>Buildings Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Dwellings 126 R 1 582 000</td>
<td>266 R 2 091 530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flats 1 R 35 000</td>
<td>1 R 48 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 4 R 981 000</td>
<td>1 R 80 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial 5 R 57 000</td>
<td>7 R 1 604 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public 9 R 402 200</td>
<td>8 R 540 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alterations etc 263 R 1 348 673</td>
<td>256 R 737 012 TOTAL 873 539 R 5 101 392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Dwellings 18 R 424 000</td>
<td>97 R 1 106 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flats 0 R</td>
<td>0 R 35 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 5 R 304 500</td>
<td>3 R 23 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial 5 R 592 000</td>
<td>4 R 242 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public 3 R 250 000</td>
<td>5 R 494 374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alterations etc 308 R 4 329 715</td>
<td>222 R 851 429 TOTAL 339 R 5 900 215 332 R 2 752 603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Dwellings 99 R 1 230 200</td>
<td>15 R 301 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flats 0 R</td>
<td>0 R 0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 4 R 118 500</td>
<td>3 R 283 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial 4 R 408 000</td>
<td>4 R 549 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public 8 R 2 145 712</td>
<td>6 R 513 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alterations etc 284 R 2 116 525</td>
<td>228 R 908 267 TOTAL 399 R 6 018 937 256 R 2 555 367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Dwellings 33 R 833 300</td>
<td>90 R 860 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flats 1 R 145 000</td>
<td>0 R 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 11 R 825 500</td>
<td>3 R 92 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial 5 R 8 684 400</td>
<td>4 R 595 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public 5 R 198 000</td>
<td>2 R 1 687 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alterations etc 369 R 2 325 146</td>
<td>226 R 4 239 186 TOTAL 424 R 13 011 346 325 R 7 473 998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Dwellings 221 R 5 825 530</td>
<td>52 R 1 796 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flats 2 R 495 000</td>
<td>1 R 15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial 8 R 1 059 900</td>
<td>10 R 856 500</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial 7 R 1 666 000</td>
<td>2 R 27 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
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<td>Alterations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>6 R 502 800</td>
<td>2 R 18 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alterations</td>
<td>579 R 4 803 905</td>
<td>297 R 1 877 647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>823 R 14 353 135</td>
<td>364 R 4 590 747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Dwellings</td>
<td>204 R 7 701 060</td>
<td>194 R 5 734 090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 Flats</td>
<td>16 R 2 329 000</td>
<td>12 R 557 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>6 R 790 700</td>
<td>1 R 31 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alterations etc</td>
<td>572 R 8 271 220</td>
<td>408 R 3 364 798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data exclude public works.

Source: Building Control Division, City Engineer's Dept., Municipality of Windhoek.
susceptible to the effects of socio-political change but it was hoped that some general order of magnitude for such change could be ascertained through comparing and interpreting them. The indicators discussed here relate largely to the private sector; public sector impact on change has been significant, but is dealt with in Sections 4 and 5b for coherence. Item A of Table 7.1 reflects physical urban growth as well as social inequality, in terms of the proportions of tarred and gravel roads in the three former racially segregated areas. Total road length has increased in all three areas, but especially in Katutura and Khomasdal. This reflects the increased rate of public housing construction there in response to the worsening shortage (Chapter 6; Table 3.4). Total road length did not increase in 1980. Road tarring has increased in Katutura and Khomasdal, although the vast majority are still gravel. The Municipality restricts such tarring to levels ‘affordable’ by the Katutura and Khomasdal budgets (see Chapter 4), but an attempt is being made to improve conditions in the face of public demands based on health and political grounds.

Water consumption has increased markedly (Item 7.1B), but this cannot be attributed directly to population growth or rising living standards, since the worsening drought from 1979 onwards has been an important contributory factor. Electricity consumption (Item 7.1C) thus provides a more accurate reflection of these trends. Overall average monthly consumption rose 3.2% in 1978, 4.3% in 1979, and 5.7% in 1980, but by upwards of 15% p.a. in Katutura and Khomasdal (except for a 2% rise in 1979 in Khomasdal). This is a function of four factors: the rapid growth of housing stock in both areas, as all new houses have electricity; the increasing rate at which existing houses are being wired for electricity (Chapter 6); the fact that much of Windhoek's recent population increase comprises blacks and coloureds living with established families (i.e. increasing house occupancy rates); and, finally, a probable rise in usage by some existing consumers as more appliances are bought with rising real incomes. All four factors are closely related to socio-political change for reasons stated elsewhere.

Items 7.1D - 7.1F are primarily economic indicators, although the effect of political uncertainty is significant in Item 7.1F. The trends in registered vehicles
(Item 7.1D) represent a shift to lighter vehicles, which are economic on fuel and suited to Namibian conditions. Total vehicle registrations rose rapidly in 1977-79, but flattened out in the later period. Ownership by whites has increased steadily, except in 1980, while that by blacks, and coloureds and Basters collectively, fell after peaking in early 1980. This suggests that disposable incomes of a significant proportion of these groups had begun to decline, since vehicle sales are a very sensitive economic indicator. The rapid rise of 'other' ownership reflects the increased governmental bureaucracy.

Information on the 'births and deaths' of firms was unobtainable, since all firms operating in Namibia are now required to register locally (see above), and the vast majority have registered headquarters in Windhoek, irrespective of the actual location(s) of their operations (Registrar of Companies, pres. comm.). Business licenses, which are issued for particular activities or commodity types, are the closest proxy measure (Item 7.1E). Although one firm generally holds 1-6 different licenses according to the nature of business, and may take out additional ones if the scope of trade is increased, it is fair to assume that, ceteris paribus, the average ratio of licenses to firms will remain constant over a relatively short period such as this. White Windhoek (W) and Khomasdal (K) have been separated here; comparable data for Katutura do not exist since all commercial premises were owned by the Municipality until 1981, and all rental and trading applications are dealt with by the City Council. The data show modest increases in 1978/9 and 1980/1 over the previous years, and a significant decline in 1979/80 for both areas. The 1980/1 totals are still below those for 1978/9. It thus appears that business conditions were poor during 1979/80.

Item 7.1F presents hotel bed and room occupancy data, which are known to be very sensitive to both economic and political conditions. With the exception of 1976, bed and room occupancy rates moved in the same direction, and the annual fluctuations were substantial. There are also regular seasonal cycles. 1978 and 1980 were better than 1977 and 1979, when bad business and political climates coincided, although significant spare capacity has existed each year. The 1979 slump was serious enough to precipitate staff retrenchments (WO 16/6/79). From Table 7.2 it is clear that 1977, 1978 and 1979 were poor years for the construction industry, and this period corresponds to the period of depressed economic and political conditions. This is also a sensitive indicator (since public works are excluded), and it is significant that marked improvement occurred in 1980 and 1981. This is especially true in terms of dwellings, and to a lesser degree commercial and industrial buildings, as they involve large (often speculative) private capital outlays. In marked contrast to these trends, the number of planned alterations and additions rose each year, reflecting the accommodation shortage, rising real incomes of home-owners, and an unwillingness to commit capital on
the scale required to build new homes. Data on the value of buildings completed mirror those for plans approved, but with a lag of 1 year, as expected.

The rate of inflation has been substantial, with the general Consumer Price Index (CPI) almost doubling over the five year period (Table 7.3). It rose at an increasing rate: 13.2% in 1977, 14.1% in 1978, 18.5% in 1979 and 19.7% in 1980. The increases in respect of food only have been more marked, more than doubling over the five years. The annual figures were 14.3% in 1977, 17.1% in 1978, 17.1% in 1979 and 22% in 1980 (WA 6/3/80; Suidwester 23/2/81). No separate indexes for different income groups are provided, as in South Africa, but the CPI for low income households is normally higher than for better-off groups since basic items, especially food, form a larger proportion of their budgets. Wage increases have not always kept pace with these rises, hence already underpaid unskilled labourers have suffered decreasing real incomes and greater hardship (WA 17/7/81; Section 7 below).

CPI figures for South Africa in March 1981 are 196.1 for all items and 219.3 for food only, representing annual increases of 16.2% and 29.9% respectively (Standard Bank 1981:8). These data show Windhoek's CPI to be increasing at a slower rate; the Dept. of Finance attribute this to the less buoyant demand in Namibia than in South Africa, where a strong demand-led upswing was occurring, with faster increases in labour costs and profit margins (Secretary of Finance, pers. comm.). Many local businessmen dispute the official figures, however, claiming that recent steep rises in transport tariffs from South Africa, coupled with higher unit costs and the effects of large scale Government expenditure since 1979, make the CPI rate of increase faster in Namibia. It appears difficult to reach definite conclusions on the basis of the indicators presented, since their trends are not all unidirectional. Additional useful indicators, such as the numbers of registered medical practitioners and attorneys per annum, could not be obtained. The major trends undoubtedly reflect cyclical variations, although some evidence of socio-political change emerged from electricity, hotel occupancy and construction data, in particular.

4. WINDHOEK'S SPATIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

The absence of significant secondary sector development in Windhoek was remarked on earlier. Manufacturing is concentrated in a few sub-sectors, namely food processing (mainly baking, meat packing, dairy products, confectionery, soft drinks and beer brewing), light engineering, motor vehicle modification and repair, printing and publishing, and miscellaneous activities e.g. paint production and pre-fabricated houses (see Lempp 1964). Most of these products are characterized by high perishability or bulk, high transport costs, and require relatively low population thresholds for market viability (Hurst 1974:131-133). These are frequently the first manufacturing activities established in developing urban areas (cf. Ogendo
The Southern Industrial Area became the first focus of manufacturing, with later overspill located in the Northern Industrial Area (Chapter 3). The Lafrenz Industrial Area was opened to the north of Katutura in the early 1970s and is now gradually being occupied. Constraints of space and strict planning regulations limit permissible levels of noise and smoke emission, especially in the Southern Area. The construction industry is also important, and like manufacturing, serves the entire country. An industrial and warehousing survey was undertaken in 1978 by the Windhoek Municipality Town Planning Section, but the data have not yet been analyzed or published.

Functional succession - the take-over by business concerns of former private dwellings - is now a feature of the Southern Industrial Areas's fringe. Commercial activity is the core of Windhoek's economic life. Wholesaling, distribution and retail concerns serve the local, regional and in many ways national market as well. Wholesale premises are scattered around the fringe of the Central Business District (CBD), in the Northern Industrial Area, and especially the Southern Industrial Area. The retail sector was the subject of a detailed study by the Municipality in 1975-77 (Municipality of Windhoek 1978a; Demasius 1979a, 1979b). Five categories of shop were distinguished according to the main commodity type sold: non-durables formed 29.37% of the total, durables 30.07%, Service shops 14.86% and the Motor Trade 14.16%, while 11.54% were unoccupied. The spatial distribution of the 572 enumerated outlets is shown in Figure 7.1. By far the most important area is the CBD, with 374 shops (65.4% of the total), followed by Katutura, Eros and Klein Windhoek. Table 7.4 gives the shop type by major planning area. It is immediately apparent that, as expected, the CBD performs the 'central' function, with the vast majority of durable goods and service shops in addition to a significant number selling non-durables. Most suburban shops are widely dispersed 'convenience' grocers and cafes with small catchment areas, although there are concentrated shopping centres in Katutura, Klein Windhoek, Eros, Pioniers Park (the last-mentioned built since the survey), where the population concentrations are greatest.2 Multiple correlation analysis found that four variables, namely annual turnover, salary bill, rent, and floor surface area, explained 91.3% of the spatial variation (Demasius 1979a:92-94; 1979b:1-2). Shops in the CBD generally had lower turnover than expected (i.e. negative residuals), and those in the suburbs higher than expected (i.e. positive residuals) in multiple regression and residual analysis (Demasius 1979b:2-6).

(2) There has been a long-felt need for a greater variety of shops, especially a supermarket, in both Katutura and Khomasdal, as the existing general dealers have smaller ranges and charge higher prices than central city stores on account of lower turnover and local monopolies. The origin of the present structure was mentioned in
Chapter 3. Improvements are planned with the upgrading of these areas from worker dormitories: a supermarket opened in Khomasdal in early 1982 (WA 26/2/82), and one is planned for Katutura by the local black Chamber of Commerce. Black businessmen resent direct competition from whites in Katutura, which is now legal (Section 2 above), as they feel it is the only place where they have been so far protected from white commercial dominance (WA 25/9/81:5).

FIGURE 7.1
LOCATION OF RETAIL OUTLETS IN WINIHOEK

No systematic survey of tertiary services and office space has been undertaken to date. Until recently, such activities were virtually restricted to the CBD, although shortage of space and expansion of the range of business and financial services in recent years have precipitated functional succession in the CBD fringe and inner city residential areas (Windhoek Central (N), (E) and (W)) in particular, with the conversion of old, often dilapidated dwellings. Windhoek's CBD, like that in most small cities, is linear, running along the southern half of Kaiser Street, the main axis (Figure 7.2). The lack of detailed office information is ironic, for this sector has witnessed the most dramatic changes of all since the mid-1970s; hence some elaboration is necessary.

Apart from the expanding private office sector, Government departments have come to compete strongly for available office space. Creation of the internal government after 1977 necessitated enlargement of existing department branch offices, the creation of new ones, accommodation of the Administrator-General's staff and various 2nd tier ethnic authorities. The Administration for Whites, as legal successor to the SWAA, retained the Tintenpalast, so other bureaucracies were forced to seek alternative quarters. Rather than build new premises, the Government began renting or purchasing office space in the CBD on a large scale. The situation caused concern, both in the business sector and the Municipality: the former faced eviction and higher bid-rents by virtue of competition for the remaining space, and the latter suffered decreased rate revenue, since the SWAA and its successor pay only 50% of assessment rates, and the central government 0%.
At least 8 buildings in the CBD, 7 of them office blocks, are now owned or leased in toto by the State (Figure 7.2; WO 7/6/80:25; 19/7/80:6; WA 3/4/81, 26/2/82; City of Windhoek 1980:6-7). In mid1981 Central Government departments occupied a total of 17 530m² of rented office space in 16 different buildings in the CBD and its fringe, and 4 449m² in 4 buildings elsewhere (Town Planner, pers. comm.). Although total office space available in Windhoek is unknown, this forms a substantial proportion. About 6 000m² of new prestige office space came onto the market in December 1981, with completion of the first private speculative building in the CBD for several years. This will have eased the situation somewhat, but raised rents because of a prestige demonstration effect. Rentals previously ranged between R4-10/m² (Republikein 21/4/81). There is a minority opinion that the severe shortage is more myth than reality, and that there would in fact be a glut of space were it not for the government's large tenancy (WA 16/9/81:1-3). Plans for a grandiose new central government centre were commissioned-(Stauch and Partners 1981) but have since been stalled for financial reasons. The balance between the supply of, and demand for, office space in the CBD is uncertain, being a direct function of socio-political change, since much depends on non-market forces in the form of government decisions over its own future location and structure.

No suitable firm ownership data is available because the Registrar of Companies does not distinguish between firms operating in Windhoek and elsewhere in Namibia (see above). While many major firms are foreign and South African-owned (Murray et al. 1974) local white entrepreneurs of all three language groups play an important role. Black businessmen are growing somewhat in number and influence, although Thomas (1978:196-7) suggested that there were only about 200 in the whole of Namibia. In Windhoek their role is still confined to Katutura, because although it is now legal, none had
moved into the former white areas by 1981. The underdevelopment and poor formal educational background of the black bourgeoisie will impede adjustment and growth potential after independence, especially if many whites leave.

5. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY CHANGE

a) The Private Sector

a(i) Sample Survey and Characteristics of Firms Windhoek firms were surveyed to investigate both geographical and economic changes in trading patterns and performance since 1977, and attempt to distinguish between cyclical and socio-political causes. The sample included the widest possible spectrum of enterprises in terms of location within Windhoek, size of firm, ownership and type of activity. No complete list of firms could be obtained because the only local business directory, telephone directory and Yellow Pages directory were outdated or of unsuitable format. The problem with the Registrar of Companies’ list has already been mentioned. There were apparently 741 firms altogether in 1974, but no more recent figure is available (President of Windhoekse Sakekamer, pers. comm.). The four Chambers of Commerce or Industry in Windhoek were thus approached for membership lists and those of the two consenting Chambers, which fortunately have the largest representation in Windhoek, formed the sample nucleus.

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Firms were divided into economic sector and overlap (resulting from membership of both) removed. Roughly 25% of each sector was selected so as to achieve a variety of locations, firm sizes (in terms of employees) and sub-sector of activity. Significant sectors not included in Chamber membership (e.g. corner cafes and grocers) were randomly sampled in areas where they were important. Of 60 interviews conducted, the results of only 2 were inadequate for inclusion in the analysis below. Various characteristics of the sample which could influence the effects or nature of change experienced were examined before the changes themselves. The reservations cited in Chapter 5 with respect to use of multivariate analytical techniques apply equally here. GLIM was not used, to avoid information loss through reducing the data to requisite form. Summary and descriptive statistics were obtained using SPSS.

From Table 7.5 it is clear that 75% of the firms were Namibian. Private one-outlet firms formed the largest single category, followed by head offices of Namibian multi-outlet firms. Categories 3 and 6 which are technically synonymous, since all non-Namibian firms must register as 'external companies',3 together form the third largest category (19%). The distribution of firms by major Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) division is shown in Table 7.6. The size of division 3 reflects the pre-eminence of wholesale, distribution and retail activities in

(3) The same is true of categories 4 and 7.

-358-
TABLE 7.9
STATUS OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Head Office</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Branch of Namibian firm</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Branch of S.A. firm</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Branch of foreign firm</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Subsidiary of Namibian firm</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Subsidiary of S.A. firm</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Subsidiary of foreign firm</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wholly owned private co.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- Independent public co.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.6
ECONOMIC SECTOR OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIC Division</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale, retail, catering, accommodation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, communíc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance, business services, real est.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community, social and personal services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Windhoek's economy. The relative importance of finance and business services has increased markedly in recent years. Manufacturing was the only other significant category. The sample's spatial distribution (Figure 7.3) shows an overwhelming concentration in the CBD and two industrial areas, and is thus representative of the actual situation. From Table 7.7 it is evident that the sample comprised a broad cross-section of firm sizes. The predominance of small enterprises is notable, and the fact that 22% employed 10 or fewer people in total, and another 17% from 11 to 25 people, suggests that a fair proportion of firms were potentially vulnerable to rapid changes in economic conditions. Many firms had all their staff in Windhoek (cf. Table 7.5), and even multi-plant firms had, with only very few exceptions, a large proportion of their staff in the capital. This fact underscores Windhoek's primacy. The correlation co-efficient of total staff with staff in Windhoek was 0.9676.

a(ii) Intra-urban Mobility and Spatial Trade Patterns: Almost half of the sample firms had been established since 1960, many during the 'boom' years of 1968-1972/3 (Table 7.8). Altogether 76% postdated World War II. In an attempt to ascertain the effects of sociopolitical change on firm mobility, the length of time in present premises and reason(s) for moving were examined. Intra-urban...
mobility rates proved very regular over time, with an average of 2-4 moves annually.4 14 had been in their premises for under 5 years, 17
(4) NB: the proxy for mobility used, i.e. length of time in present premises, may give a misleading impression in that a number of younger firms, in particular, have occupied their present premises since establishment.

between 5 and 10 years, 13 between 10 and 20 years, and 12 over 20 years. As might be expected, there was a statistically significant association between time in present premises and date of firms' establishment, although it accounted for only 30% of the observed variation.

Table 7.9 gives the reasons cited by firms for moving premises. The most important reason for both groups A and B was a need for additional floorspace, followed by 'other' (which did not contain any uniform responses), and the desire for improved accessibility. Three recent moves were the result of government take-overs of previous premises. This is the only category directly attributable to socio-political change, although indirect effects will have been significant in some cases, e.g. firms catering primarily for blacks recorded a marked increase in their clientele's purchasing power over the last 5 years, due to rising real wages of a proportion of the population (see below). This is partly due to changing circumstances, and may have increased turnover of firms to such an extent that larger premises were required, or location at a more accessible site preferred. Nevertheless, the distribution of reasons between the two groups was not significantly different. Notwithstanding the impact of factors just mentioned, it is clear that any socio-political change since 1977 has had no significant impact on the intra-urban mobility of firms.

The spatial pattern of trade over this period was also examined in terms of the proportion of goods and services purchased from, and sold to, five geographical areas - Windhoek, the rest of Namibia, South Africa, the rest of Africa, and the rest of the world in the 1977/8 and 1980/1 financial years (Tables 7.10 and 7.11). The most striking feature of the data is their stability over this period. In all cases, the correlation co-efficients of 1977/8 with 1980/1 data were higher than 0.94; and the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test proved none of the differences to be statistically significant. South Africa was by far the most important source of inputs and finished goods used or sold by
Windhoek firms. Significantly, the rest of the world (chiefly West Germany, the UK and France) was second, although three-quarters of the sample made under 10% of their purchases there. Windhoek, the rest of Namibia, and Africa, were insignificant. In terms of sales, Windhoek, followed by the rest of Namibia, were important and the other three totally insignificant. 98% of firms sold no output to Africa, and 96% none to the rest of the world. Windhoek's pre-eminence was expected, as it is the largest and most diversified locus of private and public purchasing power in the territory; it has furthermore been noted already that many firms are small unilocal concerns catering for the local market. Only in the business service sector did small firms have noteworthy turnover outside Windhoek. It is also clear that there is little vertical economic integration in Windhoek (or the rest of Namibia): backward linkages are very strong with South Africa but negligible within the
-365-
territory, and forward linkages to final users are almost exclusively domestic.5
The data thus support the more general contentions (Chapter 2) about the
nature of Namibia's economic structure and
dependence on South Africa. This analysis has shown that, on the one hand, any
socio-political change since 1977 has had no impact on spatial trade patterns of
Windhoek firms, and, on the other, that there is great scope for re-orienting trade
(especially purchases)
away from South Africa, should that be desired after independence, provided that
suitable substitutes are obtainable.
(a(iii) Magnitude of Economic Change: In order to assess quantitative changes in
economic activity, firms were asked to indicate an order of magnitude of changes
in the money value of turnover, gross profit, capital stock and current investment
where applicable, as well as the
proportion of those changes they would attribute to socio-political change or its
effects. From Table 7.12 it is evident that there was no
clear trend on any one of the four variables, except that 94% or more of the firms
did experience growth on each variable. As anticipated, turnover showed the
greatest overall change, slightly ahead of gross profit. It is common for profit
margins to shrink during times of rising inflation, and a large proportion of
interviewees said explicitly that this had been their experience over the relevant
(5) The terms 'forward' and 'backward' linkage generally refer to successive
stages in the production process when value is added.
Although true for Windhoek manufacturing firms, the terms are used here to
include distribution activities as well.

-366-

TABLE 7.12
CHANGES IN LEVEL
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF WINDHOEK FIRMS 1977/8 - 1980/1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
<th>Capital Stock</th>
<th>Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Firms %</td>
<td>Firms %</td>
<td>Firms %</td>
<td>Firms %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 No change</td>
<td>1 2 3 5 14 26 9 17</td>
<td>4 7 5 9 17 2 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Rose 1 - 10%</td>
<td>8 14 11 20 12 22 8 15</td>
<td>19 33 10 18 10 19 12 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rose 11 - 25%</td>
<td>10 17 9 16 2 4 4 8</td>
<td>5 9 8 14 0 0 4 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Rose 26 - 50%</td>
<td>9 16 7 12 6 11 10 19</td>
<td>1 -10%</td>
<td>1 2 2 4 0 0 1 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If changes in the overall consumer price index are used as a proxy for inflation, the difference between March 1977 and March 1981 was 72.3% (Table 7.3), which implies that only about 1/3 of firms increased their turnover and profit in real terms.

Capital stocks changed least over the four years, with 85% of firms experiencing growth of under 50%. In most cases, the increases were accounted for largely by new plant or vehicles, but for a few it reflected enlargement (or occasionally replacement) of buildings. Capital investment, by its very nature, has a longer gestation period than the other variables and is thus less susceptible to short term change. With respect to current investment, minor stock increases were necessitated by the higher volume of turnover for those firms experiencing real growth; for the rest the increases were due essentially to inflation. In view of the prevailing political uncertainty, spiralling costs and delays in having orders from South Africa filled, most firms were operating with reduced stock inventories.6 The results were remarkably uniform across all sectors and firm sizes, and correlation analysis showed the relationship between the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and the four variables discussed here to be totally insignificant. The same was true with respect to firm size.

The proportion of measured change in the four variables attributed to socio-political factors was small overall (Table 7.13). Categories 0 and 1 accounted for between 38% and 86% of responses, with capital and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>1 - 10%</th>
<th>11 - 25%</th>
<th>26 - 50%</th>
<th>51 - 75%</th>
<th>75 - 100%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 10%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 25%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 50%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 75%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75 - 100%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The excess demand in South Africa itself meant that Namibian orders, being proportionately very small, did not enjoy priority. This point was frequently made during interviews.

current investment being influenced very little. Nearly a quarter of firms suggested the proportion of turnover and profit to be greater than 50%, however. The major reason put forward for this was a significant increase in coloured and black purchasing power as a result of rising real wages, which reflect upward economic mobility and skill levels occasioned by economic growth, the exodus of some whites, and pressure for removing wage discrimination in line with the 'new dispensation'. The second significant reason, given across a wide spectrum of firms but particularly those in construction, building materials and allied trades, vehicle and office equipment supplies, and printing and publishing, was the impact of government expansion since 1978/9.

Several points need to be made in evaluation. Firstly, while indisputable that a section of the coloured population, in particular, has enjoyed notable upward mobility and improved financial circumstances, it was argued earlier (Chapters 5 and 6) that this does not apply to them all, and that there is a growing class dichotomy between the emerging coloured bourgeoisie or middle class, and unskilled proletariat. The question of wages and labour discrimination is examined in detail below, and racial discrimination shown to exist within the sample. From field observations and interviews with workers, employment agents and economic journalists, it is apparent that many firms pay only lip service to non-discrimination, and that the chief reason for employing more skilled coloureds and blacks is the increasing difficulty of recruiting whites, and the ability to pay lower wages for the same job, rather than a sincere commitment to equal opportunity. Such lower wages are then justified by claims that skill, productivity, or efficiency are lower than would be the case with whites. Some job fragmentation is also occurring. However, a minority of firms, chiefly large South African or foreign subsidiaries aware of scrutiny from abroad, have become 'equal opportunity employers' and, according to employees, achieved a large measure of success. The impact of government reorganization with the accompanying multiplicity of separate ethnic Authorities, has been strong. Government has traditionally been the major economic agent in Namibia. Support for the present DTA dispensation is strong among the business community, and this can be ascribed to two reasons: while making concessions and moving away from overt apartheid, the changes pose no threat to the existing economic order and vested interests, and secondly, growth in the government sector is profitable (especially with the current drought and uncertainty).
An attempt was also made to relate these changes to firms' personnel structure. Since 1977/8, 25% of firms said there had been no change at all, while 14% had taken on 1-10% more staff, and 50% had experienced staff increases of over 10%. 11% of firms had suffered a decline in staff numbers. The large apparent increases for so many firms are somewhat misleading, since the addition of just one person to enterprises employing 10 or fewer staff would represent an increase of over 10%; and many firms in the sample are indeed small (see above). This was borne out by 42% of firms not reporting any 'major characteristic' in their employment change. The most frequently cited characteristics were increases in the numbers of coloured, Baster or black men, and coloured and Baster women; increases in the number of white men and women were cited only half as often. Upward mobility of blacks and coloureds received only 6 mentions out of 59 positive responses, thereby supporting the contention made above, that racial discrimination has by no means been significantly reduced.

1980/1 was undoubtedly a successful year for the Windhoek business community, several firms claiming it to have been their best ever. The majority were optimistic about prospects for 1981/2, despite the likely ramifications throughout the economy of the worsening drought. Other problems mentioned include the disruptive effect on personnel of increased military call-up and increasing difficulties in recruiting adequately trained manpower. The inflation rate was also expected to rise 2-3% in 1981 from the 15-18% suggested by most firms for 1980. A number of respondents expressed concern that the current commercial prosperity was 'artificial' in the sense of being almost entirely due to the high level of public sector expenditure, rather than a broadening of the economy. The funds were an exogenous injection from South Africa, not generated locally, and were likely to be reduced (or cut off) in the near future with serious consequences. This has indeed begun to occur (e.g. WA 5/5/82:1-3). The majority of businessmen suggested that prospects beyond 1981 seemed bright provided there was little change in the political situation. This underscores the point made earlier in respect of support by the business community for the existing dispensation. Only a few - mainly those in food industries, and the blacks in the sample - were not perturbed at the prospect of more radical change at independence.

b) The Public Sector
Analysis of public sector economic activity could obviously not be performed on the same basis or level of detail. Much of it, particularly relating to infrastructural services, takes place outside Windhoek, while service provision at levels determined largely by
public demand rather than profit maximization is the primary motive for operation. Most such public utilities, e.g. water and electricity supply, postal and railway services, attempt to break even but frequently operate at a deficit. A few relevant and previously unobtainable indicators of changes in the level and geographic distribution of postal and rail services serve as equivalents to private sector turnover (Table 7.14). Windhoek's share of letters posted in Namibia was over 60% and rose steadily, whereas its share of parcels, goods handled and hand-dialed trunk calls, all of which were under 30% of the total, declined. The last-mentioned is not a good indicator since increasing automation of rural telephone exchanges would, perforce, reduce the proportion of hand-dialed calls. (The increase in hand-dialed calls outside Windhoek would have to be explained in terms of greater traffic from remaining manual exchanges, more person-to-person calls, etc.) The number of metered call units rose, although Windhoek's share fluctuated around 65% of the national total.

In terms of annual percentage change in the level of these indicators in Windhoek, 1979 was far better than 1980: letters increased by 14.3% in 1979 and by only 8.9% in 1980, parcels by 15.2% and -4.5%, trunk calls by -3.8% and -25.2%, metered call units by 11.2% and 9.7%, and goods tonnage by 16.8% and 6.4% respectively. These data stand in

-372-

K't r- 0 CN "0 (IN"0 *ý , LA * .:t* L O 06 9<3 O "CO 0 "CO 0 
Or CMJ 1,0 <0 -é t.0 0 CO 0 CO CO Ki< " CNt m Ulý_: 0 KN KN CO r-c ' --
CO d r-0rl- ON CJC 0 NC" * * 9
a) 0 D d a 0;r
0 " 0 : C %100. C'j<30D
-:t0C r-4 "k-o
-:D ~0 ,o -t:0 mN O
0 - r . N__(IN\:_\:L__0__0
0" CO0r- 9 -- Cý 0mD'.
N c'jc r-9-cN 0
'~~~j4J ~ a r-J 9 o tr-% r-ýD-t * * * * * * * * * -=- "- n o06I -r' \n o . CY 19. COJ KNr - CNJ
LCN0 MI r4-q 0 :-ko
CO 0 CO (IN
0 o9-0 (IN CM ,
~r4 "<3-4 9-rk - v DW \n-ri C) rc~ COO r--c' CO I, C
ON" 0 N,0 -t:0 «C c
00 0 m" r- 0 4 >N
cm r-o 'r--o Cvir- 0 1ø0
4 - - o - a% aN corr 4 ø r - o o-1-1- C
CO CO r'- LC " r- CO. " 0 CG A r.
contrast to private sector suggestions that 1980 was better. Moreover, if one assumes that the public sector's share of these services increases as government expands, as it has after 1978, and particularly in 1980, the contrast becomes more marked.

This section of the analysis has confirmed that, on balance, there has been little change in the urban economy which can be attributed to socio-political or other non-cyclical causes. Probably the most noteworthy effect has been the spin-off from increased government expenditure. There has been limited progress towards genuine non-racialism, but support for the status quo implies that capital perceives no threat in it. The lack of major change is partly explained by the short time period reviewed, but also by the absence from the existing government's programme of any significant restructuring of domestic or external economic relations. Nor have circumstances warranted any such action spontaneously by the business sector.

6. EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION

While the validity of the capital-labour dichotomy in contemporary Namibia is evident, employers are not all united in outlook. There are no fewer than four Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Windhoek, with membership drawn broadly along political and ethnic lines, thus reflecting wider social cleavages. Interviews were conducted with the head of each. The Windhoek Chamber of Commerce and Industries (WOCI) is the largest and oldest, dating from the first decade of this Century. Its membership is predominantly English- and German-speaking,
The Windhoekse Afrikaanse Sakekamer (WAS) was formed around 1950 as part of the Afrikaner nationalist movement to promote Afrikaners in commerce. It was affiliated to the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), the nationwide umbrella body, in South Africa. Tension arose after the split between the National and Republican Parties, and, in March 1980, the dominant pro-DTA group proposed opening the body to all races, removing the word 'Afrikaanse' from its name, and withdrawing affiliation from the AHI. The minority of members opposing these changes resigned and formed the rival Afrikaanse Sakekamer van Windhoek (ASW) in May 1980 (Afrikaanse Sakekamer van Windhoek 1981:1). While exclusively Afrikaner, the ASW is prepared to assist 'other population groups' to form parallel bodies. The former WAS is now the Windhoekse Sakekamer (WS).

Attempts to merge the WCCI and WAS between 1977 and 1980 failed. In 1978 Black businessmen rejected as patronising the attempts to train and draw them into the WCCI. Hence they established the Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCOCI) as "...a non-racial and non-political Chamber of Commerce catering for the needs of all Namibian businessmen specifically for the purpose of furthering the development of commercial enterprises..." (NCOCI Constitution p.1).

(7) In 1980 it changed its name to the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of SWA/Namibia in an effort to include firms beyond Windhoek (WA 15/9/80:2).

In practice its ordinary members are black, although a number of white-owned firms are associate members, some of whom provide active support, sponsorship and training. The longstanding divisions have thus been exacerbated since 1977 by a process of 'fission and fusion' between those attempting to accommodate socio-political change and those rejecting it. There is, however, little prospect of greater unity in the foreseeable future in view of racial, political and personal rivalry, although the Institute of Economic Affairs does provide a liaison umbrella for these and other employer organizations (e.g. WA 5/12/80; 22/9/81:1-2; 23/9/81:1-2).

7. LABOUR

The section analyzes the labour side of the formal (modern) economy employment, employment conditions and practices in both private and public sectors, and labour organization. Although many of the issues raised apply equally well outside Windhoek itself, discussion here will focus primarily on the capital. The interrelationship of race and class, as well as their differential bargaining strengths in the labour market, emerge clearly, and the effects of political change appear small to date.
Table 7.15 shows the occupational structure of whites and coloureds by category of employment in 1975. Note the even distribution of white men in occupational categories 2-7, and predominance over women in all but categories 6 and 7. Roughly equal numbers of coloured men and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category 1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
women were employed; they were overwhelmingly concentrated in semi and unskilled occupational groups. Equivalent data for blacks are not available, but roughly 95% were unskilled, and concentrated in domestic service (20.5%), construction (17.2%) and retail and wholesale trades (15.6%) (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:76; also Appendix C). Figure 7.4 and Table 7.16 show the spatial distribution of employment in Windhoek by major planning area and race in 1975. Despite its small area, the CBD (areas 50-52) has the largest concentration by virtue of the numerous retail concerns, tertiary services, parastatals and government departments located there. They account for some 19% of Windhoek's total employment of 33 700. The southern flank of the CBD and the municipal offices are situated in areas 53-55, together with conventional CBD fringe activities, such as motor vehicle and furniture sales. Some of these, together with professional services moving out of the expanding CBD, also spill over into areas 80 and 120. Employment in area 70 is essentially government and SWAA-related, while in 160, it is centred on the State and Katutura Hospitals. Area 140 is the railways zone; 150 and 120 are the industrial areas. Some employment is scattered elsewhere ('other areas' in Table 7.16), but associated primarily with domestic service and the suburban shopping centres in Klein Windhoek, Eros, Pioniers Park, Khomasdal and Katutura, and the hotel complex and airport in Windhoek South (area 130). The numbers employed will have risen since 1975, although this relative spatial distribution is unlikely to have changed significantly, as no noteworthy new employment foci have arisen in the intervening years. Indeed, the Windhoek Municipality based its 1980

FIGURE 7.4
EMPLOYMENT BY RACE AND AREA. MAY .175
----- 3
1 mm = 150persons
w c b
-0.5  0  0.5  1  1.5
km
ZIQ
N
N N
a.X
unknown
other
TABLE 7.16
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY POPULATION GROUP AND BY PLACE
OF EMPLOYMENT. 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>NO.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(rounded to nearest 100)</td>
<td>ded to nearest 1001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY CENTRE</td>
<td>3474</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN INDUS.</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY SOUTH</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAILWAYS</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHK. NORTH</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY NORTH</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER AREAS</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO FIXED WORK</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13158</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3413</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: (i) The figures given above for the distribution of Black work are estimates. The figure for the total number of Black workers was obtained from the Department of Non-European Affairs. The distribution of Black employees was calculated on the basis of the known number of Blacks working in the industrial areas and on the number of Blacks working for the Government, S.W.A. Administration and Municipality.


and 1985 projections, which anticipated total employment of 43 100 and 54 100 respectively, on constant percentage distributions by area (Municipality of Windhoek 1978:19).

a) The Employee Survey
This section investigates labour conditions and employment structures in the firms being studied. It focuses on absolute and relative wage levels, their consequences and interrelationships with other variables such as race, sex, age, service period, occupational structure, education and skills. It has added importance because of the lack of reliable or regular information on wages and working conditions in Windhoek, or Namibia as a whole; such data as are occasionally published are fragmentary, often unreliable averages or estimates, and seldom related directly to the cost-of-living at the time (e.g.
Kane-Berman 1972; Financial Mail 1973:49-54; Gordon 1977; ILO 1977; O'Callaghan 1977; South African Labour Bulletin 1978; Cronje and Cronje 1979). Each firm interviewed in the economic change survey discussed above was asked to provide profiles of a 10% sample of their workforce, so as to obtain a good cross-section by race, education and skill level, service period, wage category and economic sector. The original intention of having 100% coverage was abandoned for lack of time and resources. All employers refused direct access to their staff records and permission for workers to be interviewed during business hours. It was therefore necessary to obtain the relevant information from the employers during the interview or leave the forms to be completed in their own time. In most cases this was straightforward, as managers and directors know their staff personally, although this is not always true of unskilled black labour. A few respondents refused to give any particulars or provided only general information. Some larger firms gave details of less than 10% of their staff.

These factors had two adverse effects on the data base. Firstly, the sampling fraction was not uniform, and secondly, there was no way of controlling for subjectivity or deliberate bias on the part of the employers. They were asked to provide a representative sample reflecting the structure and skill levels, ethnic composition and service periods of their staff - but there is some reason to believe that this was not always done, especially if unskilled workers were poorly paid. Usable data were obtained on 220 staff employed by 35 firms, and these form the subject of analysis here. While thus not forming a strictly random or systematic sample, they are adequate to illustrate the important trends and structural relationships (cf. Colby, Ditzian and Waxmonsky 1977).

92 (42%) of the employees were white, 60 (27%) coloured, and 68 (31%) black. The fact that whites form the largest group and that no Basters were included in the 'Coloured' category suggest that the sample may (8) This reflects the extreme racial social distance, in terms of which interaction is limited to the workplace, and even then, on a rigid master-servant basis (structural social relations - Pendleton 1975). Another remarkable feature of Namibian firms is that only a handful have personnel managers, despite the existence of many large enterprises. Although the importance of such staff is being increasingly recognized, this situation is a result of the 'family enterprise' history of most Namibian firms, and an absence until recently of complex employment structures - a characteristic consistent with the territory's peripheral economic status.

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well not be truly representative. The 169 males comprised 77% of the sample. Employees were distributed across economic sectors as shown in
Table 7.17, with almost two-thirds in wholesaling and retailing. The average number of employees per firm was 6.3 (max.=24; min.=2). Several data transformations were performed to ensure comparability:

- Wages: Since most wages were given as monthly figures, all others were converted to monthly equivalents. Weekly wages were multiplied by a factor of 4.3 (roughly equivalent to 52/12), the most widely used method by the Windhoek business community, and fortnightly wages by a factor of 2.15. Hourly paid staff were restricted to some artisans in the engineering and construction sectors, and their wages converted on the basis of a 45-hour week. Most employers readily divulged precise wages; however, where only the relevant salary scales were provided, their mid-points were used as an approximation.

This analysis refers only to gross money wages, to avoid complications arising from the wide variety of deductions, fringe benefits or supplements e.g. hostel/accommodation fees, transport costs/company.

(9) The other variables on which information was obtained were occupational classification, ethnic group, sex, age, time with the firm, time in present job, highest level of schooling attained, subsequent formal education, non-formal education, frequency of payment, wage, suburb of residence, ideal academic and technical qualifications for the job. Unfortunately this was for the time of the survey only: no earlier comparative data were available against which to measure change.

TABLE 7.17 EMPLOYEES’ SAMPLE BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale, retail, accommodation,catering</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, communic.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance, business service,etc.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.18 OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF SAMPLE BY RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, owner, administrator</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional qualified</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical, skilled</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, secretarial qualified</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi- and unskilled manual (unqualif)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Distributions of occupational classification by race:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Semi- and unskilled</th>
<th>Non-manual (unqual)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 33.7</td>
<td>28 46.7</td>
<td>92 41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 8.8</td>
<td>65 29.5</td>
<td>220 99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 147.74; \text{df} = 10; \text{signif.} = 0.00\], i.e. distributions are significantly different. Nonparametric correl. co-eff. = 0.2363 *

Occupational Classification: Several potential problems were identified here. While analysis clearly requires the use of occupational categories rather than discrete job descriptions, the effect of occupation on wages depends on the number of categories used, and the way in which the catch-all ('other') group is treated (Colby, Ditzian and Waxmonsky 1977:250). A six-fold division was used to distinguish the essential element of concern in a situation of scarce skilled and surplus unskilled labour, namely the possession of formal or non-formal training (Table 7.18). This format also resembles closely that used by Municipal publications (e.g. Municipality of Windhoek 1978). Nevertheless, these categories embrace a wide range of jobs and wage-levels, so that care is necessary e.g. in category 5 those shown below to be living on or below the poverty datum line are primarily unskilled labourers.

a(i) Analysis: Use was again made of the SPSS package, initially to generate frequency distributions and descriptive statistics for each variable, and non-parametric correlation co-efficients for variable pairs. Non-parametric significance-of-difference tests were then carried out on variable pairs for which the correlation co-efficients were greater than + 0.5 or otherwise relevant.10

(10) Mann-Whitney, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, or Kruskal-Wallis tests, as appropriate. Unless stated, the 0.05 statistical significance level was used.

(1) The difference in the occupational distribution by race is statistically very significant, reflecting the hierarchical economic structure typical of southern Africa and indeed much of the Third World (Table 7.18). It emerges even more clearly with a finer classification - as in the example of one firm in the sample, which distinguishes 16 job groups on the basis of initiative and decision-making responsibility (Table 7.19). While coloureds have traditionally occupied an intermediate position between whites and blacks, a significant proportion of this group has experienced noticeable upward mobility in recent years as a result of skilled manpower shortages during the economic booms of 1968-73 and 1978-81 (see Chapters 5 and 6). This is illustrated in the degree of overlap evident between white and coloured in Tables 7.18 and 7.19. Very few blacks have been affected by these changes.

(2) The racial skill differentials are emphasized by the strong
correlation between race and level of schooling (0.7137) which is statistically significant. This is far stronger than the correlation between race and subsequent education (0.4406) because only 28% of the sample have post-school education. The same is true of the statistically insignificant co-efficient between levels of schooling and further education (0.4783).

(3) The distribution of wages by race is shown in Table 7.20. Even the overall distribution is skewed towards the lower side of the spectrum (the median lies in the R501-R600 class), reflecting the lower wages paid to many coloureds and especially blacks. These
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wage Group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-400</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-500</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-600</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601-700</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NB: Sample size = 220; wages of three individuals were missing

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discrepancies are evident from the separate racial wage distributions, and also the individual company profile (Table 7.19). The correlation of wages with race was high (R = 0.7050) and the difference in racial distributions highly significant. Reasons for these differences are complex and are discussed below.

In view of frequent evidence that poverty wages among blacks are the rule rather than the exception (e.g. Horrell 1967; ILO 1977; Winter 1977; O'Callaghan 1977; SALB 1978; Cronje and Cronje 1979; Moorsom 1979), the income data for blacks and coloureds were compared to the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) and Household Effective Level (HEL) figures for April 1981 (See Appendix B).

Of the 67 blacks for whom income is known, 29 (43%) fell below the HSL (R233.76) and 46 (69%) below the HEL (R350.64). 11 (19%) of the 59 coloureds with known incomes fell below the coloured HSL (R272.12), and 22 (37%) below the HEL (R408.18). 18.3% of the entire sample thus lay below the HSL and 31.2% below the HEL.

Virtually all the blacks were male semi- and unskilled manual workers, while the coloureds (mainly women) were both manual and non-manual workers.

In view of this alarming situation, more detailed analysis was undertaken. Many employers attempted to justify paying their black labourers very low wages on two broad grounds. Firstly, it was incumbent on employers to pay the R15 housing levy, or Hostel fees (Chapter 6), and usually part or all of the transport costs of their workers - which greatly increased the real value of earnings. Secondly, unskilled workers were 'stupid', 'lazy', or had 'terribly low productivity'. For example, the worst single case of exploitation, in which women bottle-sorters at a soft-drinks plant were paid R 58-60 p.m., was justified in terms of low productivity or enthusiasm, and particularly the fact that the women were all married, hence not the chief or sole breadwinner, and thus did not need so much money.

Examination of the black income data shows that 25 (86%) of the 29 earning less than the HSL were also below the Primary HSL of R210.69 (which excludes rent
and transport). Moreover, many large employers do not provide adequate transport for their black workers, carrying them standing, tightly packed in overcrowded and unprotected open lorries at minimal cost (Plate 7.1). The first argument is thus invalid.

With regard to the second argument, Selwyn (1975:60) has shown that many firms expect low productivity, thus pay poverty wages and then use the productivity argument to justify perpetuation of the situation. There can surely be no incentive for workers to improve their productivity at such low wages. Wilson (1975:535-536) argues further, that of the three major determinants of productivity, namely the worker's application and enthusiasm, the machinery to which he is attached, and overall managerial/entrepreneurial organization, the worker has control over only the first-mentioned; besides there is no necessary direct relation between productivity and wages. In contrast to the findings of Colby, Ditzian and Waxmonskey (1977) that migrant labourers in East London earn higher wages than resident blacks on grounds of higher productivity, migrants in Windhoek, who are mainly Ovambo, earn significantly less: employers regard their productivity and experience as lower and dislike their apparently irregular visits home. The Municipality of Windhoek supply average wage data for

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EL AM.
PLATE 7.1
Typical worker transport in Windhoek, and southern Africa in general. Note overcrowding and lack of passenger protection.
PLATE 7.2
The urban 'informal' sector - Ovambo basket sales in the CBD. The sellers are middle aged women minding infants.

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migrants and permanent residents, which show the former to be from 0% to 50% lower (Appendix C). These data confirm the wage levels found in this survey. Women frequently earn less than men for the same work (see below); the purported linkage of unskilled black women's wages to 'need' as determined by the employer is pure exploitation of an abundant unskilled resource (see also May 1979). The second argument is thus also invalid.

The mean wages for the total sample and its components discussed above, are given in Table 7.23, column 1. They all vary significantly from one another. The ratio of average white wage to average coloured wage is 2.2:1; that of coloured to black 1.8:1, and that of white to black 4.0:1. These ratios are similar to those suggested for all urban areas in Namibia (WA 31/7/81) and found to exist in the South African wholesale and retail trade (McGrath 1978:156), which is the most important element in this sample. While the ratio of racial average wages may in fact have declined since 1970, as in South Africa, it is likely that the absolute wage gap will have risen since the
mid-1970s (cf. Nattrass 1977:408-409). There is also no necessary direct relationship between a reduction in racial wage ratios, or an improvement in aggregate racial shares of income, and the distribution (11) A major problem in comparing wage ratios is the variety of bases on which these measures are calculated. For example, Cronje and Cronje (1979:43) mention an overall black:white ratio of 25:1 in Namibia in 1976. Such national figures are heavily skewed by low agricultural wages and unemployment. Comparison would require a similar sectoral balance. Some ratios are computed on a gross racial share of income basis, others per capita and others per recipient (e.g. Nattrass 1977; McGrath 1977, 1978). Keenan (1981b) reveals the misleading nature of many official statistics and claims based on them.

Moreover, as shown in Table 7.20, two-thirds of the blacks in this sample earn considerably less than R300 p.m., so that the average figure is distorted by a few high wages. The lowest white wage recorded was R17 higher than the average black wage, which itself lies between the HSL and HEL.12
Wage rates in Windhoek varied by sector, as shown in Table 7.24. Although the intersectoral differences for the whole sample were not statistically significant, those for individual race groups were. Note also that, whereas the highest average white and coloured wages were in transport and communications, the highest average black wage was in manufacturing.

(4) Women formed a 23% minority in the sample, and earned significantly less overall. Among blacks the difference was insignificant, except for those below the HEL. Among whites and coloureds, however, the differences, both overall and by income category, were significant (although there were no males below the HSL for comparison). In many cases the traditional sexual division of labour was operative, making direct comparison difficult, but where this was possible, women invariably earned less. Similar problems exist throughout the Third World (e.g. May 1979 on Zimbabwe). The proportion of economically active women in Windhoek is lower than that of men among both whites and coloureds (no separate figures by sex are available for blacks). Whereas the figure for white women rose from 23.8% in 1960 to 28.4% in 1975, the figure for coloured women fell from 49.1% to 33.1% over the same period (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:73). The last mentioned
percentage may not, however, be accurate (see Chapter 3). Many black and coloured women are engaged in domestic service rather than the formal sector, and are even worse off (see below). There is thus widespread wage discrimination, both by race and by sex.

(5) Among blacks, wages also varied significantly with age and length of service in the firm, although not with the length of service in the present job. For the overall sample, and white, and coloureds, none of these three factors was significant. The mean age, and service period in both the firm and present job (and standard deviation) for each relevant group is given in Table 7.23. For both blacks and coloureds there was virtually no difference on these variables between those earning below the HSL and below the HEL. Average service periods in all the groups were over three years, although in many individual instances periods of 2-6 months were recorded. The correlation between time in the firm and time in the present job was high for the entire sample (0.8004), but higher for blacks, especially those below the HSL (1.00) and HEL (0.9695), than for coloureds (0.710 and 0.7724 respectively). This suggests that semi- and unskilled blacks, in particular, tend to hold only one job per employer, and thus have virtually no intra-firm upward mobility. Wages are not highly correlated with service periods for these groups, suggesting that their wages do not rise proportionately over time.

(6) For the whole sample and for coloureds, wages varied significantly with the level of schooling attained, although this was not true among blacks. The average level attained was Std. 7 for the whole sample, Std. 9 for whites, Std. 7-8 for coloureds and Std. 3 for blacks. In both black and coloured groups there was roughly a year's schooling separating those with wages below HSL from those below HEL and from those above HEL. The correlation of existing qualifications (either formal post-school or non-formal) with ideal academic and/or technical qualifications for the positions presently occupied was extremely low for all groups, indicating a mismatch which reflects the chronic shortage of skilled labour in Windhoek, and Namibia as a whole. People are filling positions for which they have inadequate formal training, and are having to learn on the job, thereby adversely affecting productivity. Wages tended to be more closely related to the level of schooling attained than subsequent education, but this is chiefly a reflection of the widespread lack of subsequent education, especially among blacks and coloureds.

a(ii) Evaluation: Analysis of the data on modern sector employees has shown the existence of major structural discontinuities on every socio-economic variable.
considered. They are strongly interrelated, and can be summarized as the coincidence of race and class, although

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there is progressive blurring at the edges. DTA policy aims to hasten this process, stressing economic achievement (class) over race; but race remains the crucial independent variable, as that still determines the quality and level of education (not to mention life chances) an individual receives, and thus the ability to obtain a higher return on his labour in an environment of scarce skills. The

question of access to education and health services is the subject of Chapter 8. Unfortunately the lack of earlier comparative data on the sample has made this essentially a static analysis. There certainly appears to have been little improvement in working conditions for unskilled labour in the last few years, although real wages may have risen. This, in turn, is probably due to the effects of the 1971-72 contract workers' strike and increased international attention, rather than any endogenous factor (see Kane-Berman 1972; Gordon 1977; SALB 1978; Cronje and Cronje 1979:42-44, 77-89; Moorsom 1979).

In line with changing circumstances, racial discrimination is supposedly being removed from the workplace. The Private Sector Foundation launched a Code of Employment Practice during 1981, and politicians make periodic appeals for change and condemnations of 'outmoded practices'. Some firms have made sincere and successful attempts in this direction, especially subsidiaries of foreign and large South African corporations conscious of their image abroad.

However, they are still in a minority. Only one employer interviewed admitted that his firm had done little so far; the rest denied the existence of racial discrimination on their premises. The data above, and the regular race-specific vacancies advertised in the local press (even by firms in this sample) show otherwise.

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Wage increases for skilled labour have been very high indeed, whereas for the unskilled and some semi-skilled the increases have varied, in some cases above the rise in the consumer price index, and sometimes below. The 4:1 ratio of white to black wages reflects a few high black salaries rather than average earnings. An alarming proportion of this sample earn poverty wages, and many Katutura and Khomasdal residents have become poorer in real terms in recent years - as evidenced also by disease patterns, rising alcoholism (see Chapter 8) and unemployment. The dichotomy is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the
gulf between the 'lower middle class' and poor in Khomasdal (see Municipality of Windhoek 1981). Keenan (1981a) clearly demonstrates a similar process in Soweto, Johannesburg, where the economic boom of 1978-80 adversely affected the inhabitants. The 'trickle-down' effect of economic growth, so beloved of the business world and government, is a myth.
b) Public Sector Employment

The public sector warrants separate consideration in view of its importance as a source of employment in Windhoek, but the paucity of wage and employment data obtained perforce limits the depth of possible analysis.14 Table 7.25 shows the relative importance of private and public employment in 1975. The latter, taken collectively as Municipal, Railways, Government and SWAA, accounted for 10 824

(14) The form and complexity of employment records and wage structures, and in some cases security precautions, proved serious problems. The information presented here is largely descriptive, and was obtained during interviews with senior personnel in the relevant departments.

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TABLE 7.25
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT IN FIVE ECONOMIC SECTORS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Private</td>
<td>6 241</td>
<td>7 277</td>
<td>16,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>421’</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>20,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>1 420</td>
<td>1 364</td>
<td>-3,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; S.W.A.A.</td>
<td>2 546</td>
<td>3 856</td>
<td>51,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Servants.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10 633</td>
<td>13 002</td>
<td>22,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured &amp; Private</td>
<td>2 261</td>
<td>2 284</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baster Municipal</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; S.W.A.A.</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>126,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Servants</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>30,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 037</td>
<td>3 389</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Private</td>
<td>5 854</td>
<td>10 387</td>
<td>77,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>1 199</td>
<td>23,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>-8,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; S.W.A.A.</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>2 660</td>
<td>202,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Servants</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>2 125</td>
<td>150,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 491</td>
<td>17 229</td>
<td>81,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Working Private</td>
<td>14 356</td>
<td>19 948</td>
<td>39,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Municipal</td>
<td>1 443</td>
<td>1 748</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>2 391</td>
<td>2 250</td>
<td>-5,9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government &amp; S.W.A.A.</td>
<td>3 562</td>
<td>6 826</td>
<td>91,6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Servants</td>
<td>1 409</td>
<td>2 848</td>
<td>102,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23 161</td>
<td>33 620</td>
<td>45,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOTAL POPULATION INCREASE  50 711  74 349  46,6
Note 1) The 1968 information was extracted from the "Windhoek Town Planning Scheme Report, Volume I Civic Survey Information". Information in respect of the private sector was collected over the period 1/9/1968 to 31/5/1970.

(32.2%) of the total, having risen by 46.3% from 7 396 in the seven years since 1968. 5 725 (52.9%) of public sector employees were white, 382 (3.5%) coloured, and 4 717 (43.6%) black. The figures for whites and coloureds are given by occupational category in Table 7.15 (employment codes 1-4); comparable data for blacks are unavailable.

The Central Personnel Institution (CPI) has been the chief recruitment and staff administrative body for all government departments since its inception in 1979. One of its chief functions has been the establishment of the SWA/Namibia Government Service in terms of the Government Service Act, No.2 of 1980. It sets salaries and service conditions for both Central Government and the Representative Authorities, although the latter appoint their own staff. In view of these administrative changes no pre-1979 data were available for comparison, although Thomas (1978:205) put total public sector employment at 10 480 whites and 21 000 blacks and coloureds in 1976/77. The current total of such posts discussed in this section is roughly 46 000. Even without allowing for missing data on several parastatals, second tier and local authorities outside Windhoek, this would represent an increase of over 46%. As the Government Service is officially open to all races without discrimination, no statistics distinguish employees' race. No employment data for Windhoek or any other locality were available - the figures in Table 7.26 are guesstimates made from the respective totals by the CPI Director. The Civil Service has roughly 34 000 (including current vacancies), of which 28 000 (82%) are in the SWA/Namibia Government Service, 3 524

TABLE 7.26
CIVIL SERVANTS BY DEPARTMENT
Department Totel No in Posts Windhoek
Admin for Whites  8 114  4 800
Admin for Coloureds  706  500
Central Personnel Instlt.  104  104
Civic Affairs & Manpower  250  240
Economic Affairs  105  105
Finance  211  211
Justice  446  340
Agric & Nature Conservation  1 889  300
Health & Welfare  44  44
National Education  1 668  650
Constitutional Development  548  350
Water Affairs  1 282  400
Posts & Telecommunications  1 626  500
Transport  4 115  500
TOTAL  21 108  9 044

Precise data, supplied by this Department differ from these figures: Total (1978) = 2038; (1981) = 2055; Windhoek (1978) = 586; (1981) = 750.

NB: Data supplied for October 1980. Information on several Depts., eg. Police, Prisons and: Defence, is classified security material, and thus not supplied.
Source: Central Personnel Institution.

(10.3%) are seconded staff, and 2 700 (7.7%) 'guaranteed staff' 15

Despite the expansion of various departments and the entire government structure, it is claimed that only about 200 additional staff have been brought to Windhoek, 150 of these from elsewhere in Namibia. The 50 from South Africa were very senior personnel. Local staff have been used as part of a deliberate indigenization policy. While blacks and coloureds may now actually outnumber whites in the Civil Service, the powerful senior ranks are still dominated by whites, many of them seconded South Africans. One of the main obstacles to more rapid indigenization is the lack of suitably qualified Namibians, as long-standing Government policy restricted training and education (see Chapter 8).

Employment in other public bodies for which data were obtained, is shown in Table 7.27. The SWA system of the SA Railways and Harbours (now SA Transport Services) is still fully integrated with its parent, yet claims to have no racial discriminatory practices or wages. The Railways Staff College was opened to all races in August 1978. The SWA Broadcasting Corporation is a statutory, non profit-making body, which recruits its staff independently. Since its separation from its South (15) Seconded staff are South African civil servants who, at the inception of the SWA/Namibia Government Service, elected not to join, but stay on in the territory. Although given housing and a secondment allowance, they are not eligible for promotion and are to be systematically replaced as suitable local staff become available. 'Guaranteed staff' are those whose former jobs with certain SWAA departments now fall under the Government Service. The South African Government guarantees their position for 3 years from the inception of the Government Service (i.e. till 30th June 1983), by which time they must either join the Government Service, return to South Africa or retire.
OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
A) SWA System of the S.A. Railways & Harbours (now S.A.T.S.)
1979 1980 1981
Windhoek 4 748 4 948
Rest of Namibia 4 173 4 248 TOTAL 8 921 8 884 9 196
B) SWA Broadcasting Corporation
55 additional posts were created with the television in mid-1981.
C) Municipality of Windhoek (Dec 1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 007</td>
<td>1 007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.I</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>-1 499</td>
<td>1 832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I = semi- and unskilled
II = possessing secondary schooling and training certificate
III = qualified professionals
IV = top managerial (Dept. heads & deputies & Town Clerk.)

Source: data supplied by the respective bodies.

1978 1981
Windhoek 157 238
Rest of Namibia 50 165
Vacancies 30 116
TOTAL 237 4191

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African parent, the SABC, in 1979, all discrimination has officially
been abolished. In the Municipality of Windhoek a single set of work conditions
and salary scales were phased in after 1978. The transition appeared to proceed
smoothly, with little resistance, although some problems were being experienced
in introducing the compulsory pension scheme for unskilled workers.16
Serious problems are being experienced in filling existing posts
throughout the public sector, particularly in the higher ranks. The CPI attributes
this to competition with the private sector and
Municipality in particular, as they pay higher salaries; and also a perceptible
exodus of whites to South Africa because of dissatisfaction with political
developments, the escalating guerrilla war, and readily available jobs in South
Africa. Up to 1/3 of professional posts in the Municipality were vacant in 1980/1,
with little short term prospect of improvement; by contrast, 86.3% of its
Grade I posts were filled. Although slow upward filtering of coloureds and blacks
is beginning, whites still occupy most professional and all managerial jobs. The 7
Grade III staff who were not white were on the lowest 4 of the 15 applicable
salary scales. Most personnel departments, especially the CPI, foresaw the
possibility of having to lower the qualification requirements if the staff
shortage deteriorated much further, although they were concerned to maintain
standards. By 1982, 30% of public sector posts were vacant (WA 16/4/82:3).
(16) Low-paid workers, frequently with insecure job tenure, are commonly
loathe to accept deductions from subsistence wages, especially as the
purported benefit is uncertain and in the distant future.

No accurate picture of staff turnover in the civil service could be obtained in view
of continual transfers between Authorities during the period of reorganization.
In the Posts and Telecommunications Department it was over 27% p.a., in the
SWABC under 10% p.a. and in the Railways 15-19% p.a. The Municipality
believes its improved staff
conditions and desegregation lie behind the reduction of average annual turnover
among the semi- and unskilled grades from 74.5% p.a. between 1974 and 1977
to 30% in 1980.
There are over 600 different salary scales in the Civil Service and no
average wage data could be obtained. At the end of 1980 un- and semi-skilled
labourers' wages in the public sector ranged from R87.50
to roughly R300 p.m., a high proportion thus earning well below the April 1981
HSL figure (R87.50 is a mere 37.4% of the HSL).17
Personnel with Matric plus further training earned R283-R779 p.m., qualified
professionals R535-R1 732, and top managerial staff Ri 781 R2 525 p.m., the last-
mentioned representing the highest civil service salary.
While there does appear to have been some change in the public sector, full
evaluation would require more complete data. Most of the structural
observations made earlier with respect to the private
sector are equally valid here. Discrimination may officially have been removed,
but reality for the proletariat is little different. It is
(17) Unskilled black employees of the Administration for Whites earned
R78 p.m. but take-home pay was only R12.30-R19.03 after deduction of hostel
and transport fees and medical/pension contributions (WO 11/4/81).

unrealistic to expect skill and training levels to improve significantly in so
short a period, but unless rapid progress is made towards social equality and
paying all employees a living wage, class divisions will come increasingly into
focus. However, it seems
unlikely that any major changes in the present situation will occur before
independence. Many more white civil servants will probably return to South
Africa at that juncture; indeed, the Lusaka-based United Nations Institute for
Namibia is basing its civil service
training programme on the assumption of having to take over virtually the entire
bureaucracy at once (UNIN 1978). It should be possible to prune the Civil
Service significantly (see Chapter 4) thereby rationalizing the use of the
available manpower. If a more 'socialist' policy is followed after independence,
centralization will continue or
increase, making such a reduction unlikely. It seems, moreover, that colonial Civil Service arrangements in Africa frequently survive long after political independence (Bennell 1982).

8. LABOUR ORGANIZATION
If a well developed trade union movement is indicative of improved labour conditions by virtue of enhanced bargaining power, it is clear why worker exploitation in Namibia persists. Trade unions are still in their infancy, for several interrelated reasons. The first is the difficulty of organizing a largely proletarianized workforce in widely separated urban areas. This has been compounded by active employer and official resistance, especially from the mines, which are highly organized through the Chamber of Mines of SWA/Namibia. The build up and reaction to the 1971/72 Contract Workers Strike illustrates the

...point (e.g. Kane-Berman 1972; Cronje and Cronje 1979; Moorsom 1977b, 1979; SALB 1978). The third obstacle reflects the territory's economic structure, in that skilled (essentially white) workers are in short supply and have fairly strong bargaining positions, while increasing unemployment of un- and semi-skilled workers has rendered their position progressively weaker. The main labour legislation, the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, No.35 of 1952, specifically exempted farm and domestic workers, two of the largest groups of employees, from its provisions, and excluded blacks from the definition of 'employee', thereby denying them any legal protection. Unions were opened to all races by the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Proclamation, No. AG 45 of 1978, which also prohibited affiliation of unions with political parties and receipt or giving of financial assistance between them. Bonded contract labour and many of the other apartheid laws which indirectly affected black workers, have also been removed. The lack of closed shop agreements has impeded union formation, as non-members benefit from union gains without having to pay membership. There has been marginal improvement, and a willingness among a minority of employers in Windhoek to discuss employment conditions with union representatives, although this generally pertains to specific grievances of individual workers rather than broad negotiations on terms of employment.

In early 1981 there were 6 unions registered in terms of the Wage and Conciliation legislation, which entitles them to stop-order rights and Industrial Council membership along the lines of equivalent South African laws. They were the SWA Mine Workers' Union; Fishermen's Union of Lderitz; SWA Building Workers’ Association; SWA Typographical Union; SWA Municipal Staff Association, and Association of Government Service Officials of SWA (formerly the SWA Administration and State Employees Association). The first two operate entirely outside
Windhoek, while the third and fourth are insignificant and inactive. The Municipal Staff Association is effective, regularly achieving significant gains for its members. Together with the Mine Workers' Union and Association of Government Service Officials it forms an umbrella body, the SWA Confederation of Labour. White membership has always been compulsory by closed shop agreement with municipalities, and while now voluntary for existing black employees, it is compulsory for new ones. The Association had 1,800 members in mid-1981, 750 of them black; 1,000 members - half white and half black - were in Windhoek itself. The Association of Government Service Officials, registered in 1964, had suffered a decline in membership from its peak of 1,300 to 800 by mid-1981. This included 180 blacks. 300 of the total (including 130 blacks) were in Windhoek. The Association changed its name during the government reorganization; it has lost members through departures for South Africa among conservative employees, and 'defections' to the newly-formed rival Government Service Personnel Association, which was projecting a more progressive and non-racial image and was based within the Central Government rather than the Administration for Whites. The latter Association, though not yet registered and formed only in March 1980, claimed 700 paid-up members of all races, 80% of them in Windhoek, by mid-1981.

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Two other unregistered unions need mention. The Namibian Trade Union Council (NTUC) was established under the auspices of SWAPO-D in 1981. Membership appears very limited, although it claims some successes in redressing grievances in individual cases, and makes regular attacks on the existing labour dispensation (WA 10/12/81; 5/1/82; SWAPO-D 1981:3-4). The National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) was formed in the mid-1970s as the Namibian Workers Union (NAWU). It is affiliated to SWAPO, and as such has faced constant harassment and even imprisonment of its leaders. Although forced to operate more or less underground, it may well have the largest membership of any union in Namibia (no data are available). It has focused chiefly on the mines where many Ovambo migrant labourers, many being SWAPO members, are concentrated. Very recently a Domestic Workers' Association was formed in Windhoek to improve the lot of the most exploited sector of the urban workforce (WA 3/3/82; WO 20/3/82).

The Chamber of Mines of SWA/Namibia compiled a far-reaching set of proposals for a new non-racial labour dispensation in the territory, which included compulsory recognition of trade unions under certain conditions, and enabling rather than prescriptive legislation on employee and employer associations (Chamber of Mines 1980). Although enlightened, and a distinct improvement on existing arrangements, they appeared to favour class- and location-specific rather than national unions, and were not supported by existing unions (WA 12/3/81, 20/3/81; Republikein 12/3/81). All the registered unions, while now open to all races, are conservative and still
represent essentially the interests of semi- and skilled workers, who are predominantly white. The officials remain, virtually without exception, white, and some black members complain privately of being patronized. The role of unregistered unions, while potentially significant, has also not been great thus far. The entire union movement is still very small and fragile; the workers’ organizational revolution which has been underway in South Africa of late has not yet permeated to Namibia, where the vast majority of workers remain unrepresented and exploited.

9. UNEMPLOYMENT

No account of the urban economy would be complete without consideration of people and activities excluded from the modern formal sector. Structural unemployment and underemployment are features common to all Third World countries (and now increasingly to those of the First and Second Worlds as well). Colonial settler expansion generally required subjugation of the indigenous population, depriving them of their land-base and coercing labour onto settler farms. Even where plantation agriculture and indigenous cash-cropping were labour-intensive, they employed only a small fraction of the population. Labour migration to mines and growing urban areas increasingly provided the only means of survival and source of income necessary to pay colonial hut taxes and other levies. However, little industrialization occurred before World War II, as colonial political economy was based on supplying raw materials to, and purchasing manufactures from, the metropolitan countries (e.g. McGee 1971; Rodney 1972; Leys 1975; Fetter 1976, 1979; Howard 1978). Urban unemployment has thus been an inevitable consequence, especially as rural conditions are often so poor that people head for the cities (‘the bright lights’?) even though aware that formal job prospects are minimal.

In southern Africa, the process of proletarianization included restricting indigenous peoples to rural reserves covering a small proportion of the land area, and maintaining rigid control over rural-urban migration to prevent significant black urbanization and retain a rural ‘reserve army of labour’. Urban unemployment and underemployment were thus reduced, but displaced to the reserves, where rapid population increase further undermined peasant agriculture (see Maree 1978; De Klerk 1979; Dewar and Watson 1981 on South Africa; Clarke 1977 on Zimbabwe; Chapter 2 above; also Moorsom 1977, 1978; Gottschalk 1978; Simon 1982a, on Namibia). With abolition of formal influx control in Namibia in 1977 and escalation of the guerrilla war, more work-seekers and migrants’ relatives did flock to the cities, thereby making the extent of the problem more visible and politically relevant. Existing urban unemployment was aggravated, while overcrowding in the Katutura Hostel and Single Quarters occurred. Violence erupted between SWAPO and DTA supporters...
squatting and stock theft occurred in peri-urban areas (see Chapter 6; also Focus 1978:7; WO 28/10/78).

By 1980 the problem had assumed such proportions that the Ministers Council appointed a special committee to investigate possible solutions. It made several potentially important short term recommendations, including encouragement of temporary employment on mines in the N.W. Cape and elsewhere in South Africa. Negative aspects of migrant labour, coupled with South Africa's own unemployment problem, made this undesirable in the long run. It also favoured giving preference to local commerce and industry in filling public sector contracts, promotion of labour-intensive maintenance works and construction methods, adoption of more appropriate building and amenity standards, implementation of fiscal incentives (tax rebates, etc) to encourage labour-intensive employment, farm jails to provide ready labour for farmers and remove competition with urban work-seekers, and stricter control of immigration to Namibia by unskilled labour from outside. Medium and long term proposals included adoption of appropriate technology, training promotion, small business incentives, gradual import substitution - especially of staple foods and widely-used consumer goods, family planning campaigns, economic decentralization and co-ordinated labour policies (Ministers Council 1980; WA 3/10/80). Little detail was included on the longer term recommendations; some short term ones, notably export of labour and 'appropriate' flexible standards seem potentially retrogressive or likely in effect to maintain the status quo. Although most of these proposals were accepted by the Ministers Council, little evidence of their implementation is thus far apparent.

Unemployment is deteriorating, and receives increasingly frequent press coverage (e.g. WA 24/3/81; 24/4/81; 30/10/81; 6/1/82; 5/5/82; Republikein 21/5/81; WO 9/1/82). One report suggested a national unemployment rate of 18.1% in mid-1981, i.e. 75 000 out of the 415 000-strong labour force (cf. 10% in 1977/8), but 27.7% if underemployment is included (WA 7/8/81:1). Although no data on the structure of unemployment are available, it is a problem exclusive to un- and semi-skilled labour. There has also been police action against unemployed 'vagrants' in Windhoek suspected of having been responsible for rising crime (WA 11/3/82; 19/3/82; WO 20/3/82). Between 70 and 100 men congregate daily at the Municipal Labour Bureau near Katutura, while others search for jobs in the city. During working hours, many hundred unemployed men and women of all ages are evident in Katutura, often patronizing illegal shebeens. The attendant social problems are profound (Chapter 8), yet there is little hope of improvement in the foreseeable future.

10. THE URBAN 'INFORMAL SECTOR'
a) Introduction

In a situation of widespread unemployment, underemployment and insecurity of job tenure, people have to devise alternative sources of income. The wide range of activities engaged in are both legal and illegal, but have come to be known by the generic term 'informal sector' by virtue of their one common characteristic, namely operating outside the formal economy, with its established procedures and regulations. Their importance has been increasingly realized in recent years and various aspects of their operation studied around the world, precisely because it became clear that formal (modern) sector employment was structurally incapable of absorbing all work-seekers. Apart from a wealth of micro- and macro-scale empirical studies on the nature, scope, extent and relative importance of one or more such activities, a vigorous theoretical and definitional debate has arisen on the subject. One approach draws on notions of a dualistic economy and distinguishes a simple 'formal/informal' or 'upper circuit/lower circuit' dichotomy akin to the 'traditional/modern' divide (ILO 1972; Santos 1979; Truu and Black 1980; Zarenda 1980). Inherent conceptual

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and practical difficulties have given rise to alternative perspectives, suggesting the mode of production engaged in (McGee 1977; Gerry 1978) or income-earning opportunities (Hart 1973; Bromley and Gerry 1979) as more relevant. There is also debate, particularly from the neo-Marxist perspective, as to whether 'petty commodity production' is a subordinate form of the capitalist mode of production or a separate mode (Moser 1978; Roberts 1978; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Matsetela et al. 1980; Forbes 1981a, 1981b). Analysts from various perspectives have increasingly sought to develop analytical continua in terms of form of organization, technology, scale of operation (Dick and Rimmer 1980), firm size (Dewar and Watson 1981), or income-earning opportunities, ranging from stable wage work to true self-employment, with security of income and employment as critical variables (Bromley and Gerry 1979). The ILO appears to be adopting a similar approach itself now: "A small enterprise is ... one in which the operational and administrative management lie in the hands of one or two people who are also responsible for making the major decisions of the enterprise."

(ILO 1982:3).

Attitudes to 'informal' activities changed simultaneously with the new awareness, from the overwhelmingly negative conventional wisdom of the 1950s and 1960s which sought to suppress them as 'bad', 'illegal', 'black market', 'parasitic' or 'unhygienic', to optimism that 'informality' held the key to large scale employment provision using spontaneous initiative, skills, existing resources, educational levels, and so on. The ILO was particularly influential in this. Many more recent empirical studies have tended to show, however, that while
this 'sector' does have positive aspects in terms of employment, incomes and provision of goods and services for which demand exists, it is no panacea. Average enterprise size is small, working conditions hard, income unstable and sometimes marginal, and growth potential low (Chana and Morrison 1975; Lubeck 1977; Maasdorp and Pillay 1978; Dewar and Watson 1981; Kennedy 1981; Elkan et al. 1982). Still others regard the sector as subservient to, and exploited by, the State and international capitalist economy. It is characterized by poverty, hardship and stagnation (Le Brun and Gerry 1975; McGee 1979; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Santos 1979; Matsetela et al. 1980; Forbes 1981a, 1981b). While it is not proposed to enter this theoretical debate here, the important consensus emerging from the disagreement is that there are indeed strong linkages between 'formal' and 'informal' enterprises. The debate on the nature of such bonds has rested more on theoretical or philosophical position than empirical research to date (Simon 1981), and this study seeks to pursue this aspect, together with income and employment potential, in contemporary Windhoek.

It is very difficult to establish the number or proportion of people engaged in 'informal sector' activities by virtue of their very nature, and suspicion of questioning by outsiders. Estimates vary widely from place to place, but suggest 25-50% of urban employment in major cities in Africa and elsewhere, but only 10-20% in South African black townships (Chana and Morrison 1975:121; Rogerson and Beavon 1980:183; Dewar and Watson 1981:61). Recent research suggests that the latter proportion might be as high as 33% (Matsetela et al. 1980; Rogerson and Beavon 1982). Katutura almost certainly fits into the lower range, but only 3% of Khomasdal's economically active population admit to being thus active (Municipality of Windhoek 1981).

b) The Windhoek Survey

Familiarity with the area and initial reconpaysance were used to determine the variety and relative importance of the different activities as the basis for a sample survey. Structured interviews were conducted by an assistant with personal contact among 'informal, traders and knowledge of several indigenous languages. 25 had been completed on a stratified random basis by May 1981 when a combination of factors, most notably police harassment of 'illegal' traders, forced curtailment of the survey. As a result, services are underrepresented, especially through exclusion of motor repairs, an important local activity. q of the 25 enterprises (S%) were retail distributive only, 13 (SI%) were combined production and retail sale, 1 (4%) was both production and a service, and there were two services
They were divided as follows: 8 food and drink (including 2 shebeens); 7 arts and crafts; 7 other consumables; 4 durables; 1 personal service (see Appendix D). Retail trade, especially hawking, is frequently the dominant form of activity (e.g. Chana and Morrison 1975; Matsetela et al. 1980; Dewar and Watson 1981; Rogerson and Beavon 1982). The spatial distribution of the various activities reveals Katutura's pre-eminence, although sales in central Windhoek and production elsewhere were also significant (Table 7.28). Apart from one case of dried fish brought from Walvis Bay, the last-mentioned involved

TABLE 7.28
LOCATION OF ACTIVITIES BY TYPE AND AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Sale</th>
<th>'Services</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khomasdal</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katutura</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek (central)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Windhoek</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.29
SOURCE OF GOODS/RAW MATERIALS

| Formal sector fixed source | 10 |
| Formal sector variable sources | 11 |
| Informal sector fixed source | 0  |
| Informal sector variable sources | 4 self-made/collection | 7 |
| TOTAL                     | 32 |

TABLE 7.30
METHOD OF SALE

| Using fixed premises/site with display | 6 |
| Using fixed premises/site without display | 9 |
| Using variable premises/sites with display | 4 |
| Using variable premises/sites without display | 4 |
| Unknown | 1 |
| Services | 1 |
| TOTAL | 25 |

baskets or carvings produced in the northern 'reserves' and sold in Windhoek. The total of 38 activities reflects vertical integration of successive stages of the productive process in 13 enterprises. Hawking generally occurred along busy pedestrian routes or at major nodes such as bus termini, shopping centres in central Windhoek, or the Katutura Hostel entrance, although it did have a fairly scattered distribution in Katutura (as in South African black townships - Dewar and Watson 1981; Rogerson and Beavon 1982:260). This reflects the paucity of retail outlets, and the low range of goods offered in the townships. Hawking was particularly important in the new ‘Soweto’
extensions (see Chapter 6), where no shops yet existed, and from where the Katutura shopping centre was up to 2.5km away. They were thus fulfilling a real need in filling the vacuum. Some Katutura shop owners even set up illegal 'depots' in garages and yards in the area to meet the demand from their regular customers, in the face of severe official harassment and imposition of heavy fines. They did not complain of competition from hawkers. Shebeens were run in one or more rooms of private houses, and occurred throughout Katutura and most of Khomasdal. In some areas, as many as 1 in 2 or 3 houses contained shebeens, so that competition must have been strong. Illegal liquor brewing and sale is one of the oldest 'informal' activities among southern African urban blacks because of the initial prohibition on legal sales of liquor to them (Matsetela et al. 1980; Rogerson and Beavon 1982). Production of goods took place in the operators' homes or the site where their wares were sold, if different.

Central to analysis of 'formal'/informal' sector linkages are the questions of whether they are benign or exploitative (i.e. whether any real benefit accrues) and secondly, whether 'informal' enterprises are evolutionary or involutionary i.e. whether they are capable of growth and diversification if constraints are removed and promotional policies adopted (Tokman 1978). Dewar and Watson (1981:46) suggest the answer to the latter question to lie in the distinction between 'productive' profit-oriented and 'subsistence' enterprises. These in turn reflect the motives for operation discussed below.

Respondents were asked the origin and method of procurement of the goods they sold and/or materials used in production of goods, the destination of goods or services and method of sale used. Purchases from the 'formal' sector provided the major method of supply, with operators making use of fixed and variable sources in equal proportions (Table 7.29). Production or collection of inputs by the operators themselves (and sometimes kin) - mainly wood and grass for crafts and firewood - was also significant, although intra-'informal' sector trade was surprisingly unimportant. In all cases the products and services were sold direct to the final user, as would be expected with such a predominance of retail distribution activities. Nevertheless, a variety of sales techniques were used, depending on the nature of the particular product (Table 7.30). Fruit and crafts, for example, would be displayed on the ground or on upturned crates or boxes (Plate 7.2), sometimes in regular (fixed) locations and sometimes in different locations, while food products, e.g. vetkoek (fried batter cakes), sweetmeats, etc, might be displayed in similar fashion or sold from the producer's house. Shebeens (illegal liquor houses) were common, and served a regular local clientele, but were not advertized or displayed, to avoid drawing the authorities' attention to the houses concerned. Newspapers, some crafts, watches and jewellery were vended on foot, especially in the CBD, without display.
Linkages between 'formal' and 'informal' sectors are thus generally tenuous and not exploitative. There are two possible exceptions: firstly, shebeens, some of which buy exclusively 'White Man's' liquor from bottle stores in the CBD or surrounds, may be paying substantially more than white customers for equivalent quantities. Although the basic price may not be raised, discounts (which can be substantial) are not usually given, according to casual enquiries from those in the trade. On the other hand, shebeens generally mark up prices by at least 100% on purchase costs, by virtue of risk and convenience, and thus make large profits. The second case involves the men hawking apples and other fruit. Although they all claimed to be solo operators who had purchased their own fruit, there is reason to suspect that some, at least, are organized (in 'disguised wage work') or employed by one or more grocers. This is likely to take the form of a low 'piece-wage' or proportional commission to avoid losses, and would represent the only known case of 'formal' sector organization (with likely exploitation) of 'informal' traders, as described from other Third World cities (e.g. Le Brun and Gerry 1975; Lubeck 1977; Forbes 1981a, 1981b). 'Informal' traders are, however, in competition both with one another and 'formal' outlets for clientele (cf. Kennedy 1981) but are also instrumental in supplying commodities in a complementary way in the 'Soweto' section of Katutura where no shops yet exist.

c) Personal Characteristics of Participants

There were a mere 40 people engaged in these 25 enterprises, giving a mean of 1.6 and a range of 1 to 5 (Table 7.31). This is extremely low but corresponds very closely with the findings of many other studies.

<p>| TABLE 7.31 |
| NUMBER BY SEX AND NATURE OF PARTICIPATION |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>full-time</th>
<th>part-time</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10(+5-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13(+5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two enterprises employed an unspecified number of additional part-time women. From the nature and scale of the particular activities, it could be fairly safely estimated that they number no more than 4 or 5.

| TABLE 7.32 |
| AGE BY SEX |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Age | Men | Women | TOTAL |
| under 20 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| under 30 | 8 | 4 | 12 |
| under 40 | 5 | 6 | 11 |
| under 50 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| over 50 | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 17 | 11 | 35 |
TABLE 7.33
LENGTH OF JOB TENURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5 years</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10 years</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15 years</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20 years</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20 years</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e.g. Chana and Morrison 1975:128; Maasdorp and Pillay 1978; Dewar and Watson 1981:65). The last-mentioned, which covered a variety of areas in Cape Town, showed 66% of enterprises to be 1-man operations and only 4% to employ more than 3 people, while in Windhoek 17 of the sample (68%) fell into the former category and 1 into the latter (4%). Participants were evenly split by sex, with 57.5% women and 42.5% men (Table 7.32). There was a notable sexual division of labour, as is common in Third World cities (cf. Rogerson and Beavon 1982:260), with men responsible for all the construction-related activities, vehicle and equipment maintenance, newspaper vending, woodcarving, private taxis, and most fruit hawking. Women monopolized shebeens, basket weaving, doll-making and predominated in making and hawking food products. In many respects, these are extensions of 'traditional' domestic roles. However, the women are significantly older than the men, a fact suggesting that men probably go out to work earlier than women, who possibly have to care for children at home. They can thus only engage in home-based activities, whereas older women are able to work more freely, to supplement their husbands' earnings or have an independent source of income (Plate 7.2). This view is supported by the fact that 82% of the men, but only 35% of the women, were involved full-time. Of the 25 people actually interviewed, 13 (52%) were engaged in their 'informal' activity daily all day, and another 5 (20%) daily part-time. Twenty two (88%) held no other job at the time. In fact, 57% of the participants for whom information is available had never worked in the 'formal' sector. Of the remainder, 13% had been domestic servants and 7% each labourers, teachers and farmers.

18 of the interviewees (72%) had done their present work for under 5 years, (10 of them, indeed, for 1 year or less), while 4 (16%) had over 20 years' experience in the same job (Table 7.33). Although there was no significant relationship between job tenure and level of formal education, those with no formal schooling had generally been in their current occupation for a number of years and were, with one exception, over 35 year old - most over 50. 8 respondents (32%) had no formal schooling, 7 (28%) some primary schooling and 8 (32%) some secondary schooling, while 2 (8%) had reached unknown levels in mission schools. Only 6 (32%) had additional technical or practical training. Given the participants' low average level of formal education, the
fact that 84% said their incomes were irregular, and 18 (72%) felt their job to be insecure or only fairly secure and their relatively short average job tenure, it seems irrefutable that there has been increasing pressure on people to engage in marginal economic activities in the last few years. Unfortunately 80% of the respondents refused to divulge precise income data, thus making direct comparison with formal sector wages difficult. Many women aimed mainly to supplement family income, not at full-time employment, so that comparison is further handicapped. However, in a situation of poverty, any income is better than none. Moreover, 12 (48%) of the respondents expressed a desire to obtain 'formal' sector work, while the majority (18) Only 1 primary pupil has completed Std.5 (the highest primary level) and no secondary pupil, Matric (school leaving).

(19) Some, e.g. shebeen owners, as a result of official and police harassment, and others because of competition or irregular incomes.

of those who preferred to remain in the 'informal' sector said that it was all they were able to do, in terms of training and experience, or that it provided a necessary supplement to the head of household's income.

d) Evaluation
It is clear that roughly equal numbers of men and women of all ages engaged in 'informal' sector activities in Windhoek, although a fairly well defined sexual division of labour existed. In most cases, they had only primary or no formal education, which undoubtedly contributed to the fact that over 50% preferred to continue their present jobs through what they perceived as a lack of alternatives. Job tenure varied, with 24% having over 10 years' experience in their 'informal' sector activities, although 64% had under 5 years' experience. Almost all enterprises employed one or two people at most, with irregular income, insecurity and sometimes harassment as constant hazards. While goods and inputs are frequently bought from the 'formal' capitalist sector, products are sold to the final user. There is thus low 'linkage' and (with a few possible exceptions) no evidence to support the exploitation hypothesis, or, as suggested by Rogerson and Beavon (1982:263), that 'informal' activity is functional to the State in reducing the urgency of social welfare provision. Windhoek is a small city; its 'informal' sector, though expanding rapidly now, is still 'underdeveloped' in comparison with its counterparts in larger cities, and operates at a level unlikely to make any significant impact at that scale. Official harassment is still the rule, not the exception.

The Windhoek data do lend clear support to the hypothesis that recent 'informal' sector growth is primarily a survival mechanism in the face of rising unemployment and falling real incomes for unskilled workers. The underlying causes are thus rapid population growth, Namibia's
economic structure and educational system, and, to a lesser extent, the effect of
drought and war (see Wilsworth 1980 and Keenan 1981a for other survival
strategies in South African townships). It may offer an alternative to direct wage-
labour exploitation (Lubeck 1977), although the high proportion of participants
desirous of 'formal' sector jobs
suggests that this is not the major consideration. There is also no sign of
significant mobility between 'sectors'. As long as many participants desire
'formal' jobs or aim to supplement family incomes, the growth potential of
individual enterprises seems low.
Nevertheless, more positive policies could prove important (Simon 1982b). The
situation is not good, but one must agree with other recent findings (Chana and
Morrison 1975; Kennedy 1981; Dewar and
Watson 1981; Elkan et al. 1982) that underemployment is better than
unemployment, subsistence preferable to starvation.
11. CONCLUSION
This Chapter has examined the major elements of Windhoek's political economy
in some detail. While the time period concerned may be too short to reach firm
conclusions, it is clear that no major changes have occurred since 1977. The
general economic indicators showed
cyclical fluctuations to be the major source of variation, although the indirect
effects of rising real incomes accruing to skilled and some semi-skilled workers
were significant. The divide between

-proletariat and middle class is widening: unskilled wages have fallen behind the
cost of living, and structural unemployment is becoming
more serious and more evident. To some extent this is a consequence of
Namibia's structural dependence on South Africa, which was shown to be
very strong in economic terms; but at a wider level the phenomena are replicated
throughout the Third World, including South Africa itself.
Businessmen in Windhoek refer to increasing black and coloured purchasing
power as the most important effect of socio-political change, which itself has
removed discrimination and increased
pressures for equality of opportunity. However, analysis showed these changes to
be generally superficial. Discrimination is less overt, but
not significantly reduced in practice; it may be based increasingly on class rather
than explicitly race in future. However, these schisms correspond closely. Rising
unemployment has reduced the bargaining power of the largely unskilled labour
force which is, in the main, not represented by effective unions. At the same time
it reduces the need for employers to improve wages and working conditions and
increases
their ability to 'hire and fire' if wage demands are pressed home. While skilled
employees have strengthened their position, a high proportion of labourers earn
wages inadequate even for subsistence.
Poverty in Windhoek is real and widespread. This study has shown that people have increasingly turned to 'informal' or petty trading as a survival strategy. There was scant evidence of these activities being a 'capitalist plot', as research elsewhere has suggested, but equally clearly the arguments used by business interests and government that the benefits from economic growth 'trickle down' to the entire population, are unsupported by these findings.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Before Zambian independence, "Schools, roads, hospitals, shops and the goods in them, hairdressers, cinemas, newspapers had all been developed to cater to the needs of the white population. In some cases parallel but inferior services existed for black people; but in only a few cases had services been shared in such a way that a mere change in government could make them equally available to both races."

(Harvey 1976:136)

The applicability of this contention to Namibia, and Windhoek in particular, is further demonstrated in this chapter, which analyzes relative access in three closely related aspects of the urban social formation which have been the most resistant to change. Given changing circumstances, some whites have been prepared to tolerate mixed residential areas and, to a certain extent, workplaces and public amenities. But where close or intimate contact is involved, as in the classroom, hospital ward or swimming pool, opposition has been overwhelming. Education, in particular, is seen as the essential means by which each ethnic group transmits its unique culture to the youth. Mixed schools would threaten and dilute white cultural exclusivity, according to the politicians orchestrating resistance. This makes education a highly emotive and political issue, as was clearly demonstrated during the 1980 Namibian ethnic election campaign, which the National Party of SWA fought on a platform of preserving segregated schools (National Party of SWA 1980).

While this attitude suggests rather more about the fragility than strength of white culture, the implicit and fundamental issue is that equal access to education would hasten competition with whites for skilled jobs, and thus threaten the monopoly by means of which continued white superiority and political power have been built and thus far retained. This point was amply demonstrated in the previous chapter. As will emerge below, investigation of the themes covered here necessarily goes beyond the scope of conventional geographical analysis. However, the exceedingly poor data base, political sensitivity and lack of change, provided severe limitations.

2. EDUCATION
   a) National Background

This section analyzes the position of education in Windhoek since 1977, against the background of increased pressure for change and determined white resistance to integration. After brief sketches of
the national situation and relevant legislation, data on formal schools are examined and the role of private schools discussed. Structural change is shown to be occurring as a prelude to independence in the creation of tertiary institutions, while non-formal facilities are arising at the lower end of the spectrum.

As discussed in Chapter 2, racially segregated and differential formal education originated with the Missions in the early years of German control. The central tenet of education policy from then till at least 1977 was that blacks were to be trained solely for subservient jobs under white control. Its key role as a pillar of apartheid is thus explicit: "The most difficult problem for all nations owning colonies is the problem of educating natives for work. The value or uselessness of colonies depends on the correct solution to this problem. In this task, colonization by the state and mission by the church meet with one another, though with respect to the method of education there are several different opinions, depending on the attitude held towards the natives."

(D. Buchner, Mission Director, Berlin 1905, quoted in De Vries 1978:81)

Although there was some common interest between church and state, and schools were segregated, De Vries (1978:81-82) does point out that mission education frequently did not serve settler interests, being 'first and foremost for the benefit of the pupil himself'. As South Africa further systematized and entrenched its education system in Namibia, conflict with the missions increased. Today they are in the vanguard of resistance to SA rule, and have been responsible for most formal education in the northern homelands. Wellington (1967:292-349), O'Callaghan (1977), Thomas (1978:199-204), Bertelsman (1979), Melber (1979), Leu (1980), and Katzao (1981) analyze the Namibian education system and policy in detail, showing clearly the differential facilities, financial expenditures, percentage enrolments and pass rates between whites, coloureds and blacks. While education until the age of 16 has long been compulsory for whites, this is not true of coloureds and blacks. Total coloured and black enrolment is rising rapidly, but the drop-out rate between standards (forms) is high, especially in secondary schools, for a variety of social and economic reasons. Thus in 1975 a mere 71 of the 133 581 black school population were in Matric, and 74.1% of the total were in the lower primary classes (Sub-A, Sub-B, Std.1, Std.2). For coloureds the figures were 55, 10 171 and 55.8% respectively, for Basters 58, 6 172 and 54.1%, and for whites 1 200, 23 500, and 36.7%. Per capita expenditure on black school children was R68.38, on coloureds and Basters R163.00 and on whites R614.94 (Thomas 1978:200-202).

The early history of Windhoek's educational facilities was outlined in
Chapter 3. The churches have continued to play an important role there, despite the large state school system, and are the main force seeking to desegregate schools (see below). Nevertheless, the school system remains substantially unchanged.

b) Legislation

The Bantu Education Act, No.47 of 1953, forms the basis of Namibia's black education system, together with amendments in terms of the 1959 Bantu Affairs Act and Government Notice No.116 of 1962. Separate systems were devised for each race group and administered by different departments (O'Callaghan 1977:99-115). This is still true today, despite some changes in 1980, and a major obstacle to obtaining or comparing accurate overall data. The Coloured Persons in South West Africa Education Act, No.63 of 1972, governed coloured education while the Education Ordinance, No.21 of 1975, consolidated that for whites in accordance with principles of 'Christian National Education'.

Separate laws applied to each ethnic group. The following important legislative changes have occurred since 1977:

(1) In January 1978 overall control over white education was transferred from the South African Minister of National Education to the Administrator-General in terms of the Executive Powers (National Education) Transfer Proclamation, AGI of 1978.

(2) After sustained pressure from the churches and the AG, the SWAA amended the 1975 Education Ordinance in April 1978, to allow private schools to admit pupils other than whites. However, the SWAA does not pay these schools the R16 per capita monthly subsidy in respect of black pupils, and there have been acrimonious wrangles over various policy issues (see below).

(3) The Examination Board of South West Africa Act, No.6 of 1979, established a board "...to place education in schools on an equal basis in respect of courses of instruction and syllabuses and to conduct or arrange examinations..." (South West Africa 1979b:4)

This was heralded as a major step towards eliminating racial discrimination by the DTA, and indeed forms the basis of operation for the Department of National Education (see below); however, its provisions made no mention of white education, which remains a jealously guarded segregated sanctuary.

(4) One of the functions delegated to the 11 ethnic authorities in terms of the Representative Authorities Proclamation, AG8 of 1980, was responsibility for primary and secondary education. Tertiary education resorts under the first tier Department of National Education, which also has to ensure conformity to set standards by the ethnic
authorities. Each authority may request the Department of National Education to administer its educational affairs on an agency basis (see also Chapter 4; South West Africa/Namibia 1980a:36-42, 60-62; 1980b:6-11). Although most have elected to run their own, all black schools in Windhoek are, by agreement, controlled by National Education for greater efficiency. This is potentially important because they are thus implicitly desegregated; however, in reality, they have largely retained their single-ethnic origins. Although the Department of National Education is attempting to improve standards, they are still inferior to coloured and white schools, so that none of these groups would seek admission. Furthermore, the schools are overcrowded, and instruction in lower primary schools is in the mother tongue. Incumbent coloured and white politicians and the White Education Department, in particular, have opposed integration for political reasons because they fear upward filtering. Three authorities thus control government schools in Windhoek: National Education, and the Education Departments of the Administrations for Coloureds and Whites. This situation greatly exacerbated data compilation problems during fieldwork because of the incompatibility of the respective statistics, and the politically sensitive nature of education. The last-mentioned Department was particularly secretive and defensive.

(5) The Academy for Tertiary Education Act, No.13 of 1980, provided for the establishment of such a statutory institution in Windhoek to promote higher education within the Department of National Education (see below). The Act came into force on 1 September 1980.

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(6) The National Education Act, No.30 of 1980, provided for the provision and control of any education falling outside the Tertiary Academy and representative authorities, and setting free compulsory education for all Namibians between 6 and 16 as an ideal. It became effective on 1 April 1981. One of the Act's main purposes was to bring private schools, many of which were by this stage desegregated and in an anomalous situation with respect to the Administration for Whites, under the control of the Department of National Education, should they so wish. They could thus register and receive a state subsidy for all pupils regardless of race.

c) Formal Education in Windhoek 1975-1981

c(i) The Position in 1975: Windhoek's 1975 population included 17 034 scholars (Table 8.1). The proportion of scholars among coloureds and Basters had risen by 20% since 1968 to the point where it approximated that for whites. Coloured/Baster scholars formed a higher percentage of their total population than did white scholars because the former group was relatively younger overall (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:23). Significantly, both ratios for blacks are roughly half of those of the other races. The validity of these ratios and others cited below depends, however,
on the reliability of the census, and both the coloured and black populations were almost certainly underenumerated (Chapter 3).
While these figures suggest rapid improvement, at least for coloured children, the long term effects of differential education systems and socio-economic pressures which force pupils onto the job market at

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TABLE 8.1

SCHOLARS
IN WINDHOEK 1975
% of 5-19 % of racial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RACE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>age group</th>
<th>tot. pop*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>9 414</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col./Baster</td>
<td>3 052</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black*</td>
<td>4 568</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>17 034</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*permanent residents i.e. excluding contract migrants.


TABLE 8.2

ADULT EDUCATIONAL LEVELS IN WINDHOEK 1975*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male % Female %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal educ.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 6 or 7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 8 or 9</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 10 (Matric)</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher technical</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER</td>
<td>8 896</td>
<td>9 414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adult = 20 years and over. No data on black population available.
2Matric (Senior Certificate) is the school leaving certificate, obtained at the end of Std. 10, the final school year. Std. 10 is also referred to colloquially as Matric.


-younger ages, are clearly reflected in the distribution of educational qualifications in the adult population (Table 8.2).
Over half of coloured men and women had primary or no formal schooling, as opposed to 2-3% each among whites. Conversely, 58% of white men and 47% of white women had Matric or higher, as opposed to 7% and 3% of coloured men and women respectively. Men of both groups have higher average educational levels than women, which illustrates the male-orientation of
the society. Black educational levels are significantly lower than those of coloureds - hence the pervasive skilled labour shortage discussed in Chapter 7. The spatial distribution of educational levels among whites in 1975 reflects the social status of respective suburbs as indicated, for example, by the distribution of housing types (see Chapter 6, Figures 6.2-6.8) and German-speakers (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:21). Thus modal educational levels in Eros, Eros Park, Klein Windhoek North, Luxury Hill, the Administration area, Windhoek Central (West), Olympia and Pioniers Park are Matric for both men and women; in Klein Windhoek South, Avis, Windhoek Central (North), Windhoek West, Suiderhof and Academia, Matric for men and Std.8-9 for women; and in Windhoek Central (South), Southern Industrial Area, Windhoek South, Railways and Windhoek North, Std. 8-9 for both sexes (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:30). Only in the CBD did women have a higher modal level than men, Matric and Std.8-9 respectively, which probably reflects the many single female flat-dwellers there (see Chapter 5). The modal level in Khomasdal was primary schooling; and certainly still lower in Katutura. It seems likely that black and coloured migrants in former white areas (see Chapter 5) have educational levels similar to the modes in the respective recipient suburbs.

Educational levels in the employee sample (Chapter 7 a(i) 1 and 2) correspond closely to these data, but (if representative) suggest an improvement among coloureds, with a mean of Std.7-8, as opposed to Std.3 among blacks.

(c(ii) Schools 1977-1981: The 36 schools in Windhoek are distributed in accordance with the dictates of apartheid segregation as shown in Figure 8.1. Most black and coloured schools are thus readily accessible to their pupils - an important consideration, given the low mobility in Katutura and Khomasdal. However, until the opening of a junior secondary school in Katutura in 1977, all black secondary pupils had to attend the Augustineum (in Khomasdal), D6bra private school (on Windhoek's northern fringe) or go to the homelands. This reveals the low priority given to black urban education. Sites for future schools have also been allocated in new extensions to these townships. The number of coloured scholars was expected to fall by 13-18% over the 1978-1988 period, and that of blacks to rise significantly (Municipality of Windhoek 1978:20, 24-25, 36). Schools are fairly evenly spread in the former white areas, although English- and German-medium ones are clustered around the city centre because most were established early in the city's history. The greater number and suburban distribution of Afrikaans-medium schools reflects Afrikaner numerio~superiority. Afrikaans is the dominant home language.

FIGURE 8.1

DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN WINDHOEK
in all major areas except the CBD, Windhoek Central West and South, and Klein Windhoek (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:21-22). Klein Windhoek and Luxury Hill are undersupplied, with only one English-medium private school, but high car ownership by the numerically important German- and English-speaking groups here permits easy commuting to the centrally located schools. Olympia is currently the most underprovided suburb, with long travel distances required, although it has four sites zoned for future schools. In 1978 the Municipality envisaged that once all existing suburbs were fully developed, there would be demand for an Afrikaans primary school in Ludwigsdorf or Avis, a German primary school in Hochland Park and two Afrikaans secondary schools to serve Eros Park and Olympia-Suiderhof, while the German state secondary school would be enlarged and relocated to Olympia. Nevertheless, some significant excess capacity existed at the time (Municipality of Windhoek 1978:13-17). The number of white scholars reached 9 361 in 1971, a total surpassed only in 1975 (9 414) while the 1976 figure fell slightly to 9 366. Black and coloured school attendance increased annually, with totals of 4 852 and 3 313 respectively in 1976 (Municipality of Windhoek 1976:24).

More recent data were obtained from the respective education departments and school principals, to gain insights into trends and the quality of the various systems up to 1981 (Table 8.3). Black primary school enrolment in state schools rose steadily, reaching 6 044 by 1981, 32% more than the total black 1975 school-going population. The number of black secondary school pupils fell 12% in 1979, but had recovered by 1981 - a trend paralleled in the single private school. This probably reflects an exodus of SWAPO supporters.

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as a result of the 1978 Katutura disturbances (see e.g. SWAPO 1981:231-239). The decline in primary attendance at the private school reflects its gradual conversion to an entirely secondary school. Overall, coloured primary school attendance grew annually to over 3,000 in 1981, a 17% rise since 1977. Numbers at the single secondary school virtually doubled after 1977, despite a marginal drop in 1980, and illustrate the rapid coloured population growth rate.

White primary and secondary school attendances have fallen annually since 1978, to levels below those of 1976, although secondary attendance recovered slightly in 1981. Former white private schools declined in 1978 and 1979, but recovered a bit in 1980, as a result of increasing numbers of black and coloured pupils (see below). The most obvious explanation of these trends, substantiated by headmasters, is a decline in the white population through emigration to South Africa.

Many white children have traditionally been sent to secondary schools in South Africa for a perceived 'better' education, but the current decline is most marked in primary schools. This is further evidence that the exodus referred to in Chapter 4 has begun. High schools have probably been cushioned by more pupils being sent to Windhoek from rural areas (see Table 8.4 below). The only English-medium, and 2 of 3 German-medium high schools (including one private one) in Namibia are situated in Windhoek, and they anticipated increased enrolment in the next 2 years.

Drop-out rates during the course of each year varied widely, being higher in primary than secondary schools among blacks and vice-versa among coloureds and whites, because a larger proportion of the scholars reach secondary school (Table 8.3). The major trends were (1) a marked improvement at black primary schools, reflecting the strong desire for education; (2) rapid deterioration at black and especially coloured secondary schools, as a consequence of socio-economic circumstances and home environment. This accentuates the fall-off in numbers in the higher standards, and reduces the local
population's ability to fill more skilled jobs, while also representing a serious waste of educational resources.

Pass rates have improved in all state primary schools, especially those for blacks, but fluctuated in the private schools. They have improved in black secondary schools, remained steady in white ones and declined in the coloured one - for the same reasons as caused the high drop-out rate there. White school performance has continued at a high level, and that of blacks, while still inadequate, has shown significant improvement. The position at the coloured high school is cause for concern.

School facilities reflect differential educational investment (Table 8.4). There has been some improvement in the staff:pupil and classroom:pupil ratios in many cases, although at the coloured private primary and state secondary schools, the two ratios moved in opposite directions, as physical facilities did not expand with increasing enrolment. The former white private schools have the lowest ratios, and overall, the racially defined trichotomy in facilities and staffing levels has been but little blurred. Given the short time span and lack of reliable black population data for Windhoek (or elsewhere), it is impossible to say whether the proportion of black
children of school-going age at school has risen. Nor is it known to what extent rural children are sent to live with urban relatives to take advantage of better education facilities in Windhoek. The 1981 census results may help. Per capita national expenditure on education in 1980 was R1 042 for whites, R614 for coloureds and R148 for Basters.

The proportion of boarders provides an indication of the national, as opposed to purely local, function of Windhoek schools. Black and coloured state primary schools cater solely for local residents, and although the private schools have many boarders, a fair proportion are in fact local. The Augustineum, Namibia's leading black high school, has always been regarded as a showpiece of black education and bears little physical resemblance to other black schools. All its pupils are required to board, wherever their homes. White secondary schools have three times the proportion of boarders as primary schools, and both have risen by 2-3% over the past 5 years. Windhoek undoubtedly functions as the national centre for school education: the largest and best equipped and staffed schools are located here, as are the various education departments' headquarters.

Table 8.5 provides data on Windhoek's national educational importance, with a very high proportion of white pupils, both primary and secondary, and increasingly also of coloured pupils, in the capital. For black education it is still a proportionally insignificant centre. These figures reflect the geographic distribution of Namibia's population (see Chapter 2).
## PROPORTIONS OF NAMT1~TAN Sr-T~OOTS AW1) PTIPTIS TN WTW~TOEW 1 Q77.-81

### YEAR WHITE2 COLOURED BLACK3 AND CATEGORY SCHOOLS PUPILS SCHOOLS4 PUPILS SCHOOLS4 PUPILS

| Primary: Windhoek | 7 3 858 | 2 2 704 | 8 4 375 |
| Namibia         | 58 11 199 | - 8 646 | - 133 432 |
| W/N %           | 12.1 34.4 | - 31.3 | - 3.3 |

| Secondary- Windhoek | 8 3 834 | 1 580 | 2 1 274 |
| Namibia          | 18 8 405 | 25 | 2 923 | - 19 000 |
| W/N %           | 44.4 45.6 | 4.0 | 19.8 | - 6.7 |

### Notes:
1. State Schools only.
2. School for Handicapped omitted.
3. Windhoek totals 1977-80 are extrapolated from actual data on 6 schools (see Table 8.3).
4. Most of these are primary schools with junior secondary classes up to Std. 6, 7 or 8 as well. Only 2 senior secondary schools (i.e. to Matric) in Windhoek - one coloured and one black.

### Sources:
Computed from author's survey and data supplied by respective Education Departments.
c(iii) Private Schools and Desegregation: The private schools require separate consideration as they have moved consciously away from racial exclusivity. There are six altogether in Windhoek, four formerly for whites only and one each for coloureds and blacks. The latter two and two of the white schools are run by the Roman Catholic Church, one primary school by the Anglican Church, and one by the German community with assistance from the West German government. As part of a campaign since the early 1970s to integrate the congregations of these churches, pressure was exerted on the authorities to permit pupils of all races at their schools. The SWAA consistently opposed this, but reluctantly amended the Education Ordinance in 1978 (see above).

Three of the four schools had in fact already begun admitting black and coloured pupils in 1977; the fourth commenced in 1978. Numbers rose from 15 in December 1977 to 49 in 1978, 100 in 1979 and 163 in 1980, representing 11.1% of total enrolment in the four schools. There is a significant number of blacks at the Catholic-run school in Khomasdal, but the school for blacks remains effectively uniracial. These changes therefore affect only a tiny proportion of Windhoek pupils, and although annual increases can be anticipated, the intake is effectively restricted to those able to afford the school fees and, in the case of the German-medium school, those speaking some German. Many of the respondents in my residential mobility survey (Chapter 5) had children there, and they suggested that relatively few problems had been experienced, notwithstanding isolated exceptions. Their motives in sending their children there were chiefly the better education available than in segregated government schools, dislike of segregation in principle, proximity to their new homes and, in a few cases, also status. Principals claimed that there had been resistance to integration from only a small minority of parents; however, some children were not adapting easily to the higher tuition standards.

Private schools have been prevented by the SWAA and the Administration for Whites from participating in most sporting or cultural activities with white schools, on the grounds that interracial contact is against their express policy, which aims to preserve ‘white culture’ intact. Some state schools had been prepared to play sport with the private schools despite Departmental pressure, but a meeting between top Administration for Whites officials and a private schools’ delegation in September 1980 clarified the position: a series of pre-conditions had to be met and league matches were prohibited. This raised a storm of protest (WA 26/8/80, 10/9/80, 12/9/80, 7/10/80, 14/10/80, 24/10/80, 2/10/81, 12/2/82; Private Schools Delegation 1980; Republikein 9/10/80). Private schools have thus had to withdraw from some inter-schools leagues and competitions, but have begun to
organize rival activities with each other and non-school clubs. Staff from private schools are also precluded from membership of the SWA Teachers Union, which is dedicated to preserving Christian National Education (Suidwester 30/3/81; Republikein 3/4/81).

Similar conservative opposition from a section of the Windhoek City Council delayed erection of a R5m elite multiracial senior secondary school to be sponsored by Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) and controlled by the Department of National Education. The preferred site in Hochland Park satisfied all technical criteria but was opposed because of an uproar from white residents in adjoining Pioniers Park, fearful that it would attract blacks to live in the area. After much wrangling, a compromise site close to the original one was agreed on. Construction began late in 1981 (City of Windhoek 1981a, 1981b; Rand Daily Mail 16/1/81). The issue received wide press coverage (e.g. WA 19/5/81, 5/6/81, 15/7/81, 30/7/81, 3/8/81, 28/8/81, 2/10/81, 6/4/82, 17/5/82, 9/8/82; WO 16/4/81, 1/8/81; Republikein 14/4/81; Suidwester 14/4/81). It is, ironically, to be named 'Concordia College', after an early missionary name for Windhoek, and will probably intensify conflict between the Department of National Education and White Education Department since it represents the first direct involvement by the former in white secondary education.

The above analysis has shown that, while there has been a certain narrowing of the gap in educational indicators between races, the gross inequalities persist. These are compounded by unequal financial allocations, shortages of adequately trained staff, socio-economic factors facing pupils beyond their immediate school environment, and substantially unchanged social attitudes. Conservative reaction to integrating facilities has not been limited to schools (see below). There have also been frequent allegations of maladministration and political abuse of coloured education by the Labour Party-controlled Coloured Representative Authority, especially in Khomasdal (WA 21/7/81, 8/10/81, 20/11/81; WO 5/12/81, 6/2/82). The questions of school curricula and the relevance of their content are beyond our scope, but nevertheless a vital issue as independence approaches (see e.g. Rogers 1979).

d) Non-Vormal Education

A significant development in recent years has been the opening of several non-formal education centres specially geared to provide adult training in literacy and basic skills. Namibian blacks have an overall literacy rate of about 41% (Africa South of the Sahara 1980:733), despite a colonial education policy designed to train blacks in the ‘3Rs’ for subservient jobs (O’Callaghan 1977; Melber 1979; Katzao 1981:82).

Increased rural-urban migration, coupled with expanding modern sector employment, has heightened awareness of the problem in urban centres, and a
variety of public and private organizations now operate in this field. Although all espousing the cause of national advancement through educational opportunity, realization of individual potential, and overcoming the problems created by the 'Bantu Education' system, they differ widely in background and approach. The need for consultation and co-ordination of effort is obvious but this does not occur in practice because of mutual suspicion, personal rivalries or differing political/ideological commitments - an endemic problem in Windhoek (e.g. Republikein 22/4/81; WO 2/5/81).

Most of the organizations operate nationally, but are based in Windhoek (Table 8.6). The potential impact of such programmes, particularly those like the Bureau of Literacy and Literature, and Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), which operate through the churches and have grassroots credibility, is significant. These are totally independent of government, being funded by churches and foreign church or aid organizations and run by committed Namibians.

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TABLE 8.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>COURSES</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
<th>WINDHOEK</th>
<th>NAMIBIA</th>
<th>WINDHOEK</th>
<th>NAMIBIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Literacy and Literacy</td>
<td>Mother tongue</td>
<td>190 147 975 413 9 9 72 72</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2nd language</td>
<td>30 53 240 124 3 3 11 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. Total students 1/10/79 - 30/6/80 = 349.
Sources: Senior staff of respective bodies (interviews); CCN Information I(1), October 1980; Die Republikein 26 February 1981.
(see e.g. CCN 1980a). Their policy is to keep students until the required standard is reached, rather than have them discouraged by failing a one-off exam. Their offices are centrally located, but classes given mainly in Katutura and Khomasdal (CCN 1981b). The Rossing Foundation Centre is funded by Rössing Uranium as part of its public relations/community responsibility programme, and maintains a high profile. Its motives and ostentatiousness, symbolized by its new Rim building in the former buffer strip between Katutura and Khomasdal, have been criticized (WA 21/11/80, 8/12/80, 30/3/81, 4/8/82). In these respects it has deviated from the original intention (Rössing Foundation 1978). The Department of National Education launched its national literacy project late in 1980, offering 3-month courses in the mother tongue (Republikein 26/2/81).

Employers interviewed (see Chapter 7) reacted to these programmes in a variety of ways. Some appreciated the efforts being made, and assisted their employees to attend, but most were indifferent or hostile, claiming that possession of a certificate creates unreasonable expectations and demands in the holder, or that the holder is not in fact proficient in the particular subject. This applies particularly to the Rossing Centre, which generally issues certificates irrespective of the final exam results (Principal, personal communication).

e) Tertiary Education

Windhoek's importance as national educational centre has been significantly enhanced since 1977 by the establishment of several tertiary educational institutions. Although the nature of contemporary governmental control over education has considerably undermined their potential short term impact in training Namibians, their creation is a sign of approaching statehood and their use should be rationalized after independence.

As early as 1965, the SWAA sought to build a teachers training college with the intention of possibly expanding it into a university at a later date. The City Council granted 200ha on the western fringe of Pioniers Park for the purpose (see Figure 8.1) subject to the condition, inter alia, that the land could not be transferred, leased or in any other manner assigned or sposed of to any coloured person, native or asiatic, and no coloured person, native or asiatic, other than the domestic servants who render their services on the erf shall be permitted to reside thereon or in any other manner occupy same."

(City Council Minutes 25 Jan 1966, item E.15(g)2; also in City of Windhoek 1 979)

The College was clearly intended for whites only, given the SWAA's sole responsibility for white education, but the above conditions do not explicitly preclude other races from attending the college, only from residing there. Ultra-
modern facilities have been built with a capacity of 1,500 students, including 3 residences with 324 places, a sports complex, swimming pool, library, laboratory and other facilities far in excess of needs for teacher training. The final cost was officially put at R32m, but persistent rumours in Windhoek official circles suggested anything up to R48m, with completion due in 1981.

The first 110 students were admitted in 1979, with a further 73 in 1980. Total enrolment for 1981 was 183, or 12.2% of capacity. There are 43 teaching posts, giving a staff:student ratio of 1:4k. The 1980 pass rate was 88.4%. The college serves only white primary school teachers: even white secondary school teachers have to train in SA (or, since 1981, at the Academy for Tertiary Education), as a result of the division of government functions between first and second tiers. Since June 1979 the former State Conservatoire of Music, situated in the city centre, has been incorporated with the College. It had 450-500 mainly part-time students per term in 1980, with 23-27 teachers (SWAA 1977, 1978, 1979; SWA Administration for Whites 1980; interviews with College Principal).

A coloured training college for coloured, Baster and Nama primary school teachers opened in 1978 in buildings formerly occupied by Ella du Plessis Secondary School in Khomasdal (Figure 8.1). Enrolment was 15,5, 6978), 208 (1979), 222 (1980), and 146 (1981), while maximum capacity is 300, and 250 in the hostels. There are 28 lecturers, 20 of them white, giving a ratio of 1:5.1 - 1:7.9 p.a. Pass rates varied from 73% to 81.7%. Facilities are basic and there have been racial-political tensions, culminating in a strike during 1980. Although opened to all races in 1981, only one Herero registered. Proposed construction of a purpose-built College has been abandoned on cost grounds (interviews with Rector and Acting Rector; WA 13/1/81; Republikein 2/4/81, 3/4/81).

Prior to 1977, the only tertiary education in Windhoek was the training of black teachers at the Augustineum in Khomasdal, a function transferred to the Academy for Tertiary Education in 1981. This body began operation within the Department of National Education in January 1980, being declared a statutory body on 1 September (see above). Its structure is innovatory, providing an amalgam of pre-tertiary education, teachers training college, technikon (polytechnic) and university. While it may move entirely into the tertiary sphere in the future, the current objective is to train and upgrade local skills in the shortest possible time. For example, a special 2-year course, designed to boost the qualifications of black secondary school teachers, combines Matric with Education subjects. The average
qualification of black Namibian teachers at present is Std. 6 plus 2 years at training college. Part-time Std. 8, Matric, language and secretarial courses, full-time technical, artisan, secretarial and vocational courses are also offered in conjunction with the respective professional associations, while the Academy is, by agreement, assuming responsibility for the Namibian activities of the University of South Africa (UNISA) in phases. By 1984 it aims to be setting its own exams and awarding its own degrees. Its general policy is flexibility to the community's needs, and it claims to provide virtually any course for which 8 or more applications are received.

The Academy has experienced explosive growth, both in students and facilities. From its original headquarters, a former primary school in the CBD, it had spread to include a former maternity home on the CBD fringe, the UNISA library and offices in the CBD, an apprentice training centre in the BD, and a new campus in Khomasdal originally designated as a technical training centre for the Coloured Administration. This last includes hostels for 200 students and sports facilities, and has become the technical campus. But the central location for most classes is regarded as essential to continued wide accessibility.

In 1981 the staff strength had increased from 14 to 110, 57 of them administrative, 28 tertiary lecturers and 15 pre-tertiary. There were over 1324 registered students, 334 of them full time (interviews with Rector and senior commerce lecturer; see also Republikein 5/9/80, 8/9/80, 10/9/80, 26/11/80; WO 13/9/80, 6/2/82; WA 3/10/80, 7/10/80, 21/10/80, 8/12/80, 27/1/81, 31/1/81, 24/2/81, 8/5/81, 9/9/81, 11/9/81, 16/9/81, 23/3/82; Allgemeine Zeitung 13/2/81).

It is probably too early to judge the Academy's record. The idea is sound, its policy non-racial, the enthusiasm of staff and initial achievements readily apparent, and public response far above expectation. Nevertheless the danger exists of too rapid expansion, insufficient consolidation, and conflicts over limited resources between different needs. Some co-operation with the Post Office and Railways staff colleges, which play an important role in providing technical training locally, might be fruitful. Complaints of inadequately experienced staff, discrimination and 'rigged' exam results for certain groups have been made (e.g. WA 26/3/82), but denied by the Academy. It has been criticized from the right for being non-racial, and from the left for being too directly part of the DTA-controlled Department of National Education to make a meaningful contribution.

One indisputable problem is the three-fold duplication of teacher training facilities in Windhoek along racial lines, in terms of both squandered resources and the perpetuation of differential standards.

As with school apartheid, this will be unacceptable after
independence. Concerted political pressure has already been applied, thus far in vain, by the central government in attempting to have the Administration for Whites open the College of Education to all races, or surrender it to the central government along with the Tintenpalast and South West House (see Chapter 4; also Republikein 26/11/80, 2/3/81; WA 28/11/80, 2/3/81, 25/6/81, 29/6/81, 15/9/81, 25/9/81, 28/9/81, 12/10/81, 23/10/81, 24/2/82, 19/4/82; Suidwester 3/3/81, 6/3/81).

The interests of Namibian national liberation and development will demand a unified tertiary education system geared to local needs. The Academy has pointed the way and aspires to become the eventual university. Through its racial attitudes the College of Education has ruled itself out of the reckoning, although its buildings are purpose-built and are certain to house the future university. Perhaps the most likely contender is the United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), based in Lusaka. Although its chief aim is to train future middle-level civil servants, it arose directly out of the liberation struggle and has sponsored a co-ordinated research programme for post-independence implementation (Rogerson 1980; UNIN 1981a, 1981b). Any university will, however, need to blend the current functions of UNIN and the Academy, while offering a wider choice of tertiary subjects. This might aid the heavy expenditure required for a separate technical college and university, or total reliance on expatriate staff and ideas typical of multinational corporations (Mazrui 1975).

2. HEALTH SERVICES

a) The National Context

Health services in Namibia, perhaps more than any other, are in a state of crisis. Staff shortages, especially in the rural areas, are chronic, disruption caused by the guerrilla war in the north has had a serious impact there, health policies are inappropriate to local circumstances, and state-run services remain totally segregated. This complete political resistance to change, on a level paralleled only in education, stands out as the dominant problem and feature of the period since 1977. Given the heavy concentration of health facilities and administrators in Windhoek, most of these issues have crystallized there, and these will be discussed in turn.

There has been no health legislation of direct import to socio-political change since 1977. The major changes relate to administrative reorganization in terms of the three-tier government structure introduced in 1978-80. Representative authorities are charged with provision of both curative and preventative health services to their respective population groups. District surgeon, nursing and school services, maternity and related services, and all matters related to hospitals and clinics were included; the only exclusions related to registration of medical/paramedical personnel, control and registration of medicines, poisons and
related substances (South West Afric /1980a:38-39). These resorted under the newly-created first tier Department of National Health and Welfare, whose function is defined simply as 'promotion of National Health and Welfare' (South West Africa/Namibia 1980a:37). It disburses a predetermined per capita amount to each representative authority to provide health services to at least the specified standard, but any authority may request another to perform this function (as with other functions) on an agency basis (See Chapter 4; South West Africa/Namibia 1980a:62-63; 1980b:6-11). The Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivi, Damara, Baster and White Authorities administer their own, and those of the Nama, Herero, Tswana, Coloured and Bushman authorities are controlled by the Administration for Whites. In practice there has thus been little change other than the ethnic fragmentation, since the SWAA previously performed the present functions of the White Administration (but for all Namibia), and the SA Department of National Health those of its new Namibian namesake. The differential per capita health expenditures had not narrowed by 1980/81, being R233.70 for whites, R56.84 for Kavangos, R37.06 for Caprivians, R24.85 for Ovambos, R15.02 for Damaras and R4.70 for Basters (Abrahams 1981b; WA 18/11/81). Accurate information on the state of health and medical facilities in Namibia is almost unobtainable, being concealed by an official blanket as was until recently the case with all socio-economic data. The official annual reports divulge virtually nothing of importance other than hospital maintenance costs and crude total occurrences of certain notifiable diseases (South West Africa Administration 1977, 1978, 1979; SWA Administration for Whites 1980), while semi-official sources (e.g. Africa Institute 1980:47-48) provide only crude national aggregates, which mask regional and racial inequalities.

The background data presented here are thus fragmentary, while those on Windhoek were obtained with some difficulty during interviews with senior administrative and medical officials. Their willingness to do this, in some cases in defiance of laid-down policy, is an indication of the level of frustration and anger at conditions in the health service resulting directly from political manipulation and especially the 'new dispensation's' ethnic fragmentation (see WA 16/11/81). No active official could see any medical advantage in the system, despite the politicians' eulogies; at most they suggestively declined to offer an opinion on such a matter of official policy which has duplicated some facilities several-fold and divided others, regardless of cost, existing over-capacity, efficiency, the goal of equal access to health care, or morality. In 1979 there were 58 hospitals and 30 clinics nationwide, 23 of the former being run by the state, 28 by the churches, and the balance by mines and other private
bodies. The total of 7,799 beds (4,082 of them in state hospitals) gave a ratio of 8 per 1,000 of the official population estimate. In 1975 there were 2,830 nurses, 26 pharmacists, 156 general practitioners and 31 specialist doctors, or 1.8 doctors per 10,000 people (Africa Institute 1980:48). By 1981 there were only 2,261 registered nurses, 126 GPs, 26 specialists and 16 dentists. Half of the nurses were black, but all overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas, as were 80% of doctors and all the dentists. The average doctor/patient ratio was thus 1:6,600, but 1:17,000 in rural areas; while the dentist/patient ratio was 1:63,000 (WA 18/11/81:6).

b) Facilities in Windhoek 1975-1981

No reliable national vital statistics are available, but the Municipality of Windhoek (1976b) provides details for Windhoek. Crude and infant mortality rates per thousand were 7.2 and 21.6, 24.5 and 145.4, 18.7 and 162.7 for whites, coloureds/Basters, and blacks respectively. These reflect socio-economic circumstances as well as discriminatory health services. Crude rates of natural increase for all 3 groups had, however, declined over the preceding 5 years. Table 8.7 records occupancy rates in Windhoek hospitals. The lack of longer time-series data for the state hospitals precludes detailed trend analysis, but the average bed occupancy data show clearly that with the exception of the modern Katutura State Hospital there has been, and still is, considerable excess capacity, with fairly small annual fluctuations. It is also impossible to determine the proportion of patients from outside Windhoek, although likely to be fairly significant, especially for blacks. Virtually all specialist referrals must come to Windhoek, where such facilities are concentrated (apart from periodic sessions at Oshakati); some must even be sent to Cape Town for very specialized treatment. The most dramatic increase was in black out-patient numbers from 1979 to 1980 at the R.C. Hospital and Katutura clinic. The clinics are staffed by nurses and concentrate on preventative medicine, but perform a sifting function for the hospitals, referring only cases requiring a doctor. This accounts for the very small rise in out-patient numbers at the Katutura Hospital in 1980. It appears that the increases are primarily in socio-economically related diseases with their roots in overcrowding, increased poverty and unemployment, and freer mobility (see below).

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TABLE 8.7
Windhoek Hospital Admission Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Dims</th>
<th>Tear</th>
<th>Admissions</th>
<th>% Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>-14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,586</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,097</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1980   2 767   + 7.0   51   12 118   +49.7
Elizabeth Baum  18 1977 190 - -
(maternity) (mothers) 1978 142 -2s....
1979 148 + - -
19803 143 - 3.3 -
19813 39 - -
Old White State
Hoop  250 1970 - - 40(733.6) -
1975 - - 54.1 (31.5)1979 6 742 - 46.4 (34.4) 9
840
19804 6 790 + 0.7 - - 11 293 +14.8
1981 - - 36.0 - -
Katutura Hoop
(black & coloured) 750 1979 22 189 - - - 46 118
19804 23 826 + 7.4 - - 46 556 + 0.9
1981 - - 87.0 (56.6) -
TB Hosp  235 1979 344 - - - 2 789
(black & coloured) 19804 266 -22.7 - - 3 498
+25.4
19814 - - 47.2 -
Psychiatric Hoop  195 1979 474 - - - 2 663
(black & coloured) 19804 169 -64.4 - - 1 201
-54.9
19814 - - 43.1 -
Katutura Clinic  0 1979 - - - 20 554
1980 - - - 42 004 +104.3
Khomamdal Clinic  0 1979 - - - 7 808
1980 - - - 7 896 + 1.1
TOTAL 1979 32 483 - - - 97 869
1980 33 961 +4.5 - 124 566 + 27.3

Notes: 1. About 8% patients are white.
2. Maternity action in parentheses where applicable. These are aggregate annual % figures, which blur seasonal fluctuations and differences between sections or wards. This holds particularly for the Katutura Hospital, where wards for the most common diseases are regularly full.
3. 1 January - 31 March, when it closed down.
4. Figures for April 1981 only.
Sources: Chief Medical Supt., Head Sister & Trustee of State Hospital Complex, Catholic Hospital and Elizabeth Haus respectively.

Health facilities are concentrated in Windhoek North and the former Katutura buffer strip, although the clinics are centrally located in
Physically, they are thus very accessible to the inhabitants of these areas, in particular, although population growth there and overcrowding in the clinics suggest the need for additional facilities. High car ownership and reliance on private doctors among whites ensure their accessibility to existing facilities. The system of tariffs does not discriminate racially and subsidizes low income earners more heavily than high earners. The former ('state patients') are distinguished from the latter ('private patients') by means of a sliding income scale according to their number of dependants. The upper limit for state patient status in 1981 ranged from R1 100 p.a. with no dependants to R4 700 p.a. with seven or more. These limits were, however, very low - even the coloured Household Subsistence Level (HSL) lies above the limit for a 5-member family. State in-patients payed 40c, and out-patients between 40c-60c per visit, while private in-patients payed R1.80-R11.00 per day and out-patients R3.00-R4.50 per visit. In November 1981 fees were revised for the first time since 1973, rising by up to 375% in some cases. The upper limits for classification as state patients were raised to R3 000, R4 400 and R6 000 p.a. for single, married, and married people with children, respectively. State in-patients now pay R1.00-R1.50 and out-patients R1.00-R2.30 per visit, while private in-patients pay R2.80-R22.00 and out-patients R2.40-R9.00 per visit (Chief Medical Supt., personal communication, and SWA Administration for Whites 1981a). While the income limits are more realistic, the steep tariff increases will cause many people problems. The Catholic Hospital charged R15.00-R17.00 daily in 1981, and the Elizabeth Haus R13.50-R15.00 daily. Church hospitals receive a state subsidy, while state and subsidized hospitals receive free medicines from the authorities.

c) The Health Service Crisis
This apparently healthy picture belies an increasing crisis in medical services, rooted in their planning, structure and administration and which led, after much pressure, to the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry in 1981. The SWAA began long-range planning in 1965, based on white population projections which have not been realized, and envisaging large modern hospitals in Gobabis, Keetmanshoop and Windhoek to serve their respective regions. In line with apartheid planning, the first two were to have separate ward blocks for each race.
but one set of operating theatres, while Windhoek was to have entirely separate hospitals (Director of Health Service, personal communication; WA 18/2/82:1.4).

(i) The first aspect of the crisis is thus in physical facilities: They are too large, prestigious and costly for the territory's population or resources, a problem exacerbated by racial duplication. Plans for the Gobabis hospital have been scaled down and the 200-bed Keetmanshoop one just completed, without the projected black and coloured blocks, at a cost of R22.5m. The existing 34-bed white hospital there had only 27.5% occupancy in 1980-81, while the 225 black and coloured beds were 37.14% full over the same period. As a result one floor of the new hospital would now be used by 'other population groups for sophisticated surgical and other treatment in serious cases' (WA 18/2/82:1).

The Katutura State Hospital (Plate 8.1) was the first part of the planned Windhoek complex, providing much-needed facilities which are now crowded. Plans for a separate coloured and Baster hospital have been scrapped, and patients of these groups now moved from the Katutura hospital to one wing of the new 12-storey, 650-bed White State Hospital opened in May 1982. Costing R23m (original estimate R12m) and equipped with ultra-modern facilities, it stands in the same grounds as the old white hospital, which in 1981 had 3 floors (100 of its 250 beds) closed for lack of demand and staff. The old block will now be used for TB, psychiatric and possibly cancer treatment (Director of Health Services and Chief Medical Supt., pers. comm; WA 28/10/81, 30/4/82, 17/5/82). The Elizabeth Haus maternity hospital closed early in 1981 because of inadequate demand (WO 14/3/81; Suidwester 23/4/81). In view of their size, cost and segregation, the new hospitals have been severely criticized as being politicians' prestige projects inappropriate to local conditions, which would have suggested less monolithic and 'sterile' construction, utilizing available space, gardens and sunlight. Although the need for centralized specialist functions in Windhoek is agreed, the structure of these and the regional hospitals is wrong: health services are over-catered and geared to curative rather than preventative medicine. The priority is for more rural clinics near the bulk of Namibia's population, many of whom live over 50-100km from the nearest one (Abrahams 1981a, 1981b; WO 9/10/81; WA 27/1/81, 5/5/81, 15/5/81, 22/5/81, 11/6/81, 31/7/81, 3/8/81). These criticisms cannot be refuted. Even ambulances remain segregated.

(ii) The second element of crisis is the long term staff shortage. In recent years the problem has worsened in Windhoek as well as rural
areas, due to exceedingly poor salaries, and the creation of new posts. In the Windhoek State Hospital complex (the hospitals and clinics) the position in April 1981 was alarming, particularly regarding white nurses (Table 8.8). Additional medical staff and expertise are obtained under agreement with Stellenbosch University in SA whereby the State Hospital complex is a satellite training institution (SWAA 1977:26). Nevertheless military doctors are also relied upon in Windhoek, but especially rural areas (Abrahams 1981a; WA 5/5/81, 11/6/81, 31/7/81). Together with doctors' anger at control by non-medical bureaucrats, the staff shortage has been a subject of heated debate, but little action other than a marginal increase in overtime pay (WA 26/1/81:5; 3/2/81, 4/2/81, 23/2/81, 14/4/81:4, 10/6/81, 23/6/81, 7/8/81, 28/8/81, 9/10/81, 18/11/81, 17/2/82, 18/2/82, 27/4/82; WO 7/2/82, 9/1/82; Suidwester 18/2/82; Republikein 10/6/82). So bad did the situation become that the authorities were eventually forced to allow black and coloured nurses to attend white patients (WO 9/1/82) despite their own opposition. The Member of the White Executive Committee responsible for health services said in 1981 that such exchanges could not be permitted as "White patients want to be cared for by white nurses". (Republikein 2/3/81; my translation)

-MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN-

**TABLE 8.8**

**WINDHOEK HOSPITALS (APRIL 1981)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3:</th>
<th>4.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cf. 237 (80.1%) in 1979. incl. 1 not white. incl. 3 not white incl. 1 not white 5. 1 full-time post is equivalent to post, therefore D. E. + F. &gt; 78. Sources: Chief Medical Supt. and Head Sister and Catholic Hospital respectively.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTS FILLED</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Hospital</td>
<td>A. Top nursing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex including the Clinics</td>
<td>B. Nurses-white</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Nurses-black &amp; coloured</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL NURSES** 957 782 81.7
Even the Catholic Hospital retains segregated wards, as white patients, who form 80% of the total, would apparently not tolerate integration (Head Sister pers. comm.)

There is a severe shortage of nurses' accommodation at the Katutura Hospital, but a surplus at the White State Hospital. Thus one nurses, tower block at the latter was 'temporarily' made available to black nurses early in 1982 (WO 9/1/82).

Despite the creation of additional black nursing posts, it has further been alleged that transfer of coloured and Baster patients and staff to the White Hospital will aggravate the situation at the Katutura Hospital rather than improve it, since there were proportionately more coloured/Baster nurses than patients (WA 24/5/82).

(iii) The third crisis point relates to the population's state of health, an issue directly linked to the wider discrepancies in socio-economic circumstances and the inappropriateness of many aspects of the services to them. Previous chapters have discussed the major urban discontinuities, and the poor conditions affecting the majority of Khomasdal and Katutura residents - low housing standards, housing shortages and overcrowding, inadequate services and amenities, unsurfaced roads, low income and education levels, and rising unemployment - all typical of Third World cities. Refuse collection in Katutura is totally inadequate, with the result that large open rubbish piles are a virtually permanent feature of most streets in the older areas. They are a serious health hazard to children playing in their vicinity, encourage infestations of rodents, flies and mosquitoes in summer, and create litter, smell and riverbed contamination problems. Refuse services have not kept pace with Katutura's growth, and the level of service is determined by the tariffs levied. So serious was the situation that the Municipality was forced to take action in 1982 after various representations, despite inter-departmental disagreements over responsibility (WA 6/1/82; City of Windhoek 1982a). However, opposition by the Katutura Advisory Board to, higher tariffs, on grounds of affordability, prevented any improvement in the level of services (WA 4/6/82). This clearly
illust rates the dilemmas of municipal finance and administration under the existing and proposed systems (Chapter 4).

Many environmentally-related and preventable diseases affect the black and coloured populations, despite their proximity to such modern hospital facilities. There are certainly sexual differences in the incidence of disease, but few data are available. Analysis of mortality from notifiable diseases (Table 8.9) shows that gastro-enteritis is by far the major killer among infants, and the various forms of TB, among adults. Senior nursing sisters at the clinics have recorded a rising incidence of TB in recent years, partly linked to increased coloured migration from the Northwestern Cape. While a high proportion of gastro-enteritis cases are reported, parents frequently neglect or don't understand the correct treatments provided, with fatal consequences. Measles among children became so serious that vaccination was introduced, and it was declared a notifiable disease in 1981. Vaccinations against smallpox are still given because of local living conditions, despite its formal worldwide eradication. Hypertension, osteo-arthritis and pneumonia are also

DISEASE AGE 1 97 1978 1980 19613
GROUP C 3 T v C B T W C B T W C B T
Gatro-Rnteriti, I 0 14 34 48 1 21 53 75 1 15 63 79 0 5 22 27
C 0 0 4 4 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
A 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 6 0 1 3 4 0 0 0 0
Tuberculosis I 0 4 9 13 0 1 5 6 0 2 2 0 1 4 5
(all forms) C 0 2 2 4 0 0 3 3 0 4 2 3 0 0 0
A 1 14 40 55 1 7 44 52 0 8 31 39 0 3 8 1
Meningitis I 0 1 5 6 0 1 6 7 0 9 9 18 0 1 0 1
C 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 4 0 2 2 0 1 0 1
A 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 1 1 4 6 0 0 0 0
TV-Meningitis I 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Malaria I 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Typhoid I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Entero-Colitis I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 8 0 0 1 1
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other4 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
C 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 0 0 0 0
A 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
TOTAL I 0 20 50 70 1 23 66 90 1 27 80 108 0 8 28 36
C 0 4 9 13 0 3 9 12 0 3 11 14 0 1 1 2
A 1 15 43 59 4 9 55 68 1 10 40 51 0 3 9 12
GRAND TOTAL T 1 39 102 142 5 35 130 170 2 40 131 173 0 12 38 50
otes: 1. I = Infants (0-2 yr.)
2. Children (2-18 yrs)
3. Adults (over 18 yrs)
V = whites C = coloureds B = blacks
4. 'Other' - Rabies (I), Hepatitis (I) Bronchitis (I). Siphilis (I), Diptheria (2), Tetanus (2), Meningococal infection (45, o: O data obtained for 1979.
Source: compiled from monthly reports of City Health Officer, Windhoek.

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disproportionately common. Clinic nurses visit schools regularly as part of their general vaccination and primary medical duties (clinic staff, pers. comm.; Republikein 21/4/81). Virtually no kwashiorkor or other chronic malnutritional diseases occur in Windhoek, but some undernourishment and child neglect/abuse is known. This is associated with imbalanced carbohydrate diets, or children forced to fend for themselves (in the absence of adequate creches and schools) when mothers have to seek employment because of male unemployment - either involuntary or through alcoholism (e.g. WA 30/10/81:8). Some community health workers are actively seeking to train women, especially in Katutura, in nutritional health.

Although not officially admitted or documented, alcoholism has rapidly reached epidemic proportions, directly or indirectly affecting roughly 50% of Katutura adults and 80% of Khomasdal adults (Abrahams 1981a; WA 5/5/81; clinic personnel, pers. comm.) Shebeens are ubiquitous, and expenditure on alcohol high. A one-month survey of patients conducted at my behest by one of only two private doctors practising in Katutura and Khomasdal, substantiated these claims despite its obvious methodological limitations (Table 8.10). The problem was significantly greater among male patients than female, affecting virtually half of those from Khomasdal and a quarter from Katutura. This is a stark comment on social conditions in these areas (see Chapters 3, 6, 7, and Section 3 below).
The data presented in this section need no further elaboration. In rural areas the situation is even worse (WA 5/5/81, 11/6/81, 11/3/82, 9/6/82, 29/7/82; Suidwester 30/4/81). The lack of any

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ALCOHOL DEPENDENCY AMONG
TABLE 8.10
PATIENTS IN KATUTURA AND KHAMASDAL*
COMPLA INT
PATIENT NO. ALCOHOL ALCOHOL-RELATED OTHER
No. % No. % No. %
MEN - Khomasdal 125 15 12.0 42 33.6 68 54.4
- Katutura 78 3 3.8 13 16.7 62 79.5
- Outside Windhoek 36 2 5.6 8 22.2 26 72.2
WOMEN - Khomasdal 168 4 2.4 14 8.3 150 89.3
- Katutura 109 1 0.9 5 4.6 103 94.5
- Outside Windhoek 59 - - 2 3.4 57 96.6
CHILDREN (under 18)
- Khomasdal 247 - - - - 247 100.0
- Katutura 120 - - - 120 100.0
- Outside Windhoek 58 - - - 58 100.0
TOTAL 1 000 25 2.5 84 8.4 891 89.1
* survey conducted 7 May - 5 June 1981.
Alcohol = alcoholism main complaint
Alcohol related = secondary complaint related
Other = no connection with alcoholism.
to alcoholism
NB: The data refer only to new patients; second or subsequent visits for the same illness, or those having routine checkups, are not included.

meaningful change in attitudes or access to health facilities is amply illustrated by regular complaints of verbal abuse, undue delays, shoddy treatment, and harassment inflicted on black patients by white medical staff at the Katutura Hospital and elsewhere:
"He [Dr. K. Abrahams] said that patients - as well as Black nurses - were often called 'Kaffirs' or baboons to their faces by White personnel. Many White private medical practitioners either refused to treat Black patients at all, or saw them only at certain times, or attended to them in a special, segregated part of their consulting rooms."
(Abrahams 1981b, cited in WA 18/11/81:6)
And once treatment is complete, or patients discharged prematurely because of hospital overcrowding, they return to the same poor environmental conditions.

3. PUBLIC FACILITIES AND AMENITIES
Apartheid demanded avoidance of recreational contact as much as any other, and all public amenities and other recreational facilities were thus segregated. The Group Areas Act and related laws, which dictated this in South Africa, were never enforced in Namibia, necessitating a variety of ad hoc measures to achieve the same end. Very often they took the form of exclusive clauses in legislation such as the
Municipal, Nature Conservation, Library Service or Educational Ordinances, while owners of private facilities, e.g. hotels, restaurants or cinemas, simply reserved the right of admission and erected 'Whites only' signs. In theory, each race group should have been provided with 'separate but equal' facilities in their own residential areas, but this never occurred in practice. Usually there is only one of each type, e.g. municipal swimming pool, peri-urban nature reserve or museum, but if duplicated, those for coloureds and blacks are grossly inferior. Thus the modern Windhoek public library is well stocked with a variety of fact and fiction, periodicals and Africana reference section, while its Katutura counterpart is a tiny nondescript building with a very limited range of poor quality fiction. The differences were (and are) again justified in terms of the respective communities’ ability to pay - through the Windhoek and Katutura municipal accounts - and low readership in Katutura. The latter is certainly due in part to low average education levels, but the available literature does not encourage wider use. Those able to buy books thus have an excellent free library service, while those unable to, do not.

a) Legislation and Change Since 1977 a(i) Libraries: The legal admission of other races to former white private schools in April 1978 (Section 1 above) gave rise to an anomalous and very hurtful situation, in that they were still excluded from public libraries used by the schools as part of their teaching programme. This applied particularly in Windhoek because of the number of private schools and pupils involved.

In terms of the SWA Library Service Ordinance, No.15 of 1968, as amended by Ordinance 17 of 1973, urban public libraries were provided by local authorities with a SWAA subsidy. The SWA Library Service Amendment Ordinance, No.8 of 1979, enabled all pupils at private schools to use the libraries. This created another anomaly, because these pupils' families could not use the library, and in order to avoid continued embarrassment the City Council resolved to request a further amendment to the Library Service Ordinance enabling all Windhoek residents who are municipal ratepayers or consumers of municipal services to become members, with their families (City of Windhoek 1980a:19; 1980b:39). This explicitly excluded Khomasdal and Katutura, a move which one City Councillor recognized, "can only cause friction and bad publicity."

It transpired simultaneously, however, that library facilities now fell under the second tier authorities in terms of the Representative Authorities Proclamation, No. AG8 of 1980, and the Arnold Commission Proposals (see Chapter 4). The
Cultural Promotion Ordinance, No. 9 of 1980, created a new division in the Administration for Whites which would assume the former SWAA's responsibility for library services. The absurdity of having eleven separate libraries was realized, and the City Council and Municipal Association suggested that the Administration for Whites provide library services on an agency basis for other groups, and that municipalities in turn administer them (with full financial compensation) on behalf of the Administration for Whites (City of Windhoek 1980c:47, 1980d; Municipal Association 1980:3-6). In reality, this would retain the status quo, while removing municipal expenditure on the libraries and thus probably reducing efficiency. It illustrates well the unproductive legal contortions of the 'new dispensation'. Discussions continued, with the Administration eventually taking over and running the services in mid-1981 despite some opposition. Opening of the Windhoek library to all races was 'still receiving attention' (City of Windhoek 1981c, 1981d; WO 11/4/81). The enabling legislation made provision for agency basis operation on behalf of other authorities. Thus the Libraries Ordinance, No. 4 of 1981, also superseded the 1968 Library Service Ordinance as amended in 1973 and 1979. How this affected black school pupils was not explained.

(a(ii) Other Amenities: The Abolishment of Racial Discrimination (Urban Residential Areas and Public Amenities) Act, No. 3 of 1979, prohibited exclusion from a wide variety of facilities and amenities. As a result of determined white opposition, however, the penalty clauses were held over until 1st July 1980, and scaled down to provide for cancellation of offenders' business licenses rather than imprisonment. In December 1981 the Act's scope was widened to include all urban land, and to improve procedures for tracing offenders (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, only one offender, a popular white restauranteur who defiantly erected a sign 'Our clientele accepts only Whites here', has been prosecuted to date, and the case is yet to be concluded (WA 20/8/82:4). There are also regular press reports of discrimination and gratuitous violence against would-be black or coloured patrons in hotel bars, camping sites, cinemas and the like. Mixed couples have also been regular targets (see Chapter 5). On a number of occasions when the police were called, they reportedly sided unquestioningly with the assailants, despite injuries suffered by the victims (WA 30/8/80, 8/9/80, 5/6/81, 23/6/81, 8/1/82, 23/3/82, 25/3/82; WO 20/9/80, 8/11/80, 21/2/81, 25/8/81, 9/5/81, 15/8/81, 9/1/82, 6/3/82).

The City Council has resolutely refused to open the municipal swimming pool to all races, despite its running at a loss. Apparently, this is on the grounds that it was not covered by the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act, but, in reality, out of fear of its being swamped by other races. Legal opinion the author consulted, differed on the apparent validity of this claim, but it has not been
challenged in court. Efforts by the municipality and Katutura Advisory Board to have
a swimming pool erected in Katutura - for which there is a definite need - were
intensified in an effort to deflect pressure from the existing white pool:
"Against the background of pressure on the Municipality to
open the swimming pool to all races, it is desirable that the Municipality give
the Katutura Advisory Board all possible support in realizing the ideal of a
swimming pool in the township. Not only would the pressure to open the
existing pool thereby be relieved, but it would also prevent the inhabitants of
Khomasdal and Katutura taking it over en masse, should it one day have to be opened."
(Director of Katutura, in City of Windhoek 1981a:F.15; my translation. See also
City of Windhoek 1980c, 1980d, 1981a, 1981f; WA
31/1 0/80, 30/4/81)
Admission charges at the existing pool were raised steeply as a
precaution (City of Windhoek 1980c, 1980e; WA 8/12/80). By mid-1982 final
approval for the new pool to be built in the buffer strip between Katutura and
Khomasdal, at a cost of R600 000, was given. It is being funded by the Katutura
and Windhoek capital development
accounts, and the Department of National Education. Despite strong objections by
some Councillors, the final decision included an item:

"That an announcement be made by the Council already at this
stage that a new swimming pool will be built in the western part of Windhoek and
that as soon as it is completed, the
existing pool will be open to everyone."
(City of Windhoek 1981b:5-7,
1982c:20-31; my translation, also
WA 27/5/82:4)
As part of the residential mobility survey reported in Chapter 5, the 45
respondents were asked which public amenities they used, and
whether they would use others if opened to all races. A maximum of 3 per
respondent were recorded. The total number was 99, an average of 2.2, although 3
used none. By far the most popular was the drive-in
(37), followed by the Daan Viljoen Game Reserve, which is situated in the
Khomas Hochland, 20km from Windhoek (25), cinemas or theatre (19), and the
Goreangab Dam, beyond the western fringe of Khomasdal (12). The public
library, (3), Avis Dam, beyond Avis, (2), and the municipal
swimming pool, (1), were the only others mentioned. The pattern is significant,
but not unexpected. The drive-in provides entertainment with virtually no
opportunity for face-to-face interracial contact. Daan Viljoen provides open air
activities and especially an 'open' swimming pool. Those using the public library
and municipal swimming pool were pupils at private schools.
While most respondents felt free to use these amenities, two had experienced
racial harassment or humiliation at Daan Viljoen, one at the drive-in and one
mixed couple in an hotel in Okahandja. Two others admitted to avoiding cinemas if certain trouble-seeking motorbike gangs were present. Several others remarked on the lack of attitudinal change by most whites, and hence the superficiality of changes to date. Only seven respondents said they would not use available amenities or others when opened to all races - three for lack of time, and one each because of lack of interest, the unfriendly atmosphere, feeling unsafe and accessibility problems.

Amenities in Khomasdal, and especially Katutura, remain completely underdeveloped e.g. one grassless sportsfield, a municipal cinema and several unsurfed, unmaintained and vandalized children's playgrounds. The majority of residents lack the financial resources or means of transport to use the facilities discussed earlier, even if legally open to all races. In an attempt to improve the situation through community involvement in their own development, the Private Sector Foundation, a businessmen's organization aiming to help towards improving the quality of life of the disadvantaged sectors of the SWA/Namibian community on a non-political, non-racial basis, established a community centre in the old Katutura migrant hostel in 1981. It houses various community organizations, an information/resource centre, handiwork, domestic science and interior decoration training facilities and various sports facilities, and was originally to include the Katutura swimming pool. It is now being autonomously run, and developed with community involvement (Private Sector Foundation 1981a, 1981b; City of Windhoek 1981a, 1981b; WA 14/4/81, 30/4/81, 6/5/81, 11/8/81, 18/9/81, 29/9/81, 2/10/81, 6/11/81, 27/11/81, 12/3/82, 30/4/82). The Municipality intends developing sixteen playgrounds in Katutura in co-operation with the centre (WA 4/6/82). It is premature to evaluate the centre's likely success. Overall, it is evident that exclusive access to public amenities has been maintained in several key instances, as part of a determined white rearguard action against the erosion of entrenched privileges. Illogical and emotive arguments are offered against integration: e.g. # "Why must a bath built with the money of Windhoek taxpayers be opened to other races?"

(Councillor Joey Olivier, quoted in WA 27/5/82:4)

There are municipal ratepayers and consumers of services in both Khomasdal and Katutura, apart from recent mobility into former white areas; besides white out-of-town visitors are welcome to use the pool, library, etc. And, unacknowledged, is the fact that there has been relatively little problem in places now used by all races. Either way, such changes remain essentially superficial on their own to most blacks and coloureds.

4. CONCLUSION
The absence of thoroughgoing change, coupled with intricate legislative manipulations to give the appearance of progress, emerged as the dominant feature of the sectors considered here. Politically organized white opposition has been overwhelming, on the realization that education, in particular, holds the key to retaining much of the status quo in the guise of ‘separate (but unequal) cultural identity’. Excess capacity exists in white state schools, overcrowding in Katutura and Khomasdalo Yet the logical step is vigorously opposed. That said, there has been some improvement in the various educational indicators, and private schools are admitting all races.

But, coupled with the imminent opening of an explicitly 'elite' multiracial school under first tier control, this effectively reserves 'open' or 'equal' education for the small, wealthier elite. Health and education policies remain largely inappropriate to demonstrated needs in the southern African and. Third World context, with large capital-intensive projects diverting resources away from simpler and yet more effective possibilities. This has been a common problem in colonial societies both before and after independence (e.g. Rogers 1979). Decision-making remains overwhelmingly in white hands. Many of the current problems lie in the government structure, but that has been shown to be no accident. In private schools, some tertiary education, and some amenities where desegregation has occurred, few problems have resulted. Pressure for further change is mounting, but as in other ex-colonial societies, education and health are bound to remain thorny issues (see Development Dialogue 1978; Critical Health 1980; Mugomba 1980). Nevertheless, the simple replacement of white decision-makers by blacks, provides no guarantees that more appropriate policies will be pursued.

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CHAPTER 9
WINDHOEK FROM COLONIAL TO INDEPENDENT CAPITAL: CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECT

The central aim of this study has been analysis of changes in the spatial, political, economic and social bases of colonial urban...
organization in Windhoek during the transition to independence. This required
establishment of a 1977 baseline and detailed examination of subsequent
developments in several previously identified key 'sectors'. Mindful of the
fact that the period under review is short, and that for reasons beyond control, the
transition is not yet complete, it is now necessary to draw together the evidence.
The significance of the findings is then evaluated against a set of appropriate
criteria, and post-independence prospects are also set out with the benefit of
what little published material exists on experiences elsewhere.

1. MAJOR ELEMENTS OF CHANGE
a) The Baseline
By the mid-1970s Windhoek conformed in every sense to the requirements of
South Africa's 'Apartheid City' model (Davies 1972, 1981; Western 1981). Three
racially exclusive residential areas separated by open buffer strips had been
developed with the eventual intention of creating autonomous local authorities in
each. But gross inequalities of income, housing standards and provision, commercial, educational,
applied especially to economic activity by its very nature, and to proposed local government structures. Changes in housing policy and practice, residential patterns, education and health service provision were readily discernible in terms of shifts from previously rigid and institutionalized positions or structures. They conclusions below are arranged broadly by chapter, but their sequence has been altered to highlight interrelationships between 'sectors' and topics which emerged from the analysis. Initially national and local issues are linked through the political, institutional and legal framework, and the 'sectoral' ramifications of change then traced according to strength of interdependence or visibility of effect.

b) Politics of Transition

Politically the transition period in Namibia as a whole has been characterized by the consistent failure of negotiations to reach an internationally acceptable solution on independence. Following the Turnhalle Conference and National Party - Republican Party split in white political ranks, the South African government sought to promote the DTA inter-ethnic alliance as a credible 'multiracial and black dominated' alternative government to SWAPO. This has necessitated abandonment of the SA-style bantustan ethno-region strategy, and progressive removal of racially discriminatory legislation, initially by the AG as interim head of state and more recently by the DTA-controlled legislature and executive, the National Assembly and Ministers Council. The provincial type Administration has been replaced by a purportedly autonomous three tier structure in preparation for independence and more Namibians are now employed in the civil service. South Africa currently retains overt authority over only constitutional development, foreign affairs and defence. Nevertheless SA frequently ignores the 'internal parties' in international negotiations, only requiring that they be consulted if stumbling blocks are sought. Key administrative positions are still monopolized by South Africans, who rotate regularly and frequently fill important National Party or government posts on return to South Africa (Chapter 7). The public sector is becoming increasingly financially dependent on South Africa because of the spiralling costs of the inefficient and duplicative bureaucratic system and the anti-SWAPO war. The eleven ethnic second tier Representative Authorities are proving particular financial and political problems, subject to frequent allegations of maladministration, and being controlled in many cases by parties hostile to the DTA. The inherent contradiction between abolishing bantustans and racial discrimination on one hand, and institutionalizing many important administrative functions and services along ethnic lines on the other, is rapidly, and predictably, undermining the system (Chapters 4 and 8; Simon forthcoming).

Abrahams (1981) argues convincingly that these events represent
successive attempts by SA to impose a neo-colonial solution on Namibia, retaining the status quo and underlying structure wherever possible, with some black co-optation. This has been further borne out by recent events, as SA appears to be abandoning the DTA in favour of a broader ethnically-based anti-SWAPO alliance (Times 1982;

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Financial Times 1982). For reasons outlined, the DTA's fortunes have waned recently, while the near certainty of a SWAPO victory in UN-supervised elections has been more readily appreciated and feared by SA. Independence will thus not materialize until SA's continued presence in Namibia becomes untenable, or more likely, she feels that some 'internal' grouping stands a chance against SWAPO, or that sufficient guarantees and checks have been incorporated into the settlement package to preclude any 'unfriendly' Namibian action towards SA. These national developments have been paralleled at local level in Windhoek by persistent attempts by municipal officials and councillors to institute a municipal system different only in name from the logical apartheid solution of 3 racially exclusive authorities (Chapter 4). Such proposals are now justified in terms of geographic separateness and homogeneity of culture and interest, irrespective of size, rather than race. However the explicit recognition in at least one official report that viability required retention of all income groups in Khomasdal (and Katutura), suggests that these officials (National Party supporters) and their coloured co-optees regard race, not class, as the dominant issue. The Ministers Council, however, found the proposals unacceptable and have stalled on implementation. Instead, responsibility for local authorities was brought directly under first tier government from the Administration for Whites in mid-1982, despite municipal protests. Political sensitivity will probably rule out any major changes in the status quo at this stage, while no independent government is likely to approve such quasi-racial divisions. The impact on Windhoek of the conspicuous military presence is unquantifiable because of the security restrictions and because most supplies come direct from SA.

c) The Means of Social Advancement
Problems resulting from reorganization of government also emerged strongly in Chapter 8, on access to social services. Control over education in Windhoek alone rests with three separate departments along racial lines: the first tier Department of National Education sets overall standards and controls black schools on an agency basis for the various ethnic authorities; while the white and coloured ethnic authorities control their own respective schools. Data analysis revealed major discrepancies in the facilities, staffing levels, per capita investment, and performance between races. While some improvement occurred in black schools, trends in coloured secondary education were particularly worrying. There can be little prospect of more significant change as long as the education system remains racially differentiated, and thus retains the
old 'Bantu Education' stigma. The inherent paradox referred to above applies strongly here. However, it is in education and hospital services that white opposition to desegregation has been implacable for fear of perceived direct or indirect threats to 'standards' and, ultimately, cultural identity. White government schools have excess capacity, yet other races are precluded from utilizing their facilities, and racially mixed private schools have been prevented from participating in sporting and cultural competitions with white government schools. At present these private schools provide the only opportunity for integrated education, but by virtue of limited capacity and high fees, very few black and coloured children are able to gain admission. The Windhoek City Council unsuccessfully opposed plans for a new 'open' college near Pioniers Park to avoid black residential encroachment. The quality and level of health services have suffered directly from ethnic fragmentation and 'agency basis' operation to the extent of warranting appointment of a Commission of Enquiry. Adequate and accessible physical facilities exist, but racial allocations are distorted. In many respects health services are overcapitalized, and inappropriate to local needs, which in Katutura and Khomasdal are improved primary health care, environmental and social conditions. Racism of medical staff remains a problem.

d) Conspicuous Change - Residential Areas and Amenities
Desegregative legislation has had its most immediately visible effects in two areas - opening of residential areas and public amenities, and abolition of influx control (Chapters 5 and 6). The Windhoek City Council and Municipal Association expressed strong opposition to all these measures, seeing a threat to vested white interests (including property values), exclusivity and 'law and order'. Minor concessions were made for black pupils at private schools to use the public library, but the municipal swimming bath has been jealously reserved for whites only, until completion of another bath near Katutura and Khomasdal, due late in 1982.

Yet where racial interaction has been permitted to occur, there have been relatively few lasting problems, despite a certain rightwing white backlash. Residential mobility has been steady but slow, and insufficient to have significant impact on any area. Immigration to the former 'white' city is concentrated chiefly in the CBD fringes and middle class areas of Klein Windhoek and Windhoek West. In most cases lack or inadequacy of available accommodation, rather than any inherent desire to 'live among the whites', appears to have been the prime motive for moving. Coloureds form the bulk of migrants, and significant return migration to Khomasdal has occurred, apparently for reasons unconnected with their experiences in white areas. Mixed couples faced severe harassment initially, and are still occasionally subjected to gratuitous violence. A significant number of
such couples migrated from South Africa to escape apartheid marriage laws. Interracial unions are invariably between white men and coloured/Baster, or occasionally black, women.
e) Relaxing Some Constraints: Influx Control and Housing
Abolition of influx control has had notable repercussions, both in terms of black urban unemployment and municipal housing policy (Chapter 6). Despite some continued harassment, workseekers have been able to enter and remain in urban areas together with their families without passes. Modern sector employment opportunities have not grown at nearly the rate required to absorb those with only their labour to sell. Un- and underemployment among the proletariat, both in Windhoek and other centres has therefore risen significantly. This, however, represents at least a partial displacement from rural areas, especially the northern 'homelands', where conditions have deteriorated in recent years.

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Spatially, immigration has been concentrated in Katutura (blacks) and Khomasdal (coloureds). The latter has experienced particularly rapid population growth from both natural increase and migration, despite coloureds being the only group subject to migration restrictions from SA. Two distinct categories of such migrants could be distinguished: semi-skilled artisans from the Northwestern Cape, and formally well-educated, often professional, people from Cape Town and vicinity. Their large numbers proved one of the least expected research findings. Members of the latter category have settled both in Khomasdal and former white areas, and have had little difficulty in obtaining suitable jobs.

Abolition of influx control and aspects of contract labour focused attention on the housing situation in Katutura. The prison-like Hostel compound was rendered functionally redundant, overcrowding in the squalid Single Quarters has reached chronic proportions and family housing provision has lagged consistently further behind demand. The authorities acknowledged the need to reorientate priorities, but efforts in that regard to date have been inadequate and hampered by inappropriate and unchanged bureaucratic structures, unsympathetic officials and public indifference and suspicion. Municipal opinion has largely favoured accelerated construction of existing house types, but for sale, rather than rent as in the past. Problems experienced with the pilot self-help core-housing scheme appear to have reinforced this view, despite some influential lobbying for alternative structures to facilitate a holistic approach to the problem. This would involve

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people in planning and house construction, relate housing to wider social and environmental considerations, and provide a variety of housing options including true low cost shelter. Existing houses are being sold to their current occupants on concessionary terms in many cases, to promote home
ownership values, and remove a big public sector liability. Depending on the response, this may, in time, prove a major change in the urban political economy of domination, which sought to prevent such control over independent assets. Parts of the Single Quarters are currently being converted into family accommodation, but no action on proposed small scale boarding houses has yet been taken. The Hostel, symbol of contract labour and black oppression, remains, despite repeated pronouncements on the desirability of finding an alternative use or management system for it. While the short time period under review is a mitigating factor, the political importance attached to housing issues should have ensured rapid implementation of an alternative strategy. In Khomasdal there has been no visible shift in housing policy, other than accelerated matchbox house construction, an unfavourably received 'maisonette-type' pilot scheme, and exhortations that better-off people construct their own homes. Public reaction to these developments has been overwhelmingly negative and suspicious. Too much of the old system remains intact, and there is no denying that official policy consistently sought in the past to produce black subservience by negating and undermining individual initiative and enterprise:

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"... the majority of the inhabitants [of Katutura] interviewed were totally opposed to the present housing provided by the Municipality, and many felt that the new 'Emergency self-building scheme' was merely an extension of the 'encroaching arm of the Municipality'."
(WA 9/10/81:16)
This attitude will not be easy to reverse. Accelerated housing and institutional construction has split over into the former statutory buffer strips, thereby beginning to alter Windhoek's spatial structure by removing one of the major geographical instruments and symbols of apartheid. Roads and institutions could nevertheless be sited so as to perpetuate or even reinforce the barrier effect.
f) Economic Continuity
The urban economy experienced little structural change over the period of analysis (Chapter 7). Most commercial enterprises serve the local and sometimes national market, with negligible export. This in turn reflects the dearth of manufacturing activity, and heavy reliance on SA as a source of imports, and destination for un- or semi-processed primary sector exports (Chapter 2). Large public sector capital expenditures buoyed the local economy through an otherwise difficult period of drought-afflicted agriculture, depressed world mineral prices, and largely imported inflation. This created an artificial sense of wellbeing during 1979-81, until expenditure cutbacks forced curtailment of many construction programmes and consequent retrenchment of workers. A pervasive skilled labour shortage enabled some black and particularly coloured personnel to achieve upward mobility and
significant real wage increases. Namibianization in the lower and some

middle levels of the public service also created new opportunities. However, the
typical Third World labour market structure and increased
rural-urban migration have enabled proletarian labour exploitation to continue.
Racial and sex discrimination remain characteristic features of Windhoek's formal
economy, while real wages of many un- and semi-skilled workers have actually
deprecated. 'Informal sector' or petty commodity production and trading appear to
be expanding as a survival strategy, but as yet there is little evidence of formal
sector control or exploitation of such activities.

2. EVALUATION: THE EFFICACY OF TRANSITIONAL CHANGE
a) Bases for Evaluation
Chapter 1 established the transition period as a valid conceptual entity in the
decolonization process, and it was empirically delimited for Namibia in Chapter
2. The major processes of the transition period, as examined in the foregoing
chapters, were synthesized in the preceding section. In order to draw more
substantive conclusions, however, evaluation of these research findings is
necessary. This is perhaps best achieved through a set of four related questions:
a(i) Has empirical analysis of the transition period in Windhoek
justified its conceptual distinction? a(ii) How significant have the changes been?
a(iii) Whose interests were thereby served, i.e. who benefited? a(iv) Have these
changes had the desired effect? Finally, some reflections are provided on the
methodologies used.

a(i) The first question can be answered in the affirmative: after official acceptance
of the inevitability of eventual independence,
significant policy premises changed. New, or apparently different, formulations
appropriate to the new circumstances were needed. Although the incidence
and extent of changes have varied across the urban formation, the point of
departure and subsequent dynamic within most 'sectors' clearly distinguishes the
transition period from what preceded it.
a(ii) The second question is more complex in that distinction between
absolute change and that relative to what is possible in terms of the societal
structure is necessary. Several dominant themes emerge from the analysis. First
and foremost is the inescapable conclusion that, although some significant
legislative changes have occurred during the transition period to date, most have
had only limited short run impact. The rate of such legal change has declined
noticeably since mid-1979. In terms of numbers affected, the abolition of pass
laws is the most important, although desegregation of residential areas and
amenities, and the abolition of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality
Proclamations may have more immediately visible results in the former white
city.
Secondly, there has to date been no significant change to the structure of
economic production, consumption or distribution, or indeed the political
economy of housing provision, education and health services. Governmental structures have changed at first and second tier levels, but they are, for the most part, inappropriate to the task, being tailored towards retention of existing ethnic

discrepancies, and hamstrung by persistent reactionary attitudes and antagonistic sectional interests.

Thirdly, the City Council, Municipal Association and some top officials have consistently opposed attempted reforms - notably the opening of residential areas, public amenities, abolition of influx control and construction of a new multiracial college. They also strove to introduce a neo-apartheid local government solution in Windhoek and elsewhere.

Finally, increasing economic and political polarization has become evident. At one level this is manifested as class formation between white and some skilled coloured and black workers obtaining higher real returns to labour in a situation of excess demand for their services, and increasingly proletarianized black and coloured semi- or unskilled workers suffering increased structural exploitation and hence falling real wages. This probably has little direct relation to the transition process per se, other than its facilitation of interracial recruitment by legislative change, being fundamentally a function of Third World economic structure. A similar process is occurring in SA.

On the national political level there has been steady erosion of the middle ground since the heyday of the DTA and NNF during 1977-79. The DTA’s credibility has been undermined by its failure to effect more meaningful changes that would satisfy rising aspirations created by earlier rhetoric. This is attributable to the DTA and government’s structures, and ultimately the oft-demonstrated inability of the internal government to act independently of Pretoria on critical issues, despite strenuous efforts to suggest otherwise. The NNF fell victim to internecine feuding and personality clashes. Once disbanded, its former constituent parties lost momentum and broader recognition, falling between the two major poles of the DTA and SWAPO in the independence talks.

These trends have been mirrored in Windhoek local politics by, on the one hand, firmer white support for the National Party who have resisted integration measures, and on the other, by the discrediting of unrepresentative and allegedly corrupt coloured leaders on the Khomasdal Consultative Committee and second tier authority, with a consequent rise in support for SWAPO. SWAPO, always strongly supported by blacks in Katutura, has also benefited from disaffection with the DTA and especially continued harassment by police, army, ‘special constables’ and other authorities.
Absolute change has thus been tangible, but not structurally significant in general. Many blacks feel completely bypassed by it. Evaluation in relative terms is more problematic, since little comparative material is available. Conceptually, it appears unlikely that fundamental structural change can occur, since sovereignty has, by definition, not yet been conferred. As stated in Chapter 1, 'decolonization' implies a process for transferring authority only, and says nothing about political power per se. It is also characterized by attempts to preserve the existing political economy albeit by integration of some indigenous 'actors'. Change is thus almost certain to be limited: relatively cosmetic removal of provocative symbols and some offensive legislation, attempts to facilitate cultural/racial 'understanding', and especially to gain the confidence of at least a section of the indigenous elite. The latter is crucial to prolonging control and pre-empting mass uprising - hence some gestures to demonstrate government's social concern or goodwill to the wider populace are certain to be included.

Changes to date in Namibia and Windhoek fit this model reasonably well. Major discriminatory laws have been repealed (although generally with only minor short term impact) in attempting to give the appearance of a multiracial (cf. nonracial) democracy with universal adult franchise. Very similar government structures were formed in Kenya during the 1950s and Zimbabwe in 1978-79, "...seeking to manage conflict by establishing a coalition of ethnic leaders at the top of the political system." (Rothchild 1973:105)

There has been little major change in the political economy, despite political incorporation of many dark-skinned politicians. As in Jamaica (Clarke 1975:87) politics provided the major avenue of social mobility, although white Namibian leaders have not yet been eclipsed. Political and administrative autonomy has increased to the level of full internal self-government, at least in theory. The same was true of Jamaica by 1959 (Clarke 1975:77).

Arrangements for disposal of existing Katutura houses to their current occupants represent a major attempt to defuse political pressure deriving from social conditions, and to buy off the urban working class while simultaneously promoting middle class values and selling off a public sector liability. Although not articulated to the same extent politically, a certain analogy can be drawn with the central focus on the land issue during Kenyan decolonization (Rothchild 1973; Wasserman 1976). Land is not in the political limelight at present, but redistribution will certainly be a major post-independence issue, given the inequitable racial land holdings. A certain racial redistribution is in fact
occurring at present, as various second tier authorities purchase farms from whites to provide emergency grazing, or as investments. However, the nature of this process coupled with allegations of second tier corruption and personal enrichment suggest that it is in fact deleterious redistribution, which is certainly not broadening access to land.

While Rothchild (1973) and Wasserman (1976) give detailed accounts of racial bargaining at national level during the transition process, Clarke (1975) focuses on Kingston, Jamaica, providing the most detailed account to date of urban transition. This period lasted 18 years, from 1944-62, and bore several similarities to Windhoek additional to those already mentioned. Legislative segregation had never existed, but de facto segregation remained high and perhaps even rose in the case of whites. Moderate slum clearance was undertaken with British funds - comparable to the Katutura Emergency Housing Scheme with Central Government Funds. Indigenization of the entire civil service accompanied the dominance of brown middle stratum political and trade union leaders; however whites remained Kingston's commercial elite. In Kenya too, economic integration was one of the first objectives tackled in the integration process, but the economy proved highly resistant to full African participation (Rothchild 1973: 289). There were also some differences in Kingston: annual population growth of over 3.7%, slower than currently seems likely in Windhoek; attempts by the government to expand import substituting industrialization in Kingston; and notable improvements in educational standards as the result of broadening access to secondary schooling (Clarke 1975:77-87). Although the transition period in Windhoek is not yet complete, more fundamental changes seem unlikely.

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a(iii) The third question is important in determining the policy-effectiveness of such change as there has been. In fact only a small minority of the discriminated-against local population has benefited directly from liberalizations during the transition period. They may be characterized as incipient and established middle class, upwardly mobile by virtue of high formal training and skill levels. Apart from a handful of blacks (politicians, clergy, entrepreneurs), they are overwhelmingly 'coloured', many being recent migrants from SA. The majority of Windhoek's black and coloured population simply cannot afford to live in former white suburbs, utilize public amenities which charge significant entry fees, frequent hotels and restaurants, or send their children to private schools. These are in any case frequently not their priorities; either by virtue of inverted pride in a situation where the fundamental oppressive structures remain substantially unaltered, or because of different sets of values and norms. Most newly 'opened' facilities are in effect thus only a little
less exclusive than before. Many recent rural migrants may technically have benefited from freer access to the urban area but more detailed research is required to ascertain whether they are actually better off for it.

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Since a goal of decolonization is the accommodation of rising demands with minimal change to the status quo, the colonial elite is, almost by definition, likely to be one of the chief beneficiaries of this prolongation of privilege. In Namibia and Windhoek this has indeed been the case despite vigorous opposition to 'selling out' from rightwing politicians in the NP and HNP. No noticeable change in the character of any white residential area, public facility or amenity has followed their desegregation. The worsening conditions in Katutura and Khomasdal have no direct impact on whites while education and health services remain segregated. No white jobs have been threatened; on the contrary, it could be argued that such upward coloured and black mobility as there has been, has benefited whites by helping to maintain the viability of a seriously undermanned economic system. Political power remains effectively under white supervision, if not absolute control, within a complicated multi-ethnic government. White DTA politicians have tried to popularize their brand of 'black majority rule within a multiracial framework', but many whites appear unable to comprehend either the inevitability of change, or the fact that they have thus far suffered no loss of privilege or lifestyle as a result.

Finally, to the extent that the changes have provided a safety valve for political pressure, and hence enabled their continued occupation of Namibia, the SA authorities have also benefited. It is ironical that this should be occasioned by policies diametrically opposed to those still being roundly defended in SA itself, and that it is rightwing white pressure in SA that most strongly seeks to retain control over Namibia. There may be some truth in suggestions that SA is using Namibia as a 'laboratory' for testing social change.

a(iv) The final question, of whether changes have had the desired effect, follows very closely from the previous answer, since it implies a purpose on the part of those who introduced change - in this case, the DTA and their SA backers. Effect can be evaluated in two ways. In the sense that the changes have, on balance, occurred quite smoothly and are providing whites, in particular, a chance to adapt their attitudes to new circumstances, they can be said to be successful.

More fundamental, though, is the changes' role in modernizing the status quo as a goal of decolonization. To some extent they have undoubtedly met the most urgent and vocalized political demands,
thereby gaining some black support for the DTA. However, it is equally true that the absence of more fundamental changes, and continued emphasis on ethnicity, have increasingly discredited the DTA authorities and what positive moves they have introduced. The gap between rising aspirations and the government's ability to satisfy them is widening and further political polarization occurring. The situation will not change at least till after independence. South African military and diplomatic support, control and interests, both internally and internationally, rather than the reforms thus far introduced, are the major factors enabling maintenance of the existing political economy.

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b) Methodological Evaluation

It is appropriate at this juncture to reflect briefly on the methodologies employed. The newspaper content analysis proved effective in identifying key areas of public concern, although it would probably have been adequate to count simply the number of articles, rather than column centimetres throughout. Familiarity with the articles' content, and their wider context, is essential for reliable interpretation of significance - as illustrated by the 'Crime' and 'Political (and terrorism)' categories (Chapter 1). But sole reliance on such a method would be inadvisable, since inclusion of other categories may prove necessary on a priori or empirical grounds (as with 'Education' here). Lack of publicity on certain potentially contentious issues may be as important an indicator as open debate. The conceptual model appears to fit the observed situation well, and should be more widely applicable. The time period of analysis here was too short, however, to test its dynamic element adequately.

For the rest, utilization of a broad range of methodologies and techniques drawn from various disciplines, proved rewarding. Participant observation and interview surveys, in particular, yielded results exceeding expectation and were of great value in offsetting drawbacks and statistical shortcomings inherent in the sampling procedures. These, in turn, were largely dictated by circumstance (the 'informal sector') or available data base (electricity forms; chambers of commerce membership), and while unsatisfactory if used in isolation, were usable in conjunction with the other techniques.

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mentioned. There is also no substitute for deep personal knowledge in exercising discretion, as frequently required in the field. The results presented here are felt to be reliable in their respective contexts.

3. PROSPECTS INTO INDEPENDENCE

Following logically from the previous section is the question of future prospects. The value of this study would be considerably enhanced if the nature and extent of further socio-political change, which, it has been shown, must follow independence, could be predicted.
and hence planned for. Based on experience in other post-colonial cities, and reasoned extrapolation from the current situation, fairly good predictions can in fact be made at both national and local urban levels, as are set out at some length below. Detailed planning, however, falls beyond our present scope.

a) National Context
Since politics embraces the art of tension management, an appropriate starting point is enumeration of the major extant tensions requiring resolution. At the national level these include
(i) colonially-based inequalities of access to land, with particular overcrowding and environmental deterioration in some of the homelands. Some form of redistribution coupled with appropriate agricultural policy is a priority.
(ii) politically entrenched ethnic divisions, which serve to perpetuate, rather than reduce, existing disparities.
(iii) a little-changed colonial political economy, in which race and class coincide, structural barriers to equality of opportunity remain strong, foreign corporate ownership of major resource bases and means of production is pronounced, and the economy open-ended in an dependent external relationship with SA and the world capitalist system.
(iv) inappropriate government structures; a civil service and parastatal organizations controlled by SA whites, despite some lower level indigenization; and SA military domination.

The Lusaka-based UNIN has undertaken important research into appropriate future policy in these key areas (UNIN 1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1981a, 1981b; United Nations 1980, Green 1981, SWAPO 1981). Insights into likely short term post-independence government priorities under SWAPO control can be gleaned from those identified by the new Zimbabwean government on accession to power in April 1980, since the situation in Namibia and SWAPO ideology show many structural and circumstantial similarities to them. These are:
(i) Africanization of the 40 000-strong civil service (not by systematic discrimination according to official assurances).
(ii) Integration of the guerrilla and former Rhodesian armies.
(iii) Resettlement of refugees.
(iv) Reorganization of the media - especially radio and television.
(v) Improved labour conditions - minimum wages etc.
(vi) Introduction of a National Health Service.
A degree of success far exceeding most observers' expectations was achieved in most of these spheres within the first two years of independence. Given that around 80% of Zimbabwe's population is rural, the rural policy bias is both understandable and necessary. Namibia had a 75% rural population in 1970 (Simon 1982), but the absence from UNIN's programme of any urban planning is notable, the more since major political and economic problems have generally crystallized in African capitals and other major cities after independence. This forms the subject of our present concern.

b) Local Issues in Ex-Colonial Capital Cities

The act of granting independence shifts the locus of political decision-making from metropolitan to ex-colonial capital city. This, at least theoretically, alters the balance of cultural and power-related factors in terms of which colonial cities were distinguished in Chapter 1, creating a new category of autonomous post-colonial cities. Fanon (1967:29) suggests that it is through examination of the colonial world's compartments that its implicit 'lines of force' are revealed:

"This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized."

Just as national policies, alignments and structures should be transformed or modified in accordance with the new rulers' value system (Slater 1975), so the capital city, in particular, as the physical embodiment of all these variables, should reflect the new circumstances:

"The task for the inheritors of the colonial city is one of investing it with a new set of social, cultural and political properties and of giving it a new symbolic meaning representative of the society of which it is a now a part."

(King 1976: 288)

A growing body of research is showing, however, that relatively little change in the physical-spatial form of post-colonial cities has generally occurred, whatever the stated government policy. Existing urban form represents vast accumulated investment, however dysfunctional certain elements might be. Concrete and brick are less easily recast than paper plans and policies. As McGee (1967:70-75, Chapter 8) and King (1976:282-288) argue, many of the basic problems and structural features persist long after the colonialism which gave rise to these cities:

"If economic independence follows only slowly on political autonomy, cultural independence lags even further behind."

(King 1976: 278)

Most independent Third World countries are still tied into the
dependent trade and politico-military relations of neo-colonialism, while numerous pressing problems compete for scarce development funds. With relaxation of colonial controls and deteriorating rural conditions, rural-urban migration generally accelerates to such an extent that it far outstrips resources available for basic housing and service provision, let alone alteration of existing areas. African capital cities grew at unprecedented annual rates during the 1960s (e.g. Lusaka 11-12%, Kinshasa 11.8%, Nairobi 9.6%, Lagos 11.5%) of which over half was attributable to migration (Fair and Davies 1976:146). In most African countries the trend accelerated further during the 1970s, with national urban growth rates of between 3.1% p.a. in South Africa and 8.3% p.a. in Tanzania (Gilbert and Gugler 1982:6). The culture-related aspects of metropolitan - ex-colonial relations are perhaps even more resistant to short term change: linguistic ties and related information flows, technical assistance programmes, educational policies and planning concepts persist. Over a decade after independence, Aams (1972) concluded that there were two primate cities in West Africa in terms of communications: London and Paris! France has been singularly successful in maintaining neo-colonial continuity in its former African colonies (Higgott 1980). Even Portugal is currently re-establishing special links with its former African colonies - a mere 7 years after the end of bitter independence struggles (Financial Times 1982). Most importantly, many of the emergent elites have received formal education in the former metropolitan country. McGee (1967:75) asks pertinently, "But can the new city-bred rulers of Southeast Asia (or Africa) solve the problems of colonial urbanism when they themselves are a product of the very environment which they must seek to change?"

The reply, judging from recent experience, appears generally negative. Notwithstanding their long periods of hardship or even imprisonment during the independence struggle, indigenous leaders have frequently proved all too willing to accept the trappings of power, make ostentatious symbolic changes, yet either consciously or unconsciously preserve many of the very inequalities and practices they so vehemently opposed (e.g. La Fontaine 1970). In spatial terms this has meant preservation of the existing urban layout. Political and economic elites have moved into the high class, low density, outer suburbs vacated by the former colonial personnel, while the remaining whites and/or Asians tend to be very highly segregated in parts of these areas. Amenities and services are still concentrated here, often at great per capita expense, rather than in the overcrowded low income areas. Exclusive social and sports clubs are joined, and other cultural attributes
assimilated. Together with their structural positions, this makes the indigenous elites functionally equivalent to their colonial predecessors. Singapore, for example, remained a city "...planned by Europeans and inhabited by non-Europeans whose residential distribution continues to reflect the intentions of the European rulers to an amazing extent."
(McGee 1967:72)

Exact permutations vary according to local circumstances; whether there was a pre-colonial indigenous city; and the proportion of whites and/or stranger groups in the urban population. In independent plural societies, ethnicity and culture are still major determinants of residential segregation, although being gradually replaced by economic stratification. There is wide consensus in the literature on Asia, the Commonwealth Caribbean and Africa on these issues, and others cited below (e.g. Mascarenhas 1966, 1967; McGee 1967; De Blij 1968; Temple

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1968; Weigt 1968; Davies 1969; La Fontaine 1970; Gugler 1972; Tiwari 1972; Vorlauer 1973; Clarke 1974, 1975; Abu-Lughod 1975, 1976, 1980; McNulty 1976; King 1976; Soja and Weaver 1976). Class differences have frequently replaced racial schisms, and Abu-Lughod (1976:209) suggests that these in turn appear to decline within a few decades of decolonization. If not reduced, however, violence may result. The recent coup attempt in Kenya appears to have had its roots in just such structural inequalities (Guardian 1982), which also help explain much Third World political instability.

The urban poor, and new migrants have been living in increasingly overcrowded conditions in townships, inner city tenements or indigenous medinas, which have lost their wealthier residents to the suburbs. New peripheral spontaneous settlements have mushroomed on open land in most areas, despite all official attempts at suppression, except where availability of rented accommodation, temporary rather than permanent urban residence by migrants, or official tolerance of sub-standard housing render them unnecessary (Clarke 1974:228; Peil 1976; Gilbert and Ward 1982). However, even sympathetic government policy is no guarantee against squatting if the bureaucracy is inefficient (Lindberg 1981; Stren 1982); and there may be vested interests in maintaining slum conditions (Umeh 1972). Up to half the population of major cities may live in uncontrolled settlements.

Urban growth has thus been alarming, but appropriate positive low income planning policies can ameliorate conditions significantly (Collins et al. 1975). This growth has characteristically been by accretion on the urban fringe rather than by transformation of the

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colonial urban form. Where new capitals were created, as in Kampala or Gaborone, new government and public sector facilities became necessary
A (Temple 1968; Best 1970). These and other symbols of nationhood, like university campuses, have had significant socio-spatial impact, although most such planning is done by First World consultants, using alien criteria and expressing non-African values (Weigt 1968; Vorlauffer 1970; King 1977/78; Gibbon et al. 1980).

Economic expansion through industrialization has been widely promoted, but with very few exceptions e.g. Singapore, formal sector job creation has singularly failed to keep pace with demand. Structural unemployment and 'informal' (petty commodity) activities have thus become characteristic elements of the urban scene (see Chapter 7).

High-rise commercial and office blocks have progressively replaced most remaining colonial architecture in the CBD, thereby also reducing residential accommodation there on the North American model. CBDs themselves have generally grown up to a point, and thereafter declined in relative importance as urban expansion facilitates development of suburban shopping centres.

Spatial integration has been improved by positive use of vacant buffer strips where these existed (Mascarenhas 1967). However their new institutional or recreational functions may in fact perpetuate the barrier effect - as noted in Windhoek (Chapters 5 and 6). Urban symbolism has generally experienced conspicuous indigenization - as in renaming of cities, streets and institutions (see King 1976:246-248 on the ideological content of nomenclature), or removal of colonial statues (e.g. Cape Times 1980, RDM 1980).

One major exception to the general post-colonial experience, apart from the Kmer Rouge's nihilistic 'Year Zero' plan in Kampuchea, is Cuba's radical post-revolutionary transformation. Urban policy forms an integral part of national development policy aimed at overcoming the colonial legacy of structural and spatial inequality. The 1960 Urban Reform Law abolished the urban land market, provided for massive governmental housing construction, state authorization of all land and property transfers, cession of accommodation to current occupants with indemnification for owners, and summary expropriation of slums. Havana's rapid growth has been halted and diverted elsewhere in the urban system (Acosta and Hardoy 1971, 1972).

In conclusion, a number of broad projections on Windhoek's future after independence can now be made with a fair degree of reliability. They cover the issues raised in the previous section, and appear here in a sequence reflecting their likely chronological implementation. For obvious reasons, more fundamental changes generally have longer gestation periods. Either singly or in combination they will provide fruitful avenues for future research. Comparative analysis across
culturally diverse post-colonial cities would advance the search for a theory of Third World urbanization an important stage further.

(i) Colonial names and major symbols, like Kaiser Street, Leutwein Street, Goring Street, Verwoerd Park or J.G. Strydom Airport are certain to disappear rapidly, just as Jamieson Ave. and Kingsway in Harare became Samora Machel Ave. and Julius Nyerere Ave. respectively or Maputo's university the Eduardo Mondlane University. The name of Windhoek itself might even change - perhaps to 'Otjomuise' (Chapter 3). In the interests of national unity and avoiding repetition of past errors, living persons should not be thus honoured. Indigenous place names would be more appropriate, but many are likely to be in English, the favoured official language (UNIN 1981a). The statues of Von Francois (Windhoek's founder) outside the Municipality, and the German Schutztruppe outside the Alte Feste, will doubtlessly also disappear. Some German architecture will remain as historic monuments, and the central area morphology is unlikely to be substantially changed. The vacant buffer strips are already being utilized.

(ii) Windhoek already possesses the Tintenpalast government centre in an appropriate symbolic location. Some extensions will probably be necessary to house the full range of Departments, but some of the present government-occupied CBD premises will probably be retained. Rationalization of the existing cumbersome government structure could reduce gross space, manpower and resource requirements, although establishment of new departments for functions now performed by SA will have the opposite effect. Another option would be decentralization of certain functions to larger regional centres, although some of the necessary infrastructure might be lacking.

(iii) The local authority is certain to be administered on the basis of a single integrated municipality with City Councillors elected on a common roll. If wards contain approximately equal numbers of voters, and a wholesale exodus of whites does not occur, a racially well-mixed but black dominated Council will result, since whites, although now in the minority, still form a larger proportion of the urban population.

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than was the case in most comparable capitals. Divergent sectional interests and white resistance to changing priorities will undoubtedly generate conflict. New black members may be unfamiliar with convention and procedure (Greenwood and Howell 1980), while white officials may be felt to be obstructionist. There is no reason why the present British-based South African system should be adapted intact, although this has normally occurred elsewhere. Local government functions will hinge on the new government structure. If local integration is to be meaningful, the most necessary change will have to be in the spatial resource allocation - with the present bias in favour of higher income, lower density suburbs reversed, to reduce the discrepancies.
with Katutura and Khomasdal, and incorporate them fully into the urban system on a uniform basis. But it is precisely this cross-subsidization that will provoke sternest reaction from representatives of the wealthier wards.

c(iv) Economically it is difficult to foresee significant medium term change, except in the spatial pattern of trade if alternative sources to SA are tapped (Green 1981, Simon forthcoming). Prospects for industrial growth are dim for reasons enumerated earlier. Light engineering, commerce and tertiary services probably have the best growth potential, since Windhoek is poorly located for resource-based industry e.g. cement, or agricultural processing. Additional zoned or designated industrial land exists adjacent to present industrial zones in the north of Windhoek. The capital's retail structure will also diversify, particularly in Katutura and Khomasdal, although the CBD is unlikely to decline in importance, given Windhoek's size. Whites will retain much of their elite commercial status. The capital's economic base will thus remain narrow, job creation make little impression on rising unemployment, and 'informal sector' activity increase. Planning for, rather than against, these, coupled with public works projects, both locally and nationally, could alleviate the situation in the short to medium term.

c(v) Education and Health will receive prompt attention at the national level, since they provide the key to social progress. Socialist policies of the type favoured by SWAPO which have been implemented elsewhere, have sought to ensure the widest possible access to these services, with a form of National Health Service, universal primary education and greatly expanded secondary education in the shortest possible time. Measures have also been taken against exclusive private schools. Nevertheless, true equality of access has rarely been achieved, and the wealthy or Party faithful are commonly overrepresented. Priorities in Namibia must be to unify the education system and eliminate investment discontinuities; expand facilities, especially at secondary and post-secondary levels, compile appropriate syllabi, and train additional teachers. Many white teachers are likely to leave rather than face integrated classes. Underutilization at present white schools will increase as whites leave, creating places for other races. White opposition to such moves will continue, and some parents will prefer to send their children to SA schools. Since the private schools are already 'open', and run by multiracial churches (with 1 exception) they will probably continue unhindered. Spatial zoning, widely regarded as a restrictive instrument, is unlikely to be introduced, but the better schools, at least in terms of facilities, will for a considerable period be those currently reserved for whites. The benefits of their integration will thus be largely restricted to the new elite who will increasingly inhabit the high status suburbs.
c(vi) Intra-urban residential mobility will certainly increase after independence, with rather more blacks foresaking Katutura than hitherto (Chapter 5). More coloured people may also leave Khomasdal, especially if the housing shortage worsens still further, although they have generally felt fewer qualms about moving before independence. As long as the capitalist housing market is permitted to operate, factors analyzed in Chapter 5 will continue to determine the spatial distribution of this mobility.

Several important parameters will change, however. First, the absolute rate of mobility will depend to some extent on the number of whites emigrating or at least putting their homes on the market in order to hold liquid, rather than fixed, assets. This in turn will hinge on the precise course of political events. Secondly, a significant proportion of available high quality housing will be purchased by returning exiles (political elite and professional classes) and the international diplomatic and aid/development corps. Their creation of excess demand in the upper housing bracket will inflate prices, at least in the short term, beyond the level affordable by many Windhoek residents. Thirdly, the future government’s policy in respect of publically owned housing will be crucial. This category forms over 1/3 of the total stock (Chapter 6). Since many of the whites most likely to emigrate at independence, i.e. those in the public sector, occupy job-tied housing, the direct effect of a significant white exodus on the housing market will probably not be proportionately great. Depending on government policy, this housing could then be sold on the open market or reserved for tenancy by employees with or without the existing option to purchase. Since most of the new employees will be black, the policy effect on urban racial ecology will be marked.

c(vii) Overall government housing policy will prove of the utmost importance in retaining or transforming the status quo. Windhoek’s declining population growth rate since the 1950s (Simon 1982:244) is certain to reverse after independence, if this hasn’t already occurred, creating problems identical to those discussed above in other Third World capitals. Conventional housing solutions will be inadequate and inappropriate, and planning for rapid low income growth is essential (Collins et al. 1975). The Katutura Emergency Housing Scheme has highlighted many problems, and new structures are required for the task. African evidence suggests it unlikely that a Cuban-style strategy will be adopted. Windhoek’s physical growth will ultimately be constrained by topography, since the built-up area already covers 55% of the 10 900ha developable land, but the Guide Plan (Municipality of Windhoek 1980) envisages retention of separate high, medium and low density/income zones. While there will be progressive racial blurring in the upper and median groups, the poor, who are black and coloured, will almost certainly remain segregated in burgeoning Katutura, Khomasdal, and their envisaged future counterparts in the south of the Windhoek valley.
In that case the cityscape is not likely to undergo any radical transformation. In view of the well-established reciprocal relationship between spatial form and social process, this would suggest a lack of meaningful social progress, even if key white actors have been replaced by black.

(viii) Conclusion: Urban Poverty and Structural Change: John Friedmann (1979:101-102) defines poverty as 'unequal access to the bases for accumulating social power’. Seen from this structuralist perspective it is "... a multidimensional phenomenon that refers to a condition of relative access. The definition therefore shifts the focus from consumption to the production of life and livelihood. Low income is not the only relevant criterion; money is no substitute for life."

In addition to productive resources he thus includes social and political organizations, social networks, appropriate knowledge and skills, and information appropriate for advancing life chances. The implicit solution is to empower the poor:

"Poverty is a political phenomenon."

Such inequalities of access are institutionalized in colonial cities, and their dimensions in Windhoek have been amply demonstrated in the foregoing chapters. Liberation movements have universally pledged themselves to undo the iniquities of colonialism. However, one of the central themes emerging from the literature is the general continuity between colonial and post-colonial periods, built on an alliance between the upper (commercial) and middle (professional and especially political) social strata. A decade after independence, Clarke (1975:139) concluded that "Jamaica's motto for independence, 'Out of Many One People' is scarcely closer to realization than it was ... and Kingston is still beset by the unresolved problems of the colonial period."

Whites in post-colonial society tend to retain colonial attitudes and ambivalence towards the new state, being at once thereby fearful of, and more susceptible to, 'the operationalization of race' (Murphree 1978). Eradication of racially determined structural inequalities in a fledgling non-racial society poses tremendous challenges. The colonial city's structure lends itself to perpetuation of socio-spatial discontinuities. The road ahead is strewn with obstacles, not least because of Namibia's position vis-à-vis South Africa. But ultimately, Abu-Lughod's apposite warning (1976:209) must be heeded:

"... if the castelike structure persists and is not modified by a gradual social 'revolution' in which power and resources are redistributed in a more egalitarian fashion, these sharp class cleavages, which have highly visible projections in the physical form of the city, may translate
into more violent change."

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REFERENCES
(1980): Rabat; urban apartheid in Morocco. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Latin American Urban Research 2, pp.167-177.

-531-

-532

-533-


-534


-535

APPENDIX A

DATA SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 7.1

LENGTH OF ROADIS

TABLE 7.A

IN WINDHOEK MUNICIPAL AREA 1q77-1q8q

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1980</th>
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<td>Tarred Roads</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Windhoek</td>
<td>256.95</td>
<td>260.03</td>
<td>260.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katutura</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>11.51</td>
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### TABLE 7.B
**ANNUAL AVERAGE DAILY WATER CONSUMPTION IN WINDHOEK MUNICIPAL AREA 1977 - 1980**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Units(m3) A Rise</th>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>26 381</td>
</tr>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>26 824 1.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>29 626 10.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>31 406 6.80</td>
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Source: Municipality of Windhoek, City Engineer's Dept.

### TABLE 7.a
**ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION - WINDHOEK MUNICIPAL AREA**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>* J 97 7 - 198 0</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
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</tr>
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<td>May</td>
</tr>
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<td>n-Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GJul</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
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<td>Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures are for end June; road lengths are given in km.
NB: Increases in the total for a township. Where there is n gravel roads vary inversely.
ny area represents the layout of new o increase, the lengths of tarred and

Source: Municipality of Windhoek, City Engineer's Dept.
<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>255 751</td>
<td>236 000</td>
<td>282 949</td>
<td>270 000</td>
<td>238 007</td>
<td>285 385</td>
<td>268 002</td>
<td>268 589</td>
<td>205 241</td>
<td>252 076</td>
<td>287 563</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>531 000</td>
<td>497 502</td>
<td>587 250</td>
<td>571 530</td>
<td>569 660</td>
<td>674 780</td>
<td>646 120</td>
<td>799 600</td>
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<td>542 520</td>
<td>419 460</td>
<td>520 240</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>13 193 592</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Unit = kW/h (Kilowatt/hour)**

**NB:** In some instances the monthly totals do not correspond with the sum of the three components. The data are reproduced as supplied by the Municipality, since no means of checking the source of the
errors is available. I have calculated only the annual totals.
Source: Municipality of Windhoek, City Electrotechnical Engineer's Dept.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>M/C SOLO</td>
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<td>928</td>
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<td>797</td>
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VEHICLE OWNER

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<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Baster</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>23.831</td>
<td>24.571</td>
<td>24.329</td>
<td>24.822</td>
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<td>COLOURED</td>
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*Public authorities, paras talls, etc.
'NB: Data for the Municipal area alone are not available; however a very high percentage of Vehicles (except for some farm equipment) are in Windhoek, as there are no other urban centres in the District.

Source: Municipality of Windhoek, Town Planning Section, City Engineer's Dept.

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<table>
<thead>
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</table>
These figures do not include the single hotel in Khomasdal, as this was classified as a 'Coloured-Hotel' - a category for which data were available only collectively. The absolute number of beds and rooms in the hotels for which the data are given, is not known, and certainly varies over the period. Apart from alterations and extensions, two hotels closed down during the relevant periods one in 1978 and the other in 1979. There were thus 10 hotels in 1976, and only 8 in 1981.

Source: data obtained from the Dept. of Economic Affairs Tourism Division. There appear to be some month-to-month anomalies but no verification was possible; the data are given as obtained.
APPENDIX B
THE HOUSEHOLD SUBSISTENCE LEVEL
The Household Subsistence Level (HSL) is the theoretical minimum subsistence income for a black family of 6 or a coloured family of 5 (their respective average family sizes), and indicates what the breadwinner would have to earn to fulfil these needs in the short term. It comprises two elements, a Primary HSL - consisting of food, clothing, fuel, lighting, washing and cleansing - and the overall HSL which includes rent and transport as well. There are separate figures for blacks and coloureds, based on some differences in 'assumed' diet, but necessitated primarily by significant differences in rent and transport between them. Data are calculated for a number of South Africa cities plus Windhoek, being updated in April and October each year (April only in Windhoek).

The HSL is a very conservative measure, assuming e.g. low basic dietary requirements, transport for only one wage earner, and omitting medical and similar expenses (hence the emphasis on its being a short term indicator).

Nevertheless it remains the most widely used index in South Africa and has thus been used here for the sake of
comparability. A second index, the Household Effective Level (HEL), which is
the amount required for meaningful or 'effective' living as opposed to mere
subsistence, is 50% higher than the HSL (Potgieter 1974, 1978, 1980, 1981;
However, the HSL has been used by many firms as an indicator of the minimum
wage they should be paying in the long run.

TABLE 7.21
HOUSEHOLD SUBSISTENCE LEVEL (HSL) DATA APRIL 1980 - APRIL 1981
FOR WINDHOEK AND SELECTED SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES (R)
CITY PRIMARY HSL HSL % CHANGE*
Windhoek
Blacks 1.79.44 210.69 201.04 233.76 10.2 16.3
Coloureds 185.05 212.23 238.32 272.12 11.1 14.2
Cape Town
Blacks 154.62 176.62 179.60 209.01 3.2 16.4
Coloureds 151.08 178.74 184.04 213.52 2.8 16.0
Johannesburg
Blacks 153.45 176.46 179.94 216.22 12.6 20.1
Coloureds 154.09 180.21 192.49 222.52 17.0 15.6
Port Elizabeth
Blacks 147.48 176.64 168.85 198.01 10.0 17.3
Coloureds 138.86 172.40 171.44 208.27 7.7 21.5
Durban
Blacks 157.05 180.86 180.33 205.08 18.6 13.7
Coloureds 147.39 166.98 193.09 215.03 13.6 11.4
King W. T.
Blacks 155.99 170.02 172.09 186.12 9.8 8.2
Coloureds 142.85 164.60 166.05 193.26 2.6 16.4
*Change in HSL over previous year's level, King Williams Town
Sources: Potgieter (1980): Fact Paper 36 Table 48 pp.60-61
- (1981): Fact Paper 41 Table 48 pp.60-61
Port Elizabeth:University of Port Elizabeth Institute of Planning Research.

HSL levels are higher in Windhoek than any South African centre for which data
are provided, although the rate of increase in some of the latter has outstripped
that in Windhoek in recent years as a result of
the strong economic upswing in SA (Table 7.21). Windhoek's high cost of living
reflects the high proportion of consumer goods and food imported from SA, higher
average unit costs arising from the relatively small quantities
imported, and near monopoly market conditions. It is therefore significant the
Windhoek's HSL shows a larger increase 1980-1981 for both blacks and coloureds than the increase in the Consumer Price Index for the same period (13.7%), as the reverse is normally true (see Potgieter 1981:9).

APPENDIX C
BLACK WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA
The data provided by the Municipality are estimated averages based on modal starting wages for the various job categories. The information is derived from employees' contracts, which must still legally be registered at the Municipal Labour Bureau, despite the abolition of formal pass laws and influx control (see Chapters 5 and 6; Cronje and Cronje 1979:38-41). They are thus not totally reliable, but nevertheless a useful guide. Table 7.22 gives estimated employment data for Katutura residents in 1975 and 1980, showing the range of jobs open to most blacks, as well as 1980 wage estimates by category for local residents and migrants. While there would appear to be a slight increase in the more highly skilled categories (nurses, teachers, journalists, clerks, etc.) the most significant increase has been in the number of registered unemployed. This is certainly an understatement of the true situation, as many unemployed fail to register (see Section 9).

Analysis of the Municipality's records in respect of black unskilled workers for whom employers pay the Katutura housing levy, suggested that the 56 employers with more than 30 such workers on their books employed a total of roughly 7500 in November 1980. These figures are,

(1) An arbitrary but convenient cut-off point for 'large' employers of semi- and unskilled black labour.

-544-

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>Total Local Migrant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction workers</td>
<td>3 664 3 660</td>
<td>3 660 87.00-96-75 48.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>General labourers</td>
<td>3 463 764 251</td>
<td>1 015 86.00-107.50 96.75</td>
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<td>Cleaners</td>
<td>3 017 1 775 320</td>
<td>2 095 107.50-129.00 86.00-107.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic servants</td>
<td>2 125 1 400 600</td>
<td>2 000 35.00(women)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>1 488 1 380 160</td>
<td>1 540 103.20 44.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Messenger/delivery</td>
<td>698 713 - 713</td>
<td>129.00-150.50 107.50-129.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Employed</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck drivers</td>
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<td>630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wash and ironing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Clerks and officeiers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck labourers</td>
<td>118</td>
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<td>Garage labourers</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher and translator</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrol pump attendants</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm labourers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constables municipal</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constables: police</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constables: railway</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waiters</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mine workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hop workers</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison warders</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speculators &amp; hawkers</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcer &amp; porter</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxi driver</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garage owner</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1472</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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Where available. Hourly wages have been converted to monthly equivalents on the basis of an aerae 45-hr week, although some unskilled workers may work up to 60 hr.. Weekly wage were converted by a factor of 4.3.

Employed on city comonage.

Sources: (1) Municipality of Windhoek (1978)s Windhoek - Central to South West Africs/Naibla. pp.17-18

RB (a) These are only estimates based on a sample.
(b) Very few wages are above the April 1980 HSL of R201, thus corroborating the employment survey data.

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However, subject to rapid and significant fluctuations. One of the most remarkable features is the very short average job tenure - under 4 months - in the construction and soft drinks sectors as well as a number of other large and well-known firms. Some of these are reputed to pay particularly low wages or have discriminatory employment practices, or 'difficult' managerial staff. The construction industry is also notoriously volatile. Conversely, employees of a significant number of firms and government departments have long average service periods - 10 years or more in some cases. Again, some of these firms are known to be enlightened 'equal opportunity' employers.

Another feature is that of the top 10 firms, which employ 4 400 of the 7 500 workers, 5 belong to the State or parastatal sector. Of the top 20, employing 5 500 workers, 7 are public sector bodies. Altogether there were 15 such bodies among the 56 cited here. These figures emphasize the importance of public sector employment in Windhoek right across the skill and race spectrum.

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APPENDIX D

'INFORMAL' SECTOR ACTIVITIES

The major types of 'informal' activity in Windhoek (i.e. including Katutura and Khomasdal) are:

1) Retail hawkers and vendors selling a variety of food and other goods e.g. fruit, vetkoek, bread, cool drinks, meat (especially offal), fire-wood, baskets, wood-carvings, leather goods, jewellery.
2) Shebeens. These are widespread, especially in Katutura and Khomasdal, selling either liquor purchased from bottle stores or home-brewed mahangu (sorghum beer) or both.
3) Production of arts and crafts, especially baskets, wood carvings, shoes, leather goods, dolls, macrame and crochet work. These are generally sold direct to the public by the makers, either by street display or personal contact.
4) Personal and other services - notably backyard motor mechanics, upholstery, baby-sitting, barbers/hairdressers, shoe repairs.
5) House construction and related activities. This has become particularly common since the introduction of home extensions and self-help schemes. Bricklayers, carpenters, plasterers, welders and others are involved.
6) Scavengers and collectors - of fire-wood, and the contents of refuse bins and dumps. This was significant until the closure of the Eros Park refuse dump in 1981, and may continue at the new site.
7) Private 'bazaars' - especially at weekends. A kind of prolonged fund-raising party, where friends and relatives of the holder purchase food and drink.
8) Crime - including the recycling of stolen goods, and prostitution, drug-peddling etc.

Given Windhoek's small size and the relatively recent upswing in these activities, they correspond fairly well with the list provided by Rogerson and Beavon (1980:180).

Kaiser Wilhelmsberg
MuN Ioipality Army HQ
Newer
Admin Legislative
Off oes ssemb*F Tintenpalast
Hochland Park (Old Location)
Hoogenhout School
French
Christue-I Bank Tintenpalast kirche Centre
Auas Mountains
Academia
Southern Industrial Area
School Hostel

Khomas Hochland
Windheek West
South
West Three
Africa White
House Sco Ols
Windhoek North
Doctors' Windhoek Housing
TheT
Khomasdsl
Nurse$' Towers
White State Hospital
FIGU E 3.3
PANORAMA OF WINDHOEK 1981.
Katutura
Northern
Industrial
Area
Buffer
Strip
Katatura
State Hospital

SEUTULE SAKESEIREDS
iru 83 és et OS
or