



To Zimbabwe via Zambia

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The Central African Federation

Swedish support to the nationalist cause in Zimbabwe was preceded by a Rhodesia Campaign, which-despite the name-was launched in June 1962 in support of Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) of Zambia. Zambia was at the time joined with Zimbabwe and Malawi in the Central African Federation. Little known outside the churches, it was Per W.stberg's articles in Dagens Nyheter and, above all, his political account Forbidden Territory from 1960 that introduced the Federation and its constituent parts-Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi)-to the broader Swedish public.¹ With the Swedish participation in the UN operations in Congo, Northern Rhodesia-bordering on the secessionist province of Katanga-would at the beginning of the 1960s become a familiar name. It was dramatically brought to the fore in September 1961, when the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash outside Ndola on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt.

Both the liberal and social democratic movements had by that time entered into direct contact with the nationalist leadership in all the three federated British territories. As secretary general of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), David Wirmark of the Liberal Party Youth League had, for example, in August 1958 already befriended Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe, then President-General of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC). The Social Democratic Party had also initiated relations with Kamuzu Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP), then the most militant of the nationalist movements in the Federation. Immediately after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, Kanyama Chiume of MCP-based in London and an influential member of the Steering Committee of the All-African Peoples' Conference-was invited by the ruling party to represent the African nationalist movement and address the 1960 First of May rally in Stockholm together with Prime Minister Tage Erlander. As earlier noted, it was the first time that a Labour Day march in Stockholm included an international section and Chiume was the first Southern African leader to publicly address the Swedish workers.

¹ In his lecture on 'National independence movements in Asia and Africa', Olof Palme had as early as in November 1953 discussed the issue of the Central African Federation with various Swedish political student associations. According to his notes, Palme affirmed that "the [federated] countries belong to the indigenous [peoples]" (Olof Palme: 'Nationella självständighetsrörelser i Asien och Afrika' / 'National independence movements in Asia and Africa' op. cit.).

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During his stay in Stockholm, Chiume discussed the possibility of placing Malawian students in Sweden through the Social Democratic Party.¹ Similar discussions had been initiated with Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP of Zambia. In January 1960, Kaunda's close colleague Simon Kapwepwe, General Treasurer of UNIP, had written to Joachim Israel at the Social Democratic Party headquarters in Stockholm, explaining that UNIP "may achieve self-government in [a] few months [time], [and the] immediate problem is staffing of our government departments [...] due to the shortage of trained person[n]el". Against this background, Kapwepwe wrote, "we have thought it wise to write to friends like you and ask them if they could help us by offering [...] scholarships in all branches of arts and sciences".² The Liberal Party was also approached. In fact, its youth league had before 1960 invited Zambian students to Sweden³ and the question of training was again raised by Kaunda through Wirmark when they met at the Second Pan-African Youth Seminar in Dar es Salaam in August 1961.⁴ Such prominent UNIP leaders as Rupiah Banda, Emmanuel Chalabesa and Alexander Chikwanda would in this way come to Sweden for secondary and university studies in the early 1960s.

Kaunda, UNIP and Zambia played important parts in the early Swedish involvement in Southern Africa. This should be seen against the background of the political developments within the Central African Federation at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as it was formally called, was created by the British in 1953, mainly at the insistence of white settler interests in Southern Rhodesia wishing to tap the wealth generated by Northern Rhodesia's copper mines in favour of a larger and more diversified Rhodesian economy. Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was also seen as a promising vehicle to attain autonomous dominion status within the Commonwealth. To satisfy the British government that federation would not stall the political advancement of the African populations in the territories, the leading advocates of the federate plan—Godfrey Huggins in Southern Rhodesia and Roy Welensky in Northern Rhodesia—advanced the concept of a multi-racial 'partnership'. It would, however, soon be described in terms of white supremacy. Huggins—who served as the Federation's first Prime Minister from 1953 to 1956 (when he was succeeded by Welensky)—bluntly presented it as a partnership between "the rider and the horse".⁵

1 Chiume op. cit., p. 137.

2 Letter from Simon Kapwepwe to Joachim Israel, London, 24 January 1960 (JIC).

3 Interview with David Winnark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996.

4 Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995 and interview with David Wirmark, Stockholm, 20 February 1996. According to Wirmark, Kaunda "was at [the] very centre of events [at the 1961 Dar es Salaam WAY seminar, where] he gave us his inside story and vision on the political developments in Southern Africa. [...] The seminar itself soon became a call for Freedom and Independence Now!" (Wirmark (1997) op. cit.).

5 Cited in Neil Parsons: A New History of Southern Africa, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 316.

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For fear of falling under domination by white Southern Rhodesia, the leading African organizations-particularly in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland¹-strongly opposed the federation plan. It was, as later stated by Kenneth Kaunda, seen as "a second South Africa being imposed on us. We objected to it and we fought against it".²

Under the federal constitution, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland retained their own laws and territorial governments, but surrendered control of foreign relations, defence and-above all-the federal budget, designed to divert the proceeds from Northern Rhodesia's copper in Southern Rhodesia's favour? The unequal and exploitative 'partnership' soon led to increasing opposition and activation of African nationalism. In the beginning of 1959-shortly after the All-African Peoples' Conference in Ghana, where Banda, Kaunda and Nkomo together pledged to break up the Federation⁴-riots broke out in Nyasaland and around twenty Malawians were shot dead.⁵ The colonial authorities reacted by introducing emergency legislation in all the three territories, followed by massive arrests and the banning of Banda's Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), Kaunda's Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) and Nkomo's Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC).⁶ Kamuzu Banda was detained and Kenneth Kaunda rusticated. Joshua Nkomo was at the time in Europe and avoided arrest.

The wave of repression marked the beginning of the end of the Federation. It forced Great Britain to partly reconsider its Central African policies. The recently appointed Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced at the beginning of 1960 that Britain recognized a "wind of change" blowing over the continent.⁷ Kaunda was allowed freedom of movement in January 1960 and Banda was released the following April. Within a year of the bannings, NAC reappeared as the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), ZANC as the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and SRANC as the National Democratic Party
¹The opinion in Southern Rhodesia was more divided While it was recognized that federation would lead to enhanced power for the white settlers, many saw the alternative of a closer union with South Africa as an even more unpleasant possibility. Some were therefore attracted by the fact that a small number of seats in the Federal Assembly were reserved for Africans. Joshua Nkomo, for example, unsuccessfully contested the Matabeleland seat in the first federal elections in 1953.

² Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995.

³ Among the projects made possible by Southern Rhodesia's disproportionate share of the federal revenues were the Kariba hydroelectric scheme, the railway line to Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and the university. After the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, Southern Rhodesia inherited these and other facilities, including most of the armed forces and the defence equipment.

4 A.J. Wills: *An Introduction to the History of Central Africa: Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe*, Oxford University Press, Fourth edition, Oxford, 1985, pp. 338-339.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 340.

6 The riots and the subsequent repression took place when PerW stberg lived in Zimbabwe. The events are vividly described in the chapter 'Operation Sunrise' in *Forbidden Territory*.

7 Macmillan gave his famous 'wind-of-change-speech' to the South African parliament in Cape Town on 3 February 1960. Less than two months later, the Pretoria regime killed more than sixty unarmed demonstrators at Sharpeville and banned ANC and PAC.

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(NDP).¹ While the Federation was eventually dissolved at the end of December 1963, it was, however, only the strategically less important and economically poorer Nyasaland which without major disturbances was constitutionally brought to national independence under Banda and MCP in July 1964.²

In the case of the two Rhodesias, the road was considerably more rocky. Backed by Welensky's federal government, the alliance of white settlers in the South and copper barons in the North was not ready to recognize any changing winds and give in to the African demands for democratic rule. On the contrary, in Southern Rhodesia a chain of repressive policies³ effectively neutralized the nationalist movement and eventually paved the way for the Rhodesian Front under Ian Smith, who became Prime Minister in April 1964.

With regard to Northern Rhodesia, the British government had in principle agreed to a negotiated process towards qualified African franchise and selfgovernment along a similar path to the one in Nyasaland. A constitutional conference on the future of Northern Rhodesia was opened in London in December 1960. However, firmly opposing the territory's right to leave the Federation, Welensky manoeuvred openly and behind the scenes to frustrate the process. Katanga's secession under Moïse Tshombe in mid-1960 was in this context seen by Welensky-backed by Portugal and the British and international Katanga lobbies⁴ as an opening. By linking Katanga to the white citadel of Southern Africa, the nationalist aspirations in Northern Rhodesia could, it was argued, be thwarted and the rich territory kept under Salisbury's control. Welensky and the mining companies therefore channelled support to Tshombe and the Katangese. To further weaken the Northern Rhodesian independence movement they supported UNIP's main rival, Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress (ANC), which maintained close contacts with Tshombe. Kaunda's sympathies, meanwhile, lay with those opposing Tshombe and Katanga.

Between September 1961 and January 1963, the Swedish UN troops were on several occasions seriously engaged against Tshombe's Katangese secession, confronting mercenaries from South Africa, France, Belgium and other countries.⁵ The developments were closely followed in Sweden, ⁶ where Kenneth

1 The draconian laws introduced in Zimbabwe at the beginning of 1959, notably the Unlawful Organizations and Preventive Detention Bills, were, however, to last for the following five years.

2 In a remarkable volte-face, Banda-who had led the most militant of the nationalist movements in the Federation would upon independence turn away from his old nationalist allies and steer Malawi dose to the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.

3 The National Democratic Party was banned in December 1961. This was followed by the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), formed the same month. In turn, ZAPU was banned in September 1962.

4 A Swedish Katanga Committee was formed in 1962.

5 There was severe fighting between the UN troops and the Katangese gendarmerie led by white mercenaries in September 1961, December 1961 and December 1962 (Sk61d op. cit., p.239-241).

6 See, for example, Ronald Segal: 'Vein ingriper först i Sydafrika: FN eller Chrustjev?' ('Who intervenes first in South Africa: UN or Krushchev?') in Expressen, 7 April 1961; Per Waistberg: 'Sk6rda storm' ('Reap the storm') in Dagens Nyheter, 1 October 1961; and Per Wistberg: 'Katanga och Nord-Rhodesia' ('Katanga and Northern Rhodesia') in Dagens Nyheter, 6 August 1962.

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Kaunda and the nationalist cause in Northern Rhodesia were presented with sympathy. Per Wastberg had already in 1960 given a brief portrait of Kaunda in his Forbidden Territory-comparing his political programme to that of "the early [Swedish] social democracy"-which he later followed up through articles in Dagens Nyheter. In October 1961, he wrote, for example, that "next to his close friend Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, Kaunda is in my opinion the most impressive personality in Africa: A moralist rather than a politician, and a tactician".² The following year, Sven Oste published an in-depth presentation of the UNP leader, his background and beliefs, in The Face of Africa, an important collection of profiles of African political leaders. Finally, in May 1962-the same month as Kaunda paid his first visit to Sweden-Anders Ehnmark and Sven Hamrell released the political anthology Africans on Africa, with a chapter by Kaunda on 'Northern Rhodesia's Demands'.³

Zambia and the 1962 Rhodesia Campaign

Through direct contacts with UNIP, Zambian students, newspaper articles and books, Kaunda was thus not unknown⁴ when he was invited in May 1962 to Sweden by the Social Democratic Party.⁵ The visit took place at a crucial time. As a result of Welensky's pressures, the British government had the previous year started to backtrack from earlier positions regarding African representation in a constitutional dispensation for Northern Rhodesia. The frustration of African hopes led in mid-1961 to widespread protests and disorders, during which twenty-seven Zambians were killed and more than three thousand arrested, mainly on the Copperbelt, but also in the Northern and the Luapula provinces.⁶ And early in 1962-while Welensky was playing the Katangese card-the British revealed that they still hoped that Northern Rhodesia could be kept within the Federation.⁷

Nevertheless, despite dissensions within the Conservative Party (1960), p. 90.

2 Per Wastberg: 'Skerda storm' ('Reap the storm') in *Dagens Nyheter*, 1 October 1961.

3 Kaunda's contribution was first published as *Black Government* (Lusaka, 1960). As noted, Kaunda's *Zambia Shall Be Free* was published in Swedish by the publishing house of the Swedish Mission Covenant Church in 1963.

4 Learning about Kaunda's visit to Sweden through the local Rhodesian newspapers, Eskil Forstenius at the Swedish consulate in Salisbury wrote a portrait of the UNIP leader for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm, inter alia expressing that "the veracity of Kaunda's statements is perhaps not always the best" (letter ('Mr Kaunda's Stockholm visit') from Eskil Forstenius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 1 May 1962) (MFA).

5 Interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995. Oliver Tambo of ANC also visited Sweden in May 1962, addressing the Labour Day rally in Gothenburg. According to Kaunda, the two leaders-and close friends-did not meet in Sweden (interview with Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 15 July 1995).

6 Jan Pettman: *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, London 1974, p. 18. 7 Wills op. cit., p. 352.

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Kenneth Kaunda outside the Stockholm university students' building, May 1962. (Photo: FLT-PICA)

ervative Party, Britain eventually confirmed that elections on separate racial rolls would be held in October 1962.

During his visit to Sweden, Kaunda asked for support to avert a possible catastrophe in Northern Rhodesia and, generally, in Central Africa. The call was taken up by the Liberal youth. After discussions with Emmanuel Chalabesa, a UNIP student at the University of Stockholm, and Reuben Kamanga, at the time UNIP's Vice-President, Björn Beckman of the Liberal Student Union took the initiative of launching a fund-raising campaign in favour of Kaunda and the United National Independence Party.² The Rhodesia Campaign, as it was called, was formally launched through an 'Appeal for Northern Rhodesia' in *Dagens Nyheter* and other Swedish newspapers on 3 June 1962. It stated that Kenneth Kaunda and his party, the United National Independence Party, pursue a convincing and impressive line of anti-violence in the struggle for the right to self-determination. The contrast with the sabre-rattling Welensky is huge. Because of that, UNIP must also be given the resources to successfully continue the peaceful road. Northern Rhodesia's future will be determined at the elections in October. A

1 Chalabesa was one of the first Zambian students in Sweden. As secretary of the Mufulira branch of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC)-out of which ZANC and, later, UNIP were formed-he had been active, detained and tried during the rolling strikes on the Copperbelt in 1956.

2 Telephone conversation with Björn Beckman, 6 April 1997.

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victory for Kaunda is a victory for the peace-keeping forces in Central Africa, who wish to prevent the independence struggle from taking a violent course [and turn it

into] a new Algerian tragedy.

[...] After trying in vain to obtain assistance elsewhere, the Africans in Northern Rhodesia now appeal to Scandinavia. We can help UNIP and we must [do so], because we cannot silently sit and witness a new Algerian tragedy unfold before our eyes. Our contribution is urgently needed. Only a couple of months remain before the elections. [...] A Swedish effort may, due to the strategic situation and the wealth of Northern Rhodesia-and not least to Kaunda's central role in contemporary Africa-influence African developments in a peaceful direction)

The appeal was published by an ad hoc Swedish Rhodesia Committee.² Among the first thirteen signatories were a number of prominent Swedish politicians, academics and journalists. As the initiative came from the Liberal youth, several Liberals-first and foremost the party chairman Bertil Ohlin-supported the call. So did the chief editors of the liberal morning and evening newspapers Dagens Nyheter³ and Expressen.⁴ As with earlier appeals against South Africa, no representative from the Moderate Party joined the call.⁵ A number of leading Social Democrats-such as Gunnar Myrdal and Inga Thorsson-were, however, among the first signatories, together with the chief editors of both Stockholms-Tidningen⁶ and Aftonbladet.⁷

With support from leading Liberal and Social Democratic politicians, as well as from all the major liberal and social democratic morning and evening newspapers, the Rhodesia Campaign represented a broad, established and influential opinion in Sweden.⁸ It was, in addition, supported by a majority of the political youth organizations in the Nordic countries. In mid-August 1962, the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo condemned "the financial assistance given by vested interests [...] with the sole aim of wrecking the coming general elections in Northern Rhodesia" and encouraged

1 'Upprop för Nord-Rhodesia' ('Appeal for Northern Rhodesia') in Dagens Nyheter, 3 June 1962.

2 The Rhodesia Committee was an ad hoc set-up for the purpose of the Rhodesia Campaign. It was never structured or institutionalized along the lines of the Swedish South Africa Committee. A separate Zimbabwean solidarity committee was never established in Sweden. ³Olof Lagercrantz.

4 Per Wrigstad.

5 On the contrary, many members of the Moderate Party supported the Swedish Katanga Committee, set up in 1962 in defence of Tshombe and the secession of Katanga. This was the case with both the conservative youth and the party itself. Birger Hagård, who in 1963 became president of the Moderate Youth League, was a member of the Katanga Committee (interview with Birger Hagård, Stockholm, 9 October 1996) and-as was noted above-Moderate members defended the cause of Katanga in the Swedish parliament.

6 Victor Vinde.

7 Kurt Samuelsson.

8 In addition, the following signed the original appeal: Axel I-6jer, Signe Hbjer, Ivar Lo-Johansson, Torgny Segerstedt, Herbert Tingsten and Per Wistberg. Signe H6jer had been present at the important All African Peoples' Conference in Aera, Ghana, in December 1958, where Kamuzu Banda, Kenneth Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo pledged to oppose the Central African Federation.

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the Scandinavian people, political parties and trade unions to support the fundraising campaign which is being run by the Rhodesia Campaign Committee in

Stockholm for assistance to Kaunda and [...] UNIP.¹

It was most unusual that a public fund-raising campaign in support of a particular political party in foreign elections was organized in Sweden.² This fact was soon noticed in both England and Southern Africa. At the beginning of July 1962, the conservative London newspaper *The Sunday Telegraph* speculated, for example, that it would "disturb the Anglo-Swedish relations"³ and in South Africa the Johannesburg paper *The Sunday Times* wrote that the campaign had "established a precedent which can be used not only against Mr. Kaunda's party, but against Sweden herself".⁴

The strongest reactions, however, came from Welensky's government and, above all, from Swedish business interests in the Central African Federation. The Swedish consulate in Salisbury (now Harare) reported that the Federation government in mid-July had made enquiries regarding "the Swedish so-called Rhodesia Committee".⁵ Later in the month, a Captain Robertson, member of the ruling United Federal Party (UFP) in Northern Rhodesia, asked Prime Minister Welensky in the Federal parliament "whether he [would] protest against this interference in the internal affairs of the Federation".⁶ In his reply, Welensky stated that he was "making certain inquiries" into what he called "these deplorable practices". If found that foreign governments were implicated, he would have "to consider what action ought to be taken to secure recognition of the proprieties of international behaviour". Deeply involved in support of Tshombe's Katangese secession, it seems that Welensky eventually was

1 ASYC Report op. cit., p. 146. With six participants, UNIP had one of the largest delegations to the Afro-Scandinavian Youth Congress in Oslo, 10-31 August 1962. The UNIP participants were Rupiah Banda (elected to the presidency), Emmanuel Chalabesa (instrumental for the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign), Henry Matipa, Wilted Phiri, Edward Sampa and Lastone Tembo.

2 The issue of Swedish support to ZANU and ZAPU during the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe, to SWAPO in Namibia in 1989 and to ANC in South Africa in 1994 would be hotly debated.

3 Cited in *Dagens Nyheter*, 8 July 1962.

4 *The Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 8 July 1962.

5 Letter ('Den svenska insamlingen för Mr. Kaunda' / 'The Swedish fund-raising campaign for Mr. Kaunda') from Eskil Forstenius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 27 July 1962 (MFA).

6 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 'Votes and Proceedings of the Federal Assembly' (Hansard), 30 July 1962, p. 1181.

7 Ibid. It was also rumoured that the Swedish government and Kaunda colluded to get Swedish missionaries into the Northern Rhodesian government. During the same session, Mr. Simukonda, representing UFP in Kafue, Northern Rhodesia, asked Welensky if he was "aware that the [Swedish] government [had] instructed Mr. Kaunda to put two Swedish missionaries as candidates for the forthcoming Northern Rhodesia general election [as] compensation for the money [to] the United National Independence Party". Welensky replied that he was not aware of this, but that-if it was true-Kaunda was "welcome to them as far as I am concerned". The rumours could possibly have been based on the exceptional situation in Tanganyika, where Barbro Johansson of the Church of Sweden Mission was a member of Julius Nyerere's TANU party and elected to the first national legislature in 1959.

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satisfied that the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign did not enjoy any official support from the Erlander government and he, therefore, let the matter rest.

Meanwhile, representatives of Swedish business interests remained upset.

According to the Swedish consulate in Salisbury, Donald Chase, the head of Atlas Copco Rhodesia,¹ complained at the beginning of August that six of the company's clients "had been highly irritated by the Swedish action in support of the subversive elements in Northern Rhodesia", adding that "the resistance against Atlas Copco's products could have difficult consequences for [...] the company in the whole of Rhodesia, particularly if Kaunda [...] comes to power".² Eskil Forstenius at the consulate also reported to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm that "it is perhaps understandable if people start to get irritated by the constant and not exactly constructive criticism of the conditions here [in Rhodesia]".³

The elections in October 1962 led to the formation of a coalition UNIP-ANC government, ending Welensky's hopes that Northern Rhodesia could be kept within the Federation. Kaunda entered the government as Minister for Local Government and Social Welfare and immediately started to negotiate with the British for a new, less racially biased constitution. As a follow-up to the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign, he was in early May 1963 once again invited to Sweden, this time by the Liberal Party Youth League and the Swedish Students' UN Association.⁴ When news about the visit reached the Swedish government, Kaunda's counterpart, Sven Aspling, Minister for Social Affairs, also extended an invitation to official discussions.⁵

Kaunda's visit took place at the end of May 1963, immediately after he had attended the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa. Not yet leading a government and despite the fact that the process towards Zambia's independence was still fraught with difficulties, Kaunda described by Expressen's Gunnar Nilsson as "the most gentle"⁶ and by Dagens Nyheter's Sven Oste as "one of the noblest"⁷ of Africa's leaders -was given an extraordinary welcome. He met representatives of the Swedish government, industry and the aid agency, NIB. He also appeared on radio and television and addressed a fully

packed hall at the Stockholm School of Economics.⁸ The attention was largely due to the Swedish Rhodesia Campaign, but also to the

1 Peter Wallenberg, a leading member of the younger generation of the Wallenberg family, had been Managing Director of Atlas Copco Rhodesia from 1959 until 1962. He was at the same time responsible for the company's operations in Congo.

2 Letter ('Svenska Rhodesia-kommittén' /'The Swedish Rhodesia Committee) from Eskil Forstenius to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, 6 August 1962 (MFA).

3 Ibid.

4 Cable ('Kaundas bestk' /'Kaunda's visit) from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish consulate in Salisbury, Stockholm, 9 May 1963 (MFA).

5 Ibid.

6 Expressen, 26 May 1963.

7 Dagens Nyheter, 24 May 1963.

8 In Swedish, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm

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fact that the consumer boycott against South Africa had been launched only three months earlier, highlighting the situation in Southern Africa.

The Rhodesia Committee's fund-raising campaign for Kaunda and UNIP resulted in the modest amount of 60,000 SEK.¹ Nevertheless, it marked the beginning of Sweden's assistance to Zambia. The campaign, furthermore, largely explains why the Liberal Party-together with the Centre Party-via the early commitment to the nationalist cause in Northern Rhodesia during the second half of the 1960s appeared as a strong advocate of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, in particular of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, which was close to Kaunda's UNIP.² After the split between ZANU and ZAPU, Kaunda would in April 1964 publicly recognize Nkomo as the "leader of the Southern Rhodesian people".³

After new elections in January 1964-in which UNIP won 55 of the 65 contested seats-Kaunda emerged as the youngest Prime Minister in the Commonwealth. Having negotiated an agreement on full national independence for the Republic of Zambia in London in May 1964, he immediately contacted the Swedish government for assistance, sending Simon Kapwepwe, the Minister of Home Affairs, to Stockholm to "discuss [...] problems that will face our country when we become independent next October".⁴ In a letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson in mid-May 1964, Kaunda wrote that

Zambia, like most newly independent countries in Africa, faces immense problems in building a nation. If we are to succeed with our tasks, then we require generous assistance [from] our friends. Recalling the valuable assistance the people of Sweden gave my party in its struggle for freedom and the great kindness shown to me on my visit to Sweden, I am confident that our request for help in solving our

new problems will not be in vain.⁵

During talks in Sweden in May 1964, Kapwepwe emphasized his country's needs in the areas of "agricultural training, cooperative societies and youth

[development]". 6 Together with support in the fields of health and education, they would feature prominently in the future development cooperation programme between independent Zambia and Sweden.⁷

1 Data-Dernokreen, 11 June 1963.

2 The Liberal Party Youth League launched another Rhodesia Campaign at the beginning of 1968, this time in favour of ZAPU.

3 Cited in Pettman op. cit., p. 19.

4 Letter from Kenneth Kaunda to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 19 May 1964 (MFA).

5 Ibid.

6 Letter from Simon Kapwepwe to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, 18 June 1964 (MFA). The areas of proposed cooperation were close to the interests of the Swedish Centre Party. 7 Swedish development cooperation with Zambia started in 1965 and Zambia was in the late 1960s included as one of the priority countries for Swedish assistance. As of 30 June 1995, a total amount of 6.9 billion SEK (in fixed prices; 1995) had been disbursed to Zambia through SIDA.

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With Kenneth Kaunda as President, Zambia became independent on 24 October 1964. However, the problems of nation-building were only a year later greatly compounded by the fact that Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front in neighbouring Rhodesia (formerly Southern Rhodesia) on 11 November 1965 announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Great Britain. For the next ten years, Zambia would more than any other country suffer the consequences of this rebellion in defence of white settler interests.

The Domboshawa Indaba

The Rhodesian Front (RF) was founded in March 1962. Representing the extreme political right, it also campaigned against the Central African Federation, but with a policy of 'Rhodesia First', stressing the primacy of white settler interests, maintenance of land segregation and opposition to British government control. RF won the Southern Rhodesian elections in December 1962 and its President, Winston Field, became Prime Minister. Failing to get British approval for an independent Southern Rhodesia, Field was replaced in April 1964 by Ian Smith, under whose leadership the party made independence its chief cause at the same time as the repression of the African nationalist organizations was intensified. Immediately after coming to power, Smith turned against Joshua Nkomo, who was to spend most of the following ten years without trial in various jails and prison camps. In August 1964, both ZANU and Nkomo's PCC (ZAPU) were banned.¹ The ZANU President Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Secretary General Robert Mugabe were at the same time detained and would, like Nkomo and hundreds of African nationalists, spend the next decade in prisons or remote detention camps without being brought before a court of law.² As a result of the sweeping arrests, there were according to the humanitarian organizations in the country in May 1965-before UDI-almost 2,000 political prisoners in Smith's Rhodesia.³ Via SIDA, the Swedish government

1 ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) was formed in August 1963 by dissident members of ZAPU opposed to Joshua Nkomo's plans to set up a Zimbabwean government-in-exile. At the inaugural congress in May 1964, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole was elected President and Robert Mugabe Secretary General. The older ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), a successor to the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (banned in February 1959) and to the National Democratic Party (NDP; banned in December 1961), was formed in December 1961. Led by Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU was in turn banned in September 1962. It was reconstituted as the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) in August 1963, parallel to the formation of ZANU. When PCC was also banned and its leaders either detained or forced into exile, the name PCC was dropped and ZAPU re-introduced. In December 1963, the recently formed OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam recognized both ZANU and PCC/ZAPU as genuine Zimbabwean liberation movements.

2 Sithole was in and out of prison until early 1969, when he was sentenced to six years on a charge of having plotted to kill Ian Smith. Mugabe remained imprisoned from August 1964 until December 1974, when he-together with Nkomo and Sithole-was released to participate in constitutional talks with Ian Smith in Lusaka, Zambia.

3 SIDA: 'Protokoll från styrelsemöte' ('Minutes from board meeting'), Stockholm 21 December 1965 (SDA).

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would from the same year channel financial support to many of the families of the prisoners.

The repression of the nationalist organizations was coupled with a policy of revival and cooption of African chiefs and headmen in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), that is, the rural areas 'apportioned' to the black population and formerly known as 'native reserves'.¹ A Council of Chiefs was set up in 1961 to represent African concerns in the TTLs. The Smith regime frequently turned to the council, both to undermine the nationalist movement and to elicit support for its own policies. After banning ZANU and PCC (ZAPU) and jailing their leaders, in October 1964 the government assembled some 600 chiefs and headmen for an *indaba*² at Domboshawa outside Salisbury in order to convince Britain that the African population supported the demands for independence.³ The convocation was not publicly announced and the area "sealed off by military forces to avoid interference from African nationalists".⁴ As expected, at the end of the meeting the chiefs unanimously announced their acceptance of the Rhodesian Front's plans to declare Rhodesia independent from Britain.

The Domboshawa gathering took place at the same time as Zambia celebrated its national independence across the Zambezi and it was apprehensively followed by the Organization of African Unity. The Swedish honorary consul in Salisbury, Sven Bouvin, was present at the final session of the stage-managed meeting, invited by the Southern Rhodesian Secretary for Defence and Foreign Affairs.⁵ When Bouvin's presence became known, it immediately provoked severe criticism. The government of Tanzania, in particular, strongly censured Sweden

for condoning an "illegal and unconstitutional act"⁶ In a diplomatic aide-memoire handed over to the Swedish ambassador in Dar es Salaam, Julius Nyerere's government stated that "the attendance of observers from Sweden is not the kind of action which African countries, and the United Republic of Tanzania in particular, have come to expect".⁷ The note contrasted the Swedish presence with the absence of the British, "who declined to send an observer

¹ The land question was central to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Through the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the African majority was allocated a mere 20% of the land, covering the poorer soils and divided into scattered 'reserves'. The Tribal Trust Lands were formed in the early 1960s, fragmented into more than 160 units. The nomination of African chiefs was controlled by the white government, which used them as paid government servants to administer the rural areas 'according to tribal custom and tradition'.

² Indaba is a Nguni word for 'council', 'meeting' or 'discussion', widely used in Southern Africa.

³ Ken Flower: *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record-Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981* John Murray, London and Quest Publishing, Harare, 1987, p. 40.

⁴ R. Kent Rasmussen: *Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia*, The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, N.J. & London, 1979, p. 78.

⁵ Letter from Sven Bouvin to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Salisbury, 18 December 1964 (MFA). ⁶ Letter ('Svensk närvaro vid hövdingmöte i Sydrhodesia' / 'Swedish presence at chiefs' meeting in Southern Rhodesia') from Knut Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 26 November 1964 (MFA).

⁷ Aide-Memoire from the government of Tanzania to the government of Sweden [no date], attached to a letter from Philemon Paul Muro, ambassador of Tanzania, to the Chief of Protocol of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 3 December 1964 (MFA).

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because they did not regard the indaba consultations as either representative or adequate".¹ Finally, in a letter to the Chief of Protocol of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Tanzania's ambassador in Stockholm, Philemon Paul Muro, underlined that his government wished to "remind Sweden that they should be more considerate to our African problems".²

Coming from a government with which the ruling Social Democratic Party maintained exceptionally close and friendly relations, it was a strong protest. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs had no previous knowledge of the indaba³ and had not instructed Bouvin to attend. The Tanzanian government, however, took a firm, principled stand and did not accept any excuses. After the Swedish ambassador to Tanzania, Knut Granstedt, "repeatedly [had conveyed to the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that the consul had acted entirely on his own and probably for sheer reasons of protocol", he had to "conclude that the Swedish explanation unfortunately [did] not dispel [Tanzania's] displeasure".⁴

Bouvin's presence at the meeting was soon forgotten.⁵ Essentially a storm in a teacup, it nevertheless underlined independent Africa's principled views and sensitivity to Sweden's relations with the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. It also highlighted the importance of better coordination between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Stockholm and Sweden's official representations in Southern Africa, in particular-as with the consular missions-where political and commercial loyalties could enter into conflict. The Swedish antiapartheid movement had in late October 1964, that is, at the very time of the Domboshawa meeting, in a letter to Foreign Minister Nilsson criticized such a conflict in the case of Swedish consuls in South Africa, representing the Transatlantic shipping company and other Swedish business interests.⁶ If publicly known, Bouvin's role could have been quoted in this context. Defending his presence at the indaba in a letter to Hugo Tamm, the Swedish envoy to South Africa, Bouvin insisted in mid-December 1964 that "it would [have been] most discourteous to decline the Minister's invitation, particularly as [...] a consul should always endeavour to maintain friendly relations with [the] authorities in the countries to which he is appointed".⁷ He had, however, vested interests in

1 Ibid. Representatives from twenty countries were invited to the Domboshawa indaba. Those present were Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, South Africa and Sweden.

2 Letter from Muro to the Chief of Protocol, Stockholm, 3 December 1964 (MFA).

3 According to a later letter from Jean-Christophe Oberg of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Peter Wallenstein, Stockholm, 29 September 1965 (MFA).

4 Letter from Granstedt to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 26 November 1964 (MFA).

5 In 1-ds memoirs, Ian Smith gives the indaba a prominent role, stating that "eight nations"-among them Sweden-"agreed to send observers [to the meeting]" (Ian Douglas Smith: *The Great Betrayal*, Blake Publishing, London, 1997, p. 81).

6 Letter from the Gothenburg South Africa Committee to Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, Gothenburg, 22 October 1964 (AJC).

7 Letter from Bouvin to the Swedish legation in Pretoria, Salisbury, 18 December 1964 (MFA).

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keeping friendly relations with the regime and would-after the announcement of UDI and the subsequent closure of the Swedish consulate in Salisbury openly declare his stand. In addition to representing several Swedish companies in Southern Rhodesia, Bouvin was the head of an asbestos mine controlled by the Swedish company Svenska Eternitbolaget. Interviewed by *Aftonbladet* just after UDI, he said that he was "staying in Rhodesia to run [his] businesses. [...] You have to be optimistic. Ian Smith has a relatively fair chance to make it. People down here do not at all react to the threat of sanctions. They do not believe in it".

1 Relieved from his consular duties, Bouvin criticized the decision to close the consulate. "The Swedish government", he said, "has left 150 Swedes [in the country] completely hanging in the air [...], without [any] consular protection".²

Per Wiistberg in Zimbabwe

Outside the churches, Zimbabwe³ was little known by the Swedish public until Per Wastberg started to publish his impressions in *Dagens Nyheter* in March 1959. The country was before that "basically seen as an extension of South Africa, where the real problems and possibilities were".⁴ Wastberg had been given a scholarship by Rotary International in December 1958 to study African literature and anthropology at the new University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury. He later wrote that he at the time knew something about South Africa and Kenya, Congo and West Africa. But Rhodesia and Nyasaland were no man's lands. Educated friends had difficulties in pointing out Nyasaland on the map and they had not heard of Bulawayo or Lusaka. [...] I was therefore happy to travel to a country which was relatively unknown and not much written about.⁵

Wastberg-who at the time was only twenty-five years old, although already an established writer and journalist⁶-arrived in Zimbabwe in early 1959 and stayed there until July. At close quarters, he witnessed the African resistance against the Central African Federation, the agitation and riots in February' *Aflonbladet*, 24 November 1965.

² Ibid Almost all the Swedes were attached to the Church of Sweden Mission. At the time of UDL there were 68 CSM missionaries in the country. Including children, the CSM community numbered 127 Swedish citizens. (CSM: 'Press release', Uppsala, 12 November 1965) (CSA).

³ Although the name of the country officially became Zimbabwe only at independence in April 1980, it will here be used Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia or Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will be used where they appear in quotations from original documents, in conference titles etc.

⁴ Carl F. Hallencreutz: 'Religion and War in Zimbabwe-and Swedish Relationships' in C.F. Hallencreutz & S. Axelson (eds.): *Annual Report 1992 of Uppsala Studies of Mission, Faculty of Theology, University of Uppsala, Uppsala, 1993, p. 12.*

⁵ Per Wastberg: *Frbjudd Omride* (1960), p. 9.

⁶ Wastberg had already made his literary debut at the age of fifteen with *Pojke red Stpbubblor* ('Boy with Soap-Bubbles') (1949), a collection of short stories.

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March 1959, the banning of the nationalist movements and the subsequent mass arrests of their leaders and members in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. Through his university contacts and, above all, his friendship with the Zimbabwean journalist Willie Musarurwal-who in July 1960 became a founder and executive member of the National Democratic Party-Wastberg became close to the nationalist opposition. His stand in favour of the African majority was at the time uncommon and attracted criticism not only from whites in Zimbabwe,² but also from some of the more concerned Swedish missionaries in the country. Forbidden Territory was, for example, in August 1960 described as "one-sided"³ by the Methodist missionary Lennart Blomquist, who-running a project at Headlands in favour of families of detained nationalists-was closely involved with the Zimbabwean peasant movement and had established good contacts with several

African church leaders, such as the future bishop and political leader Abel Muzorewa.⁴ Wilstberg, however, replied that "only a clear stand in favour of the democratic African movements can save the whites in Southern Rhodesia. Nothing will stop the Africans from becoming free", adding that "the missionaries play an important role in the new Africa, [but] it is important that the churches [also] take a stand in the political conflict"?

During his stay in Zimbabwe, Wastberg—who like Herbert Tingsten would become chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter*⁶—wrote a number of major articles on Zimbabwe and the Central African Federation in the Swedish Liberal newspaper, appearing from March 1959 under the heading 'Per Wastberg in Africa'.⁷ The articles, which were also published in the Swedish-language Finnish

1 To protect Musamrswa, Wsstberg calls him Joshua Mutsingi in *Forbidden Territory*. Musarmrwa later became Public Relations Secretary in Joshua Nkomo's PCC/ZAPU. Together with the ZAPU leadership, he was detained for more than ten years, mainly at the Gonakudzingwa camp and in the Gweru prison, before being released in December 1974.

2 The CSM missionary teacher Tore Bergman, who at the time was based in the Mberengwa area, recalled in 1997 that "there were some Letters to the Editor in the [local] papers concerning [WAsstberg's] general attitude towards the farmers and the farm workers. They did not like the way in which he fraternized with the local employees" (interview with Tore Bergman, Uppsala, 10 February 1997).

3 'VAssterAsare i Syd-Rhodesia finer kritiken obalanserad' ('[Missionary from] Vasteras [active] in Southern Rhodesia finds criticism unbalanced') in *Vestmanlands Lins Tidning*, 6 August 1960.

4 In an interview with Bishop Abel Muzorewa in 1996, he said that "the first white home to which I was invited to actually spend two nights was the Swedish home of Lennart Blomquist and his family. That was at Mutambara. I had been invited for a meeting on the mission station. It was very important for me. I consider the context and the attitudes of our time racially and that was the first time that I actually stayed in a white home as a guest" (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).

5 Per WAsstberg: 'Vitt och svart i Syd-Rhodesia' ('White and black in Southern Rhodesia') in *Veatmanlands Liins Tidning*, 17 August 1960.

6 Tingsten was still the chief editor of *Dagens Nyheter* when WAsstberg wrote his articles from Africa. Wastberg was chief editor of the newspaper between 1976 and 1982.

7 Per Wlstberg: 'En dag i det lyckiga landet' ('A day in the happy country') in *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 Mardi 1959.

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morning paper *Hufvudstadsbladet*,¹ attracted the attention of Roy Welensky's government. Wastberg was called to the federal Ministry of Home Affairs, where he was told that the government had informed the Rotary Club in Salisbury that he had "betrayed [the association] concerning international understanding and good will".² After only six months in the country, he was asked to leave.

Returning to Sweden via South Africa, in September 1959 Wastberg set up the Swedish Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa together with the former Church of Sweden missionary Gunnar Helander. At the same time, he wrote *Forbidden Territory*, a political account of his experiences and impressions from Zimbabwe and the wider Central African Federation. The book, which appeared in April 1960—just after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa—had an unprecedented impact. Eventually published in the extraordinary number of 90,000 copies in Sweden alone—and in about a quarter of a million copies worldwide³—it truly entered Swedish homes. Both a very personal account and a political analysis, the book covered such different subjects as the intellectual life in Zimbabwe, the 1959 emergency, the African opposition, the work of the Swedish mission, the detention camps⁴ and the conditions for African workers on a white settler farm. In his own words written by "an observer who was surprised",⁵ the sum total was a devastating indictment of the white minority regime.

Published six years after Herbert Tingsten's important *The Problem of South Africa* and, similarly, widely used in study circles all over the country, *Forbidden Territory* became a turning point for a generation of Swedes. Together with his *On the Black List* about South Africa from October 1960—over the years published in just under 80,000 copies⁶—it not only opened the eyes of the Swedish public to the oppressive conditions of the African population in Southern Africa, but, in general, contributed to a new awareness regarding the developing countries. It occupies a prominent position among the background factors and conditions that eventually led to the official Swedish involvement on the side of the Southern African liberation movements.

¹ A portrait of the Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, Roy Welensky, was also published by Beetingske Tidende in Denmark. See Per Wistberg: 'Sir Roy tar emot' ('Sir Roy receives') in *Dagens Nyheter*, 19 April 1959; *Hufvudstadsbladet*, 19 April 1959; and *Berlingske Tidende*, 1 May 1959.

² Wastberg: *Föbjudet Område* (1960), p. 255.

³ Ryberg (1973 and 1983) op. cit. and Wastberg: *Föbjudet Område* (1969), p. 234.

⁴ *Forbidden Territory* contains a chapter ('Fingelsesöndag'/'Prison Sunday') on a visit to the Kentucky detention camp just outside Salisbury. It was the first time that the Zimbabwean version of concentration camps was described to an international public. ⁵ Wastberg: *Föbjudet Område* (1969), p. 234.

⁶ With translations into foreign languages *On the Black List* would eventually be published in a total of around 155,000 copies (Ryberg (1973 and 1983) op. cit.).

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Like Tingsten in his book on South Africa, Wastberg was "surprisingly generous"¹ in his assessment of the Swedish missions. Visiting the headquarters of the Church of Sweden Mission (CSM) at Mnene in the south-western part of Zimbabwe, he

felt relieved [...] at finally meeting people for whom the work in the new country is a privilege which gives life a meaning. [...] At Mnene everything was racial

harmony. The state of emergency did not reach there. The African headmaster of the school was a wise and balanced man, who supported the government because he was well off at the mission station and really could not imagine how other Africans lived. He was a cousin of Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the National Congress. [...I Mnene could become something more than the great [place] it already is.

It could symbolize that cooperation between the races is possible within Rhodesia's borders. But that would require less submissiveness to the state and more knowledge about, and understanding of, the 'other world' of trade unions and

nationalism, dam constructions, strikes, mines and slums.²

In 1965, the Zimbabwean journalist and ZANU leader Nathan Shamuyarira wrote in his *Crisis in Rhodesia* that "nine out of ten nationalist leaders have been educated at mission schools".³ Due to the importance of CSM for the formation of the Swedish opinion on Zimbabwe, this is far from irrelevant. It was, for example, through the church that the Swedish public at an early stage started to have direct access to the writings of the Zimbabwean leaders in the Swedish language. In 1960—the year after the English original—the publishing house of the Swedish Mission Covenant Church released Reverend Sithole's classic *African Nationalism*. A contribution by Sithole was also included in *Africa Narrates*, a literary anthology in Swedish published by Wastberg in 1961.

Sithole was an early member of the National Democratic Party. Together with leaders such as Leopold Takawira and Robert Mugabe, he broke with Joshua Nkomo and formed ZANU in August 1963. The fact that Sithole by that time was already known in Sweden served in ZANU's favour. As pointed out by CSM's former Southern Africa secretary Carl Fredrik Hallencreutz, with the Swedish translation of *African Nationalism* "ready at hand, Swedes could not easily dismiss the new movement".⁴ More important for Sweden's future support to both ZANU and ZAPU was that the Church of Sweden Mission was dominant in a large, multi-lingual geographical area where the communities tended to be closely associated with the urban political movements and organizations. In a study of the Lutheran church and the liberation struggle, the Zimbabwean historian Ngwabi Bhebe—himself coming from CSM schools¹ Hallencreutz op. cit., p. 13.

²Wtistberg: *Fbribiidet Omride* (1960), pp. 210-213. The chapter on the Swedish mission was together with six others—left out of later editions.

³ Nathan M. Shamuyarira: *Crisis in Rhodesia*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1965, p. 141. Shamuyarira, however, added that "nearly all [of them] would say today that they mistrust the Church as a whole" (ibid.).

⁴ Hallencreutz op. cit., p. 14.

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concluded that "before they were banned, ZAPU and ZANU were very strong in the missions among staff and members".¹ The influence of the two liberation movements in the CSM missionary area would dramatically resurface during the latter part of the 1970s, bringing the Church of Sweden closer to the liberation struggle.

The Missionary Connection

Swedish missionaries were late in coming to Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, due to the influence of the mission and to the absence of other tangible Swedish interests, the church connection would for a long time constitute an almost exclusive link between the two countries and merits more than a passing comment.

A number of Swedish companies had established a presence in Zimbabwe at a relatively early stage. They were, however, primarily set up as sales' offices of subsidiary companies in South Africa, covering the combined market of British Central Africa, that is, including Malawi and Zambia (and often-as in the case of companies active in the mining sector-the Katanga province of Congo). From an economic point of view, direct trade between Sweden and Zimbabwe was, however, insignificant. As already noted, it can be estimated that Zimbabwe in 1950 received as little as 0.06% of total Swedish exports and that its share of Swedish imports amounted to around 0.01%. Zimbabwe was thus of marginal material importance and to the extent that the country was known at all in Sweden, the opinion was largely shaped by missionaries. Correspondingly, it was through contacts with the Swedish missions that people in Zimbabwe formed their first, general ideas about Sweden. Independent Zimbabwe's first President, Canaan Banana-himself a Methodist minister-has emphasized the role of the missions for the relationship between the two countries, saying that the missionary work played an important role and that missionaries-although they were also divided between a progressive and a conservative element-were concerned about the plight of the majority of the black people of this country. From time to time they submitted written reports to their home missions. Others wrote to magazines [...] to give the Swedish people a picture of the situation [...]. Also, do not forget that they had begun a trans-Atlantic voyage and that a few Africans who got scholarships from the mission centres were beginning to study in Europe. They became a kind of ally through which the church and the people of Sweden

generally would be introduced and exposed to the nature of our struggle.²

1 Ngwabi Bhebe: 'Healing the War Scars in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe' in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds.): *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Volume II, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1995, p. 151.

² Interview with Canaan Banana, Harare, 3 June 1996.

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The missionary influence has, likewise, been stressed by leaders such as Ndabaningi Sitholei and Abel Muzorewa, ² although both of them-like Banana -represent religious denominations other than the official Swedish Lutheran faith. The political significance of the early missionary connection is further underlined by the fact that the first ZANU representatives appointed to Sweden were selected on the basis of previous contacts with the Church of Sweden Mission and, as such, assumed to have a basic knowledge of the Swedish society. ³ In the case of the African National Council (ANC), set up in December 1971 to oppose the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals and led by the two

Methodists Abel Muzorewa and Canaan Banana, Erling Söderström, a son of the Swedish CSM missionary teacher Hugo Söderström, was even appointed as the official representative to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries.⁴

The ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo also maintained close contacts with the Swedish mission. And when Robert Mugabe himself a Catholic in September 1977 paid his first visit to Sweden, he included a meeting with CSM at its

1 In July 1995, Sithole himself a Congregationalist minister from the United Church of Christ stated that the Swedish support to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe began as an "involvement by the missions. Sweden had a very big mission in this country at Mnene. Incidentally, my first child was born at that mission. [...] When the struggle started, somehow the good-hearted people at Mnene sympathized with the African nationalist cause and we were able to send some of our fellows to Sweden. My own son, for instance, got into a family there. [...] My daughter also got there through a Swedish family. But it is not only my family that benefited from being kept by Swedish families during the struggle, but other families as well. [...] I was trained at Dadaya mission, two or three hundred miles away from the Mnene mission. Mnene mission was Lutheran and Dadaya was of the United Church of Christ, but we used to have inter-sports and a good number of my friends came from Mnene. [...] The missionary involvement is always very important" (interview with Ndabaningi Sithole, Harare, 25 July 1995).

2 Addressing the question why Sweden and the other Nordic countries had become closely involved in the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa in general, Muzorewa-bishop of the United Methodist Church-said in November 1996: "I have tried to think what the reasons could be. I know that they are not former colonizers, so it would not be like in the cases of Britain or France. As a Christian myself, I want to believe that their involvement [...] came from the church influence that they had [...] [and that they] wanted to share with others. But they did not only share their beliefs. They also shared their sons and daughters, who came to Zimbabwe as preachers, ministers of religion, nurses and educators. These people came as missionaries and I believe that the Scandinavian countries, so to speak, later continued to be missionaries in the social, political and economic life in this part of the world" (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).

3 Interview with Ndabaningi Sithole, Harare, 25 July 1995. ZAPU also appointed representatives to Sweden with a background in CSM schools. This was, for example, at the beginning of the 1970s the case with Phineas Makhurane, who studied at the University of Uppsala. After independence, Makhurane became pro vice-chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe and later vice-chancellor of the National University of Science and Technology.

4 After attending a white school, Erling Söderström became involved in nationalist politics. Taking active part in student demonstrations at the United Theological College in Salisbury against the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals, he was-at the age of eighteen-expelled from Zimbabwe in March 1972. He returned to Sweden, where he continued his studies at the University of Stockholm. In spite of his young age, he was appointed representative of ANC in Scandinavia

and held in that capacity several meetings with SIDA and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. See, for example, CCHA: Memorandum ('Samtal 1973 01 16 och 1973 01 19 med Sverige-representant fir African National Council, ANC (Rhodesia)')/Discussions 16.01.1973 and 19.01.1973 with representative to Sweden of the African National Council, ANC (Rhodesia') by Anders Millander, Stockholm, 22 January 1973 (SDA).

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Addressing the church. Robert and Sally Mugabe with Cal Fredrik Hallencreutz at the Church of Sweden Mission headquarters in Uppsala, September 1977 (Photo. Jim Elfstrom/IKON)

headquarters in Uppsala, where he talked about the role of the church in an independent Zimbabwe. 1

Three different missionary ventures with Swedish connections were embarked upon in Zimbabwe in the early 20th century.² The first was the Lutheran initiative in the Mberengwa area in the south-western part of what today is the Midlands province, emanating from the Church of Sweden Mission in Zululand. The second formed part of a broader international Methodist initiative and had its centre at Old Umtali outside Mutare in the Manicaland province. The third was a Pentecostal enterprise at Gwanda in southern Matabeleland South. The Swedish Pentecostal Mission at Gwanda existed, however, only a few years before it was transferred to CSM in 1928.

There were close links between the Methodist Church in Sweden and the missionary initiative of the United Methodist Church (then the Methodist Episcopal Church) at Old Umtali. The Swedish nurses and midwives Ellen Björkl and Tord Harlin: 'Minnesanteckningar förda vid samtalen mellan representanter för den Patriotiska Frontens ZANU-grupp, Lutherska Världsförbundets svenska sektion och Svenska Kyrkans Mission' ('Notes from the discussions between representatives of the ZANU group of the Patriotic Front, the Swedish section of the Lutheran World Federation and the Church of Sweden Mission'), Uppsala, 19 September 1977 (CSA). At the meeting, Mugabe criticized the Swedish mission for not denouncing the Smith regime in sufficiently clear terms. Hugo Söderström of CSM—the father of Erling Söderström, the ANC representative—shared this view, stating that "we have to admit that we have not done as much as the Roman Catholic church when it comes to protests against the regime in Rhodesia". (The Catholic church is the largest Christian church in Zimbabwe, with just under half a million members. During the war of liberation, no church spoke out so publicly as the Catholic church, nor suffered as many casualties, both at the hands of the guerrillas and the security forces. Thus, one bishop, twenty-three expatriate missionaries and one local priest were killed, one bishop and eighteen missionaries deported and more than sixty mission stations, schools and hospitals closed. See Janice McLaughlin: *On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, Baobab Books, Harare, 1996.)

² For a good summary of the early Swedish missionary initiatives in Zimbabwe, see Hallencreutz op. cit

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lund, who came to Old Umtali in 1913 after four years at Inhambane in Mozambique, and Ruth Hansson, who joined her there in 1926, made, for example, important contributions to the mission's health services. Both of them had close and special personal relations to bishop Muzorewa. ¹ The Methodist missionary venture was, however, of a broader, international character. Its impact on the bilateral relations between Sweden and Zimbabwe could not be compared to that of the official Church of Sweden Mission, which played a dominant role in the Mberengwa-Gwanda-Beitbridge area.

In 1900, CSM decided to extend its activities north of the Limpopo,² although the year 1903-when the Mnene farm south of Mberengwa was purchased-is considered as the actual beginning of the missionary endeavour in Zimbabwe.

Due to adverse conditions, it was, however, not until 1908 that a permanent CSM presence was established. The first baptism took place in 1911. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the three-pronged approach of preaching the gospel in combination with formal education and medical services rapidly bore fruit. After the takeover of the mission station at Gwanda and the extension of the missionary field to southern Matabeleland, a number of new stations were opened. To the first mission at Mnene were added Masase (1920), Gwanda (1928), Musume (1932), Zezani (1932), Manama (1938) and Masingo (1932).³ In the beginning, they were regarded as part of the Swedish Lutheran mission in South Africa, but in 1934 a local missionary committee was established in Zimbabwe. In 1959, Arvid Albertsson, who previously had developed the Manama mission, took office as the first bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe (ELCZ) and in 1975 Jonas Shiri was consecrated as the first African bishop.

The liberation war reached Mberengwa in 1976. All the Swedish missionaries were then withdrawn by CSM. The process was, however, reversed at the beginning of 1977, when ZAPU provoked a massive departure of more than 300 school children, teachers, nurses and even a clergyman from the Manama

¹ In his autobiography, Muzorewa refers to Miss Bjirklund as the nurse who saved his life after a premature birth in 1925 (Rise up and Walk, Evans Brothers Limited, London, 1978, p. 1) and in an interview in November 1996 he talked about both Sister Ellen and Sister Ruth: "[T]he first white person that I ever met, so to speak, was the Swedish nurse Sister Ellen Bjirklund. She was the midwife when I was born [...]. I probably would have been just sand or mud-nothing-if she had not been there, because I was born a premature baby and in those days, with all due respect to my African ancestors, people did not know what to do with a premature baby, except to just put it in a pot and throw it away. But because she was there, I was saved. That was my very dramatic first contact with Scandinavia, or specifically with Sweden. Sister Bjirklund is buried at Old Umtali and whenever I go to the cemetery I dean up the grave and put flowers on it, because she means a lot to me. When I grew up, there was also a female Swedish nurse, Sister Ruth Hansson. She was a good friend of my parents and the last person that my wife worked for before she got married to me. I used to go to her house to see my wife-to-be. [...] I [later] had to go and see her [in Sweden], up in the mountains" (interview with Abel Muzorewa, Harare, 26 November 1996).

² For the history of the Church of Sweden Mission in Zimbabwe, see Söderström op. cit. and Bhebe op. cit.

³SKM: Svenska Kyrkans Missionsdyrskrifts Arbok 1960 ('The Yearbook by the Mission Board of the Swedish Church: 1960'), Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1960, pp. 124-127. To these missions should be added Chegato (1949), Gungwe (1953) and Bulawayo (1955).

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mission to Zambia,¹ a dramatic event that led to CSM's direct involvement in humanitarian assistance to the liberation movement.

Over the years, the missionary field in south-western Zimbabwe would develop into CSM's most important operation in Southern Africa, involving more Swedish missionaries, indigenous evangelists, schools, pupils, clinics and patients than in the older field in South Africa.² The spiritual impact can be illustrated by the fact that well over 180,000 people out of a total population of around 350,000 in the three districts of Mberengwa, Gwanda and Beitbridge according to the 1982 Zimbabwe census claimed to be Christians.³ To this should be added significant social achievements in the areas of education and health. Nevertheless, dominated by pietistic 'old-church' values,⁴ the Swedish Lutheran enterprise was for a long time largely seen as a crusade against both heathendom and other churches, leaving little latitude for the indigenous population's political concerns. Bhebe has commented that the

Swedish missionaries [...] insisted on abstention from participating in Rhodesian politics by first emphasizing their differences of nationality from the Rhodesian white settlers and secondly by upholding the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, which taught that citizens must be obedient to their secular rulers because they represented the will of God. Swedish missionaries had therefore in the sixties and early seventies frowned upon the church employees who actively participated in nationalist politics, as that was regarded as a form of rebelliousness against, if not actual attack upon the secular rulers.⁵

As noted by Banana, there were both conservative and more progressive missionaries. The latter would from the mid-1960s-in particular after Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence; in itself a rebellion against secular rule -become increasingly open to the political aspirations of the African majority. One of them was the CSM educationalist Tore Bergman, son of the pioneer missionary Johannes Bergman⁶ and born in Zimbabwe. He served as the first principal of the CSM secondary school at Chegato from 1957 to 1966, at the same time assisting with the establishment of the secondary schools at Musume, ¹Paulos Matjaka Nare: 'Education and War' in Bhebe and Ranger (eds.) op. cit, p. 130.

² In 1965, CSM/ ELCZ was running 175 primary schools with a total of 24,000 pupils; 2 secondary schools with 400 pupils; 4 hospitals-at Mnene, Manama, Masase and Musume-treating an average of 15,000 patients annually; and 9 clinics with a corresponding figure of around 100,000 out patients (CSM: 'Press Release', Uppsala, 12 November 1965) (CSA).

3 Bhebe in Bhebe and Ranger (eds.) op. cit., p. 154.

4 The Church of Sweden has never been a monolithic, homogeneous body. It contains various currents and trends, including a pietistic and a high church movement. In the case of Zimbabwe, a large number of the missionaries traditionally came from the Swedish west coast region, "where faithfulness to the Holy Scriptures and the Lutheran Confession and a deep respect for the ordained priesthood are dominant. [...] It is obvious that the strongest influence [over CSM Zimbabwe] came from the group of Lutheran Christians which in Sweden are called 'schartauans', or old-church people" (Söderström op. cit., 125).

5 Bhebe in Bhebe and Ranger (eds.) op. cit., pp. 156-157.

6 The CSM missionary Johannes Bergman had originally worked as an agriculturalist in South Africa. He moved to Zimbabwe in the 1920s, where he developed the mission farm at Mnene.

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Masase and Manama. A number of prominent future Zimbabwean nationalists passed through these schools and Bergman was at an early stage exposed to their political concerns. In an interview in 1997, he confirmed that "the general opinion among the [Swedish] missionaries was that we should not involve ourselves in party politics, and therefore not take sides for ZANU, ZAPU or any particular political movement". At the same time, Bergman said, "we [...] tended to sympathize with the nationalist movement, although we did not speak out officially and openly [...], as maybe we should have done".¹

In the case of South Africa, the CSM missionary Gunnar Helander had in the 1940s already publicly raised his forceful voice against racial discrimination and oppression of the African majority. Helander had, however, no Swedish counterpart in Zimbabwe and the official missionary reports from the field to the Church of Sweden Mission in Uppsala would for a remarkably long period reflect both racist and politically reactionary attitudes. Dean Arvid Albrektson in 1959 consecrated as the first CSM bishop for Zimbabwe²-stated in the annual report for 1952 that it "is easy in a country like Sweden to definitely criticize the racial policies in countries with a mixed population. False idealism and massive ignorance about the real situation has determined much of the Swedish criticism of the racial policies in both South Africa and Kenya". According to the CSM missionary,

a characteristic which, unfortunately, is very common among the Africans [is] the lack of sense of responsibility. If you don't take the trouble to [...] penetrate the psyche of the African, trying to understand his conditions, vexation or irritation will be easily comprehensible reactions to the many daily examples of his irresponsibility. He is to a much larger degree governed by emotions than by the intellect.

He literally talks about his heart as if it was a force external to himself, a rather fickle force whose whims he has to follow. [...] The African's lack of sense of responsibility, together with his conspicuous clumsiness with regard to organization [and] his lack of system in everything he sets about to do, naturally constitute a

great obstacle on his way to the desired equality with the white man.³

In later reports, Albrektson denounced the nationalist movement. In March 1959, that is, shortly after the demonstrations throughout the Central African Federation, the introduction of emergency legislation and the banning of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, the recently confirmed head of CSM Zimbabwe gave his views of the events, declaring that

1 Interview with Tore Bergman, Uppsala, 10 February 1997. In 1966, Bergman was appointed CSM education secretary in Zimbabwe, a post which he kept until 1970, when he moved to Sweden and became Africa secretary at the CSM headquarters in Uppsala.

2 Albrektson had served as a missionary in Zimbabwe since 1932. According to Hugo Söderström, he had "a conservative [political] attitude, did not approve any radical or sudden changes and was inclined to point out how the African benefited from the Western civilization [...] which the colonial power supported. [...] The African Christians gave bishop Albrektson the nickname Vareva chimwe ('He who tells only once'). For the bishop was of a strong mind and did not expect that decisions already made should be subjected to further discussions" (Söderström op. cit., pp. 120-121). 3A. H. Albrektson 'Rhodesia' in Svenska Kyrans Missionsstyrelsens Årsbok: 1953 ('The Yearbook of the Mission Board of the Swedish Church: 1953'), Abnqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1953, p. 57 and 59.

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the facts now known are that extreme nationalist parties in the Central African Federation have been increasingly active, infiltrating a great number of non-political associations. They have also to a rising degree and with more and more daring insolence been keeping many of their racial kinsmen in terror through scares and threats. It is now obvious that they did not hesitate to try to achieve their objectives through open violence and that they in Nyasaland had worked out a terror plan which [...] would have [led to] the killing not only of Europeans, but also of many of their own race. It is also evident that some of the inspiration behind this policy of violence has come from outside the borders of the Federation. [However,] through a firm and well-planned intervention, the authorities managed in time to limit the fatal consequences.¹

These and similar reports from the missionary field in Zimbabwe were not censured by the Mission Board in Uppsala, but on the contrary published in its official yearbooks. In fact, well into the 1960s prominent representatives of the official Church of Sweden largely held the same views as those expressed by Albrektson. For example, in a book published to meet "the need of literature for reading aloud in the many [study] and sewing circles [that constitute] one of the conditions for our effort in Africa",² bishop Bo Giertz of Gothenburg proudly wrote after visiting Zimbabwe in mid-1961 that our missionary field in Rhodesia [...] begins down at the Limpopo. From there it reaches like a wedge which broadens [...] towards Bulawayo and Fort Victoria [...].

Within this area, the Church of Sweden has [...] been allowed to alone preach the gospel. At times, Rome has tried to insert itself between our congregations, but without any major success. [...] The remarkable has thus happened that we Swedes have been able to colonize this piece of Africa in the best sense of the word. [...] There still remain vast areas to be conquered [...], but the organization is so firm

and the foundation so solidly laid that the continuation almost follows by itself.³ Giertz rejected the democratic demands of the African majority. Warning against "the two forces" that in his view could threaten the harmonious development of Zimbabwe, namely "unrepentant white conservatism [and] extreme black nationalism", he conveyed to his church readership in Sweden that

I on several occasions have heard Africans express their conviction that universal and equal suffrage-'one man, one vote'-at present would lead to a catastrophe. [...] A people is not really mature enough for democracy as long as the majority believes that the best way to get guidance for important decisions is to slaughter a cow and watch how the entrails are positioned.

1 Arvid Albrektson: 'Syd-Rhodesia' in Svenska Kyrkans Missionsstyrelses Ardeok: 1959 ('The Yearbook of the Mission Board of the Swedish Church: 1959'), Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala, 1959, p. 47. 2 Bo Giertz: Afikamska Övrasningar ('African Surprises'), Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, Stockholm, 1962; Preface.

3 Giertz op. cit., pp. 35-39.

4 Ibid. pp. 53-55.

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However, following the example of the Lutheran church in South Africa,¹ the Mission Board of the Church of Sweden in Uppsala was by that time committed to a policy of devolution of power to the local church, combined with efforts to indigenize both the clergy and the administration of the educational institutions. CSM "clearly realized that only an indigenous church could properly fulfil her divine mission",² seeing the Africanization of the church in a wider perspective and giving it high priority. This policy-which developed parallel to an increasing political polarization between the nationalist movement and the white settler interests-culminated in March 1963 with the formation of ELCZ and the subsequent transfer of the mission schools, health facilities and other properties to the new Evangelical Lutheran Church of Zimbabwe.

The Africanization of the Lutheran church and the ascendancy of the extremist Rhodesian Front, which had come to power in December 1962, soon led to a conflict between the church and the government in which both ELCZ's Swedish parent organization and the remaining Swedish missionaries³ were eventually forced to take a position. In addition, ELCZ belonged to the ecumenical Zimbabwe Christian Council, which was formed in 1964 and also counted the Anglican and the African Methodist Episcopal Church among its members. Interacting with the Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Christian Council-a member of the World Council of Churches (WCC)-would increasingly take a

critical stand towards Ian Smith's regime, particularly regarding its discriminatory land and education policies.

Two weeks after UDI, the Christian Council denounced the rebellion and declared that it regarded 'independent' Zimbabwe as an illegal entity.⁴ The Lutheran church had thereby taken a first political stand in the ensuing conflict. This would be further clarified through its humanitarian work within Christian Care, a welfare organization set up by the Zimbabwe Christian Council in 1967 to give relief assistance to families of detainees and political prisoners. As WCC members, both the Church of Sweden and ELCZ, finally, formed part of the decision taken at the WCC assembly in Uppsala in 1968 to launch the Programme to Combat Racism, which recognized the possibility of Christian support to liberation movements involved in armed struggle and from 1970 extended financial assistance to both ZANU and ZAPU.

The quite dramatic change by the Church of Sweden Mission after UDI was illustrated in February 1966, when Holger Benettsson, at the time in charge of CSM matters pertaining to Africa, published a booklet in Swedish entitled *The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa-Southeast Region* was formed by the Lutheran communities in Natal and Zululand in 1961, with bishop Helge Foss6us of CSM as its first leader. The Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Kavango Church (ELOK) in Namibia-later the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN)-became independent as early as in 1957.

² S6derstr6m op. cit., p. 132.

³ In 1962, there were 74 CSM missionaries in Zimbabwe. The number had in 1975 been reduced to 20. ⁴Holger Benettsson: *Problemet Rhodesia* ('The Problem of Rhodesia'), Nordiska Afrikainstitutets skriftserie, Wahlstr6m & Widstrand, Stockholm, 1966, p. 64.

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Problem of Rhodesia through the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Condemning UDI and stating that "the problem of Rhodesia in the final event is a human problem which originates in the contempt of the Africans by the white race",¹ the CSM Africa secretary gave a brief, but positive and informed account of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe. Regretting the split between ZANU and ZAPU-"which has weakened the African opposition"²--Benettsson's publication marked a clear break with past missionary reports.

Few Swedish voices would after UDI question the nationalist movement's demands for democracy and majority rule, although the conservative review *Svensk Tidskrift* was a notable exception. It continued to oppose "short-term political changes", stating as late as in 1966 that the consequences of an African government "have been demonstrated in Congo. The fact is that the blacks today do not have sufficiently many and sufficiently educated administrators to maintain Rhodesia at its present high standard. In such a situation", the Moderate ideological review concluded, "majority rule is not much to build upon".³

'The Boycott against Rhodesia Must Become Effective': First of May in Stockholm, 1966. (Photo: Pressens Bild)

Ibid., p. 61.

2 Ibid., p. 52.

3, 'Ultimatun i Rhodesia' in Svensk Tidskrift, No. 7, 1966, p. 385.

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