On the Frontline
Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War

Janice McLaughlin MM

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PART 1
Foreword

Each time we in South Africa heard that another missionary had been killed in Zimbabwe's war of liberation, we wondered if Church personnel would suffer the same fate here. We were proud of Bishop Donal Lamont's outspoken criticism of minority rule in that country and closely followed the Justice and Peace Commission's well documented reports of human rights abuses. But few of us were aware of the extent of involvement by rural missions in the liberation struggle.

Although the reality in Zimbabwe and South Africa differed in many respects, both countries suffered from a racist minority regime imposing its rule by force on the African majority. In both cases, the majority won freedom after a long and painful struggle, with the support of others, both locally and internationally. In both cases as well, the Churches were active participants in the colonial enterprise and in its eventual demise. This volume documents how the Catholic Church made this transformation and goes on to describe the interaction between guerrillas and Church personnel at four rural missions. On the Frontline raises critical issues of morality and ethics, throwing light on the complex subject of religion and politics and highlighting changes in Church-State relations over the years.

With meticulous detail and exciting new information gleaned from numerous interviews and from the archives of the Church and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Sister Janice McLaughlin has woven an inspiring tale of courage and commitment. In these pages, missionaries, catechists, mission
teachers, nurses, drivers, priests, sisters and bishops alike grapple with the challenge posed by an armed revolution. Often at great personal risk, most opt to remain with the people in the rural areas who bear the brunt of the liberation war. The case studies read like a fast-paced novel as characters make life and death decisions on a daily basis. Janice lets the participants speak for themselves, revealing a variety of viewpoints and attitudes. She has managed to hear many sides of the same story, even tracing the guerrillas who operated in each area. Such a detailed chronicle of the Church in a situation of armed conflict, provides much food for theological reflection. It also offers support and guidance to those caught in conflict throughout the world. Though the situations may vary, the dilemmas are the same - to what extent to get involved and in what manner. Janice suggests that Churches can be a force for healing and reconciliation only if they have borne the heat of the struggle. Though many life and death decisions took place on an ad hoc, personal basis, Janice reveals that there was in fact much organised research and reflection at both national and diocesan level, resulting in policies that not only saved lives but brought life-giving change to the institutional Church. While what followed after independence must be the subject of a separate study, Janice provides a useful analysis to explain why many positive innovations did not carry over into peacetime. She suggests that just as the center of power shifted from the freedom fighters in the field to the politicians around the conference table, the balance of power in the Church moved from rural Church personnel and the Justice and Peace Commission which was their voice, back to the institutional centre. She concludes that the demobilisation process that followed robbed both Church and society of disciples to carry out the revolutionary agenda. This is a vital lesson to learn - and most timely for us in South Africa.

Fr Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, M P Cape Town, South Africa, May 1995

Preface
"The position of the Church vis-a-vis the guerrillas is unique. I doubt if it has taken place elsewhere in Africa," I wrote in my diary in June 1977, one month after my arrival in Rhodesia to work as the Press Secretary with the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. "When F O mentioned how the 'boys' borrowed his record player because they were having a dance and then returned it the next week - it reveals a trust and respect on both sides. Another has them in his house every day. Another gets their clothes for them."

I went on to consider the motives of these missionaries who were assisting the guerrillas at great risk to themselves and often unknown to others, even at the same mission. "Do the missionaries do it under fear of death or do they believe in the boys themselves, if not the struggle?" I asked. This question kept recurring to me long after the war had ended. I was intrigued by the possibility of a Church that supported revolutionary change and wondered what impact this had on the Church itself and on the wider society. In ZANU-run refugee camps in Mozambique during the last years of the liberation war, many guerrillas had told me of individual priests and sisters who had saved their lives.
and of missions which had fed, clothed, healed and protected them. I also wondered how this had influenced the liberation movements.

I was not clear how this partnership had come about or why. Reason would suggest that Church personnel, hostile to communism and opposed to violence, would be the last people to support armed gunmen and women advocating Marxism. Yet often in Zimbabwe they had done so.

Had they faced a crisis of conscience over this? How had they made their decisions? Had they been willing or unwilling accomplices? How had the giving of material aid been organised? Did attitudes and behaviour differ between Church leadership and the personnel in the field and between expatriate and local Church personnel? Had the Church been changed by this interaction?

On the side of the guerrillas, had their outlook changed after coming into contact with Church personnel who supported their cause and gave them assistance? Were ZANLA policies and practice anti-Christian? What factors determined relations between individual guerrillas and specific missions? Had the guerrillas treated expatriate and African staff members differently?

Did they favour or oppose traditional religion? Why had some missionaries been killed? Who had killed them?

Finally, I wanted to know how actions in remote rural areas affected the overall relationship between Church and State.

I was in a privileged position to explore these questions. As a religious sister who worked for the Church, I had access to Church personnel and knew from the inside how the Church operated. As a former detainee and deportee who had worked in ZANU camps in Mozambique, I also had some knowledge of ZANU and its activities and had access to many former ZANLA guerrillas and political leaders. As a missionary who had lived and worked in East and Southern Africa for more than twenty years, I had some knowledge of the languages and culture of that region, and a deep and abiding love of Africa and its people.

During the liberation war and in the years after independence, I had had opportunities to question bishops, guerrilla commanders, refugee teachers, even former members of the Smith Government about the war. Almost all were happy to share their experiences with me. "You're the first person who has ever shown an interest," I was often told.

I was able to carry out a more systematic study of the role of the Church in the war when I embarked on a research degree at the University of Zimbabwe in 1989. This came about as a result of the Church-State Project in the Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy. I am grateful to all those who facilitated this research. Special thanks are due to my academic advisers, Dr Ambrose Moyo, Professor Ngwabi Bhebe, and Professor Carl Hallencreutz, to my external examiner, Professor Terence Ranger and to Baobab Books, and all those who funded the study, including the Bethlehem Mission Society, Maryknoll Sisters, University of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Ministry of Education and Culture. Former Air-Marshall Josiah Tungamirai, Bishop Patrick Mutume, Fr Michael Traber, SMB, Sr Rocha Mushonga, LCBL, Brigitte Angays-Katiyo,
Magda Pavitt, Dr Patricia Brennan, John Reed and John Conradie who provided valuable information, editorial advice and encouragement along the way. I have listed at the end of this book (Sources I: Interviews) the many people who gave me the opportunity of interviewing them about the events I describe in it. Where I have quoted from these interviews, this is acknowledged by adding the surname(s) of the interviewee(s) in square brackets, for example [Muzungul or [Muzungu, Mutume]. Where a date (or the abbreviation n.d., for ‘no date’) appears after a name, sometimes with a page reference following, the citation refers to the written sources, published and unpublished, which are listed in the second section on sources. References to archival material are to be found in footnotes.

It is worth noting here that I was one of the first independent researchers to be given access to ZANLA field reports which provide unique insights and information about the liberation war and those who fought it. As with other archives I consulted, no restrictions were placed on my access to information nor subsequent use of it.

All history is written from an individual perspective. I have never professed to be a pacifist and took sides with the liberation forces because I thought their war was just. I have not hesitated, however, to deal openly with controversial issues such as violence, indiscipline, and internal conflicts in the case of the guerrillas and leadership, policies, ideology, and structure in the case of the Church. In all this, my main objectives was to compile a record of the war at the grassroots before the story is lost, altered or distorted.

It was both an honour and privilege to be trusted with very precious and often very painful memories. The real credit for this book goes to all those men and women who shared their stories with me. They are the protagonists in a drama which I merely describe. It is my hope that this study will provide some models and encouragement for churchmen and women caught up in situations of conflict around the world - from Sudan to Peru, East Timor, Guatemala, Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia - and that it may inspire and challenge future generations of Zimbabweans to complete the unfinished revolution in both Church and society.

Janice McLaughlin MM
April 1995
Chapter 1
TAKING SIDES: To 1972

"I just wanted to evade the issue, that's what neutrality means'.

Sister Radigunda Mdiiller, OP, Berejena Mission

The new nation of Zimbabwe was born on the night of 17 April 1980 with a 21 gun salute, a flaming torch, and a prayer. The leader of the Catholic Church in the country, Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa, shared the dais at the independence ceremony with the newly elected Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, the President, Reverend Canaan Banana, the Chief Justice, Mr Hector McDonald, and the guest of honour, Prince Charles. The thousands who thronged Rufaro Stadium for the occasion paused in their jubilant clapping, stamping, and cheering while the Archbishop recited a short prayer for the welfare of the new nation and its leaders. The Archbishop had had a private visit with Robert Mugabe a few weeks previously, at which it was rumoured that the Prime Minister designate had asked Chakaipa to be his personal confessor and spiritual advisor. I The morning after the celebrations, the Prime Minister, his wife, Sally, and most of the Cabinet members attended a special independence Mass at the Catholic Cathedral. Later that afternoon, they attended an ecumenical service at the Anglican Cathedral. The prominent role played by the Catholic Church during these celebrations was seen by many as a public acknowledgement of the support which the Church had given to the nationalist guerrillas during the liberation war. It was also seen by some as proof that

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Mugabe had not renounced his Catholic faith in spite of his years as leader of an avowedly Marxist liberation movement. While other Churches, such as the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the United Methodist Church, had also assisted the liberation movement, none had spoken out so publicly nor so frequently as the Catholic Church nor suffered as many war casualties, both at the hands of the guerrillas and the Rhodesian Government's security forces. Eighteen Catholic missionaries and one bishop had been deported. A bishop, 23 expatriate missionaries and one local priest had been killed. By March 1979, 65 Catholic mission stations, schools and hospitals had been closed. The Church's Commission for Justice and Peace (JPC) had been harassed and put on trial by the Government, its officers arrested and deported, and its publications banned; most recently Mambo Press in Gwelo had been blown up by Government agents during the election campaign of 1980.

At independence, few knew the extent of the aid that individual missions had provided during the war, but all had heard of Bishop Lamont's outspoken opposition to the Smith Government and of the human rights reports put out by the JPC.

There were those who praised the Church for the role it had played during the war, while others, including many of its own members, condemned it. Those most involved at the time said the least about it. During the war it would have been foolhardy to acknowledge the support that some members of the Church were giving the liberation armies. Officially the Church maintained that it was neutral, with the Bishops' Conference repeatedly condemning the violence of both sides in the conflict. The Justice and Peace Commission, while ultimately responsible to the Bishops' Conference, spoke with an independent voice, sometimes at odds with that of the bishops.

After the war, the official Church maintained silence about this period of history while those who had been most intimately involved either left the country or were too occupied with post-war reconstruction to be able to reflect much on the past. In any event, such reflection was not encouraged by the leaders of the Church.

The composition of the Justice and Peace Commission changed shortly after independence. Many of its most active and outspoken members during the war were replaced by persons who had not been so deeply involved and were not known by the former guerrilla leaders. In the climate of reconciliation then prevailing, few challenged these developments. As a result, the full story of the Catholic Church and the war has not been told.

Catholic theologians, historians, and sociologists such as Ian Linden (1980), Enda McDonagh (1980), Richard Randolph (1985), John Dove (1983, 1989) and Dianne Auret2 have all provided valuable documents on specific aspects of the Church and the war. Whether they focus on the Colonial history of the Church, the stand of the Bishops' Conference, the application of the 'just war' theory to wartime Zimbabwe, heroic individuals such as Dr Luisa Guidotti and John Bradburne, or the Justice and Peace Commission, their books make a valuable
contribution to our understanding of religion and politics and confirm many of the findings contained in this volume.

What sets this study apart from those mentioned above is its concentration on the relationship between Catholic rural missions and nationalist guerrillas. This focus puts it in the company of books written about the role of various Protestant Churches and of spirit mediums in the war by Ngwabi Bhebe (1989), Terence Ranger (1983, 1985, Ranger and Ncube, 1991) and David Lan (1985).

The Catholic Church, called simply "Roma" by many Africans, is the largest Christian Church in Zimbabwe with just under half a million members. In 1979 its infrastructure consisted of 80 urban parishes, nearly 130 rural missions complete with schools and clinics or hospitals, and a far-reaching network of 800 teaching and preaching centres, known as outstations. Its fulltime personnel at that time consisted of 380 priests, 150 religious brothers, 1 000 sisters, and 1 200 lay catechists.

The Catholic Church is more highly centralised than most Churches and its hierarchical mode of decision-making more clearly defined. In addition, its international links give it access to the mass media and diplomatic channels overseas.

The local leader in the Church is the bishop who heads a selfgoverning administrative unit called a diocese. Since the 1960s, bishops have been organised into national and regional conferences. At the time of the liberation war, there were four Catholic dioceses in Zimbabwe: Salisbury, Umtali, Gwelo (now Harare, Mutare, Gweru) and Bulawayo; and two ecclesiastical jurisdictions Sinoia and Wankie (Chinhoyi and Hwange), eventually to become dioceses as their Catholic populations grew.

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The Catholic Church in Zimbabwe served both the majority African population and the European settler community. This double mandate became a source of tension during the war, dividing Church personnel who laboured in urban, mainly white areas, from those who worked exclusively with the impoverished African people in the rural areas.

Yet, the Catholic Church has a history of mission work in the area running back more than three hundred years before European settlement from the south created this divided society.

The first Catholic missionary to come to what is now Zimbabwe was Fr Goncalo da Silveira, a Portuguese priest. Within three months of his arrival he was accused of being a spy for his country and put to death in 1560.

In spite of this, the Church did not withdraw from the area but continued to send replacements from Portugal. Silveira's successors were given large tracts of land by the Portuguese Government and received a monthly stipend from the State. Some of them became landowners, merchants, and even slave traders to help finance their missionary endeavours. (Rae in Bourdillon, 1977:13-24; Mudenge, 1976:32-63) When political events in Europe caused all missionaries to leave the area in 1775, they could boast that several generations of Shona rulers (Mutapas)
had been baptised and at least two of their sons had been ordained to the priesthood. The historical studies of Mudenge and Rea suggest that this adherence to Christianity by the Shona leaders was dictated more by political and economic motives than by religious zeal. They also suggest that Catholicism remained a court religion which made few inroads among the grassroots community. However this was, the initial period of missionary endeavour in Zimbabwe paved the way for future Church-State relations. Catholic missionaries worked hand in hand with Colonial authorities and local African leaders to gain access to new territory and to secure protection and funding for their enterprise. In their lifestyle, behaviour and activities, they were often indistinguishable from the Colonial officials and the settler population. David Livingstone's celebrated journeys to Africa in the middle of the 19th century created something of a religious scramble for Africa, in which the Catholic Church took part. Claiming Zimbabwe as their territory because of the work of Silveira and his successors, the Jesuits put together an international team of eleven men, led by Fr Henry Depelchin, which left Grahamstown, South Africa, on 16 April 1879. Like their Portuguese predecessors, this generation of Jesuits relied on Europeans for information and assistance. A British hunter, 

Fig. 1 Map of Early Missions Source: Letters and Noices, No. LXI, May 1879, Manresa Press, Roehampton

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Henry Edward Barry, is reported to have interested Bishop Grimley of Cape Town in the possibility of re-establishing the Zambezi Missions, and the famed explorer and hunter, Frederick Courtney Selous, advised them on their route. (Dachs and Rae, 1979; Gelfand, 1968) Like Silveira, they too approached local Africar, rulers for permission to work in their territories, but were turned away by Umzila of Gazaland, Lewanika of Barotseland, and Mwemba of the Tonga. (Dachs and Rae, 1979:22) Only Lobengula of the Ndebele, who had already allowed Protestant missionaries into his domain, was receptive, giving the Jesuits a large tract of land in the west of his territory, which became Empandeni Mission. They also built a chapel and rest house at the trading post of George Westbeech, about 50 miles south of Victoria
Falls at Pandamatenga, which is celebrated as the first mission. In 1885 all but Fr Peter Prestage withdrew after seven of this pioneer group had died of sickness or accident.

Prestage started the first trade school at Empandeni, but when few students turned up and no converts were forthcoming, he too returned to South Africa, convinced that progress was impossible until the Ndebele were defeated militarily. When, in 1889-90, the British South Africa Company was preparing to send a group of miners and settlers to Mashonaland, he volunteered his services to them as chaplain and nurse and recruited some Dominican nuns as well. (Dachs and Rae, 1979:28) This wave of Catholic missionaries arrived with the Pioneer Column of European settlers, forming close links with them which would influence the young Church's outlook and behaviour.

Accepting Prestage's offer to serve in the Pioneer Column, Rhodes agreed to pay his expenses, and later offered the Jesuits four large farms and free stands in the urban areas as well as free bricks for their buildings. (Mashingaidze, 1973; Linden, 1980:303) The Catholic Church eventually became one of the biggest landholders in the country, owning nearly 190 000 acres.

Prestage was outspoken about the advantage of being "within the British sphere of influence" and "under the protection of Great Britain". (Davies, 1974:103) Such protection had its cost, however. The early Jesuits and the Dominican nuns paid the price by ministering to black and white separately. St George's Jesuit College and the Dominican Convent School educated the white leaders of Rhodesian industry, politics, and commerce. Donations from this settler elite helped to pay for the African schools and clinics in the rural areas.

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In 1893 the Ndebele, who lived to the south and west of the area occupied by Rhodes's British South Africa Company, were provoked into a war which, after their surrender, allowed the Company to extend its rule over the whole area—soon to be called Southern Rhodesia between the Limpopo and the Zambezi. The missionaries clearly sided with the Europeans. Writing to Mother Patrick, the superior of the Dominican Sisters, Fr Prestage reiterated his belief that armed force was necessary to defeat the Ndebele. "If ever there was a just war, the Matabele war is just," he declared. "I am delighted that such a tyrannical and hateful rule has been smashed up. The Chartered Company's force deserve sound praise. They have done their work well." (A Dominican Sister, 1947:135)

When, in 1896, both the Ndebele and the Shona launched attempts to roll back the tide of settler occupation, the Catholic mission at Chishawasha became one of the targets of Shona resistance. Founded in 1892 on land taken from the Vashawasha people by Rhodes and given to the Church, it had become the site of one of the first "Christian villages" where new converts were isolated from contact with their "pagan" relatives and their traditional cultural, social, and religious background. The mission superior, Fr Francis Richartz, SJ, wrote a detailed report of the attack which took place on 21 June 1896. His account fully supported the use of force against the attackers and praised the harsh measures taken by the Colonial authorities against the local population. He also advocated placing military bases on Catholic missions to protect them. "Colonel Beal has since punished our adversaries, burned their kraals and driven them out of the Rupara rocks, their stronghold from olden times," he wrote. "It is a wise arrangement to keep such a strong place free from natives by a little garrison on our farm. Some more small laagers of this kind in our district will soon prove a great help towards restoring quiet and safety till offensive action can be fully taken up by reinforcements," he concluded.

In a report to the Chief Magistrate in Salisbury, Fr Richartz analysed the religious, political and economic causes of the uprising. In particular he stressed the influence of Kaguvi, a local religious leader (who had a daughter at the mission school).

Historians such as Ranger and Mashingaidze have highlighted the religious dimension of the 1896 chimurenga, or liberation war, suggesting that it could be seen as a "war between two religious systems." (Ranger, 1970:2; also Mashingaidze, 1973)

Both during and after the war, ministers of religion were admitted to prisons to try to make converts of captured leaders awaiting execution. As a result, Fr Richartz claimed, "Belief in superstition and witchcraft has received a severe blow."8 This period set the stage for an era of cordial relations between Church and State which lasted for the next 60 years. Catholic schools and hospitals received Government grants for staff salaries and running costs, and there were continued grants of land for expansion in rural areas. Initial hostility on the part of the African population was replaced by a growing demand for mission services.
Explaining this change of attitude, Lawrence Vambe, who grew up at Chishawasha, credited it to pragmatism. "There was nowhere in the whole country where Africans could live without interference from the hydra of white political, economic and administrative control," he said, "so they decided to swim with, rather than against the tide." (Vambe, 1976:iff.; also Ranger, 1970:15-24; Bhebe in Dachs, 1973, Vol. 1)

Swimming with the tide meant going to a mission school, adopting Western dress, and becoming a Christian. With this new impetus, the Catholic Church embarked on a two-pronged strategy for expansion: the creation of Christian villages such as Chishawasha, and the establishment of schools. In the first decade of the twentieth century a model for the future was developed - the large mission station on a commercial farm with its workshops, school, compound for African Christian families, and a clinic or hospital. Triashill, Monte Cassino, Embakwe, Driefontein, Gokomere, and Kutama were the fruit of this early expansion. These became contested areas between the Rhodesian security forces and the liberation armies in the second chimurenga.

The referendum in 1923, in which the whites chose limited self-government rather than a future within the Union of South Africa, hardly concerned the Churches. Although the land issue, and in particular the passage of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, caused some heart-searching among missionaries, the Church, while it was growing and spreading its institutional roots, did not challenge the white settler Government. Segregation was common, even in churches, as the Church accommodated itself to the Colonial milieu. As Vambe, an early product of this mission system, observed with sadness, "I felt increasingly that the Church in my country was living in the

"The Weight of History clouds, if not wholly on the side of the destroyers and plunderers of my people." (Vambe, 1976:89)

Under the leadership of Aston Chichester, SJ, who was appointed Vicar Apostolic in 1931, the Church began to change. One of Chichester's first priorities was the promotion of local vocations to the priesthood and religious life. He founded a community of African Sisters, the Little Children of Our Blessed Lady (LCBL) in 1932, and in 1936 he opened the seminary at Chishawasha, where he often taught. The first two Zimbabwean priests, Fr Simon Turo and Fr Isidore Chikore, were ordained in 1947. This emergence of an African clergy and religious meant that the Catholic Church began to hear the cries of the poor from within its own ranks. This opened the possibility for a change of allegiance from identifying with the settler State to championing the rights of the African majority.

Archbishop Chichester also opened the door to new ideas and the possibility of considerable divergences of opinion when he invited missionaries from many lands and a variety of religious orders and congregations to come to Zimbabwe. The Bethlehem Missionary Society of Switzerland, Irish Carmelites, Burgos Missionaries from Spain, Irish Franciscans, Marist Brothers from Canada, and Jesuits from Germany responded to this invitation as did religious women from Switzerland, Ireland, Germany, the United States, England, Spain, South Africa,
Italy, and Holland. None of these new arrivals had historical links with the Colonial authorities and settlers, but came to minister primarily the African population.

As this diversification was taking place in the Church, bringing it to the brink of important changes, society too was experiencing radical change with the rise of African nationalism. The first generation of nationalists was mostly mission-educated and included men like Leopold Takawira who had been raised at Gokomere Mission and studied for the priesthood at Kutama and Chishawasha. Another leading nationalist, James Chikerema, was the product of Kutama Mission, which his father, Joseph Dambaza, had helped to found with Fr Loubiere, SJ. The trade unionist Charles Mzingeli was trained at Empandeni Mission and often quoted Catholic social teaching in his fiery speeches.9

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, African nationalism became more aggressive and, in many cases, hostile to Christianity which was seen to support the status quo. The trade unions also criticised

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the Churches because they allegedly "softened the people into acquiescence to the settler Government".10 As nationalists searched for a religious and cultural base for their movement, there was a revival of traditional African religion. The Church adapted to this by making some initial attempts at inculturation: Shona hymns were composed with Shona melodies and local musical instruments, and African art and architecture were used in the construction of new churches such as the one at Serima Mission. Many of the Christian hymns were politicised a few years later and sung at all-night freedom rallies by ZANLA guerrillas.

In 1958, the Mambo Press was founded to provide an outlet for writing in African languages and in English; a year later a newspaper, Moto was launched. Both played a critical role as the Church began to deal with political issues, setting it on a collision course with Government and leading to serious divisions within itself. The first open division took place in 1959 when the newly appointed Bishop of Umtali, Donal Lamont, O Carm, drafted a pastoral letter openly critical of the racial policies of the Government. This letter, Purchased People, was meant to be a joint statement of all the bishops but was vetoed by the Jesuit advisers to Archbishop Markall of Salisbury as "intemperate... arrogant... and biased against the European". (Dachs and Rea, 1979:207; Linden, 1980:50ff.) Lamont was not deterred and published the letter himself. It was translated into fifteen languages and quoted widely outside Rhodesia, though it received no publicity within the country. Purchased People would hardly be considered a radical document today, with its attack on the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, its emphasis on gradualism, and its praise of "benevolent colonialism", but it went further than any previous Church document in recognising the legitimate grievances of the African majority and in criticising white racism. In it, Bishop Lamont also spelled out the conditions for a just war, but expressed the opinion that these conditions had not been met in Rhodesia in 1959."
As the increasing radicalism of African nationalism gave rise to a white backlash, all the bishops of the country issued Peace Through Justice in 1961, their first joint address on the nation's problems. Commenting on the 1961 Constitution, the entire Catholic hierarchy condemned racism for the first time, comparing it to Nazism.

At the same time, personal links were being forged between individual nationalists and some Church leaders. Bishop Aloysius Haene, SMB, of Gwelo Diocese, for instance, assisted many of the nationalists to go abroad for higher studies and gave financial assistance to the families of imprisoned leaders. He was especially influenced by Leopold Takawira whom he visited regularly in detention.

Bishop Lamont was also influenced by his contact with African nationalists. He had come to know and respect Chief Rekayi Tangwena whom he consulted about opening new missions in Inyanga. When the Tangwena people were forced from their land in the late 1960s the bishop became personally involved in public protests and in assisting the displaced families. Moven Mahachi, another young nationalist, frequently visited Lamont at Triashill Mission.

Another link with nationalist leaders was Silveira House, a leadership training centre established on the outskirts of Salisbury in 1964. The centre led the way in offering courses to trade unionists and in setting up credit unions and agricultural projects.

Mambo Press and Moto newspaper were in the forefront in voicing African opinion and in employing and training African journalists such as Simbi Mubako, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Paul Chidyausiku, Stan Mudenge, and Justin Nyoka. Revd Canaan Banana was responsible for sales in Matabeleland while the Christian Council ran a joint page in Moto in 1972-3. When there were rumours of a split within the nationalist movement in 1963, Bishop Haene went to see Leopold Takawira to plead for unity while Bishop Adolph Schmitt, CMM, of Bulawayo saw Joshua Nkomo. Their intervention was unsuccessful and, in August 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed. While the staff of Mambo Press and Moto newspaper initially greeted the news of the formation of a new party with caution, once it was an accepted reality they were prepared to assist, just as they had previously assisted the National Democratic Party (NDP) and ZAPU at the request of Nkomo, Takawira, and Josiah Chinamano. Mambo Press printed the Party cards and the posters for ZANU's first Party Congress which Bishop Haene helped to finance. The emergence of more militant African nationalism created a backlash in the white community, leading to the election in December 1962 of the Rhodesia Front (RF) Party, of which Ian Smith became leader in 1964.

As Zimbabwe moved closer to armed confrontation, the brief
papacy of John XXIII (1958-63) was bringing far-reaching changes to the Church. The new Pope showed his awareness of Africa in his appointment of the first African Cardinal, Laurean Rugambwa of Tanzania, in 1960. Four years later the Ugandan martyrs were declared saints. Pope John showed himself an advocate of justice and human rights by issuing two major social encyclicals, Mater et Magistra (1961) and Pacem in Terris (1963). These had a profound impact on Bishop Lamont who organised a series of public meetings in his diocese for Catholics and Protestants alike to study these documents. "To find one's original motives such as I articulated them in Purchased People, to find these canonised in Pacem in Terris, made one confident and sure that one was on the right track," he told me. [Lamont]

But the most important event of the reign of Pope John was the convening of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) which was attended by every bishop in the world. The Council had a great influence on the little delegation of five from Rhodesia. Coming from a closed, colonial society, the delegation was exposed to international views and opinions which ran counter to the RF platform of white supremacy. "The situation in Rhodesia stuck out like a sore thumb," commented Lamont. The bishops referred to Council documents in many of their subsequent statements, especially during the war years.

At this time Rhodesia was moving towards a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The bishops flew back shortly after the declaration on 11 November 1965 and on 28 November issued A Plea for Peace. While calling for restraint on the part of the African majority, the bishops questioned UDI without condemning it outright. The Christian Council and Moto were much more direct and outspoken in their criticism.

The next major confrontation between Church and State occurred in 1969 with the referendum on a new Constitution. The Bishops issued A Call to Christians which was the most unequivocal critique of entrenched racism they had ever issued. At the same time, it raised publicly the real possibility of armed confrontation. The 1969 constitutional proposals also brought the Christian Churches together in a rare show of ecumenism. In their Message and Appeal from Church Leaders to the Christian People of Rhodesia, they offered a concrete analysis of the unacceptable elements of the proposals. The Catholic Church's opposition to the constitution resulted in

the Weigh t of History
"The proposed new constitution will ensure that Government will be retained in responsible hands..." (White Paper).

Fig. 3 Moto Cartoon, Special Edition, June 1969

Takinkg Sides: To 1972
the first deportation of a Catholic priest from Rhodesia on 9 March 1970. Fr Michael Traber, SMB, of Moto newspaper, was charged with publishing a subversive statement, a cartoon showing blacks being squeezed by white hands dripping with sweat or blood. The caption read: "Government will be retained in
responsible hands". Bishop Haene was urged to censor Moto by some priests and even fellow bishops, as well as by white Catholics, but he refused. Moto and Mambo Press were singled out by many Africans as the first encouraging signs that the Church was changing sides.

The Church failed the next test of its allegiance, however, when it backed down in a confrontation with Government over the Land Tenure Act of 1969. The Act divided the country unequally on racial lines, giving 45 million acres of the best land to less than a quarter million whites, while five and a half million blacks were given an equal area of land in the least fertile regions with the lowest rainfall. It also restricted movement into areas reserved for one race by members of another race except by special permit.

This affected the Church's right of entry into its own institutions. Fr Richard Randolph, SJ, who was then the Communications Secretary of the Bishops' Conference, mounted a full scale education campaign to inform Catholics of the consequences of the Act. This publicity further polarised the Church between those who wanted to preserve the status quo and those who saw the need for change.

Government critics like Bishop Lamont and Sr Mary MacLeish, the superior of the Notre Dame Sisters, advocated closing all Catholic institutions rather than comply with an unjust law. With internal divisions growing as a result of the Act, the Bishops asked the Holy See to mediate. A Vatican diplomat, Fr Johannes Schuette, SVD, who had been a missionary in China, came to the country and advised that a compromise should be accepted. In February 1971 the Church agreed to drop its objections to the Act and Government accepted multiracialism in Church schools, provided that the number of blacks admitted to previously all white schools did not exceed six percent. This prompted Bishop Lamont to state that he did not know one could have a percentage of a principle! Far from restoring unity to the Church, the compromise sharpened existing divisions. The first casualties were the lay editor and subeditor of the Catholic monthly, The Shield, Timothy McLoughlin and Anthony Chennels, who resigned in protest at both the decision and the undemocratic manner in which it was made.

When Sr Mary MacLeish continued her opposition, she was threatened with disciplinary action by the bishops. When she went on home leave in 1971, her contract was not renewed. Looking back on the incident from retirement in Scotland in 1989, she described the reactions of the various dioceses: "The Germans, they kept the law; the Swiss were neutral. In the north-west the Spanish weren't political at all... . In Salisbury, the Archbishop and the Jesuits were English and they compromised, like the English always do, to their back teeth. The only ones who fought were the Irish, Bishop Lamont and the Franciscans. The Irish always work for the underdog." When the Government evicted 1 000 African families from Chishawasha Mission in November 1971 in violation of its agreement with the Church, the bishops
realised their mistake. The compromise came to an abrupt end only eight months after it had been negotiated. (Linden, 1980:162)
The Church had learned the hard way that it was not possible to compromise on principles or to trust the Rhodesia Front Government. These were valuable lessons to learn in 1971 with the country on the verge of civil war. The 1960s had been a school for the Church, a preparation for the more difficult decisions that were to follow when it found itself between the battle lines of a civil war.

Footnotes
(NB. A name without further reference indicates an intertext.)
1 It was also rumoured that the Archbishop refused on the grounds that he did not want to be linked to any political party, believing in strict separation of Church and State.
11 Haene, Mutumbuka, Sheu, and interviews with Simbi Mubako and Vice President Muzenda all indicated the extent of the assistance the bishop gave to the nationalists. As Bishop Haene commented, "We helped them to go on to study and helped them go over the border. We didn't talk about it". 13 Moto, Vol. 11, No. 6, 19/6/1969 (Special Edition). 14 Linden, 1980:121-155. Also RCBC Statement, 29/4/1970; Race and Morality, Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1970; The Land Tenure Act and the Church, Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1970.
15 Linden, 1980:152-155. For a very different account, see Randolph, Brief Account,
March 1971 and Randolph, 1971. Also SJA for Fr Schuette's report. Randolph never refers to the compromise though he was one of those who led the initial resistance to the Land Tenure Act.

16 Video of Sr Mary McLeish, 23/9/1989, lent to the author by the Notre Dame Sisters in Zimbabwe. SJAdocuments show that Sr Mary's superiors connived with the bishops to prevent her returning to Zimbabwe.

Chapter 2
CHANGING SIDES: 1972-80
'The barrel of a gun pointed churchmen inexorably along paths they would otherwise not have trodden, into attitudes of commitment, anger, numbness and near despair, evoking in them political choices they otherwise would not have made, and which their Christian vocation often forbade them acknowledging.'

Ian Linden
The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe
At the beginning of 1972, the Catholic Church lagged far behind the Protestants in confronting social issues. The response to the Pearce Commission which tested Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement early that year, was a clear indication of Catholic caution. While the Protestant Churches under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Revd Canaan Banana, President and Vice-President respectively of the African National Council (ANC), had resolutely condemned the proposals, the Catholic Bishops' Conference was non-committal and the bishops and clergy were divided in their views.'

The seminarians at Chishawasha were becoming more politically active, however, and joined their Protestant counterparts from Epworth in demonstrating against the settlement proposals in central Salisbury. In his periodic reports to Rome, Fr Randolph made little mention of African nationalism in the 1960s and early 1970s but focussed on clashes between the hierarchy and the Government over racial separation and discrimination and the divisions which this created between the bishops and the majority of European Catholics. Referring to a "depressing missionary climate", Randolph commented:

"The political straight-jacket of obsolete colonialism neither offers scope nor inspiration. The missionary himself is tempted to succumb to the prevalent ideologies of his surroundings."2

A change in this climate came about with the creation of the Justice and Peace Commission in November 1971. The initiative for this body came from the Second Vatican Council and was spearheaded locally by Bishops Haene and Lamont. Bishop Haene chaired the meeting at the Major Seminary at Chishawasha on 20 November 1971 when 28 leaders representing every diocese and major Church organisation recommended that a national Justice and Peace Commission be formed. They proposed that its first task be the preparation of a series of sermons on the social teaching of the Church, noting that their purpose was "not to involve the Church in 'politics'."3
The existing polarisation between black and white in Church and society, however, guaranteed that the sermons would be controversial. They were rejected by European Catholics as too political and by Africans as hypocritical because the Church still practiced segregation in its own institutions. (D Scholz in Dachs, 1973:1/203-204)

Events in the north-east of the country in 1972 shattered this preoccupation with race and reform, forcing the Church to deal with the issue of armed violence. While ZANU and ZAPU had carried out military operations in the country in the late 1960s, these had not directly affected the Churches. This changed when the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of ZANU, launched a new military offensive on 21 December 1972 with an attack on Altena Farm, located about twenty kilometres from St Albert's, a Catholic mission 200 kms north of Salisbury.

This, and subsequent guerrilla attacks in the area, brought down the full force of the Rhodesian military machine on the rural population. Collective fines were imposed, cattle were confiscated, and villagers were detained and interrogated in an attempt to extract information from them and to discourage them from assisting the guerrillas. This harsh counter-insurgency campaign, details of which reached the Justice and Peace Commission almost by accident, brought about changes in its whole direction and led to conflict with the Government and with many members of the Church as well.

Fr Dieter Scholz, SJ, learned about the campaign from a fellow Jesuit visiting Salisbury from Chitsungo Mission in the Zambezi Valley, who casually mentioned events in the north-east over supper one night. When Fr Scholz, a leading member of the JPC, brought the information to the Commission, the members were initially reluctant. Investigating the conduct of the Rhodesian police and security Forces went far beyond the original JPC mandate of educating Catholics about the social teachings of the Church.

Only after Fr Scholz went to the Zambezi Valley himself and brought back first hand reports of Government brutality against the civilian population, did the members of the Commission agree to pursue the issue. Fr Scholz recalled that Government conduct of the war caused a profound conversion in the white members of the Commission as their investigation of the counter-insurgency campaign exposed the insincerity of Government officials whose word they had previously believed.

In the early stages of the JPC investigations, the entire student body and staff of St Albert's Mission were abducted by ZANLA guerrillas in July 1973. This was the first indication that Christian missions might be subject to military operations by both the guerrillas and (overnment thrces. It did not deter the JPC from continuing to investigate the Government's counter-insurgency campaign, however, nor the guerrillas from treating missions as sources of food, clothing, medicine, and new recruits for their forces, with or without the knowledge and consent of the priests in charge.
Meanwhile, the escalation of the war in the north-east led to the first official request from the JPC to the Bishops' Conference for guidance on the whole question of violence.5 Several meetings were held to discuss the issue and some papers were written by theologians which dealt with the topic in the abstract. Their list of definitions of violence and quotations from Church documents and the Bible were of little help to those caught in the crossfire of an ever-deepening conflict.

Parallel to these theological initiatives, the JPC completed its report on security force operations in the north-east in August 1974, giving it to the bishops for action. The first public protest based on this report was in fact ecumenical. Signed by eleven leaders representing the Catholic, Methodist, and Anglican Churches, An Appeal to Conscience by Christian Leaders (15 August 1974), was circulated to five hundred community leaders. The Churches only went public after the JPC report had been rejected by the Prime Minister, Ian Smith, and his Minister of Justice, Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke who referred to the documented cases of assault as "nothing more than the mistakes and misadventures that are inevitable in any military campaign."

The ecumenical response, which spoke of "the deliberate use of illegal and inhuman acts when questioning civilians", hardened the attitude of those in power, who passed the Indemnity and Compensation Act (1975) which absolved army and law enforcement officers in advance for any misconduct committed while on duty. The Protestant and Catholic reactions to this sinister development came separately but were equally critical. (Linden, 1980:210. Also Hallencreuz in Hallencreuz and Moyo, 1988)

This experience reinforced the Commission's mistrust of the Government, bringing an end to any further attempts at dialogue. In April 1975 the JPC published its first major document, The Man in the Middle, which grew out of An Appeal to Conscience. In addition to documenting individual cases of security force brutality against civilians in the north-east, the report also described conditions in the so-called "protected villages". Intended to isolate the nationalist guerrillas from the rural population, this counter-insurgency measure resulted in thousands of peasant families being moved into guarded settlements where they lived in poor and crowded conditions allowing little meaningful activity, and where they were often harshly treated by the camp guards. Modelled on similar measures used in Kenya, Mozambique, and Malaya by Colonial Governments against nationalist uprisings, and by the United States against nationalist guerrillas in Vietnam, these villages were extremely unpopular with nearly all their inhabitants. In response to numerous complaints about the villages, the Churches sent delegations to conduct on-site inspections.7

The first such enclosures were established in the Zambezi Valley in the latter half of 1973 after an initial trial run at St Albert's Mission which was temporarily used as a holding and interrogation centre. By mid-1974, approximately 47 000 people in the Chiweshe area north of Salisbury had been moved into 21 villages and
another 13,500 in the Madziwa area had been relocated in ten villages. The role that the Churches felt they should play in these villages became a source of controversy. Some churchmen and women felt that chaplains should be appointed to minister to the spiritual needs of the people enclosed within them while others argued that this would be tantamount to collaboration with an oppressive and highly unpopular Government policy. This view was reinforced by a confidential Government circular to staff in the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were responsible for running the villages. Suggesting that Church personnel could help to make the villages more acceptable, it advised: "If you can catch a minister of religion, use him, consult him, encourage him to have religious practices established." A compromise was eventually reached, with the Churches publicly condemning the villages but setting up an inter-denominational committee to care for the material needs of the displaced people. This committee became part of the ecumenical relief agency, Christian Care. (Hallencreuz in Hallencreuz and Moyo 1988:90-91)

The public exposure and criticism of the Government's handling of the war by the JPC infuriated members of Government. Instead of taking the Commission's well-documented evidence seriously, it lashed out at the Commission, labelling it a "Fifth Column", which had been subverted by communism and masqueraded under the cloak of religion. This war of words widened the existing divisions within the Church's own ranks. At the Major Seminary at Chishawasha, nationalist sentiment ran high among many of the candidates to the priesthood. Contact with nationalist leaders in their home areas during their holidays made them more aware of injustices in the wider society and within the seminary as well. In 1974 the seminarians went on strike to protest the expulsion of Ernest Mukuwapasi, a seminarian from Umtali Diocese, who openly challenged the Rector, Fr John Berrell, SJ, about various practices in the institution which he considered to be racist. The strike led to a major evaluation of the seminary by a team appointed by the Bishops' Conference. As a result, Fr Tobias Chiginya was appointed the first African Rector and other teaching posts were Africanised as well. (Linden, 1980:205. Also SJA for the evaluation)

The first African bishop in the country, Patrick Chakaipa, had been appointed to succeed Archbishop Markall of Salisbury the previous year, 1973. While the number of African clergy was growing, they were still a minority within a Church largely dominated by expatriate missionaries. To give their voice more weight, the African priests formed the National Association of Diocesan Clergy. Responding to the seminary closure, the Association resolved "that the Church should put its own house in order in matters of justice and peace". It also urged that "more Africans be included in the various episcopal commissions and committees".

A year later, tension between African and European clergy reached
a climax over the issue of army chaplains. When a English secular priest, Fr Walter Beale, was appointed full time chaplain to the Rhodesian security forces, at least two black Zimbabwean priests volunteered to serve as chaplains to the liberation forces. One of these was Ernest Mukuwapasi, whose expulsion from the seminary had caused the strike, and the other was Fr Constantine Mashonganyika, who had been expelled from the seminary on two occasions and had led the seminary protest against the 1971 settlement proposals. (Linden, 1980:205)

Both were asked by their bishops to consider other ways of getting involved. Fr Mukuwapasi, as will be seen, was stationed at Avila Mission where he came into frequent contact with the guerrillas while Fr Mashonganyika was sent to Ireland for studies where he became an active member of a liberation support group which collected medicine, clothing, and funds for ZANU. As the war escalated, two ordained priests and one sister joined the liberation forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA while many seminarians and sister candidates also crossed the border.

While the Church never encouraged its personnel to become guerrilla fighters, and as a rule disowned those who did, at least three members of the hierarchy, Bishops Lamont, Haene, and Schmitt, had been in touch with nationalist leaders from the inception of the various nationalist parties. The formation of the Justice and Peace Commission created another source of contact between nationalists and the Church.

When the African National Council (ANC) served as an umbrella group for the various nationalist parties in the early 1970s, Sister Aquina Weinrich, OP, a sociologist lecturing at the University of Rhodesia, carried out a survey of the ANC, indicating that it had widespread popular support in urban townships.

No sooner had this research been completed when the political scene changed drastically. A new political initiative led to the release of the imprisoned leaders of ZANU and ZAPU in the second half of 1974. They were flown to Lusaka for talks with the leaders of the frontline states about unity among the nationalist parties in preparation for a proposed constitutional conference.

On 17 December 1974, Robert Mugabe met secretly in Salisbury with the JPC Executive to brief its members on the outcome of the gathering of frontline states in Lusaka. He spoke frankly about the divisions which surfaced between ZANU and ZAPU, and the attempts of Presidents Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to impose unity on the two rivals. When it looked as if the talks would break down, ZANU put forward a proposal which was accepted. Under this plan, one member each from ZANU, ZAPU, ANC, and FROLIZI would form the four-man executive of a united front, under the umbrella of the ANC, for the purpose of negotiating at the proposed Victoria Falls Conference, but there would be no merger or fusion and the parties would retain their own identities. This briefing was leaked to the press where it was dubbed the "Mugabe Diary".
Robert Mugabe spent the early months of 1975 commuting from his house in Highfield to Silveira House where he was given an office and a telephone. Two of his sisters, Sabina and Brigid, were employed at Silveira House in its development programmes for women. [Adamson]

By March 1975, the ceasefire negotiated in 1974 had broken down completely and in that month Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's Chairman, was assassinated by a car bomb in Lusaka. The Rhodesian Government blamed his death on faction fighting within ZANU, while ZANU maintained that he had been murdered by Government agents.

The Rhodesian authorities used these events as a pretext to start redetaining the nationalist leaders who had been released. The nationalists turned for assistance to some members of the Church whom they had come to trust. One of these was Fr Emmanuel Ribeiro, who had served as prison chaplain since 1968 and was well known by all the detainees. He had smuggled letters out of prison for them, assisted their families, and brought them messages and news from home. Fr Ribeiro recalled that Robert Mugabe regularly attended Mass in prison and often helped set up the altar and read the lesson. [Ribeiro]

On the first Friday of April 1975, Fr Ribeiro received a call in his prison office informing him that he had visitors at the parish house in Rhodesville. When he arrived he found Robert Mugabe and Enos Nkala waiting to see him. They asked if they could stay at the parish house for a few days while they planned how they could get out of the country. Fr Ribeiro and Fr John Gough, SJ, the parish priest, agreed.

"I thought of the story of the Scarlet Pimpernel," said Fr Ribeiro. "I told myself, don't complicate things. Do something simple. Get nuns, old nuns."17 With this in mind, he set off for the Dominican Convent where he saw the superior, Sr Ferrera. She agreed that he could take a carload of retired nuns for a Sunday drive. Neither Sr Ferrera nor

c kang Ling Sides: 1972-80

the nuns knew the real purpose of the outing. [Ferrera] On the first Sunday of April 1975, two carloads of old nuns set out for a leisurely drive in the country, unaware of the identity of their travelling companions. At the request of Robert Mugabe, Sr Aquina of the JPC drove the second car. She collected Mugabe from Rhodesville in a yellow VW while Fr Ribeiro collected Edgar Tekere from Msasa. They were stopped at a roadblock, but, seeing the old European sisters, the police waved them all through, assuming, as intended, that the African men with them were workers at the mission.

The secret passengers were taken to Ruwa where they met Moven Mahachi who accompanied them to Nyafaru Community Farm in Inyanga. There, Chief Rekayi Tangwena hid them and guided them over the mountains and safely across the border to Mozambique."8

Chitepo's assassination had, meanwhile, led to the arrest of hundreds of ZANU guerrillas in Zambia.19 This, coupled with the policy of detente, might have been an irreparable setback to the liberation struggle if it had not been for the formation of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) at the end of 1975. ZIPA was composed
of combatants from both ZANLA and ZIPRA and had the backing of Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique. Even though fighting between members of the two armies broke out in training camps in Tanzania in mid-1976, ZIPA succeeded in demolishing detente and reviving the armed struggle.

New fronts were opened along the entire eastern border and in the south-east in 1976. More guerrillas were recruited in that year than in any other period of the struggle, with the majority coming from Manicaland. Missions along the eastern border were visited regularly by combatants passing to and from their rear bases in recently liberated Mozambique. It was not long before these contacts brought the Church into open confrontation with the Rhodesian Government. This confrontation would signal the final split between the Catholic Church and the minority Government of Ian Smith, putting most rural missioners, the Justice and Peace Commission, and a few bishops irrevocably on the side of the African majority and the liberation forces.

With Church and State no longer on speaking terms, Church personnel began to be regarded as enemies of the State and treated as such. By 1976, the courts were hearing numerous cases against them. Three seminarians from St Charles Lwanga Minor Seminary in Melsetter were convicted of "attempting to go for terrorist training" in May of that year. Dr Luisa Guidotti of All Souls' Mission, Mtoko, was detained in Chikurubi Prison for several weeks for "assisting and failing to report the presence of terrorists". Fr Albert Plangger, publisher of Kristo, formerly Moto, was tried and acquitted of publishing four articles contrary to the banning order. Fr Alexander Sakorombe, a diocesan priest stationed at St Andrew's Mission, Maranke, was arrested while saying Mass and held in solitary confinement for eleven days. He was redetained several times over the following years. Fr Paul Egli, SMB, of Berejena Mission, was imprisoned for one year and then deported for assisting "terrorists" and failing to report their presence. On the Protestant side, the best known detainee in 1976 was Revd Canaan Banana.

It was in 1976 that Bishop Donal Lamont of Umtali Diocese was charged for an incident that had taken place at Avila Mission in April of that year. In his testimony, later published as Speech From the Dock, the outspoken bishop pleaded guilty to the charges of "failing to report the presence of terrorists and encouraging others to do likewise". By using his court appearance as another opportunity to criticise the Government for its handling of the war and for its racist policies, the bishop further antagonised Chief Justice Hector MacDonald who sentenced him to ten years hard labour. The bishop was deported in March 1977. In a related case, Frs Ignatius Mhonda and Patrick Mutume were detained, tortured, and sentenced to four years imprisonment, with three suspended.

Although the loss of Lamont's strong voice represented a serious
setback, especially as it coincided with Bishop Haene's retirement, it did not silence the Church. By the time of the bishop's deportation, the JPC had become a critic of the Government in its own right. Composed of a wide range of persons with differing views, from different sectors of the community as well as from the Church, it was united in its willingness to listen to the ordinary men and women in the war zones and to adopt their perceptions of the war. A former Special Branch Officer who had been assigned to investigate the JPC, acknowledged the impact of these Catholic critics in an interview in 1988. "The biggest thorn in Government’s side was the Roman Catholic Justice and Peace Commission," he stated. "Government didn't like seeing and hearing the criticisms that were being levelled because they knew it was true and it was undermining their authority." [Special Branch]

More serious criticism was levelled by the JPC with the publication in 1976 of another volume of security force atrocities against the civilian population entitled Civil War in Rhodesia. Intended to show "the suffering of blacks at the hands of Government forces, suffering no less terrible than those publicised by the Government as perpetrated by the insurgents", it was banned within a year.23 Repeatedly, the Government attacked the Commission for being one-sided in exposing only the conduct of Government forces while ignoring the behaviour of the nationalist armies. The Commission countered by saying that the misdeeds of the guerrillas were widely publicised by Government, while the more serious and systematic misconduct of members of the Rhodesian police and security forces was denied. It was also true that, until late in 1976, the Commission had never received any complaints about guerrilla atrocities. After his trial, however, Bishop Lamont brought reports that bodies of those killed by the guerrillas as traitors or "sell-outs" were being forbidden burial. The Commission decided to approach the nationalist leaders about this matter. Explaining their intention to the bishops, Br Arthur Dupois, Organising Secretary of the Commission, wrote of the dangers involved. "It is appreciated that the matter is delicate," he said, "that our step might be utterly futile. More, it might result in more harassment brought on the tribesmen, the missionaries, the mission!"24 Regardless of the risk, the Commission went ahead with its plan, following the same procedures used in bringing complaints to responsible authorities in Government. The opportunity to do this came at the end of 1976 when nationalist leaders gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, from 28 October to 14 November for another attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement. The JPC message, which was of general nature except for the specific mention of the burial issue, was delivered to the ZANU delegation by Mr Joseph Mugore, a new member of the Commission. He was not well received. Apparently the nationalists objected not to the message but to the messenger, whom they suspected of being a Government agent.25 The media got hold of the
story, alleging that Robert Mugabe was furious and had declared that "the future of the Catholic Church would be jeopardised if this report of terrorist atrocities against African civilians were to be made public". The Commission denied this charge, but the damage had been done. 26

"The Weight of His Tonr"
Even more damaging to nationalist credibility were the murders of missionaries which took place during the Geneva Conference. On 28 November, Fr George Joerger, a Bethlehem Father from Bondolfi Mission in Gwelo Diocese, disappeared while travelling to say Mass at an outstation. Because of his good relations with the local people and his knowledge of the local language, many in the Church initially believed that he had been taken to Mozambique by the ZANLA forces. Later, when there was no information and no trace of his remains, the Bethlehem Fathers assumed that he had been killed by Government forces masquerading as guerrillas in order to discredit the liberation forces. 27

In reality, he had been killed by ZANLA forces. In an interview with the author in August 1989, Henry Muchena, former ZANLA Provincial Commander of Gaza Province, admitted that his forces had committed the crime. Muchena, a Catholic himself who had been taught by Fr Joerger, said that a new group of guerrillas had mistakenly identified the priest as a member of the Selous Scouts and he had been "interrogated accordingly". Visibly moved when recounting the incident more than ten years later, Muchena said that by the time he arrived and identified the prisoner as a priest, "it was too late to rescue him". 28

On the opposite side of the country, a few days after Fr Joerger disappeared, the retired bishop of Bulawayo, Adolph Gregor Schmitt, was ambushed near Gwaii on the Victoria Falls road. He was shot together with Fr Possenti, Principal of Regina Mundi school, Lupane, and Sr Maria Francis van der Berg, also from Regina Mundi. A survivor, Sr Ermenfried Knauer, described the attacker as a "terrorist" wearing camouflage and a balaclava. 29

These murders, coinciding with the Geneva Conference, put the nationalist delegations on the defensive, diverting attention from the main agenda. They issued statements denying responsibility for the attacks to a sceptical press and diplomatic community. Joshua Nkomo, the ZAPU leader, added a personal note when he revealed that Bishop Schmitt had officiated at his marriage and that Fr Possenti was a family friend, while the Zambian press also reported that "Mr Mugabe, a Catholic, appeared shaken by news of the attack". 30 Some journalists who were friendly to the Rhodesian Government insinuated that the murders may have been revenge for JPC complaints about guerrilla behaviour. 31

Hardly had the uproar subsided over this event, when an even greater crisis gripped the Church with the murder of seven European missionaries at St. Paul's Mission, Musami, only 45 kms from Salisbury. The lone survivor, Fr Duncan Myerscough, SJ, blamed the "terrorists" for the deed. The JPC, with the help of the Jesuit Superior, Fr Henry Wardale, conducted their own investigations which pointed to the Selous Scouts. 32
The Rhodesian Government now attempted to silence the Commission by arresting four of its leading members in August 1977. Two were subsequently deported, the Commission's files were confiscated and it was charged with publishing subversive literature, a reference to a series of "fact papers" about the war, later published in Britain and the United States under the title, Rhodesia - The Propaganda War. (CIIR, London, 1977)

The court case against the Commission, which dragged on for more than a year, brought the work of the JPC to a virtual standstill, as it dropped everything else in order to prepare its own defence. The charges were eventually withdrawn. A former member of the Rhodesian Special Branch who had been involved in the Government's investigation of the Commission, admitted in retrospect that the Government had hoped to put an end to the Commission, but, he said, the Government was forced to withdraw the case because their own investigations proved that the Commission's charges against the security forces were correct.

Meanwhile, individual dioceses grappled with the challenge of guerrilla activities. When rural missions in Umtali Diocese were first visited by guerrillas in 1976, Bishop Lamont called a diocesan meeting to develop a common position. There it was agreed to give the guerrillas whatever material aid they requested and not to report their presence. Those who differed were advised to leave the country.

Individual missions in the diocese worked out their own systems of communication and decision making while the bishop tried to visit them on a regular basis. From this experience, the Carmelites of the Irish Province in Rhodesia drew up a policy document in 1978 which formalised their commitment to remain in the war zones unless the lives of their members were in imminent danger. "In our experience the safety of individuals is protected most of all by fidelity to our work of ministry and service and by maintaining close and wise relationships with the people," the document affirmed. It warned that the missionaries should be aware of the attitudes of the people toward the warring factions and of any changes in these attitudes, "lest the work of the Church is compromised by being identified with aspirations contrary to the religious feelings of the people".

A similar process of discernment took place in Gwelo Diocese, where Bishop Haene set up a Crisis Committee in 1976. Gwelo Diocese adopted comprehensive guidelines prepared by the Committee which became a model for other dioceses and were eventually revised and issued by the Bishops' Conference in 1979.

More than just a set of rules, the Gwelo Guidelines contained passages of theological reflection which could be considered the beginnings of a theology of liberation in the country. They began, for instance, by calling for a new type of Church. "The Church may be called to strip off an old dress and put on a new one... We need a spirituality which is enlightened by the Mystery of the Incarnation."
In concrete, it means to us that we must identify with the people around us: to listen to them, to learn to think and feel with them, and even to anticipate their reactions to certain events."

Spelling out the type of collaboration that could exist between pastoral workers and guerrillas, the document went far beyond any of the previous pastoral letters from the bishops, which tended to deal with the situation in the abstract. It also went beyond the just war theory, by taking for granted that the Church had much in common with the aims of the liberation movements and was already actively involved in assisting the guerrillas. This involvement was encouraged as was the adoption of lay ministries, the promotion of grassroots Christian communities, and deeper cultural adaptation.

While members of the Bethlehem Missionary Society within Gwelo Diocese were reflecting on the role of the Church in the struggle, others, at its headquarters in Switzerland, also set up a committee to examine the topic. Codenamed ZIKO, Zimbabwe Committee, it was meant to explore the present and future role of the Bethlehem Society in Zimbabwe. It was composed of old Rhodesia hands such as Frs Amstutz, Niederberger, Traber, Rutishauser and Bruehwiler, but others were invited to join the meetings depending on the topic under discussion.

ZIKO made contact with ZANU's political leaders, many of whom had been students and co-workers in Gwelo Diocese. ZIKO sent a delegation to the Geneva Conference where they had occasion to provide financial assistance to some members of the ZANU delegation whose personal belongings had been destroyed by a fire in the hotel where they were staying.

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After the Conference ended in failure in December 1976, two of the delegates, Fay Chung and Dzingai Mutumbuka, spent several weeks at the SMB headquarters in Switzerland. Raised as Catholics, both trusted the priests and brothers to tell them the truth about the war on the ground. Fay Chung interviewed four of the priests on home leave about the conduct of the war around their missions. She received frank answers from them, not all complimentary to the guerrillas, which she compiled and gave to ZANLA's military commanders."

While Fay Chung conducted her interviews, Dzingai Mutumbuka was asked to prepare a critique of the conduct of the Bethlehem missionaries based on his long experience with them and his knowledge of every mission station in the diocese. His eighteen-page "frank appraisal of human relations" may have come as a shock with its specific references to colonial and racist attitudes and behaviour on the part of some of the Society's members. It had a major influence on the Gwelo Guidelines which quoted verbatim many of Mutumbuka's recommendations.39 The report ended with ten guidelines for priests in the war zones. Mutumbuka advised them, for instance, to wear their Roman collars so they could be
recognised, to ride bicycles whenever possible in order to avoid landmines and prevent their being mistaken for soldiers or European farmers, and never under any circumstances to fraternise with the Rhodesian forces. He was adamant that any missionary who could not support the guerrillas should leave the country, both for his own survival and that of the Church.

Mutumbuka warned that each missionary would be judged by the guerrillas on his own merits and must prove himself a friend of the people. "The missionary should not consider himself the man in the middle," Mutumbuka declared. "This is a dangerous myth. If he is not on the side of the freedom fighters, he will be considered to be a Government supporter or even an agent. A neutral position is impossible."

Looking back on the assignment, Mutumbuka recalled, "I asked if I could be as honest, as brutal as I could in my report, so some of the things I wrote didn't please many people." He added that some of the priests later told him that his report helped them to survive the war. [Mutumbuka]

Other nationalists visited the Bethlehem Society's headquarters during the war. Simbi Mubako addressed a study session in Switzerland in March 1978 which analysed the internal settlement,

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and his critical assessment helped to influence Church personnel present to reject the settlement and to urge the Bishops' Conference to do likewise.4'

The Bethlehem Society was the only missionary community with members in Zimbabwe to engage in such ongoing reflection and to maintain regular contact with ZANU leaders throughout the war, although not all members of the Society supported these initiatives.2

The expatriate mission societies were not, however, the only ones to initiate theological reflection during the war. In fact, one of the most significant pastoral-theological initiatives was taken by the National Council of Priests (NCOP). Meeting in, 1976, Rhodesian priests from almost every diocese shared their experience of meeting guerrillas. Patrick Mutume, then based at Avila Mission where he had extensive contact with ZIPA guerrillas, recalled the importance of this meeting: "People were seeking advice, especially those who lived in areas where the war had not yet come," he said. "We spent hours and nights trying to explain what it meant to be involved in the struggle." [Mutume]

As a result of this gathering, the NCOP organised a national symposium on "The Church in a New Social Order". Originally intending to focus on African socialism, they decided that the topic was too narrow, and chose instead to examine the wider implications of the armed struggle for the future of the Church. Held at Driefontein Mission from 17-19 May 1977, the Symposium was attended by 45 persons including every bishop except Patrick Chakaipa of Salisbury Archdiocese.

Though there were several major speeches such as a critical overview of the fate of the Church in Angola and Mozambique delivered by Bishop Prieto of Wankie Diocese, and a prophetic address by the Superior General of the Bethlehem Mission Society, Joseph Amstutz, entitled "The Guerrillas Are Coming", the
major business of the meeting was conducted in small discussion groups. Participants examined questions about their own attitudes towards the guerrillas and socialism, their hopes and fears for the future, and their response to the uncertainty of the times.

In conclusion, they issued a Declaration of Intent which challenged the Church to admit its mistakes and to accept change. It called for social justice to be implemented fully in the Church and for an end to all discrimination and racialism. Priority was given to the formation of lay leaders and the establishment of basic Christian communities. Some participants also advocated that control of all Church institutions be immediately placed in African hands. Not all could go this far and a final compromise read: "We must be ready to transfer responsibility to the local community where advisable." Fr Amstutz captured the spirit of this meeting in his closing remarks where he declared that the figure of the missionary was changing. "In the affected areas, we no longer carry the people, they carry us," he said. Stating that the new order had already begun in the operational areas, he called on local communities to respond to the needs and distress of others. "Communities must be islands of Christian love and care," he concluded. "This is the priority; structures will follow."

By the end of 1977, with the Church on the brink of radical change, for which the war had been the catalyst, the war itself had entered a new phase. To prevent a guerrilla take-over, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Revd Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau on 3 March 1978, entered into an "internal settlement" with the Smith regime, giving blacks more places in Government than ever before. This agreement effectively "africanised" the conflict, making it more difficult for ZANU and ZAPU to explain why they continued to fight. This had serious implications for the Churches as well. Two of the signatories to the agreement were Church leaders, and both Bishop Muzorewa and Revd Sithole had gained some political credibility and international standing over the years.

In view of the new situation, those in the Catholic Church who had been most active in opposing the minority Government and working with the nationalist forces, had to reassess their position. The dilemma facing them was summed up at an Executive Meeting of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in London at the end of 1978. The participants acknowledged that on the whole the Church had been "an uneasy ally of the militant African nationalist cause" and that pressure would most likely be put on the Church "to persuade the Patriotic Front to renounce violence and participate immediately in the internal settlement".

To meet this challenge, they analysed the terms of the settlement to see if it had any hope of succeeding. They concluded, as had the JPC, that it was a flawed arrangement which left power in the hands of the white minority. They warned that it could not end the war and advised Church members against endorsing it.

While the Bishops'
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Conference withheld publication of the JPC analysis for three months because they felt it was biased, events on the ground soon proved it to be true.46
The Bethlehem Society's ZIKO organised a two-day study session on the agreement in Switzerland in March 1978 whose stated aim was "to gain a deeper insight into the actual situation in order to come to a strategy which the Church ought to follow". They too concluded that the agreement would not bring peace, but would actually intensify the war. "All the parties must be involved and the terms of the settlement must be changed and there must be fair elections," they advised the missionaires and the bishops, through Bishop Tobias Chiginya of Gwelo Diocese, then Chairman of the Bishops' Conference.47
Within a few months, it was clear that these critical analysts had been right. Despite their promises, neither Bishop Muzorewa nor Ndabaningi Sithole were able to persuade the guerrillas to lay down their arms. On the contrary, the fighting escalated as private armies loyal to the two internal leaders joined the fray. These auxiliary forces, as they were officially called, unleashed a new reign of terror in the countryside which the JPC was among the first to expose and condemn.
Describing them as "a cheap army, equipped largely with captured weapons, with little training, low pay and minimal rations", the JPC report accused these forces of "theft, assault, rape and murder".48
In spite of its innumerable shortcomings, the internal settlement raised hopes that a negotiated peace which would include the Patriotic Front (PF) of ZANU and ZAPU was possible. Even before the settlement, the JPC had been urging the bishops to meet the externally based leaders of the Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, "to discuss matters of a more general nature concerning the socio-political order of Zimbabwe." "We felt that the bishops needed to be educated," explained Mr John Deary many years later.49
The bishops delayed taking a decision on the matter. Meanwhile, the situation continued to change - and so did the aims of the proposed meeting. After the signing of the agreement of 3 March 1978, the terms of reference for a meeting with the Patriotic Front leaders were amended to include: "the possibility of an all-party conference to widen the base of the Salisbury Agreement"; and complaints of guerrilla indiscipline.
Reports on this last issue had recently disturbed the JPC and it resolved to bring them to the attention of the nationalist leaders.
36

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Codenamed "Project Excommunication", the investigation of guerrilla behaviour was carried out by a sub-committee composed of Sr Nora Broderick, Fidelis Mukonori, Mr Ismael Muvingi, and Fr Dieter Scholz. Recalling the negative reaction to the JPC mission to the Geneva Conference in 1976, they resolved to be
as thorough and professional in their investigation as possible. "JPC must insist on the customary rigorous standards of factual accuracy and objectivity," the Commission stated in an internal memorandum on the subject. "It must be in a position to assess the scale, the extent, and if possible, the reasons of complaints."

The bishops finally agreed to participate in the proposed dialogue, provided that similar meetings were held with the internal political leaders, namely Bishop Muzorewa, Ian Smith, Ndabaningi Sithole, Chief Chirau and General Walls. The Holy See was called upon to assist at this stage by authorising the Apostolic Delegates in Maputo and Lusaka to approach the Patriotic Front leaders. Archbishop Poledrini reported that Robert Mugabe readily agreed to such a meeting, reassuring the Delegate that ZANU supported freedom of religion and missionary activity. In separate contacts, the ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo, also agreed to meet with the Catholic delegation.

The meetings took place in Lusaka, Zambia, in August 1978. Led by Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa of Salisbury and Monsignor Helmut Reckter, SJ, of Sinoia, the delegation included Fr Bernard Ndlovu of Bulawayo Diocese, and three members of the Justice and Peace Commission. The inclusion of the bishops gave added status and weight to the delegation, but it also restored the former balance of power, putting the bishops in the forefront once more. This would have consequences long after independence.

In addition to the official meetings, the Church delegation visited two refugee camps run by ZAPU on the outskirts of Lusaka and a camp for young mothers. At each site the Archbishop gave an impromptu address, assuring the refugees of the Church's love and concern. The meeting with Joshua Nkomo and his senior aides seemed likely to end before it began because of divisions within the Church delegation. Fr Bernard Ndlovu threatened to walk out in protest at Monsignor Reckter's opening remarks which he judged to be biased against the liberation movements.

Fr Ndlovu was sensitive to the hierarchy's position because Bishop Karlen, his own bishop, refused to allow a diocesan Justice and Peace Commission to be formed in Bulawayo and frequently denounced the guerrillas as "terrorists."

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After a hasty consultation between the members of the Catholic delegation, Fr Ndlovu was persuaded to stay. In future meetings with other political leaders, Archbishop Chakaipa gave the opening remarks based on a prepared text. Unruffled by this disturbance, Joshua Nkomo made a very conciliatory statement, assuring the churchmen that ZAPU had nothing against whites. "We aren't going to hang Smith," he declared. In a rare defence of his ZANU partner, he stated: "We are not murderers. Mugabe is not a brute because of some political statements he has made."

Nkomo went on to deny responsibility for missionary deaths: "Under no circumstances have any orders been given by the PF leadership for murder or harassment of missionaries, in fact quite the reverse." He pointed out, however, that individual guerrillas might have reason to be angry with the Church. "If the
Patriotic Front forces have been guilty of this, blame the system, the war, the frustration, ill-discipline and possibly the fact that the Church has, in the past, supported or accepted the system."55

The day after this meeting, Nkomo met secretly with Ian Smith in a political initiative aimed at bringing him into the internal settlement. Organised by the Nigerian Government and Lonrho's Tiny Rowland, the meeting was held without the knowledge of Nkomo's Patriotic Front partner, Robert Mugabe. (Martin and Johnson, 1981:294-295)

While the Church delegation waited impatiently in Lusaka to see Mugabe, he had been flown to Lagos to be told by the Nigerians about their plan for ending the war. He was understandably furious and denounced Nkomo, whom he accused of deliberately deceiving him.56

Mugabe and his delegation composed of Simon Muzenda, Edgar Tekere, Emmerson Munangagwa, and Josiah Tongogara finally met the Catholic team on Sunday, 20 August 1978. The meeting proceeded along the same lines as the one held with Nkomo the previous week, with the Church seeking guidance on whether it should withdraw its personnel from the rural areas and on its role in an independent Zimbabwe.

Speaking very frankly, Mugabe first defended the use of force in terms of the just war theory. He went on to criticise the mistakes of the past. "The Churches have supported the regime and gone along with some of its policies," he said. "At one time, you couldn't go into a Church in a white area (if you were black)." In a rare admission of guerrilla policy toward rural missions, he said, "Our fighters have instructions to win the Church to our side - not to disturb the institutions. We have worked hand in hand with some missionaries who feel they have a duty to support the struggle."57 Taking advantage of the presence of the ZANLA military commander, Josiah Tongogara, the delegation raised the issue of complaints about guerrilla behaviour. The response was much more positive than anticipated, with the ZANU leaders promising to take action if they were informed by the JPC of specific complaints on a regular basis.58

Thus began a close working relationship between Br Fidelis and General Tongogara. Explaining how he went about the investigations, Br Fidelis said, "I'd do it systematically. I'd give the name of the guerrilla, the area and the day that it happened, what happened. I always tried to keep the facts and figures... so they could make a follow-up." Fidelis praised the ZANLA commander for taking action on all his reports by removing the commanders responsible for areas where indiscipline was rampant. [Mukonori]

After meeting Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, who gave the Catholic delegation a polite reception without committing themselves to make any changes, the JPC team took its diplomatic initiative to Washington D C Leaving the bishops at home, Br Fidelis, John Deary and Mike Auret testified before Congressional Committees and lobbied individual senators and members of Congress in October 1978. Their message was straightforward and simple: the internal settlement is not working; an all-party conference should be held which includes the leaders of the
Patriotic Front; the US Government should use its influence with the British to make this happen.59
In February 1979, a return visit was made to both Maputo and Lusaka to give first-hand reports of the Justice and Peace Commission's investigations of guerrilla behaviour.60 Their reports singled out the excessive demands made on the people for material assistance, drunkenness among the guerrilla forces, involvement in family matters such as marriage problems, and corruption among the mujibas.
In the meeting with ZAPU leaders the JPC team also discussed ZIPRA's policy toward schools, bus robberies, and the perception that ZIPRA was hostile to the Churches and to white missionaries in particular. They brought up the murder of Fr Gregor Richert and Bernhard Lisson at St Rupert's Mission, Magondi, in June 1978 which was said to have been carried out by ZIPRA forces.61
The report of these meetings concluded that the complaints had been taken in a positive manner by both wings of the Patriotic Front,
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giving hope that guerrilla discipline would improve. The violence increased, however, before the internal settlement elections of April 1979 which were won by Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC Party. The high voter turnout was a disappointment to the Patriotic Front which had tried hard to discourage people from voting.
Muzorewa claimed his election victory to be a vote for peace. Ironically, this was the one thing that he could not deliver. The JPC, and the CIIR in London, published critical reports on the elections, urging the international community not to recognise the new Government nor to lift sanctions.2
In this they parted company with their Protestant counterparts in the Rhodesian Council of Churches. Through its Secretary-General, Cornelius Watyoka, the Council lobbied locally and internationally for the Muzorewa Government.63 The Catholic Church was caught in the dilemma of rejecting violence but also rejecting the settlement which promised to end the violence. Throughout the war, the official Church had distinguished between the means and the end, declaring its support for the objectives of African nationalism but condemning the violence used to obtain them. Since it first raised the issue in 1973, the JPC had repeatedly asked the bishops for guidance in this matter.
The question of violence was not merely of academic interest to those living and working in the war zones who often suffered a crisis of conscience about the day to day decisions they had to make in order to survive. The Driefontein Symposium also asked for guidance on the subject. The JPC finally took up the challenge itself and in 1978 commissioned a study from CIIR on "the ethics of the armed struggle".
An Irish theologian, Fr Enda McDonagh, was asked to undertake the study which was intended primarily "to assist missionaries in Rhodesia who are immediately confronted with the moral dilemma". It was also meant to help "black Christians... to grapple with the apparent contradiction between their Christian faith (which seems to reject violence as a means of achieving political change) and their
commitment to national liberation (which the overwhelming majority believe can only be achieved through violence)." 64 McDonagh carried out his research in Rhodesia in 1978 and concluded his study in November 1979, just as the Lancaster House negotiations seemed about to bring the war to an end. His findings, that the conditions for a just war had been met in Rhodesia by the early 1970s, were published in a book, _The Demands of Simple Justice._

Though couched in scholarly and theological terms, McDonagh's

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overriding message was a radical one. For the first time, a spokesman for the Church had publicly justified taking sides with the liberation forces. It was a vindication for the rural missioner and a break from the tradition of condemning the violence on both sides. The message came too late, however, to benefit those most in need of it.

While McDonagh was conducting his research within Zimbabwe, another new initiative was taking place in the neighboring countries of Zambia and Mozambique which brought the Church another step closer to the liberation movements. The Zimbabwe Project, established in 1978 to assist refugees from Zimbabwe, was the product of forces that had been spearheading change in the Church for decades. Its founders and trustees were the CIIR in London which had been working closely with the JPC; the Bethlehem Mission Society, in particular Frs Amstutz and Traber; and Guy Clutton-Brock, a founder member of Cold Comfort Farm who had been deported from Rhodesia with his wife in 1971. (Cold Comfort Farm was a multiracial community on the outskirts of Salisbury established in the early 1960s.)

The Project was staffed mainly by deported members of the JPC. Fr Dieter Scholz was its Chairman, Arthur Dupois, the Executive Secretary, and the present writer was the Project's Officer in Mozambique. Judith Todd, the daughter of Southern Rhodesia's former Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, and a political activist in her own right, was responsible for projects in Zambia, and Fr Nigel Johnson, SJ, who had worked at St Paul's Mission, Musami until mid-1979, was assigned to JZ Moyo Camp in Solwezi, Zambia. 65

Members of the Patriotic Front were included as consultants on the Management Committee. Meetings were regularly attended by Frederick Shava and Arthur Chadzingwa, the ZANU and ZAPU representatives in London respectively, as well as by Simbi Mubako of ZANU and Johnson Ndlovu of ZAPU.

For the first time, Church personnel lived and worked with the liberation movements in their camps in Zambia and Mozambique. Some of the Catholic members of the ZANU leadership felt that such open identification with their struggle was long overdue. Simon Muzenda, ZANU's Deputy Chairman and Secretary for External Affairs, had been responsible for obtaining permission from Mozambique's President Samora Machel for the international Catholic relief agency, CARITAS, to operate in Mozambique where Church agencies and non-governmental groups were generally not welcome.

He had also discussed the possibility of priests and sisters working
The Weight of History in the camps with the Papal Nuncio in Maputo. They differed on the role such volunteers would play, with Muzenda insisting that they would not be given special treatment. "Priests and sisters can join us, not as special people apart, but the same as others, coming together with others, going for military training," he told the Nuncio. "The Church should learn from history... from the mistakes which led to the Reformation. The Church must be ready to change."66 Instead of encouraging volunteers, this conversation, as reported by the Nuncio, convinced the Church that its personnel had no role to play. The Zimbabwe Project proved this perception to be false. As its representative in Mozambique, for instance, I was attached to ZANU's Department of Education and Culture and was invited to attend coordination meetings that brought together all ZANU Departments. I also taught some classes in the camps and helped to set up a new school in Maputo which was intended to train middle-level managers for an independent Zimbabwe.

I can truthfully say that this period was the high point of my life. Though I tried very hard to recruit other Church personnel to join me in the camps, none responded except several of the LCBL Sisters who had been kidnapped from Marymount Mission in 1979, spending months with the guerrillas in Mozambique before they were released. The Nuncio's assistant had them flown back to Salisbury from Maputo before I could take them to the camps. Though the Project's aid was slight in comparison to that of international donor agencies such as UNICEF and the World Food Programme, it had a more personal touch. Like McDonagh's study, however, it was started at the eleventh hour as negotiations for settlement were about to begin and only two Church personnel were actually present in the camps for any prolonged period of time. Reflecting on his experience in JZ Moyo Camp, Fr Johnson expressed regret that more religious men and women had not shared this unique experience. He blamed it on fear and ignorance. "It is unfortunate," he wrote, "that through our ignorance, our lack of contact with the liberation movements, our susceptibility to Rhodesian propaganda, our stereotyped concept of 'religious life', we abandoned these refugees once they had left Rhodesia and left them to sort out their problems alone."68

Even so, the Zimbabwe Project was recognised as an important contribution of the Church and was appreciated by the leaders of the Patriotic Front and by the many refugees and guerrillas that it managed to assist. Because of the good reputation which it gained during the war, the new Government invited the Project to assist in the vital work of resettling ex-combatants after independence - but that is another story.69 The internal settlement, though flawed, had paved the way for an all-party conference which was convened in London in September 1979 under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. The behind-the-scenes lobbying that went on after hours almost rivaled the official meetings in importance. Many groups from
within Zimbabwe sent delegations to make their views known to the Patriotic Front leaders from whom they had been cut off for many years by the emergency powers of the Rhodesian State.

The Churches were not left out of this political free-for-all. Representatives of the Christian Council, the Justice and Peace Commission, the CUR, the Bethlehem Fathers and the Zimbabwe Project held private meetings with the various parties to express their hopes and fears for the future.

The Patriotic Front did its own lobbying with the Churches, convincing them that they were not the Marxist devils that they had been painted by the media and would not abolish religion or seize Church property. Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe also asked the Churches to assist them to pay the expenses of their delegations to the conference as they were not completely covered by the British Government. CIIR, together with Br Fidelis and John and Pat Deary of the JPC, put out an urgent appeal to Church agencies which succeeded in raising the necessary funds.

The Patriotic Front members also paid frequent visits to the Zimbabwe Project office to ask for more aid for the refugee camps since they had decided to maintain their schools in Mozambique and Zambia until they could prepare new schools within Zimbabwe.

The Bethlehem Fathers sent a small delegation to London, including Frs Traber and Bishofberger, to meet with the ZANLA delegation about the recent closure of several Catholic schools in Gwelo Diocese by the guerrillas. One of these was Gokomere school near Fort Victoria which had produced some of the ZANU leaders. They were assured by the ZANLA commander, Josiah Tongogara, that the policy of keeping schools open had not changed but that circumstances sometimes intervened. He gave his approval for reopening Gokomere. Tongogara spoke openly of the problem of controlling the mujibas

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who often took the law into their own hands, explaining that they were not supposed to bear arms. They also discussed the problem of the rogue guerrilla, Simukai, who was terrorising people at Serima and Driefontein Missions and in the surrounding area.

Speaking of ZANLA's policy toward rural missions, Tongogara stressed the cooperation that existed between the guerrilla forces and most missions. He pointed out that recent anti-Christian tendencies observed in some groups were the result of training received in countries such as Russia, China, Cuba and Ethiopia. Usually ZANLA gave its own ideological orientation to groups returning from military training abroad, but this was not the case in 1979 when new trainees were sent directly to the front to combat the Muzorewa elections.

The delegation was impressed by the ZANLA commander who had been a shadowy figure before the Lancaster House Conference brought him into the public eye. Fr Bishofberger noted in his report of the meeting that Tongogara did most of the talking in the group which also consisted of Emmerson Munangagwa and Josiah Tungamirai. Speaking of Tongogara he wrote, "He is a tall and imposing figure, radiating authority and requiring respect. When he speaks the
others listen in silence.... Tongogara not only is a general, but he also seems to have political know-how and great political influence.’ The guerrilla leader died in a car accident in Mozambique three months after this meeting.

This period of diplomacy helped to overcome many of the stereotypes that had been propagated by the media, as guerrilla leaders met face to face with leaders of the Churches and the international community. This contact reassured both sides. The bishops saw that the Patriotic Front leaders were intelligent, reasonable people with whom they could communicate while the nationalists welcomed the opportunity to create a more positive image of themselves.

While such diplomacy had important benefits for both sides, it changed the centre of power. The priests, sisters and laity at the rural missions were no longer the only contact persons with the liberation forces as the bishops now had direct access to their political leaders. Attention shifted from the battlefield to the conference room and both guerrillas and rural missionaries lost the initiative.

The power vacuum in the Church that had been filled by the JPC was again taken over by the hierarchy as the radical options that the liberation forces offered were being whittled away by negotiations. This period would have lasting repercussions on the shape of both the Government and the Church in a new Zimbabwe.

WEEKLY

ROBERT MUGABE

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Despite the pessimistic predictions about the Lancaster House Conference, it did succeed in bringing an end to the long conflict. A ceasefire went into effect at the beginning of 1980 in preparation for nationwide elections in February. The election campaigns waged by the various parties played on many of the old fears and prejudices. More sinister was the placing of bombs at the Anglican and Catholic Cathedrals in an attempt to discredit the Patriotic Front. Mambo Press was also bombed after a counterfeit issue of Moto, which had only recently been revived after years of banning, appeared on the streets, portraying Robert Mugabe as a "ruthless, power hungry Marxist heathen" who was subject to "psychological deviation and pathology". The bombings backfired on the Government in several cases when the bombers blew themselves up and were later identified as members of the Government security apparatus. 

Tragedy struck at Gokomere Mission on 1 February 1980 with the murders of Fr Machikicho and a catechist on their way to say Mass at an outstation. Mujibas were later discovered to have carried out the attack but the Diocese chose not to bring charges against them. On 20 February 1980 Fr Killian Huesser was shot to death at Berejena Mission. The Selous Scouts were suspected because of Fr Huesser's known links with the guerrillas. 

Because of these unexpected attacks by unknown gunmen, many Church personnel who had remained at their posts throughout the war were removed during the ceasefire period. The JPC exposed many ceasefire violations on the part of the auxiliaries and the Rhodesian forces which the Government tried to blame on ZANU and ZAPU. On several occasions a JPC delegation met with Lord Soames, the Acting Governor, urging him not to disqualify the nationalist parties in some parts of the country as he had threatened to do. In at least one case, the JPC report was presented to Lord Soames by Archbishop Chakaipa. 

The elections brought a stunning victory for ZANU (PF) which won 57 out of the 80 seats that were contested on the basis of universal suffrage - twenty additional seats were reserved for white representatives for ten years in terms of the Lancaster House constitution. 

For the Catholic Church in the new Zimbabwe, the challenge would be to implement the lessons it had learned through participating in the liberation war - to become in truth the new Church for the new society.

Footnotes 
3 Press statement attached to the minutes of the Consultation on Proposed Pastoral Message, 20/11/1971. 
' Information obtained from Fr Dieter Scholz in informal discussions with the author, Harare, 1990 and 1991.
s T 0 McLoughlin to RCBC, Annexure 4, 9/2/1973, "Violence: The need for guidelines".
6 See, for example: Minutes of Theological Commission, 18-19/7/1973; Minutes of joint meeting of Theology and Justice and Peace Commissions, 2 1/10/1975.
9 Informal discussions with Frs Ted Rogers and Dieter Scholz, SJ, and Sr Dymphna van Wesenbeeck. Also "JPC Reports on Protected Villages", see footnote 7 above.
12 Muzungu, Moloney. Also author's interview with Fr Mashonganyika.
13 Interview with Fr Mashonganyika.
17 The account of Mugabe's escape relies entirely on information from Fr Ribeiro, as I was not able to contact other participants.
'8 "Prime Minister pays last respects to Tangwena", Department of Information Press Statement, 18/6/1984.
20 "People's War in Zimbabwe", interview with Dzinash Machingura by
48
Cklnioging Sides, 1972-80
Mozambique Information Agency (AIM). Also Zimbabwe Review, No. 5:23. 21 Research by Tungamirai for an MPhil in history, University of Zimbabwe, 22 JPC Archives, Box 104, File: Church Employees, "Church Personnel and Legal Proceedings/Casualties 1976-77".
24 JPC Archives, Box: Political, Brother Arthur Dupois to RCBC, 12/11/1976. 25 JPC Archives, Box: Political, JPC to Nationalist leaders December 1976. Informal discussions with Fr Traber indicated that Sr Aquina had told Mugabe she did not trust Mugore. The JPC decided after this to look for a Press Secretary from outside of the country in 1977, which led to my appointment from Kenya, where I was Communications Co-ordinator for the Catholic Church.
26 JPC Press statement, 17/12/1976. 27 Haene. Also JPC Archives, File: Church Employees, "Church Personnel...:
2; and BMS Archives, Box 26e: "The mystery of Fr Joerger's disappearance."
2 Muchena. He asked me to convey to the Bethlehem Fathers that Fr Joerger had died at the hands of ZANLA forces, which he "regretted very much". The Bethlehem Fathers responded that they did not believe Fr Joerger had been mistaken for a Selous Scout but had been killed for fraternising with Rhodesian soldiers and officials. Muchena did not comment when I reported this to him.
30 The Times of Zambia, 7/12/1976.
32 Mukonori. Also Daly, 1983:15. David Martin, in articles for The Observer, London, and The Times of Zambia, early on suggested the Selous Scouts were responsible for missionary murders.
3 Personal experience of the author. I was one of those arrested; I was detained for three weeks, then deported.
3 Policy Document, prepared at meetings of the Carmelites in August and September 1978.
35 Haene. The official title of the Gwelo Guidelines was "Guidelines of behaviour during present war situation". 36 Gwelo Guidelines: 1.
37 SMB Archives, Box: ZIKO, Minutes of General Council, 19/2/1976. 38 Interviews by Fay Chung with Frs Kaufmann, Zuelig, Camazind and Isenegger, all of the SMB.

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40 Ibid.: 16.
S SMB Archives, Box: ZIKO, Minutes of Zimbabwe Study Session 1112/3/1978.
14 Fr J Amstutz, "The Guerrillas Are Coming": 1-5 (paper for the Driefontein Symposium, see footnote 43 above).
47 SMB Archives, Box: ZIKO, Zimbabwe Study Session:24,28. 48 "Zimbabwe - a position paper", JPC, March 1979, from the private collection of Fr P Moloney, SJ.
5 Letters to the author from Fr Ndlovu (1978), who, because of continuing differences with Bishop Karlen, went to work in Botswana after independence.
Muvingi, "Report...".5. See footnote 52 above. s See the official JPC report (p. 5) cited in footnote 52 above. 56 The author was present at a meeting between Mugabe and a US delegation, at which he denounced Nkomo's meeting with Smith.

Changing Sides. 1972-80
(15/10/1990) both of whom were at St Rupert's at the time of the murder and knew the ZIPRA group which, they claimed, carried out the murders. 62 "Free and Fair? The 1979 Rhodesian Election", London, CIIR, 1979. 63 Hallencreuz in Hallencreuz and Moyo, 1988:88-97. In the same volume he examines the problems that support for Muzorewa later caused the Council. ("Ecumenical Challenges in Independent Zimbabwe: ZCC 1980-85".)
64 CIIR Archives, Box: JPC, "Violence in Rhodesia: The ethics of armed struggle", 12/1/1978.
5 Ibid., Box: ZIMPRO, Introducing the Zimbabwe Project, May 1979.
69 My reports of contacts with many political leaders and ex-combatants about the role the Project could play after independence are with the Project.
The experience of the Zimbabwe Project was instrumental in the formation of the IMBISA Refugee Service and may also have influenced the Jesuit Refugee Services which was headed by Fr Dieter Scholz, SJ after he had chaired the Zimbabwe Project.

70 Mukonori. Also Deary: see footnote 49. Also JPC Archives, Box: Annual Reports, "Chairman's Report for the period ending 31 August 1980".

71 Personal experience of the author who typed project proposals for PF delegates.

72 BMS Archives, Box: ZIKO, Meeting in London, 27/9/1979, minutes taken by Fr Otto Bishofberger, SMB.


76 "Breaches of the Ceasefire", 5/2/1980 in notes prepared by JPC for RCBC. Also Deary: see footnote 49. Mutume.

Chapter 3
"THE COMMUNIST MENACE"

9f Robert Mugabe were to be in charge, then there would be Russian Marxist-Lenin'st vs. Nationalism....

Archbishop Francisco Colasuanno, Apostolic Pro-Nuncio to Mozambique, 1977

Throughout the war years, the Rhodesia Front Government used the fear of communism to win support for its counter-insurgency measures. The war was depicted as a battle against atheism and terrorism with nationalist guerrillas referred to as "communist terrorists". Did these appeals to anti-communism win over the Christian Churches? Was the Catholic Church, in particular, influenced by the fear of communism in its attitude towards the warring parties? Did Church personnel in the rural areas experience anti-Christian attitudes and behaviour among the guerrillas? Did ZANU's ideological stand change over the years?

As far back as 1935, the Jesuits had been asked to furnish information about the spread of communism in the region by Fr J H Ryder, SJ, Secretary of the newly formed Anti-Atheist Bureau of the Pontificio Instituto Orientale. In addition to requesting copies of "communist anti-God propaganda", Fr Ryder also suggested that the Jesuits find "an enterprising and cool" lay person who could infiltrate the leftist movement and send eye-witness reports of meetings to Rome. I judging by his frustrated follow-up letters, it is doubtful if Fr Ryder was enlightened on the subject by his colleagues. Nevertheless,

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this incident points to the fact that anti-communism, which has been endemic to the Catholic Church since the publication of the Communist Manifesto, was exported to Southern Africa very early on. Potentially, it threatened the Church's acceptance of Zimbabwean nationalism which included elements of socialism in its platform.
Southern Rhodesia had a fledging Communist Party from the early 1940s. The trade unions in particular became increasingly radicalised, raising fears among some Church leaders that the nationalist movements were being infiltrated by communists. Charles Mzingeli, of the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) left the Church after a confrontation with Fr Burbridge, SJ, of St Peter's Church in Harare - a suburb of Salisbury, now called Mbare.

Burbridge asked for the constitution of the ICU .... He boldly stated the constitution... reeked communist ideas, unworthy of a good and intelligent Catholic such as Mzingeli seemed to be. However, he went on, this could be put right if Mzingeli agreed to change certain of its sections and inserted in the constitution a new clause, stating that the ICU was a Catholic trade union, subject to the direction and control of the Catholic Church. (Vambe, 1972:103)

When Mzingeli refused, he was excommunicated on the spot by Burbridge, a priest whom he had formerly admired. Other trade union leaders at the time such as Clemens Kadali and Masotsha Ndlovu also broke with the Christian Churches because of their alleged alliance with colonialism. The unions had close links with the South African Communist Party until the 1950s, distributing the South African Worker and organising May Day parades. (Vambe, 1972:93-103; Shamuyarira, 1967:30-33; Ranger, 1970:138-193)

The next generation of African nationalists in the City Youth League, the ANC (Southern Rhodesian African National Congress) and the NDP (National Democratic Party) tended to appeal to African tradition rather than to socialist ideals to mobilise support from the African majority. According to Nathan Shamuyarira, at that time with the African Daily News, "Past heritage was revived through prayers and traditional singing with African instruments, ancestral spirits were evoked to guide and lead the new nation. Christianity and civilisation took a back seat, and new forms of worship, and new attitudes were thrust forward dramatically". (Shamuyarira, 1967:68)

When political organising turned to armed struggle in the 1960s, socialism was once more invoked and the examples of China, Cuba and the Soviet Union were used as models by both ZANU and ZAPU. From its inception, ZANU espoused socialist ideals and aimed to establish a "Nationalist, Socialist, Pan-Africanist Democratic Republic of Zimbabwe". In its first Constitution, passed by the founding Congress of May 1964, ZANU included a reference to socialism in its aims and objectives: To reconstruct Zimbabwe's economy and evolve a socialistic pattern in which the country's resources are fully tapped for the common benefit of all the people of Zimbabwe in close collaboration with the rest of Africa.

ZANU established a Department of Political Affairs at the 1964 Gwelo Congress which in 1969 was renamed the Commissariat Department. Headed first by John Mataure and later by Mayor Urimbo, it was responsible for drafting political lessons and for training political commissars who organised and addressed the
evening political rallies orpungwes which became a ZANIA hallmark during the liberation war. Political education was introduced in ZANU's military training camps in Tanzania from the early 1970s, one of ZANU's common slogans being "politics rules the gun". Claiming to be a political army fighting for a cause, ZANLA's first aim was to mobilise the African population to support it. The education given to every ZANLA cadre consisted of the history of ZANU, lessons on "The People's Army" which were adapted from the training manuals of China's Red Army, and "The National Grievances" series which was a thorough critique of colonial policies and practices. These lessons contained a wealth of information and much practical wisdom geared to winning support from the Zimbabwean masses. They were also very critical of the links between the Christian Churches and colonialism. Repeating the old sally that when whites came to the country "we had the land and they had the Bible; now we have the Bible and they have the land", the lessons accused missioners of being spies and agents of the European settlers. Religion, by preaching against the use of force, softened the people so they would not defend their rights. "Religion is nothing but a concept aimed at preserving the white rule", one lesson concluded.

The subject of Christian religion appears again briefly in Serial II, "Division in our Nation", as part of the Colonial State's tactics of divide and rule. Referring to the artificial divisions based on denominational lines, it called for unity to overthrow settler rule.

Missionsary institutions were accused of destroying African culture and promoting a western life style in the lesson on "Mental Enslavement". "They lay the foundation for the western religious doctrines and philosophy and make Zimbabwe a practice ground for western immoral practice".

These critiques linking Christianity and colonisation were based on historical data rather than on philosophical arguments derived from Marxist-Leninist ideology. A Marxist critique of religion was developed after the amalgamation of the armies of ZANU and ZAPU to form ZIPA (Zimbabwe's People's Army) in November 1975, four months after Mozambique's independence. ZIPA's leadership was composed of eighteen military commanders, nine from ZAPU and nine from ZANU. The ZIPA soldiers and their leaders were generally younger and better educated than the first generation of guerrilla fighters whom they had replaced. This second generation made a clear-cut ideological choice in opting for scientific socialism; they redrafted the political education lessons, retaining the historical section, but adding lessons on Marxism. This new syllabus came to be known as the Whampoa Syllabus, named after its Chinese counterpart, while ZANU's political education centre was called Whampoa College, later to be renamed Chitepo College.

While ZIPA cadres were given lessons in Marxism, these were not intended for the population within Zimbabwe. The syllabus itself stipulated that the masses would only be taught "scientific Marxism-Leninism... when conditions are ripe".
The written lessons were very theoretical, lacking the concrete practical examples of the "National Grievances". They spoke of dialectical materialism with such subheadings as the "law of unity and opposites" and the "law of negation of the negations". It is doubtful whether many of the new recruits fully comprehended what they were being taught.

The ZIPA experiment lasted only one year. During that time extensive military operations were mounted within the country, but almost from the start, the new army experienced many internal problems. By June 1976 most of the new members from ZIPRA had left, so that from that time ZIPA must be considered virtually a ZANU army, though not a united one. When the ZANLA military leaders detained in Zambia after Chitepo's assassination were released at the end of 1976, it was divided between those who supported the leadership of Robert Mugabe and Josiah Tongogara (himself among

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those released) and those that did not. These tended to be young radicals and became known as the Vashandi because of their espousal of a proletarian revolution led by the workers (vashandi) and progressive intellectuals, rather than the peasant dominated struggle in which ZANU was engaged.8

Thus when Mugabe and his delegation returned to Mozambique early in 1977 after the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, they faced an internal crisis. Some of the leaders of ZIPA, which had been the only operational army throughout 1976, had denounced the conference and refused to accept the old leadership. After consultations with President Samora Machel, the decision was taken to arrest the leaders of the Vashandi including some ZIPA commanders and political commissars. Most of the rank and file soldiers and the other leaders were absorbed into the old ZANLA structures.9

ZIPA's political education programme was banned in all ZANU camps. In July 1977 Chitepo college, ZIPA's political training centre in Chimoio was closed and the Whampoa Syllabus banned. The oral evidence given by Josiah Magama Tongogara, ZANLA's Commander-in-Chief to a committee investigating the closure of Chitepo College, provides some insights into the ideological divisions that had arisen:

I went to Chitepo on 25 July 1977 and there were 258 comrades. I attended a lesson there. I spent the whole day. The lesson was about Space and Time. In the afternoon, we had discussions about the lesson which was taught in the morning. Comrades say we don't have God, the one we worship is for Europeans. I told them to concentrate on the situation we have now, teaching Party line, not philosophy... . On the rally, I talked about war situation. I said we must not teach about space and time. This should be taught at Chindunduma, we must not mix things.10

Investigations at all ZANLA camps to identify Vashandi members, now seen as dissidents, caused fear and confusion among many of the new recruits who did not understand what was taking place. [Mandipaza, Gumbo, Kusotera] The round up of the alleged rebels continued throughout much of 1977. A full account of the ZIPA Vashandi chapter in ZANU's history has yet to be written.
In regard to religion, former members of ZIPA maintain that in spite of their Marxist orientation, they were not hostile to the Christian Churches. They claim, in fact, that they considered the Christians as allies because of their stand for social justice and equality. Some former "The Communist Menace" ZIPA members admitted that they felt more in sympathy with the Catholic Church than with most other Christian Churches because of the well known position of Bishop Lamont and the help that they were receiving from Avila and other Catholic missions.

This is not the picture portrayed by ZIPA's critics, as well as some of its friends, who maintain that ZIPA's political orientation was against all religion and that they were in reality very hostile toward the Churches. [Kanengoni, Kusotera, Gumbo]

Though some ZIPA leaders claim to have advocated a tactical alliance with Christian missions at this stage of the national democratic revolution, their ultimate objectives were not so clear. Some of their trained guerrillas preached at pungwes that churches would eventually be confiscated by the State and turned into public halls, and priests and sisters would be forced to marry. Understandably this raised fears in some quarters of the Church and such stories spread with great rapidity in ecclesiastical circles.12 In the rear bases as well, some Christian recruits say that they were told to renounce their religion. [Gumbo, Kusotera]

Many ex-combatants, including some who were detained as members of the Vashandi later acknowledged that there were "extremes" during this period while others suggest that they had the right message at the wrong time.3

The first murders of Catholic missioners took place during the ZIPA period. There is at present no evidence that ZIPA was responsible nor that ideology was the motivating factor, though further research is required on this issue. Two cases were acknowledged by ZANU: Fr Joerger (3 December 1976) and Fr Rubio (28 February 1977), both in ZIPA's newly opened Gaza Sector located in Gwelo Diocese. The first was said to be a case of mistaken identity which had more to do with. skin colour than ideology. 14 The death of Fr Rubio, however, may have been the result of his strong anti-communist leanings which he brought with him from Franco's Spain. Commenting on his death in retrospect, Bishop Haene said: "He was a very outspoken man and a Spaniard, and he went through the Spanish war and he was a Franco man. He might have said something in the church that the vakomana heard." [Haene]

If Christianity came under fire during the ZIPA period, traditional religion suffered even more. The ZIPA forces were forbidden to consult spirit mediums and the norms and directives which had controlled the guerrillas in the early days were ignored. This may have been consistent with ZIPA's Marxist orientation, but it often resulted in

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indiscipline and conflicts with the peasant population.15
ZIPA had been disbanded by mid-1977. In the aftermath, ZANU held a special Central Committee meeting in Chimoio, Mozambique, in 1977 to reorganise and restructure the Party. (Martin and Johnson, 1981:276) In a revised version of "ZANU Party Line and Policies" issued that year, ZANU clarified its ideological position, confirming the need to mobilise all forces during this stage of the "national democratic revolution". While it adopted Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, ZANU sought to repair the damage done the previous year by reaching out to all classes. According to the new directives:

In ideology, ZANU is guided by the Marxist-Leninist principles. ZANU aims to achieve a socialist revolution. While we are still executing the general line of armed struggle against the enemy, it is not possible to effect a socialist revolution. We need to unite with all forces in Zimbabwe that oppose the settler regime. These include businessmen, trade unions, women organisations, students, peasants and intellectuals, despite their ideological beliefs.16 Churches were also to be included within this broad united front as subsequent documents indicated. ZANU's newly elected President, Robert Mugabe, went out of his way to reassure the Churches, particularly the Catholics, that ZANU was not opposed to religion and had no intention of closing churches if it came to power. He may have wanted to distance himself from the ZIPA radicals who were suspected by some of killing missioners.

Speaking to the author in Maputo in September 1978, President Mugabe compared the teachings of Marx and Lenin to those of the Church. "I can't understand the Catholics saying that the basis of collective organisation is un-Christian when in fact this is the manner in which they organise themselves". Stressing that he saw no contradiction between the practice of Christianity and Marxism, he concluded that ZANU would permit the free practice of all religions. "After all, religion is a matter of conscience," he said. (Mugabe, 1983:156ff.)

In a conversation with Fr Michael Traber half a year later, President Mugabe expressed very similar views. While reiterating that ZANU had adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology, he maintained that this was an economic theory which would not affect their attitude towards the Churches. He maintained that FRELIMO's hostility to "the Communist A4enace"

Christianity had more to do with Portuguese colonialism than with Marxism: One thing we shall never adopt from Marxism is its attitude towards religion and the Christian Churches. This goes against our own belief and that of the people of Zimbabwe... We want friendly relations with the Catholic Church. We want to co-operate with them. We want that they have the freedom to exercise their ministry.17 Thus, while ZANU defined its ideology as Marxist-Leninist and its aim as a socialist revolution, its leaders with their Christian backgrounds did not intend these long-term objectives to create conflicts with the Churches. Rather, they made a distinction between Marxism as an economic theory and as a philosophy of life. This distinction was not accepted by everyone in the Party, particularly the
ZIPA/Vashandi leadership which had espoused dialectical materialism. The proposal to unite all democratic forces the better to defeat white settler colonialism prevailed, which meant that political lessons in scientific socialism were replaced by the old "National Grievances" Series.18 Church personnel were only vaguely aware of these debates within ZANU. Even now, their extent and impact are not known. The attitudes and behaviour of the guerrillas in the field were what really mattered. Through all these various phases of nationalist resistance, neither of Rhodesia's two most outspoken Bishops, Lamont of Umtali and Haene of Gwelo, feared a communist takeover. Both were astute enough to see how the communist bogey was used by white extremists to justify their racist policies and both were politician enough to recognise that the primary objective of the nationalists was to win back their land, an objective which the Church supported.

Speaking of the fear of communism which was so strong in some Catholic dioceses, Bishop Haene gave his personal views on the subject, blaming Government propaganda for instilling this fear:
I don't think I had that fear. Of course, you could understand the people who had that fear, but that fear was put into them from the Government side. I'm at heart a socialist too.... I'm from a poor family and I know what it means to be poor. But I'm not a Marxist or an atheist. Of course not. (Haene)

Lamont also had no fear that communism would succeed: "I had such a conviction of the African's sense of God." [Lamont] In his Speech from the Dock, he clearly stated that he did not see communism as a threat in Southern Africa but recognised that the best antidote against communism was for the Church to practise its social teachings:
I cannot too greatly emphasise the need for the Church to be seen here and now as a courageous voice in the denunciation of acts of injustice.... Such clear-cut public denunciation and action is especially necessary when we are told that communists threaten the whole of Southern Africa, and that all along the Eastern border, that is all along my diocese, the forces of Marxism are already at work to invade and take over Rhodesia.

I must say at once that I personally doubt every bit of Government propaganda that I hear on the BBC or RTV, just as I read with the greatest sense of skepticism much that is printed in our Rhodesian newspapers. I do not believe that Rhodesian Africans want communism, or Russia, or China or Cuba... . I believe that they want to be with the West and with the English speaking world. (Lamont, 1977:56ff.)

Bishop Lamont later travelled to London during the Lancaster House Conference and saw both Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo with two questions - did they intend to introduce Marxism-Leninism and were they going to abolish religion? After receiving reassurance from them on these points, the bishop counselled them to adopt a policy of reconciliation. "For a blessing to your country, when
you get independence, let there be no more bloodshed, let there be no Nuremburg." [Lamont]

* * *

The Justice and Peace Commission, headed first by Bishop Haene, then Bishop Lamont and from 1977 by Monsignor Helmut Reckter of Sinoia Prefecture, was also never swayed by Rhodesian anticommunist propaganda and rarely, if ever, referred to the ideological position of any of the warring parties. The Commission was regularly accused of being one-sided, focussing only on security force atrocities while ignoring those of the nationalist forces, and of being soft on communism. They never publicly answered Che latter charge, and as to the former, they replied that the Rhodesian Government amply documented and publicised the brutality of the guerrillas while that of its own security forces was hidden and denied.

The Bishops' Conference, as a whole, followed the lead of its strongest members, Lamont and Haene, and seldom referred to

"the Commkst MenTace ideology. Their concern was the abolition of institutionalised racism and the establishment of a majority rule Government which would uphold the rights of all its citizens. In December 1974, the bishops refused to attend a meeting convened by the Minister of Information to discuss the "spread of Marxist influence in Rhodesia", accusing the Government's racist policies of being "largely responsible for making communism attractive to the African". 19 This attitude began to change after 1976, however, when the ZIPA forces adopted a doctrinaire Marxist line.

The Conference made its first direct public reference to communism in 1976 in the study document The Road to Peace. Drafted by the Theological Commission, the document borrowed heavily from a similar statement by the Bishops of Chile, Evangeio y Paz. The document refers to three obstacles to peace: atheistic communism, individualistic capitalism and extreme nationalism. The section on communism distinguishes between various brands of socialism, singling out Marxist or scientific socialism as dangerous because of its inherent atheism. Pointing to the dangers of anti-communism, it warns that this can be used as a cover for "counterfeit ideas and attitudes which are as bad as the very communism which they pretend to fight". It refers to the guerrillas in a positive manner, concluding: "It is fostering communism to label as communists those who fight for the dignity of men, for justice and for participation in Government for all citizens".

In February 1977, the Conference expressed concern over the "deliberate and clandestine indoctrination of young people... in the ideas of atheistic communism".20 This was followed by a letter to the Vatican Secretariat of State "on the danger of atheistic communism".22 This concern was expressed in response to the new wave of ZIPA combatants who visited many missions for the first time in 1976. It was also issued in response to complaints from Wankie and
Bulawayo Dioceses where ZIPRA forces were seen to be hostile to Christianity, forcing many missions to close.3

Reflecting these concerns, the Secretary General of the Bishops' Conference, Fr Richard Randolph, SJ, took an increasingly anticommunist position in his annual reports and in the articles he reproduced in the Conference's monthly newsletter. After March 1977, when Bishop Lamont was deported and Bishop Haene had retired, Randolph had more freedom to operate. He frequently circulated negative articles about the suppression of religion in Marxist

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Mozambique as a warning about what might happen in Zimbabwe if the radicals came to power. The following is a typical example of Randolph's growing preoccupation with ideology:

Gradually, as the war escalated, young Africans went as guerrillas for military training organised by the Russians and Chinese. Inevitably the technological and military training included ideological atheistic communism (Marxism of various kinds). Many of the young African guerrillas especially in Matabeleland are now no longer nationalists fighting for tradition and African majority rule, but nationalists fighting for power, fully indoctrinated in Marxist methodology and many of them militantly anti-Christian.24

Archbishop Francisco Colasuanno, the Apostolic Delegate for Rhodesia and Mozambique, was also concerned about ideology. An effective diplomat who engaged in open dialogue with ZANU and FRELIMO, he nevertheless mistrusted their ultimate intentions. In a meeting in Maputo with Fr Randolph in early 1977, he expressed his views very plainly, advising the Zimbabwean bishops to Africanise the Church in order to prevent the nationalisation of Church property which had occurred a few years earlier in Mozambique. "Please for the sake of the Church, change. Not just a point or two, but with a new mind, a new soul," he urged. "Start now. Do it now so you can say - we started even before you came into power! Hurry or it will be too late."25

Though these fears of some Catholic leaders spread easily in the white, urban areas and in Bulawayo and Wankie Dioceses, they had little impact at the grassroots in the other four dioceses. In the rural areas the Church was learning to live with the prospect of a socialist Zimbabwe as the four mission studies that follow show. Its contact with the guerrillas had convinced it that the Church could co-exist with socialism. These experiences and attitudes were reflected at the Driefontein Symposium where the Church took a positive look at socialism, focussing on what it held in common with Christianity rather than on the differences. While a note of warning was sounded by Bishop Prieto of the Wankie Diocese, who gave a chilling description of life in Marxist Mozambique, other speakers cited Tanzania's ujamaa as a socialist model more compatible with Christianity.26

The Bethlehem Fathers' Superior, Fr Amstutz, played down the

"the Communist Menace"
Marxist orientation of the guerrillas in his presentation at the symposium. Portraying them as nationalists involved in a decolonisation process rather than as communists, he pointed out the futility of Government propaganda. "The Government, news media and courts speak of the guerrillas as communist or communist-inspired," he said. "The people conclude that communists are on their side. Government propaganda is defeating its own aim." 27

The German Jesuits in Sinoia Prefecture brought their anticommunist attitudes with them from their homeland where they had experienced political repression and hostility towards Christianity. Even so their pastoral ministries in the rural areas brought them close to the people, enabling many of them to overcome their background, and, at St Albert's Mission their critical attitude toward the guerrillas related rather to the kidnapping of school children from the Mission than to ideological considerations.

Avila Mission came under the jurisdiction of Bishop Lamont and the Irish Carmelites. The Irish, with their own history of being oppressed and colonised, tended to sympathise with nationalist aspirations. 28 They knew from their Irish experience that injustice, not communist agitation, was the cause of popular unrest.

At St Paul's Musami, anti-communism also never took hold. Few at the mission believed that the guerrillas had been responsible for what happened there in February 1977 and nearly all the mission staff were prepared to support the nationalist cause. After mid-1977, when the mission was collaborating with the guerrillas, the priests, brothers and sisters found themselves in agreement with the guerrillas on most issues, including socialism. Neither Fr Johnson nor Br Adamson found the guerrilla's appeal to socialism very well defined. Johnson said it was a "fairly undigested philosophy" while Adamson said it didn't make a lot of sense to him. [Johnson, Adamson] Fr Johnson pointed out that the anticommunist and anti-guerrilla propaganda mainly influenced those working in the white, urban areas who had no first-hand contact with the guerrillas. 29

Ideology was also not an issue at Mutero Mission where the priests and sisters were more concerned about the suffering of the people at the hands of the security forces than about Marxist indoctrination by the guerrillas. The Bethlehem Fathers were preparing themselves for life in a socialist Zimbabwe and may have

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been more familiar with Marxism than the guerrillas. As one priest wrote to a friend about the future:
Isn't it revealing that the relatively poor rural population manages to feed and support the thousands in the bush... whereas it never managed to support the few missioners? Just because we really never left everything. Once we are stripped of everything, voluntary support will surely come forward. Can we imagine at all a Church without its own institutions? We might soon find out. 30

Within the Church, as in ZANU, some individuals emerged with more radical views, espousing socialism as an ideology more compatible with Christianity than capitalism could be. They were influenced by their reading of liberation theology
as well as by their contact with Zimbabwe's liberation movements. The Jesuits, Dominicans, Maryknollers and Bethlehem Fathers, for instance, all had personnel working in Latin America and would have been aware of theological and political developments on that continent through these community links. The Jesuits' 1975 Assembly on Justice and Faith had much in common with the Latin American Bishops' statements of Medellin and Pueblo, calling for a "preferential option for the poor".31
These international influences as well as a post-Vatican II openness to the world encouraged many within the Catholic Church to work for a revolution within the Church as well as in society. Thus, Fr Michael Traber could optimistically state in early 1980:
My own conviction is that the Church could be liberated in spite of herself, and could be liberated into a true Christian practice and true Christian way of life through socialism and through Marxism. I believe that a genuine Christian has to be a socialist.... I have had the great advantage in my life that I could travel to Mozambique and Tanzania and... some Latin American countries where I saw all these convictions in action, and where I experienced... a Church taking part in a socialist reconstruction of society.32
Although a theology of liberation did not emerge from the Zimbabwean struggle, the Church did come to adopt a more flexible outlook toward socialism. By the time of independence, most church personnel in the rural areas had prepared themselves to accept revolutionary change. The extent of such radicalism within some sectors of the Church can be glimpsed from the following comment by a priest working in Harare township (now Mbare suburb):

'the Communist Meoace"
I think more and more priests are coming to see... that to be a Christian is to be a socialist, particularly in our situation. You just can't really take the gospel seriously without implementing some kind of socialist structure.33
While the picture seemed more hopeful at the grassroots level, the fact that many of the radicals had been deported and never returned after independence may help to account for the absence of a liberation theology on a national scale.4 Those who remained rarely had an opportunity to meet and develop their thinking. Caught up in the mammoth task of reconstruction as they were, and with no encouragement from the official Church, their experiences soon became individual memories to be treasured but not acted upon.
Within ZANU, the ideological debate was much more damaging and divisive. Without going into detail about the various splits within the Party, one can say that the ZIPAIVashandi group spearheaded a shift to the left in nationalist politics. Its suppression may have had more to do with military strategy than with ideology, and, certainly, it led to many detentions and some loss of life. Many ex-combatants are reluctant to talk about this period of internal conflict. Some feel that it set back the socialist revolution indefinitely and helps to explain ZANU's failure to define clearly its alleged socialist goals. [Mutumbuka]
Footnotes
SJA/26e: J H Ryder, SJ, to Fr Beisley, 9/9/35.
2 The complete set of the "People's Army" lessons is preserved in the ZANU Archives under Commissariat Department as is a set of the "National Grievances".
4 Ibid., Serial II, "Division in our nation (Divide and Rule)", p. 1.
7 Ibid., Box: Commissariat, "Whampoa Syllabus", p. 2.
s Mandipaza, Kusotera, Gumbo. This period in ZANU/ZANLA history is referred to as the 'Vashandi rebellion' by critics of the ZIPA/Vashandi grouping.
9 Published sources for this period of crisis inside ZANU and ZANIA include Martin and Johnson 1981:215-276, and Ian Christie Machel of Mozambique, Harare, ZPH. Christie is particularly concerned with President Machel's role, which Martin and Johnson also discuss, on pp. 257-263.
An important archival document is the "Internal Memorandum to ZANU Central Committee", 20/1176, signed by eight members of ZIPA.
This is deposited in the ZANU Archives, as is the 1984 interview (see Chapter 4, footnote 3) with Mujuru (Rex Nhongo) who provides useful information concerning the period in 1977 when the Vashandi grouping was being broken up.
Finally, much of my information came from informal discussions with Minister Fay Chung, Sam Geza, Dzingai Mutumbuka and many former members of ZIPA.
1o ZANU Archives, Box: MMZ Province, Committee on Chitepo College, Report of 13/9/77. Chindunduma was ZANU's Education Headquarters where primary and secondary education was provided to young recruits and refugees.
66
"The Communist Menace"
Tichafa, Chiwenga, Muchena, Kanengoni. Also informal discussions with Augustine Mpofu and Sam Geza.
12 Informal discussions with Bishop Mutume. 13 Nyabiko, Kusotera. Also interview with Augustine Mpofu. 14 Muchena. The Bethlehem Fathers are sceptical of this explanation as they say that Fr Joerger was so well known in the area that he could not have been mistaken for a member of the Rhodesian army or a spy. See also Chapter 2, footnote 28.

11 Gumbo, Kusotera, Kanengoni, Mandipaza. Also interview with Augustine Mpofu and informal discussions with John Gwitira.


18 The issue of political education was very sensitive after this episode. The Whampoa Syllabus was banned and its possession was a serious offence. The following minutes, from the Commissariat files in the ZANU Archives, illustrate this: "Meeting on the issue of ex-Wampoa (sic) papers at Base IV convened by Cde. George Rutanhire. The sensitivity of such issues consists in the fact that the Department of the Commissariat has undergone unfortunate periods attributed to rebels like Dzino, so much that politics has become a resented practice and the impression... will be that the department is now on the blunder again yet it is actually individuals and not the department that create discord and rebellion in the Party. As far back as early 1977, I circulated documents to all camps ordering the non-continuation of the papers in question and their subsequent surrender to the Security Department of the respective camps." The minutes were signed by George Rutanhire, 16/8/79. Dzino refers to Dzino Machingura, one of the leaders of ZIPA and of the Vashandi. There are copies of interviews that Dzino gave to the Mozambique News Agency in the ZANU Archives.

For a further analysis of the achievements as well as the shortcomings of ZIPA, see the full transcript of an interview with Lazarus Nzarayebani, MP, in Social Change, December 1989. For leftist critiques of ZANU, see Mandaza, 1986; Astrow, 1983; John Saul in Review of African Political Economy, 1977.

19 RCBC files, Appendix to GS/RHO GOVT/76 of 9/12/76. 20 The Road to Peace, RCBC, Gwelo, Mambo Press, 1976, pp. 21ff. 21 RCBC Minutes, Ordinary Plenary Session, IBM 77, 8/2/77, p. 3. 22 RCBC Minutes, Administrative Meeting, 22/77, 31/3/77, p. 2. 23 The experience in Bulawayo and Wankie Dioceses was very different on Tuie Weight of Historg the side of both the guerrillas and the Church and merits further study.

Professor Ngwabi Bhebe has written extensively about the role of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in southern Matabeleland in Zimbabwe's war of liberation. Jeremy Brickhill is currently doing research on ZIPRA at St Antony's College,
Oxford University, while Terence Ranger and Mark Ncube have studied religion in the war in southern Matabeleland.
27 Amstutz, "The Guerrillas Are Coming", May 1977, p. 4. 28 Both Carmelite missionaries and ex-combatants mentioned discussing the situation in Northern Ireland and the IRA.
29 Johnson. He observed at one point in our interview that: "One of the difficulties at that time was coming to Salisbury and meeting other priests, Jesuits, who were either working in the white parishes or teaching in the white schools, who would be very much affected by that propaganda... . I would sleep like a log at the mission but I could never sleep there because the nights were preceded by long conversations with people in which one would try to explain what was happening out in the rural areas. They simply could not understand.
And that I'd find very disturbing, very upsetting." 30 SMB Archives (Box: Zbe) J Wyss to Michlig, 24/6/78. 31 Penny Lernoux, People of God, The Struggle for World Catholicism, New York, Viking Press, 1989. See also Assembly documents in Jesuit Archives, Harare.
31 Religious figures such as Sr Aquina Weinrich, OP, Fr Michael Traber, SMB, and Roger Riddell, SJ, either left or were deported during the war. Sr Aquina and Riddell only returned for a brief period after independence while Fr Traber has only come for short visits. While the JPC played a critical role throughout the war, few of its members would have espoused socialism. Bishop Lamont, though an outspoken critic of the minority Government's policies, was also a critic of socialism.
Drawn by Buxton Mwandimudzira

St Y-lbert's Mission

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Chapter 4
WAR GAMES: ST ALBERT'S MISSION, MT DARWIN (SINOIA PREFECTURE, ZANLA'S NEHANDA SECTOR)
'they were making children the pawns in their war games. We had that under the
flazis. We had that under the Communists. Most of us
were Germans. We had been through this before.
Fr Clemens Freyer, SJ, 10 May 1990
To their surprise, the missionaries from the German Province of the Jesuits found
a warm welcome awaiting them when, in 1958, they came to the north-east of the
country.
Though almost 200 years had elapsed since the withdrawal of the Portuguese, the
memory of these early missionaries was still very much alive among the
indigenous population. "We've been waiting for you to return. Why did you take
so long?" the Jesuits were asked repeatedly by people in the Zambezi Valley. Fr
Norbert Gille, SJ, one of the first generation of new missioners to enter the area in
1963, recalled that the spirit mediums were particularly friendly. He said that they
would recount the history of Fr Silveira and his Dominican successors, tracing the
missionaries' links to the former Mutapa empire. Fr Gille always consulted the
mediums when he wanted to build a church and they seldom withheld their
approval. This cordial co-existence, based on memories of a shared history, made
the gradual growth of the Church possible, and continued even during the difficult
days of the war.
St Albert's Mission, located on the Zambezi escarpment, became the centre of the
German Jesuits in Zimbabwe. A hospital was
St I-lbert's Mission
completed in 1963 and a convent for the Dominican sisters who staffed the
hospital and secondary school opened in 1964. A convent for the Little Children
of our Blessed Lady (LCBL), who also worked in the hospital and school, was
completed in 1968. The church itself was not built until 1973.
By then, St Albert's was a thriving community with 34 outstations, a primary
school of 261 pupils, a secondary school of 197 pupils, an 80-bed hospital, and a
staff composed of Zimbabwean laity, eleven German Jesuit priests and brothers,
German dominican sisters and Zimbabwean diocesan sisters. (Dachs and Rea,
1979:173; also SJA/ 206)
In a speech at an Open Day at St Albert's in 1984, Robert Mugabe, then Prime
Minister, said:
The school was an oasis in the jungle of under-development which characterised
the Zambezi Valley. It was quiet and little known, except in the Jesuit world. But
the war of liberation... brought it to the notice, not just of the whole nation, but of many parts of the world as well....
The history and fate of the school became inextricably linked to the history and fate of the liberation war which, by 1973, had become part and parcel of this area.1

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) which Mugabe later came to lead, had been formed in 1963 by nationalist leaders who believed in the need to take up arms to achieve their objectives. ZANU began sending recruits for military training in Ghana and China, as well as engaging in sabotage and some small-scale military operations at home. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) also adopted military tactics and, in 1967, joined forces with the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) to infiltrate guerrillas into the north-west of the country.

Early military operations by both liberation movements were begun without educating and involving the local population. This resulted in many setbacks as the local people often informed the police and army of the presence of the guerrillas. When ZANU lost seven of its guerrillas in the Battle of Sinoia in 1966 because of local informers, the Party realised that it was time to change tactics.2 For the next four years, they concentrated on learning the techniques of mass mobilisation from their Chinese and Mozambican instructors.

In June 1970 ZANU began to put what it had learned into practice by carrying out a one-month reconnaissance mission across the

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Fig. 8 Map of Salisbury Archdiocese and Sinoia Prefecture Source: Dachs and Rea The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe 1879-1979
The War and 7our Missions
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St Yq7bert's Mission
Zambezi River. (Martin and Johnson, 1981:25) After this successful fact-finding exercise, a group of ZANLA guerrillas remained in Mozambique's Tete Province for a period of in-service training with FRELIMO forces. (Ibid.:26-28; Gwitira, n.d.) During this time, they began laying caches of weapons in the Zambezi Valley and made contact with some of the spirit mediums who later became
important allies of the guerrillas. (Gwitira, n.d.; Lan, 1985) The use of these traditional religious leaders was a pragmatic decision made by officers in the field who realised the influence they exercised over the local population. This was a specifically Zimbabwean innovation, as the Chinese and Mozambicans frowned on the practice of traditional religion which they termed "obscurantism".

The ground having been laid for mass mobilisation and recruitment, 21 ZANLA soldiers led by Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo) infiltrated through the Valley from Mukumbura in October 1972 while another group which included Josiah Tungamirai entered the Mutoko area about the same time under the command of John Gwitira. They operated primarily as political commissars at this stage, discussing the grievances of the people against the Rhodesian Government and recruiting young men and women to join them.

They did not wear uniforms or carry guns openly, but mingled freely among the people wherever groups gathered. Onesimo Chinyemba, a student at St Albert's primary school at the time, recalled that the guerrillas came individually and participated in the daily life of the community; working in the fields and drinking beer with the adults, playing football and swimming in the river with the youth. "They used to tell the people about oppression," he said. "They made people realise what the whites had done." [Chinyemba]

The guerrillas' message fell on fertile ground. The area was undeveloped and the people lived in extreme poverty. They were not able to keep cattle because of the presence of tsetse fly in the Zambezi Valley. Their leader, Chief Chiweshe, was involved in a succession dispute. His family had been replaced by another ruling line considered to have been loyal to the settler Government during the 1896-97 chimurenga. Chiweshe readily perceived the guerrillas as allies in his efforts to be reinstated to the chieftaincy. Such local disaffection combined with poverty to produce a population who were "easy meat for subversion". [District Officer]

Most of St Albert's lay staff came from the Valley or the escarpment around the mission. Because of the large population settled around the mission, it was an obvious target for guerrilla penetration. Some of the mission's most loyal employees were visited by the ZANLA forces and soon became active guerrilla supporters.

Erick Musere from Kujoko Village had been working at St Albert's as a foreman since 1968. He recalled that six guerrillas including Mujuru, came to his village in October 1972, recruiting youth to join them. Musere himself was won over. As a father with young children, he could not go into the bush for training but was entrusted by Mujuru with calling the community to political meetings and helping to transport and cache arms and ammunition on the escarpment, a stone's throw from the mission itself. Musere even hosted a gathering of the guerrillas at his home on mission property at the end of 1972, roasting a goat for the occasion. [Musere]

Augustine Kanyamura had helped to build the mission and worked in various capacities as primary boarding master, cook, and eventually as an ambulance driver. Like Musere, he recalled attending meetings with the guerrillas towards the end of 1972 and providing them with supplies from the mission.
He remembered that the early group of guerrillas included Rex Nhongo (Mujuru), David Tsanangura, Biggie Tamai, Chimukute and Evaristo Nhamo, the last two having been recruited from the area. "Most of the people from this area responded willingly," he said, and the guerrillas were so successful in their recruitment campaign that "some people were even turned down on account of their health." Onesimo Chinyemba was too young to become a guerrilla soldier so he became a mujiba instead, assisting the guerrillas throughout the war.

Pragmatism led ZANLA to seek allies from all sectors of the rural population, "irrespective of ideological, religious or regional differences." Thus, guerrillas entering an area for the first time questioned the people about the headmen, chiefs, spirit mediums, local pastors and expatriate missionaries. They then approached these people personally, both to win their support and to discourage them from reporting the guerrilla presence to the authorities. They also soon learned that spirit mediums were among the most influential people among the KoreKore, the dominant group in the area. To ignore or denounce them would be to risk making powerful enemies, while winning them over to the cause would ensure the support of the entire community. Solomon Mujuru claimed that it was simply a matter of tactics for him. "I myself did not believe in it," he stated. "I never used magic or bought a cloth or anything. I was able to lead everybody because I accommodated their beliefs."

He pointed out, however, that many of the guerrillas were themselves firm believers in the religion of their ancestors. Mujuru used this faith to instil discipline in the guerrilla forces. In particular, he said, it enabled him to control their behaviour toward women. Traditionally, the mediums forbade sexual relations outside of marriage and exhorted married men to refrain from having relations with their wives before they went hunting or to war. In keeping with this traditional moral code, unmarried girls were not permitted to attend ZANLA pungwes nor could they cook for the guerrillas. According to Mujuru, these regulations were strictly enforced in the early days and helped to prevent rape and unwanted pregnancies.

Kanyamura, a Catholic himself, witnessed the close collaboration between the early ZANLA cadres and the spirit mediums. "The comrades said that without the support of the spirits, the struggle would be a failure," he recalled. He said that guerrillas made contact with a trusted medium in the area, "Sekuru Chiwawa", and that the medium travelled with them, showing them "sacred mountains and other sacred places." Kanyamura

This alliance with traditional religious leaders did not prevent the ZANLA forces from appealing to the Christian Churches as well. In addition to the Catholics who had arrived in the area only ten years before the guerrillas, the other major Christian denomination in the Valley was the US-based Evangelical Alliance Mission, known as TEAM, which opened its first mission at Mavhuradona in 1940 and five more over the next twenty years. A local independent Church, the
Vapastori, had members in the area as well, but they were few in number and had no infrastructure of schools and hospitals which could benefit the guerrillas. (Lan, 1985:40)

The guerrillas made contact with the staff of both the Catholic and the TEAM missions. Like the mediums, the Christian leaders could give legitimacy to the struggle among their followers. Additionally, they could provide material support - food, medicine and money. This served a dual purpose; it enabled the guerrillas to provide for their own needs and to offer services to the disadvantaged people, competing with the Government to win their favour.

Some of the lay staff at St Albert's Mission were among those giving material aid to the guerrillas. Being employed, they were better

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off than their neighbours and they also had access to the mission hospital and kitchen. The guerrillas visited the homes of individual supporters who worked at the mission like Kanyamura and Musere. Kanyamura said that he was helping the guerrillas in every possible way. "...(our) family helped a lot," he stated with pride almost twenty years later. [Kanyamura] Onesimo Chinyemba recalled that even students shared the little they had with the ZANLA forces. "They asked for the shoes we were using and they said that it was better for us to go barefooted than for them because they were working for us," he stated. [Chinyemba]

Ephilda Nyakudya was the wife of a local storekeeper who had a shop just outside the entrance to the mission hospital. She and her husband supplied the ZANLA forces with goods from their shop, especially clothing. In 1973, she began working at the mission hospital from where she supplied the guerrillas with medicine as well. [Nyakudya]

Besides material aid, the guerrillas were also recruiting young men and women to join them. They succeeded in winning over four of the seven catechists or lay preachers who assisted Fr Gille in his mission outreach in the Zambezi Valley, teaching catechism, preaching and helping to build small mission chapels in the Valley. (Martin and Johnson, 1981:79-83; Rutanhire)

The first to cross the border with the guerrillas was Peter Musanu whose family had moved to the area from Wedza in 1956.8 Musanu had attended St Albert's primary school and said that he wanted to be a priest when he finished school but his father refused to let him join the seminary. When he failed to get a place at StAlbert's secondary school, he went to a far school near Karoi but was expelled for being involved in student politics.

Musanu got a job with the police for a short period but ran away when they wanted him to spy on the political prisoners in detention. He returned to St Albert's seeking help from the priests. Fr Gille offered him a place in a training course for catechists which he readily accepted. Musanu worked with Fr Gille from 1969 to the end of 1972, helping to establish 25 small chapels or mass centers.

Musanu recalled that three FRELIMO combatants approached him in January 1971 at Karanda Hospital where he had gone to visit his sick father. They asked him to assist them materially and to take care of the Mozambique refugees who
had fled to Zimbabwe because of the liberation war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese in 

St Albert's Mission Mozambique. He supplied them with salt and shoes from his small monthly salary of fourteen dollars and mobilised the chiefs, subchiefs and the local Christian communities to assist the refugees. Eventually these border communities were looking after more than 450 Mozambican families. The Catholic Church at Musanu near Mukumbura was their centre. Sunday services became political meetings as well, where FRELIMO combatants gathered information and new recruits from among the refugee population.

When ZANLA began its period of in-service training and reconnaissance with FRELIMO forces, they were introduced to Musanu. Unfortunately, the police also became aware of his activities. In November 1972, he and his wife, Emeldah, received a warning that the police were after them. That same night they said evening prayers with the local Christian community as usual, left a note for Fr Zinkann, SJ - Fr Gille was on leave - and crossed the border to Mozambique.

Peter Musanu was renamed George Rutanhire when he joined the ZANLA forces and his wife was renamed Susan. They both underwent political training with 136 other recruits within Mozambique. Rutanhire was sent for further political and military training at Mgagao in Tanzania while Susan spent the next two years ferrying weapons and ammunition from ZANLA's main base at Chifombo in Zambia to the Zambezi Valley. She also received military training and became one of the first women leaders in ZANLA.

When Rutanhire finished his training, he said that the Party decided that he should return to the north-east where he was known and respected. "They told me I had to go there because I was catechist in the Roman Catholic Church and the majority of the people in that area knew me," he said. "Thus they would gain confidence and the people would know that ZANU and the Churches were related and... we would get the... help and support we needed."

Rutanhire pointed out that many of ZANU's leaders at that time had been educated in Catholic mission schools and looked favourably on the Church. He said that during his period of military training, the guerrillas discussed the role of the Churches in the war. He mentioned that young leaders such as Josiah Tungamirai and Emmerson Munangagwa took part in these informal discussions, which helped to shape ZANLA's policy towards Christianity. "We would discuss our politics and analyse where the Churches were helping us," he recalled. "We would analyse the help from Churches and chiefs, 

The War and Your Missions traditional healers and spirit mediums. We would categorise them differently, trying to find out how we could get help from all these groups."

In April 1973, Rutanhire returned to the Zambezi Valley as an armed guerrilla. Martin and Johnson (1981:82) observe, "Where he once taught catechism, he now taught ZANU's political education as a commissar." He did not
leave his Catholic background behind, however, and soon started composing songs for political rallies using popular Church melodies. This practice of using Christian hymns to teach politics soon became an accepted ZANLA tradition which spread to the whole country and lasted throughout the war.
Fr Michael Traber, SMB, was informed of this phenomenon by Simon Muzenda, then ZANU’s Vice President, when he visited ZANU’s offices in Maputo in 1979:
Muzenda pointed out that many of the Shona Church hymns were widely sung among the people in the camps. This was partly due to a catechist with the name of George from St. Albert’s who is an excellent singer and who, together with his wife, is in one of the camps.9
When ZANLA espoused scientific socialism, this Christian cultural innovation remained intact. These chimurenga songs had significant mobilising influence among the Christian population. Many people interviewed throughout the country credited these songs with winning their support for the struggle.
The Rutanhires also helped to shape ZANU’s decision not to close missions or drive expatriate missionaries from the war zones, but to utilise missions as centres of logistic support. The lay workers at St Albert’s, as we have seen, readily cooperated with the guerrillas, while the priests and sisters were either unaware of this extensive collaboration taking place right under their noses - or consciously chose to ignore it.10
The Jesuit community, composed of two brothers and nine priests, was completely absorbed in developing the school and the hospital, and in their pastoral work in the Valley. Natives of Germany, they had strong feelings about the Second World War, Nazism and the Allied victory which cut their homeland in two. They also had strong feelings about communism.
In a letter to the editor of The Rhodesia Herald (4 July 1973), Fr G Sunder, then Jesuit Superior, wrote: "The missionaries have become friends of this country through the fact that they themselves and their

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Fig. 9 Map of St Albert's Mission

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overseas organisations have been persecuted by the Communists. Some people are talking about Communists but they do not know what they are talking about. We do not need to be told. We know.” The mission had little contact with the
white farming community except through the hospital where the farmers and their families came for treatment. When St Albert’s was first started, Fr Gregor Richert, SJ, paid regular visits to eight schools for the children of the African farmworkers in the district. In his diary, he criticised the conditions he found there, complaining that the European farmers exploited the children for their labour. "Instead of giving them a salary for their work," he wrote, "he gives them free schooling - half-day work, halfday school. Of course, it is good that the children have a chance to go to school, but they pay a high price for it." (Richert, 1988:106-107)

When Fr Richert left St Albert's for St Rupert's Magondi in 1967, this critical observation of the white farmers seems to have come to an end. "We did not cultivate contacts with European farmers," explained Fr Lawrence von Walter, SJ, who held monthly services for the African farm workers in the tobacco barn of one of the commercial farms near the mission. [von Walter]

The farmers had never been happy about having a mission for Africans in the vicinity, believing that secondary education would spoil them. The former District Officer in Centenary said that many of the white farmers in the area were "extreme conservatives" who regarded their African labourers as mere workers with no personal identities and considered the social relationships of the missionaries with Africans as subversive. [District Officer].

Already some members of the Government's Special Branch were becoming suspicious of the mission. They reported that large quantities of food and clothing were being purchased from shops near St. Albert's. They also reported that men were disappearing from their villages and that armed men had been sighted in the Zambezi Valley. (Ellert, 1989:21-22)

Some of the missionaries also noted suspicious signs and changes in the area, but paid little heed to them. (SJA/206) Fr Ebelhard Fuhge, the Principal of the secondary school, recalled that Chief Chakoma, who lived about 30 km from the mission, used to ask his opinion about "the strangers coming from Zambia." [Fuhge, Gille]

In December 1972, the guerrillas held a meeting near the mission where they announced that they would soon launch the armed struggle. They told those present to spread the word to others. Erick

St 41kertS Mission

Musere decided that the time was ripe to tell the priests at the mission about what was taking place. He spoke to the mission superior, Fr Rojek, SJ. "I told the priests that the area was not all right anymore and that some young man was soon to leave for Zambia." The young man referred to seems to have been Dennis Mashonga, who took the chimurenga name of Everisto Nhamo. He was a worker at the mission and a Catholic. Musere claims that Fr Rojek did not express surprise and was willing to meet guerrillas. Both Musere and Kanyamura insist that such a meeting took place on the escarpment behind the mission. Mujuru and Rutanhire also claim that such a meeting took place, with the priest agreeing to assist the guerrillas. It was also agreed that Fr Rojek would deny ever having seen the ZANLA forces if he were questioned by Government officials.2 It appears

...
that if such a meeting did take place, Fr Rojek kept it a secret from his confreres
as well, pretending to be hostile to the guerrillas.
On 21 December 1972, ZANLA forces attacked Altena Farm, 18 kms from St
Albert's. They had not intended to come out into the open so soon, but their hand
was forced when the Special Branch spotted a group of 80 porters with donkeys in
the Mzarabani Tribal Trust Land. 13 Police and army reinforcements were rushed
to the area. The guerrillas decided to take immediate action before their carefully
cultivated network of supporters was discovered.
A ZANU War Communique described the event in victorious terms:
In an action about 60 miles from the Mozambique border, ZANLA attacked
Altena Farm belonging to a Marc de Borchgrave which Rhodesian security forces
had been using as an operations centre. In the attack with mortars and bazookas
two white civilians - a white man and a child - were wounded and some shops and
buildings destroyed.14
The attack on Altena Farm and at Whistle Field Farm, where the de Borchgrave
family had fled, turned the spotlight of public attention on the area. It also turned
the settler community and the Rhodesian army and police against St Albert's. On
New Year's Day 1973, the police came to the mission, arresting Augustine
Kanyamura, Erick Musere, Marcos Jairosi, a primary school teacher, and nine
other men from the area.
"The army moved in and they suspected us of training all kinds of guerrilla
fighters," recalled Fr Fuhge, recounting what took place. "Then they were quite
rough. They arrested people in Concession and Centenary. They beat people and
showed the bodies of those who had
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been killed." [Fuhgel
Musere was so badly beaten that he thought he would be killed. He was
eventually tried for carrying arms and ammunition from Chitsoro to Nembire. A
captured guerrilla, Chigona, was the chief witness against him. When Musere
asked to call Fr Rojek, the mission superior, to testify on his behalf, the magistrate
dismissed the request with contempt, indicating that he was personally convinced
the priests at the mission were also involved.
According to Musere, the magistrate threatened to arrest Fr Rojek as well. "They
said I was a friend of the priests and they didn't give a damn about them." He was
found guilty and sentenced to four years in prison, most of which he spent at
Gwelo Prison, working as a mechanic. [Musere]
Augustine Kanyamura was also beaten, given electric shocks and detained for one
year. On his release, he was re-arrested and was detained at WhaWha Prison until
1978. The teacher, Mr Jairosi, had his case taken up by the newly formed Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace (JPC). Supported by the JPC, he claimed
damages in the High Court against the Minister of Law and Order for the
treatment he received in January 1973 at the Centenary Police Station where he
was beaten with fan belts, kicked, dropped on the ground, and beaten on the soles
of his feet. 15
His case was contained in the dossier of cases accompanying An Appeal to
Conscience by Christian Leaders. When the Government passed the Indemnity
and Compensation Act in response to this ecumenical appeal, his case was among
those reported in the first Justice and Peace publication which gained international
attention, The Man in the Middle.

The storm now threatened to sweep the mission away as the European farmers
accused it of harbouring and training terrorists. In January 1973, one of them,
Doug Davis organised a petition to have St Albert's School closed. (SJA/206) It
was signed by about 120 other white farmers in the area. "The missionaries are
fluent in the local languages and are in contact with Africans every day," Davis
told the local press, justifying the farmers' petition. "More than 100 Africans
come and go all the time and we feel they must have known something about
terrorist activity in this area."

The mission superior, Fr Rojek, SJ, denied the allegation. "We have no
knowledge of terrorists and certainly do not intend to become involved in
terrorism," he declared, pointing out that the missionaries

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were not in contact with their African staff 24 hours a day since most of them
lived in villages five or six kilometres away from the mission. 16
Such denials convinced neither the European farmers nor the Rhodesian
Government. The German Jesuits continued to be accused of supporting
terrorism, even in the Rhodesian Parliament. Though they claimed they were
apolitical, they were learning that in a white racist state, speaking an African
language and running schools for African youth were viewed as political acts by
Europeans and Africans alike.
On 19 February 1973, both the primary and secondary schools at St Albert's were
closed by order of the Protecting Authority, without any reason being given.17
This was the first case of active interference by Government at a Catholic mission
and came as a complete surprise.
A few days later the Rhodesian security forces moved into the mission
unannounced. They surrounded the school with rolls of barbed wire and put up
powerful searchlights. For the next two months, the school premises were used as
an interrogation centre for the nearly 4 000 people living between Chinjira and
Karanda. 18 Later Fr Fuhge referred to it as the "first keep or concentration camp
in the history of Zimbabwe."
Ephilda Nyakudya, whose home was in Nembire, was among those rounded up in
big trucks and dumped at the mission. "We did not bring anything because we
didn't know when we would be going back home," she recalled. "On the first day,
food was prepared and it ran short. There were no toilets. We lived under terrible
conditions. We stayed there for about thirteen days."
Meanwhile, the priests and sisters were virtually under house arrest on the
opposite side of the road. They were questioned about their political views and
rumours reached them of the harsh treatment being meted out to the people. Fr
von Walter, SJ, recalled that the Jesuit community at St Albert's protested to the
authorities: "After the first reports of beatings and other maltreatments, we went
over and asked to see the commanding officer there and we made it clear to him that we considered the entire place the property of the mission and we would go public if any kind of torture or those nasty ways of interrogating people were carried out there." [von Walter]

Though this intervention may have spared a few individuals, it did not bring an end to the Government's counter-insurgency campaign in the area. The authorities detained many persons and imposed collective fines on the rest, which included confiscating 10 percent of their cattle. "We're being rough now," a member of the security forces told Fr Fuhge, "being soft doesn't work." This would remain the Government attitude throughout the war. [Fuhge] The experiment at St Albert's convinced the authorities that it was necessary to isolate the people from the guerrillas. The Government now embarked on a large-scale programme of forced villagisation, similar to that employed by the British in their colonial wars in Malaya and Kenya and by the Portuguese colonisers in Mozambique. By the end of 1973 almost the entire population of the north-east was moved into fenced enclosures, called "protected villages", at Mzarabani, Mukumbura, Hoya, Sohwe, and Katarira.19 Derisively called "keeps" by the local population, the protected villages were among the most unpopular measures adopted by the Government during the course of the war. Not only did they deprive the people of their freedom of movement and their livelihood, but the guards employed at the camps often used excessive brutality against the inmates.

These villages became prime targets for the guerrillas. Often they managed to infiltrate under the eyes of the guards and to collect food and clothing from the inmates as well as hold political meetings with them.

Cornelius Gwashure, a former student of St Albert's who later became a member of staff at the mission, was interned in a protected village at Mzarabani in the Zambezi Valley. He recalled his own experience: "People left their belongings, their cows and crops. In these keeps, people used to be beaten thoroughly by the soldiers. These people were suspected of being in contact with the comrades. The comrades used to come to the keeps by night. They would cut the fence and then they would collect food and clothes. The people who guarded the keeps were called DAs (District Assistants). These DAs were very rude." [Gwashure]

The Christian Churches united once more to bring assistance to those detained in the villages and to try and influence Government policy. They failed in the latter, as the Government moved ahead with its plans, detaining 47 000 people in 21 villages in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land in 1974, and 13 500 in the Mtoko, Mudzi and Mrewa areas.2" Monsignor Helmut Reckter, SJ, Prefect Apostolic of Sinoia gave the first one thousand dollars to buy food, clothing and blankets for the displaced in Chiweshe. (Rogers, 1983:1-3) Though there was a debate within some Church circles whether giving such aid was a
form of collaborating with Government policy, in the end the Churches agreed to work together to alleviate the suffering of the people while continuing to protest to the Government about its policies. Christian Care, the relief arm of the National Christian Council, and the Catholic Commission for Social Service and Development (CSSD), its counterpart in the Catholic Church, took the lead in assisting those held in the villages. They knew that they were indirectly supporting the guerrilla forces by this action. "The Commission (CSSD) was quite aware that some of the food and blankets went over the wire to the freedom fighters whom many of these people supported in spite of their own dire need," reported Fr Ted Rogers, SJ (1983:11) in the official history of the Commission. He explained that the Commission responded by sending in more goods to provide for both the interned population and the guerrillas. "We had to keep secret what was happening to a proportion of our goods otherwise Commission members would have been tried under the Law and Order Maintenance Act."

The lines were beginning to be drawn between the Catholic Church and the Government during this early encounter. The Government's counter-insurgency campaign and the behaviour of its security forces attracted the attention of the newly formed Justice and Peace Commission, while CSSD, also recently established, concentrated on assisting the victims of the war. These actions brought two of the Church's leading agencies into direct contact with the oppressed population who were themselves in close contact with the guerrillas. The Church, therefore, now had access to an alternative and first hand view of the war which differed widely from that provided by Government propaganda.

Though the Jesuits at St Albert's Mission were determined to remain apolitical, they could not remain uninvolved when their own staff were detained by the Government, their schools were closed, and their property used as an interrogation centre for the local community. Thus, when the ZANLA forces openly visited the mission in July 1973, they were in a position to win friends, even among the anti-communist priests. Though the counter-insurgency campaign made it more difficult for the ZANLA forces to maintain contact with their supporters, it also won sympathy for the guerrillas among the bulk of the population.

The War and Your Missions

St Albert's Mission

Recruitment soared. The number of young men and women volunteering to join the guerrillas had grown so quickly that Commander Mujuru (Nhongo) was called back to headquarters at Chifombo in Zambia to explain his success. [Mujuru In his absence, Thomas Nhari, then Provincial Political Commissar, took command and proposed to abduct the entire student body of St Albert's. None of the junior guerrillas opposed his plan. Since George Rutanhire was already familiar with the mission, Nhari assigned him the task of drawing a map of the mission compound and proposing routes for entry and exit. The operation was
scheduled to be carried out on the night of 5 July 1973. In addition to Nhari, those in charge were James Bond, Section Commander, and Nyika, Sectorial Security Officer. The group included eight local young men. [Rutanhire, Mujuru, Mudimu, Chando]

It was evening when the ZANLA forces arrived. Most of the teachers were in their recreation room. The secondary students were studying in the classrooms. Fr von Walter, the boys' boarding master, was just leaving his room to call the students to evening prayer before lights out. Fr Freyer, the science teacher, was showing films in the school hall while Fr Fuhge, the Principal, was relaxing in the priests' sitting room with other members of the Jesuit community. The Dominican and LCBL Sisters were in their respective convents. [von Walter, Fuhge, Freyer]
The guerrillas divided into four groups - one group led by Nhari went to the primary school; another led by Nyika went to the secondary school; James Bond was assigned to get supplies from Fr Rojek with whom they had already been in contact; while Rutanhire's group went to the hospital and collected the nurses. Rutanhire said that his group laid landmines on the road and cut the telephone lines as well.

Rutanhire played down any conflicts with the priests in his version of events. Initially he claimed that the intention was only to hold a political rally, but the students and staff themselves insisted on leaving with the guerrillas when they pulled out.1

The priests have a somewhat different version of events. Fr Freyer recalled that he was showing a film about the Suez Canal. When a group of armed men burst into the hall, he assumed at first they were Government security forces. He said that they turned on the lights, opened the doors and ordered everyone outside. The students were quiet and disciplined, showing no sign of fear. "They were lining the students up and marching them off," he recalled. "I followed them. I was responsible." One of the guerrillas threatened to shoot Fr Rea, SJ, who was also present: "It seemed the man had either taken drugs or was drunk. He was quite jittery. They told me to go away, but I didn't so they let me go along." [Freyer]

Rutanhire said that Fr Freyer and Sr Hilaria, LCBL, the boarding mistress, volunteered to accompany the students. Rutanhire interpreted this as a sign of support for the guerrillas as did General Tongogara when he recounted the story later.22 From his own account, Fr Freyer appeared rather to be motivated by a desire to protect his charges.

Meanwhile, Fr Lawrence von Walter ran directly into a group of seven armed men as he left his room in the dormitory blocks, shortly before 9 p.m. When he saw the teachers and students of the primary school lined up, he says that he immediately suspected that they were being abducted. He recalled that James Bond, the commander, poked him in the ribs with his rifle, ordering the priest to go with them.

"A tremendous anger rose in me; number one, against this intrusion, number two, the manner in which it was done," Fr von Walter said. He remembers shouting at
the commander, "Who the hell do you think you are, coming in the middle of the night taking our kids away?" and hearing the sound of the safety locks on their weapons being released. "This is it," he thought, but at that moment he felt no fear. [von Walter]

Quick thinking by Mr Jairosi, the primary teacher who earlier in the year had been badly beaten by security forces, broke the tension. "I think Father is making a mistake," he said. "He thinks you are the security forces." The guerrillas relaxed. According to Fr von Walter, James Bond tried to calm him, telling him that he didn't need to fear and explaining that they were only taking the students for a meeting, after which they would return. He was allowed to accompany them to the secondary school classrooms which they found empty and to the deserted hall where the projector was still running.

From there, they went to the shops near the mission. Fr von Walter says that the students took as much as they could carry from Chibumu's store, including food, blankets and a gramophone. In the meantime, Fr Fuhge was called from the sitting room by one of the cooks, who told him "there were some comrades outside." He recalled that the cook appeared to know the guerrillas well and took him to the shops where he joined Fr von Walter and the group already there. [Fuhge]

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"Nhari came out and greeted me," Fr Fuhge said. "He clicked his gun and I don't know what he said. He was in a kind of relaxed mood and there was no danger." Nhari repeated the same message as James Bond, telling the priests that they were only taking the students to a meeting and that they would be back soon. Fr Fuhge says that he told the guerrillas not to take Fr von Walter who wanted to accompany them.

Several of the LCBL sisters watched as the guerrillas went to each of the eight secondary classrooms, calling the students out into the darkness. Sr Winifred Chiripamberi, LCBL, who was present, recalled that the whole operation only took about ten minutes. She felt that the students went willingly with the guerrillas and did not seem frightened or surprised by their visit. [Chiripamberi] Some of the sisters volunteered to go along but the guerrillas refused, arguing that their white habits would be easily spotted and endanger the whole group. They permitted the boarding mistress, Sr Hilaria, LCBL, to accompany them, but she was soon forced to turn back on the escarpment when she could not keep up with the group. [Chiripamberi, Mushonga]

Israel Chizenya was a Form II student at the time. He said that he had heard that the guerrillas were in the area from classmates who lived nearby, but had never met them himself until that night. "They introduced themselves to us briefly that they were comrades. Three came in. They were heavily armed. Since it was our first time to see them, most of us felt very uneasy." He said that he felt better when he saw that Fr Freyer was coming with them. They marched down the Zambezi Escarpment into the Valley. [Chizenya]

Soon after leaving Mvuradona, the guerrillas split into three groups, one led by Rutanhire.
As soon as the guerrillas left the mission, Frs Fuhge and von Walter walked to the army base located at Stacey's farm to report the incident. "We had to report," explained Fr Fuhge. "Anyway, what would we have done? The army was only five miles away." When they reached the camp and made their report, the local commander of the security forces radioed to Centenary and planes were sent out to look for the guerrillas and their 291 captives.

The rescue operation followed the group led by Rutanhire, attacking with aircraft and ground forces dropped by helicopter around 1 p.m. the afternoon following the abduction. "We told the children to stay behind and not to run away for fear of gunfire," said Rutanhire. "All they had to do was hide and we would know what to do. We knew

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that if we instilled panic in the kids, some would die or be injured." [Rutanhire] Chizenya confirmed this version of events, praising the attitude of the guerrillas and the care they took to protect the students from harm. "The guerrillas were very friendly. They kept us in a comfortable mood as we were marching down," he recalled. "Even when the soldiers came, they didn't abandon us. They tried to stay with us to see that we were safe, even when the crossfire was taking place.” Sigauke, one of the guerrillas, was killed in this attack. After routing the guerrillas, the security forces rounded up the students, flying them by helicopter first to Hoya and then to the mission. According to Chizenya, the soldiers attempted to be friendly and slaughtered a goat to feed the students at Hoya. Unfortunately, while they were eating, a member of the security forces accidentally discharged his rifle, killing Hedrick Mandebvu, one of the students, on the spot. "This brought lots of panic and terror among us." [Chizenya] Another student, who was in the same group as Fr Freyer, described his experience with the guerrillas in the diocesan magazine, The Shield. He reported that partway down the escarpment, a meeting was held before they separated into different groups. He said that the guerrilla spokesman, later identified as Nhari, told them that they were being taken outside the country for further education. "The terrorists told us that we would be trained to become doctors, nurses and teachers of politics, further, some of us would become scientists."

The anonymous student, who may in fact have been one of the teachers or the seminarian, also noted that the guerrillas appeared to differ among themselves. "The one who was standing said that guerrilla warfare was good," he observed, "but one who was sitting down, grumbling low, spoke up in a bored voice saying, "Boys, this is war. Follow our orders tomorrow; if we tell you to hide, then do so, otherwise the soldiers will shoot you. The sky will be filled with aeroplanes and you'd better watch out for them.” The student reporter noted that some of the ZANLA forces were wearing green shirts and camouflage trousers and that they carried a rocket launcher or bazooka with them as well as their distinctive AK 47 rifles. Though his report could not be construed as supporting the guerrilla forces, he acknowledged their courage. When they heard the planes flying overhead, he said that one of the guerrillas near him wanted to shoot them down. "But their voices and faces indicated
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that they were not alarmed and they were in no hurry," he concluded.24
Fr Freyer, though angered by the abduction, did not criticise the conduct of the
guerrillas towards himself or the children. On the contrary, his depiction of Nyika
was not unfavourable. "He didn't talk much," he said. "He was firm, trying to
keep the children together. They kept disappearing."
Starting with a group of 60 students, only twelve or fourteen were left after six
days on the March. Freyer recalled that they were given some food and a half cup
of water in one of the villages where they stopped. They were exhausted and
hungry when, on the sixth day, Freyer asked Nyika if he could take two
handicapped children back to the mission. Nyika agreed.
Looking back on this incident, Freyer made the following observation which may
explain his relatively positive assessment of Nyika: "In those days, they weren't
ideologically oriented." This contrasts sharply with his view of the guerrillas in
later years when he feels they came under the influence of communism, leading to
attacks on missions and the killing of priests. [Freyer]
Only one group managed to reach the Mozambican border with any students - that
led by Thomas Nhari and James Bond which also included the primary
headmaster, Mr Chihope, and a seminarian, Peter Machingura. In a final shoot-out
with the Rhodesian security forces on the banks of the Zambezi River, Gurure,
one of the guerrillas was killed, and Chihope and Machingura escaped.
'[Rutanhire, Mudimu.] (Also Webber, 1973:14-17)
Only seven recruits arrived at ZANLA’s Chifombo Base in Zambia: Faith
Mudimu (Andie Changamukai), Stephanie Mukusha (Tendie Ndlovu), Rosemary
Siyamachira (Lucy Tongai), Bernadette Mtandadzi (Catherine Garanewako),
Florence Magunje (Sarudzai Gomo), Felicitas Magunje (Lois Moyo) and Sarah
Mtandadzi. All were from the primary school except for Rosemary who was from
a nearby village, and most had been helping in the kitchen to earn their school
fees. All were young women and all received military training and became senior
ZANLA commanders.25
Faith Mudimu, for instance, was only 14 years old when she was abducted with
her younger sister, Leocardia, who never made it to the border, much to her
personal disappointment. [Chimbandi] Faith, who became Cde Andie
Changamukai, was trained and served as a medic during much of the liberation
war. In 1979, she was elected Secretary for External Organisations in ZANU's
Department of
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Women's Affairs, which took her abroad for international conferences and
speaking engagements. After Independence, she became an officer in the
Zimbabwe National Army.
She described the hardships of the journey across the Zambezi Valley in an article
she wrote a few years after Independence. (BondStewart and Mudimu,
She said that they only ate and drank every few days, and that blisters formed on their feet. They hid under trees during the day and only survived by eating wild fruits, especially masau. When they were attacked by security forces as they neared the end of the journey, they were sure that they would die. In spite of it all, she maintained that morale was high. "We had lost some of our goods but the comrades gave us morale and we forgot all about it," she observed. "We arrived at Chifombo base where we received a warm welcome."26

Nhari's reception was not nearly so positive. He had lost two men in the operation and all but seven of the original 291 abductees had escaped. In addition, he had alienated the Jesuit priests and the Catholic hierarchy at a time when ZANLA was supposed to be making friends. The Rhodesian forces had been alerted to the strength of the guerrillas and subsequently intensified their counter-insurgency campaign in the north-east, causing endless misery for the local population. Furthermore, Rhodesian forces in pursuit of the students almost collided with a group of guerrillas from Chaminuka Sector who were escorting new recruits from Mt Darwin. If an encounter had taken place, it would have been a major setback for ZANU at this early stage of the war. (Gwitira, n.d.)

The abduction clearly brought the continuation of the school into question; at least 30 students withdrew. "I can't sacrifice my life for education," one young man was quoted as saying.27 Fr Fuhge put the matter to a student vote. Sixty-seven percent opted to remain at the school on condition that Government security forces be based at the mission. [Fuhge, von Walter, Chizenya]

The army set up a camp on the mission compound which was manned not by regular soldiers but by local farmers called up for military service for one month at a time. These territorials, as they were called, patrolled on foot around the mission during the day, preferring to remain in the safety of their quarters at night. Under cover of darkness, the guerrillas moved freely through the area. As Fr Sunder wrote in his annual report, "The terrorists in spite of the activity of the army are still active in our district. People are very intimidated. During the day, they see the army, during the night, the terrorists." [Fuhge, von Walter, Rutanhire. Also SJA/206]

Eight nurses left the hospital fearing to be abducted again. Though the hospital remained open until the last months of the war, staffing was a constant problem.28

The German Jesuits found themselves in the spotlight, as the media focussed on them. "I am absolutely disgusted by this violent act of terrorism," Fr von Walter was quoted as saying in The Sunday Mail. "Whatever their cause, these men (guerrillas) have done themselves an enormous amount of harm. There is nothing but hatred for them among the local Africans." An accompanying front-page editorial referred to the guerrillas in the emotionally charged style that would later be adopted by the Rhodesian Army's Psychological Action Unit. Calling the abduction the work of "hyenas", it claimed: "The way of the terrorist is to murder and rape, to abduct and destroy. "29
An in-depth feature story in Illustrated Life Rhodesia (Webber, 1973:14-17) entitled "The Rape of St Albert's" called the abduction "the most diabolical act committed by terrorists so far." It played up the attack on Fr Maurice Rea, SJ, who was quoted as shouting at one of the guerrillas:

"You're just a bloody mampara," he swore. "You're a lousy beggar." The terrorist ordered him to move. "Go to Hell!" snapped the priest unreligiously. With that, the terrorist lashed out at the father, knocking off his spectacles. It was a nasty moment. He was saved by another priest, Fr Clemence Freyer, who pleaded clemency for his fellow Jesuit.

"He is an old man, don't trouble him," said the Father. "Give him back his glasses." The guerrilla obeyed.

The priests were portrayed as the heroes, and were also the reference for the story that the guerrillas were either drunk or on drugs. This too would become part of the standard propaganda image of the nationalist forces. While the media undoubtedly took advantage of the emotional state of a few of the German Jesuits immediately following the abduction, and may have quoted them out of context, highlighting the most derogatory remarks, the priests never claimed that they had been misquoted or misrepresented. Their outspokenness against the guerrillas after this incident contrasted sharply with their public silence about the torture and beating of civilians by Government forces on mission property only a few months before.

The abduction marked the beginning of a shift in attitude by both the German Jesuits and by the Rhodesian authorities, which was reflected in the media coverage. While previously the Rhodesian Government had viewed the mission and its staff with suspicion, it now praised the priests for their courage in standing up to the guerrilla forces. Where once it had been condemned in Parliament, St Albert's now became the recipient of Government largesse. The Minister of the Interior, Lance Smith, gave the mission an Agric-Alert radio while the Terrorist Victims Relief Fund awarded the mission a sum of $680,10 to cover lost and damaged property. (SJA/206)

"Now the school had to continue at any cost as a matter of honour," reported Fr Sunder in his annual report. "The District Commissioner was now on our side and supported our case. The Minister of Internal Affairs came personally to have a talk with the children at the school, praising the courage of the fathers." (SJA/206)

Even the commercial farmers had a change of heart for a time, regarding the Jesuits as their allies instead of their enemies. In Church circles, the incident intensified already existing divisions that had surfaced over the Land Tenure Act and the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement. While the Government's counterinsurgency programme which had been launched at the beginning of 1973 caused the German Jesuits to question the conduct of the Rhodesian army and police, the abduction overshadowed this, casting the guerrillas in the role of the Nazis and the communists.
Frs Rojek, Freyer and von Walter began to attack those in the Church whom they suspected of being soft on "terrorism". In a strongly-worded letter to the Rector of the National Seminary at Chishawasha, they complained that "a number of the students of your seminary indulge quite freely and openly in sympathising with the terrorists and their aims" and that prayers were being offered for the "liberation of Zimbabwe". Calling such practices "a scandal", they described their "own awesome ordeal" as a "slave-raiding operation", concluding, "if this is what is meant by 'Liberation of Zimbabwe', then we cannot but feel sorry for Zimbabwe." 31

Mambo Press was another of their targets. Fr Freyer said that they attended a meeting at Mambo Press in Gwelo where the abduction was viewed in a positive manner, as a great feat by the guerrillas.

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"We got annoyed with the fathers at the Seminary and the fathers at Mambo Press," he stated, almost twenty years after the event. "They were only concerned about how the guerrillas treated us... in the first big action of the guerrillas, not in the victims. These victims were children." [Freyer]
The Justice and Peace Commission was another sore spot. Even though some of the Justice and Peace cases concerned mission staff such as Mr Jairosi, opinion was divided over whether going public was the best way to bring change. As we have seen, Fr von Walter and others had approached the relevant authorities quietly when they disapproved of their actions during the rounding up and interrogation of the local population at the mission. Since a member of the executive of the JPC, Fr Dieter Scholz, SJ, was a German Jesuit himself, this caused tension within the community. "We'd rather prefer not to talk because we knew their kind of approach," acknowledged Fr von Walter, referring to the Commission. "This brought some kind of dissension and dividing line between us and made it very painful to stay on, and to consider ourselves as brethren of one and the same society." [von Walter] Unlike the Swiss Bethlehem Society in Gwelo Diocese or the Irish Carmelites in Umtali, the German Jesuits never appear to have dealt openly with these divisions and the resulting silence, nor to have developed a common policy for dealing with the war. While few, if any, of the German Jesuits supported minority rule, some were sympathetic to the Rhodesian Front Government and went along with its anti-communist rhetoric. Others believed that political neutrality was the best way to maintain their presence in the country. "We were just in-between...," explained Fr Fuhge. "We were neither for this side nor that side. We just wanted to do our job honestly so whatever was cruel on both sides, we condemned." He mentioned that they all had supported Mr Jairosi in his effort to get some kind of justice after he had been beaten and tortured by the security forces. Even in this case, however, the JPC did not get the co-operation of all the Jesuits and none were as outspoken in their condemnation of security force brutality as they were in condemning the guerrillas. 32

Fr Fuhge went on to describe the painful dilemma which each man faced on his own: "You didn't commit yourself and you didn't talk to the people in the way that
you had to commit yourself. There's a Shona word - bembera - talking between - so that's what

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I did all the time. We were all kind of groping our way in between.' [Fuhge]
Not all the German Jesuits interviewed described themselves as in-between; some had clearly taken sides against the liberation forces. The abduction was one reason given for taking this position as well as subsequent acts of guerrilla violence against missions in particular and civilians in general. Though Fr von Walter admits that he was influenced by "the Smith propaganda at the time", guerrilla behaviour seems to have played the bigger part in forming his attitudes. "Because of this constant threat on our very existence and lives, I didn't think very highly of the movement (ZANLA) then, particularly when things like murders on mission stations happened... . You had to live up to your calling as a priest, somebody who is committed not to take up arms or to advocate violence." [von Walter]
As the war continued, it was less clear that they did not support the violence of the Rhodesian Government. The army eventually established a base at the mission. As a result the guerrillas viewed St Albert's as simply another Rhodesian army post.
In retrospect, Fr Freyer was extremely critical of the guerrillas. As a witness to some of the most destructive guerrilla actions against missions in Chinhoyi, it is not surprising that he feels that the war has been "over-romanticised" and that there was too much "heroworship." In addition to being present for the abduction at St Albert's, he was at Kangaire Mission when Fr Pieper was killed in December 1978 and then at Chitsungo Mission which was destroyed at the beginning of 1979.
Fr Freyer is convinced that abduction remained a common practice of the ZANLA forces as he had seen it happen at Ruwani, an outstation of St Albert's, and at Chitsungo in the Valley. "They were making children the pawns in their war games," he declared. "We had that under the Nazis. We had that under the Communists. Most of us were German. We had been through this before. It made us sick." He explained that the priests were not involved in politics, but in caring for children. While he acknowledged that it might have been necessary for the people to fight for their freedom, he condemned war in general, and especially this war. "War is bad anyway," he stated. "It was a dirty war."
One of the things he minded was the Marxist orientation of the guerrillas. He felt that this increased after 1978, worsening the situation. "Then it became tight; you couldn't talk to anybody," he

St 1-bert's Mission explained. "These were the Marxists; these were the capitalists; these were the oppressors... It was better to stay quiet and say less." [Freyer]
A ZANLA War Communiqué described the July 5 operation at St Albert's Mission as a stunning victory. Claiming that "a high powered team of high ranking commanders and political commissars" had gone to the mission at the
invitation of the students, staff and local population, it stated that they held a political meeting to find ways to stop "the Smith regime's brutal terror tactics" as well as Government plans to recruit students for national service. The communiqué concluded that the students had gone voluntarily with guerrillas. "The people present unanimously reached an agreement that every able-bodied male and female present should go for military training," Explaining why so few made it to Mozambique, it stated that most of the recruits returned to the mission when they became tired or sick.33

These exaggerated claims were not borne out by the evidence either then or later. The communiqué was a clumsy propaganda exercise meant to cover up an unauthorised operation which had tragic consequences for ZANLA.

St Albert's Mission had been the scene of a power struggle between two ZANLA commanders. Thomas Nhari, who had replaced Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo) as the commander of Nehanda Sector in July 1973, used the opportunity to try and outdo Nhongo's recruitment record, which was indeed enviable. Within their first few months in the north-east, the 21 members of the Sector under Mujuru's command had recruited 350 persons. In early 1973, they recruited another 400. Mujuru claims that these were all voluntary recruits and that ZANU policy was against forcing students to leave school. "We wanted students to be left to their books," he stated.

Blaming rivalry for the abduction, he said, "It seems that Nhari wanted a name like Nhongo." He went further to suggest that this incident was the beginning of a division in the Party ranks which led to an open rebellion the following year. "I think up to now this was where the problem of Nhari and his friends wanting to take over the Party started."

Another senior commander at the time, Josiah Tungamirai, The War and Your Missions confirmed Mujuru's version of the abduction. Calling the action at St Albert's "a fiasco", he said that it "was frowned upon by other ZANLA commanders and the political leadership". As a result, Tungamirai maintains, ZANU stopped using press-ganging as a method of recruitment. (Tungamirai, 1991:14) [Also Rutanhire, Mudimula

When Nhari arrived at Chifombo base with his seven new recruits from the mission, he was immediately removed from his post as acting commander. It is not clear, however, if he was punished because the exercise was a failure or because it was unauthorised and a violation of policy at the time. Early in 1975, he and some others were accused of attempting to carry out a coup against ZANLA's senior commanders. They were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad. The so-called Nhari Rebellion and its aftermath was a serious blow to ZANU, creating rifts along regional lines that remain unhealed to the present day.35

For the mission itself, the future looked bleak. The students were being politicised by the guerrillas and had begun to organise strikes at the school. "Every time the kids came back from their holidays, I noticed they had been in contact with freedom fighters," recalled Fr von Walter. "We had strike action by students for
any kind of minor thing, you know, about food or accommodation or anything like this." He said that the students objected in particular to the white staff at the school.

No action was taken until Fr von Walter intercepted a letter from Arthur Chiwashira, a student who had been expelled for his involvement in the strikes, which spoke of another planned attack against the mission and punishment for those who collaborated with whites. [von Walter] He called the police who detained some of the students for questioning. The secondary school was closed in May 1975 and the remaining students were transferred to other mission schools including St Paul's Musami, Makumbi and St. Benedict's.

The primary school and the hospital continued to operate and Fr Gille continued his pastoral work in the Zambezi Valley, travelling by bicycle now because of the danger of landmines. Though he sometimes met the guerrillas on his visits to outstations, they never threatened him. "Ignorance was my protection," he explained. "I tried not to know." When guerrillas asked him to meet with them, he refused, telling them it was better that he know nothing about their activities. They accepted this argument and left him free to carry on with his work. "In my area, ZANU was positive," he said, pointing out that it was 100

St Albert's Mission very different in neighbouring Chesa Purchase Area where some of the guerrillas were very "anti-religious."37

Reports in the ZANLA Archives indicate that Hudson Kundai, ZANLA's Provincial Political Commissar for the north-east, was also concerned about the behaviour of the guerrillas in this sector. He blamed it on a low level of political education and strongly urged that some commanders be withdrawn and that crash courses in political education be held for all the forces in the sector.8

He, and other guerrillas who operated in the north-east, acknowledged that another problem was that some of the priests refused to take orders from the guerrillas and fraternized with the Rhodesian authorities. [Tichafa, Shiri] In a war situation, this created conflict, intensifying mistrust between the guerrillas and the missionaries. Other dioceses such as Umtali and Gwelo had developed wartime guidelines which counselled their personnel to obey guerrilla commands and to have no social contact under any circumstances with members of the Rhodesian forces. Sinoia had no such guidelines.

When Fr Gerhard Pieper, SJ, was shot and killed at Kangaire Mission in Chesa on 26 December 1978, he knew his assailants well. A group of ZANLA guerrillas had visited the mission a few days previously, telling him not to hold Christmas services as usual because it was too dangerous for the people. Refusing to listen, he ordered his catechist to call the people to Mass. No one came. The following day the guerrillas killed him and threatened the life of the catechist.39

After the closure of the secondary school, St Albert's continued to be visited by the guerrillas who were receiving supplies from the lay staff. Ephilda Nyakudya and the other nurses gave them medicine from the hospital whenever they requested it. She said that the Dominican Sister in charge told her to do what had
to be done without informing her about it. Lay staff in the kitchen smuggled food to the ZANLA forces, and some of the teachers in the primary school also helped. It is likely that the LCBL sisters were also co-operating with the ZANLA forces, as Robert Mugabe’s aunt was a member of their community and many of them had close relatives in ZANLA.4°

In April 1978, the son of a neighbouring European farmer was wounded in a shoot-out with ZANLA forces at the mission. The ZANLA cadres had reportedly taken a wounded guerrilla to the home of one of the nurses for treatment [von Walter] The entire nursing staff was arrested the following day and the mission superior, Fr Christian Weichsel, SJ, took the case to the Legal Aid Office which had been set

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the War and 7our Missions
up by the Christian Churches.4

The ZANLA report of the incident records that six guerrillas approached St Albert's at 7 pm to collect food from the nurses and were spotted by Rhodesian troops in the area.42 Two guerrillas were wounded in the incident, but all escaped from the scene.

The commercial farmers were furious. Once again, they suspected the mission of collaboration with the nationalist forces, demanding that a security fence be erected around the mission and that a paramilitary force be stationed there. The Jesuits agreed.43

In the eyes of the guerrillas, this turned the mission into a Rhodesian army base, making it a legitimate military target. ZANLA field reports from Nehanda Sector list St Albert's with other Rhodesian bases and record several guerrilla attacks on the mission. On 4 June 1979, for instance, 41 ZANLA troops are reported to have attacked St Albert's, retreating into the Dande Game Reserve where they were ambushed. Three guerrillas were killed in the ambush and two were wounded.44

Another more serious ZANLA attack occurred in October 1979, leading to the closure of the mission. The ZANLA report indicates the extent to which St Albert's was viewed as part of the Rhodesian establishment by that time and also the continued contact between the guerrillas and the lay staff.45 Headed, "The racist enemy camp at St Albert's Missionary School destructed bringing the imperialist preacher to a halt", the report goes on to explain that they were sighted as they entered the mission compound and fired upon as they prepared to enter "the employees’ houses". The report claimed that some of their members were already there "busy politicising the employees".

The report went on to list the medicines that had been captured in the attack and to note that one of the guerrillas had been wounded. Sr Winifred, LCBL, who remained at St Albert's throughout the war, said that the sisters used to sleep on the floor at night to avoid being caught in the crossfire between the security forces and the guerrillas who came frequently to the mission for food. She recalled that final battle in October 1979, explaining that the guerrillas had grown very hostile towards the priests because they were seen as having taken sides with the security forces.
She said that the guerrillas chased all patients from the hospital and damaged mission property. "They shot three bullets into the church, then they came looking for the priest with the idea of killing him." [Chiripamberi] The Rhodesia Herald (31 October 1979) reported

St Albert's Mission
that the battle lasted four hours. It said that the guerrillas had fired rockets and mortars at the mission and had beaten up some nurses and a teacher. St Albert's was closed as a result of this incident. The neighbouring European farmers who had always blamed the mission for the security problems in the area, ransacked and robbed its buildings, causing an estimated $100 000 damage. 46

With the coming of Independence the following year, the zest to rebuild overcame the bitterness and disappointment of the war years. The priests and sisters returned, sending for the loyal staff members who had sought refuge in towns during the war, or who had been detained. Erick Musere and Ephilda Nyakudya returned. Augustine Kanyamura became the ambulance driver at the hospital and Onesimo Chinyemba a teacher in the secondary school. Israel Chizenya became a teacher in Bindura. George Rutanhire was elected Member of Parliament for the area. Frs Fuhge, Rea, von Walter and Freyer remained in Zimbabwe but were assigned to different missions as were the Dominican and LCBL sisters. Fr Rojek had left the priesthood in 1974 when he went on home leave, eventually settling in Canada where he died of cancer.

The damage to mission buildings was repaired and the school and hospital were both enlarged, with the secondary school adding Forms 5 and 6 and the hospital getting an operating theatre. Robert Mugabe, then Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, visited the school in 1984. Though he repeated ZANU's wartime version of the abduction episode, he went on to thank all those who contributed to the development of the mission, paying tribute to those who had died in the war. He mentioned Mandebvu, the student had been shot by a Rhodesian soldier during the rescue operation and he also named Br Lisson and Fr Richert. 47 "It is a great comfort to all of us present today to know that these gallant people did not suffer in vain," he concluded. 48

Footnotes
"Education must be relevant to social needs", 4/8/84, Ministry of Information Press Statement 546/84.
2 Mujuru, Urimbo. Also interviews with Richard Hove and William Ndangana. 3 Mujuru, Zvinavashe. Also previous interview with Mujuru, 17/7/84, lent to the author by Prof N Bhebe.
5 ZANU Archives, Commissariat Files: "Political Files", 1/8/70.
6 Mujuru. Also previous interview with Mujuru, 17/7/84. The treatment of
women became, later in the war, a source of division as some commanders ignored the prohibition against 'taking liberties with women'.


1 Rutanhire, Gille. Also Martin and Johnson, 1981:79-83; and interview in 1991 with Rutanhire and his wife Susan.

9 Michael Traber, "Thoughts and Observations of Mugabe", Maputo, 5 April 1979, p. 5, personal collection of Fr Traber, kindly lent to the author.

Also interview with Simon Muzenda, in his residence, Harare, 9 June 1991.

0Musere, Gwashure, Chinyemba, Nyakudya, Kanyamura. n Musere. From the mid 1960s to 1975, both ZAPU and ZANU had bases in Zambia. For the rest of the war period only ZAPU operated from Zambia, ZANU from Mozambique.

12 Interviews with Solomon Mujuru and George Rutanhire. General Josiah Tongogara, the ZANLA commander in chief, also told the author the same story the first time that she met him in Maputo in 1978. Some of the German Jesuits were surprised when I told them this, because they said that Fr Rojek always appeared to be very hostile to the liberation forces. This could have been part of the agreement he made with the guerrillas in order not to get the mission into trouble.

13 JPC Archives: "JPC Reports on Protected Villages". This was reported to an ecumenical delegation visiting PVs in 1974 by Supt M Reeves. See also Gwitira, n.d., and 1984 interview with Mujuru.

4 CIIR Archives, File ZANU: Communique, 4/1/73, ZANU Information and Publicity Services. Gwitira maintains that the campaign in the north-
Protected Villages, 1974-8", Appendixes 9-13, "Documents concerning the prosecution of members of the Executive 1977-78".

21 Rutanhire. At a second interview with him, together with his wife Susan, in 1991, Rutanhire acknowledged that the abduction had not been sanctioned by ZANLA headquarters, and that it had not been popular with most of the students and staff at the Mission.

2 When I first met Tongogara in Maputo in 1978, he used this story as proof that some priests supported them. He said that the priests had to pretend to be against the guerrillas in order to survive retaliation by the security forces and the commercial farmers.

21 Fuhge, von Walter. The number of those abducted is based on newspaper accounts of the incident. The student body of the secondary school numbered 250 at the time. In addition some primary school students and teachers were taken, one seminarian, six nurses and some of the kitchen staff.

24 The Shield, "Terrorism Hits Mission", No. 333, September 1973, p. 11. According to Faith Mudimu, it was Nhari who addressed the students. 25 Mudimu, Mujuru. Also Emeldah Chinhanga (Susan Rutanhire), her residence, Harare, 19 August 1990.

26 I was introduced to another member of the group, Stephanie Mukusha (Tendie Ndlovu), on the day of my arrival in Mozambique in 1978. Tendie, who had been trained as a photo-journalist in Eastern Europe, was a leading member of ZANUs Publicity Department at the time. ZANUs Vice President Muzenda brought her to visit me so that I would meet a Catholic student who had joined the liberation struggle.


105 The War aia 7our Mission s

28 Ibid.


30 Windrich, 1981, documents how the Rhodesian media were controlled and used by the Government as another weapon in its war against the nationalist forces.

31 SJA/206: Frs Rojek, Freyer and von Walter to Fr Rector, Regional Seminary, 2/8/73. Fr Fuhge was not aware of the existence of this letter. When I showed it to him, he laughed and said, "I should have been involved." It seems that he and others such as Fr Gille were deliberately excluded as their views were known to differ from those of the authors of the letter. 32 Author's informal discussions with members of the JPC. 33 ZANU Archives, File: ZANU Department of Information and Publicity. 34 Mujuru. Also interview of 17/8/84 with Mujuru. 3' Nhari is reported to have become an informer with the Rhodesian Special
Branch in order to get revenge (Martin and Johnson, 1981:159-168; Ellert, 1989:35). Not all ZANLA ex-combatants would agree with this version of events which casts Nhari as the villain, though all agree that he was responsible for the abduction and was punished for it. Interviews with Richard Hove, William Ndangana, and Solomon Mujuru in the ZANLA Archives describe the coup attempt in great detail and tell how it was foiled. There is still dissension within the Party over the killing of Nhari and his companions. He and his followers were Manyikas from the eastern border region. They were reported to be opposed to the domination of ZANLA by Karangas. Such regional tensions, and numbers games based on regional origin, continue to play a role in ZANU(PF). 36 Interview with Chizenya who was a friend of Chiwashira’s.

3 Interview with Fr Gille, who requested that I should not record it but agreed that I could make notes.

38 Kundai. Also ZANU Archives, File: Commissariat. 39 Mukonori. Also JPC Archives, Reports: Investigation of Fr Pieper’s death; and interview with Sr Irene Rufaro who had visited Kangaire from Marymount only a few days before he was killed. Fr George Richert, SJ, and Br Bernhard Lisson, SJ, were shot dead at St Rupert’s Mission in Magondi in June 1978. LCBL sisters who were present at the time are convinced that they were killed by ZIPRA guerrillas who were competing with ZANLA at that time.

40 Nyakudya, Gwashure, Chiripamberi, Mushonga. Also interview with Sr Irene Rufaro.

SJA/206: Weichsel to Randolph, Secretary General of the RCBC, 14 April 1978. Also Oskar Wermter, SJ, ”St Albert’s Mission - a few historical notes and present state of development” (unpublished paper available in the mission scrapbook).

42 ZANU Archives, File: Nehanda Sector, Operational Report, Centenary Detachment, 8 April 1978, by Blackson Chakamuka. Another attack at St Albert’s had been reported by ZANLA on 29 March 1978.

4 Wermter, ”A few historical notes”. See footnote 41.


48 R G Mugabe, ”Education must be relevant”, pp. 2f. See footnote 1.

Chapter 5

DEFIANCE: AVILA MISSION, INYANGA
(UMTALI DIOCESE, ZANLA’S CHITEPO SECTOR)

The real terrorists... are the people who framed the new constitution....
Bishop Lamont on the occasion of Fr Michael Traber’s deportation from Rhodesia, 10 March 1970

The first Catholic priests to come to Zimbabwe from Ireland arrived in 1946. They brought with them their negative experiences of British rule in their own homeland. Donal Lamont, the leader of this first group of Irish Carmelites often acknowledged this influence on his own thinking. "During my youth, the Irish war of independence was being waged all around us. The establishment of the Irish Free State meant a turning point for the lives of many of us who supported the nationalist cause," he said in 1977, explaining the background to his political views. (Lamont, 1977:25) It was not a great leap for an Irish nationalist to support the nationalist cause in Zimbabwe. Nor was he alone in his attitude towards Irish and Zimbabwean politics. Other Carmelites expressed this view to Professor Terence Ranger in 1981. (Ranger, 1983:450)

Ranger observed that their "Irishness was a significant factor in their ability to remain in place." Fr Kenny defined what this "Irishness" meant to him in a letter to the author in 1990:

"It is not simply a sense of solidarity with a peasant people, but also a sense of justice, plus, in my own case, the fact that I was seeing with my own eyes what I had heard from my mother as a child."

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The Rhodesian authorities also noted the effect of being Irish. As a former Special Branch officer observed in an interview in 1988: "We found that a lot of Irish priests were very hostile towards Government and authority - but I think this is an Irish trait." [Special Branch]

This blend of Carmelite spirituality and Irish nationalism, was to shape their response to African nationalism in later years. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the priests were more concerned with starting new missions in the eastern border areas that had been allocated to them by Bishop Chichester than they were with local politics. The Carmelites found only three established missions in a huge area covering more than 32 000 square miles which included the civil districts now called Nyanga, Mutare, Chipinge, Chimanimani and Makoni.2

In the next twenty years, they carried out a vast expansion programme, establishing about 70 primary schools, eleven mission stations, each with a dispensary, eleven secondary schools, a teacher training college, a training school for nurses' assistants, nine rural hospitals, a tuberculosis hospital, a minor seminary to train future priests, a novitiate to train future sisters, two multi-racial secondary schools and 30 churches as well as a cathedral in Umtali. (Lamont, 1977:31) Except for the mission farm at Triashill, the Carmelite missions were not located on large estates.

In 1957, the eastern border areas assigned to the Carmelites were raised to the status of an independent diocese with Donal Lamont as the first Bishop. At his episcopal consecration, attended by many Government representatives including the Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, he joked about his Irishness and singled out the land issue as the major problem in colonial Rhodesia. "We must do something about land hunger among the African people," he stated. "Go into the reserves and see what they have to live on, and you will understand what I mean."3

Founded in 1954, in Chief Katerere's area in Inyanga North, Avila Mission is twenty kilometres from the border with Mozambique. The area is so inaccessible that transport and communication are a constant problem. In addition to Chief Katerere and Headman Samakange, the other influential people in the area were the spirit mediums, the most powerful in the area being Rukudza [Mzungu, Chitungwel, who became a particular friend of the mission. [Ibid.] (Also Gelfand, 1959 and 1962). "The spirit mediums respect the Church, even though they won't come to church," stated Sr Michael Longina Nyamutswa, a diocesan Carmelite sister who has lived at Avila Mission for many years. She explained that the mediums regard the sisters as their children, sending local people to inform them of messages from the ancestors. [Nyamutswa]

In such a remote area, one would hardly expect to find competition. A few years before the Carmelites had come on the scene, however, the Elim Pentecostal Church had established a large mission in Inyanga North, about ten kilometres from the proposed site for Avila Mission. Started by Dr Cecil Brien and his wife
in 1946, Elim Mission grew into a centre comprising a 100 bed hospital, a boarding school for secondary students and a central church with a network of small chapels. At times, there were as many as 1 000 people living on the 100 acre compound. (Thomson, 1979:17ff.) Born in Northern Ireland, Dr Brien was not inclined to welcome the Catholics. Bishop Donal Lamont, also born in Northern Ireland, was equally suspicious of the Protestants. Ironically, their battle for missionary hegemony in the area was mediated by the Rhodesian authorities. Dr Brien won the first round when he had one of the Catholic out-schools removed for violating the three-mile radius agreement.

With the support of Chief Katerere, the Carmelites finally managed to get into Inyanga North, despite the objection of the Pentecostals and the Native Commissioner. The mission was started in 1954 by Fr Anthony Clarke, O Carm. The following year the Carmelites were joined by the Presentation Sisters who taught in the school and worked in the hospital. In the 1970s, diocesan clergy and the diocesan community of Carmelite nuns founded by Bishop Lamont came to Avila. Fr Egan, O Carm, arrived in 1964, and, with his building and engineering skills, had soon solved the recurring water problem by running pipes from the Nyangombe River, three miles away. He also built a unique round church of stone and copper. In the twenty years between its foundation and 1974, the main preoccupation of the church in Katerere, besides preaching the gospel, was offering medical and educational services.

Between 1949 and 1953, the implementation of the Land Apportionment Act resulted in many people being moved from Inyanga and the Triashill Mission area to Katerere. Among those uprooted in 1951 was the family of Maximan Muzungu, who became one of the first students at Avila School. He later joined the priesthood and came back to work at Avila during the war. [Muzungu] The area was extremely poor and the population was committed to its traditions. Only boys were sent to school while girls were married when they were still very young. Western education and Western medicine were not popular. Sr Aletha Matswayi recalled that patients would only come to the hospital when their own medicine had failed. Even then many patients would leave their hospital beds in the middle of the night to consult their n’angas and mediums, returning in the morning for their next dose of Western medicine. The Irish Presentation Sisters had similar recollections, which they published in the history of their first 40 years in Zimbabwe. (Galvin et al., n.d.:16)

The Carmelite priests and sisters may have had to devote their full time to the multifarious tasks of building the institutions of their highland diocese, but their bishop, Donal Lamont, while spearheading the growth of the diocese, was also actively involved in national affairs. As Chairman of the Bishops’ Conference, and later President of the Justice and Peace Commission, he led the other bishops in speaking out on social issues. Two years after the publication of his controversial pastoral letter, Purchased People, the entire Bishops’ Conference...
issued their first joint address on the nation's problems, Peace Through Justice. (Plangger, 1968:53-75) In this statement the Catholic hierarchy as a group condemned racism publicly for the first time, comparing it to Nazism in Germany. This was a favourite theme of Lamont's who had personally witnessed the evils of Fascism when he was a student in Rome in the 1930s. (Lamont, 1977:26-29) In the next ten years, the Bishops' Conference issued more than 30 pastoral letters, messages, instructions and press statements on political events in Zimbabwe, representing a radical departure from the quiet diplomacy of the past. This was due to the influence of Bishop Lamont and of Bishop Haene of the Gwelo Diocese. "The leader was Lamont," said Haene, "My job was to get the other bishops to come along with it." [Haene]

Lamont was to gain international attention during the Second Vatican Council. He was elected to the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity and his first public address at the Council was a denunciation of anti-semitism. (Lamont, 1977:43ff.) But his most famous speech came towards the end of the Council when he helped to break a deadlock over the schema on missions. His outspoken criticism of the schema drew laughter and applause from the Council Fathers and was instrumental in having it sent back to be redrafted.'

As Chairman, Lamont represented the Bishops' Conference at the 1969, 1971 and 1974 Synods in Rome. These too brought him into contact with international opinion. It was during these visits to Europe that he began to develop the partnership with Mildred Neville, Director of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in London, and with its Africa co-ordinator, Mr Tim Sheehy. This was to be of great importance in later years, when, as President of the Justice and Peace Commission, Lamont could rely on them to spread news of events in the remote war zones of rural Zimbabwe. [Lamont]

One of the bishop's biggest disappointments came in 1971 when the other bishops failed to stand with him in opposing the Land Tenure Act. Writing to a friend, Fr Paddy Moloney, SJ, of his regret at the compromise adopted by the Bishops' Conference, he confessed, "I have been greatly disappointed by the flabby response of the Conference on the matter of freedom for our schools.... I have insisted on my right to state that I disagreed with the decision. At the same time, I would not tell everyone or do anything to show that there was a split. "6

In an interview with the author in 1989, he defended his right to disagree, but acknowledged the pain that such differences of opinion within the Bishops' Conference had caused him. On first meeting the author in 1977, he had recalled his initial shock at finding racism existing within the Church itself. Some of the Church's schools and hospitals were segregated and, worse, African Catholics were not admitted into the body of some of the churches but had to worship from the sacristy. "This fact, more than anything else," he wrote in 1976, "drove me to a realisation of the disparity that existed between our preaching and our practice." (Lamont, 1977:38)
The divisions within the Church had deepened with the outbreak of guerrilla activity in the north-east in 1972, coinciding with the formation of the Justice and Peace Commission. Lamont succeeded Bishop Haene as President of the JPC in 1973 and came into immediate conflict with its lay Chairman, Alexander Graham, a medical doctor who was far too pro-European to suit either Lamont or Haene. [Lamont, Haene] The conflict came into the open when Graham met privately with Ian Smith. "I must tell you that the Prime Minister made absolutely clear that relations between the Government and the Church would not improve so long as Bishop Lamont remains in Rhodesia," he wrote to Bishop Haene. "The Government regards him as a political agitator acting against the Constitution as well as, of course, against the Government."

A month later, Graham reiterated his plea to Bishop Haene. "I understand the biggest block to easing relations between the Government and the Church is Bishop Lamont. To quote the Prime Minister, 'So long as Bishop Lamont is in Rhodesia, you cannot expect the Government to change its policy to the Catholic Church'." Haene refused to go along with this attempt to remove Lamont, as did most of the members of the Commission. Sr Aquina, OP, reported in June 1974 to Fr Moloney: "We had a most important Justice and Peace meeting on Friday night. Alec and Lamont had their deep-seated grievances out in the open and everybody said what we thought.... More and more members now support Lamont." She suggested that those who didn't support their Chairman should resign. Eventually Graham did so.

Avila Mission, lying among the mountains close to the border, became, from 1976 onwards, a transit point for guerrillas moving to and from their rear bases in Mozambique. As early as 1974, however, rumours started circulating that there were strangers in the area, dressed in civilian clothes, gathering information from the people. The rumours also reached the ears of the Rhodesian authorities. Looking back, Sr Aletha Matswayi recalled that Rhodesian Government officials appeared at the mission in 1974, calling all the students and staff to a meeting near the swimming pool. [Matswayi] She said that they warned the people against supporting "terrorists", showing pictures of dead and captured guerrillas. The local population kept the presence of the guerrillas a secret even from the priests and sisters at the mission. Sr Aletha said that they did not trust any white person. She was also suspect because she was staying with European missionaries. In 1975, guerrillas visited the mission hospital, where Sr Aletha was working. She explained that they did not ask for anything and did not hold meetings with the people but simply familiarised themselves with the area. 1975 was a turning point for the liberation movements. A ceasefire at the end of 1974 opened the way for a new round of negotiations in

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Lusaka. Then, in March 1975, ZANU's Chairman, Herbert Chitepo, was killed by a car bomb in Lusaka, leading to the detention in Zambia of most of ZANLA's military commanders and many of its troops.

The so-called detente exercise, beginning with the 1974 negotiations, had the effect of bringing guerrilla activities throughout Rhodesia almost to a standstill in 1975, but when Mozambique gained its independence in June that year, the whole eastern border area was opened to guerrilla penetration. The newly formed ZIPA forces started to use Katerere as their launching pad for operations inside the country, coming from their rear base at Catandica in Mozambique.

Thus in April 1976, Avila joined St Albert's Mission on the front line. A simple request for medicine was to lead to the trial and deportation of the bishop, the arrest of two African priests and the departure of all European personnel from the mission. The story, as told by Bishop Lamont, is straightforward. The guerrillas sent a letter of request for medicines with a local messenger. When Bishop Lamont visited the mission on 21 April 1976, he was shown the note and asked what to do:

The sister showed me this dirty piece of paper asking to give the bearer medicine for malaria and diarrhoea. I said to Sr Vianney, "Oh, come off it, you know quite well who it is." And she said, "Yes, I know. What do we do?" I said, "Well give, give." She said, "That's all right, but what about reporting? We are supposed to report." Because, you see, the penalty was death for collaboration and the penalty was death for not reporting.

I said to her, "How could you possibly stay, having informed? You're simply associating yourself with an illegal regime that is not recognised by any State in the whole world. You couldn't possibly do it." And of course, it was all right for me to say that and then to go back to Umtali, but I regarded this as the only possible thing one could do. And they were extraordinarily brave women. [Lamont]

Sr Vianney prepared the medicine as requested. A few days later, the guerrillas came at night to collect it. They summoned Sr Vianney and Fr Peter Egan, the mission superior, and spoke to them. Appearing hostile, they pointed their guns at Fr Egan and delivered a harsh attack on the Catholic Church.

According to Bishop Lamont, the guerrillas lectured the two missionaries on "the glories of communism and the evils of capitalism as represented by the Kennedys, the Rockefellers and the Catholic Church". They ordered Fr Egan to reduce the school fees and the charges at the mission clinic, threatening to destroy the mission if their other requests for watches, radios and...
cameras, were not granted. (Lamont, 1977:72)
The next morning, 24 April, Fr Egan and the two Presentation Sisters drove to
Inyanga where the priest reported the incident to the civil authorities. Fr Egan and
the sisters then drove to Triashill Mission where they met Bishop Lamont and
informed him of what they had done. The bishop was understandably upset that Fr
Egan had ignored his orders. Fr Egan left the country shortly thereafter, not to
return until the war was over. The two Presentation Sisters, Sr Vianney and Sr
Anne, returned to Avila but were withdrawn by their superiors before the end of
the year as the war escalated in the area. [Mutume, McGrath]
Rhodesian security forces arrived at Avila soon after the guerrillas' visit and
started interrogating and beating people at random, including the brother of a
local priest, Fr Ambrose Vinyu. Other soldiers shot at people from helicopters
which hovered over the mission, seriously wounding Mrs Maida Nyamapfeni,
whose case was reported to the Justice and Peace Commission by Bishop Lamont.
(Lamont, 1977:75)
He wasted little time in calling all his diocesan clergy together. Determined to
prevent a similar catastrophe at the other missions in the diocese, he issued a
verbal directive that guerrillas were to be helped if they came to the missions and
their presence was not to be reported. [Mutume] When asked in 1989 what had
motivated him, he replied: "The basics of associating more with the African
people, having more to do with them, having little contact with white people, and
then the basics of the Christian position." [Lamont]
Recalling this meeting, Bishop Patrick Mutume noted that this directive was
unanimously accepted with the exception of one Carmelite priest who
subsequently left the country (presumably a reference to Fr Egan). "We were
going to take a common line of action, the whole team," he explained. "We
advised everybody who did not agree with this to leave the country .... We
decided at that meeting that whatever you do, you must think of your neighbour
mission because the people in the next mission will suffer from your mistakes
too." [Mutume]
Most of the rural missions in the diocese were visited by the guerrillas before the
end of the year. Few, if any, experienced difficulties. Lectures on "the glories of
communism and the evils of capitalism" were expected and received with good
humour if not agreement. The diocesan policy together with the Irish predilection
for the underdog led to cordial relations between the ZANLA guerrillas and the
Irish missionaries, often bordering on partnership. Looking back on this
period with a certain amount of satisfaction, Bishop Lamont again mentioned the
Irish connection:
And it was total commitment and involvement and it was just taken for granted,
the boys are coming and that's that. Incidentally, we had this experience here in
Ireland and it was the same thing. The boys, you knew who the boys were. As a
small boy, I remember being called one morning early by my mother as I was
serving Mass. "Go down and tell so and so that the Tans are here." And it was always the boys and so we'd been through it. [Lamont]

Bishop Mutume concurred, recalling with a laugh that to be Irish was a sure sign of acceptance by the guerrillas:

What struck us in the Umtali Diocese, is that each time they (guerrillas) would come to a place for the first time, they would ask us, "Are you Irish?" And then you said yes, and they'd put down the guns against a wall and they would ask for a drink.... They immediately were at home.
The relationship was quite good... . Some of our priests were so much on their side that you sort of had to warn them that... , you could not show that visibly. It could be dangerous. [Mutume]

They soon discovered just how dangerous it could be. In the meantime, Bishop Lamont continued to visit the rural missions from his headquarters in Umtali, spending a week at Avila in May 1976. He personally recalls meeting ZANLA forces on only two occasions, once at Avila itself and once on the way to Avila when a guerrilla who had attended Catholic schools identified Lamont by recalling his skill at making shadow-rabbits with his hands. [Lamont]

Bishop Lamont also travelled regularly to Salisbury for meetings of the JPC which he chaired. He carried on a prolific correspondence as well with the local and international press, condemning the increasingly repressive measures being taken by the Rhodesian Government against the African population as the war escalated. He was frequently attacked in Parliament and in the white urban churches for being "unpatriotic, treacherous and a supporter of terrorism". (Linden, 1980:222ff.)

Undeterred, he attempted to get the Catholic Bishops' Conference to issue an open letter, dissociating the Church completely from the Rhodesia Front ideology which used Christianity to justify its brutal counter-insurgency campaign against the rural poor. As in 1959, when he was forced to issue Purchased People on his own after the other 119 bishops refused to go along with him, he found himself standing alone in August 1976 when he published an open letter to the State:

Conscience compels me to state that your administration by its clearly racist and oppressive policies and by its stubborn refusal to change, is largely responsible for the injustices which have provoked the present disorder and it must in that measure be considered guilty of whatever misery or bloodshed may follow.

Far from your policies defending Christianity and Western civilisation, as you claim, they mock the law of Christ and make Communism attractive to the African people... . On whatever dubious grounds you may at one time have based your claim to rule, such argument no longer has any validity. You may rule with
the consent of a small and selfish electorate, but you rule without the consent of the nation, which is the test of all legitimacy. (Linden, 1980:225)

On 27 August, the State hit back. Bishop Lamont was charged on two counts of failing to report the presence of guerrillas and two other counts of inciting others to do likewise. His trial in Umtali courthouse on 22 September 1976 was an international event, attended by foreign journalists and a representative of the International Commission of Jurists, Seamus Henchy, Judge of the Supreme Court of Ireland. Bishop Lamont pleaded guilty to all four charges and delivered an unsworn statement which was subsequently published in book form under the title Speech From the Dock. The bishop chose this method of defence in order to avoid cross-examination which might incriminate particular diocesan personnel. Only three witnesses were called: Detective Officer Williams of the Rhodesian Special Branch for the prosecution and two Anglican Bishops for the defence: Rt Revd Paul Burroughs, Bishop of Mashonaland and Rt Revd Mark Wood, Bishop of Matabeleland. (Lamont, 1977:139 and Burrough, 1988)

Bishop Lamont's speech traced his own personal history, the development of Umtali Diocese and pertinent Church teaching on social issues, including his own pastoral letters. He then described the incident at Avila Mission which led to his trial and concluded by explaining his reasons for the diocesan directive to assist guerrillas and to refuse to report their presence to the Rhodesian authorities.

In his usual forthright style, the bishop pointed to the root of the problem - the persistent denial of equal rights to the African majority by a ruling white elite. With tongue in cheek, he reminded the court of the Government's own propaganda which portrayed the guerrillas as bloodthirsty murderers who would not hesitate to kill all those who reported. He concluded by quoting from his open letter of August 1976 in which he had referred to the issue of civil disobedience and the dilemma of the rural missioner in the war zones:

Over the years and as a matter of principle, the Catholic Church has had to refuse to practice racial segregation in schools and hospitals... Today, an equally important decision will have to be taken whenever or wherever the charity of the Church is sought by those who are in conscience opposed to your regime. Have not those who honestly believe that they fight for the basic human rights of the people a justifiable claim on the Church for the spiritual administration of the clergy? How can one counsel loyalty and obedience to your ordinances when doing so is tantamount to giving approval to the manifold injustices you inflict? To keep silence about one reign of oppression in order to better combat what you alone consider to be another is wholly unacceptable. (Lamont, 1977:104)

The presiding magistrate did not relent, sentencing the bishop to ten years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The case then went to the High Court on appeal. Though Chief Justice Hector McDonald reduced the sentence to four years, he
used the occasion to mount a sharp personal attack on Bishop Lamont and his political views. Exposing his own position, Justice McDonald defended the record of white rule, repeating the standard racist myths about pre-colonial African society. "The truth is simply that the changes which have been brought about transforming Rhodesia from a primitive country, racked by tribal divisions and conflict, and plagued by barbaric practices of witchcraft, to a country with a highly sophisticated twentieth century economy, could not have been achieved by either section of the community without the other," he proclaimed. "It is a monstrous travesty of the truth to describe the history of this country under European rule as one of oppression." (Ibid.: 115ff.)

McDonald concluded by declaring that a communist propagandist could not have given more comfort and encouragement to the "terrorists" than the bishop had done. "His words reveal not the balanced and moderate viewpoint of a prelate," McDonald stated, "but the diatribe of a political activist, anxious to promote by any means the victory of Communist terrorism." (Ibid.: 132)

Before he could serve the sentence, Bishop Lamont was deported to Ireland in March 1977. He was fortunate to be alive. A senior member of the Rhodesian Special Branch later admitted that the RF Government viewed him as one of its most dangerous enemies. "Bishop

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Lamont was really a thorn in our side," he acknowledged. "He seemed to enjoy it and he was quite open in his criticism and in his assistance to the nationalist cause. And he was nearly blown up on one or two occasions, which did not lessen his assistance to them. And we saw him at the time as a person who was using the Church to support terrorism. That was the official attitude." [Special Branch]

The bishop himself was convinced that his life was in more danger from the security forces than from the guerrillas. He received numerous death threats and on two occasions, was involved in "accidents" which seem to have been planned. One such incident occurred on the same Sunday as the murder of seven Catholic missionaries at St Paul's Mission Musami when the car in which Bishop Lamont was travelling was deliberately forced off the road by an oncoming vehicle and rolled over four times. This incident permanently impaired his hearing. [Lamont]

Bishop Lamont's departure from the country coincided with Bishop Haene's retirement, creating a serious leadership vacuum in the Catholic Church. No other bishop was as outspoken as Lamont, nor many as far-seeing and courageous as Haene. Future Church statements, drafted by the theological commission, lacked Lamont's and Haene's insight and punch. Though the JPC continued to take a stand, it too suffered from the lack of a strong voice.

At diocesan level, however, the Bishop left behind a team committed to a "common line of action". Though he was a controversial figure even among his confreres, he had succeeded in forging a united stand on national issues in the diocese. Fr Martin O'Regan summed up Carmelite views on their bishop: While we might have felt otherwise on some other issues, as regards his policy here... we believed what he was saying was right... in many ways he was a tremendous prophetic leader for Zimbabwe at the time. He had
Fr O'Regan recalled defending Lamont to priests in another diocese who were ridiculeing him: "Immediately my reaction was... are you not* Christians? Do you not accept Catholic teaching? He's only saying what we are supposed to be."

Among the guerrillas too, the bishop made an impact. Lamont's example, especially his arrest and trial, and the work of JPC which he chaired, helped to give credibility to an institution that had been compromised by its colonial past. Comments by leading members of both ZIPA and ZANLA give an indication of Bishop Lamont's standing among the guerrilla leadership. Perenz Shiri, for instance, former Provincial Commander for the entire north-east and an alumnus of Mt St Mary's Wedza, said:

Bishop Lamont fought very hard. Actually, he was a hero in his own right for the cause of the Zimbabwean people... the image that was given by the Roman Catholic Church had to force even a lunatic to realise that the Church was behind the struggle, so we became allies.12

Sectorial Commander for Fort Victoria, Henry Muchena, from Zhombe Mission, near Que Que, also mentioned the role of Bishop Lamont. He said that occasionally he used to get copies of Moto and read about the Church. "The only outspoken bishop was Lamont," he stated. "He is the one we knew about. We were not aware what the others felt... ",3

Dzingai Mutumbuka, ZANU's Secretary for Education and Culture, and a graduate of Gokomere High School, credited Bishops Lamont and Haene as well as the JPC with "saving" the Church in Zimbabwe. "In this country, we were lucky to have Bishop Lamont," he declared. "Being Irish... he was anti-English, and of course, he was very much against the things that were happening." He concluded that the postindependence Church leadership "owe a lot to the JPC and to Bishop Lamont and Bishop Haene because they put the role of the Church in a very positive way." [Mutumbuka]

From April 1976 until the ceasefire in 1980, Inyanga North, ZANLA's Chitepo Sector, saw constant military action. The Rhodesian forces' Ruangwa Base, located on a hilltop not far from Avila Mission, was a regular target of first the ZIPA forces, and later those of ZANLA, as was the Binyu Road from Inyanga to Nyamaropa. ZANLA field reports for 1976 to 1978 refer to frequent sabotage of the roads and bridges in Inyanga North as well as to several major attacks on Ruangwa Base.

In the month of May 1976, for instance, at least four ambushes or landmine attacks were reported in Katerere alone. A ZIPA report for 5 May 1979, tells of a landmine on the road to Katerere which was detonated by a truck carrying cattle. It claims that the driver and his assistant were killed as well as some of the cattle and that the occupants of a Land Rover travelling behind the truck were either killed or
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injured. 14 Another, issued two days later, describes the ambush of a truckload of Rhodesian soldiers on the same road, alleging that 32 soldiers were killed. 15

Ruangwa Camp was attacked on 19 April 1978 by a large group of 215 ZANLA troops, many of whom were new reinforcements. The ZANLA operational report noted that there were 33 known enemy losses while 3 ZANLA soldiers were killed in the attack and one injured. 16

According to guerrilla reports, the bridge near Kambudzi clinic on the road from Ruangwa to Nyamaropa was sabotaged on 29 November 1977 and again on 1 December 1977. The operational report says that the 12 ZANLA troops involved left behind some placards on which were written:

Stop. ZANLA forces in action ahead.
Mind your tails. ZANLA forces will cut them off.
Some surrender quickly, we still need you in the field.

Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action.17

Because it was located directly on the transit route used by the ZANLA forces coming to and from their rear bases in Mozambique, Avila Mission was at the centre of much of this activity. The mission staff came to know almost all the ZANLA soldiers operating in the area because at least two groups of guerrillas passed through Avila each day. Reinforcements from Mozambique arrived near midnight while those going to the rear passed through Avila about 3:30 in the afternoon, stopping for a rest and a meal and often holding pungwes with the local community.

The Rhodesian security forces also paid regular visits to the mission, sometimes missing the guerrillas by minutes. To taunt the Government troops, the guerrillas occasionally left a bullet and letter announcing their presence. The mission staff lived in constant tension, never knowing if the two forces would clash on mission property. Eventually they did. [Nyakupinda, Mutume]

By the end of 1976 all of the surrounding Catholic missions such as Regina Coeli in Nyamaropa, Mt Melleray and Marist Brothers in Inyanga as well as All Souls, Mtoko, were receiving regular visits from the ZANLA forces. Interestingly enough, Avila's closest neighbour, Elim Pentecostal Mission, had no more incidents after a guerrilla visit in April 1976. (Thomson, 1979:81) As the situation grew more tense, however, the Pentecostals decided to move the secondary school to the

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Vumba. The lorry carrying some of the mission goods detonated a landmine on 21 July 1977 and a few weeks later two of the three school buses carrying students to their homes did the same. A history of the mission reported that no one was seriously injured in the lorry, though the equipment it carried was ruined and the lorry itself was a writeoff: "The laying of land-mines was increasing," it noted.

"This disaster only confirmed that the right decision had been taken in moving away from Katerere... ." (Ibid.: 92ff.) In fact, it was a fatal decision as nine
teachers and one infant were murdered at the new site in Vumba on 23 June 1978, less than a year after their arrival.18

ZANLA recorded the land-mine incident in its field reports:
Date and Time of Operation: 21/7/77, 8:38 am
Place of Operation: Inyanga - Ruangwa to Inyanga Road
Type of Operation: The mine was detonated by a vehicle belonging to LN Mission. This surprised the comrades because these people had been told not to use the road. No one was killed but there were three white teachers in the truck.19

Each time the guerrillas carried out any operation, the security forces retaliated by attacking the civilian population. Before his deportation, Bishop Lamont reported to the JPC numerous incidents of security force brutality. In October 1976, for instance, several teachers at Avila were severely beaten and one was detained at Inyanga police camp. Fr Ernest Mukuwapasi reported several cases of civilians killed by security forces, including small children. "The people are embittered by the uncontrolled cruelty of the soldiers," he reported in 1976. "Over and above the brutal beatings the soldiers mete out to the people, they seem to really enjoy shootings like those reported above; at least some of them indeed boast about such shootings to the people."20

Cases like these were to appear in the next JPC publication, Civil War in Rhodesia (London, CIIR, 1976), which came out to coincide with Bishop Lamont's sentencing at the beginning of October 1976. Longer and more detailed than The Man in the Middle, it too documented specific cases of security force brutality, including torture and the killing of civilians.

Soon churchmen and women would experience this brutality directly. Frs Patrick Mutume and Ignatius Mhonda were sent to Avila Mission after the departure of Fr Egan. A few months after their arrival soldiers came to the mission, threatening to arrest or kill Fr Mutume. Accusing the mission of "breeding terrorists", a soldier shouted, "One dead missionary is worth 100 dead terrorists." [Mutume] When the first missionaries lost their lives, Church leaders remembered this threat.

After Bishop Lamont's trial and the publication of Civil War in Rhodesia, the army came for Fr Mutume. He was taken to the nearby camp at Ruangwa where he was beaten and tortured for five days in October 1976 by "Taffy" Evans of the Special Branch. He was told plainly that at the end he could be dead, or permanently maimed. He finds it painful to speak about what happened. Each day you had to take a special course. You had to go through this course when they put your head inside the water; when you are tied to the jeep and the jeep is driven; the electric shocks when they connect you to the battery of a jeep. And they do all these things and many other things like that. [Mutume]

He was also hung upside down from a tree until he thought his head would explode. Then his head was tied in a plastic bag and held under water until he
almost suffocated. After all this Mutume was taken to Inyanga prison for three weeks while his wounds healed. Only then was a doctor permitted to examine him.

Fr Ignatius Mhonda was picked up by security forces at Avila on the same day as Mutume, but was taken to their camp at Inyanga. They hoped to get Mhonda to act as a witness against Mutume. When Mhonda refused he was struck on the head and his eardrum was perforated. Finally, Mutume and Mhonda were brought together at Rusape prison where they remained for a month while awaiting trial.21

Bishop Lamont described the scene at their trial, and pointed to the contradictions involved when Catholics were on opposite sides of the conflict: "I called as many of the priests and the sisters as I could to go to Rusape for the trial. These two men were brought down in their khaki pants and their khaki shirts, handcuffed, in their bare feet to the trial in the Rusape courthouse where the magistrate was a Catholic and the following Sunday, Fr Mhonda gave him communion". [Lamont]

Both priests were sentenced to five and a half years imprisonment. On appeal, they won their case, setting a legal precedent, by convincing the High Court that the law requiring one to report the presence of guerrillas was unjust since it sentenced a person to death - at the hands of either the guerrillas or the State. They were the last to be tried for that particular offence. [Mutume]

Frs Mutume and Mhonda were prohibited by the Government from returning to Avila Mission and were replaced by two other local priests, equally committed to justice and the liberation of the country, Fr Ernest Mukuwapasi and Fr Maximan Muzungu. Fr Mukuwapasi had been expelled from the seminary in 1973 for opposing the racism he experienced there. In 1976, he was one of two priests who openly volunteered to serve as chaplains to the liberation forces.2 Now he had his chance. As parish priest at Avila, he was in daily contact with ZANLA forces. Fr Muzungu had grown up at Katerere after his family had been removed from their home in Inyanga in 1953. As one of the first graduates of the mission school, he had an intimate knowledge of the area. Even during the war, he often travelled alone on foot through the mountains visiting remote villages. [Muzungu]

Both priests were initially beaten by the guerrillas to test their sincerity. [Mutume]

ZANLA reports show that they passed the test and became important sources of information and support for the nationalist forces. A ZANLA report of an attack on Nyamaropa Camp on 8 January 1978 by a large contingent of guerrillas, for instance, was based largely on Fr Muzungu's testimony:

As for the attack on the enemy side, a Father Muzungu, a reliable source of ours who stays near the camp, informed us. He pretended to sympathise with one black soldier he saw.... The soldier told him only two of them managed to flee. It was reported that the enemy commented that the killing was brutal and ruthless. The total number of comrades present after the attack was 138 out of 162.23
A ZANLA report of an "enemy surprise attack" at Kadyamusume's village, near Avila, on 19 July 1978, in which ten guerrillas died and four were injured, relies on Fr Mukuwapasi's evidence:
Bombed about 15 min after arrival, no chance to retreat.... The information of the other nine killed was stated to us by Fr Mukuwapasi, a contact of us who works at Avila Mission. He was shown the bodies by the enemy at Ruangwa Camp. It was from this information that we proved these comrades were killed.24
The lay staff and the sisters at the mission were as deeply involved as the priests. The headmaster of the primary school, Cornelius Munyaka, co-ordinated the collection of ten dollars per month from each of the twenty teachers to buy supplies for the guerrillas. The

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money was given to one of the priests who organised the purchase of supplies. The Rhodesian army eventually caught up with Mr Munyaka and he was arrested, together with the caretaker and several of the teachers. They were held at Ruangwa Camp where they were badly beaten. Mr Munyaka was tried and acquitted. On his release, he was transferred to St Joseph's in Umtali, where he remained until the end of the war. [Munyaka]

Mr Wilson Martin Chiutanye, known as Heavy Duty, was the driver, caretaker and handyman. Always present at the mission, even after it was closed, he witnessed the war right up to the end. He was severely beaten several times by the security forces and threatened with death for supporting the guerrillas. Making frequent trips to Inyanga to collect supplies for the ZANLA forces, he pretended that the goods were for the mission when he was stopped at roadblocks. During the night, he often stayed with the guerrillas at one of their bases but would return to work at the mission during the day. He recalled that it was exhausting and dangerous: "My heart was getting worried and I was saying to God that all the people had gone and I was staying alone so if he could help me so that the soldiers and the comrades could not stay here at Avila". [Chiutanye]

Heavy Duty protected the mission from vandalism after all others had left. He spoke highly of the guerrillas, explaining that most of them had been educated at mission schools and were friendly to the Church. Unlike the security forces, they did not harm the mission. He described one incident when the Rhodesian forces desecrated the blessed sacrament, threatening to destroy the Church:
I kept crying to God since I am a Catholic. Some white soldiers came to the church and went to the tabernacle and broke it. They drank all the wine and ate the bread and then I was left to repair the boxes... . They (guerrillas) used to say the missions were their places where they got their education. They acquired knowledge and the ability to write through them. What they only wanted was that the priests and sisters would respond positively when called upon... . They said they were Catholics so they were respecting their church.... The comrades used to come into the church but they would take nothing. Only the whites would destroy
the church. The blacks would come in with their subs or bazookas and look around the church. Afterwards, they would peacefully say goodbye. [Chitungane]

This act of vandalism against the most sacred objects in the Catholic Church was perhaps proof of how far the Church had distanced itself

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from the Government. The Church was now seen as an enemy by the security forces and as a friend and ally by the guerrillas.

At least two of the senior ZANLA commanders operating in Inyanga North (Chitepo Sector) were known to be Catholics: Saraoga Hondodzino, the Sectorial Security and Intelligence Officer and Batahana Mushorapinga, Detachment A Commander. Saraoga was a former Jesuit brother and Batahana a former student of St Benedict's Mission and a cousin to Fr Ambrose Vinyu and Sr Helen Nyakupinda, the Carmelite sister superior at Avila. [Nyakupinda, Muzungu]

Helen recalled that by and large the guerrillas treated the mission with respect. "They were quite good," she said. "What I was seeing was that most of them were Catholics. They could even say prayers when they were having their pungwes. They could talk something about God and it was really nice. When you were with them, you really didn't feel very bad," she concluded. [Nyakupinda]

Philemon Nyabiko (Cde Shingirai), a ZANLA guerrilla from the area, recalled that Batahana and another guerrilla named Museve were very popular with the people because they saved many lives. In contrast, a guerrilla named Bombi had to be taken back to Mozambique for punishment because he was accused of killing civilians unnecessarily. [Nyabiko]

Juliet Gotekote (Cde Chipo), a recruit from Katerere, also praised Batahana for his behaviour. "He tried to explain what was good and what was bad. He wouldn't beat or harass the masses." [Gotekote]

Fr Martin O'Regan from Regina Coeli Mission in Nyamaropa spoke highly of Batahana:

People like Batahana were freedom fighters to the core... . They were looking for their own country... . I remember one incident in a village where there was a meeting. One woman stood up and said, "The fathers at the mission have taken my son's sheets at the boarding school."

Batahana replied, "Do you think a murungu would be bothered with your son's sheets?" He just made a joke of it.... He knew where we stood so he wasn't interested in gossip. In that way we were saved... . I never heard Batahana saying anything anti-Church... . To me there was something tremendous about him. 25

The ZANLA forces helped to establish the credibility of the missionaries at a pungwe held in the area in 1977. Mr Munyaka, who was present, recalled the dramatic approach that the guerrillas took to teach the people that deeds were more important than the colour of

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the skin. Calling all adults to a meeting at Samakange Village, the guerrillas questioned them about the mission. "Now, what do you think about these whites, these vazungu... and what do you think about the mission?" they were asked. "Do you like these people here? What are they doing for us or do you think they are only parasites, wanting to milk us only?" [Munyaka]

Mr Munyaka reported that one old man stood up, urging that all the missionaries be killed. An old woman defended the missionaries, saying that they had taken good care of her when she was a patient at the mission hospital. She asked who would help the people if they were killed. The guerrillas then called on one of the teachers. He also defended the missionaries, saying that they were providing a service even though they were white.

The guerrillas became harsh, accusing the teachers and the headmaster of being friends with the whites because they received favours from them such as riding in their cars and eating with them. The guerrillas waited to hear if people would turn against the teachers for being pro-white. No one spoke up. At the end of the meeting only one person was beaten - the man who had advocated killing the missionaries. Mr Munyaka summed up the lesson which no one who attended that pungwe would ever forget.

They were trying to convince the parents that one's colour does not count in as far as helping was concerned. We don't count on colour but the services they are doing. [Munyaka]

This lesson may have saved some lives. It also may have enabled expatriate missionaries to remain in the area and the missions to continue operating.

Because of good rapport with commanders such as Batahana and Saraoga, the priests and sisters felt free to pass on complaints about guerrilla behaviour and, in this way, influence the conduct of the war. Bishop Mutume recalled that he was able to speak frankly to the guerrillas, telling them what the people expected of them and what they disliked. He felt that the ZANLA forces took his comments seriously, changing their behaviour and their commanders accordingly. "And usually after that briefing things changed and they'd take the right course," he stated with some satisfaction. [Mutume]

The guerrillas also respected the traditional religion still practiced by most of the elders of the community. Though the political education given to the ZIPA cadres was highly critical of all religion, they adopted

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the same pragmatic approach that ZANLA had followed since 1972. Thus, they spoke of Nehanda, Kaguvi and Chaminuka at pungwes with the local population, claiming to be the successors of these heroes who had led resistance to settler occupation at the end of the last century.26

They were selective in their use of mediums, however, and harsh toward people whom they accused of being witches or wizards. Evelyn Taibo, a chimbwido from the area, recalled that several mediums were badly beaten after some guerrillas died from wearing poisoned clothing. "If the young mediums spoke what was
contrary to their thought, they would be beaten or killed. Some mediums were loved but others were not," she observed.
This lack of respect for tradition caused confusion within the community and led to some serious mistakes, particularly in identifying traitors. As Mrs Taibo explained:
In 1976, then came comrades killing our people during our presence saying that they were witches and wizards. They killed our neighbours saying they were sell-outs. As a result, life became hard for us. We had no one to depend on. We were now afraid of both the whites and our children (the guerrillas). [Taibo]
When ZIPA was replaced by ZANLA in 1977, an effort was made to repair the damage done. Teams of guerrillas were sent to investigate why people had been killed. "They asked for reconciliation and said that they acknowledged their wrongdoings," she said. "There were no more killings for no specific reasons."27
The revival of traditional religion created a new type of problem within ZANLA, however. As more and more of the rank and file turned to mediums for advice, younger ZANLA cadres and former ZIPA commanders and commissars who had retained their ranks within ZANLA continued to be critical of religion. Political commissars wrote numerous reports from the field, complaining about the influence of mediums over the troops. The following report for Inyanga North by Hudson Kundai, who was the Provincial Political Commissar for several years, is indicative of some of the tensions traditional religion created within the movement:
Idealism (a firm belief in Midzimu) to which most of the fighters are committed is gradually dropping their fighting capacity to a low ebb. For instance, fighters are taking preference of midzimu than their commanders. They know better the rules and directives of midzimu than 131

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those of the Party, resulting in disunity amongst the fighters and the broad masses on the other hand.28
Though the issue caused division within the ZANLA forces, the war brought the mediums and the mission closer together. "We were united with the spirit mediums," said Sr Nyamutswa, explaining that the mediums gave good advice to the guerrillas, urging them to reduce the number and the size of rallies in order to protect the people from attack by the security forces. [Nyamutswa] "The spirit mediums gave the guerrillas security. The Church gave them food, clothing and medicine," she said, summing up the division of labour that enabled people to survive.
Batahana was concerned about the safety of the priests and sisters in the area under his command, both that of the expatriate missionaries and the local black clergy and religious as well. His cousin, Sr Helen Nyakupinda, came to Avila in 1976 after the two Irish Presentation Sisters, Sr Vianney and Sr Anne, had been withdrawn. Helen, a nurse, was the daughter of one of the founders of St Benedict's Mission who was also a leading catechist. Her younger sister, Gertrude
joined the ZANLA forces from Regina Coeli Mission in 1976. Helen was one of the first generation of African superiors replacing the German Precious Blood Sisters who had trained the diocesan Carmelite community. There were three other Carmelite sisters at Avila in 1976 when Helen was appointed the superior but she was the one in closest contact with the guerrillas. She accompanied them to the hospital to get medicine, cooked food for them in the middle of the night, and accompanied the priests to Salisbury to collect clothing and radios for them. As superior, she was also the one questioned by the security forces and threatened by them. Besides providing food, clothing and medicine to the ZANLA forces, the mission treated wounded guerrillas. Batahana himself was once a patient at Avila Mission after being wounded. Priests from other missions in the diocese brought wounded guerrillas to Avila because it was so close to the border that patients could be carried across on a stretcher when they had recovered sufficiently for them to be moved. Diocesan personnel also recall the attitudes and behaviour of the Rhodesian forces. Once, security forces lined the bodies of dead guerrillas around the outside of the church at Avila, forcing people to walk past them. They also beat the local people and burnt their homes whenever there was a guerrilla attack in the area. Pointing out the differences between the two armies, Sr Helen said, "When they came to the mission, they were not very harsh at all. They used to ask us nicely. And at times we even used to eat with them. They used to comfort us... they said, 'you don't need to worry; things will be settled and you'll be all right... .' But the soldiers, they were terrible. One day they burnt a village that was very near the mission. They burnt everything and people came to the hospital with bruises and some of them were beaten to death. They were really cruel... Soldiers were bad, I tell you, soldiers were bad." [Nyakupinda]

After the murder of seven missionaries at St Paul's Musami in February 1977, Rhodesian soldiers warned Helen that the same thing could happen to her. Badly frightened by the threat, she confided in Batahana who took it as seriously as she did, offering the protection of the guerrillas if she decided to flee to Mozambique for safety, as many of the local population had already done. "I felt that I was going to die. That's why I decided to go because I really knew that the Rhodesian soldiers were against me and that some day they would kill me because they talked of the sisters who died at Musami," she said, explaining her decision to leave the country.

In mid-1977, Helen boarded a bus to Nyamaropa where she went to the home of the catechist, Mr Sizo, whose wife escorted her to a nearby ZANLA base. From there, the guerrillas took her to a Catholic mission at Nyadzonya, inside Mozambique where she stayed for several months before moving to the Catholic mission at Catandica. During this time, she waited for ZANLA forces to assign her some duties. The day the guerrillas came for her, their headquarters at Chimoio was attacked by Rhodesian aircraft. Helen saw bombs fall and heard the
pounding of gunfire as she was rushed to the Government hospital in the nearby city of Chimoio to treat the survivors of the attack. She stayed at Chimoio for several months before being transferred to the Government hospital at Sussendenga where she met a former seminarian who would eventually become her husband.

Looking back on her experiences in Mozambique, Helen does not regret her decision to cross the border. She feels that she learned the true meaning of charity in the war: "to reach out with love to those who are suffering". Praising the generosity and the kindness of the Mozambicans among whom she lived and worked, she said: "They looked after us well... the people from the villages used to bring us food, chickens. The Mozambicans were quite good, very kind. Especially when you had treated them, they always brought you something. I had 60 chickens which had been brought by the patients and I had plenty of eggs. I didn't even think of money because I had everything I wanted."

Helen herself does not know why ZANLA placed her at Catholic missions rather than taking her for military training at their own camps. It may be because her cousin, Batahana, did not want to endanger her life since he had promised to protect her. It may also indicate the respect that he and some of the other guerrilla commanders had for religious personnel. Helen and her husband moved to Zimbabwe after independence. Helen's only complaint has been that no member of the Church except her uncle, Fr Vinyu, has been to see her or to involve her in church activities. She questions whether they reject her because she joined the struggle, maintaining that she is still a dedicated Catholic who wants to work for the Church. [Nyakupinda]

Maximan Muzungu entered the seminary after completing his secondary education at Avila Mission. He became politicised while at the Major Seminary at Chishawasha, participating in the public demonstration in Salisbury against the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement. Ordained in the early 1970s, he was assigned to his home parish in Katerere in 1976 after the arrest of Frs Mutume and Mhonda. In May 1977, he was transferred to the neighbouring Regina Coeli Mission from where he ministered to Avila as well.

Often travelling on foot over the mountains between the two missions to say Mass for the people in outlying villages, he was well known throughout the district and to the ZANLA forces who never tried to interfere with his movements or his services. "They were suspicious at first, but later on they were really at ease with the missions and the missionaries," he said, describing ZANLA's attitude and relationship with Catholic missions in Inyanga North.

Fr Muzungu had many close calls with the Rhodesian police and security forces, however, who suspected him of assisting the guerrillas. Several times he was stopped at roadblocks when his small truck was full of shoes, jerseys, food and cigarettes for the ZANLA forces. He marvelled that he was never caught, crediting God's providence with his frequent narrow escapes:
I remember when I got to roadblocks and God really protected us.... I prayed, "God save us from this mess!" I was so puzzled because when you get into trouble, you have no power and you can't even think that you're doing right.... People were really surprised that I survived.31

I? vila Mission
He also hid wounded guerrillas in his room on several occasions. Though soldiers regularly searched the mission, they never found the injured ZANLA patients. In August 1977, a shoot-out occurred at Regina Coeli Mission between the guerrillas and the security forces, killing one guerrilla and wounding two others. As a result, the school and hospital were closed and the mission superior, Fr Martin O'Regan, was tried and deported. In the report of the attack, the ZANLA Provincial Commander, A Mhuru, was very critical of the behaviour of guerrilla forces, as the following excerpt from his report illustrates:

These comrades were coming from Satuku kraal and had drunk two crates of beer and four quarters of Limosin Brandy. They arrived at Regina Mission and were told by the principal of the school that the situation was not right but wouldn't allow that.... The comrades were not vigilant and they flocked into the hospital, nurses home and the school premises. No positions or guarding system was maintained but every comrade was within the school premises. The commanders were playing racords with their bandoliers off in the nurses' home. The enemy came to as far as the windows without being seen and the attack started about 8.55 pm.32

After this incident Fr Muzungu was alone at Regina Coeli Mission. It was only a matter of time until he too was caught. Meanwhile, he continued his journeys to Inyanga and to Avila, also serving as the local contact person for the Red Cross in the district. Unknown to him, ZANLA had become suspicious of the Red Cross, believing that it had been infiltrated by Government agents.33

On 15 May 1978, a Red Cross vehicle was ambushed by ZANLA forces on the Nyamaropa Road, very near Regina Coeli Mission, and three Red Cross personnel were killed. "We were convinced these people knew field engineering since they were able to detect and take out one of our mines," reported ZANLA detachment security officer, Tirivangani Magorira. "Moreover, they were encouraging enemy trucks to use the road because the enemy would watch their movements and follow," he wrote, justifying the attack.4

The report went on to mention that the attack on the Red Cross personnel had not been sanctioned by higher authorities within ZANLA: "For this operation, Cde Cooper criticised us for killing these Red Cross members since internationally world-wide no one is permitted to kill them."35

Cde Cooper, the Sectorial Commander, did more than criticise his forces. When Fr Muzungu went to see him about the incident he offered

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to apologise in person to Red Cross officials. Fr Muzungu set up the meeting. "I went to see the comrades and asked them what had happened," he recalled. "They said they would apologise for that. After some time, we organised a meeting with the comrades and the Red Cross personnel... The Red Cross people came. Then we drove them in my car to the spot and they then started discussing all that had happened and then an apology from the comrades was heard." [Muzungu]

Such intense involvement was unlikely to remain undetected for long. On 8 November 1978, Fr Muzungu was arrested after Rhodesian soldiers searched Regina Coeli Mission and found a number of letters from the guerrillas. He was imprisoned in Inyanga and his case was heard first in Rusape and then in Marandellas. Because of the legal precedent set by Mutume and Mhonda, he was released but forbidden to work in the rural areas.36

Stationed in Mutare, he could not resist returning to Regina Coeli and Avila at regular intervals, travelling part of the way by car and then taking a bus to avoid detection by the police and army. He did not realise that his intervention on behalf of the Red Cross had angered some of the ZANLA forces who were still convinced that the Red Cross harboured many Rhodesian agents. In fact, he was singled out in a report signed by the former Jesuit brother, Hondodzino, in mid-1979: "Generally the mass understanding is quite satisfactory the only reactionary elements are found in the teachers, businessmen and Red Cross Campaigns. The enemy is sending young males to the country as teachers and individuals like Mzungu (sic) who instead of helping the people, are exploiting them indirectly."37

Journeying to Nyamaropa in September 1979, Fr Muzungu's car was looted and ransacked by guerrilla forces who subsequently took him to Mozambique.38 No one from the Church knew what had happened to him. He simply disappeared. When his badly damaged car was discovered, it was assumed that he had been killed and the Diocese of Umtali held a requiem Mass for him. [Mutume, Muzungu]

Muzungu spent the next four months with ZANLA in Mozambique and another five months at an assembly point at Dendera. Most of his stay in Mozambique was spent at Tembue Camp, Tete Province, where he did some military training. He had wanted to serve as a chaplain but found that this was not possible as ZANU wanted to avoid religious differences in the camps. Just when he was assigned to Chitepo College in Chimoio as a political commissar, the ceasefire agreement was signed

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Alvila Mission
at Lancaster House in London.

Though Fr Muzungu did not have any sacramental ministry in the camps, he was known as a priest. He was one of only five ordained priests who lived with the guerrillas for any length of time.39 His impressions of life in the camps and of the place of religion there sheds further light on the subject:
There was really a good spirit of sharing. When you buy a pack of cigarettes, you have to give nearly everyone.... it was really a hard life.
Sometimes we could spend three to four days with little or no food and we could only moralise ourselves by singing and talking, just trying to encourage one another. I made quite a lot of friends there. Some knew me from the missions and, surprisingly, some days the girls would sing church hymns.... As regards my prayers there, I only had the rosary with me. We had to surrender everything..., but I asked them to give me back my rosary... so it was returned to me.... They didn't prevent me from praying. I used to say my rosary every morning, walking in the camp back and forth, and in the evening.... They didn't have any services in the camp because they said it would sort of divide them. There would be Catholics coming for services and non-Catholic won't be coming. So a misunderstanding may be caused there, thus dividing the camp.

[Muungu]

When he was demobilised in May 1980, he turned down a post in the National Army to return to his priestly duties. Both Patrick Mutume, who was now Bishop of Mutare, and Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa of Harare welcomed him back.40 He emerged from this unique experience with an aversion to war and to the mistrust and suspicion it causes even among friends and relatives. Like Fr Freyer of StAlbert's, he felt that the peasant population had been used by both sides in the conflict. Unlike the German Jesuits, however, he identified fully with ZANU and its cause, criticising their mistakes from within the movement while praising the dedication of the guerrillas and the sacrifices they had made. [Muzungu]

Inyanga North had become one of ZANLA's liberated areas by 1978. Rhodesian forces seldom travelled far from their bases so the guerrillas could move freely in the mountainous terrain. The local population fed and clothed the guerrillas and participated in acts of sabotage against Government targets and European farms. By 1979, Party committees and branches had been formed and were starting some self-help projects. As we have seen, Katerere was an impoverished area. The war put an even greater strain on people who were already

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living at subsistence level. The guerrillas were aware of these problems, as ZANLA field reports indicate. They were also aware of problems within their own ranks such as indiscipline and lack of political understanding, which they took measures to correct. A Commissariat Report for 1978 clearly portrayed the situation with its shortcomings as well as its achievements:

Comrades in this Sector (Chitepo) had problems during the beginning of the year and mid-year. They had been spoiled by pleasure-seeking and beer-drinking which led to taking liberties with women. However, security and commissariat were deployed in the Sector and most of the cases were eliminated. Comrades were criticised politically and physically, leading to a much greater improvement in the political field.... Politically the masses are well equipped except a few areas where political problems have been faced due to the March 3rd Agreement.... The masses are now able to carry out their own operations, e.g., sabotaging the dip-tanks and engines, driving away cattle, goats and sheep from the European farms, and sabotaging enemy crops. Organisation among the masses is high.
Committees for proper material aid to comrades were set up and Youth Leagues who observe enemy movements.41 Because of its proximity to Ruangwa Base, Avila Mission continued to be visited by the Rhodesian Army. Sometimes, the security forces came disguised as guerrillas but the mission staff were not fooled. With the March 1979 elections, the Rhodesians adopted new military strategies. They took the offensive, carrying out intensive bombing raids on ZANLA bases. At the same time, ZANLA infiltrated large numbers of recently trained recruits into the country in order to disrupt the elections. They also began training youth inside the country. The bombing took a heavy toll on these inexperienced youth with ZANLA reports listing as many as 50 guerrillas killed at a time.42

As the day of the elections approached, the Rhodesian forces moved onto the mission compound, provoking an attack by the guerrillas, as the staff had feared all along. Several soldiers were killed at the entrance to the mission. Determined to get revenge, Rhodesian soldiers went to the school kitchen, throwing grass and soil into the cooking pots full of sadza for the children’s meal. Threatening to kill Sr Michael Longina Nyamutswa, the mission superior, they took her to Ruangwa Camp for six days for questioning. By now, all the priests had been removed and only three local sisters remained with the lay staff: Srs Michael, Auxilia and Dolorosa. When helicopters began circling the mission after Sr Michael’s return, the sisters decided to leave with the 138 Tangwena children who had been placed at the mission when their parents fled to Mozambique several years previously. [Nyamutswa] Spending one night at Elim Mission and another at Gotekote Village, they reached Mt Melleray Mission after three days of walking over mountain trails and remained there for the duration of the war. Heavy Duty stayed behind with a few of the lay staff, protecting the mission. Nothing was destroyed, though some things were stolen from the sisters’ convent by local people. Sr Michael summed up the position of Avila Mission during the war:

The Church really suffered during the war. In its suffering, it wanted the people to be liberated. It never lost heart…. It helped in a peaceful manner…. It knew that the will of God was in the struggle so the Church did support the struggle. Also, even though they were sometimes violent, the boys knew that the Church was offering its help…. The help we were giving the boys enraged the soldiers. [Nyamutswa]

This involvement at Avila cost the Church dearly at the time. Bishop Lamont was deported; Frs Mutume, Mhonda, and Muzungu were arrested; Fr Egan left the country and Srs Vianney and Anne were removed by their superior; Sr Helen and Fr Muzungu joined the guerrillas; Heavy Duty, Mr Munyaka and Sr Michael were detained; most of the mission staff were beaten and some were arrested; the school, hospital and mission were closed.

Avila was the first Catholic mission in the Umtali Diocese to be visited by guerrillas. It was also one of the first Catholic missions in the whole of Zimbabwe
to be visited by ZIPA forces after they were formed at the end of 1975. It can, therefore, be seen as a test case.

Although Donal Lamont, the bishop of the diocese, was known as an outspoken opponent of the Government's racist policies, the Carmelite priests felt that they were unprepared for their entry into the war. It was one thing to oppose racism. It was quite another to stand face to face with a young man with an AK rifle, telling you that the Church was one of the oppressors and that all religion would be banned in an independent Zimbabwe.

The first contact with the ZIPA forces precipitated a diocesan crisis. The act of reporting the presence of guerrillas at Avila and the swift reprisal by Government forces against the civilian population galvanised the entire diocese into action. Belatedly, the religious personnel prepared themselves to take a common stand. In spite of the ambiguity caused by ZIPA's Marxist orientation, and despite the 139

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escalating violence, the priests and sisters unanimously agreed to assist the guerrillas and to defy Government regulations requiring them to report the guerrillas' presence to the authorities.

The brutality of the Rhodesian security forces was one of the major factors influencing the decision. If the Government troops had not responded so cruelly and destructively against the civilian population, the Church might have tried to remain neutral. The myth of a "Church in the middle" was shattered at Avila.

Heavy Duty's experience as a lay person was probably similar to that of the religious personnel in the diocese. He explained that when the war started, he was not against the Government. His attitude changed because of the behaviour of the Rhodesian forces. "We thought everything was okay," he confessed. "The lack of trust occurred when the whites started beating people and burning their houses. The people began to hate the whites in this country. They began to look towards the comrades." [Chiutanyel

Within the Church, this lack of trust in the Rhodesia Front Government no doubt increased when the Church itself became the victim of Government persecution. By arresting, trying and deporting Bishop Lamont and arresting and torturing Frs Mutume and Mhonda, the Government declared war on the Church. The cordiality which had existed between Church and State since 1890 was shattered. Instead of supporting the Government forces as it had done during the 1893 and 1896-97 conflicts, the Church now stood with the African majority. Unlike St Albert's where anti-communism and guerrilla mistakes had hardened the German Jesuits against the liberation forces, the experience at Avila hardened the Church against Government forces. The Church was not on the side of established law and order or in the middle any more, but had aligned itself with the forces of change. So decisive was the break with the past that the Rhodesian Government seriously believed that the Church was supplying the liberation forces with arms and ammunition. A former CIO officer who was a Catholic described the official view:
Our attitude on the whole was one of fury towards priests whom we thought were assisting the ZANLA guerrillas in planting landmines and killing....
The sort of picture I think our security forces were trying to portray to the public and to the world was that the Roman Catholic Church in particular was actively involved in supporting terrorism in every aspect - from weapons, safe houses, information, supply and medicines. [Special Branch]

This realignment was recognised by the liberation forces as well. Without knowing it, the Church had changed sides at a critical juncture. Just as a leftist group espousing Marxism-Leninism had assumed leadership of the nationalist forces, bishops, priests, sisters and lay Christians were being arrested, tortured and deported. Faced with the reality of a Church with the people, ZIPA found it had to revise its attitude toward religion in general and Catholic missions in particular. Political commissars reasoned that if the Church was now an enemy of the Smith Government, it must be their friend. The Marxist language which had alarmed Fr Egan was exchanged for open dialogue and an honest sharing of views with the Church now viewed as an ally rather than an enemy. This change of attitude was clearly expressed by Air Vice-Marshal Perenz Shiri: Some of us for quite some time in Tanzania had the chance to read... that religion is the opium of the masses. Surely as a Marxist I believed what Marx said.... When I came home where the actual battle was being fought, I had to slightly sideline Marxism and look at the actual situation in Zimbabwe.... That was a question of common sense. In Zimbabwe during the days of the liberation struggle it became very clear that religion wasn't all that much of an opium of the masses. [Shiri]

If the Church had not changed sides at this decisive moment, the war might have taken a very different direction. As in the first chimurenga, and as at St Albert's Mission, Christian missions might have become the targets of the liberation forces. As it happened, Avila came to represent a Church with the people and of the people. It gave the Church a new image, enabling a sister and a priest to cross the border to join the liberation forces, something unthinkable in the early years of the war. It also gave the guerrillas a new source of support, both material and spiritual. From 1976, first ZIPA and then ZANLA knew they would be assisted by Catholic missions. The spirit mediums were now joined by Christians as motivators and mobilisers. Appeals to traditional religion and Marxism by the ZANLA forces would decline in the later years of the war as Christian missions became reliable and trustworthy allies. Avila was the new Church for the new society, changing Church-State relations irrevocably.

Footnotes
Personal letter from Fr M Kenny to the author, 25/6/90.
3 "Umtali's First Bishop", The Shield, July 1957, p. 6. 4Informal discussions with
Peter Griffiths, Curriculum Development Unit,
5 H Fesquet, B Murchland (trans.) Drama of Vatican II, New York, Random
6 Lamont to Moloney, 28/2/71. Private collection of Fr Moloney.
7 Gweru Diocesan Archives, Box: JPC, Graham to Haene, 19/3/74.
8 Ibid. Graham to Haene, 1/4/74.
9 Sr Aquina Weinrich to Moloney, 23/6/74. Private collection of Fr Moloney. 10
O'Regan.
11 Ibid.
12 Shiri. He had been in prison in Tanzania during the ZIPA period because
of factional fighting in the camps.
13 Muchena. He was a junior officer during the ZIPA period, and was promoted
in ZANLA in later years.
14 ZANU Archives, File: MMZ, Department of Defence, "Operational Results
as at 30/9/76 from Takawira and Guru Sectors", by Elias Hondo, Director of
Operations, p. 4. Chitepo Sector was originally known as Guru Sector. 15 Ibid.
6Ibid., File: Chitepo Sector 2: Chitepo Operational Report, 19/4/78, by George
Kashiri, p. 2.
7 Ibid.: Chitepo Operational Report, 4/12/77, by Kanyau Takawira, p. 2. 18
Thomson, 1979, provides a moving account of their lives and deaths. ZANLA
forces were accused of the murders. Thomson and Peter Griffiths (see footnote 4)
report that the leader of the group later confessed, became a
convert and is now a committed Pentecostal preacher.
19 ZANU Archives, File: Chitepo Sector 2: Chitepo Operational Report, 21/7/77,
by B Chakamuka.
20 JPC Archives, Box: Cases: Fr Mukuwapasi to Br Arthur, 21/10/76, p. 2. 21
Ibid., Box: Church Employees, File 104: Church Personnel and Legal
This account, therefore, relies on the evidence of Bishop
Mutume.
22 See Chapter 2, "Changing Sides".
23 ZANU Archives, File: Chitepo: Chitepo Operational Report, 17/1/78, by B
Chakamuka.
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24 Ibid., File: Chitepo Sector 2: Chitepo Operational Report, 17/8/77, by B
Chakamuka.
25 O'Regan. Batahana died in a car accident several years after independence.
He had been working with disabled ex-combatants at the National
Rehabilitation Centre near Harare.
26 Chiutanye, Taibo. Also ZANU Commissariat lecture notes for 1976-77.
29 Informal discussions with Mrs Gertrude Nhundu (Cde Vimbisai Rusununguko), ZIMFEP Education Co-ordinator.
30 Muzungu. Also informal discussions with Bishop Mutume. Fr Muzungu died suddenly in mid 1991.
31 Muzungu.
32 ZANU Archives, File: Chitepo Sector 2: MMZ Province, Chitepo Sector, "Operational Report", n.d., by A Mhuru. Another report in the same file (14/8/77, by B Chakamuka) tries to absolve ZANLA forces from any blame for the incident. It seems that higher command levels continued the investigation and reached the more critical conclusions set out by Mhuru. 3' This is borne out by numerous reports in the ZANLA files, as well as by the author's interviews with Kundai and Tichafa.
38 Bishop Mutume seemed to be aware that Muzungu had been kidnapped because of a conflict with the guerrillas. Muzungu himself never alluded to this in the interview, suggesting rather that the damage to his car was done by a new group who did not know him and that another group took him to Mozambique to rescue him from being re-arrested for violating his restriction order.
19 Fr Albert Starch Ndlovu of Bulawayo Diocese joined ZAPU. Fr Alexander Sakorombe of Umtali Diocese spent many months at a ZANLA base just inside the eastern border of the country. Fr Nigel Johnson, SJ, spent almost half a year in J Z Moyo Camp for refugees in Solwezi, Zambia, where he was joined by Fr Patrick Moloney, SJ, for several weeks.
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40 Fr Albert Starch Ndlovu did not find the same welcome awaiting him in Bulawayo Diocese. He was forced to leave the priesthood.
Kunaka, 20/8/79. Also Detachment A North, report by Hondo Dzangadzaibva, 20/8/79 and another report by Killmore Pedzisai on 19/8/79 and one by Sweet Mafuta on 21/8/79. In all these cases of airborne "enemy surprise attacks", many guerrillas and civilians were killed.

Chapter 6
UNSOLVED CRIMES; ST PAUL'S MISSION, MUSAMI
(SALISBURY ARCHDIOCESE, ZANLA'S TAKAWIRA SECTOR)

A member of the security forces put a gun behind an African priest's ear saying, "You black bastard, speak up. one dead missionary is better than one hundred dead terrorists."

Ian Linden (1980)

Sunday, 6 February 1977, had been much like any other Sunday. Mass was celebrated at the mission church in the morning. The teachers and nurses went about their normal duties. The acting mission superior, Fr McCann, SJ, was away for the weekend, while the superior, Fr Mark Hackett was on leave in Europe.

After the evening meal some of the Jesuit priests and Dominican sisters stayed in the dining room to watch the news on television. The others went to their respective rooms while Br Dennis Adamson, SJ, went to visit one of the youth promoters on the mission compound. Four LCBL candidates were in their dormitory chatting with the sister-in-charge, Sr Monica, LCBL, when they heard a loud banging on the door. Emerentia Naka, who was an LCBL candidate at the time, described what took place:

Four guys entered into our quarters. It was just a single dormitory with our beds and lockers in there... So these guys come in. They had their hair well done, plaited with standing buns. Some had caps on with a shiny cap-front and they were holding their guns with very shiny knives at the end of the gun... They asked us, "Have you ever seen freedomfighters?" We said, "No, we have never seen any freedom-fighters."

Ian Linden (1980)
Sr Anna, OP, 75 years of age, heard a knock at her door and opened it, thinking it was one of the other sisters. She later reported what she saw to Sr Dominica, OP: She opened the door and found herself confronted with a man. He appeared young, almost boyish, the gun lamely hanging down his arm and wore a khaki safari suit, knee-stockings and shoes. He spoke English and said softly, "Get out." Sr Anna slipped at the doorstep, fell and said she couldn't get up so quickly. As she supported herself with her left arm at the doorpost, the man saw her watch and said, "Give it to me."

She did so and when she said, "Let me go," he answered, "Where do you want to go to?" Pointing into her room, she answered, "In here."

The man gave her a gentle push towards the inside of the room and then ran towards the open lit-up door of the OP sitting room where Sr Epiphany was still engrossed in the Readers Digest. Sr Anna had in the meantime locked her room and switched off the lights... One of the armed men was overheard as saying to the other in Shona, "Leave her, she's already dead...".

Eventually Sr Epiphany, OP, appeared at the convent door, escorted by armed men who asked her where the others had gone. The men became angry and unreasonable when she said she didn't know. One of the men grabbed her wristwatch, slapping her in the face when she resisted. Sr Monica, LCBL, tried to intervene and was also slapped in the face. "If you are trying to be funny, we shoot you all right now," one of the men shouted. This frightened the sisters so much they started blaming Sr Monica. "You want us to be killed?" they asked.

Sr Epiphany is reported to have asked what they had done wrong. She was told, "We want our country," to which she replied in turn, "But we are on your side, we are your comrades." Together with Sr Epiphany and Sr Monica, the LCBL candidates were led back to their dormitory, where they were told to lock the doors and windows and not to open to anyone. When Sr Monica asked why they were taking an old woman like Sr Epiphany, she was slapped again and told, "They are not your brothers. Get away." [Naka]

Outside, the armed men kept asking Sr Epiphany the whereabouts of the others. She finally led them to the TV room.
where they found Fr Shepherd-Smith, SJ, Br John Conway, SJ, Sr Magdala Lewandowski, OP, Sr Ceslaus Stiegler, OP, and Sr Joseph Wilkinson, OR Fr Duncan Myerscough, SJ, was in his room reading when he heard a knock on the door and Sr Magdala calling him. When he opened the door he saw Sr Magdala and an armed man. Fr Martin Thomas, SJ, was apparently called out of his room by Sr Ceslaus in a similar manner. All were marched at gunpoint from the priests' house, along the access road through the mission to a gap in the hedge leading to the two convents.3 It seems that at first the missionaries thought they were being taken to a political meeting which they had heard about from missionaries at other rural missions. They had been waiting for their turn to come.4
Fr Myerscough said that the man he took to be leader of the group told them to walk quickly, saying something like, "Faster, faster - we are not going to shoot you. We just want to show you something." Fr Myerscough said that he spoke good English. (O'Malley 1980:113) The African sisters overheard some members of the group speaking in Sindebele as well as in Shona. [Naka] The man leading Fr Myerscough took his watch and his glasses. Another armed man ordered Fr Thomas to remove his trousers. The group of missionaries began to realise that they were not being taken to apungwe and asked Fr Myerscough to give them absolution, which he did.
Fr Myerscough's testimony at the inquest provides the only firsthand account of what took place next:
As we approached gap in hedge.... Saw a number of terrorists in group by the hedge and seemed to be one man there, older than the others, not in uniform and not armed.... There was some discussion amongst all the terrorists. All I can say it was not in English. At one stage two more came out and faced us. After a little discussion two others came and joined them and there was some noise. I took to be order of command. The three facing us raised their rifles and rest of party started

to move off in haste.

I was looking at centre one. I saw his gun belch fire. I turned away from him and fell down. There was a continuous burst for a few seconds after which more running feet receding and seconds later there was some heavier firing from opposite direction, from Musami township. Followed
by quite a sizeable explosion.5

Fr Martin Thomas (45), Fr Christopher Shepherd-Smith (34), Br John Conway (56), Sr Magdala Lewandowski (42), Sr Epiphany Schnieder (78), Sr Ceslaus Stiegler (59) and Sr Joseph Wilkinson (58) were dead. Fr Myerscough, the lone survivor, went to get help from others on the mission. Br Adamson, who heard the gunshots as he was returning from his meeting, helped to move the bodies to a nearby guest house. Sr Dominica, LBCL, also helped. When they finished, Br Adamson and Fr Myerscough spent the night at the sisters' convent. They heard banging on the door about two hours later but kept quiet, pretending not to be there. [Adamson] (Also O'Malley, 1980:118).
The shooting had taken place at approximately 9:30 p.m. Police and security forces arrived about midnight in response to a phone call from a Greek storekeeper in Musami township who had overheard Fr Myerscough phoning the Jesuit superior in Salisbury. The only people they managed to arouse at that hour were the LBCL candidates who were called out of their dormitory for questioning. The candidates had heard the gunfire which was quite close to their house, but did not know what had happened. They could only say that they had seen a group of about ten armed men, dressed in an assortment of clothing. The LCBL candidates refused to identify the men as guerrillas, which angered the police. They were kept under guard by the fishpond the entire night. Other interrogators came from Mtoko the next morning to resume the questioning.6

On Monday morning the mission was crowded with reporters, police, soldiers and intelligence officers, seeking information about the murders. Investigators found 111 spent cartridges from both RPD machine guns and AK-47 rifles.7 At a press conference, Fr Myerscough was asked whether he was quite satisfied that the killers had been terrorists. He replied, "Well, I never thought differently. I took it for granted." At the inquest on 5 May he said "There is no doubt in my mind that they were terrorists." St Paul's Mission, located about 45 kms north-east of Salisbury at Musami in Mrewa District, was started as an outstation of Chishawasha Mission in 1918 when Fr Charles Daignault, SJ, gained permission from the local chief to start a school and build a chapel there. 10 By 1925, fifteen outschools had been opened but they could only offer kindergarten classes because of the absence of trained teachers.

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A Jesuit priest, describing the situation at St Paul's in those early days, said that the standard of living was so low that it was impossible to charge fees. "In fact those early missionaries had to make presents of blankets, etc. to the parents in order to get their consent to allow their sons to attend school. Parents were reluctant to allow their daughters to go to school as it was considered that their future life as married women did not warrant education," he observed." By 1966, the mission was responsible for 26 out-schools, with more than 6 000 pupils, a primary and secondary boarding school, a 50 bed hospital and a large stone church built in 1925. Its 33 outstations covered a 200 km radius which included Chikwaka, Chitowah, Maramba and Uzumba. A large staff of both local and expatriate religious, as well as local laity, was needed to run all these institutions.

St Paul's first entered the political arena in the early 1960s when crops were slashed on neighbouring commercial farms by local peasants, acting in concert with strike action taking place in urban areas. The police at nearby Musami township believed that the mission had been a leading influence behind the local unrest. According to a former student, Alexander Kanengoni, relations between the local community and the mission were very good in the 1960s as a result of
the community development projects initiated by Fr "Jeep" Davis, SJ. Fr Davis had also started a football team at Musami which played in national league games. Kanengoni thought that these popular projects which brought the mission closer to the community may have aroused police suspicion. ZANLA forces had operated in nearby Chiweshe as early as 1973 and had come to Uzumba, Chikwaka and Maramba in 1974. As a result the Government had erected protected villages in these areas in 1974. The period of détente intervened in 1975, bringing the war to a temporary standstill. Fighting resumed with the formation of ZIPA in late 1975.

The initial message of the guerrillas was not complicated. Building on the political awareness developed by Chief Mangwende, his wife and other activists in the area in the 1960s, it focused on the root causes of the war or the "National Grievances", as they were called in ZANLA's political education syllabus. These grievances, which had been collected from the peasant population during the early days of mass mobilisation in the north-east, had been analysed and systematised by ZANLA's Commissariat Department and fed back to the people during political rallies known as pungwes. [Rutanhire]

* Ti-w Waracl omr Msslon7s
Looking back on the pungwes he attended in early 1976, Ignatius Matondo, a former Jesuit seminarian who in 1976 was teaching at a primary school 15 kms from St Paul's, recalled:

Meetings stressed the oppression by the Government. They talked of minimal wages; people being made slaves, not respected as human beings... . The Government wasn't prepared to let an African child learn more than the white man because they knew that if they did, we might be equal sometime. We were also told of the intentions of the future Government.... The people would have enough money to send their children to school... . People might even have their own companies assisted by the Government. They said that land and cattle would be plentiful and enough for all. People could move where they wanted. There wouldn't be any segregation by colour... . If buildings weren't available for children to go to school, even churches could be turned into classrooms. [Matondo]

"They were preachers and teachers," David Tigere said of the guerrilla forces. A Catholic from Chanetsa village, about ten kilometres to the east of Musami, he became a leading mujiba in the area. He recalled that the first group of guerrillas came to his village in November 1976, led by Comrade Shortie. [Tigere]

Not long after the liberation forces arrived in the area, other groups started to come and hold rallies with the people as well. They dressed like the guerrillas, shouted guerrilla slogans and sang guerrilla songs, but their message was very different. According to Matondo, they preached against religion and said that the Government would control everything, including the churches. People became confused and afraid to talk to one another. Matondo explained that they didn't know which group to believe or who was who. He said that one day a certain group would hold a rally and the following day another group would call the
people together, telling them not to believe what they had been told the previous day. [Matondo]

Eventually people came to believe that those preaching against the Church were not guerrillas at all but were a unit of the Rhodesian army. [Matondo, Tigere]

Called the Selous Scouts, its members impersonated the guerrillas in order to discredit them and identify their supporters, who would later be arrested. The Selous Scouts tended to overdo the anti-Christian rhetoric which was supposed to characterise the guerrillas. Propaganda leaflets distributed by the Rhodesian army's psychological action unit in 1977 referred to the guerrillas and nationalist forces as "murdering mad-dog communist terrorists". They attributed every imaginable evil to the guerrillas: rape, beating, torture, starvation and murder.13 The Selous Scouts acted out this image.

To complicate the situation, some of the ZIPRA members of the combined ZIPA forces began to abscond, making their way across the country to Matabeleland. 14 Tigere spoke of one such breakaway group led by Comrades Nkulube and School Boy. He said that they too held rallies with the people until eventually there was a battle between the two groups in 1977. [Tigere, Nglazi]

In addition to ZANLA guerrillas, breakaway ZIPRA units and Selous Scouts, other Government security force units also operated in the area. Whenever the guerrillas carried out an operation, the security forces retaliated against the local population. David Tigere recalled, for instance, that the entire adult community at Chanetsa Village was thoroughly beaten after a battle at Matura mountain on 23 December 1976 which Tigere said was won by the liberation forces. [Tigere]

Javers Kaonde, another guerrilla supporter from Mahodza village in Mrewa, described how he was dragged by the neck behind Rhodesian soldiers on horseback, beaten and shot in the stomach, all because he said that he had never seen any guerrillas. [Kaonde]

A report to the JPC from Mrewa at that time described the death of a man held in custody by the police as well as some of the methods of torture being used to extract information about the guerrillas. Stating that whole families were taken for interrogation which consisted of severe beating with whips and leather thongs, the report also claimed that the security forces used wild hyenas during the interrogation. "One man is said to have come out of the official tent bleeding profusely from a deep wound inflicted upon him by the hyena", the report concluded. 15

The nationalist guerrillas were not perceived as being so brutal although they issued warnings to those accused of being Government informers or "sell-outs". Matondo recalled that a shop owner near Gezi School was beaten and his shop burnt by mujibas. A sabuku whose home was guarded by Government troops was captured by the guerrillas but rescued by the Rhodesians before sentence was passed on him. Matondo said that he never witnessed the guerrillas punishing anyone throughout 1976 and 1977. That task was left to the mujibas.'16 Tigere
remembered that the guerrillas executed a man in his village who had killed another man when drunk. [Tigere] Both Tigere and
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Matando pointed out the difference between guerrilla and security force actions, stressing that the former did not punish at random or in large numbers, but were selective and gave clear warnings. Tigere, who worked closely with the guerrillas for four years, described their method of operating:
Comrades did not kill unnecessarily. Comrades killed a person only after everyone had come to know their misdeeds.... They killed a killer. They did it in front of everyone. They answered questions first and everyone observed and knew why it was being done. [Tigere]
Though the guerrillas were active in the surrounding area throughout 1976, they had still not come to St Paul's Mission by the end of the year. In December 1976, the missionaries received a message through an old man saying that they could expect the guerrillas around Christmas time, but Christmas came and went with no sign of them.17 The priests at the mission were still visiting most of the outstations where they heard firsthand reports of the war from their parishioners. The Dominican and diocesan LCBL sisters continued working at the school and hospital. The war had not yet disrupted the mission routine.8 The mission was like the eye of the hurricane where a deceptive peace reigned until it was shattered by the events of that Sunday night in early February 1977.
The first official statements from Church authorities after the killings expressed grief, outrage and condemnation at the senseless killing of the seven missionaries. They carefully refrained from blaming either nationalist guerrillas or Government forces. Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa of Salisbury who spoke for the local Church, issued a condemnation which could apply to either side:
At Musami a blow has been struck not only against the missionaries but also against the suffering and needy African people. I condemn this evil act just as the Catholic Bishops have repeatedly condemned all violent actions against the innocent in the course of the struggle now being waged in this country. I warn that such acts create habits that will be difficult for those who practise them to break.... Those responsible for crimes like that committed at Musami make mockery of whatever good ideals they claim to serve.19
The Pope sent a message three days after the murders which was
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also broadcast over Vatican Radio, condemning violence in general.” Hundreds of messages of sympathy and solidarity poured in from around the world. Few, if any, singled out the culprits but condemned violence from both sides. Meanwhile, the Rhodesian media consistently blamed the liberation forces. Bishop Lamont was the first to question this version of events:
I cannot say who is immediately responsible for it. Those remotely responsible for it are the authorities, who have refused to face the fact that the majority of the
population of Rhodesia does not enjoy equality under the law nor equal opportunity in the civil, political, economic and cultural life of the country. Nor have they any effective share in decisionmaking.21
Fr Henry Wardale, Jesuit Provincial in Rhodesia, made a note of the funeral Mass, held on 10 February 1977, in his diary: "Sermon by Isidore Chikore had a controversial slant - Government and security forces who make life difficult and unequal for Africans real cause of the deaths".12 The Daily News of Tanzania reported that Fr Chikore's sermon so angered a group of whites attending the funeral that they walked out of the service in protest. One man even called for his arrest.23
The Justice and Peace Commission immediately instituted an investigation of the murders and prepared an initial confidential statement. Based on information given to the Church after the murder of Bishop Schmitt and his companions less than two months before, it took the unusual step of defending the liberation forces:
It is our belief that if the massacre was done by guerrillas, it was the action of a maverick band of guerrillas out of control and not subject to a higher command system of guerrilla leaders.... Recently the Patriotic Front made it quite clear that their own guerrillas are subject to stringent command systems and operate within the confines of a code of conduct... which aims at the protection of innocent civilians. Mr Mugabe, himself a practising Christian, has categorically stated that missionaries are not a target of attack by his forces. If these murders were done by such renegade guerrillas, the Musami incident cannot constitute an indictment of the entire African liberation struggle. On the other hand, there are sufficient features of the Musami massacre as to cast considerable doubt upon the proposition that this was the work of guerrillas.24
Within days of the crime, information began to be collected which called the official version into question. After visiting Musami on 19 February, Fr Wardale noted the new evidence in his diary: "Some facts or rumours are beginning to emerge; the talk of a blue van which appeared before the killings and people seen getting out and later returning to it. Another curious feature was that no police investigation in the area appears to have taken place".5
This omission seemed very curious to the people of the Musami area who were all too familiar with police investigations and the beatings and arrests which they normally entailed. A neighbour who lived only a few hundred yards from the mission pointed to the anomaly. "The fact that the security forces made no investigation, makes me believe that the vakomana were not responsible for the murders", he wrote to Fr Wardale. "We the older ones stayed at home waiting for the security forces to come and pick us up. But no one came. I do not know of any person in our area who was arrested and interrogated after the incident".6
The most specific evidence came from a former pupil of St Paul's Mission who had joined the Rhodesian-African Rifles and was stationed in Mrewa. He claimed
that the massacre had been directed by another mission graduate who was against whites and also had a grudge against the former mission superior, Fr Desmond Donovan, SJ. According to the informant, the leader of the killers belonged to Section 9 of the Selous Scouts. He was not acting under higher orders but diverted the group on its way from Marandellas to Salisbury in order to take his revenge on the mission. The same informant said that the group was severely punished when their senior officers learned what had taken place.27

The JPC had already begun collecting information about the activities of the Selous Scouts. They intensified their investigations after the tragedy at Musami, concentrating on the Mrewa area. On two occasions during the weeks after the event, Fr Wardale noted in his diary that the evidence against the Selous Scouts was growing, but there was danger that the story would break before the proof was complete. Expressing fear for the safety of one of the witnesses, he also noted that there could be tremendous consequences if the JPC could prove that Government forces were guilty, especially in the light of the Anglo-American peace initiative then under way.28

As Fr Wardale had suspected, the story was indeed beginning to break. On 10 March he received a phone call from David Martin, a correspondent for the London Observer based in Lusaka. Martin asked

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him about the Church's investigations and their conclusions. Similar phone calls were made to many Catholic leaders in the country.29 The result was an article which appeared in both British and Zambian papers, publicly suggesting that the Selous Scouts were responsible for the Musami massacre, as well as for the murders of other Church personnel. The article, headed "Did Smith Men Kill the Priests?" quoted many reliable Church sources including Bishop Lamont, Bishop Prieto of Wankie Diocese, Br Arthur, Organising Secretary of the JPC and Fr Joseph Elsener, Vicar General of Gwelo Diocese.0

"All but one of the priests to whom I spoke stressed that their African congregations were convinced that the killings were being carried out by the Selous Scouts, an elite counter-insurgency unit formed in 1974," wrote Martin. He went on to recount an incident, told to him by Bishop Lamont, which had acquired added significance with the Musami murders. "I had a visit from one of my African clergy who reported that he was terrorised by European members of the security forces. They said to him, 'You had better watch out. One dead missionary is as good as a 100 dead terrorists to us'."31

Another British paper, the Sunday People, carried a story the same day by Gordon Thomas Wood, a former soldier in the Rhodesian army, claiming that he could prove that the Selous Scouts had been responsible at Musami. Confessing that he himself had killed many unarmed civilians, Wood said that the footprints left by the killers at Musami came from soldiers' boots. "It was in the interest of the Rhodesians that missionaries should be stopped from helping the blacks," he said.2
At the same time as these versions of events were appearing in the international press, the Rhodesian army was making its own headlines at home by claiming to have captured a diary from a guerrilla killed near Shamva on 11 March and an AK-47 rifle from another guerrilla killed in Mangwende Tribal Trust Land on 13 March. The diary and the rifle were to become the two leading pieces of evidence in the Government's case which was presented at the inquest on 5 May. Fr Wardale was being pressured from within and without the Church to accept the Government's account of events at Musami. Writing in his diary on 26 March, he noted the divisions within the Jesuit community over the incident: "The feeling of the Jesuits evenly divided over Musami. Fr Myerscough still much quoted as 'the survivor and eyewitness'. Eyewitness to what? His witness ends in the fact that armed Africans did the killing. Beyond that is speculation." The Jesuit Provincial then took the courageous step of airing his views in the Rhodesian press, which was not known for its impartiality. In the article he pointed out "the utter lack of communication between Africans who could not believe it possible that the deed had been done by the guerrillas - and Europeans who think it equally impossible that the deed could have been done by anyone else".

At the same time he sent a letter to all Jesuit houses, "urging unity and sensitivity to others' feelings and great caution in any expression of opinion on the subject..." Wardale also mentioned the difference of opinion on the issue between the JPC and the Anglican leader, Bishop Paul Burroughs, who advanced the European argument that the murders could not possibly have been committed by security forces. On 6 April, Fr Wardale noted that he was visited by two assistant commissioners of police who showed him further information in the hope that he would change his mind about Musami. He remained unconvinced. He mentioned that General Walls, the head of the Rhodesian forces, also approached the Churches, looking for advice. According to Wardale, the advice was clear, "If you stop beating and shooting innocent people we might start liking you more." Fr Wardale, like most leaders of Catholic religious, was well aware of the beating and shooting going on around the country, as they shared reports of the war situation during the periodic meetings which they attended. After a meeting of superiors of major religious orders on 11 March 1977, for instance, Wardale wrote in his diary about security force brutality taking place in other dioceses. "An appalling story emerges," he wrote. "The Selous Scouts would, it seems, do anything.... In the Carmelite area there are terrible stories of beating of hundreds of people time and time again. At St Killian's girls were stripped, tied upside down to trees and beaten until the men have what they want to know.... The stories can be multiplied ad infinitum but the general picture is ghastly with the Government forces far more vicious than anything else." Thus, evidence from other dioceses, particularly Umtali and Gwelo, was overwhelmingly critical of the
behaviour of Government troops. The guerrillas, by and large, were still an unknown factor.

After all the adverse publicity, the Church expected that the Government would go to great lengths to defend itself. Church officials anticipated that the inquest would seriously challenge the findings of the JPC. To everyone's surprise the inquest was poorly handled, raising more questions than it answered. It rested exclusively on the testimony.

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St Paul's Mission of Fr Myerscough, and on the notebook (or 'diary') and rifle taken from two bodies, found in two widely separated places, which were, on rather slender evidence, alleged to be those of known guerrillas. Fr Myerscough was the first witness. He narrated what took place, concluding, "There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that they were terrorists." Peter James Begg, Detective Inspector, CID, based in Mtoko, gave the bulk of the evidence for the State, supported by David Perkins, Chief Inspector, BSA Police armoury:

On 11th March 1977... a well known terrorist was killed... . From his body certain documents recovered indicated to us at JOC (Joint Operational Command) that the group responsible for the attack (on St Paul's) emanated from Mangwende TTL... . "No Talks" Mabhena is a well known terrorist commander... in book (the 'diary') there was a entry relative to Mabhena - 3036. On the 13th March, 1977, as result of an action in Mangwende TTL, a body was produced to me. I was not positively able to identify the body but a weapon 3036 was recovered with the body. It was a AK rifle... . Exhibit 12 (AK rifle 3036) was responsible for firing 15 cases at St Pauls Mission... . Verdict of the court is that the deceased met their death on the 6th February, 1977, at St Paul's Mission, Musami, and that in each case death was due to multiple homicidal gunshot wounds and that the fatal shots were fired by members of a terrorist group.38

Church officials who had been following the case were less convinced than ever by this performance. Fr Wardale noted in his diary that the police had dropped the investigation when they realised that the evidence was pointing in the direction of the Selous Scouts.39 The JPC prepared a damning critique of the inquest, with this conclusion:

Cartridges, notebook, a weapon and two dead bodies alleged to be "terrorists" are added up to equal "terrorist" guilt in the Musami tragedy....

If a unit of the army was indeed responsible... then the army would be in possession of the weapon AK 3036 and they only dispose of it by planting it on someone else, and placing the blame on him. Since he was dead, he could not deny the charge or defend himself. It would also not be difficult to manufacture a notebook and place it on another dead body. Such is the situation in Rhodesia today, that these speculations are conceivable. Substantiating them is more difficult. In the meantime, the real mystery of Musami remains unsolved in the minds of many.40
Whether it is ever solved or not is no longer of central importance. What is now significant about the Musami case is the clear indication

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it gave of changing perceptions and alliances in some quarters of the Catholic Church at that time. In particular, Bishop Lamont, Fr Wardale, JPC members and other influential leaders were giving more weight to evidence from their rural African members than from Government officials and even from one of their own priests, Fr Myerscough.

They no longer trusted the Government. In fact, they viewed the Government as the enemy, and were convinced that elements in Government and the security forces might even be prepared to condone murder to silence the Church and prevent rural missions from assisting the guerrillas. They tried very hard to prove that Government forces were killing missionaries, as they believed was indeed the case.

These sections of the Church were prepared to listen to guerrilla denials, though they had no direct contact with the nationalist leadership in either Lusaka or Maputo at that time. Indirectly, they were receiving information from the nationalists through the Bethlehem Fathers' headquarters in Switzerland and from the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in London. From rural missions inside Rhodesia, they were being informed about what the guerrillas in the field were doing and saying. These first-hand sources convinced them that the Church could work with the liberation forces. A highly vocal and influential sector of the Church had changed sides. Musami was the proof.

* * *

The murder of the seven missionaries at Musami sent shock waves through the liberation movements as well as through the Churches. The liberation forces were branded the killers by the Smith regime. The international media initially accepted this version of events without question. The British Guardian commented in an editorial on 8 February 1977: "The only credible assumption at present is that the seven missionaries at Musami near Salisbury, were killed by nationalist guerrillas. The war thus takes on an ugly and inexplicable twist".41

The nationalists categorically denied that their forces were responsible, as they had two months earlier denied responsibility for the killing of Bishop Adolph Schmitt and his two companions. In a press release about Bishop Schmitt's murder, ZANU blamed the Selous Scouts: "It is very easy for the public to mistake these Selous Scouts for the freedom fighters since these murderers are clothed and armed with weapons identical with those of the guerrillas".42

In the case of Musami, Robert Mugabe, recently chosen as president of ZANU, who had been raised a Catholic, denied responsibility for the killings on the basis of the good working relations which the nationalist forces had with Christian
missions. He had become more aware of these relationships during the Geneva Conference where he met Fr Michael Traber who told him about the experiences of the Bethlehem Fathers in Gwelo Diocese. In a BBC interview two days after the Musami killings, Robert Mugabe defended his Party's forces against the propaganda onslaught:

"We are not capable of such inhumanity. After all, we are fighting a progressive war which is aimed at mobilizing all the democratic forces capable of lending support to the Revolution and all along we have been working very harmoniously with all the Church organizations.... Our guerrillas know who are our friends and the missionaries have always been sympathetic towards our objectives."

Throughout 1977, Mugabe spoke often of his Party's attitude towards the Churches, and in particular towards the murder of missionaries. He may have done so to counteract the anti-church image that ZANLA had inherited from ZIPA. It is be possible that veteran ZANLA commanders recently released from Zambian prisons suspected that ZIPA cadres were indeed responsible for missionary deaths taking pains to distance themselves from what they considered to be ZIPA's "excesses". In any event, Mugabe used the occasion of an international conference hosted by the United Nations in Maputo to expound on the issue, blaming the Smith Government for targeting the Catholic Church:

"The Smith regime has started a witch-hunting campaign against Roman Catholic missionaries. Some of the Roman Catholic priests have disappeared without trace. Others, like Father Paul Egli, have been tried and sentenced to one year imprisonment. Yet others like the renowned Roman Catholic missionary, Bishop Donald Lamont, have been arrested, tried, sentenced and then deported out of the country. The campaign against the Roman Catholic Church by the Smith regime is deliberate and calculated because of the stiff resistance which that Church has put up against the injustice and mass murder of people perpetrated by the fascist regime of Ian Smith. Smith, in an attempt to cover up these atrocities, has accused us of committing them... . The truth is that the white missionaries are being sacrificed by the Smith regime on the mistaken belief that the gullible Western world will believe his side and see justice in his cause and injustice in ours."

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ZANU's Party organ, Zimbabwe News, and Radio Maputo also went out of their way to deal with the issue of missionary deaths, highlighting the good relations that existed between rural missions and guerrillas. In a release early in 1977, ZANU stated:

"Besides civilians, the regime has also declared war against churchmen, who have been doing all their best to serve the struggling masses of Zimbabwe and to support the cause of freedom by providing medical and logistic help to the liberation forces. Thus at the end of last year, Bishop Lamont of the Roman Catholic Church was jailed for ten years; three missionaries were brutally slaughtered by the racist notorious Selous Scout, (sic) who was never brought to
justice. And this year, the racist regime's Selous Scouts again murdered in cold blood seven missionaries at Musami Mission station.47

Such a concerted publicity campaign is a clear indication that ZANU was concerned about its reputation. It also showed that it was aware of the role the Church was playing. Since Mugabe and many of his deputies had been raised in the Catholic Church, the issue took on added significance. ZANU intended to set up its own inquiry into the killings in order to clear its name at home and abroad. This intention was superseded, however, by more pressing problems within ZANLA itself arising from the so-called "Vashandi rebellion". As a result, such an inquiry was never undertaken.

The guerrilla forces operating in Mangwende carried out their own investigations on the spot, however. David Tigere was sent to the mission to hear what was being said about the murders and to the funeral of the missionaries in Salisbury. Tigere said that Comrade Shortie and his group were very disturbed by the killings and wanted to clear their name. They had come into the area recently, persuading the local population to support them and trying hard not to antagonise any section of the community. "The death of the missionaries also gave pain to the comrades," Tigere said. "They sent me to hear what really happened. The comrades were also trying to find out who did it." [Tigere]

Another group of guerrillas came from Mt St Mary's Mission, Wedza, to investigate at the request of the mission superior, Fr Pascal Slevin, OFM, who was deported by the Government later that year. [Hackett] ZANLA forces operating around Silveira Mission, in Gwelo Diocese posted notices on trees, proclaiming that their forces were innocent.41

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ZANLA's rules and regulations were widely known, as they were contained in a song which was sung at most rallies. ZANLA found it necessary, however, to reassure their supporters both within and without the Churches, that these rules were being followed:

The three main rules of discipline were:
1. obey orders in all your actions
2. do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses
3. turn in everything captured.

The eight points of attention were:
1. speak politely
2. pay fairly for what you buy
3. return everything you borrow 4. pay for anything you damage 5. do not hit or swear at people
6. do not damage crops
7. do not take liberties with women
8. do not ill-treat captives.49

In addition, ZANLA had rules for mobilising the population which stressed forming good relations while avoiding harsh and brutal behaviour like that of the
Rhodesian security forces. When they were forced to punish traitors, they were advised to do it openly so that the public would be aware of the reasons: "Arresting and killing without discrimination is forbidden," these rules read. "In suppressing reactionaries, if possible, open trials should be held and crimes made public and notices posted."  
The Musami case violated all these norms. Guerrillas had not met the missionaries before, no warnings had been received and no motives were made known. The guerrillas also noticed that the security forces did not carry out their customary follow-up. As far as Tigere was concerned, the most convincing argument against guerrilla culpability for the crime was the fact that they had nothing to gain from the murders. On the contrary, such actions only served to alienate them from the local community and discredit them internationally. At the end of his investigations, Tigere reached the same conclusion as the JPC - that the Selous Scouts had been responsible: I stayed with the comrades. I was beaten but they didn’t kill unnecessarily. There were so many missions... they could have killed many European missionaries. Why didn’t they? The comrades hated only one thing the system... . From corner to corner, everybody knew the missions 163

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were the places where the comrades were getting their supplies. They were fed and rested at the missions. The Selous Scouts were going into these areas to blame comrades. [Tigere]
A former member of the Rhodesian Special Branch also reached this conclusion. He recalled how the Selous Scouts operated, carrying out robberies, murders and other atrocities that were then attributed to the guerrilla forces. He explained that by 1977 the Rhodesian forces were furious at the Catholic Church because they believed it was working in league with the guerrillas. He felt that the massacre was carried out by the Selous Scouts to break this alliance between the Church and the guerrillas:
A lot of things happened which we will never know but which we suspect were done by security forces and the blame was put on ZANLA. I mean I cannot say categorically but I suspect like the Musami incident... . So dreadful things happened to try to get the ZANLA cadres to dissociate themselves from the Roman Catholic priests. [Special Branch]
The killing of the missionaries, however, strengthened rather than destroyed the relationship between the nationalists and some of the leading members of the Church. The fact that a prominent and vocal segment of the Church was prepared to blame the Selous Scouts rather than the guerrillas showed how far it had dissociated itself from the Government and that it was moving much closer to the liberation movements. The massacre actually increased dialogue between missions and ZANLA forces as some guerrillas sought out missionaries to express their sympathy and to deny guerrilla responsibility for the brutal and senseless crime.51 The fact that ZANLA was in disarray at this
juncture might cast some doubt on its innocence. The possibility that a rogue guerrilla group was responsible cannot be completely ruled out nor is it impossible that elements of ZIPA where involved. Whatever the truth, Musami proved that the Church was prepared to give ZANLA the benefit of the doubt.

After the funeral of the seven slain missionaries, the Jesuit superior, Henry Wardale, returned to Musami to determine the future of the mission. "The whole area is a mixture of subdued fear and shock", Wardale wrote in his diary. He also noted that a bomb exploded in Musami township as he was leaving the mission, causing a number of deaths.

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During the following week, Wardale agonised over the decision he had to make. Unlike the Irish Carmelites who had developed a code of conduct for their missions in the war zones and all other personnel, neither the English nor the German Jesuits had any such common policy. Wardale, therefore, had to deal with each case as it arose. In the case of Musami, he made himself a list of reasons for and against keeping European missionaries at the mission. The list spells out the reasoning going on in mission communities throughout the country as they debated whether they should stay in the war zones, facing the danger of death:

AGAINST:
* The danger is too great to risk it.
* Other missions are in trouble and there are threats to them so the danger is real.
* Since it seems anti-European, we should staff it with Africans who seem safe.
* The witness of keeping Europeans there will not really be noticed or, if noticed, not remembered.
* What is the point of keeping the school going if most/many of the boys will cross the border and even return to attack us.
* African priests will take over anyhow so why not now?

FOR:
* We are, as Jesuits, expected to work in dangerous and difficult situations....
* We should maintain solidarity with our parishioners who are suffering and dying and are not able to choose to depart if they want to. It would look like deserting them and affect our future credibility.
* Many missions are in a potentially dangerous position and we should not want to give the lead in departing. African priests by themselves cannot begin to cope with the apostolic work.
* Immediate Africanisation would give the idea that we are willing to endanger relations with the African clergy and affect African vocations to the Society.
* The move would discourage Dominicans... and members of other
orders on missions.
* We should not give the impression that we easily give way to threats
or the message may get round that this is an easy way to break
mission influence.
* Although we may well lose some/much of our influence in secondary
education, we do not want it to be said that 1977 was the time when
the Church ran away from their schools.
* Mission a rallying point and gives the whole area stability.54
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With this mixture of self-interest, heroism and identification with the local
community, Wardale and the English Jesuits decided that expatriate personnel
should remain at the mission. At the same time, they increased the number of
African personnel.5
Though the Jesuits, LCBL and Dominican Sisters were never absolutely sure who
killed their colleagues, over the next two years they became deeply involved in
assisting the liberation forces. Each staff member interviewed has a different
recollement of the first time that they met guerrillas.
The LCBL candidate, Emerentia Naka, said that the ZANLA forces held their first
public meeting with staff and students at the end of the first term, which places it
in March or April 1977. She said that they denied responsibility for the murder of
the missionaries, calling on the mission to support them in their struggle. [Naka]
The headmaster of the secondary school, Peter Claver Uzande, recalled that the
ZANLA commander, Happy Trigger, came to see him shortly after the massacre.
Walking openly on the football field where Uzande was refereeing a game, Happy
Trigger told him that the mission had nothing to fear from the ZANLA forces.
According to Uzande, this was the beginning of a good partnership. [Peter
Uzande]
Br Dennis Adamson's first encounter with the guerrillas was more traumatic. A
letter, purportedly from ZANLA, demanded that Adamson be dismissed because
he had fired one of the mission cooks. Adamson went to the nearest guerrilla base
to plead his case in person. He said that his visit was met with apparent hostility
but he had been warned by the mujiba who had escorted him to the base that he
should show no fear, no matter what happened. Adamson passed the test. When
he remained calm while the guerrillas poured petrol on his car, threatening to burn
him to death, the atmosphere changed. "Brother, we do not want to kill you. We
are friends with the mission," the commander pledged. The guerrillas denied
having sent the letter, and invited Adamson to join them. He explained that he
could help in other ways than by taking up a gun. [Adamson]
The ZANLA forces were especially interested in getting help from the hospital. Fr
Nigel Johnson, SJ, a dentist who was in charge of the mission hospital at Musami,
mattered the guerrillas for the first time at the end of 1977 when they attended the
Sunday Mass he was saying for the school children. "Two young men with big
hats walked in and it caused quite a stir," he recalled. "I did not know they were
guerrillas because I expected guerrillas to walk in with guns... . They were just
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like nice local lads." [Johnson]
Fr Mark Hackett, SJ, the mission superior who had been in England at the time of
the massacre, met the guerrillas for the first time almost a year after the killings.
[Hackett] Happy Trigger approached him when he was visiting the hospital,
asking Fr Hackett if he liked beer. When he answered in the affirmative, Happy
Trigger promised to have a crate sent around in the evening. He kept his promise.
After that the guerrillas frequently visited the mission in the evenings, joining the
priests and brothers at recreation.
Sr Edward Chivavaya, LCBL, the boarding mistress, said that she often met the
guerrillas in the church, praying. "If they had wanted, they could have disturbed
the Mass," she said. "But they only waited for the Mass to end, then left.... The
vakomana only came to rejoice, to ask for food or to tell us the history of the war
of liberation." [Chivavaya]
The presence of guerrillas at the mission forced the staff to decide how far to get
involved in assisting them. The lay staff appear to have taken it for granted that
they would assist as much as they were able. The dilemma came for the religious
personnel, who had to overcome the effects of their training. They had been
taught that the Church was apolitical and should be neutral in times of conflict. Fr
Johnson recalled how these notions changed when he was confronted with the
reality of the liberation war:
I had a very clear scenario in my mind that the mission was neutral; that this was
a war and we did not get involved in war. The Church should somehow be in the
middle.... With the experience of seeing the people suffering from the effects of
the Rhodesian army you naturally felt for the people and against the army. And
then having first contact with the guerrillas; they were very pleasant and charming
in contrast to the Rhodesian army who were rude and brutal. At the same time the
people seemed to quite like the guerrillas and... you got the idea that it was not a
war in which you could be neutral but there was something at stake and you felt
obliged to take a stand. It was natural to take a stand; to be
on one side or the other side. [Johnson]
Fr Johnson became so involved that if he had to do it over again, he said he would
go off and join the guerrillas if they would have him. Br Adamson had a similar
conversion. "At first you say, I am a Church person, I cannot get involved," he
explained. "But at the end of the day you are involved in the whole thing. The
only difference was that
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I did not walk around with an AK rifle in my pocket, but you felt this is a cause
and you got caught up." [Adamson]
They got caught up in providing food, medicine, clothing and information to the
ZANLA forces, as well as transport on occasion. All mission personnel without
exception recalled the close working relationships that developed between the mission and the vakomana - the boys. A committee was set up to co-ordinate the collection of money from staff for the purchase of supplies. Led by the headmasters of the primary and secondary schools, and by Fr Johnson for the hospital and Br Adamson for the Mission, this committee purchased up to $500 worth of goods each month. Some of the lay staff calculated that they each contributed at least several thousand dollars to the cause during the three years that the guerrillas were active in the area. [Gwandura, Mukozhiwa, Peter Uzande]

Various staff members drove the mission truck to Salisbury to collect school and mission supplies as well as orders for the guerrillas. They have vivid recollections of being stopped and searched at the police roadblock on the Salisbury road, each time miraculously escaping detection. [Peter Uzande, Gwandura, Johnson, Adamson]

The guerrillas frequently communicated in writing with the mission, sending the letter with a mujiba from the area. The letters generally were requests for medicines, though occasionally they contained political lessons or warnings that the Selous Scouts were in the area. A typical request letter follows:

23 October 1978
Pamberi nehondo!
Pamberi nekubatana!
Pamberi neZANU!

Dear Johnson

As the struggle continues you know also problems continue. We have seriously injured people and the medicine is out so please try to arrange us a bit. Please, please and if you have a Red Cross medical kit would you mind giving me one. Also thermometer and forceps and small scissors.

Yours in the struggle
Happy Trigger

P.S. Opiom/Dyspum also needed. Do not tell us that you do not have the medicine. If you do not have you have to fetch from town today.56

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Another letter to Miss Hilary Wynne, a European lay nurse on the hospital staff, spelt out ZANU’s non-racial policies:

We do not hate you because you are white, no way. We hate the oppressor of any type. We have whites who are supporting this war and we are not in for destruction but for construction of our Zimbabwe. If you are also supporting the struggle, we will work with you....57

The case of Lovemore, a wounded guerrilla who was brought to the hospital for treatment in July 1978, became a living legend during the war. Mrs Nyamauya, a nurse who had worked at St Paul's since 1959, explained that soldiers, having been tipped off that one of the patients was a guerrilla, surrounded the hospital, demanding to search it. [Nyamauya] The nurses asked Fr Johnson, who was in the
process of operating on Lovemore, to leave. Dressing Lovemore as a pregnant women, they put him on the labour bed. As the nurses wheeled the bed into the labour ward, the soldiers stepped aside to let them pass.
The diocesan community of LCBL sisters was also involved in assisting the ZANLA forces. Though the priests had told the guerrillas that they were not to go to the convent, this directive was sometimes ignored. [Adamson] In one case, the guerrillas knocked on the convent door in the afternoon, asking for a place to rest after an encounter with security forces in a nearby township. The sisters vacated their rooms. [Naka]
Not all guerrilla groups were so friendly. Fr Hackett reported to Henry Wardale in mid-1977 that an anti-religious group was camped in the hills near Rota. This group forbade young people to attend church services and showed off watches which they claimed had been taken from the slain missionaries. Fr Hackett noted that the local people did not think this was a genuine group, adding that this might be wishful thinking on their part.5 In mid-1978 two students from the School of Social Work were taken for spies and killed by mujiba's when conducting research in the Musami area for the University's Department of Sociology.59
The religious and lay personnel at Musami gave credit to the ZANLA commander, Happy Trigger, for the good relations which the mission usually enjoyed with the guerrillas from mid-1977 to the end of 1978. Fr Johnson kept a diary throughout these turbulent years, which gives a day to day account of the extent to which the mission was involved in the liberation war. A few entries for 1978 illustrate the spirit of co-operation that existed, as well as the joy, even in the midst of danger:

6 August: Visited by Comrade James Gova and about 20 of his group, all heavily armed. The school children were in turmoil at seeing these boys all over the place as they gathered outside the church for night prayers. We prayed for Zimbabwe that night and sang Ishe Komborera Africa. The comrades drank, danced and smoked with the SJ community....
20 August: A request for medicines came from comrade Kidi Mutimwi, David Hondo and Jimmy Hondo. Fr Johnson took the medicine and met them at their camp. He returned again the next day with more medicine and to take photographs. This is the fourth group we have made contact with. They seem to be new....
6 December: Tonight about 30 ZANLA guerrillas came and addressed a meeting of those pupils left at the school - Form 1 and 3 and the hospital staff. The message... was that the Form 3 pupils must come back to school next term; they must not be afraid of the call-up or try to flee to Mozambique. The pupils very much enjoyed the meeting, sang well, answered the responses well, etc. It had the atmosphere of a party rather than a political meeting.
8 December: The rest of the pupils went home for the long holiday. They were very sorry to leave the mission. In the afternoon one of the ZANLA guerrillas was shot, but not killed just outside the mission. Fr Johnson and Sr Hilary went out and tended to him... 60

The mission staff at St Paul's had clearly taken sides with the guerrillas. In spite of the murder of the missionaries and the priests' initial intentions to remain neutral, they had been won over. The mission was providing for the material needs of the liberation forces as well as offering psychological relief from the tensions of the war. In a circular letter to rural missions, Fr Johnson explained that the mission could help to "humanise" the war. "If you are going to be dealing with guerrillas, then it is well to remember the strains under which they are living", he wrote. "Unlike a regular army, they are behind enemy lines 24 hours a day. They cannot be off duty until they return to Mozambique after several months.... Given the strains they live under, the mission can play a very important stabilising role". 61

Ten years after independence, some members of the ZANLA forces who operated at Musami praised the various supportive roles which the mission had played. Singling out Fr Johnson, they said they did not expect a white man to be so involved. Gilbert Uzande, a mujiba and brother of the headmaster of St Paul's Secondary School, recalled 170

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that Fr Johnson managed to get him released from detention after he and a friend had been arrested at the mission, accused of being "terrorists". [Gilbert Uzande] Chiororo Makombe, a political commissar who became detachment commander in 1979, remembered that Johnson gave him lessons in first aid and also gave him the book, Where There is No Doctor, which was sent to ZANU's Medical Headquarters in Mozambique. [Bhariri]

Dry Hondo, the section security officer, explained that he initially mistrusted Fr Johnson, thinking that he would report the presence of the guerrillas to the police and security forces. When Johnson found a bayonet and magazine about four kilometres from the mission and brought them to a nearby ZANLA base, Dry Hondo trusted him completely:

He (Johnson) was really a friend, not only a friend but I can say a mother and father. This was because when we asked for something, he had no hesitation. If he had, he could give. If he could help, he would.... He used to do what he said.... He was the man who motivated me so much. I thought he would one day be a sell-out and for about three to four months I didn't trust him. But after seeing his courage, I was very much interested in him.... He had come for the people, so he would work for the people. [Muwishi]

Another ZANLA commander, Bob Bouncer, recalled with gratitude that Fr Chitewe had once given him a shirt. [Mudzengerere] Fr Chitewe also helped Makombe compile his reports on the situation in the area. Makombe, too, was full of praise for the contribution of the staff at the mission: "We were very much
helped by the missionaries at St Paul's, especially Fr Johnson, Baba Chitewe and Br Adamson and other missionaries. They helped us quite a lot. All the comrades who got injured were being treated there and medical assistance, we were getting it from there." [Bhariri]

Both guerrillas and mission personnel were therefore in agreement that the relationship between them was close and positive. The missionaries later admitted that they were prepared to co-operate with the ZANLA forces, even if it had been proven that the guerrillas had murdered the priests and sisters. The Church personnel at St Paul's believed that the cause of the nationalists was just and accepted that breaches of discipline could and did occur. They were satisfied that ZANLA policy did not condone such killings. [Johnson, Hackett]

The internal settlement of March 1978 created new problems for the mission. The settlement Africanised the conflict by advancing black political leaders and introduced another army into the battlefield, the auxiliary forces of the interim leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole. An auxiliary training camp was established on a farm in Mrewa, about 20 kms from Musami on the Mtoko Road. The auxiliary forces began to visit the mission and to hold rallies in imitation of the guerrillas.62 Several battles were held in the vicinity of the mission, but even more worrying was the fact that some of the mujibas had switched sides. Kasikai, a leading mujiba in the area, had joined the auxiliaries and was now threatening to kill some of the mission staff. He was well aware of the extent of mission involvement with the ZANLA forces and could easily have used this against the mission. The guerrillas were also concerned. Happy Trigger sent a letter of warning to the mission.

I think those people (Kasikai and Lancelot) are after you. Whenever they come tell them (you) know nothing like comrades.... Please do not open the doors since the situation is hard these days. Whenever the forces come there, tell them the fault comes from those people Lancelot, Gringo, Knowwell and Kasikai....63

The mission was already in trouble with the Government forces. When Fr Johnson went to see Mr Bob Muffins, the member in charge of the Special Branch in Mrewa, about releasing the brother of Mr Uzande from detention, he was threatened with detention himself.64 Mullins used the occasion to harangue Johnson about the mission's collaboration with "terrorists" and told him that he would get a prison sentence of fifteen years unless he became a police informer. At the same time as the auxiliary forces were causing confusion and the Special Branch were threatening mission staff, there was a change of personnel within the ZANLA forces in the area. Happy Trigger disappeared, causing rumours that he too had defected to the auxiliaries or that he had been recalled to Mozambique. There were further rumours that he had been killed.6 His whereabouts were a mystery as was the identity of the commander who replaced him. New groups of guerrillas coming to the mission were much less predictable. Fr Johnson noted in his diary an increasing lack of discipline, with guerrillas coming to the mission
drunk and "making a general nuisance of themselves". Fr Hackett recalled that Jimmy Tambaoga, one of the most frequent ZANLA visitors at the mission, would come at all hours demanding drink and was fast becoming an alcoholic.

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1987 (MZ Tt Province (cmple fomiteviwsan ANA reivs
Provincial Commander - E Munyaradzi Provincial Political Commissar - H
Kundai Provincial Security and Intelligence - A Mhere Provincial Logistics and
Supplies - G Matunhu
Provincial Medical Officer - C Mukwanisi
Sectorial Commander - Mhumburu Kupisa Sectorial Political Commissar - Roy
Shupo
Sectorial Security and Intelligence - Pondai Mabhunu
Sectorial Logistics and Supplies - Thadies
Sectorial Medical Officer - Ngoro Moto
DC - Joseph Chacha DPC - Chiororo Makombe DSI - David Hondo DLS
DMO - Temba Mudziwendiri
DC - Masweet Kunaka DPC - Nzayo DSI - Martin Mazarura DLS - Kachingwe
DMO - Norton
PC - Happy Trigger PPC PSI
PC - Manesi PC - Bob Bouncer
PPC - Kuvamba Zvasiyana PPC PSI - I PSI - Sylvester Nhamo
SC - Sam Gabaza SPC - Gailord Zimunya SSI - Dry Hondo SMO - Nicolas
Zvenyika
Seto 2S usm
SC - Batsirai Muhondo SPC - Mc'Ntosh SSI - Alexander SMO - Jones
(NB: There were additional detachments, platoons and Sections within Takawira
Sector. The above are the ones that operated in the area of St Paul's Mission
Musami).
Fig. 16 Chart of ZANLA Command Structure Takawira Sector, 1978-79
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Fig. 17 Chart of ZANLA Command Structure, MMZ Province, 1979
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By the beginning of 1979, the situation had become so tense that the Jesuits decided to hold a meeting with the commander of the auxiliaries, Mr Danie Freeke, known as SaMtoko.67 Fr Spence, who had replaced Fr Wardale as superior, went with Fr Johnson to the auxiliary headquarters in Marandellas to report that Kasikai was threatening to kill the missionaries. SaMtoko concurred that Kasikai was unreliable, informing them that Kasikai was no longer allowed out of the camp without an escort. For this favour, he wanted the mission staff to persuade the guerrillas to accept a ceasefire. The missionaries did not refuse outright to act as mediators but said it was doubtful if ZANLA would listen since they had made it clear that they were not interested.

Far from accepting a ceasefire, ZANLA stepped up its operations in the area, sending in more forces to disrupt the March 1979 elections. According to the detachment commander, Makombe, several battles took place at polling stations in the area and many voters stayed away.68 In May 1979, the ZANLA detachment commander for Mangwende, Joseph Chacha, called a meeting of all the commanders in the area. They held a rally at the mission the day before their own deliberations, dancing to the mission band until almost midnight.69 The following evening five guerrillas came to the priests' house led by a newcomer called Chiororo Mabhunu. The Jesuits assumed he was the new commander, replacing Happy Trigger. He did not behave like Happy Trigger, however. "He became extremely unpleasant," Fr Johnson recorded in his diary. "He put the pistol to Br Adamson's head and cocked it, but did not fire. He ordered Fr Johnson about, to demonstrate his power and authority and waved his pistol at him. He also spoke against praying to Jesus, saying we should pray to the Vadzimu and said we do not respect black skin.... "70

After this frightening incident, the guerrillas abducted about 100 youths who were attending building and carpentry classes at the mission as well as another 100 from the surrounding area. Several of those kidnapped managed to escape the following day. Returning to the mission they reported that some of the guerrillas were accusing the priests of being "sell-outs".71 The Jesuits took the warning seriously, not wanting to risk a repetition of the missionary murders two years previously. All the expatriate missionaries and Br Adamson left the mission, while the African staff remained.72

A few days later, Joseph Chacha, the detachment commander, ordered the school to be closed.73 According to Mrs Nyamauya, the

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ZANLA forces entrusted the local community with protecting the mission from theft or damage, warning that anyone who stole from the mission would be severely punished. [Nyamauya]
The departure of the missionaries and the closure of the school had severe repercussions for ZANLA. Joseph Chacha was removed as Detachment Commander and punished for lacking discipline. It was said that he spent more time drinking with his girlfriend than waging the war. [Bhariri] Mabhunu, who
had threatened the missionaries, was Chacha's aide-de-camp, a very junior officer. Apparently he had been drunk and was showing off in the absence of his superior who was occupied with the meeting of district commanders. Mabhunu was given 55 cuts for harassing the missionaries."

Chacha's replacement, Chiororo Makombe, was a stern disciplinarian, who neither drank nor smoked himself. He punished many of the worst offenders, among them frequent visitors to the mission, like Kuvamba Zvasiyana and Jimmy Tambaoga. [Bhariri, Mudzengerere] The ZANLA files contain reports of this disciplinary action taken in the Musami area at the beginning of 1979: Comrades James Tambaoga and Kuvamba Zvasiyana were taking beer and doing a lot of indiscipline in the front. They were in Detachment D. They were all criticised - 35 cuts each and sent back to the front. James Tambaoga and David Tichatongo were careless in keeping material. They were sent to Tete for criticism.

Gaba Rinocheka took liberties with women in the front and organised his own food and clothes. He was ever against Party Regulations. He was working in Detachment D. He was withdrawn and sent to Tete.

Cde Stewart Nyakanhaka led to the capture of a comrade after the comrade had been wounded. He was also in Detachment D (Mangwende). He was criticised - 45 cuts and sent to the front again.75

A commissariat report for 1978 singles out Detachment D Mangwende from among the detachments in Takawira Sector for its discipline problems. The report points to the relative security and high standard of living in the area as the root of the problem:

Comrades in the sector (Takawira) have maintained a high standard of discipline and political consciousness as an example to the masses they freed from the keeps and are now living in the forests.... Deviation from the Party line is only found in Mangwende where the masses never

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5t PaU / s M/oSv, went into keeps and are able to buy materials such as tape-recorders, special clothes and beer for comrades, which led comrades to pleasureseeking and taking liberties with women.76

The mission may have contributed to this problem, as it supplied the guerrillas with clothing, cigarettes and drink on a regular basis. It is possible that the stabilising effect which the mission felt it was having could have spoiled the guerrilla forces to a certain extent. Fr Ken Spence, SJ, who was Archbishop Chakaipa's secretary during the war years and later the Jesuit Provincial, observed how some of the guerrillas softened over the years. "Some mellowed as time went on," he said. "Some mellowed too much. They dug themselves in and had a good time."77

Another problem in Takawira Sector according to Commissariat reports, was over-reliance on traditional religion. The chief mediums in the area were Gwenzi and Nyakunama, who both supported the guerrillas. ZANLA forces sometimes camped at Nyakunama's village, until it was attacked by Rhodesian troops.
[Matiza, Tasarira] Nyakunama said that he held weekly services to pray for the safety of the guerrillas and that each ZANLA detachment was protected by one of his assistants. [Matiza] Dry Hondo recalled that each morning, one of the guerrillas in his section was sent to the forest to offer snuff to the ancestors.7 Br Adamson confirmed that some of the ZANLA groups which passed through St Paul's were devoted to traditional religion:

There was strong belief that one time they are protected by God, the next time it is the ancestors. I remember... a group came through St Paul's dressed in black gowns and they would not eat meat brought from the town. It had to be chickens killed there and they would not have their sadza and meat from enamel plates; it had to be from a wooden thing. It was all instructions from Ambuya Nehanda. So you had groups who were like that. Do not kill snakes, they are protecting us.... Ambuya Nehanda is protecting us. [Adamson]

Many of the commanders who operated in that area credit the mediums with saving their lives on various occasions. Dry Hondo, who said he became a Catholic after the war because of his experiences at St Paul's Mission, recounted how a woman medium saved a ZANLA base by giving the guerrillas snuff which he believed made them invisible to enemy helicopters circling overhead. Hondo saw no contradiction between religious traditions. "I would always say a prayer to my ancestors and my God," he said, echoing the attitude of 177

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many of the Christians interviewed. [Muwishi]

Masweet Kunaka, the detachment commander for Goromonzi who had also participated in the abduction at St Albert's in 1973, was a firm believer in traditional religion. He said that he was directed to the war in a dream and throughout the war had many dreams which helped to save lives. He recalled that initially the guerrillas were unsuccessful in Goromonzi because they had consulted the wrong medium:

In Goromonzi we spoke to a medium from Chikwakwa which was not true to that area. It had just captured the place during the early wars. Whenever we set landmines they would not detonate, bazookas would not work. It was then that I asked those of that area and was told we had to go to Birinaganywe in Marandellas. So we sent someone by bus there and he went with snuff and told him our guns were not firing. Why? When he came back, he had the message that we could carry on because we had not informed him before. [Chando]

Perhaps it was incidents such as these which led to the following type of complaints by the Sectorial and Provincial Commissars:

Takawira Sector:

The midzimu tendency i.e., some of the comrades believed there are certain areas prohibited from being operated by 'Vanasekuru'. Suggestions to counter problems: All comrades will be ordered not to consult 'Vanasekuru' without a written report and approval from Sectorial leadership except when going for treatments. The patients can only be
accompanied by a Detachment Commander.79 Such traditional beliefs seem to have had little effect on the guerrillas' interaction with the mission. Though the number of Christians attending services declined during the war, there was no evidence at St Paul's that this was a result of guerrilla prohibitions. Adamson said that he asked the guerrillas outright if they were against people coming to church. "They said, 'No, no. We do not do that. Who do you think is protecting us when we are out there in the bush? Many of us went to Catholic schools'." The guerrillas told him that they objected to people gathering in the open to pray because they could easily be shot by security forces, but they did not oppose people travelling to the mission to attend church services.

[Adamson]

While guerrilla adherence to traditional religion did not cause problems for the mission, the uncertainty of the ceasefire period did. The combination of Happy Trigger's departure, Mabhunu and Tambaoga's threats, Kasikai's instability and Mullins' and Freeke's warnings created a crisis. The memory of the massacre was still fresh in everyone's mind. On top of that, Fr Donovan, SJ, had disappeared from neighbouring Makumbi Mission in January 1978 and was presumed dead.0 More priests had been killed in other parts of the country in 1978 as well. The total unpredictability of the situation finally convinced the Jesuits to withdraw Frs Johnson and Hackett and Br Adamson from St Paul's. In spite of letters from the guerrillas pleading with them to reconsider, they did not return to the mission until after independence.81

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It was the role the JPC had played in the investigation of Musami which was probably the most important single factor in the Government's action against the Commission later in the year. Almost immediately after the Musami incident, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a background briefing entitled, "Terrorists, Missionaries and the West". Alarmed at the influence which the JPC and Bishop Lamont were having over British and American attitudes towards Rhodesia, the briefing tried to discredit them as reputable sources of information. Claiming that attacks on Catholic missions were part of "terrorist strategy", the Government document sought to undermine the JPC and its President, Lamont. Apart from pro-nationalist Catholic newspapers like 'Moto' (which has now been banned), the Justice and Peace Commission remains the principal publicity-seeking Catholic structure under the outspoken and intelligent Bishop Lamont.... Officially, the Rhodesian Commission's functions are to work towards racial reconciliation and a more equitable social structure: in fact, however, it exists to 'ensure' the Catholic Church's future under black nationalism.... It is far from proven that the majority of Catholic priests or laity Sympathise privately with this selfappointed 'martyr' (Lamont), who sought to make his trial on charges of assisting terrorists into a 'Church versus the State' issue and proudly pleaded 'guilty'.82
A few months later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a "fact paper" on "Terrorist Attitudes Towards the Christian Religion and Missionaries in Rhodesia". This paper focused on the incidents at Musami and Avila Missions to prove that ZANU had adopted a Marxist ideology which was anti-religious.

Predicting the supersession of religion if the Patriotic Front forces ever came to power, it portrayed the nationalist forces as cynically manipulating the Churches:

Whatever attitudes Churches and missionaries adopt towards militant black nationalist movements, these Churches and their beliefs are seen by these movements as symbolic of white colonialism and oppression.

Missionaries sympathetic towards the cause of radical nationalism will be temporarily used to the benefit of the nationalists and then discarded and persecuted when power is obtained. Those who are not sympathetic will be persecuted and harassed anyway.

As this Government fact paper was being distributed, another series of "fact papers" prepared by the JPC was being suppressed. At the end of August 1977 the day before the Anglo-American negotiating team led by Britain's David Owen and America's Andrew Young arrived in Salisbury, the Government moved against the JPC. Members of the Special Branch searched the Commission's offices for fact papers dealing with the conduct of the war, which had been prepared specifically for the Anglo-American delegation. These papers covered sensitive issues such as protected villages, security legislation, propaganda, civilian deaths and the use of torture.

Four members of the JPC were arrested and charged with causing alarm and despondency. Mr John Deary, Fr Dieter Scholz and Br Arthur were released on bail while the Press Secretary, the present writer, was detained for three weeks and then deported. The Government used the arrests to try and split the Church, alleging that the Commission had been infiltrated by communists and supporters of terrorism.

As noted in Chapter 2, by 1977 the Government regarded the JPC as an enemy and the Commission's attempt to prove that the Selous Scouts had killed the missionaries at Musami was seen as particularly threatening. A former Special Branch Officer who was involved in investigating the charges against the JPC, acknowledged in 1988 the Government's hostility towards the JPC and its desire to put the Commission out of action:

The biggest thorn in Government's side was the Roman Catholic Justice and Peace Commission. I say Government because they did not like seeing and hearing the criticisms that were being levelled, because they knew it was true. It was undermining their authority and they wanted something done. And foolishly this move was made to arrest these people considered to be involved in publication of the reports of the Justice and Peace Commission... . It was treated as a matter that could be dealt
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with quickly and act as a deterrent... . It was a silly move and one that cost them a lot of support but the Government saw the Justice and Peace Commission as a very big obstacle and one that had to be removed. (Special Branch)

For the duration of 1978 the JPC was diverted from its normal work in order to assemble evidence for its court case. The charges were continually changed, forcing the defence to work overtime preparing new briefs. The following year Fr Dieter Scholz, the Commission's Deputy Chairman and the person most involved in preparing the Commission's defence, was deported.8

Henry Wardale, the Jesuit Provincial, had been carefully following events since the Musami massacre. A few months earlier he had predicted that a full scale attack on the Church was in the offering. "The Umtali arrests and Government pronouncements point in that direction," he suggested. "Government bitter and desperate - troop morale low and they are not containing the situation. Attack on Church in The Sunday Mail - said the missions were being used by the vakomana and the Bishops were just gullible."87

Now that his predictions had come true, Wardale accurately analysed the situation again, suggesting that the Government would moderate its attack because of the current political situation. "One might well ask whether this attack on J&P (JPC) is to be seen as the prelude to a wider attack on the Church... . This might be the case. It is true that some priests especially in the TTL's are the object of considerable animosity to the security forces. However, any wide scale hostility with the Church would not be the sort of atmosphere that would fit in well with the required atmosphere for an internal settlement."8

He was correct again. After a fullscale investigation lasting more than a year, all charges against the Commission were dropped on the grounds that a new political climate had been created by the transitional Government. The real reason, according to the chief Government investigator on the case, was that the Government realised it was likely to lose. (Special Branch) Though the JPC was set back by the attack, it had not been destroyed. By the end of 1977, members of the JPC had become directly involved with the liberation forces, warning them of impending attacks on their camps in Mozambique and Zambia.89 The warnings were given by flying to South Africa to telephone to the CIIR offices in London or to the Bethlehem Fathers in Switzerland who would in turn inform the nationalists in Maputo and Lusaka. The Commission had also begun to lobby the bishops to hold face-to-face meetings with the Patriotic Front leaders.90

With the introduction of the transitional Government in March 1978, the JPC's focus turned to diplomatic efforts to bring about a ceasefire and an all-party conference. After 1977, the JPC issued no further publications overseas, concentrating instead on the diplomatic arena. With its lobbying efforts in

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Washington, London, Lusaka, Maputo, and Rome, the spotlight shifted from rural missions to senate chambers and conference halls. With the inclusion of some bishops in the JPC delegation which held meetings with the internal and external political leaders, the focus of power was now beginning to move from the grassroots back to the hierarchy.91

Footnotes

Naka. Some ex-combatants believe that the dress of the group is the most significant proof that the killers were not genuine guerrillas. They claim that at this period all guerrillas dressed alike, in new khaki uniforms and that they were forbidden to plait their hair or wear different types of caps.

2 Notes regarding the massacre taken by Sr Dominica. Given by her to the author. These notes, together with my interview with Emmerentia Naka, form the basis of the account which appears in the next two paragraphs of the text.

3 Notes by Sr Dominica, p. 1.

4 For an account of the massacre, see O'Malley, 1980, pp. 66-123. Although Fr Wardale objected to this book because of its heavy reliance on the evidence of Fr Myerscough without any reference to the JPC and other views, it provides some useful details about the incident. See correspondence in SJA.

5 "Inquest" p. 2. This refers to a copy of the proceedings in SJA/326, File: Musami, Inquest of massacre: official transcript, "Inquest: Fr Thomas and six others". It should be noted that the record is written in the form of rough notes rather than complete sentences.

6 Naka. Also notes by Sr Dominica, pp. 2ff. (See footnote 2 above.) "Inquest" (see footnote 5 above), testimony by Begg (p. 3) and Perkins (p. 6).

8 The Rhodesia Herald, 9/2/77.

9 "Inquest", p. 2.


12 The Man in the Middle, London/Salisbury, JPC, 1975. See also "Inquest" (see footnote 5), testimony by Begg (p. 3)


16 Matondo. He left the area at the end of 1977 and practices changed over the years. In the period in question, however, he and others say that the guerrillas were not killing anyone. A comparison of ZIPA versus ZANLA and ZIPRA punishment of alleged traitors would be useful to determine if the practice changed during different periods.

17 Siegel. Also notes by Sr Dominica. (See footnote 2 above.)
'Ih' War anyod or~s MssIonS
"Ibid. There were rumours that an old woman came to the mission and warned
that the missionaries would be killed. See "Reflections by a
mission teacher" in the Jesuit Archives.
Chaplain's Weekly, 77/3, 17/2/77, p. 3.
20 Ibid., p. 2. see also Vatican Radio transcript. 21 The Daily News, Tanzania,
11/2/77, quoting The Rhodesia Herald. Private
collection of David Martin and Phyllis Johnson.
22 SJA/400-403: Wardale's notes, letters and diary, Diary entry for 10/2/77.
The author was given permission by the Jesuit Provincials, Fr Ken Spence and Fr
Joe Hampson, to quote from Fr Wardale's diary which is not available to the
public. It was in the possession of Dr Timothy
McLoughlin at the time.
23 The Daily News, Tanzania, 11/2/77. 24 Quoted in Wardale's diary: "Musami"
statement by JPC. 25 Ibid., 19/2/77.
26 Wardale's notes, 28/3/77.
27 Ibid., Hackett to Wardale, 6/3/77.
2 Ibid., 28/2/77 and 2/3/77.
29 Informal discussions with David Martin and Fr Joseph Elsener, SMB. 3"
David Martin in The Observer, 13/3/77. 31 Ibid.
31 Wardale's diary 26/3/77.
35 Ibid., 27/6/77.
36 Ibid., 6/4/77.
37 Ibid., 11/3/77.
3 "Inquest". (See footnote 5).
39 Ibid., p. 4 and p. 6. See also Wardale's comments on the inquest, 10/5/77.
"The events at Musami were remarkable in the worldwide interest shown in them
and in the dispute as to the responsibility for the crime. The inquest was of some
importance. It was the great chance of the Government to vindicate itself in the
eyes of the world; it was at least a chance to make a coherent case that would
convince fair-minded people....
In fact, what did they see? A shoddy presentation with contradictions that no
respectable lawyer would have passed. Obvious questions were not asked. The
official transcript was a cryptic summary, sometimes barely making sense and
containing errors. What reason was there for this rushed, uncritical inquest and the
miserable transcript? Either the
Government did not care or they had no case. Perhaps both...."
4JPC Archives, Box: 104, File: Incidents at Missions: Analysis of the inquest, *
unpublished, p. 6.
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41 Quoted in Revolutionary Zimbabwe, No. 6, 19/2/77, Zimbabwe Solidarity
Front, p. 2.
42 ZANU Press Statement, Geneva, 6/12/76, p. 6. Bishop Schmitt, Fr Weggartner and Sr Van der Berg were shot by a lone gunman on the Lupane road, 5/12/76.
43 Informal discussions with Fr Michael Traber. 44 Revolutionary Zimbabwe, op. cit., p. 1, quoting a BBC interview with Robert Mugabe on 8/2/77.
45 Even some ex-ZIPA members raised the possibility that an anti-Mugabe, leftist group may have been responsible for killing missionaries because of Mugabe's known links with the Church.
48 Wardale's diary, 9/4/77: "I heard that Silveira Mission was visited by the vakomana.... Put some sort of notice in the ground saying that the vakomana were not responsible for the deaths at Musami." See also war diary of Fr John Kilchmann, SMB, of Silveira Mission. Lent to the author.
50 Ibid., "Basic Principles for Guerrilla Warfare", p. 12. "...Many missionaries mentioned this fact. They also mentioned that the security forces used the massacre to threaten them in order to obtain their co-operation.
52 Some former members of the ZIPA/Vashandi grouping suspected that their forces might be responsible because of the strong anti-religious training that they had received in 1976. Looking back, they said they felt that it had been a mistake to adopt such an extreme Marxist position when many of their recruits were illiterate peasants who would misconstrue it to mean that all whites and all missionaries were evil and should either be killed or forced to leave Zimbabwe. The ZANLA files contain a report of the death of Momb Macheni at Houston Farm on 11/3/77. His gun was listed SMG0272. Another ZANLA operational report from Takawira Sector lists the death of Notalks Mabhena on 13/3/77 in Nehwembwa. He was listed as the Detachment Security officer. These were the two guerrillas named at the inquest. Fr Wardale noted in his diary that when the evidence was pointing to the Selous Scouts, the security forces were ordered to kill guerrillas who could serve as scapegoats. Hackett to Wardale, 6/3/77. OWardale's diary 12/2/77.

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54 Ibid., 14-21/2/77.
55 Ibid., 19/2/77.
56 SJA/400-403: Fr Wardale's notes, letters and diary. Happy Trigger to Fr Johnson, 23/10/78.
57 Ibid., Kuwamba Zvasiyana to Hilary Wynne, no date (translated from Shona).
58 Ibid., Hackett to Wardale, 18/5/77. 59 Kaseke. Accused of being spies, Kaseke and his two classmates were thrown into the Shavanhowe River with rocks tied to their bodies to make them sink. Only Kaseke survived.
60 Diary of St Paul's Mission, Musami, kept by Fr Nigel Johnson from July 1977 to July 1980. Lent to the author by Fr Johnson.
61 "Letter from one missionary to another", mimeo., 1979, p. 4. This letter is reproduced in full in Frederickse, 1982:301-302.
62 Bhariri. Johnson. See also Johnson's diary entry for 4/11/78: "Tonight's group called themselves the interim forces and they were a great contrast to the ZANLA forces who spoke before. Interim forces were showing off with their guns, frightened the kids by shooting a hole in the dining room roof. They were high on marahwana (sic), unable to walk straight, some collapsed unconscious. They spoke badly and the kids were bored for four hours. ZANLA a few weeks ago were drunk, some of them, but they spoke very well and the kids enjoyed it. No fooling around with the guns and relatively well organised and disciplined."
63 Wardale's notes, letters and diary. Happy Trigger (or Judas Black Moses) to Fr Johnson, undated.
6 Johnson's diary, entries for 23-24/7/78.
6 Naka said that Happy Trigger was killed in an assembly point in Mtoko during the ceasefire period. Matondo said that Happy Trigger killed himself when he was caught in an ambush at Pakati. Adamson heard rumours that he had defected to the auxiliary forces. Bhariri said that he was sent back to Mozambique because he had been in the area for too long and had become corrupt. Not one of the more than 25 people I interviewed concerning Musami has seen him since independence, so it seems that he died before the end of the war either within Zimbabwe or in Mozambique.
"Johnson's diary, entry for 6/5/79.
67 Johnson. Also his diary entry for 25/1/79. 'Bhariri. This was confirmed by other ex-combatants and ex-mujibas. 619 Johnson's diary, 7/5/79.
70 Ibid., 9/5/79.
71 Ibid., 115/79.
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14 Kachere. He denied that he had harassed Fr Johnson, suggesting that someone else might have been impersonating him. Other ex-combatants who were with him during the war and continued to work with him in the army confirmed that he was the guilty one. Chando confirmed that Kachere had been severely punished for the incident. This was also confirmed by Bhariri and Muwishi.
Chapter 7
WITH THE PEOPLE: MUTERO MISSION, Gwelo (GWELO DIOCESE, ZANLA'S MUSIKAVANHU SECTOR)

People will not forget a gospel which they have been living and sharing through a period of painful social and political changes. They will not easily abandon a Church which has gone along with them in the thick of troubles.

Gwelo Guidelines, 20 September 1977

The Mutero mission community in the late 1970s consisted of Fr Anthony Wey, the mission superior, Fr Walter Kaufmann, Fr James Bernet, and for a time, Fr
Winterhalder, all of the Bethlehem Mission Society, and five sisters of the Diocesan Congregation of the Infant Jesus (SJI): Sr Tarcisia Gundani, the superior, Sr Josephine Makamure, Sr Brigid Pasipamire, Sr Avila Ziki, and Sr Mechtilde Ndebele, sisters who ran the primary and the secondary school and the clinic. They all stayed at the mission until the end of the war, in spite of the hardships and dangers and the fact of being cut off from all outside communication and transport from April 1979 to April 1980. There was also a large lay staff.

Some of the earliest missions of the Jesuit and Dominican pioneers were established in the Midlands and Masvingo Provinces, which today comprise Gweru Diocese. The Bethlehem Missionaries first moved into Gutu District – then a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) stronghold – in 1945. Within the next 25 years, the number of baptised Catholics grew sevenfold and African vocations flourished. (Dachs and Rea, 1979:156)

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Fig. 18 Map of Gwelo Diocese

Source: Dachs and Rea The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe 1879-1979
"The War is over All 4 Isslo./k-
Like the Jesuits, the Bethlehem Missionary Society relied on schools as the main source of converts (Daneel, 1971:210), and the DRC's closure of five of its schools opened the door for Catholic expansion in the area. Simon Mutero, one of Mutero Mission's founders, persuaded his father, a local leader, to win the support of Chief Chagwiza for Catholic entry into this former DRC preserve. Mutero explained that the DRC missionary at Alheit Mission tried to persuade the chief to stop the Catholics from entering the nyika, but Chagwiza said to him: "I have had enough of the DRC missionaries because many of my children are not now attending school. They have not attended for a long time now because you closed down the schools."
(Daneel, 1971:226)
This policy of expanding the school system had often led to conflicts with the other Churches, and in these conflicts the Colonial Government intervened on the side of the Catholics. Bishop Haene believed that this was due to the influence of the Prime Minister, Godfrey Huggins, who wanted to keep out the South Africans with their openly segregationist policy. [Haene] (The DRC was closely linked to its sister Church in South Africa.)
Similar disputes developed over the establishment of clinics and hospitals. At one stage, competition was so intense that the parish priest at Mutero, Fr Suter, wrote an urgent letter to the Bishop pleading for speedy action in starting a hospital before the DRC took over two local clinics. "I keep quiet of our plans," he wrote, "but I should say that his Lordship will have to act quickly. Otherwise the DRC may win the race."
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According to Mr Goposo, a leader at Alheit Mission, the DRC headquarters in Gutu, which had been founded in 1910, Catholics had a distinct advantage in the competition for influence:
The fathers mix freely in African society and go further in associating with people at the village level than I myself would go. They go into the reserves and befriend people by drinking beer with them. That is something we DRCs cannot do, and to some extent it is a pity, because at a beer party, there are only two possibilities; making friends or making enemies, and when you are in, you are in! (Daneel, 1971:226)
The fathers' skill at making friends extended into the realm of nationalist politics. In 1964, when ZANU opened a Party office at Basera, about 10 kms from Mutero, the priests from both Mutero and
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Mukaro established good relations with the local ZANU officials who were all Catholics. The ZANU chairman, Crispin Mandizvidza, a builder and storekeeper, had been helped to start his business by Bishop Haene and he and his wife remained friends and supporters of the Church over the years. [Haene] The DRC leaders at Alheit, on the other hand, wanted to have as little contact as possible with the politicians. (Daneel, 1971:68,227; Daneel, 1987:130)
The opening of the ZANU office in Basera immediately attracted Government attention to this remote area in the heart of Gutu district. The bombing of a store owned by a ZAPU supporter a few months later brought down the Government's security apparatus on the local inhabitants. Several women were rounded up and detained in the mistaken belief that they would tell the authorities who was responsible for the bombing.

The detention of women, most of them mothers with small children, politicised the area as no campaigning could have done, making Gutu district a centre of anti-government sentiment and activity. Many of ZANU's political and military leaders were recruited from the area and many of them were Catholics.

One of the most prominent parishioners from Zvavhera, an outstation of Mutero Mission, was Simon Muzenda. A leader of the lay apostolate in Gwelo Diocese as well as a trade union leader, he was elected the Deputy Organising Secretary of ZANU at its first Party Congress in 1964. He was tireless in raising the question of politics and religion to a Church that still wanted by and large to keep them in separate compartments. The parish priest at Mkoba township, Gwelo, Fr Constantine Mashonganyika, recalled Muzenda's frustration at the conservatism of the Church in those days:

Muzenda was quite connected to the youth group in Mkoba. When he had to decide to go to Zambia we had long discussions with him. He was a leader in the lay apostolate in Gwelo, but whenever anything came, there was a tendency to say we shouldn't be so outspoken. That was the general atmosphere in the Catholic Church... The overall teaching of the Church was, "leave politics alone".... It was for Protestants to be politicians.4

Mutero Mission produced another prominent member of ZANU, Josiah Tungamirai, who had studied for the priesthood but quit the diocesan seminary because of its political conservatism and racism. (Martin and Johnson, 1981:76-77) As ZANLA's chief military political

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commissar and third ranking member in the ZANLA army, he advocated a policy of cooperation with Christian missions, regarding them as potential allies in the struggle against minority rule.5

In the 1960s, the interaction between priests and politicians like Leopold Takawira, a former seminarian, and Simon Muzenda helped to politicise the Church in Gwelo Diocese. In the 1970s, the interaction between the rural missionaries and the guerrillas took this process a step further. The liberation war in Zimbabwe began almost at the same time as major changes were taking place in the Catholic Church as a result of the Second Vatican Council. It also coincided with the birth of liberation theology in Latin America where the Bethlehem Society also had missions. This new openness of the Church to the world, combined with the concrete situation in Zimbabwe, would lead in some cases to willing participation in Zimbabwe's armed struggle.

One such case was that of Fr Walter Kaufmann, SMB, who came
to Mutero Mission in 1977 from St Ambrose Mission, Matibi. Kaufmann had been at St Ambrose since 1969 and knew the Matibi people well by the time the guerrilla forces arrived there in early 1976. In response to the ZIPA infiltration, the security forces sealed off much of the area. Refused entry to many of his outstations, Fr Kaufmann appealed to local Government officials to be allowed to work in the affected areas.

With their often reluctant agreement, he visited the different Mass centres on a regular basis, eventually coming into contact with the guerrilla forces in June 1976. Some began to confide in him, sharing their personal stories of why they had joined the struggle. Deeply moved by their tales of suffering and commitment, he made a decision to support them. As he explained in 1989:

I believed in these guerrillas. They were also people and I knew from Makambe (Matibi) how many had to leave Zimbabwe, leave the country because of cruelty to them, because of their aspirations. At Makambe, a group of guerrillas showed me the soil and said, "The people have to plough this stony ground and the Europeans have the best farm land and we have to stay in such places as this." They are people. We have contact with them. I knew a lot of comrades who were students.... I was never shown any enmity or hostility there in the whole southern area or at Mutero, Gutu. [Kaufmann]

The hostility and enmity came from the other side - from the Rhodesian Government's police and security forces. Kaufmann recalled how these Government representatives terrorised the local population, burning their homes, beating, arresting and torturing them. When Fr Kaufmann protested, they turned against him as well. Speaking of the District Commissioner in Nuanetsi, Kaufmann observed: "He was really like a Nazi.... I had a bad name with the officers and with the police. They searched my house and questioned me more and more often." [Kaufmann]

The guerrillas also gave him a name. They called him "Comrade Chamuka Inyama" (Whatever comes). Sister Tarcisia Gundani, SJI, who was with Fr Kaufmann at Mutero explained what the name meant. "Whether I live or whether I die, whatever comes, I'll stay here with the people. That is a man of Zimbabwe," she said, describing Fr Kaufmann and his commitment to the people. [Gundani]

Fr Kaufmann's conflicts with Government officials and soldiers in Matibi caused Bishop Haene to remove him for his own safety in early 1977. Arriving at the Bethlehem Headquarters in Switzerland in March 1977, Kaufmann encountered ZANU representatives Dzingai Mutumbuka and Fay Chung, who had come from the Geneva Conference. He readily agreed to Chung's request to be interviewed for a report she was compiling for ZANLA's military commanders. Kaufmann's testimony gave a comprehensive picture of the situation in the south-east in 1976 and early 1977. His positive portrayal of the guerrillas contrasted sharply with the image presented by the Rhodesian media at the time. The
following excerpts from his testimony to Fay Chung reveal his impressions of both the Government and the guerrilla forces:

Roughly 50% of the population of 50,000 have been taken in for interrogation by the security forces. Torture is a common procedure during interrogation. Also the army is encouraged to burn the granaries and fields of the people. They even burn villages.... The security forces have killed at least 20 curfew breakers in the area...

. The relationship between the freedom fighters and the people is very good. The vakomana always consulted the people before taking action against anyone, although there still remains the danger that someone can be killed as an informer as a result of a rumour. On one occasion, the villagers asked the vakomana not to place landmines near the villages but to place them further away in uninhabited areas. The vakomana complied. In talks with the people, the vakomana speak of the aim of their fight. They

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GUTU TRIBAL TRUST LAND
CHIKWANDA TRIBAL TRUST LAND BC - BUSINESS CENTRE
Fig. 19 Map of Mutero Mission
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show respect for their elders and give the impression that they are not against the traditions and traditional religion. They talk of their ancestors and of restoration of the land. As a result, people are much more politicised and think in terms of nation rather than in terms of just the family as before. About 15 people have been killed by the vakomana in the area. They were all informers. Thus it is now known that those who sell information for money will not live to enjoy the money.... The vakomana have spoken out in the villages against polygamy, but they only criticised in the most extreme cases. At present, recruitment in the area by the vakomana has stopped, although many people in the area still manage to join, including many girls. Matibi, like Berejena, is controlled by the vakomana. Usually, the security forces can only enter by helicopter or plane. So safe is the area that at one time, a large meeting of freedom fighters took place, when their leaders came from Mozambique to speak.6

Fr Amstutz, the Bethlehem Superior, no doubt drew on the experiences of Kaufmann and other priests in the war zones in his talk to the Driefontein Symposium in March 1977. For Kaufmann, this experience of living in a semi-liberated area where he had regular contact with the guerrilla forces prepared him for his new assignment to Mutero Mission in Gutu. The other priests who were with him at Matibi jokingly referred to this period at Matibi as Walter's "noviciate in the struggle". He confirmed that these experiences prepared him for the future. "The relationship I had at Makambe helped me at Mutero. I was not afraid any more." [Kaufmann]
ZANLA forces operated in the districts to the north and south of Gutu from early 1976 but only entered the area around Mutero Mission, in the heart of Gutu District, in late 1977.

Operational reports from ZANLA's military commanders at this time provide an intriguing glimpse of their activities in Gutu District:

We were at Chiura, Gutu (13.1.78). The enemy came to attack us while we were giving politics to our masses. The enemy opened fire and we returned fire.7

We destroyed the enemy council [Hama, Chilimanzi] which was harassing our masses of paying taxes (9.2.78). We found a truck of Chibuku (traditional opaque beer, ferried in tankers) at the council and we took the whole beer and gave to our beloved masses. We gave our masses the right to take many Castles (bottled lager) to their places.... Some shouted "Pamberi neChimurenga." All comrades were in high morale to see their masses happy for doing good things to them.8

We were at the mission (Gokomere) addressing our masses (12.2.78). The time we dismissed the masses, the enemy started firing at us and we returned the fire. There were three ambushes but we retreated safely.9 Bako, Gutu; we were in our ambush after the information that the Skyline buses are carrying enemy soldiers (22.2.78). They act like conductors, so we waited for the bus and the bus had three soldiers...; one on top of the bus with FN and two inside the bus with pistols. The time we stopped the bus, one of the enemy soldiers was seen by one of our comrades and he was shot.10

Though the ZANLA forces never actually entered the mission premises until mid-1978, the priests, sisters and lay staff at Mutero were aware of their presence in the outlying areas, occasionally meeting them at various outstations. In early 1977 Fr Anthony Wey and Sr Brigid Pasipamire drove past a guerrilla group which had stopped a bus at Sheshe near Gutu Mission. "I passed the bus slowly," recalled Fr Wey. "Nobody stopped us. We heard stories that guerrillas sometimes stopped buses and demanded money and watches from the passengers and from the conductor. They also checked identities of passengers."11

In July 1977 Fr Wey again drove past a group of armed men, this time on the road between Mutero Mission and Basera where he had gone to say Mass. As he passed Guzha School, two men with automatic rifles whom he assumed were guerrillas began shooting at the green truck he was driving. Escaping unhurt, he later received apologies from the guerrillas who claimed to have mistaken the mission truck for an army vehicle. Fr Wey kept the incident to himself: "I didn't inform the police as law required... at that time. I reasoned: If I let the police know, the army will come and there will be a big enquiry. The guerrillas would revenge themselves."12

Instead, an act of revenge by Government security forces in May 1978 led to the death of almost 100 civilians at a farm at Kamungoma to the north-east of
Devure. This horrific incident, which became known as the "Gutu Massacre", was brought about by the farm owner's son, a black soldier in the Rhodesian army who was on home leave for the weekend. When he learned that ZANLA would be holding apungwe there, he reportedly arranged for his fellow soldiers to attack the gathering. 11

The Justice and Peace Commission issued a press statement a few days after the massacre, condemning the killing of innocent civilians, and sent an investigator to Kamungoma to find out what

Mutero Missiopi

had happened.14 He reported that a group of eight guerrillas had entered the homestead that Sunday afternoon, sending word for people in the vicinity to gather for a meeting in the evening. The guerrillas as well as the local youth then spent the afternoon drinking, failing to exercise caution or vigilance. Only one unarmed guerrilla addressed the meeting while others were still in outlying areas gathering people or in nearby homes with local girls. A warning that security forces were approaching was ignored. According to the JPC Report, security forces deliberately fired at civilians at close range, attempting to kill or injure as many as possible:

Members of the security forces approached the crowd and one shot was fired. The guerrilla who had been addressing the people called out to the audience to lie down and then he fell dead. The people in the gathering, men, women and children threw themselves to the ground. There was much shooting. A grenade or something that gave out a bright light was thrown into the crowd. Some people tried to run away and others were buried under the dead. One eye-witness says that he heard the commander of the soldiers give an order "Fire" and then the group in uniforms used machine guns against the crowd. Fire was aimed at the prostrate people. Survivors state that there were no guerrillas present except for the one who died when the first shot was fired and they say that the shooting was at such close range that the army must have seen that they were shooting at civilians and not at armed men.

The firing went on for quite some time.15

The priests and sisters from Mutero were among the first to arrive on the scene the following day, burying the dead, treating the wounded and comforting the survivors. The sisters rescued a child whose parents had been killed in the incident, taking him to their convent where he lived until he completed his education.16 The priests requested the Red Cross and the Catholic Commission for Social Services and Development to provide relief aid for the survivors.7 The tragedy cast a deep shadow over the area. "There is bitterness one can almost touch and it is against guerrillas, Security Forces, the whole white race, and it will take a long time to die out," the JPC investigator observed.18

On this unhappy note, Mutero Mission entered the war.

Less than a month after the Gutu massacre had wiped out whole families from Chimombe Reserve and the Devure Purchase Area, the
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staff of Mutero were called to attend their first pungwe at Gonye School. "It was quite an experience to attend a meeting with the same dangers as that fateful gathering at Kamungoma, although there was better 'protection',' Fr Kaufmann wrote to the JPC. "However, I am convinced it helps to go through the same dangers as the people."19

After this public introduction to the ZANLA detachment which had entered the area from Buhera, the guerrillas made their first visit to the mission. Keven Masango, Detachment Security Officer, was their spokesman, soon winning the confidence of the mission staff. The first meeting with the headmaster of the primary school and some of the teachers was not easy, however. Though the guerrillas already knew and trusted Fr Kaufmann, they were suspicious of the other missionaries and of the lay staff who worked with them. Mr Mutanga, the primary school headmaster, explained that they had to win the trust of the guerrillas. "They were in good books with Fr Kaufmann, much better than what they thought about us," he said. "So after some time, they realised that Fr Kaufmann and ourselves were indentical as far as our behaviour was concerned so they became our friends." [Mutanga]

Keven Masango, who had joined the struggle in 1975 from Rushinga confirmed that the ZANLA forces received a positive reception from every member of staff at the Mission, priests, sisters and laity. In particular, he recalled his first meeting with the Swiss priests: "We talked to them about the war and said that we didn't want them as priests to tell the soldiers about us and to cause harm to us. They said that they would co-operate with us. They said that their aim was to work with us, support us and they truly did as they said." [Katende]

The guerrillas first visited the sisters' convent in October 1978. At approximately 8 p.m. the sisters were listening to the evening news on the radio in their sitting room. According to Sr Josephine and Sr Tarcisia, several guerrillas entered the room, inviting the five sisters to come outside where they found about 50 ZANLA soldiers assembled. The guerrillas asked for watches and medicine. Only Sr Josephine and Sr Avila responded, giving the comrades their watches and accompanying several ZANLA medics to the clinic to fill their order. The sisters then went with the guerrillas to a pungwe where they remained until after midnight. [Makamure, Gundani]

After this first encounter, in which the guerrillas approached the priests, sisters and lay staff separately, the three groups met together 198

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to determine how they would support the nationalist forces. Initially they agreed to pool their resources, but as guerrilla demands grew, the priests withdrew, claiming that they were unable to raise the money. [Wey] The lay staff then bore the brunt of meeting the material needs of the ZANLA forces, though Fr Kaufmann and the sisters continued to help in their own way. The withdrawal by
the priests from this pooling system would eventually create tension between them and the lay staff. [Mutanga, Mutero]

Though no member of the mission staff failed to assist the ZANLA forces in some way, Fr Walter Kaufmann, Sr Josephine Makamure and Sr Avila Ziki went further than the rest because of a growing commitment to the guerrilla cause. Kaufmann had been politicised by his experiences in Matibi while the two sisters viewed the guerrillas as their brothers, deserving their support. [Makamure] Sr Josephine's brother was ZANU's chief representative in Canada, while Sr Avila's brother, Victor, was a member of ZANLA Forces and once visited her at Mutero. As the nurse in charge of the mission clinic, Josephine had frequent contact with the guerrillas who came in search of treatment and medicine. We have already seen that ZANLA placed a high priority on acquiring medicines in order to treat the local population. The Musikavanhu Sector was no exception. A ZANLA commander in the sector explained why this was such a priority in a report to Headquarters in May 1978:

One of the surest ways of mobilising the masses is the ability to solve their problems, especially healthwise. If we would have more medicine at the front, it would do us good. Medicine is one thing the enemy, even puppets Sithole and Muzorewa do not offer them free or adequately to the masses. The effective treatment given by ZANLA Medical Officers had inspired confidence in the future with ZANLA to most of the masses who received treatment.

Josephine was prepared to co-operate, acquiring additional medicine for this purpose from the Red Cross and from Gertrude Sheu, a Swiss volunteer who was the diocesan co-ordinator of the Catholic Commission for Social Services and Development. [Makamure, Sheu] Sister Josephine counselled her staff of five never to tell the Rhodesian authorities what they were doing and to deny it if they were questioned.

One of the nurses, Epiphania Nyandoro, recalled several occasions when Rhodesian soldiers came to the clinic searching for injured ZANLA guerrillas. She said that they beat the nurses, threatening to close the clinic and to kill Sr Josephine unless the staff co-operated with them. [Nyandoro] Fearing for Sr Josephine's safety, the nurses sometimes persuaded her to sleep in the clinic with the other patients so the soldiers would not find her. On one occasion some of the patients may have saved her life when they told the Smith forces they had
not seen Sr Josephine, though they knew she was lying in the bed next to them. [Makamure, Nyandoro]

In addition to giving medicines to the guerrillas, Sr Josephine, Sr Avila and the lay nurses often visited nearby ZANLA bases to instruct ZANLA medical officers how to use them. Sr Josephine also warned ZANLA forces of the presence of Rhodesian troops in the area and she and Sister Avila sometimes made the long and risky journey to Fort Victoria to buy clothes for the guerrillas with money from the priests or from the clinic. When the road from the mission to Gutu was mined during the final year of the war, the two sisters got up in the middle of the night and walked 53 kms to Gutu where they boarded the bus. On the return journey, of course, they had to repeat the long hike. [Makamure]

The guerrillas eventually felt so at home with the sisters that they often arrived early in the morning for breakfast at their kitchen, leaving before anyone else at the mission was aware of their presence. Some of them confided in the sisters, telling them their life histories as well as the hardships they encountered in the war. The sisters, too, felt free to advise the guerrillas about their behaviour and to report acts of indiscipline to senior commanders. When a guerrilla proposed love to Sr Josephine, trying to trick her into being alone with him, she reported the case to the Detachment Security Officer, Keven Masango, who immediately had the offender removed from the area. [Makamure]

Fearing that the expatriate missionaries, aside from Fr Kaufmann, might have links with Rhodesian Government officials, the guerrillas consulted the sisters about the attitudes and behaviour of the Swiss priests at Mutero.21 The sisters also advised the priests how to act and what to say to the nationalist forces. As Sr Tarcisia explained:

"The fathers were very good, they would take any word we were telling them. I think that's why we were saved, both of us. They would supply them with what they had in the form of money or petrol or whatever and we only helped them with the word of mouth. We'd say "Fathers, if it
particular priest." That was Fr Kaufmann. They said, "What do you know about him?" I said, "This one works with the people. His colour is just his colour but I know he's more of a liberator than you can think of." [Mandizvidza]

After this introduction, Mrs Mandizvidza accompanied Fr Kaufmann to a ZANLA base at Tiresi where he was interrogated by a ZANLA commander named Jesus. Shortly after, Kaufmann was invited to apungwe at Basera. From then on, he was totally accepted and was the only churchman allowed to move freely throughout the district. [Mandizvidza, Kaufmann]

Concurring with Mrs Mandizvidza, Sr Tarcisia described the close relationship which Fr Kaufmann had established with the guerrillas: "Whenever they (ZANLA forces) came in, they were talking about Fr Kaufmann. If we say we know Fr Kaufmann, we are safe.... He spent all he had on them. They liked him very much." [Gundani]

She said that the guerrillas especially liked it when Fr Kaufmann shared a cigarette with them, taking a few puffs himself before passing it around. "They never expected a European to be that close to them," she explained. In a racist society like Rhodesia at that time, this simple act of sharing and socialising between black and white was significant because it was so rare. Such acts made an impact on the sisters as well and were the kind of example that Sr Josephine used when asked by the guerrillas to comment on the attitudes and behaviour of the priests:

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I was saying they are really good. Even if you come, you will see that they will give you meat and sadza like what we eat. We eat together. They never show that they can't eat with us because we are African. [Makamure]

A detachment security officer in the area, Petros Mabvongodze, who had also operated at Murambinda Mission in Buhera and Gandachibvuva Mission in Enkeldoorn, praised Fr Kaufmann for his co-operation and support:

Even some of the comrades were using him as a Political Commissar for the Party. That father is very good and even now if you ask some of the villagers in the area, they will tell you that Fr Kaufmann was their father. He was a hard worker and I am sure if he is still there, he is still carrying on with his good work. [Mabvongodze]

He mentioned that Fr Kaufmann lent the guerrillas his radio so that they could listen to the news and that he travelled 80 km to Chivhu on his bicycle to collect the British newspapers so that the ZANLA forces could read about political developments during the Lancaster House Conference.22

The platoon commander for the area, Aaron Chimurenga, made no distinction between the priests and sisters, but said they all understood the cause of the war and supported the guerrillas. He explained how the guerrillas protected the priests, making it possible for them to remain and even to visit the outstations. Giving Fr
Kaufmann as an example, Chimurenga described how the guerrillas facilitated his work:
If he wanted to travel by car, it was us that would tell him when to travel since we knew what we had planted in the roads would not be there....
Any day he went on foot, it was us who would have told him to leave his car, the road was dangerous.... At Makura, he would meet some of us and also even on the way. Hence soldiers always questioned him why he wasn't killed by the terrorists, yet he travelled that much. [Shanganya]
Fr Kaufmann confirmed that the ZANLA forces never prevented him from doing his pastoral work. He said that they encouraged him to continue and, on one occasion, they even urged him to have an ecumenical service with the Dutch Reformed congregation which met in the same hall. Other Churches were encouraged by Kaufmann's example to resume their services and many non-Catholics prayed for his safety. [Kaufmann] This was a great change from the inter-church

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rivalry that prevailed when the Catholics first entered the area.
The lay staff at the mission bore the brunt of the war. Gutu was their home and they wanted to remain there in spite of the dangers and hardships. Some of their friends and relatives had been killed at Kamungoma. They knew that the same thing could happen to them, but they stayed, sacrificing most of their material wealth in contributions to the guerrillas. They also took on much of the responsibility for keeping Church activities going and protected the priests and sisters as much as possible.
Both Mutanga, the primary school Headmaster, and Simon Mutero, the co-founder of the mission, teacher and acting headman, cited a briefing by Fr John Kilchmann, SMB, of Silveira Mission, as being significant in helping prepare them for the war. [Mutanga, Mutero] Having been on the front line since March 1977, Silveira Mission became a case study for others in the diocese to follow. Fr Kilchmann was a member of the Gwelo Diocesan Crisis Committee which had drawn up the Gwelo Guidelines described in Chapter 2. His written record of wartime experiences at Silveira begins with the following reflections:
Our mission stations..., always remained open and naked. This was not simply a matter of finances. We wanted to remain in solidarity with the ordinary people. (For) our missionary and social work (to) go on, we had no alternative but to accept risks.... With meshes and walls around us all, trust in us would have been gone for good. What has to be protected? What has to be hidden? There was no other way but to learn
to live with both guerrillas and security forces.23
Unlike the sisters and priests, the laity were not excused from attending the evening political meetings held by ZANU and these became a regular feature in their lives. While the risks of gathering were great, these meetings were generally popular among the staff at Mutero because of the songs that were sung. "They were so clever that they could use the tunes from the Church, fitting their own
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Kanotembwa, felt that:
Those songs of chimurenga are songs of crying... . There are so many ways of teaching the people. In teaching, some could not understand, but some could understand in singing.... At last, they came to know that we are their children and they are the original owners of this country and we are fighting for them. [Kanotembwa]

In spite of the danger involved, the laity also took the risk of practising their faith openly. While they said that ZANLA never interfered with church activities in the area, the security forces sometimes prevented people from gathering for prayer. According to Mrs Mashaya, the wife of the catechist at Basera, Christians avoided attending services when they knew that Government soldiers were in the area, fearing that they would be attacked. "The comrades never prevented people from praying," she said. "They wanted the people to pray in private to prevent harm." [Mashaya]

The laity were unanimous in interpreting ZANLA's policy toward religion as a question of priorities. Summing up the opinion of virtually all the laity interviewed, Mutanga said that the guerrillas were not against Christianity or the Catholic Church but wanted people to concentrate on the war. "They didn't want the people to be involved in a number of different things," he explained. "That's why they were against taking the cattle to the dip tank and going to church." 24 Lay leaders like Mutero and the catechist, Mashaya, kept the church going in Gutu District. No Sunday went by without a service at the mission church, even when the priests were withdrawn during the ceasefire period. The courage and dedication of the laity in the entire Gwelo Diocese made a great impression on the priests, who came increasingly to rely on them. As Fr Bernet observed:
We have seen that a few of the catechists were able to run the church for years without seeing one single priest. And there were quite courageous girls who took the Holy Communion in sacks in baskets with food on top.... They were able to go into all areas and through the lines.... I did admire really the work of the catechists and the work of the community leaders. How they were able to continue without the presence of the priest.... The Church became independent and selfreliant and no longer so clergy-bound. [Bemet]

By mid-1978, several ZANLA detachments were active in Gutu District. A research team of four members of ZANLA's Commissariat 205
Department, sent on a reconnaissance visit in October 1978, reported favourably on the political commitment in the district but raised questions about some negative aspects of guerrilla behaviour: Generally in the Gutu area, the masses are very politically active and very aware of the present situation but only to find that the comrades themselves are lagging far behind the masses politically.... The boys and girls in this area are very active in the struggle. They also take part in their own programmes of guarding; they even have uniforms bought out of their own pockets... . The masses do listen to Radio Maputo, Voice of Zimbabwe, unlike some of our own comrades who don't... . One of the problems I came across was that of excessive demands by comrades on the masses. A typical example was from a businessman who does bring supplies and clothing for the comrades from town but now he says... the comrades are draining their money... one week alone the comrades had taken 33 crates of beer from his store which they always promise to pay [for] but never do.25

To complicate matters, two different ZANLA detachments operated at Mutero, one coming north from the Bikita and Zaka Districts and another coming from Buhera. Caught between the two groups, the staff at Mutero sometimes found the demands excessive but always managed to raise the necessary cash, which could run into thousands of dollars. Some months virtually the entire salaries of the 26 primary and secondary teachers went to finance the war. [Mutanga, Mutero] The primary school headmaster, Mutanga, co-ordinated the collections, dividing the cost of goods required by the number of teachers so that each paid the same amount. Nurses contributed separately. Local businessmen also played their part by enabling the school to purchase goods wholesale. Both Mutanga and Mutero recalled a particularly difficult month when the total amount requested came to more than $5 000! Failing in their bid to negotiate a reduction, they paid the full amount - to one ZANLA group and to the other. Mutanga accepted this pragmatically, as the price for staying alive. "No one complained," he said. "It wasn't anybody's fault. It was a duty.... We said, let's give them the money and save our lives." [Mutanga]

Even after ZANLA closed the school in July 1979, explaining that it was part of a new stage in the struggle, the requests from the guerrillas did not cease. Teachers, no longer receiving their salaries, were forced to sell their cattle, goats and other possessions to raise the necessary cash. [Mutanga, Mutero]

Such extravagant demands were a violation of ZANLA directives, and those responsible were subject to punishment. A ZANU circular issued in 1979 spelt out the Party's position on fundraising, stating:

N.B.: Such contributions should be given freely and crude methods such as demanding should not be employed. No fixed amounts should be demanded.26

The incredible hardships inflicted by violations of this directive began to create friction between some members of the lay staff and the priests. Fr Wey calculated
that the mission gave approximately $700 to the guerrilla forces during the entire duration of the war, much less than the lay staff were expected to contribute each month. [Wey] Resenting this disparity, some of the staff apparently gave negative reports about him to the guerrillas. The fact that he did not distribute used clothing free of charge, as his predecessor had done, was another mark against him in the eyes of some of the parishioners. As a result, Fr Wey was denounced at a pungwe by one of the section commanders, Chamuka, who said that all white people were bad, using a Shona proverb: "The son of a snake is a snake." Sr Josephine managed to convince Chamuka that the reports about Fr Wey were false, possibly saving his life. [Makamure]

"Excessive demands" were only part of the problems of discipline which concerned ZANLA's commanders as much as Church personnel. Endless reports were filed by Security and Intelligence Officers at all levels to senior staff, urging them to send more security officers in disguise to apprehend guerrillas who violated ZANLA's code of conduct.27 A report in late 1979 by the Provincial Field Commander for Manica Province, Tonderai Nyika, under whose jurisdiction Gutu fell, revealed some of the common problems which included beer drinking, dagga (marijuana) smoking, and "taking liberties with women".28 Senior commanders, sent to Mutero on one occasion to investigate the behaviour of the guerrillas operating in the area, interviewed Sr Josephine. Recalling their visit, she laughed, explaining that the guerrillas disappeared from the mission property when they heard that their superiors were in the area. Leading the visitors to a nearby ZANLA base, she heard them warn their forces to stay away from the mission because their presence endangered the lives of the people there. [Makamure]

The sisters and priests at Mutero, as at most other Catholic

The War and Your Missions
PC - Dominic Chinenge PPC - Gibson Gumbo PSI - Edward Matanga PLS -
Tinzwei Goronga PMO - Mutisi
SC - Edward Pedzisai SPC - Herbert Shungu SSI - Amon Wadukuza SLS -
Elsan Katsande SMO - Kenneth Tsime
DC - Donald Manyange DPC - Joey Nyatwa DSI - Keven Masango DLS -
Nyika Yashata DMO - Svosve Nyokayafa
PC - Aaron Chimurenga PPC - Romio PSI - Masini PLS - Mafuta PMO -
Paradzai
(N.B. There were additional detachments, platoons and sections
operating in Musikavanhu Sector but the above are those that
operated around Mutero Mission, Gutu)
Fig. 21 Chart of ZANLA Command Structure Musikavanhu Sector.
Detachment D, 1978-79

Mutero MiSSp1o0P
missions, hoped to have a positive influence on guerrilla morale and behaviour. They encouraged the guerrillas to pray. Sr Tarcisia, for instance, felt that it was not a coincidence that the ZANLA forces usually arrived at dusk when the sisters and priests were saying their evening prayers. She recalled that the guerrillas often slipped quietly into the church, joining them in saying the rosary. [Gundani] Sr Josephine agreed that most ZANLA groups coming to Mutero had a good attitude toward Christianity but felt that they believed they were disobeying God in taking up arms, therefore preferring traditional religion at this time. [Makamure]

Keven Masango confirmed that his detachment had no objection to anyone praying or going to church as long as they supported the struggle. All prayers were welcome — whether to God or to the ancestors:

What helped us to succeed was that some could pray and others could offer to the mudzimu. So we were working hand in hand. [Katende]

Charles Kanotembwa, another guerrilla leader in the area, expressed a similar ecumenical attitude. Raised a Methodist, he was familiar with the Bible and saw no incompatibility between his life as a Christian and as a freedom fighter. He also saw no incompatibility in getting help from spirit mediums. [Kanotembwa]

With this flexible attitude of the ZANLA forces in the area, the relationship with the mission was generally friendly. The laity viewed their role in the struggle and in politics as a safeguard for themselves and for the future of the Church. "What saved our mission here was our relationship with the comrades. We were so closely related that they found in us shelter, so they also had to shelter the Church which had been helping them," Mutanga explained.

He went on to say that present-day politicians would not harm the Church either because they know the important role it played in liberating the country and they also know that the laity, who were among their strongest supporters, would not tolerate any attack on the Church. [Mutanga]

During the war the laity had come to see the Church as "their" Church and the mission as "their" mission. They assumed responsibility for keeping the mission running regardless of whether the priests and sisters stayed or not, and there were probably a few who would have preferred the expatriates to leave so they could continue to be in charge. [Makamure]

Fr Kaufmann's views were well known within the Bethlehem Society where he was often criticised by those opposed to violence and to socialism and accused of siding with murderers and atheists. [Kaufmann, Plangger] He alluded to these differences of opinion in some of his letters to his confreres. In a letter to Fr Joseph Elsener, for instance, he described specific instances of security force brutality, commenting:

You remember that in 1976 and '77 many of our people in the security of the mission stations would never believe the stories about the atrocities perpetrated by
the forces of law and order. I have seen now so many things and suffered together with the affected people. It is just sickening. 29
Fr Kaufmann was rarely present at the mission, spending most of his time travelling to the outstations where he had frequent contact with the guerrillas. Because of his absence, he did not exert much influence on events and decisions which took place at the mission itself.
A European soldier once asked Sr Josephine why Fr Kaufmann hadn't been killed by the guerrillas as other Europeans had been. Explaining to him the secret of missionary survival in the war zones, she said:
But how can Kaufmann be killed? He is not fighting in this war. He has no gun. He has no farm. He has nothing. You should go to his room. There is only a bed and a small table. He has come for something different than what you are fighting for.... He has just come for the word of God. That's why they leave him because he has a different aim than yours. [Makamure]
The dangers mounted in the final year of the war, especially for the local population, and were well documented by the priests who maintained communication with their diocesan headquarters in Gwelo by letter and phone when road transport became impossible after April 1979. Fr Joseph Elsener started keeping a record of the reports from the various mission stations in 1979, based on phone calls, letters and personal visits. His entries on Mutero include these:
30 May 1979 - personal report:
No news had been received from the place for over a week. The Bishop tries to reach by car. Uses side roads but has to turn back eventually because the road is barricaded at several places (ditches dug across). The primary schools in the area are being closed. No direct contact with Mutero.

19 June 1979 - letter from Fr Kaufmann:
There were two landmine explosions on "my" road to Basera. I understand that such incidents must make the army furious but I wonder whether the new people in the Government know what is going on far out here. So many villages were burned down again, others looted, people beaten up and some even shot.... One man [who] was shot... said, "See what Bishop Muzorewa has done to me." The fact that the leader of it all is now a churchman will undoubtedly have a bad effect on the reputation of the Church.
12 July 1979 - oral report from Fr Wey:
On Sunday 8 July, another group, better known in the area, came and took some girls to a meeting nearby and everybody had to attend with the exception of the European staff and the nurses. At this meeting, the two schools were ordered to be closed. No report was to be made; the teachers were to remain at the place; the building should be looked after since they might re-open the school again in 2 to 3 weeks time.

Walter continues to visit his places by bicycle for 5 to 6 days a week but at least once a week he comes to Mutero. At Mutero itself, Sunday attendance is not bad. Two more centres are still visited from there but attendance is very small (10 to 20 people). There are no reports that people were ever told not to attend church.

13 August 1979 - letter from Fr Kaufmann:
As far as I know the Christians appreciate my work very much and even the non-Christians pray for me a lot (One Mupostore even fasted). It would be a pity if we had to leave the place.

28 September 1979 - oral report from Fr Wey:
At... (a)... night meeting, the group leader spoke strongly against theft of cattle from the place. Not all have returned so far. The committees in the area are not yet working well. They are responsible for too big an area (7 to 8 lines) and the leaders were not democratically chosen.

There are also reports that some groups are not against the re-opening of primary schools but they would have to be conducted under a tree: obviously as a sign that they are schools of a new order in the liberated areas.

Fr Kaufmann, in a letter to Fr John Kilchmann in September 1979, revealed his awareness of the dangers, his faith in God and his commitment to the people. In it, he also referred to the opposition he faced from some members of the Bethlehem community:

Here I am right in the middle of the soup still now visiting nearly all the former centres, I know with the special help of the Lord who sent us. I do not care if other people think I do not see the dangers out of naivety - up to now since 1976 it needed quite a dose of carefulness to reach September 1979. I am just convinced that the Good Shepherd wants me to see all the terrible sufferings of the people and to help where I can. Of course, I was often accused of siding with the wrong people but the fiasco of the amnesty programme and the tremendous loss of support for the Muzorewa Government are proof enough about just how much security people get from the keepers of law and order, from the guards of Christian civilisation and defenders of freedom. Deep in the bush, Nazi methods are still used like in 1976 in (Matibi)... Everybody is so frightened and hopeless. Probably just because of all this the good Lord gives me a lot of joy and energy to go on cycling up and down the huge area.

Some of the "Nazi" methods he mentioned were the destruction of
entire villages by the security forces. Kaufmann witnessed such an attack near Basera on 10 August 1979 after an army truck had detonated a landmine near the army camp at Mpindimbi. A Justice and Peace report by an eye-witness from the area told of soldiers setting fire to houses, granaries and fowl runs. Mentioning the presence of Fr Kaufmann at the village, he wrote: "The priest had been watching the sadists burning the village - probably his presence saved some houses where he was standing. From Fr Kaufmann I learnt of the killing by the security forces of six persons at Ruti and Rineshanga before they destroyed seven villages."32 Writing about the same incident to Fr Elsener, Kaufmann said that he stood in the open where he would be seen by the soldiers with the intention of deterring them from destroying even more homes. He went on to report that as many as 95 homes had been burnt down by the security forces in the area of Mazuru near Ruti Mountain and four civilians executed.33

Even though security forces in the area never strayed far from their bases during the final years of the war, such retaliatory attacks were always possible. During the elections in 1979, which only the parties to the "internal settlement" contested, the area was once more opened up to Government troops who rounded up people, taking them to mobile polling stations to vote. The lay staff reported that Bishop Muzorewa's auxiliary forces were especially harsh, brutally beating many of the teachers at the mission. The only killings by guerrillas in the area took place during this election campaign. [Mutero, Mutanga] After the elections, ZANLA controlled the area once more until the end of 1979.

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The ceasefire period from January 1980 brought an increase in violence to Gutu district when it was again opened up to the auxiliaries and security forces, while the guerrillas were confined to assembly points. One of the largest assembly points, Fox Trot, was located near the mission, at Ruti Dam. Keven Masango, Charles Kanotembwa and their chief mujiba, Sam Mabika, were among those who had the very difficult task of gathering the guerrillas in the district into the assembly points. They said that the comrades did not trust the arrangements, believing that the assembly points were merely a new Rhodesian strategy to take over their liberated areas. They had no intention of surrendering so easily. Their suspicions proved to be correct as security forces, especially the auxiliaries, took advantage of the guerrillas' absence to move into areas where they dared not venture before. In this fluid situation, several pitched battles took place between the liberation forces and the army. In response to guerrilla complaints, the auxiliaries were moved to Devure. "All the people in the area (Basera) were very happy since no one was quite happy to have the dzakutsaku's (auxiliaries) and comrades living near each other." [Mabika]

In addition, the leadership structure and organisation of the guerrillas were upset during this period as hundreds of the ZANLA forces and mujibas were brought to
assembly points with their weapons while most of their commanders were assigned to help with the election campaign. In the leadership vacuum thus created, individuals went freely in and out of assembly points, often making excessive demands in the surrounding areas. Sr Josephine recalled that persons who were not known would arrive at the mission and behave as they pleased, all rules and codes of discipline completely ignored. "There was no control," she said. "There was no one to discipline them (ZANLA forces) so they were just coming to the mission, all of them, taking school children and sleeping with them in the dormitories.... During war, they couldn't do that. They were not understanding people; they were drinking too much. They wanted to kill me and Fr Kaufmann had to intercede... . There was no leader, I can say." [Makamure]

Because of the new dangers that this chaotic situation imposed, as well as the deaths of two other priests and a catechist in the diocese in February 1980, Fr Kaufmann and Sr Josephine were withdrawn by their superiors until after the elections. Fr Wey was also absent which left the lay staff, together with Fr Bernet, four sisters and a

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seminarian, Nicholas Ndebele, who had come to Mutero for pastoral experience. One day, Ndebele was badly beaten by a ZANLA group who suspected him of being a ZAPU spy. Another night, he and Fr Bernet hid in the church when they heard suspicious noises around the mission. [Bernet, Ndebele] It was a tense period for all. Dzingai Mutumbuka was shot in the shoulder when he was campaigning in the province and an attempt was made on the life of Robert Mugabe when he visited Fort Victoria for an election rally in February 1980.34

During this period, the mission had its first experience of female guerrillas when a large group of almost 200 ZANLA women camped next to the mission for almost a week en route to the womens' assembly point near Enkeldoorn. During this time, too, individual guerrillas stayed at the homes of parishioners because their normal bases had been closed. Aaron Chimurenga, for instance, stayed with Simon Mutero in order to protect the mission.

The political structures which had been established by ZANU in Gutu district in 1979 were now utilised for the election campaign. The lay staff moved into the political arena as well, becoming officers in the newly formed Party branches and later in local Government structures with the headmaster, Mutanga, becoming ZANU's District Chairman and Mutero the District Treasurer as well as a local councillor. [Mutanga, Mutero]

Few at Mutero Mission were surprised when ZANU won the election, not only in Gutu district but in the whole country. In a letter to a friend written shortly after independence, Fr Wey captured the mood of celebration that prevailed, as well as the desire to transform church structures to match the new spirit of people's power in the
country:  
Now we are living in real freedom and quietness. It is a real honeymoon time for our country. People are happy and relaxed. Only they have to go to many political meetings in which they are introduced to the new way of Government. There are elections for village, branch, district and province committees. It takes time until everything is organised. Then there are celebrations in the villages as signs of joy and thanksgiving for the independence. Here in Mutero, we have again more people in church, even youngsters and children. For the coming pastoral year starting in July we shall have the slogan aSangano vanhu" The Bishop himself proposed that slogan. We have to emphasise that the people are the church. If people are becoming more aware of this, they will also take more pride and responsibility.

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in the church. They are proud of their country. They are not yet in the same way proud of their Church. [Wey]
Unlike St Paul's Musami and St Albert's, Mutero Mission passed through no major crisis, suffered no catastrophic event. Rather, it experienced the type of normal, routine interaction between a rural mission and the ZANLA forces which took place throughout much of Zimbabwe. Mutero also illustrates the close ties that developed between the Church and the local people. It is unique in that it provides a picture of life in a semi-liberated area where there was little outside contact for an entire year. This led to special problems during the election period of 1979 and again during the ceasefire period early in 1980 when the area was opened up to Government forces. Mutero also represents a vision of a new Church with the beginnings of a new spirituality and theology and with new grassroots structures which gave power to the laity.

In many ways, Mutero Mission also provides a model of unity and co-operation. Not only did the priests, sisters and lay staff support and protect one another, but they also shared a common outlook, supporting majority rule and opposing the minority Government of Ian Smith. They established good relations with the guerrillas and were hostile to the security forces. No serious incident took place near Mutero after the Gutu massacre. No one was killed and neither the guerrillas nor the security forces seriously injured anyone or damaged any of the buildings. The mission was never closed; church services never stopped and no one left for security reasons until the ceasefire period.

There were several unifying factors that were peculiar to the Gwelo Diocese: the pro-nationalist stand of the diocesan leader, first Bishop Haene and after May 1977, Bishop Chiginya; the Gwelo Guidelines which spelt out how to behave in the war zones; the attitude of Fr Amstutz, the Superior General of the Bethlehem Fathers, expressed in his address to the 1977 Driefontein Symposium on "The Church in a New Social Order"; and ZIKO, the Zimbabwe Committee at BMS headquarters, which maintained contact with ZANU leaders. These four factors were strong enough to overcome the differences which existed among the priests, among the sisters and between the priests and the lay staff,
helping too to prevent friction with the guerrillas. The greatest source of division among the priests was their differing attitudes towards violence. Fr Wey felt that non-violent means had not been exhausted while Fr Bernet admired the courage of the guerrillas but felt that they took too many risks with the lives of others. [Bernet] Only Fr Kaufmann supported the means as well as the end, feeling it was too late to question the use of violence and did no good to theorise about a reality they could do little to change. [Kaufmann]

In spite of these differences, everyone interviewed referred to a growth of unity and co-operation at that time. They all felt that the war brought them closer together, deepened their prayer life and their commitment to their vocation. Fr Kaufmann expressed it as a growth in interdependence. "I think that the relationship between the clergy and the people has become closer because we were all wearing the same shoes and were so much dependent on each other," he said. "I would say that afterwards we were carried even more by the people than before." [Kaufmann]

The laity agreed. Referring to a new spirit of co-operation, Mutanga said: "The war taught us to be highly co-operative. It involved everyone. Even after the war, this type of spirit hasn't died out." [Mutanga]

The guerrillas seemed to take it for granted that they would find help and support at the mission. Many of them had a Christian background and saw no contradiction between religion and the armed struggle.

We have seen that the excessive demands made by the ZANLA forces caused problems at the mission. This eventually rebounded on the guerrillas when local business people reported the matter to higher ZANU authorities who punished many of the offenders.35

Bishop Haene's forward-looking approach in building up the local church through fostering vocations to the priesthood and sisterhood, as well as through promoting lay leadership, gave Gwelo Diocese, and Mutero Mission in particular, a strong and dedicated local staff of laity and religious women. Many of the diocesan lay leaders became political or military leaders in the nationalist movements and the Bishop and his priests maintained contact with them.

The Bethlehem Fathers stayed in touch with ZANU throughout the war, largely through Fr Michael Traber, formerly of Moto, who had been deported in 1970.36 This contact was mutually influential. We saw for instance that Fr Kaufmann reported his war experiences to Fay Chung, who passed them on to Robert Mugabe and Josiah Mutumbuka's report was influential in formulating the diocesan guidelines on behaviour and attitudes in the war.

Mutero Mission Tongogara to be used in formulating military and political policy. Dzingai
Bishop Haene's belief in Mambo Press was also confirmed by the war. ZANU militants invariably mentioned Mambo Press, and Moto in particular, as a sign of Catholic support for the goals of the struggle. The Bishop's foresight in establishing the Diocesan Crisis Committee, which drew up the Gwelo Guidelines for conduct in the war, also helped to create a unified approach throughout his diocese and was finally adopted by the entire Bishops' Conference in 1979.

In conclusion, the Mutero case study illustrates the importance of strong diocesan leadership, open communication, and a clear political analysis leading to the development of common policies and procedures. At the same time, it demonstrates the role of individual initiative, courage and commitment. The unified stand on basic goals and principles meant that individual responses, though varied, did not become antagonistic. While the murder of five priests in the diocese and indiscipline among some ZANLA forces raised serious doubts about the future among some diocesan personnel, day to day contact with the guerrillas, such as Fr Kaufmann and Sr Josephine maintained at Mutero, helped to balance the picture.

A theology faithful to the teachings of Vatican II kept the diocese open to dialogue with nationalist forces, even though they professed to be socialists, and led to a condemnation of racism and white minority rule. Gwelo, more than any other diocese including Umtali, was fully integrated in the struggle. Mutero Mission was a reflection of this involvement at grassroots level.

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Footnotes
1 Correspondence between the bishop and some of the priests, preserved in the Gweru Diocesan Archives, reveals the extent of the rivalry.
3 Chipo Mahamba, Clement Mahamba. Also informal discussions with their daughter, Irene (Cde Ropa Rinopfuka).
4 Interview with Fr Constantine Mashonganyika, Major Seminary, Chishawasha, 21/6/90.
6 Rutanhire. Also informal discussions with Josiah Tungamirai over many years.
7 ZANU Archives, Box: MPOR/01: Operational Reports, Manica Province, 1/1/78 to 30/12/78. Report by Gunston Spring Shorts S/C, Musikavanhu Sector, Bikita A Detachment, 26/7/78.
Ibid., Report by Tenson Sithole, Pfomo and Spear Gonono, S/C, Musikavanhu Sector, Gutu Detachment, 27/7/78.
9 Ibid., Report by Spear Gonono, 28/7/78. 10 Ibid., Report by Agripa Mutonhodza, Musikavanhu Sector, Bikita B Detachment, 14/9/78.
1 "My war experiences at Mutero Mission from 1977 to 1980", notes prepared
by Fr Anthony Wey, SMB, for an interview by the author on 26/6/89, p. 1.

12 Ibid.

13 This evidence comes from interviews with other former ZANLA combatants who were not present when the incident took place.


1 JPC Archives, Box 494: "The Gutu Incident", p. 1. According to ZANLA excombatants Forbes Katende and Charles Kanotembwa, the guerrillas involved in this disaster were removed to Mozambique where they were punished for their reckless behaviour which led to so many deaths.

16 Mutanga, Mutero. The youth, Hondo, became a well known figure in the area.

18 Ibid., "Report on enquiries made on 26th and 27th May 1978", 31/5/78, p. 5.

7 JPC Archives, Box 49: Kaufmann to Michael Auret, no date.

8 Ibid., "Report on enquiries made on 26th and 27th May 1978", 31/5/78, p. 5. '9

9 Ibid., Kaufmann to Michael Auret, no date. 20 ZANU Archives, Box: Manica Province, Defence Department Operations: "The political and military situation at the front", by S Gazi, Intelligence and Security, 6/5/78.

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21 Muchena. "Initially... there was some reluctance in dealing with missionaries, because we felt much closer to the blacks but in most cases, it was missionaries..., that would openly challenge the Rhodesian forces and criticise them openly.... We felt initially that there might be contact between them and the Rhodesians but when we discovered that there was no contact, very few of us had any grievances against the missionaries." 22 Mabvongodze. Fr Kaufmann later confirmed this. 23 Fr John Kilchmann, SMB, "War Diary: Silveira Mission" (unpublished), p. 2.

Lent to the author by Fr Kilchmann.

24 Mutanga. Many of the ex-guerrillas interviewed gave the same explanation of their attitudes.


27 Periodic field reports by political commissars repeat this refrain. 28 ZANU Archives, Box: ZANU Defence Operations Department: Internal memorandum from Tonderai Nyika, PFOC, to Rex Nhongo, COP, "Indiscipline Prevailing at the Front", 4/7/79, p. 1.

2 Ibid., "Elsener's Notes", Walter Kaufmann to Joseph Elsener, 13/8/79. 30 Ibid., "Reports from Mission Stations in Gwelo Diocese, 11 May 1979 to 8 September 1979", pp. 1-15. Fr Elsener developed code words to refer to the priests and the places mentioned with the priests named after their home villages in Switzerland.
Chapter 8
THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE - A JUST WAR OR TERRORISM?

We relied 90% on force and 10% on psychology and half of that went off half-cock. The guerrillas relied 90% on psychology and only 10% on force. Former Rhodesian army officer, quoted in Paul Moorcraft (1990)

The Catholic Church does not have a strong tradition of pacifism, but through the centuries it has evolved and applied a doctrine of the just war to sanction certain wars, by distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate use of force. We saw how Fr Prestage appealed to the theory to justify the suppression of the African resistance movements of 1893 and 1896-97.2

In 1959 in his first Pastoral Letter, A Purchased People, Bishop Donal Lamont raised the issue of a just war in the case of colonial Rhodesia. Quoting the conditions for such a war, Lamont laid the foundations for a decision which was only made by the whole Church twenty years later. In the intervening war years, individuals were forced to reach their own decisions, which caused, for many, a crisis of conscience.

Lamont himself was never convinced that non-violent means had been exhausted. He felt, for instance, that a general strike might have produced far-reaching results. Once the war was a reality, however, he directed his diocesan personnel to assist the guerrilla forces and seemed proud of the contribution they made:
At St Killian's Mission, the priest never left the place. He stayed there the whole time and the vakomana came in freely and they knew they could get what they wanted. And it was a total commitment and a total involvement and it was just taken for granted; the boys are coming and that's that. Incidentally, we had this experience here in Ireland... So we knew the danger of total violence and I certainly tried as hard as I could to avoid violence... [Lamont]

Bishop Haene of Gwelo Diocese supported the means - armed struggle - as well as the end. Though he never issued a pastoral letter on the subject, his priests knew where he stood. Fr Kaufmann, for instance, recalled that the bishop often told him to tell the guerrillas to get on with their job and finish it. The bishop told an American journalist in 1977, "I'm a peaceful man, and as a bishop I don't support violence but I support the liberation struggle in Rhodesia... It is simply a matter of justice." [Haene]

Haene himself was very open about his stand. When asked in 1989 why he had supported the armed struggle he said simply, "It's their land." Bishops Haene and Lamont were the exceptions, however. The other bishops would not commit themselves on the subject, while the Secretary General of the Bishops' Conference, Fr Richard Randolph, condemned the violence of both sides on their behalf. Randolph recalled issuing 39 such statements in the course of the war, crediting them with enabling the Church and, in particular, the Justice and Peace Commission to continue operating:

Violence was supposed to be coming from one direction, and the statements condemned violence in either direction. But they were important... I think it is the reason why the antagonists to the Government managed to stay as long in the battle and caused so much discomfort. In the end, when it became obvious that the war was being won, there was no particular point in going on hammering it. [Randolph]

We have seen that the JPC officially asked for the bishops' guidance on the issue of violence as far back as 1973. Only in 1978 was a theologian commissioned to carry out a study on the problem on the initiative of the JPC and its partner in London, the CIIR. Fr Enda McDonagh, who was employed for the task, concluded that the conditions for a just war in Zimbabwe had been met by the early 1970s. (McDonagh, 1980) This may have provided some consolation to the many priests, sisters and laity in the field who had reached that decision independently much earlier.

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Fr McDonagh noted that the issue was not so much violence per se but whose violence. Those who saw justice in the nationalist cause, tended to condemn the violence of the Government forces, while those who supported the Government, condemned the violence of the nationalist forces.7
The JPC was often accused of being one-sided, condemning only the violence of the Government forces. The members accepted this accusation, explaining that they were redressing the imbalance, since the Government media only reported the violence of the guerrillas. We have seen that the JPC did in fact investigate reports of guerrilla misconduct which they reported to the leaders of the liberation movements, sending a messenger to the Geneva Conference in 1976 and assigning Br Fidelis Mukonori, SJ, to investigate and report cases of guerrilla misconduct directly to the ZANLA military leader, Josiah Tongogara from 1978.8 The JPC felt there was no need to go public since the nationalists, unlike the Government, appeared to accept their findings and take action on them. The JPC had initially used the same approach with the Rhodesian Government. Investigating cases of security force brutality in the north-east, they presented well-documented dossiers to the appropriate Government ministries. It was only when the Government rejected their reports, categorically refusing to investigate the matter, that the Commission decided to go public. When the Government passed the Indemnity and Compensation Act in response to the Commission's attempt to bring the cases to court, the battle-lines were drawn for a confrontation lasting until independence.9

The members of the Commission were sincere in their belief that by exposing the misconduct of the security forces, they could stop it. Man in the Middle, Civil War in Rhodesia, and Rhodesia - The Propaganda War, as well as their numerous typewritten and mimeographed reports, helped to establish a more accurate and balanced picture of the war. Without them, the Rhodesian army might have been able to cover up its misdeeds and present a false image to the world. A recent book on war and revolution in Southern Africa by Paul Moorcraft confirms the picture presented by the JPC, which was the opposite of that presented by the Government at the time. Moorcraft states that security force reliance on brutality was one of the reasons why the Rhodesians lost the war.0 During the war, no one except the JPC was making such claims.

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The JPC relied for their information on the priests, sisters and laity at rural missions who were confronted daily with the realities of the use of force. If they remained in the rural areas, the question was not whether or not to get involved, but to what extent. Those who could not take it, were free to leave. Some took the option of leaving, such as Fr Egan of Avila Mission and Fr Rojek of St Albert's Mission. All those who stayed had to grapple with their consciences over how far to get involved. Fr Nigel Johnson of St Paul's, for example, drew the line at carrying a parcel into Salisbury which he suspected was a bomb. He said that he hadn't thought through whether he could go that far or not, so he refused. [Johnson] The guerrillas accepted his refusal. Sr Helen Nyakupinda and Fr Max Muzungu of Avila Mission crossed the border to join the guerrillas. Both were prepared to take up arms. Fr Muzungu received some military training and had been appointed a political commissar at ZANU's
Chitepo College when the war ended. Others were just as involved inside the country. As Br Dennis Adamson at St Paul's put it, "I was fully involved only I didn't carry an AK rifle around...."

Most of the priests at St Paul's had kept guerrilla weapons at one time or another. Fr Hackett, for instance, said that one commander gave him his pistol for safe-keeping. Fr Johnson collected weapons left at a battlefield, returning them to a ZANLA base, while Br Adamson hid a rifle and some grenades that had been left in one of the mission cars until the guerrillas came to collect them.

Not all missionaries were prepared to get so involved. Frs Wey and Bernet at Mutero Mission struggled with the question of violence. Fr Bernet felt that the ZANLA forces were often careless about protecting life, putting civilians at great risk. The Gutu massacre was a case in point.

At Avila, Church personnel were themselves the victims of Government violence. Patrick Mutume, then parish priest, was detained and tortured. Frs Mhonda and Mzungu and Sr Michael Nyamutswa were detained while the handyman, Heavy Duty, the headmaster, Cornelius Munyaka, and many of the teachers were beaten by the security forces on several occasions.

The German Jesuits at St Albert's appeared to accept the violence of the security forces by allowing them to be based at the mission. As a result, it became a guerrilla target.

African sisters like Josephine Makamure of Mutero, Michael

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Nyamutswa and Helen Nyakupinda of Avila, and Irene Rufaro of Wedza accepted that violence was necessary to liberate the country. They were prepared to assist the guerrillas as much as they could. Josephine put it simply: "These were my brothers. I had to help them." [Makamure] When Irene and other LCBL sisters and candidates were taken to Mozambique from Marymount Mission however, all but one refused to put on a military uniform and carry a gun.

We have seen that the excessive violence and brutality of the Government forces against the civilian population politicised Church personnel, being a major factor in winning their support for the liberation forces. Though the guerrillas also used violence, Church personnel distinguished between the nature and the scale of the violence employed by the two opposing forces. Bishop Mutume noted, for instance, that guerrilla violence was selective while security force violence was generalised, indiscriminate and a matter of policy.12

The murder of missionaries introduced a new and emotive element into the debate on violence. The Musami massacre of seven missionaries at the beginning of 1977 polarised the Church into two distinct camps: those who were convinced that the guerrillas had been responsible and those who believed just as strongly that the Selous Scouts were guilty.

Before the war was over, 25 priests, brothers and sisters had been killed. Two of the priests and a catechist died during the ceasefire period. While the Selous Scouts or other Government troops were suspected of being responsible for the murders at Lupane and St Paul's Musami, the later murders were generally
attributed to the liberation forces. This caused further division among Church personnel. Bishop Lamont recalled, for instance, that many of the clergy blamed him each time a missionary was killed. [Lamont] Fr Michael Traber and Fr Dieter Scholz also felt accusing fingers pointed at them whenever a confrere died in the war.3

The Rhodesian Government tried to make political capital from each missionary death, using them to discredit the guerrilla forces and to prove that the nationalist movements were against all whites and against Christianity. To this end, the Government published at least three booklets exclusively on the topic of missionary murders. 14 One of these concluded that the nationalist forces were ambivalent towards Christian missions, appreciating the services they rendered but resenting their links with colonialism and their domination by white foreigners.5 Another propaganda booklet used the murders to castigate guerrilla behaviour. "Missionaries have been murdered not so much for their faith - but because they were easy to murder," it claimed. "Their deaths are a tragic commentary on the arrant cowardice of 'freedom fighters' and the inept leadership of those utterly undisciplined terrorists."6

The killing of seven missionaries at St Paul's Musami, and other incidents of violence against them elsewhere, remain unsolved. Other deaths, such as the murder of Fr George Joerger, SMB, have been acknowledged by ZANLA. The commanding officer of the group responsible called it a case of mistaken identity.17 Perhaps, with the passage of time, more ex-combatants from both sides will come forward to admit responsibility for other missionary deaths. What is evident is that it was never ZANLAs policy to harass or kill missionaries.8

Judging from its field reports, ZANLA was even more concerned about guerrilla behaviour than was the Church. The conduct of the war was guided by military regulations that were monitored through the command structure. From 1,72, ZANU adopted the Chinese Red Army's three main rules of discipline and eight points of attention which became ZANLA's version of the "Ten Commandments". We have seen that these rules were incorporated into a song, Nzira dzemasoja, which was sung at almost every pungwe so that the rural population would know the type of conduct expected from the guerrillas. These rules, which were very wide-ranging, were meant to create good relations with the peasants and to distinguish the guerrilla army from the settler army.

Spirit mediums also imposed traditional norms that reinforced these rules, ensuring as well that blood was not spilled lightly. Missions, once they had established good working relationships with the guerrillas, put forward regulations as well. At Avila, for instance, Bishop Mutume mentioned that the priests advised the guerrillas when their actions alienated the local population. The priests at St Paul's set certain ground rules for the guerrillas, prohibiting them from entering the sisters' convent or taking school fees. Sr Josephine lectured the guerrillas about their conduct with women, asking them if they would want to marry a girl who had slept with many different men during the war.
As the war progressed, ZANU introduced more specific regulations to deal with problems as they arose, and also set punishments for their infringement. In early 1978, for example, the following "Operational Rules and Directives" were circulated to all ZANLA

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forces. They give an indication of the nature of guerrilla indiscipline at the time:

A. Command (Discipline)
1. Obey orders in all your actions.
2. Surrender anything captured from the enemy.
3. Never take or demand anything from the oppressed masses....

B.
1. Any captured item from the enemy is not to be used by individuals.
2. Captured materials should be accompanied by their reports and surrendered.
3. No comrade is allowed to take or demand anything from the masses by force....

C. Security and Intelligence
1. Liberties with women is strictly forbidden.
2. Smoking dagga is strictly forbidden.
3. Beer drinking is strictly forbidden.
4. No comrade is allowed to make love in operational areas because this will lead to many temptations....

The same circular went on to specify that violations of these rules would be punished by 30 cuts and disarming for two to five days. Regular offenders would be surrendered to higher levels for more serious punishment. At every level of ZANLA operations (section, platoon, company, detachment, sector and province) all five senior officers: commander; political commissar; security and intelligence officer; logistics and supplies officer and medical officer, were expected to enforce these rules. Given, however, the nature of a guerrilla army, it was not easy to exercise total control, or even to know what was happening at all times in any given unit. Breaches of discipline were, therefore, fairly common.

The main types of indiscipline mentioned in ZANLA field reports were "trigger-happy" troops, "roving rebels" and "pleasure seekers". Trigger-happy guerrillas were those who relied too much on force, rather than on political mobilisation. Roving rebels were individuals who had broken away from a group and were operating on their own. One such solo operator was Simukai who was notorious at Serima, Assisi and Driefontein Missions. Pleasure-seeking was the most common and the most understandable form of indiscipline. Drinking, smoking dagga (marijuana), having love affairs and stealing were the chief sins of

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the pleasure-seekers. Since these failings could alienate the peasant population on whom the guerrillas relied for support, they were not taken lightly by those in command, as the following report indicates: Cde Black Satan was disciplined with 45 cuts after agreeing that he had committed sexual intercourse with a certain girl called Chipo... . Bob M was disciplined with 45 cuts after being proved that he was leading in corruption, e.g., drinking beer, smoking dagga and playing with girls in the forefront.21

As already mentioned, the JPC set up a sub-committee to investigate cases of guerrilla indiscipline which were then reported to ZANLA's Chief of Defence, Josiah Tongogara. ZANLA too, had its investigating teams. These went regularly to the front to identify problem areas. They often encountered opposition to the rules and regulations, as the following report from the Chipinge area testifies: I found that the comrades strongly and openly objected to the rules, especially the one that prohibits love affairs, saying that such rules do not conform with the concrete situation... . They also protested bitterly on the liquor prohibition rule saying that, faced with a tough life as they were, one needs alcohol.... Overall comrades regard the implementation of such rules as cruel to the fighters.22

Cruel or not, ZANLA found it essential to enforce discipline, if it was to retain the support of the local population. Ranger refers to the "crisis of legitimacy" which the liberation forces suffered as discipline deteriorated in the final two years of the war. (Ranger, 1986:386-90) Fr Randolph's annual reports about guerrilla conduct also dealt with the question of legitimacy and became increasingly critical as the war progressed. In 1978-79 he reported, for instance, that guerrillas were making excessive demands on the peasant population for money, watches, clothing, radios, alcoholic beverages, and in some cases, for young women. "This unprincipled exploitation was a form of protection racket, a form of blackmail," he stated. "Missionaries were ashamed and disgusted by this behaviour... . It is not surprising that many had serious misgivings about the future," he concluded. (Randolph, 1985:29)

Monthly field reports by political commissars indicate their awareness of these problems. In early 1979, Blackson Chakamuka reported, for instance, that "comrades demand too much from the masses, e.g., funds and special diets, despite the fact that the masses have been impoverished by the war." He went on to complain that dressing had become very divisive with guerrillas favouring western clothing. He also accused the ZANLA forces of spending more time listening to pop and rumba music than to their own revolutionary broadcasts on Radio Maputo, and of preferring novels and western magazines to ZANU's revolutionary pamphlets. "Consequently, there is little unity within the ranks... in all sectors," the commissar concluded.23

As a result of such reports, the Commissariat Department introduced crash political courses in the field in an attempt to reeducate all members of its forces. It
also withdrew the worst offenders, inflicting corporal punishment or detention on some of them.

Mounting indiscipline in the latter stages of the war was probably mainly due to the vast increase in the number of guerrillas, many of whom had received only minimal training. 24 Another factor seems to have been the large numbers of Muzorewa's auxiliary forces who defected to ZANLA in 1978-79 and were often redeployed without being retrained. 25 The fact that, as the war progressed, new recruits were younger and better educated meant that they did not take the prohibitions of spirit mediums seriously, and some of them were not willing to obey less educated commanders. 26

We have seen examples of ZANLA's response to its discipline problems: several of the guerrillas who operated around Musami were punished for various offences which included harassing the missionaries. Thomas Nhari, who was held responsible for the abduction of students from St Albert's, was demoted - he was later executed for allegedly leading an internal rebellion. A ZANLA investigating team visiting Mutero Mission asked Sr Josephine to brief them on the conduct of the guerrillas operating in the area. On another occasion, a guerrilla leader who proposed love to her was removed when she complained to his commander.

ZANLA commanders formally apologised to the Red Cross for the murder of three Red Cross personnel in Inyanga near Regina Coeli Mission, though the group responsible does not appear to have been punished. Guerrilla leaders were withdrawn from Katerere for killing innocent people who had been labelled as witches or sell-outs by their neighbours or by spirit mediums. The lay staff at Mutero mentioned how harsh the guerrillas were in punishing each other for violating their military norms.

Most missions in close contact with the liberation forces did their best to humanise the conduct of the war. Missionaries sometimes

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intervened with both the guerrillas and the Government forces to get them to treat the rural population more humanely. Their very presence could be a deterrent, as Fr Kaufmann discovered when he witnessed the burning of homes by the security forces near one of his outstations, while Sr Josephine was able to protect the nurses in the mission clinic against the unwanted attentions of the guerrillas. Priests sometimes ignored guerrilla injunctions against burying those killed as "sellouts" and against treating those beaten or tortured by the guerrillas. Fr Nigel Johnson, for instance, recalled going against guerrilla wishes by treating the burns of a woman accused of witchcraft. [Johnson]

Aware of the intense tension and pressure under which the guerrillas lived, priests and sisters in the war zones believed that missions could act as safety valves by providing havens where the guerrillas could relax and unwind. Fr Johnson expressed this view in an open letter which he wrote to fellow missionaries based on his experiences at St Paul's Musami

Bishop Mutume recalled that when guerrillas in Umtali Diocese ascertained that a priest was Irish, they put down their guns and went into the house for a drink and
a discussion about the Irish Republican Army. "They were immediately at home," he said, with a chuckle. Sr Josephine remarked that the ZANLA forces in Gutu looked at Mutero Mission "as a nice place where they could find something peaceful, which they could really trust". [Makamure, Katende] She felt free to report cases of guerrilla indiscipline to the detachment security and intelligence officer, Keven Masango, who not only took immediate action but reassured the sisters when negative incidents occurred by explaining that not all who joined the struggle were good people.

Fr Walter Kaufmann, like Fr Nigel Johnson, understood the strain of guerrilla life, making allowances for the occasional act of indiscipline. "I always thought they were also human beings and being all the time in the bush, it was also a strange life and not conducive to good discipline and morality," he explained. In spite of these limitations, he was convinced that "on the whole they really tried to act according to their aims and motives - to get independence." [Kaufmann]

Indirectly the Church influenced the conduct of the war through the example of mission-educated guerrillas. Many ex-combatants who had attended Catholic schools said that their Catholic upbringing made them avoid unnecessary killing. George Rutanhire, for example,

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mentioned that he had spared the lives of people accused of being Government collaborators, including several police agents who had infiltrated ZANLA camps; he favoured re-education instead. [Rutanhire]

Air Vice-Marshal Perenz Shiri, a former student at Mt St Mary's Wedza, also maintained that his Catholic upbringing influenced his conduct toward the civilian population. As the commander who opened ZANLA's Percy Ntini Sector around Sipolilo in 1978, he said that he ordered his forces to win over the people by persuasion, rather than by coercion. [Shiril Other mission-educated ex-combatants gave similar examples. Forward Jonasi who had been educated at Makumbe Mission in Buhera, Inyathi Secondary School and United Teachers' College, Bulawayo, pointed out that it was easy to recognise a Christian guerrilla by his or her behaviour. Giving President Mugabe as an example, he said that Mugabe's speeches were very constructive, advising the guerrillas to adopt humane attitudes and behaviour towards others, and Christian virtues such as dedication, self-sacrifice, and discipline. "People who had a church background could persuade; they had that culture of persuading, tolerance and even forgiveness," Jonasi explained. "It was very easy to find a commander who had that background accepting that a sell-out (can) be forgiven, can be taught and reprimanded by a whip." [Jonasi]

At St Paul’s Mission, guerrilla indiscipline was traced to a soft life, with access to too many material goods and for this the missions were perhaps partly responsible. Further research would be required to determine more precisely whether, overall, the missions had a positive or negative effect on guerrilla behaviour. From the evidence at hand, however, it seems safe to conclude that they had a positive, humanising influence.
Church personnel at rural missions were witnesses to what was taking place on the front line. They were also protagonists, seeking to exert a positive influence on the conduct of the opposing forces. Their reports to diocesan headquarters and the JPC helped to shape the image of the guerrillas and of the security forces. Their perceptions were vital in the propaganda war, as they provided almost the only alternative independent source of information. Through the JPC and its links with the CIIR in London, what happened in a remote village in Gutu or Katerere could be front-page news in the British or American papers the following day. This first-hand information from credible church sources tended to favour the guerrillas, giving them

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a considerable propaganda advantage over the Rhodesian Government. Paul Moorcraft states that it was ultimately the propaganda front which created the conditions for a nationalist victory. (Moorcraft, 1990:154)
The nationalists were not unaware of the role the Church was playing in disseminating information abroad about their struggle. Major General Chiwenga, a former Provincial Political Commissar and graduate of Mt St Mary's Wedza, singled out this role when looking at the contribution the Church had made to the liberation war:
The missionaries were part and parcel in revealing the evil which was being done, through organisations like the Justice and Peace Commission and other forums where they could denounce the regime for illegal detentions or torturing and killing people... . We were fighting the regime through the armed struggle and... they were fighting the regime through their own front, but the end result was the same.

[Chiwenga]
While no one could claim that ZANLA guerrillas were without fault, it would be equally untrue to portray them as totally undisciplined rapists and murderers as the Smith regime's propaganda did at the time, and as some researchers have done since.28 Gundani and Bourdillon have suggested that the ZANLA forces treated senior church personnel such as priests and sisters with more respect than the ordinary men and women in the villages.29 This distinction was not borne out in any of the four missions studied, where the lay staff were deeply involved in assisting the guerrillas and were often the mediators between the guerrillas and the expatriate priests and sisters. The laity were consulted first about the attitudes and behaviour of the religious personnel before the guerrillas would approach them. Negative reports often meant that a priest or sister was forced to leave a mission.30
ZANLA mobilisation tactics involved winning over influential people in any community. Priests were among such leaders. The guerrillas also understood that priests controlled mission supplies and mission transport, and therefore could not be bypassed. Major General Chiwenga, explaining why guerrilla forces may have appeared to favour priests over sisters or lay staff, said: “The local sisters were quite helpful, but the infrastructure was such that the priests were the heads of the
missions. So whatever happened was organised through the priests. The priests were mostly foreigners." [Chiwenga]

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Lay staff were probably more aware of the faults of the guerrillas as they were in closer and more frequent contact with them. In Gutu, for instance, ZANLA forces sometimes camped at Simon Mutero's home while Mrs Mandizvidza often took them in her truck to collect supplies. This kind of interaction did not result in negative relations between the guerrillas and laity at our four missions, but rather strengthened the bond between them. Those closest to the guerrillas, whether lay, clergy or religious, were more positive about their behaviour, while those at a distance tended to be influenced by negative propaganda against them. In the rural areas, it was rather the actions of the security forces which were feared and condemned. At St Albert's the beating and torture of the teacher Jairosi by Government troops was one of the first cases taken up by the newly formed JPC. Investigations into conditions in the Government's protected villages soon followed. At Avila Mission, the priests experienced the brutality of the Government forces themselves, when Fr Mutume was beaten and tortured and Fr Mhonda and many of the lay staff were detained and assaulted. At Devure Purchase Area near Mutero Mission, almost 100 civilians were shot by security forces, the incident referred to as the "Gutu Massacre". Security forces also burnt homes in villages in the vicinity of Mutero.

While the guerrilla forces at times also mistreated the civilian population, especially those accused of being witches or Government informers, their violence was selective and on a smaller scale than that of the Government forces. It was these differences in the attitudes and behaviour of the opposing forces, as well as the fact that many in the Church saw the guerrilla cause as just, which led many missionaries to support the liberation forces.

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Footnotes
The issue of violence has already been explored by others. Bruce MooreKing (1988) illustrated the way in which violence had dehumanised the white soldier in the Rhodesian army. Ron Reid-Daly (1983) glorified the violence of the Selous Scouts in his history of this unit - which he headed for much of the war. Terence Ranger (1986) has looked at how guerrilla behaviour interacted with traditional culture. Norma Kriger (1985) highlighted the role of force in ZANLA's mobilisation of the peasant population of the Mtoko district. If she had focussed on the rural missions and the districts this volume has dealt with, her conclusions might have been different. Her findings may have been skewed by a pro-Muzorewa bias in her interviewees, just as mine may have been by a pro-ZANU bias among Church personnel I interviewed.
2 See Chapter 2.
3 Lamont in Plangger, 1968.
4 Informal discussions with Fr Kaufmann.
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18 ZIPA's policy regarding Christian missions requires further study. 19 ZANU Archives, Box: Operations Department: "Operational Rules and Directives", 13/4/78, Ref. DSO/01. Signed by Rex Nhongo, Chief of Operations. Approved by J M Tongogara, Chief of Defence. A comparison of the rules and regulations and the system of punishment between the guerrilla and Government armies would make an interesting study. It would also be important to know whether the Rhodesian Government punished soldiers found guilty of carrying out atrocities against the civilian population and massacres of civilians such as that at Gutu.

20 Ibid., Box: Defence Operations Department: Manica Province, "Report on Cde Simukai Tivapedze", by Donald Manyange. "29 July 1979, Cde Simukai Tivapedze was working in Monomotapa Sector in Buhera C Detachment which he deserted on the 19/8/78 and he stayed and operated alone..." Many priests and sisters in Gweru Diocese spoke of incidents involving Simukai at Driefontein, Assisi and Serima Missions. Excombatants who operated in the area told of trying to arrest him to take him to Mozambique for punishment. Apparently he survived the war and is reported to be working in Mutare with a Government ministry. 21 Ibid., Box: DSMP ops/01: Manica Province, Musikavanhu Sector, Mavhonde, 17/8/79, by Edward Pedzisai.
22 Ibid., "Report of Fact Finding Mission", by Boniface Hurungudo, Research Officer, Commissariat Department, 14/10/78.
24 This was one of the explanations which General Tongogara gave to a group of Bethlehem Fathers who spoke with him in London during the Lancaster House Conference.
26 This is one of the issues associated with the "Vashandi Movement". Some of these tensions are portrayed in a novel about the war by Alexander Kanengoni, When the Rainbird Cries, Harare, Longman, 1987.
2 Frederickse, 1982, p. 302. Fr Johnson also has a copy of the original letter. 28 For example, Norma Kriger (1985) sees coercion as the major mode of guerrilla mobilisation.
29 Gundani and Bourdillon in Hallencreutz and Moyo, 1988:147-61. This may have been true in some parts of the country under individual commanders at certain times but I could find no evidence that this was ever the policy of ZANLA.
30 Several cases were reported to me from Mutare, Gweru and Harare Dioceses of expatriate priests who were asked to leave during the war.

Chapter 9
MISSIONS, MEDIUMS AND MORALE
The spirit mediums saw us as their children. Whatever they spoke, the people would come and inform us ... The spirit mediums gave the guerrillas security, the Church gave them food, clothing and medicine.
Sister Michael Longina Nyamutswa, Avila Mission, June 1990
Christian missions were among the targets attacked during the first anti-colonial struggle (chimurenga) in 1896-97. This is hardly surprising as missionary attitudes and behaviour at that time reflected those of western society. Africa was the "dark continent", its people were primitive and their religion mere pagan superstition.
Dr Elleck Mashingaidze gives many examples of such cultural bias in his unpublished doctoral thesis. While such attitudes were not confined to Roman Catholics, some of Mashingaidze's most glaring examples come from Chishawasha Mission where both Frs Biehler and Hartmann were notorious for their rough treatment of the local population and the desecration of places and persons considered holy. Fr Hartmann forced the Vashawasha to burn their prayer houses, for instance, while Fr Biehler tore the clothes off a woman medium, beating her naked body with a stick. Even the more sympathetic Fr Richartz beat the local herbalist, and broke his medicine containers.
Mashingaidze suggests that the first chimurenga might have taken a very different form if Europeans in general and Christian missionaries in particular had treated Shona religion with respect and understanding. 2 Pointing out that the early
missionaries were welcomed by Nehanda and other mediums, he laments the lack of reciprocity by Christian leaders at the time.

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Even when the era of ecumenism dawned with the Second Vatican Council, traditional religion was not viewed as a genuine partner for dialogue. In Zimbabwe one of the most outspoken proponents of inculturation, the late Joseph Kumbirai, who had been a Catholic priest in Gwelo Diocese, called repeatedly for more openness to African religion. Predicting some of the tensions that later developed between the Church and the nationalist movements, he warned that Christianity would be rejected together with colonialism unless it adapted itself to African culture.3

Zimbabwe’s war of liberation brought the lesson home forcefully. It was clear that the majority of the peasant population had confidence in traditional religion and that increasingly the guerrillas shared this trust. Some of the mission-educated amongst them relied on both Christianity and the religion of their ancestors for spiritual comfort and strength in the face of death, seeing little need to make distinctions between supernatural forces. As Valentine Mazorodze, ex-combatant and author of The Silent Journey from the East observed:

There is a need to communicate with someone other than human beings when you are in very difficult circumstances. During the first days, the easiest thing to do was to pray to God because we were in a Christian environment. And then when you were in the liberation struggle, you were introduced to the spirit mediums.... In a way it was quite easy to switch over and pray to the spirit mediums. [Mazorodze

Terence Ranger and David Lan suggest a degree of continuity between the role of mediums like Nehanda and Kaguvi in the first chimurenga of 1896-97 and that of contemporary mediums in the second. Both imply that traditional religion performed positively and consistently and that Christianity suffered as a result.4 Ranger has also offered a somewhat different view suggesting that, in areas where Christianity was strong, Christian priests assumed roles and functions similar to those exercised by mediums elsewhere.5

Rather than a situation of conflict between Christians, traditionalists and guerrillas, there seems to have been a syncretic approach as guerrillas strove to unite everyone behind the war effort, regardless of their religious beliefs. The Catholic Church too tried to adapt itself to African nationalism, taking inculturation more seriously.6 Peasant Catholics on the whole opted for co-existence, consulting their ancestors as well as praying to Jesus Christ and the Christian saints.

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The question of traditional religion seems to have created more problems for ZANU than for the local churches. The issue figured in the dispute between the ZIPA/Vashandi group and the ZANLA veterans. Even after this was resolved,
tension appeared in some areas when mediums seemed to have more control and influence over guerrillas than their military leaders. As Christian missions provided much needed logistic support as well as mediation and legitimisation, they came to be trusted. Eventually, it was spirit mediums who were, in many cases, suspect. ZANLA’s written war records point to much more ambiguity and tension between ZANU and traditional religion than previous studies have indicated.

John Gwitira (Kenneth Gwindingwi), the first ZANLA commander of Chaminuka Sector, has recorded in his memoirs of the liberation war that ZANLA’s first contact with spirit mediums occurred in early 1972 in Mozambique, when a group of 45 ZANLA combatants were receiving in-service training with FRELIMO in Tete Province. He suggests that the decision to consult mediums was an ad hoc one made in the field rather than a policy decision from ZANU headquarters, then in Lusaka, Zambia. Of course it is possible that some ZANU leaders in Lusaka were themselves in touch with mediums and might well have sanctioned such contact if asked. ZANU’s policy, as has been shown, was to respect the culture of the people and to reach them through those they trusted, whether chiefs, spirit mediums, or Christian priests.

According to Gwitira, a Zimbabwean medium residing in Mozambique was instrumental in formally introducing traditional religion into the war. Her name was Mrs Duwa, the medium of Reza. Her home was Matimbe, a FRELIMO base five kilometres from the Zimbabwean border at the foot of Gungwa mountain near the Mukumbura River. When some of the ZANLA pioneers visited the base, she directed them to the refuge where Chief Mapondera had settled for some time before his capture and imprisonment by the settler Government in 1904. This historic spot was to become one of ZANLA’s first bases in Mozambique. Gwitira records that Mrs Duwa called a "Congress of Ancestral Spirits" to bless the re-launching of the war in July 1972. Mediums from as far away as Bindura converged on Matimbe for this gathering, which was also attended by a senior delegation of the ZANLA guerrillas in training. Gwitira himself, then Commander of Chaminuka Sector and Provincial Deputy Political Commissar, was 240

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included in this, as were Joseph Chimurenga and Thomas Nhiri. The chief medium was Karuwa who resided at Koromo Kafue mountain and whose jurisdiction covered parts of Zimbabwe as well as Mozambique. Gwitira described what took place at this historic "Congress" and the message received from the ancestors through Karuwa. He said that some of the replies were vague and hard to understand, punctuated by the sound of a lion's growl, but that the medium praised the fighters for consulting them before going to war, predicting that they would be victorious. "There were many statements of caution, praise and moral instigation," Gwitira noted. "All in all, we were supposed to be obedient, brave..., and midzimu-respecting people's warriors." (Gwitira, n.d. :85ff.)
Mrs Duwa was appointed by Karuwa to deal directly with ZANLA and to put the ZANLA forces in touch with other mediums in the places where the guerrillas would be operating. Gwitira credits her with saving the life of Josiah Tungamirai when he was seriously ill and says she was consulted in the selection of personnel for specialised duties such as reconnaissance.0

Gwitira, who was both Christian-educated and a Marxist, managed to reconcile the three opposing world views with apparently little effort. Explaining that each performed different functions which were necessary during the war, he rationalised the contradictions of such a position. The mediums were valued for their knowledge of natural bush lore, sound military strategy and tactics, human psychology and practical morality i ather than for their alleged supernatural powers, he claimed. The mediums actually helped to "remove the myth of magic from the comrades," he said, warning them that war meant death, and citing the example of previous heroes who had died fighting against colonialism. He pointed out that the mediums could hardly be ignored, commanding as they did the allegiance of the majority of the population. (Gwitira, n.d. :87ff.)

Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), the Commander of Nehanda Sector, was not present at the "Congress of Ancestral Spirits" but he too sanctioned the use of mediums. Further, it was he who gave the orders to rescue the medium of Nehanda and take her to Mozambique when it appeared the Rhodesian authorities would arrest her as they had arrested the medium of Chiwawa in February 1973. This reinforced the view that ZANLA and the mediums were one. In an interview in 1985 and again in 1990, Mujuru claimed that he

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personally had no belief in traditional religion but used mediums to instil discipline in the guerrillas and to win the support of the peasant population. Having been trained in the Soviet Union with ZAPU before crossing over to join ZANU, Mujuru was not schooled in the peasant warfare of Maoism but says he made a tactical decision to go along with the beliefs of the majority of the veteran guerrillas:

Remember that three quarters of the first freedom fighters came from the rural areas and believed in spirits. They would say now we are going home to finish off the work that Chaminuka foresaw when he said that his bones would rise and fight the whites and that the Chimurenga war would go on. So when we crossed into Nehanda Sector, we found that Mbuya Nehanda was in that area... . We decided that as she was our medium, we would remove her before she was killed by the whites....

We did not realise that we would be stuck with this spirit medium issue. Everybody started believing that if you had no cloth or beads you would get hurt easily, etc. I was able to lead everybody because I accommodated their beliefs."

Mujuru explained that the mediums helped to enforce discipline, especially in matters of sexual behaviour, so that unmarried girls were forbidden to attend pungwes or to cook food for the ZANLA forces in the early days of the struggle.
He said that traditional norms were rigidly enforced, preventing rape and pregnancies, and this only broke down under Thomas Nhari in 1973. [Mujuru] Josiah Tungamirai, another ZANLA veteran with a Christian background, acknowledged the important role that spirit mediums played in recruiting young men and women from the north-east to join the liberation forces in 1972-73. ZANLA guerrillas, who were pragmatic and always sought foundations for long-term co-operation with the peasants, persuaded the mediums to join them. This was purely a tactical manoeuvre aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Dande people... . With the help of the spirit mediums the guerrillas were able to carry out in the Dande area their clear-cut instructions to politicise the masses, to cache arms and to recruit would-be fighters.... . Spirit mediums Chipfeni, Chidyamauyu, Chiodzamamera, Mutota and Mbuya Nehanda played a major role in the recruitment of young men and women to go to war. (Tungamirai, 1991:15ff.) This personal testimony by one of those involved, confirms Lan's findings about the Dande area in the early 1970s. (Lan 1985) In those early days of the liberation war, traditional religion served several useful functions, helping to give morale to the fighters as well as enforcing discipline. On the side of the peasants, it served to unite and mobilise them in support of the ZANLA forces.

In later years, however, those early ad hoc decisions to utilise mediums led to debates and divisions within the Party. The tactic of accommodating traditional beliefs was a two-edged sword which not only cut between the older veterans and the young radicals in ZIPA in 1976 but also between the senior officers and their troops in the field. A tactic that was designed to promote unity in the end became divisive. The problems created by traditional religion in the war may be an indication of the strength these beliefs still had, even among Christians. ZANU's dilemma was how to utilise this strength without letting it dominate the movement. ZANLAs commanders were quick to point out that they were not waging a "holy war" though they could not ignore the culture of the people they sought to liberate.12 On the other hand, many who had participated in the struggle could recount seemingly miraculous events attributed to the mediums. Dzingai Mutumbuka, for instance, recalled that the lives of almost 4 000 students and their teachers were saved when a medium predicted the Rhodesian raid on ZANU's camp at Gondola near Chimoio in 1978. [Mutumbuka] Almost every guerrilla told similar stories of close escapes from death which they attributed to God, the ancestors or both.

When ZIPA led the combined ZANLA and ZIPRA forces in 1976, there was a shift away from such close relations with mediums. Former members of ZIPA claim that this occurred for pragmatic rather than for ideological reasons, explaining that the Rhodesians, aware of ZANLA's links with mediums, were using them to lure guerrillas to their deaths.3 Some of the ZIPA ex-combatants claim that the Rhodesians placed false mediums in the border areas, who would
call the guerrillas to meetings where they were ambushed by Rhodesian forces. The ZIPA leaders reacted by banning all contact with mediums. At the same time, ZIPA's leftist ideological position tended to reject all religion, both traditional and Christian. When Bishop Lamont and Frs Mhonda and Mutume were arrested by the Rhodesian Government in 1976, the ZIPA leadership began to reconsider its policy on religion. As noted in our study of Avila Mission, they concluded that the Catholic Church must be their friend since it was considered an enemy by the Rhodesian Government. Spirit mediums, however, were still rejected by the ZIPA leadership.

When ZIPA was replaced by the ZANLA veterans in 1977, the mediums were reinstated, but Christian missions were not, in general, negatively affected as a result. Some ex-combatants feel that the resurgence of traditional religion at this time may have led to anti-Christian attitudes and behaviour on the part of some of the ZANLA forces. This would explain negative incidents such as the murder of the catechist Sambaza at St Barbara's Mission. ZIPA's influence was still present, however, as most of the new recruits had studied scientific socialism, using the Whampoa syllabus. This radicalised younger group continued to be suspicious of mediums and conflicts developed in certain areas between guerrillas who were under the influence of mediums and those with a more rationalist outlook.

ZANLA's problems with traditional religion after 1977 appear to have been worse in several sectors of ZANLA's Tete, Manica and Gaza Provinces where traditional beliefs were predominant among the rural population. In some instances, individual guerrillas or groups of guerrillas followed the directives of spirit mediums when these contradicted ZANLA regulations, leading commissars to allege that mediums were taking over the command of the war. Basically, this was viewed as insubordination and was punished accordingly. For instance, a report on the problems in ZANLA's Tete Province in 1978 mentioned that guerrillas in Takawira and Chaminuka sectors were refusing to operate in certain areas on the orders of mediums:

The midzimu tendency i.e., some of the comrades believed that there are certain areas prohibited from being operated by Vanasekuru (ancestors). Suggestions to counter problems: All comrades will be ordered not to consult any Vanasekuru without a written report and approval from sectoral leadership except when going for treatments. The patients can only be accompanied by a Detachment Commander.14 A year later even more serious accusations were made about the negative impact of the spirit mediums in some sectors of Tete Province where they were said to have ordered the deaths of many innocent civilians:

Again, the masses are confused by some of the measures taken by comrades against them e.g. killing of members of masses being directed by spirit mediums that they are sell-outs... . They have lost the art and science of war in the sense that they are taking first preference of
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Mudzimu. Mudzimu have caused such confusion within the fighters' rank and file... Spirit mediums are giving their own directives to the comrades, which are utterly contrary to those of the Party... The suggested solution was to withdraw the affected guerrillas for further political education. Several meetings, held in various sectors of Tete province to deal with specific problems, indicated that ZANU wanted to restrict the role of the mediums and make them subservient to the Party. A meeting was called, for instance, to handle the sensitive issue of cultural taboos surrounding menstruation. On the order of a certain medium, female guerrillas were not being allowed to carry weapons during their monthly periods. The meeting overturned this cultural norm, stressing the supremacy of Party regulations over religious or cultural prescriptions, and the women were told to retain their weapons at all times. As the commissar sent to deal with the issue concluded: 

"We are not under the rule of spirit mediums nor churches... No...medium spirit has ever liberated a country. In the General Regulations and Discipline there is nothing like disarming girls while at periods. You want to create your own Medium Spirits Policy instead of the Party." 

Tangwena Sector Commander, Mpetabere, pointed out that "all comrades at the front must be clean of bangles, rings, snuff, horns and cloths". He explained that this order was not made because the "Party denounces Mudzimu but because some comrades are taking advantage of the fact that the Party respects Mudzimu and are causing corruption in various ways". He further noted that all visits to mediums were to be reported in full to ZANLA Headquarters.

In another case, in Takawira Sector, the peasants complained that the guerrillas refused to eat male animals. The Provincial Political Commissar, Hudson Kundai, addressing the Party Committee members on the subject, acknowledged the role of culture in the revolution but condemned its abuse by individual guerrillas who were manipulating mediums for their own ends:

"As a matter of our culture, we follow some of our cultural beliefs in our revolution. But nobody had the right to exploit this chance to deviate from the mass line... Instead of getting the operational rules and directives from the Party, the comrades get them from the mediums because they dance to their tune... We do not neglect our culture in this Socialist Revolution. But the spirit medium should not lay the directives for us... They should also have a progressive role to play e.g., they can nurse the sick."

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A case in Manica Province involved a guerrilla who left the Section's recoil-less rifle under the protection of a "wizard" called Gumiguru and then carried out traditional rituals.
Gumiguru and Kambanje poured beer and blood on the RR as a prayer to the ancestral spirits... One day after a serious battle Kambanje was ordered by Gumiguru to stay in the battle radius and was given beer and beads and then sat on the goatskin until the enemy soldiers went away... He saw a green snake where the RR was hidden.... Cde Kambanje came and knelt down, poured snuff and said necessary speeches to the covered RR.19 Kambanje was arrested and punished with 50 cuts from which he subsequently died.

Speaking to Fr Michael Traber in Maputo in April 1979, ZANU’s President, Robert Mugabe, acknowledged that the misuse of traditional religion had created problems for the Party:

It seems that almost everybody who is dead is now back as a spirit. There are just too many midzimu. This goes far beyond the traditional Shona belief. It’s all too much for my liking because in its present expressions these beliefs are sterile.... The enemy has used traditional beliefs for the purpose of infiltration. Some of the agents have talked about nothing but the midzimu, so that we are now suspicious if somebody invokes Shona beliefs too ostentatiously. Nevertheless we accept the fact that our people are religious people. We support them in that. But we are worried about some of the recent excesses and pseudopractices.20

The proliferation of mediums in the camps in Mozambique may have resulted from the preferential treatment they received as well as from fear of going to the front to fight. According to many excombatants, mediums in the camps were given better food, clothing and shelter than others.21 Thus, many pretended to be mediums when these goods were in short supply. On one occasion, Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo) is reported to have gone to Pungwe III Camp and called all mediums forward. When half the camp stood up, he said he would call trucks to take them to the front to lead the forces, warning them to stop pretending.22 ZANU eventually carried out tests to distinguish between real and phony mediums.23 Mayor Urimbo recalled that they used to shoot at mediums who were in a trance, claiming that genuine mediums would continue as if nothing had happened.24

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Senior officers responsible for ZANLA policy were adamant that traditional religion did not play a major role in the struggle, but was used in order to win support from a population which was steeped in such beliefs. This is not to deny that many of the guerrillas themselves were devout believers in the religion of their ancestors, giving rise to a dual allegiance which lay at the heart of the problem.

Hudson Kundai, the Provincial Political Commissar for Tete Province, who wrote numerous reports about the issue of traditional religion and addressed many meetings on the subject, saw it as a question of strategy:
As a strategy, you will find that ZANLA looked at all religious organisations with great respect... . The official position was that we had to respect the culture of a community of which religion was also a part... . The official position of the Party was that we had to mobilise all the forces against the common enemy... . When you got into a new area, you would either approach the local mudzimu or the Church that was the most influential in the area. [Kundai]

Kundai pointed out that the problem arose when the mediums mobilised the guerrillas to their position rather than vice-versa.

The Provincial Commander, Tete Province, Perenz Shiri, expressed a similar pragmatic attitude. Speaking of ZANLA's policy toward religion, Shiri said that all were equal in the war:

I would like to believe that we took advantage of any religious sect, church or denomination. Those who supported us, we would rally them together. We would forget about their own contradictions and conflicts just in order to maintain our aim. Our aim was not to determine which religion was best for Zimbabwe. Our aim was to free the suffering masses... . I might say we were not crusaders of any sort and we were not fighting a jihad of any sort. [Shir]

Turning to the missions, St Albert's, St Paul's and Avila are located in areas where traditional religion exercised a strong influence and where spirit mediums played active roles. Some of the German Jesuits at St Albert's were themselves very knowledgeable about the customs and traditions of the surrounding population, in particular Frs Fuhge and Gille who have acknowledged that they were aware of guerrilla links with the local mediums, while avoiding "prying into the secrets of the people". Both had established good relations with some of the local mediums and we have seen that the mediums actually welcomed Fr Gille's work of building Catholic churches in the Zambezi Valley. He was of the opinion that the mediums were being used by the guerrillas. As he put it, "They used spirit mediums the way they used headmen, chiefs, headmasters and the Church." [Gille]

Fr Fuhge saw the wisdom of approaching the mediums first in order to win the support of the rural population: (ZANLA guerrillas) in that border area, among the Kore-Kore,... had got at their mediums. I'm not sure how much they had got Chakoma but there was some indication that the comrades had got at these people first and had got them on to their side first. The people followed that. I still think it was the right policy... . To lead the people to yourself you tread carefully, show sympathy... . [Fuhge]

The older members of the staff at St Albert's such as Augustine Kanyamura respected the mediums and were aware that the ZANLA forces had recruited "Sekuru Chiwawa" to their side. The younger generation like Onesimo
Chinyemba seemed to be more sceptical of the role played by the mediums. "There weren't many (spirit mediums) in the area," he stated. "They never affected the Church. And, like the Church, they didn't take sides openly."

Everyone at the mission knew that the Rhodesian forces had arrested Chiwawa and that the guerrillas had taken Nehanda across the border. Fr Fuhge explained how the Rhodesians tried to use Mutota:

They tried to stop the mediums by dropping those leaflets. The soldiers would say they were the Mutota speaking from the air. "I don't want this and that. I work with the Government" and so on. I think this was so stupid. The naivety for them to think that people would believe something so foolish, that their totem was speaking from the air. Then the true medium of Nehanda was still alive at that time... (she) was taken across the border. I also heard... that this old lady had given very strict orders to the comrades, telling them certain taboos, that they were not to get involved with girls which they obeyed at that time. Some of the comrades complained against the upper class that they did not follow the instruction of ambuya and things like that. [Fuhge]

During that first phase of ZANLA's mobilisation campaign, the guerrillas seemed to make a distinction between their relationships with the mediums and with the missions. No one mentioned that the guerrillas ever preached about the religion of their ancestors at the mission. Even when the students were abducted, none of the priests referred to the influence of traditional religion.

Thus, even though traditional religion was strong in that area, it does not appear to have been a significant factor in the relationships between the guerrillas and the mission. At any rate, most of the Catholics in the area, like George Rutanhire, were settlers from other parts of the country and not local Kore-Kore. Rutanhire, like many other ZANLA commanders interviewed, interpreted the mobilisation of mediums as a question of tactics and saw no contradiction with the mobilisation of Christian leaders as well. [Rutanhire] As an active mobiliser in the north-east, he had advocated approaching Christian missions for support. He and other mission-educated recruits in the early days of the war may have helped to prevent conflicts between Christianity and traditional religion. They may also have helped to give Christian missions a more prominent role.

At Mutero Mission in Gutu, traditional religion does not appear to have been a major factor. According to active Catholics in the area, traditional religion was hardly practised in Gutu because of the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church which had been present there since 1910. When asked about mediums in the area, some of the older laity simply said, "yberapa," they're finished. [Mashaya, Clement Makamba]
Sr Josephine Makamure however, recalled that the guerrillas had relied on a medium who was employed by the mission as a teacher. She suggested that many guerrillas suffered a crisis of conscience over the issue of violence, causing them to put Christianity aside for the duration of the war, though not rejecting it completely. Many of the comrades confided their dilemma to her: "Sister, we like the Church and we know there is God," they told her. "But you know God is a loving Father and he is a peacemaker so at the moment what we're doing is against the ways of God because God wouldn't like us to fight and kill." They turned to traditional religion rather than Christianity for legitimacy and support. "They seemed to have a belief that this is the time the ancestors are helping us. They were really mostly putting the ancestors ahead of God," she concluded.

Forbes Katende and Charles Kanotembwa, two guerrillas close to the mission staff, did not agree that they put the ancestors before God during the armed struggle. Both had been raised as Christians and insisted that they saw no contradiction in practising traditional religion and Christianity simultaneously. Pointing to the valuable role played by both Christians and mediums, they referred to a division of labour in the assistance each afforded. They mentioned, for example, that mediums warned them if food or clothing had been poisoned, and also helped to instil discipline in the ZANLA forces.

Kanotembwa recalled that mediums told them not to hate each other, nor to lie, stressing as well that fornication and racialism were wrong. [Kanotembwa]
Katende explained that they visited the medium on arrival in a new area in order to get the ancestors' permission to shed blood, which went against their culture. He pointed out that all religious people worked together: "In the war, what helped us to succeed is that some could pray and the others could offer to the mudzimu. So we were working hand in hand." [Katende]
The Gwelo Guidelines stressed the need for inculturation: "We show a positive attitude towards the vadzimu belief and other aspects of Shona religion; integrate these elements into our worship." Perhaps this accommodating attitude is the reason that there were no conflicts with traditional religion at Mutero Mission.
The fact that the mission employed a medium as a teacher was possibly another point in its favour.

When Fr Joseph Amstutz, Superior General of the Bethlehem Mission Society, addressed the Driefontein Symposium, he referred to the role of traditional religion as part of the "ideological indoctrination" common to most groups of guerrillas. He pointed out that recourse to the ancestors lent weight to their claims to repossess the land and its wealth. Their main line of indoctrination is: "We want the land of our fathers back again", "our aim is to restore back to the people the land that has been taken from them". They call in traditional religious belief wherein the vadzimu are seen as the motivating power... . The vadzimu are also seen as providing protection and legitimising their
Perhaps this rational explanation and the assurance that such "indoctrination" was not usually anti-Christian also played a part in preventing conflicts. Sixteen years earlier in his address to the Diocesan Missionary Conference, Bishop Haene had made similar references to traditional religion as an element of nationalism and had encouraged the diocese to run courses for priests on African customs and language. With such background and training, the Bethlehem Fathers were able to adopt a more ecumenical attitude towards traditional religion.

Missions, Mediums and Morale

Avila Mission, located in ZANLA's Chitepo Sector near the Mozambique border, had established cordial relations with the local chief's and mediums which continued throughout the war. The inhabitants of the area retained their traditional beliefs and practices for the most part, refusing to send their children to school though utilising the hospital when they were ill. There were few converts to Catholicism in the area and ZANLA reports indicate that guerrillas in the sector often gave preference to the directives of mediums rather than the regulations of the Party. The mission and the mediums each assisted the guerrillas in their own way. Sr Michael Nyamutswa aptly summed up this division of labour, stating: "The spirit mediums gave them (the guerrillas) security. The Church gave them food, clothing and medicines." [Nyamutswa]

She explained that the mission "was united" with the mediums during the liberation war because the mediums were able to control guerrilla behaviour. "They would tell the boys not to travel at a certain time. They were asked to reduce the times they had their rallies and reduce the number of the groups of people," she said, giving examples of the influence of the mediums over the ZANLA forces. Sr Michael concluded that the mediums respected the Church, often coming to the mission to thank the staff for the services they rendered to the people.

The mission handyman, Heavy Duty, confirmed this view. Identifying the mediums in that area as Mutota, Nyawada and a woman called Nyakwava, he said that they gave the guerrillas rules to follow and sent certain animals to warn them of danger. Though a practicing Catholic for many years, he believed that the mediums also protected him: "These were really protecting the comrades. Even for my part, they used to take care of me during my work. Even though God is there, these ambuyas and sekurus were helping me as well." [Chiutanye]

Fr Muzungu, who had many long discussions with the guerrillas on the topic of religion, concluded that traditional religion was a tool used to win support. He recalled that many of the ZANLA forces who had been educated at mission schools confided in him: "Father, what we do is mobilise the people so that we get through. After the war, we'll go to school, we'll go to church; there won't be any change." [Muzungu]

According to Evelyn Taibo, a chimbwido who lived near the mission, the guerrillas were highly selective in their use of mediums,
rejecting those who didn't follow their line. "They had favourite mediums whom they trusted and they used to go there for advice as to how they should walk," she said. "If the young mediums spoke what was contrary to their thought, they would be beaten up or killed. Some mediums were loved but the others were not." She also pointed out that people accused of being witches and wizards were routinely killed by the liberation forces when the guerrillas first came to the area. She claims that when the people complained, ZANLA sent a team to investigate and regain popular support: "They asked for reconciliation and acknowledged their wrongdoings. There were no more killings for no specific reason." [Taibo] This change may have coincided with the transfer of leadership from ZIPA to the ZANLA veterans. It is still a matter of controversy among ex-combatants whether ZIPA or ZANLA was more guilty of random killing of people falsely accused of being traitors. There is also no clear evidence of the role played by mediums in such killings, though commissars like Kundai accuse them of being responsible for misleading the guerrillas.

Periodic reports by ZANLA commissars in Inyanga North complained about the influence of mediums over the guerrillas during the later years of the war. "Idealism (a firm belief in midzimu) to which most of the fighters are committed is gradually dropping their fighting capacity to a low ebb," one stated. "Fighters are taking preference of midzimu than those of the Party resulting in disunity amongst the fighters and the broad masses on the other hand."29

St Paul's Mission, like Avila, was located in a sector in which ZANLA had apparently lost control of some of the guerrillas who were under the influence of mediums. We saw the groups of guerrillas wearing black cloth and beads and refusing to eat certain foods sometimes passed through the mission and that some guerrillas in Takawira Sector offered snuff to the ancestors each morning. The medium of Nyakunama, Francis Matiza, was active in the area, and the detachment which operated at St Paul's was sometimes based at Nyakunama's village, but there is no reason to believe that he, or his five "lieutenants", as he called them, were hostile to the mission or to Christianity. [Matiza, Tasarira] While none of these four missions provide substantial evidence of conflict between Christianity and traditional religion, it should be noted that Richard Sambaza, a catechist at an outstation of St Barbara's Mission in Umtali Diocese, was murdered for refusing to replace the Catholic Sunday service with a ceremony to the ancestors. Given several days to consider his decision, he was ordered to dig his own grave before he was shot. According to Bishop Mutume, the local people were so outraged by Sambaza's murder that they moved from the area in order to deprive the guerrillas of support. Mutume said that ZANLA acted quickly to remove the group which had been responsible and no further problems concerning traditional religion were reported.30 Bishop Lamont and many of the Irish Carmelites spoke highly of the
witness of Sambaza, suggesting that he should be canonised as the first Zimbabwean saint." Among ZANLA excombatants this incident is blamed on ZIPA excesses, while former ZIPA cadres blame it on the reinstatement of traditional religion by ZANLA, claiming that some mediums took revenge on Christians who had supported ZIPA.

Missionary efforts at inculturation appear to have created a degree of understanding and openness between missions and spirit mediums and their followers, while ZANLA's policy of uniting all sectors of the community played a part as well. Though a cultural revival was an integral part of the nationalist programme, it was not necessarily hostile to Christianity but rather encouraged Christians to take traditional religion more seriously.

While ZANLA was initially suspicious of white missionaries for fear they would "sell out" the guerrillas to the Rhodesians, it learnt from experience to trust rural church personnel. As the Church was increasingly persecuted by the Government, this trust grew into outright partnership in some cases. Paradoxically, it was the more radical and ideologically committed wing of ZANLA during the ZIPA period that favoured missionaries over mediums. By the end of the war, the status of Christian missions and mediums was almost reversed, with missions being favoured because of the countless services they rendered, logistical as well as legitimising.

Mediums had few material benefits to offer guerrillas. They had been powerful mediators and legitimisers of armed struggle in the early 1970s, but, as youth began to flock to Mozambique from secondary schools in 1975 and later years, these roles were no longer so necessary.32 Theirs became largely a spiritual and psychological role: raising morale and providing inspiration and courage together with practical advice on bushlore and peasant morality. Their moral prescriptions against shedding blood unnecessarily, adultery, rape and theft were similar to the Christian commandments and may have had as much influence in humanising the war as those of the Christian churches.

Finally, guerrillas as well as local Christians had recourse both to the religion of their ancestors and to Christianity. They believed that both the ancestors and the Christian saints were praying for them and protecting them. This eclectic approach served to unify the rural population behind a common cause - regaining the land of their forefathers. Thus, it seems that Christian missions, traditional religion and Marxist ideology, although apparently contradictory forces, were able to work together, if not always harmoniously, to help win the war of liberation.

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Footnotes

2 Ibid.: 13,17,178. Also Vambe, 1972.
3 J Kumbirai, "Kurova Guva and Christianity" in Bourdillon: 123-130. By the 1960s, many missionary communities had heeded such warnings and also repeated papal calls for an "African Christianity". See Ela, 1989:xiii.


5 Ranger, 1983. Also, Ranger, 1985:215. 6By inculturation I mean the insertion of the Gospel message within a people's culture. To use the definition in the most recent Encyclical Letter on mission, "Redemptoris Missio" (December 1990), "inculturation means the intimate transformation of authentic cultural values through their integration in Christianity and the insertion of Christianity in the various human cultures". (Art. 52.)

7 The information about this early meeting with spirit mediums comes from an unpublished manuscript by John Gwitira. (q.v.) I quote from it at length because none of it has appeared previously and because it provides clear evidence of early interaction between guerrillas and mediums.

8 Kundai, Chiwenga, Kanengoni. Also informal discussions with Tungamirai.

9 "Mapondera Base", code-named Nkai, was situated near the road leading from Mukumbura to Chioko about an hour's walk north of the Ruya River (also Luia). See also Beach, 1989.

10 Air Marshal Tungamirai acknowledges that Mrs Duwa nursed him back to health when he was very ill. She moved to Zimbabwe after the war and keeps in touch with many of the former guerrillas.

11 Interview with Solomon Mujuru, 1985, in ZANU Archives.

12 Kundai, Chiwenga, Shiri, Tichafa. 13 The information about ZIPA attitudes towards traditional religion comes from interviews with Kundai, Tichafa, and Mutumbuka as well as from informal discussions with Fay Chung, Sam Geza and many excombatants who were in the camps in Mozambique during the ZIPA period. See also Moore, 1991.

14 ZANU Archives, Box: Chitepo Sector 2 Operations: MMZ Province Operations Department, Points of Discussion between Provincial Level: Problems and Developments in all Sectors, reports, by Blackson Chakamuka, p. 1.

ZANLA reports refer to mudzimu / midzimu, vanasekuru, wizards, witches and spirit mediums interchangeably. Interestingly they never use the term svikiro or n'anga when referring to mediums.

Signs of Contradiction - Signs of Hope


17 Ibid., Box: D S MCOR F/a: Political Reports, Tangwena Sector, Monthly
Chapter 10
A CHURCH OF THE PEOPLE

The whole experience of people being in the struggle was a liberating thing. The people were far more sure of themselves. They had been running the area to some extent.

Fr Nigel Johnson, SJ

In the early 1970s, the Church was mainly concerned with the issue of racial discrimination and with its own institutional rights. The Land Tenure Act was the first real test of where it stood after UDI. By accepting a compromise, the Church revealed that it was more concerned about its rights than about human rights. The memorandum on the issue from Fr John Schuette, SVD, the mediator sent out by Rome, reflects the cautious mentality that prevailed at the time. Urging further negotiations with the Government, he called for the exercise of the "utmost
prudence and full pastoral responsibility" in order "to preserve what we can, to keep the missions 'going' to provide for the future of the Rhodesian Church." The Pastoral Letters of the Bishops' Conference, while condemning racial inequality, tended to share the same cautious mentality. They too appeared to be more concerned with the survival of the institutional church than with the rights of the African majority. In a critical analysis of the Bishops' statements from 1950-77, Roger Riddell maintained that the Rhodesian hierarchy was too closely aligned with the status quo to opt for radical alternatives. Accusing the bishops of withdrawing from the realities of the social and economic situation, thereby helping to preserve the basic injustices which they verbally condemned, he charged: "The Rhodesian Church has no prior commitment to liberation, no radical option for the poor, and the Bishops begin their analysis of what to do and say with certain universal theological presuppositions rather than beginning with the present state of Rhodesian society and moving from that towards these universal ideals."3 Sr Aquina Weinrich, OP, also questioned the Bishops' stand on issues of social justice. Analysing the position of the Church in 1979, she stated: "In confining themselves to pronouncements on faith and morals, the Bishops could leave the oppressive social structure intact and did not need to dismantle their elite schools which served the rich. They only protested vigorously when their vested interests in the educational field were threatened."4 The Justice and Peace Commission launched its ministry in 1972 with a series of sermon notes which stressed "faith and morals" and "universal theological presuppositions". They also tended to focus on racial equality apart from political and economic equality. Some of the topics covered were: Has the Church any teaching about society? Are all men equal? Are all men brothers? Who gives man his rights and duties? Can I be a loyal citizen and a loyal Christian at the same time.5 As Ian Linden pointed out in his history of the Catholic Church in Zimbabwe, the authors for the most part were not members of the JPC nor were they black Zimbabweans.

Events in the north-east soon changed all this. When the JPC began to investigate the conduct of the war, the focus shifted to the plight of the black rural community. Linden maintains that the JPC represented a "listening" Church which heard the voice of the poor and the oppressed, as opposed to the "teaching" Church of the Rhodesian hierarchy with its concern for institutional survival - its "ecclesiocentrism", as he called it. He suggests that the effect of JPC on the teaching Church was visible from 1974, with the Bishops' statement "Reconciliation in Rhodesia", drafted by a member of the JPC. Linden sees this statement as signifying a move away "from the ideology of 'multiracialism' onto the analytic ground from which effective action could take place."6 Subsequent publications by the JPC, The Man in the Middle (1975), Civil War in Rhodesia (1976), and Rhodesia - The Propaganda War (1977) offered concrete
evidence of the suffering of the rural poor at the hands of Government security forces. This became the base from which effective action could be taken and theological reflection could develop. Banned within Rhodesia as they appeared, these 258

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booklets were well publicised internationally. As Linden observed, "...the voice of the rural African was being broadcast far and wide through the bonds forged by the listening Church."7 If the events at Avila Mission represented the turning point at the local level, for the rural missions, the most significant date on the national level was the "Symposium on the Church in a New Order" held at Driefontein Mission in May 1977. The Symposium came about as a result of meetings of the National Council of Priests to share their war experiences. It publicly raised the question of changes needed within the Church. The suggestions which arose from the Symposium proposed nothing less than an internal revolution. They stressed the promotion of lay leadership and the formation of small Christian communities as in Latin America, essentially a call to democratise and Africanise the Church. Among the suggestions which called into question the traditional top-down, clerically dominated Church structures and modes of operating were the following:

We (one of the groups) envisage each mass centre becoming a parish under the care of a layman or lay-woman properly trained, assisted by a council and answerable directly to the diocese... .8

The necessary changes in missionary life-style: cf. the advertisement inserted by one group: FOR SALE: motorcars, trucks, fridges, houses and workshops - WANTED: bicycles, badzas (hoes), donkeys and sleeping bags.9

a. All traces of racial discrimination must go.
b. Full commitment to social justice (e.g., pay just wages to Church workers).
c. Make surplus land available.
d. Accelerate Africanisation in key posts in colleges and institutions.
e. Make institutions available to a new government....
h. Simple life-style for missionaries.
i. Use our energy and resources in the development of basic communities, not large organisations. O

The final Declaration of Intent reflected a new vision of a Church of the People. At the same symposium, the address by the Superior General of the Bethlehem Mission Society, Fr Joseph Amstutz, described some of the changes taking place in the rural Church as a result of the war, stressing the development of lay leaders and small Christian communities which were praying together and assisting the victims of the war, regardless of their religion."

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The Gwelo Guidelines also focused on community building, the development of local African leadership, and inculturation. Regarding the latter they recommended that: "We show a positive attitude towards the 'vadzimu' belief and other aspects of Shona religion, integrate these elements into our worship."12

Another forum where a new role and identity for the Church was discussed was the Zimbabwe Study Session organised by the Bethlehem Fathers' Zimbabwe Committee (ZIKO) in March 1978, to debate the merits of the internal settlement. Questions circulated beforehand to the participants included the following concerning the Church:
The new identity: "Liberation" as the focus of Christian life.
The de-colonisation within the Church and its personnel.
New forms of communities, not in a ghetto, but "being there for others".
Basic communities as the fundamental Church unit.
New forms of ministry and leadership in the Church.
Reflection on the interpretation of the signs of the time in Zimbabwe.
Discernment of the prophetic function of the Church concerning ideology.13

During the discussions, suggestions were made that the Church should produce a theology of liberation, that the Church's institutions should be turned over to the local people, that the clergy should exercise less control, power instead going to the people, and that the Church should openly identify itself with the cause of liberation.14

This self-examination on the part of the Church, the asking of hard questions, came about as a result of the war and grew out of the concrete experiences of the priests, sisters, brothers and laity on the front line who were finding new ways of living out their Christian vocation. ZANLA's Commissariat lecture notes which pointed to the links between Christianity and colonialism were also having their impact. So was a more vocal laity which began to ask questions and raise objections to some of the openly racist attitudes and practices in the Church.

The most notable changes that were occurring in the Church in the operational areas concerned the respective roles of the clergy, the sisters and the laity. Traditionally, the Catholic Church in Rhodesia was associated with large institutions, particularly schools and hospitals. It was through these practical services that the Church won acceptance and converts. With the war, many of these rural institutions were forced to close. The Church could have pulled all of its personnel out of the war zones, considering it too dangerous for them to remain. It did precisely this in parts of Wankie and Bulawayo Dioceses. But many Church personnel in other dioceses opted to stay in spite of the risks. In remaining, they discovered a new and meaningful role for themselves. As Fr Amstutz noted at the Driefontein Symposium, "It is essential that the missionary stays. His presence is a comfort and a sign of solidarity with the people."15
Particularly in the case of Avila, we have seen that Church personnel shared the suffering of the local people, facing arrests, beatings and torture. This form of solidarity took the Church far beyond the "simple lifestyle" referred to at Driefontein. While sharing the hardships of the poor, the Church began to minister by its presence, rather than through its institutions. Through this ministry of presence and solidarity, some Church personnel gained new insights about their role and the meaning of their service. Bishop Mutume, for example, said that during his time in prison, he was able to encourage other prisoners not to give up hope. [Mutume]

Fr Muzungu could not exercise a sacramental ministry in the ZANLA camps in Mozambique but his role was one of presence and solidarity, the role which Simon Muzenda had suggested religious and clergy could play when he met the Papal Nuncio in Maputo in 1977.

The priests and sisters remained at Mutero to show their love and solidarity with the people - "whatever comes, we have to stay with the people". It was this concept which influenced the Jesuit Superior to keep St Paul's Musami open after the killing of seven missionaries. "We should maintain a solidarity with our parishioners who are suffering and dying," he concluded.

If the Church had not stayed, the JPC would never have known what was happening in the rural areas. Rhodesian propaganda would then have encountered a much less informed audience, both at home and abroad, and the world might never have learned the truth about the war.

Women in the Catholic Church have traditionally held subordinate roles. Though they are in the majority among the membership, and include those belonging to religious communities who have dedicated their whole lives to the Church, women are not represented at decision-making levels and are excluded from ordination to the priesthood.

Black religious women in Zimbabwe have been at an even greater disadvantage. For a long time they suffered from racism in Church and society, as well as from sexism. Many of them were deprived of formal schooling since they joined religious life at a time when education was not considered a necessity for an African woman. Many of the African sisters, therefore, worked in the garden and in the kitchen rather than in the classroom, hospital or church.

The liberation war propelled the local sisters into the forefront. In most cases, they were working at rural missions with expatriate missionary priests, and occasionally with expatriate missionary sisters as well. The Zimbabwean sisters of local, diocesan orders knew the language and the culture of the people since it was their own. Many of them had brothers or other relatives in either the guerrilla forces or the security forces. All of them had experienced the discrimination and oppression of colonial rule when they were growing up and had witnessed it in the Church as well. Most of them could easily identify with ZANLA's "National Grievances" lessons, but some had problems with the issue of violence.
Sr Rocha Mushonga, the first African Mother General of the Little Children of Our Blessed Lady (LCBL Sisters) which was founded by Bishop Chichester in 1932, felt that the war had made the sisters more aware of oppression and had deepened their commitment to the people. "We were united by the suffering in the war," she explained. "We didn't want to be comfortable while other people were suffering. We stayed on in the rural missions."

Sr Rocha started assisting the guerrillas in 1973 when a group of young men visited Regina Coeli Convent in Highfield, Salisbury, asking for help. They told her that they were on their way to StAlbert's Mission and a few days later she heard about the kidnapping of the students over the radio. She continued to give money, food and clothing to the guerrillas who approached her until she went overseas for studies in 1977. "They never demanded too much," she said. "They asked for what they wanted. One time they sent for jerseys... dark coloured ones. I went around collecting second-hand clothes and I sent them."7 She recalled being attacked by policemen with dogs when she went to the home of Robert Mugabe in Highfields with seven other sisters to give him condolences after the death of Herbert Chitepo. The LCBL Sisters were familiar with the Mugabe family because four of its members had joined their community. Occasionally Robert Mugabe visited his aunt, Sr Alecta, at Regina Coeli Convent. Sr Rocha felt that this relationship with Mugabe's family gave her confidence in his leadership: Robert had taken up guns for the sake of Zimbabwe. Lots of young people were following him because they had had enough from the whites. I trusted him, and as a Catholic I thought that he was going to do a lot of peace talks without bloodshed but how could he avoid it? [Mushonga]

The LCBL Sisters remained in the rural missions in the Salisbury Archdiocese and the Sinoia Prefecture throughout the war years. They were present at three missions where expatriate missionaries were killed: St Paul's Musami, St Rupert's Magondi and Kangaire Mission in Chesa. They were at St Albert's when the students were kidnapped and one of them accompanied the students part of the way down the escarpment but had to turn back when she couldn't keep up. One of their members, Sr Irene Rufaro, was detained and beaten in Wedza police camp in June 1977 and in 1979 was taken to Mozambique from Marymount Mission in Rushinga together with seven other sisters and a brother. Three LCBL candidates were detained for three years for trying to cross the border to join the guerrillas.18 Sr Helen, HLMC, superior at Avila Mission, crossed the border to Mozambique where she worked as a nurse, treating many of the victims of the war. Sr Michael Longina Nyamutswa, HLMC, also of Avila, was detained by the security forces for a few days and threatened with death. The LCBL sisters stayed on at Musami after the seven missionaries were killed. Though the priests and Br Adamson had ordered the guerrillas not to contact the sisters directly, this directive was often ignored. We saw that, at least on one occasion, guerrillas used the sisters' convent as a resting place after a battle in the area. At Mutero Mission, Sr Josephine, SJ,
helped to establish the credibility of the expatriate priests. She supported the ZANLA forces wholeheartedly, often travelling long distances on foot and by bus to get supplies for them.

These examples do not mean that all African sisters supported the liberation struggle or were opposed to the colonial system. The sisters interviewed who had been actively involved in the war mentioned the opposition that they faced from within their own religious communities.

In an interview in 1989, the former Sr Helen said that one of the 263 Signs of Contradiction - Signs of Hope sisters at Avila was furious at her for giving medicine to the guerrillas. Sr Josephine recounted how she and Sr Avila were locked out of their convent one evening by the other sisters when they assisted the guerrillas. Sr Irene Rufaro said she was "attacked" by other sisters because she was "a supporter of the guerrillas". She blamed these different outlooks on the training the sisters had received from European religious communities, acknowledging that her own mentality only changed after contact with the ZANLA forces.

As with the African sisters, some individual expatriate sisters willingly supported the liberation forces while others did not. Most missionary communities of religious women had no policies on how to behave in the war zones, but were free to leave if the situation became too difficult. Most were withdrawn by their superiors during the final years of the war.

We have seen that Sr Vianney, PBVM, at Avila Mission gave medicine to the guerrillas and remained at the mission with Sr Anne, PBVM, until they were withdrawn by their superior. Bishop Lamont praised the Presentation Sisters at Avila for their courage. At neighbouring Regina Coeli Mission, the expatriate sisters sometimes dressed in lay clothes to take food and medicines to the guerrillas. At St Paul's Musami, Sr Dominica Siegel, OP, who was a student at the University of Rhodesia at the time of the massacre, interrupted her studies to replace those who had been killed. At St Albert's Mission, the German Dominican Sisters kept the hospital going until it was the target of a guerrilla attack. Ephilda Nyakudya mentioned that the Dominican Sister in charge ordered the lay staff to give the guerrillas whatever medicines they requested, without telling anyone, even herself. Sr Theresa Corby, LCM, the doctor at Mt St Mary's Mission in Wedza, often treated wounded guerrillas and reported cases of torture of the civilian population by the security forces to the JPC. She was deported for this in September 1977. The guerrillas operating in the area sent her a farewell message, indicating their appreciation of her services and their disregard for the colour of a person's skin:

We have seen, observed and accepted the tremendous good working spirit which you have shown in times of difficulties. We would like to congratulate you for standing up and being counted as a human being with feelings... . Please make
sure that all the good works you have been carrying out while you have been here, you continue to do them all over the world.... The majority of people of Zimbabwe hail you and
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salute you for the good work which you have done to serve the revolution... . You are a hero in the history of the Zimbabwean revolution.... Yes, doctor, you have a place in new Zimbabwe and we look forward to your coming back.22
Rumours circulated during the war that sisters had been raped by guerrillas. I could find no evidence of this. Some sisters explained, however, that in 1976 and early 1977 some groups of guerrillas told them that they should get married and have children.23 Sr Irene Rufaro described one such negative encounter with the guerrillas at Mt St Mary's Wedza, which took place in early 1977, during the first visit of the ZANLA forces to the mission. She said that the detachment commander, Mapondera, took all the nuns aside, threatening to kill them because they were following a European life-style and serving a foreign God. Each sister was forced to explain her reasons for choosing the religious life. The sisters' commitment and willingness to die for their vocation made such an impact on Mapondera that he became a special friend of the mission. He was wounded and captured by the security forces who brought him to the mission on a stretcher to identify those who had been assisting the guerrillas. As the mission staff filed past one by one, he showed no sign of recognition. He died, having protected those he had once threatened.25
It is clear from these examples that religious women played a vital role in the liberation war. It is also clear that their role and status in the Church improved at this time. They were given more responsibility, taking over, together with the laity, many of the duties usually reserved for the priest. They also made independent decisions, often very critical ones, without consulting either the priest in charge or their religious superior. Sr Rocha, a religious superior herself, explained: "They had to make their own decisions on the spot. Some groups were friendly and other groups were tough. One had to think very fast." [Mushonga]
The war period was marked too by a deepening of their spirituality and the strengthening of their vocation. All interviewed spoke of a deep dependence on God. Their prayer life tended to become more concrete, rooted in their daily experiences and no longer based simply on traditional formulas. Sr Michael Nyamutswa, HLMC, the superior at Avila Mission, spoke for many when she described how her spirituality had been transformed as a result of the war: I saw that my survival is because of the power of God. God is ever
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protecting us... . We were in the war seeing the nature of suffering.... Our hearts were happy but in the flesh we were afraid. We saw that God was with us.... This encouraged us... to carry on with our work. [Nyamutswa]
Sr Marie Theresa Paulino, SJI, a diocesan sister in Gweru Diocese, was stationed at St Anthony's Mission, Musiso, during the war. A nurse, she often travelled to ZANLA bases dressed as a peasant woman with her medical instruments tied around her waist, spending several days treating wounded guerrillas. Her reflections on how she decided to assist the nationalist forces reveal the development of a local theology and spirituality of liberation:

I pictured Christ carrying his cross bleeding and falling and the crowd just watched. Only one woman had courage and stepped out and wiped his face with her veil. I asked myself if I would stand by and watch the people suffering or if I would take courage and get involved. [Paulino]

Many African sisters also credited the war with helping to bring blacks and whites closer together at most missions. In many cases, a common dining room was set up where priests and sisters, blacks and whites, ate together, often for the first time.26 In a few cases, sisters and priests stayed together in the same house for the sake of safety.27 All faced the same dangers and felt compassion for the suffering people, helping to break down the racism in the Church.

The war forced drastic changes in the rules and regulations of religious life which had become totally impractical in the midst of so much destruction and uncertainty. The war also tested the sisters’ courage and perseverance. The presence of religious women encouraged the local population to persevere as well. Some sisters felt free to reprimand the guerrillas for their misbehaviour, and the guerrillas seem to have accepted this from them.28 Some sisters spoke up to the security forces and wilfully defied the laws of the Rhodesian Government.29 In short, sisters shattered most of the stereotypes about religious women during the war years; yet little has been heard about their role. They remain invisible heroines, just as they have always been the invisible powerhouse of the Church.

Traditionally, the Catholic Church has been organised as a pyramidal structure with the bishop of a diocese at the top and lay people at the bottom. Those at the bottom had neither voice nor vote

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in this hierarchical, monolithic institution. While Gwelo Diocese had established the Catholic African Association for the laity in the 1950s, the clergy still held the power and controlled the money. The Second Vatican Council called for a more meaningful role for the laity but this was only put into practice on a wide scale when the war made it a necessity. With the movement of clergy and religious severely restricted, it was the lay leaders who kept the Church going.

Fr Bernet of Mutero Mission cited the new role of the laity as one of the major achievements of the war:

A few of the catechists were able to run the Church for years without seeing one single priest. [Bernet] (See also quote p. 205)

We have seen that Simon Mutero continued to lead the services at Mutero Mission when the priests were gone. Heavy Duty stayed to protect Avila Mission at great personal risk after everyone had left. Many of the lay workers at St Albert's spent the war years in prison while the lay nurses consistently supplied
the ZANLA forces with medicines and treated them when they were wounded. It was the lay nurses at St Paul's who disguised a wounded guerrilla as a pregnant woman, thus saving the mission from closure and all the staff from arrest. At Mutero the lay nurses carried messages from Sr Josephine to ZANLA bases. The catechist's wife at Avila Mission took Sr Helen to a ZANLA base when she was fleeing to Mozambique. It was also a lay woman, Auxilia Mandizvidza, who defended Fr Kaufmann and the priests at Mutero Mission to the guerrillas. The Church pyramid was turned upside down as the priests became dependent on the laity and on the local sisters. Fr Amstutz noted this reversal of roles in his address at Driefontein:

The figure of the missionary is changing. In the affected areas, we no longer carry the people, they carry us. We depend on them for our safety. They take care of the missionary who has taken care of them and identified with them. Warnings are sent. Frequently, the intermediaries are old women.30

At Musami, as at many other mission stations, the lay people kept the Church alive, not only by protecting the missionaries but also by running the outstations which the priests could no longer reach.31 The change in the position of the laity as they undertook new responsibilities transformed their relationship with the priest. They were now equals rather than subordinates. This was their Church.

When examining the role of the laity, we must not forget the nationalist politicians and guerrillas. Many were Christians and were influenced by their faith. Batahana, for instance, was known for his fairness and for the respect he showed for the local population. He also taught peasants not to judge others by the colour of their skin and is reputed to have saved many lives. George Rutanhire, the former catechist from St Albert's transformed church hymns into freedom songs creating one of the most effective mobilising tools of the war. Simon Muzenda made it possible for Caritas, the Catholic aid and development agency, to be established in Mozambique. Dzingai Mutumbuka wrote a critique of missionary behaviour and guidelines for conduct during the war which influenced the Gwelo Guidelines and may have saved some missionary lives. Simbi Mubako and Frederick Shava assisted the Church in setting up and running the Zimbabwe Project.

They, and many more like them, were members of the Church who used their education and skills to liberate the country. They took it for granted that the dialogue and co-operation that had developed between the liberation movements and the Church would continue after independence.2 Robert Mugabe, another lay leader who had grown up in the Church, frequently expressed his belief that the Church would complement the work of Government in the new Zimbabwe, especially in the field of development, stressing that Zimbabwe's form of socialism would not be godless. Speaking on British
television during the Lancaster House Conference, Mugabe referred to the positive contribution which the Catholic Church in particular had made during the liberation struggle, and called on it to continue to play a role after independence: I think the Catholic Church played a very significant role in the liberation struggle. Not that they fought with arms as we did, but they opposed racialism and refused to be made an agent of Government in implementing racial policies. We valued the support which the Church gave us as it helped to internationalise our grievances and helped to mobilise international support for us. Within the country, it gave us a broader base than the one which we ourselves, acting entirely on our own, could have created.... I want the Church, especially the Catholic Church, to help this country more as we build a new society.... 33

Many of the priests and sisters who had worked with the guerrillas 

were prepared to work closely with the new Government and to assist in building a socialist Zimbabwe. A priest interviewed a few weeks before the elections, for instance, expressed his hope for a new Zimbabwe and a new Church: The Church must completely shed all its compromises. It has been guilty in the past of racialism..., all that must be shed.... Religious people would work... with the State, with the people... . I'm hoping that if the thing really changes radically and you really have a radical type of socialist system implemented, all those who think in the old ways... they'll say "This is not for me." I'm hoping that all of those will go, leaving those who really want to work with the new socialist system. This is where I see the hope - that those together with the black priests and nuns really (put) into operation a completely new approach.34

Anticipating the new relationships that would be formed between a people's Church and a people's Government, a member of the JPC prepared a draft memorandum for the bishops. The memorandum pointed out that the Church should not "resurrect the structures of the past" but should aim at creating something new, more in keeping with the social teachings of the Church and the documents of the Second Vatican Council. Throughout rural Zimbabwe, health, educational and many other social services are in a chaotic state. They must be restored, but they must also be reformed.... We should have a wholly enlightened and positive approach to the Government's socialistic and communitarian schemes.

At the same time, Catholic religious and personnel such as teachers, social workers, nurses, doctors, etc., would be encouraged to be a leaven for the evangelisation of Zimbabwean structures rather than to establish or re-establish our own specifically Catholic structures... . If many of the members of the Government are Catholic, we must be all the more careful not to exploit this for sectarian ends.35

The memorandum recommended a move away from the confessional policy of the past, towards a more secular state in which the Church would participate as an equal partner, without expecting any special privilege for itself. The role of the
Church would be to serve the people through state structures as well as through its own institutions which would be remoulded to cater for the most needy. At independence then, the stage seemed set for a relationship of inter-dependence and co-operation between Church and State, which at the same time would recognise the autonomy of each. Such a

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relationship would aim at restructuring both the Church and society for the benefit of the majority of the nation's population, giving special priority to the poor. Already new structures, new theologies, a new spirituality and new ministries relevant to the situation had been developed at the local level. A new Church of the people was growing alongside the emergence of a new society. Old rivalries between churches were breaking down and religion became a unifying force in the midst of destruction and death. Ecumenism replaced competition as churches faced life and death issues together. The popular or folk Christianity of the peasant population coexisted and co-operated with traditional religion as the Church began to take inculturation more seriously. Some sectors of the Church opened themselves to the possibility of socialism as well, foreseeing a Christianity without wealth, power or large institutions. All these changes taking place through the war years seemed to promise the chance of a revolution in the Church as well as in society. Yet there remained inhibiting structures inside the Church. Francois Houtart refers to these structures as the "sociocultural system" of the Church based on a model of medieval traditional society. In his classic study, The Church and Revolution, he shows that in such a model the hierarchy forms part of the ruling elite, tending to align itself with the establishment. (Houtart and Rousseau, 1971:317-349) In a similar vein, Linden (1980) views obstacles to change as inherent in the "ecclesiocentrism" of the teaching Church.

As noted above, critics from within the Church during the war often blamed the hierarchy for resisting change. Roger Riddell criticised the bishops for preaching a faith distinct from ideologies. Maintaining that such a disembodied faith did not exist, he accused the bishops of supporting the ideology of the status quo. Basing his arguments on the writings of the Latin American theologian, Luis Segundo, Riddell concluded that the bishops should have made an ideological option consistent with the Church's mission to the poor and oppressed:

It must not be a question of the Church waiting to see which group wins mass support... If the Bishops had spent less time pointing out their impartiality in politics and more time working out a strategy for the future with those desiring change (and the number of dedicated Christians in the leadership of the revolutionary struggle is unique in modern history) then the problems of what choice to make would have been a good deal easier.36

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Sr Aquina Weinrich also used the arguments of Segundo in an analysis of the limitations of the bishops' position. In a paper delivered at a conference in Dar es Salaam, Sr Aquina called for radical transformation:

The problem facing Christianity in Rhodesia today is... whether the Churches will willingly surrender the power and influence they held in the past as partners in colonial hegemony... whether they are prepared to radically strip themselves of their former non-religious power and evolve an ideology of service in a socialist society.37

She expressed doubt as to whether the leadership of the Church would be willing to abdicate in this way, and suggested that the rank and file members, and the clergy and religious who had identified with them, would develop a new form of Christianity without institutions and without a hierarchical ruling elite. Such a Christianity she predicted, would be ecumenical, democratic and revolutionary. Being without institutions, it would pose no threat to the State and this would also obviate the possibility of new alliances developing between the Churches and the ruling class, as had happened in colonial times. Foreseeing a total separation of Church and State, with the new Christianity acting as a conscience and an example, she presented a model of a Church which would demonstrate the goals of the revolution as well as challenge the State to implement them.8 She had embraced socialism as the ideology most compatible with Christianity, as did others in the Church such as Fr Michael Traber, SMB, Fr Roland von Nidda, SJ, and Fr Hector Farina, SMI.39

In spite of these radical voices in the Church and the involvement of many of the Church personnel at the grassroots with the liberation forces, the Church in Zimbabwe never developed a full-fledged theology of liberation. The elements were there but they were never gathered and developed into a coherent whole.40 If the radical visions we have been examining were to be implemented, the wartime experiences of rural missions would need to be replicated nationally. This, in turn, would require a breakdown of the Church's normal structures, procedures and methods of operating, all of which are standardised and centralised; in other words, the eclipse of its internal socio-cultural system. The collapse of the prevailing social order brought about just such an eclipse of the ecclesiastical order during the war. Problems of communication and travel, as well as the need for secrecy, necessitated power-sharing at the base. As we have seen, important decisions were being made daily on an ad hoc basis at the grassroots level. The absence of standardised national policies and procedures enabled innovations to take place as required, and grassroots initiatives to flourish.

But all of these changes were seen by Church leaders as extraordinary measures for a time of crisis. The Church, like the Government, instituted a "demobilisation" process by which the participants in the struggle were reintegrated into traditional Church structures and subject to "universal" Church practices. When the crisis was over, the Church returned to normal, meaning that
the Bishops reasserted their authority; the clergy resumed their dominant status; the sisters and the laity retired to the sacristy and the pews; and the JPC was harnessed by the hierarchy. The leaders of the new State aligned themselves with the traditional Church leaders rather than with those at the grassroots who had supported them during the struggle and who were ready to help build a new Zimbabwe with them. The veterans of the front line were given little opportunity to share their experiences with each other when the war was over and it was safe to talk about what had happened.

"To be quite honest, I don't think the Church learnt anything at all because really we went back to where we were," said Brother. Dennis Adamson, reviewing events after independence. "This should have been the time for us to reflect and ask: Isn't there a new direction now? What do people really want the Church to be? Do we have to run all these places?" Instead of examining itself, he maintains that the Church spent millions of dollars restoring its large institutions. "We take up where we left, which I think is a pity," he said. Many who had been on the front line during the war shared this view.

Thus, although the foundations for a new type of Church were laid at individual mission stations between 1976 and 1980 and individuals within the Church were transformed, few of the changes begun in wartime survived demobilisation. The process had already begun during the period of the "internal" settlement, when leading members of the Church as well as some bishops became involved in diplomatic initiatives, shifting the focus of power back to the centre.

But the war showed that the Church is not a monolithic, rigid institution. It proved itself a living organism with a response as varied as the individuals which compose it. That those who supported revolutionary change were able to exert such a significant influence during a time of crisis offers hope that it can happen again.

Footnotes

1 Johnson.
2 SJA/375 : Memorandum from Fr John Schuette, SVD, 9/11/70, p. 2. The compromise over the Land Tenure Act was described in Chapter 1 which concurs with Linden's (1980) analysis.
5 Ibid., p. 5.
7 Ibid., p. 5.
10 Ibid., pp. 9ff.
14 Ibid., Zimbabwe Study Session, 11-12/3/78, Antoniushaus Mattli, Morschach, Switzerland, p. 27.
15 J Amstutz, op. cit., p. 5.
16 H Wardale, SJ, diary for 14-21/2/77. In the possession of Dr Timothy McLoughlin.
17 Mushonga. Also interview with Irene Rufaro, LCBL, Gandachibvuu Mission, 15/10/90. The author was detained at Chikurubi Prison in September 1977 with the three LCBL candidates.
18 Most local congregations did not attempt to educate their members about the root causes of the war and issued no policy directives, though individuals were told they were free to request a transfer if they found the situation too difficult. [Mushonga, Makamure] The superiors exchanged information about the war during their periodic meetings. They also attended the Driefontein Symposium, but the author does not know how much information about that meeting they communicated to their members.
19 Nyakupinda, Makamure, also interview with Sr Irene Rufaro cited in footnote 17 above.
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Nykudya, Chiripamberi. See also SJA/206: St Albert's Mission, annual reports during the war years, and Chapter 3.
23 Makamure. Also interview with Sr Irene Rufaro cited in footnote 17. 24 Ibid.: Rufaro.
21 Slevin. Also informal discussions with Sr Theresa Corby and Sr Irene Rufaro.
26 For example, such an eating arrangement took place at St Paul's Musami and Mt St Mary's Wedza.
27 Such accommodation changes also took place at the above two missions during certain critical periods.
28 Both Sr Josephine Makamure and Sr Irene Rufaro mentioned speaking frankly to the guerrillas when they misbehaved. See Chapter 8.
29 This was true of Sr Josephine Makamure, Sr Irene Rufaro, Sr Theresa Corby and others.
30 J Amstutz, op. cit., p. 5.
31 Johnson. See epigraph to this Chapter. 32 Informal discussions and interviews with Simon Muzenda, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Simbi Mubako and Robert Mugabe.
34 Interview with Fr Roland von Nidda by a Mozambican journalist, early 1980. Private collection of Fr Michael Traber.
3- Memorandum, Fr P Moloney, SJ, undated, unsigned. Private collection of Fr Moloney.
39 Interviews with Frs von Nidda, Traber and Farina by a Mozambican journalist in Harare, early 1980. The author also shared and propagated these views of a new Church for a new society.
In the course of this study I have collected a number of war diaries kept by individual priests and sisters that point to the development of a theology and spirituality of liberation. David Maxwell's current research on the Elim Pentecostal Mission and Avila Mission, both in Katerere, Nyanga, examines the dynamic nature of rural Christianity and may enable us to establish whether a form of liberation theology developed at the grassroots in the war, and if it continues to inspire the rural population.
See Maxwell, 1991a.
41 No doubt the politicians had been misled by the public stance of the Church to believe that the entire Church was united in its support of the liberation struggle and in its openness to change. The presence of several bishops in the Justice and Peace delegations to Lusaka and Maputo must have further confirmed this view.
As the Church is structured hierarchically, it was also well nigh impossible for Government leaders to ignore their counterparts in the Church, just as it had been impossible for the guerrillas to bypass leadership structures at rural missions.
Also, by urging the Churches to rebuild their schools and hospitals and supporting their applications for funds abroad, many Government ministers unknowingly promoted a return to Colonial Church structures.
The restoration of its institutions required a return to bureaucratic structures, foreign subsidies and expatriate staff.
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Epilogue
THE JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMISSION AFTER 1980
is that the Church will not be in a position to minister in a revolutionary situation, because of our attitudes, because of our historical back ground, because of all kinds of things that have/i'i't to us. We i# i'll want to reform things, not radically change them. None of us is prepared for radical change. "That is my fear.

Bishop Mandlenkoszi Zwane of Swaziland A Man For All People

How quickly it was possible to squander the fund of goodwill that had been built up between the leaders of the liberation struggle, now the leaders of the new Zimbabwe, and the Church; how soon, once crisis conditions no longer prevailed, authority and hierarchy reasserted themselves in the Church itself can be illustrated by continuing the story of the Justice and Peace Commission for a year or two into the era when peace was restored.

In the new circumstances a move from human rights monitoring into the promotion of social change was felt appropriate. An international speaking tour by members of the Justice and Peace Commission had been planned. The aim was to "encourage overseas investment in Zimbabwe... so that employment may be created thus improving social justice and so leading to peace".

In August 1981 the Bishops' Conference recommended that the tour be cancelled. Most outspoken in his opposition to this new role for the Justice and Peace Commission was Bishop Lamont himself. It had become, he said "too secular, too political, too partisan, too partypolitical, too international.'n

At the same meeting the bishops refused to confirm the appointment of the proposed new National Director of the Commission, Mr John Stewart. While stressing that they had the highest regard for his personal conduct and character, the bishops felt Mr Stewart was unqualified for the position. Members of the Commission criticised the bishops' handling of this matter.

At an Extraordinary Plenary Session of the Bishops' Conference held in Gweru in October, the bishops concluded that the Commission had become too independent, "leaving the Bishops' Conference with a sense of having been presented with faits accomplis on various important occasions." This led members of the Commission to offer their resignations. In a letter to the bishops, Mr John Deary wrote, "I remember the time when we faced a common danger together; and were a source of strengthening one another This spirit is no longer apparent.... We/ are not able to function effectively under presently existing conditions... .4

He went on to suggest two alternatives - forming a new justice and peace group without the sponsorship of the bishops, or re-forming the original group with a less formal relationship to the Bishops' Conference.5 Both suggestions were rejected by the bishops. The resignations were accepted and new members were appointed. The constitution of the Commission was redrafted, giving the hierarchy more control. As the bishops stated, "The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops'
Conference is responsible for the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace as an episcopal Commission and... the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace is entirely accountable to the Bishops' Conference from whom they hold their mandate.'

The members whose resignations had been accepted, reconstituted themselves into a new human rights group which addressed the problem of inter-party clashes within the new national army and the emergence of dissidence in western Zimbabwe, developments which seemed to threaten unity peace and stability in the country.

Believing the Church could influence the Independent Government through dialogue rather than through confrontation, the new group built on the relationships that had been established with nationalist politicians during the liberation war. Though prepared to challenge the Government if necessary, they made a distinction between the leaders of a new popularly elected Government and those of the former regime - elected by and representing a small minority and in any case not a legal government. The aim was, through connections already made, to alert the authorities to problems in the making, before they festered and spread.

This Independent human rights group included John and Pat Deary, at whose house the group usually met, Fidelis Mukonori, and Geoff Feltoe. The author was also a member. Funds for the reconciliation initiative were sought and obtained from overseas donors.

Over a period of almost two years, meetings were held with Maurice Nyagumbo, Enos Nkala, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Edison Zvobgo of ZANU and Joseph Msika, Sydney Malunga, Joseph Msipa and John Nkomo of ZAPU. Most of these were eventually chosen by their parties to be members of a Government-sponsored initiative to restore unity.

Though much important groundwork was laid by this informal initiative, there was no clear outcome until the Unity Accord of 1988. This was partly due to further outbreaks of violence in the country but also to the actions taken by the official Justice and Peace Commission. While the informal group had used their access to former guerrillas, now Government leaders, to raise matters privately out of the glare of the media, the new members of the Commission had no such entree. They therefore adopted the confrontational tactics used against the minority Government during the war.

Presented with information from rural missions in Bulawayo Diocese about military action being taken against the civilian population, the Bishops' Conference issued a hard-hitting statement, accusing the Government of committing genocide in Matabeleland. Released to the mass media and read from the pulpit in every Catholic Church in the country without having first been discussed with Government leaders, the statement provoked widespread controversy. Though it had the positive effect of drawing world attention to the conflict in western Zimbabwe and of forcing the Government to investigate its military operations, it destroyed the dialogue between the Church and the new
political leaders which had been so painstakingly built up during the latter years of the war.
Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was openly distressed that he had learned about the bishops' statement from a broadcast on Radio South Africa, although he had met with representatives of the Justice and Peace Commission in his office a few days previously. He claimed that they had not given him a copy of the statement nor even hinted that such a move was in the offing. The Prime Minister felt betrayed by people he thought he could trust.

Uncharacteristically, he lashed out at the bishops, accusing them of being "sanctimonious prelates" who had aligned themselves with "reactionary foreign journalists" and "non-governmental organisations of dubious status". Others in Government were suspicious of the source of the information. Aware that Bishop Karlen had opposed the formation of a Justice and Peace Commission in the Bulawayo Diocese throughout the war and that he had openly opposed the nationalist forces, they did not regard him as a credible witness in this case. They were unacquainted with Miss Dorita Field, the Irish volunteer who was running the Justice and Peace Office in 1983-84, as well as with most of the Commission's new members. Fr Richard Randolph, who was acting Secretary General of the Catholic Secretariat, was perceived as being too closely associated with the former regime to be relied upon.

The Catholics in Government, and there were many as we have seen, felt that the Church had placed them in an untenable position. While wanting to take action against the excessive use of force in Matabeleland if the allegations proved to be true, they resented the fact that the Church seemed to treat the new government with less respect than it had treated that of Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front Government. Pointing out that the Church had maintained dialogue with the former minority Government throughout the war going public only as a last resort, they charged the Church with being biased, even racist in its approach. As a result, the Church's critique was not taken as seriously as it deserved to be. Action on the matter was delayed, causing further loss of life. The entire incident created a serious rift between Church and State within a few years of independence.

Footnotes
ZCBC Minutes 11/3/81. Also extract from ZCBC Minutes, Admin. Meeting, Bulawayo, 4/8/81. Transcription of intervention by Bishop Lamont,
minutes by Fr Randolph.
2 Letter from JPC Executive to Archbishop Chakaipa, 13/8/81.
Diana Auret refers to the conflict in Reaching for Justice, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace 1972-1992, Gweru, Mambo Press, 1992. See especially Chapter 7, "Conflict and Renewal: The Commission's Search for a New Role", pp. 133-139. She omits to mention, however, that a new group was formed by the members who had resigned, which continued to operate for several years.
5 Ibid.
6 Minutes of Extraordinary Plenary Session, Gweru, 5/10/81. See also ZCBC News Sheet, No. 102, February 1983, p. 2.
'The Commission's experience with General Tongogara and Robert Mugabe during the war convinced its members that they could exert similar influence through quiet diplomacy after independence.
9 The Prime Minister called the author to his office in April 1983 to communicate his concern that this incident would provoke a conflict between Church and State. He made it clear that he did not object to the contents of the message but to the way it had been handled, making it more difficult for him to take action. 10 The Herald, 6/4/83.
'Nathan Shamuyarira, then Minister of Information, made a scathing attack on the bishop which was published in the local papers. Though a diocesan Justice and Peace Commission had been established in Bulawayo during the early years of the war under Bishop Schmitt, it appears to have been discontinued at a later stage. See letter from Fr Bernard Ndlovu to the Justice and Peace Commission, Bishop Lamont and the author: "Why I think that the presence of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission is needed in our diocese", 6/178. Attached comment to this letter: "The informant (Fr Ndlovu) states that the Bishop of Bulawayo is reluctant (or unwilling) to let the Justice and Peace Commission come into his diocese; the informant attributes this attitude to the general feeling of the expatriate clergy in western Rhodesia which is sympathetic toward the Government. (The clergy are mainly of German origin.)"
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12 This view was expressed to members of the "unofficial" Commission by members of Government such as Minister of Education, Dzingai Mutumbuka, Minister of Justice, Simbi Mubako, Vice President Simon Muzenda, Minister of Local Government, Eddison Zvobgo and others. 11 On 17 May 1984, the (official) Commission called for a Committee of Enquiry into its evidence on events in Matabeleland, believing that such an investigation would refute critics (of the JPC and the Church) in Government. Rejecting this call, Minister Shamuyarira (Information) and Minister Zvobgo
(Justice) concluded: "We dispute your contention that the Catholic Church has remained as the voice of the voiceless, in the post-independence, but we believe time and history shall deliver the right judgement on that issue."

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Appendix I
1. Commander in Chief - President R Mugabe
4. Army Commissar - J Tungamirai
5. Security and Intelligence - Sheba Gava 6. Logistics and Supplies - C Dauramanzi
7. Training - J Misihairambwi 8. Personnel - P M'Punzarima
Secretary - K Kidza Logistics - M Mhaka
Transport - Agnew Kambeu 13. Six Field Commanders:
5. Perenz Shiri 6. Rex Tichafa
1. Joseph Kumalo
2. Joseph Chimurenga
3. Edzai Mabhunu
16. Education - Sheba Tawarwisa 17. Production, Constuction and Development- P Baya

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Appendix II
CHRONOLOGY
1560-61 Mission of Fr Goncalo Silveria to the court of the Mutapa and his martyrdom there.
1664 A son of Mutapa Kapararidze is ordained. He becomes Vicar of the Convent of St Barbara in Goa (India).
1704 Two sons of Mutapa Nyamadende Mhande ordained. 1775 All missionaries withdrawn from the area, due to political events in Europe.
1879 April 16 A party of Jesuits leave Grahamstown, in the Eastern Cape, SA, for Zimbabwe.
1890 September 12 The Pioneer Column sent by C J Rhodes's British South Africa Company (BSA Company) to take control of the northern areas of Zimbabwe, raises the British flag in Fort Salisbury, later Salisbury, now Harare. Jesuits and Dominican Sisters accompany the column. 1892 Chishawasha founded as a Jesuit mission on land north of Fort Salisbury that had been given to the Catholic Church by Cecil John Rhodes.
1893 The 'Matabele' war, leading to the defeat and death of Lobengula, the Ndebele leader, enabling the BSA Company to take control of the rest
of Zimbabwe, which is to be called 'Southern Rhodesia' until 1980.

1896-97 The first Chimurenga, which the settlers called 'the Rebellions' of the 'Matabele' (Ndebele) and then of the Shona peoples of Zimbabwe. 1896 June 21 Chishawasha attacked. 1904 Mapondera captured and imprisoned for leading an armed rising against the settlers.

1910 Alheit Mission (DRC) founded. 1918 St Paul's Mission, Musami, set up as an outstation of Chishawasha. 1923 Referendum among the electorate of SR to discern their wishes as to the future form of Government of the territory after the imminent end of BSA Company rule. Amalgamation with South Africa is rejected in favour of 'Responsible Government'. This allowed the settlers and their Government almost complete autonomy, save that Britain reserved the right to examine and, if necessary, veto legislation relating to the black ('native') population. Although these powers were never used, their existence was a source of grievance to the white settlers from then on and, in the end, HMG’s refusal to remove them was causative of UDI.

1930 The Land Apportionment Act divides the country into two roughly equal parts: one for the tiny minority of white settlers, where no black is allowed to own property or even to reside without permission; and the rest, containing the poorer soils, and receiving the lowest rainfall, for the black original inhabitants of Zimbabwe. From the time of the passage of the Act through to the early '70s, the process of 'resettlement' - of moving blacks still in white areas, whether these were utilised for commercial agriculture or not - proceeded spasmodically, adding to the already increasing population of the 'native reserves', later called TTLs. 1931 Bishop Aston Chichester appointed Vicar Apostolic. 1932 Chichester establishes the LCBL sisterhood for black women religious. 1936 Major Seminary opens at Chishawasha to train local priests. 1945 Bethlehem Fathers, in the Gwelo Diocese, move into Gutu District in the Midlands Province.


1960-61 Negotiations between British and Southern Rhodesian Governments lead to the adoption and implementation of the '1961 Constitution' which is rejected by the NDP, successor to SRANC and shortly to be itself banned in turn. 1962 Second Vatican Council begins. 1962 ZAPU founded, led by Joshua Nkomo again, but is banned within months. 1962
December RF comes to power in SR elections, led by W inston Field. 1963 Rhodesia Catholic Bishops' Conference (RCBC) established. 1963 August ZANU founded under the leadership of Revd Ndabaningi Sithole.
1964 Silveria House established. Ian Smith becomes RF leader and PM. ZANU's first Congress, held in Gwelo. ZANU opens office in Basera. 1964 Rhodesia Christian Council formed. 1965 November 11 UDI.
1965 November 28 Publication of A Plea for Peace. 1966 April 28 Battle of Sinoia, regarded by ZANU as the first engagement of the first phase of their armed struggle.
1967-68 Various incursions into the west and north-west of Zimbabwe by forces of the alliance of ZAPU and the ANC of South Africa are contained by the regime's security forces joined by elements of the SA defence forces who remain in the country until the late 1970s. Such intermittent incursions, by both ZANU and ZAPU, mark the period up to 1972.

O-i'7ronoloq
1969 Passing of the Land Tenure Act, a refinement of the old Land Apportionment Act to suit the purposes and policies of the RF.
1969 Publication, by the leaders of most Churches in SR, of A Call to Christians: Message and Appeal from Church Leaders to the Christian People of Rhodesia.
1971 Other bishops fail to support Lamont's opposition to the Land Tenure Act.
1971 The Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a constitutional settlement are negotiated by Smith and British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home. Subjected to a form of 'testing', in which blacks were allowed to participate at the insistence of the British, the proposals were found to be unacceptable to the majority of the population and were abandoned in early 1972.
1971 1 000 families evicted from Chishawasha under the Land Tenure Act. 1971 November JPC created, following a meeting of leading Catholics the Major Seminary at Chashawasha.
1972 African National Council (ANC) emerges, from the groups opposed to the 1971 Proposals, as an internal opposition force. Having been prominent in the 'No' campaign, United (American) Methodist Church leader, Bishop Abel Muzorewa becomes president of the new Party. 1972 August Congress of Ancestral Spirits (Ch. 9). 1972 December 21 The attack on Altena Farm near Mt Darwin launches the guerrilla war in the north-east.
1973 February 19 The closure of the primary and secondary schools at St Albert's Mission marks the first overt Government move against a Catholic institution.
1973 February Arrest of the medium of Chiwawa. 1973 July The abduction from St Albert's. 1974 April Revolution in Portugal begins. 1974 The 'year of the SA-inspired 'detente exercise' in the wake of the collapse of Portuguese resistance to anti-colonial forces in Mozambique, Angola and its other possessions. Detained Zimbabwean nationalist leaders are released from prisons around the country and flown to Lusaka for negotiations in which SA and Frontline State leaders Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique, as well as Rhodesian representatives all become involved. Such negotiations became a constant, if intermittent, feature of the Zimbabwean political scene - later involving the USA as well as Britain until, finally, peace was achieved and legality restored in 1979-80. The 1974 round resulted in a shaky and short-lived ceasefire, and ZAPU and ZANU's reluctant and equally temporary acceptance of their inclusion under the umbrella of the UANC. However, the detente exercise and other, related and unrelated, events the following year combined to set back ZANU’s war effort very seriously.

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1974 December Robert Mugabe, now on the way to becoming ZANU’s leader, meets the JPC executive.
1975 The Indemnity and Compensation Act (see Ch. 2). 1975 The 'Nhari Rebellion' inside ZANU is crushed and its leaders executed early in the year, though the movement began in late 1974.
1975 March The assassination of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's Chairman, is followed by the detention by the Zambian authorities of nearly all ZANU cadres in that country.
1975 April Publication of The Man in the Middle. 1975 April Mugabe escapes into Mozambique through the mountains on Zimbabwe's eastern border.
1975 June Mozambican independence. 1975 November Leading elements in the military wings of ZAPU and ZANU agree to merge forces in the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). It was never clear to what extent ZANU leaders in detention in Zambia agreed with or were involved in this step.
1975 This year saw the emergence, through an undateable process, of Robert Mugabe as leader of ZANU, following the eclipse of Sithole - who had been deposed the year before by a 'caucus' of the leadership in prison, though that step was repudiated by Frontline leaders at the 1974 negotiations in Lusaka.
1976 Early in the year, ZANU, now based in Maputo, Mozambique and recovering from the detente exercise and the events of 1975, opened a new front in the south-east of Zimbabwe, signalled by attacks on the road and rail links to SA at Easter. During this and subsequent years the number of young Zimbabweans crossing to Mozambique to join ZIPA (and later ZANLA when it re-emerged as a separate
force) increased enormously.
1976 April Bishop Lamont charged. 1976 September Lamont's trial in Umtali. Later in the year, his Speech from the Dock was published.
1977 During the first half of the year, ZIPA, as representing a tendency within ZANU was proscribed. ZIPA itself had ceased to have much reality as a fighting force or political movement late in 1976 as ZANLA re-emerged as a separate army following the release of its leaders, including Tongogara, from detention in Zambia for the Geneva negotiations.
1977 July Chitepo College, ZANU's ideological and administrative training institution is closed and the 'Whampoa' syllabus used there is banned (see Ch. 3).
1978 March 3 The 'internal settlement' Salisbury Agreement leads, in April, to the formation of a new cabinet with Bishop Muzorewa of the UANC as Prime Minister.
1978August20 Catholic delegation meets Mugabe and other leaders of the liberation movements in Lusaka.
1978 October Guerrillas visit the convent at Mutero Mission, Gutu. 1978 November 8 Fr Muzungu arrested. 1979 June 4 41 ZANLA troops attack St Albert's Mission. 1979 July ZANLA forces close Mutero school. 1979 August Fr Muzungu abducted to Mozambique. 1979 September -December Lancaster House Conference in London reaches a settlement of the conflict in Zimbabwe. 1979 October - ZANLA attack on St Albert's. 1979 November McDonagh's findings on the issue of the 'just war' in relation
to the conflict in Zimbabwe are presented. He later publishes them as
The Demands of Simple Justice.
1979 December ZANLA's Chief of Defence, Josiah Tongogara killed in a road
accident.
1980 January The ceasefire agreed on at Lancaster House is finally in place,
the guerrillas are moving into assembly points and Lord Soames is
the Governor of a SR restored to legality. 1980 February 1 Murder of Fr
Machikicho. 1980 February 20 Murder of Fr Killian Huesser. 1980 February
Attempt on life of Robert Mugabe.
Attempt to blow up Moto premises, and fake election issue of the paper.
Elections: the results, announced early in March, give ZANU 57 of
the 80 seats contested on the basis of universal suffrage. 1980 April 17 (midnight)
The new nation is officially born.

Expatriate Missionaries Killed
R.I.P.
Fr George Joerger SMB Bp Adolph Schmitt CMM Fr Possenti Weggartner CMM
Sr Mary van der Berg CPS Fr Martin Thomas SJ Fr Christopher Shepherd Smith
Br John Conway SJ Sr Epiphany Schneider OP Sr Joseph Wilkinson OP Sr
Ceslaus Stiegler OP Sr Magdala Lewandowski OP Fr Jose Manuel Rubio Diaz
SMI Sr Ferdinand Ploner CPS Dr Johanna Decker Fr Desmond Donovan SJ Br
Peter Geyermann CMM Br Andrew van Arx Fr Gregor Richert SJ Br Bernhard
Lisson SJ Fr Gerhard Pieper SJ Fr Martin Holenstein SMB Dr Luisa Guidotti Mr
John Bradburne Fr Raymond Machikicho Fr Killian Huesser SMB

Date
7 Feb. 77 7 Feb. 77 7 Feb. 77 7 Feb. 77 10 Aug. 77 10 Aug. 77 15 Jan. 78 2 June
78 2 June 78 28 June 78 28 June 78 28 June 78 26 Dec. 78 1 Jan. 79 6 July 79 3 Sep. 79 1
Feb. 80 19 Feb. 80
Killed Deported
Bishop Priests Brothers Sisters Helpers
Total
6
3 25
9 18
Source: R. Randolph, SJ "Dawn in Zimbabwe-
288
Area
Bondolfi Lupane
Lupane Lupane Musami Musami Musami Musami Musami Musami Musami Musami
Bangala Lupane Lupane
Makumbi Embakwe Embakwe Magondi Magondi Kangaire Shurugwi Mutoko
Mutoko Gokomere Berejena
Diocese GRU BYO BYO
Appendix III
ABBREVIATIONS
ANC - Reserved nowadays for the majority, and newly governing, party in South Africa, but in the 1950s there were also African National Congress movements/parties in the three territories of the short-lived Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Southern Rhodesia ANC (SRANC) was founded in 1958, later than those in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), with Joshua Nkomo as leader. It was banned early in 1959 - most of its leadership detained or restricted in terms of the state of emergency declared throughout the Federation in response to the perceived threat from emergent Black nationalism. However, the same set of initials was used, purposely, for the African National Council which emerged in 1971-1972, under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, from the movement of popular opposition to the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals for a settlement of the constitutional crisis triggered by UDI (q.v.). See also UANC below.
BMS - The 'Bethlehem Fathers' or Bethlehem Mission Society, with headquarters at Immensee in Switzerland. Its members have long been active in the Midlands of Zimbabwe, in Gweru - formerly Gwelo Diocese. The Society is also abbreviated as SMB in the text. CARITAS - Catholic international relief and development agency. CCJP - Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. See JPC. CIIR - Catholic Institute of International Relations, a progressive 'think tank' in London, active during the Zimbabwe war both through its publications and in behind the scenes diplomacy.
CIO - Central Intelligence Organisation, the security agency set up by the Rhodesian regime in response to the escalation of the guerrilla war in the early 1970s; the name was retained by the Zimbabwe Government after independence.
CMM - Marianhill Community.
CPS - Precious Blood Sisterhood.
CSSD - Commission for Social Service and Development of the Catholic Church both before and after independence, but now called CADEC. DRC - Dutch Reformed Church, the 'established' Church of Afrikaaner nationalism in South Africa; its missions and many of its churches after independence chose to form themselves into the Reformed Church in Zimbabwe, though DRC congregations still exist, mainly among white Zimbabweans. 289

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FRELIMO - The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique waged war against Portuguese colonialism in that country from 1964-74. When Mozambique became Independent in June 1975, FRELIMO formed the Government.

FROLIZI - Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe. Formed in a 1971 attempt to unite ZANU and ZAPU which soon petered out in failure, it continued as a (minor) third liberation party/force until 1974 when its leadership was absorbed into the UANC (q.v.).

FRONTLINE STATES' - The independent black African States whose support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa, especially the provision of rear bases and, in the case of Mozambique and Zambia, the imposition of sanctions, was an important factor in the ultimate success of the various struggles against Portuguese colonialism, settler recalcitrance in SR, South African imperialism in Namibia and apartheid itself. Originally composed of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, with Botswana participating later, the group was joined by Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990.

HLMC - Handmaidens of our Lady of Mount Carmel. The order of the Carmelite sisters.

ICU - The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (later the Reformed ICU, hence RICU) was an influential trade union-cum-embryo political Party in the 1930s when it was an object of considerable suspicion to the Southern Rhodesian authorities for its role as one of the major voices of black discontent. Its most prominent leader, Charles Mzingeli, later (in the 1940s and 1950s) came to be regarded by the younger 'radical' generation of politicians, who formed the Youth League in 1957 and the SRANC (q.v.) in 1958, as having 'sold out' i.e., as having been co-opted.

JPC - Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church (more officially: CCJP), existing as an arm of the Church in many countries. Established in Southern Rhodesia in 1971.

LCBL - Little Children of Our Blessed Lady, a religious order for (mainly black) women founded in 1932 by Bishop Chichester, then Vicar Apostolic in SR.

LCM - The Little Company of Mary. MM - Maryknoll Missioners.


O Carm - The Carmelite Order of male and female religious, active in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe from 1954. OFM - Order of Friars Minor or Franciscans.

OP - The abbreviation used for one of the oldest established orders of religious men and women, the Dominicans: Order of Preachers.
PBVM - The sisters of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary. PF - Patriotic Front: the form in which the two main Zimbabwean nationalist parties chose to ally themselves, especially for the purpose of negotiations during the period 1976-79. RSA/SA - Republic of South Africa. RCBC - Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference. RCC - Rhodesia Christian Council. RF - Rhodesian Front: the right-wing, anti-majority rule Party, exclusively composed of whites, that ruled SR (which they called Rhodesia) from the December 1962 election until the reimposition of direct British rule after the Lancaster House accord in December 1979. SI - The Society of Jesus, commonly called 'the Jesuits'. JA - The Jesuits' Archive (in Harare), one of the author's major sources. SJI - Sisters of the Infant Jesus, an order of women religious. SMB - See BMS. SMI - Spanish Mission Institute (Burgos Fathers). SR - Southern Rhodesia, often called Rhodesia after Northern Rhodesia became Zambia. The illegal RF regime purported to make the name change official after their seizure of independence at UDI (q.v.). SRANC - See ANC. SVD - Divine Word Society (of missionaries). TEAM - The Evangelical Alliance Mission. TTL - Tribal Trust Land(s). The areas making up about half the land in the country - which were reserved for the black population by the 1931 Land Apportionment Act. At first called 'reserves', this - much the worse - half of the land was intended to support the great majority of the population. Especially in the early years after the act, there were few blacks in urban areas and the labour force serving the needs of the large scale white-owned commercial farms was by and large made up of migrants from Mozambique, Malawi (then Nyasaland) and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia). In general, Zimbabwean blacks conducted a protracted - and successful - strike against work and employment on the country's commercial farms. UANC - United African National Council (see also ANC). The UANC was the front or alliance of black nationalist political parties and liberation movements formed as a result of the negotiations (détente) of 1974. These were initiated by the SA Government to try to end the escalation of the war in Zimbabwe which followed Portugal's termination of its

UDI - The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the then Prime Minister of Portugal, which prompted the UDI by the South African regime to protect its extensive commercial interests in Rhodesian (Zimbabwe). The UDI resulted in the imposition of British military forces on the country to prevent the collapse of the regime and the intensification of the guerrilla war. The UANC was formed after the negotiations (détente) of 1974, which were initiated by the SA Government to try to end the escalation of the war in UDI.

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struggle against FRELIMO in Mozambique. Set up in December 1974, the UANC at first included ZANU and ZAPU under its 'umbrella', but they both pulled out during 1975, leaving the rump under Bishop Abel Muzorewa as basically an internal political Party. Together with the former ZANU leader, Revd Ndabaningi Sithole and Chirau, one of the 'traditional chiefs' so constantly promoted by the regime, the UANC entered into the 3rd March (1978) Agreement with the RF. This 'internal settlement', of which Bishop Muzorewa became titular head, ruled the country amid deepening conflict until the Lancaster House Conference brought about peace at the end of 1979. 
Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith, leader of the RF (q.v.), on 11th November 1965. It was intended - and claimed - that this act of illegality would terminate any residual constitutional powers that the British Government might exercise in 'Rhodesia' to the detriment of the interests of the white minority and would therefore obviate the need for progress towards majority rule, which the UK was calling for.

Instead, it launched the country into fifteen years of illegality, isolation - even the regime's like-minded neighbours in South Africa and the Portuguese in Mozambique refused to recognise it - economic sanctions and war.

ZANLA - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military wing/armed force of ZANU.

ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union. Founded under the leadership of Revd Ndabaningi Sithole in August 1963 by a group of nationalists dissatisfied with the policies and methods of Joshua Nkomo and his senior lieutenants (see ZAPU), and banned less than a year later. It was, from exile, to become the major force in the struggle against the Smith regime in the 1970s, led by its chairman, Herbert Chitepo (until his assassination in March 1975) and by Josiah Tongogara, its Chief of Defence (as he was titled in the last years of war) up to his death in a road accident just after the Lancaster House peace settlement.

ZANU, through its military wing, ZANLA, opened a new front for armed struggle in the north east in December 1972 - after years of preparation and mobilisation among the peasants of the area, and with assistance from FRELIMO of Mozambique. Through the vicissitudes of the succeeding years - including deep internal divisions - this bridgehead was maintained and, after the independence of Mozambique, expanded eastwards and southwards until the entire eastern half of Zimbabwe was engulfed in the conflict.

Sithole was replaced as the president by Robert Mugabe in 1975 and under his - sometimes contested - leadership, the Party waged the guerrilla war inside Zimbabwe, and the seemingly endless series of negotiations beyond its borders that culminated in the Lancaster House settlement (December 1979). Having gained a convincing victory in the election that followed, ZANU(PF) (q.v.) formed the first Government of Independent Zimbabwe, though some members of ZAPU also held cabinet office until their dismissal in early 1982. From then on, ZANU(PF) ruled alone until the ZANU-ZAPU Unity Accord of 1988 created the present unified ZANU(PF).

ZANU(PF) - The title assumed by ZANU on the formation of the Patriotic Front and under which it fought and won the 1980 elections (separately from PF-ZAPU). See also ZANU.

ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union, the third in the succession of
banned African nationalist parties of the late '50s and early '60s. Like them it was led by Joshua Nkomo, and ZAPU was subsequently one of the two major liberation movements in contestation with the Rhodesian regime, still under Nkomo's leadership. Formed soon after the banning of the NDP (q.v.), it was banned in turn in less than a year. Nationalist leaders had already agreed not to form another Party should ZAPU be banned, but a group dissatisfied with the leadership and policies of Nkomo and his immediate lieutenants - especially what they saw as a lack of militancy, as unwillingness to consider the option of armed struggle - broke ranks in August 1963 to form ZANU. Those loyal to Nkomo then formed the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) which was banned along with ZANU in 1964. In exile, the name ZAPU continued to be used, and, especially after the formation of ZIPRA, it remained a major political force, both in the armed struggle, and in the long series of negotiations leading up to independence in 1980 - in the latter part of this period in a loose alliance with ZANU in the PF (q.v.). Leaders of the Party who had taken office in 1980 at the invitation of the majority Party, were forced out in early 1982 after being accused of complicity in a planned armed uprising against the newly independent Government. Suspected of collusion with the 'dissidents' who, after 1982 staged a campaign of sporadic violence in Matabeleland and western Zimbabwe generally, the Party maintained itself as an Independent - if embattled - political force, especially in those areas, until the 1988 Unity Accord when ZAPU 'fused' with ZANU(PF) and its leaders re-joined the Government.

ZCBC - Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference. ZIKO - The Zimbabwe Committee of the Bethlehem Fathers (see BMS) set up at the society's Headquarters in Switzerland. ZIPA - Zimbabwe People's Army. See Chapter 3. ZIPRA - Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army the military wing of ZAPU which played the major role in the armed struggle against Rhodesian forces in western Zimbabwe, 1976-79.

Appendix IV
GLOSSARY
(Words explained are Shona, unless otherwise indicated.) Ambuya Specifically, mother-in-law, but sometimes like mbuya (q.v.) used generally to greet/describe an elderly female person. Baba Father/father. Chamuka Inyama Literally: 'what is alive is meat'. Used generally as a war term for 'slaughter/kill'. Used in the text as a nick-name for a guerrilla. Chimbwido A girl, one of the young, usually local, supporters of the guerrillas who acted as their 'eyes and ears', reporting the activities of Rhodesian security forces and the presence of informers in the area and often acting as bearers and suppliers of food and other requirements of the fighters. Chimurenga Best translated, in a work of history like this, as 'war of liberation', but with the literal meaning of a war: a fight in which
everyone participates.

**Dzakutsaku** A term which the 'auxiliary' forces of Bishop Muzorewa and the Revd Ndabaningi Sithole (which fought alongside the Rhodesian security forces) used to mean the 'Party for everyone'. The guerrillas of ZANU and ZAPU and their supporters used it in a derogatory way to suggest people with no political direction.

**Ishe** Honorific: sir, chief, lord, compare mambo (q.v.). Ishe Komborera Afrika 'God bless Africa'. The Shona version of the hymn of the ANC of South Africa, which was later adopted by the other Congress parties in the sub-continent. Still the national anthem of Zambia, it served the same purpose in Independent Zimbabwe until 1994. Kristo /Kriste Christ.

**Mambo** According to some historians, this was the title of, or honorific for, the king, the mutapa, in the States of pre-colonial Zimbabwe; now employed as a general honorific: lord, master, even, vulgarly, 'boss'. 'Mampara' NOT Shona or Ndebele; meaning 'idiot' 'oaf' 'fool' in one of the argots, generated in RSA and used by the whites to communicate with servants/workers throughout the region.

**Mbuya** Grandmother (see also ambuya above). Nehanda, one of the leaders of the first Chimurenga in 1896 and 1897, is nowadays always referred to as Mbuya Nehanda.

**Moto** Literally: fire. Also the name of an opposition Catholic paper banned by the Rhodesian regime in 1970.

**Mudzimu** pl Midzumu or Vadzimu Spirits that take possession of a medium when he/she enters a trance.

**Mujibha** See chimbwido. A mujibha was a boy or youth who performed the same services for the guerrillas.

**Mupostore** pl Vapostore A member of the Apostolic sect, one of the many African Independent Churches.

**Murungu** pl Varungu A white person. **Mutapa** Mwene mutapa, sometimes munhumutapa (corrupted to 'Monomotapa'), was the name or title given to a late C15 ruler of part of present-day Zimbabwe. Various translated, sometimes unflatteringly, it became the honorific of subsequent 'emperors'- which was the way the Portuguese chose to render it when they encountered his descendants/successors in the Mt Darwin area.

**N'ganga** Traditional healer, what whites chose to call, derisively, 'witch doctors', witches themselves being varoyi - singular muroyi. Nyika Country, as in 'our country' i.e., not implying rural area. Nzira Dzemasoja 'The Soldiers' Way'. Title of a liberation song. It is guerrilla soldiers that are referred to.

**Pamberi Nechimurenga** Freely translated: forward with/long live the (liberation) struggle. One of the slogans used at meetings by the guerrilla speakers, to which the povo (q.v.) would respond, 'Pamberi!'
Povo Term of Portuguese origin, (a borrowing from FRELIMO) for the ordinary people, the 'masses'.
Pungwe Specifically, as used in the text: an all-night session, of songs, speeches, hearings to mobilise and conscientise the people of the village or larger area being visited by the guerrillas.
Sabuku 'Kraal' head, Kraal, a borrowing from Afrikaans, means a village or smaller settlement, often of only a very small number of families.
Sadza The name given in Shona to the staple food of Zimbabwe and indeed of much of the sub-continent: a stiff porridge made of meal ground from shelled maize - corn in the USA.
Sangano Vanhu Literally: the meeting/gathering of the people. Sekuru Literally: grandfather, sometimes uncle, more generally elderly man. Also used as an honorific in salutation, as a sign of respect. Svikiro Spirit medium.
Ujamaa Swahili: the name given to the African form of socialism espoused by the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere.
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Appendix V
REPORT OF WALTER KAUFMANN
ON HIS EXPERIENCES IN AN OPERATIONAL AREA
Father Walter worked in Matibi near Nuanetsi from 1969 onwards, but extended his work towards the border only in 1975.
He first met the vakomana in June. The meeting was arranged by someone in the area. There were some Catholics among the vakomana.
The war had begun properly in this area in March, 1976. On 3 March he had tried to go back, but was not allowed to by the Police who said it was too dangerous. Thus he only went back in May. He was only some miles away when the South African tourists were killed. It was his habit to stay two weeks in every month in his house in the operational area.
In April-May, 1976, hundreds of young people left for Mozambique, and some of them may already have returned after training. Other young people have gone into the towns because of harassment and ill treatment by the security forces. Roughly 50% of the population of 50 000 have been taken in for interrogation by the security forces. Torture is a common procedure during interrogations. Also the army is encouraged to burn the granaries and fields of the people. They even burn villages. Van Der Byl, when he was Minister of Defence, encouraged the security forces to burn granaries. People are discouraged and wonder why they should
plough when it only meant that their crops would be burnt down before they could be eaten. Moreover the people are not allowed to grow tall crops, as this may provide cover for the freedom fighters.

The security forces have killed at least 20 curfew breakers in the area. One reason for this is that the people can be careless, as there may not be security forces in the area for months, and suddenly they return. People start running as soon as they see security forces, as they are so afraid of them. On one occasion soldiers shot into a hut where a number of people had run for shelter. A man and his wife were killed.

The relationship between the freedom fighters and the people is very good. The vakomana always consulted the people before taking action against anyone, although there still remains the danger that someone can be killed as an informer as a result of a rumour. On one occasion the villagers asked the vakomana not to place landmines near the villages, but to place them further away in uninhabited areas. The vakomana complied.

In talks with the people the vakomana speak of the aim of their fight. They show respect for their elders, and give the impression that they are not 297 against traditions and traditional religion. They talk of their ancestors and of the restoration of the land. As a result the people are much more politicised, and now think in terms of nations rather than in terms of only the family as before.

About 15 people have been killed by the vakomana in the area. These were all informants. Thus it is now known that those who sell information for money will not live to enjoy the money. One of those killed was a school manager, Musamani Chauke. The people say that he had papers on his desk showing that he was giving information. They also say that he was carrying a weapon. Anyone carrying a weapon may be seen as a legitimate target. The vakomana have spoken out in the village against polygamy, but they only criticised in the most extreme cases.

At present recruitment in the area by the vakomana has stopped, although many people from the area still wanted to join, including many girls. The vakomana told them they had too many people.

The people have been put into two "protected" villages. Schools in the area have been closed. Teachers left because they were very badly treated by the security forces. The last straw for the people was the imposition of an entrance fee in addition to the school fees. This was a means of providing additional revenue for the Government. However, the people did not have the means to pay this additional fee. Their main source of income was the sale of cattle, but at present because of the war situation, cattle could not be moved along roads for sale. The vakomana forbid the people to sell their excess crops, so the people cannot get income from this either. He did not gain the impression that the vakomana had begun their own schools and provided their own services. Probably this was for two reasons: firstly because the security forces could still enter the area, although they might be absent for as long as three months, and secondly he gained the impression that the area was a transit area rather than an area where the freedom
fighters settled down for any length of time. It was also a resting area to which they retired. The stage has been reached where all roads have been closed, and security forces do not often enter. As a result there are few government targets anymore in the area. There is only fighting if the security forces come into the area. Matibi, like Berejena, is controlled by the vakomana. Usually the security forces can only enter by helicopter or plane. So safe is the area that at one time a large meeting of freedom fighters took place, when their leaders came from Mozambique to speak to them. On that day Father Kaufmann had the impression that there was going to be no danger from landmines but the very next day a landmine exploded.

The vakomana openly say they belong to ZANU. They are very eager to hear news, especially during the Geneva Conference, when they would arrive to ask for newspapers and to listen to the radio. They made it clear that they were against the Geneva talks. However, he also gained the impression that many of the vakomana did not relish the life of the soldier, and would prefer peace. They were not professional soldiers who wanted to continue fighting for the rest of their lives. They were fighting for a cause, and he got the impression that they would lay down arms when this cause was attained.

Father Walter also gained the impression that the vakomana held back their strength, and did not fight unless it was absolutely necessary. They knew that time was on their side. In one report the vakomana ambushed a group of black soldiers, and could have killed all of them, but instead they were allowed to leave, after receiving a warning.

Many African soldiers are very unhappy at the present time. The vakomana are not generally after the District Assistants, unless they are known to have committed crimes against the people. Generally the vakomana work hand in hand with the District Assistants who allow them to move in and out of the "protected" villages. One "protected" village was destroyed by the vakomana. On the whole they were very lenient towards the district assistants, who were not fully trained military personnel, but who carried some sort of out-of-date gun.

Sometimes the vakomana write letters to the security forces, challenging them to come to a certain place to fight. Usually the security forces only come 3 or 4 days after the appointed date, because they are afraid. He also had the impression that the security forces would avoid contact with the freedom fighters if possible. Neither side was eager to meet the other in battle.

(Reported by Fay Chung, 24 March 1977, "Confidential")

Appendix VI
THE CHURCH AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
(AN EXTRACT FROM A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE BETHLEHEM FATHERS)
INTERIM GOVERNMENT
As soon as a transitional Government is formed, the Church hierarchy should be seen to accept the new social order. The clergy should make a determined effort to dismantle all the vestiges of discrimination. The question thus arises of the preparedness of the white clergy to change. One expects to see the Church leading the way by desegregating all its institutions (forget about the quota of blacks in schools, hospitals etc.). Wouldn't it be a wonderful demonstration to the people if the Church, which has always preached against segregation, were to initiate and lead a campaign of desegregation? NATIONALISATION
The first thing that an African Government is likely to nationalise is land. In this the Church hierarchy should give a lead, if they have not already started co-operatives on their property. The consequences of this are clear enough. It will mean less cash in the church. But then it should be remembered that the Church cannot afford to be seen as a capitalist enterprise. The main concern of the clergy should be the people and their welfare rather than the Church institution with its semi-commercial enterprises.

The Church should actively participate in mutual Church-Government development projects, especially in the rural areas, where the Government is most likely to seek the co-operation of Church authorities (education, health, co-operatives, artisan training etc.) This mutual co-operation will also help to eliminate antagonistic rivalry with the Party for mass support and ideology. TRIBALISM
Unfortunately, the Church's ecclesiastical regions are more or less divided along regional and/or tribal lines (Sinoia, KoreKore and Zezure; Salisbury, Zezuru; Gwelo, Karanga, Shangaan and Ndebele; Umtali, Manyika and Ndebele, Bulawayo, Ndebele and Kalanga and Wankie, Ndebele, Tonga, Luvale etc.) SOCIALISM
The question of the kind of socialism the new State of Zimbabwe is going to pursue is a burning issue. It is clearly a question that is on many people's minds. It is very difficult at the moment to say in precise terms what form it will take. However, it is right for one to suggest that it will probably be somewhere between the Tanzanian model and the Mozambique model. It is important that the clergy be prepared for the coming changes. As far as the Africans are concerned, there is no incompatibility between socialism and Christianity.

The Church and African Government
In preparation for this change, some clergy and especially African sisters and laymen who have shown leadership in the field of socio-economic development, should be sent to Tanzania now to re-orientate their thinking. OPERATIONAL AREAS
The SMB clergy as a whole have been branded by the Rhodesian Front as friends, helpers and sympathisers of the independence movement. In the operational zones, relations between the clergy and the Government security forces are strained, and they are likely to get worse. However, there is a serious danger of taking it for granted that since the Government sees the clergy as supporters of the people, the people themselves will necessarily see their situation in the same light.
Each individual missionary will be judged by the freedom fighters according to his own merit and will have to prove himself at every stage. The missionary should not consider himself the man in the middle. This is a dangerous myth. If he is not on the side of the Freedom Fighters, he will be considered to be a Government supporter or even an agent. A NEUTRAL POSITION IS IMPOSSIBLE. How can anybody say in face of the most unjust structures which the Rhodesian Government has imposed - that he will stand in the middle?

The demands that will be made of the clergy working in the operational areas will be very exciting. Their very lives are likely to be under constant danger both from the Government security forces and sometimes even from the guerrillas. Floggings, various methods of torture (interrogations, electric shock etc.) and all other forms of brutality are already the order of the day. In each particular situation hitherto, the clergy have had to make an on the spot independent decision. There is need to formulate a generalised policy. Perhaps a special type of man will be needed to work in these areas. There may even be need to give special courses on the situation to prepare all clergy in areas of incipient insurrection on how to manage.

There must be no illusions. The security forces will certainly use every trick and device to get the clergy away from the operational zones. This is because they will not want anyone white to bear testimony, least of all, to challenge their excesses. What will the policy of the Church be, to leave or to stay and suffer with the people? A policy of withdrawal from such areas will set a very dangerous precedent.

The Church hierarchy should, as a whole, realize how finely balanced the relationship between the Church and the guerrillas is. Under no circumstances should their relationship be taken for granted. It should be realized that the regime holds a prime interest to provoke a guerrilla-Church conflict. The clergy cannot afford to light off this spark. So far, the clergy who have lived and worked in the contested zones have managed to coexist and function in a very tense and fragile situation. We must learn from them.

The Rhodesian Government is in the habit of sending agent provocateurs who commit crimes on behalf of the guerrillas. It would be very dangerous for the Church to accuse guerrillas of having committed a specific crime on the basis of hearsay or rumour-mongering, without any concrete evidence.

Based on the currently available information, one can draw a guideline which the clergy might find useful. This need not be confined to Church personnel in the operational areas proper, but should be made available to all clergy because the guerrillas are constantly expanding their zones of activity, so that one never knows when a particular area becomes operational.

The clergy must at all times put on a collar.
2 Keep an open door policy. People must be free to come in. You must be seen to have no protection whatsoever and to place all your trust in the hands of the people.
3 One must not change one's mode of transport (nor change cars). It is advisable for clergy in the operational areas to use bicycles.
4 One should not keep dogs or carry arms. No sandbags. No barricades.
5 If guerrillas ask for medicine, food, cigarettes, watches, radios, or for assistance in transport, their requests should, whenever possible, be met.
6 Under no circumstances should one allow the despised Rhodesian security forces to encamp on parish grounds. It should be standard policy that the clergy are seen to have no relationship whatsoever with the security forces (no lifts, not medicines, not material assistance of any sort.)
7 If and whenever necessary, guerrillas will send instructions to the clergy either directly or indirectly, on the use of certain roads. These instructions should not be taken lightly. However, the man on the spot should be allowed a certain degree of freedom on this issue, because sometimes silly instructions (e.g., do not go to church any more) may be issued by a crank just to settle a grudge with Christianity without even the knowledge of the guerrillas.
8 There are some clergy who, in the eyes of the people, are openly proRhodesian regime. Under no circumstances can the society send such people to work in these areas. On the contrary, serious consideration should be given to recall them home, because their continued presence could endanger the lives of all the others and their attitude might be a counter-witness.
9 Should the Church withdraw from a certain area or not? This is a complex question. One does not want to advocate a policy of carelessly sacrificing the clergy. But without sacrifice there cannot be any rebirth of Zimbabwe (a little suffering gives the Church a direction where to go). If the guerrillas do not specifically advise a member of the clergy to leave an area, then clergy should consider this as an invitation to stay. The Church, however, should resist any pressure from the Government to vacate an area.
10 If the society sets down certain clear guidelines of action and behaviour in the present struggle, such guidelines should be made known to the political leaders of the freedom fighters.
Prepared by Cde Dzingai Mutumbuka
February 1977.

Appendix VII
FR AMSTUTZ'S REPORT
This report comes from what I have heard. All the information given has been checked as carefully as possible and refers to the southern part of Gwelo Diocese.
I HOW DO THE GUERRILLAS ESTABLISH A PRESENCE?
WHERE?
Invariably in hilly areas covered by bush, but close to the people, i.e., in TTLs, some purchase areas and some big estates.
HOW?
First of all, they send in scouts to explore the ground: the whereabouts of the people and the geography of the area. This done they move in arms and cache them, often using girls as bearers. At this stage, they move in and out of the country.

This done, the armed group moves in and, in their first contact with the people, they wear uniforms and display their arms. They present themselves as (a) in control and (b) as handling the 'weapons of the people'. Their immediate task is to win the sympathy of the people. This they have to do (a) for their security, (b) for their support and (c) for political reasons, i.e., to convince the people that they are the liberators of Zimbabwe. Early, they bring things ahead in such a way as to require the people to show their loyalty. They are well informed of all important people in the area, both Africans and Europeans and including the names of priests, sisters, teachers, etc. They have a 'Who's Who' in which people are categorised according to whether they are 'with Smith or with us'. This has an important bearing on the missionary in the area whose standing with the Guerrillas depends on the testimony of the people. They start early indoctrinating the people and laying down rules for their behaviour.

CONTROL OF AN AREA
Having established a continuous presence (estimated in some areas to require 4 months), they aim to control that area by:
1. Eliminating the 'enemies of the people', black or white. Government institutions (DCs' offices, dips, beerhalls) and personnel (except health and agricultural officers) and those Church institutions which they consider further the cause of the Government are attacked as symbols of exploitation. Informers are killed and white farmers are harassed. Atrocities are committed.

2. Avoiding contact with the security forces. They do not want a war in the traditional sense of war, army versus army. Their tactics as far as the SF are concerned are hit and run in order to irritate, harass, and tie or in order to keep them jumping from place to place.
3. Controlling the traffic in the area. Their aim is to prevent people moving out of a troubled (area) in order to operate in an area.
4. Indoctrinating the people.

IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION
This is difficult to obtain, but
A. In General
They identify themselves. In this area, south of Gwelo, they identify themselves as 'Mugabe's people', 'Mugabe is our leader'. They enter the country from Mozambique. They teach by question and chorus answer and by singing liberation songs. Sessions are interspersed with dancing and beer drinking. Sessions frequently continue all night. Their main line of indoctrination is: "We want the land of our fathers back again", "our aim is to restore to the people the land that has been taken from them". They call on traditional religious belief wherein the vadzimu are seen as the motivating power (Cfr Terence Ranger on the early
Mashona rebellions). The vadzimu are also seen as providing protection and legitimizing their claim to the land. A variant on this line is: “We want the riches of our country- they are ours”, by which they mean the mines and industry. They say that their aim is to restore the land and riches to all the people. Land and riches must therefore be wrested from the hands of the white minority.

After Liberation, all will be expected to work hard and all privileges will be eliminated especially those derived from the presence of (and) association with the white minority. There will be free education for all and all will be paid just wages. The white has a right to stay if (a) he integrates with the people and opts to live with them according to Government policy and (b) abandons all privileges. The missions of the Church are to continue for they bring certain services to a region. (None has been closed down in this area).

The process is thus essentially one of decolonization, reversing the situation created by white settlers. Their aims are common to all liberation movements and contain nothing specifically communist. B. The Minority

A minority has an anti-Christian turn of mind. The minority might consist of one or two in a group, possibly the group leader; or one or other groups. They would eliminate Church influence as this conflicts with the monopoly of doctrine and loyalty they demand.

They would say that the Church has not identified sufficiently with the liberation movement and Guerrillas. Certain Christian ideas are branded as

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'chiRungu'. Some have expressed their views in atheistic slogans. They tend to be Moscow or Peking trained and they put heavy emphasis on national traditions. Even this minority has not forced the closure of any mission but they will demand that missionaries keep away from certain areas.

It is possible that they are Guerrilla elements which have got out of the control of field commanders or the higher political command. They might be simply plain bandits (tsotsis, skuzapu). Guerrilla groups have taken counter measures against such freelance groups.

STRATEGIES

The details are not clear. Their priorities are the indoctrination of the people in order to secure sympathy and loyalty, not primarily to escalate a war. Nonetheless, they do aim to liberate and establish control in an area. They are in no hurry, knowing that time and history are on their side. On the whole, they seem to handle the 'weapons of the people' with responsibility and most are friendly towards the local people. Many will listen to a reasoned argument. In some cases, they have modified their tactics following a reasoned argument (e.g., their presence once known invites the attention of the security forces with all the unpleasant consequences for the people). They keep to a strict discipline and their code of behaviour includes no drinking, no rape, no stealing.

ATROCITIES

There are various possible interpretations. Either (a) cruel means to deter the people from co-operation with the Government and to ensure loyalty and/ or (b)
sheer hatred for the enemy and anyone associated with him. In most cases the people know why an atrocity has been committed. People would have been warned. They don't employ hit and run tactics against the people or kill at random. But there are incidents and rumours which sometimes prevent the people discerning the pattern of the killings.

WHERE ARE THEY?
Their scouts are all over the country, including the urban areas. They have an effective communications network. They have established a continuous presence in all TTLs of the Gwelo diocese except Chilimanzi, Zimutu and Zilobela. Those who come in are all Mashona or Matebele: there are no foreigners among them nor there any mercenaries. Rumours about whites among them have not been sustained.

NUMBERS
A conservative count of the number in the area is about 2,000 in groups varying from a few to 200 or more. This number does not include helpers, messengers, contact men, etc. The Government figure for the whole country is 2,500.

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1. **Appendix**

II GUERRILLA GROUPS AND THE POPULATION
On the whole, the population is sympathetic and the people identify with their goals. They are 'our boys'; they are freedom fighters'. Everyone in the TTLs is thus a potential 'mukomana'.

REACTION
1. Some use their weapons to settle old personal accounts. Those are the 'incidents' and they create friction between the 'vakomana' and the people.
2. The presence of the 'vakomana' brings in other groups the SF, Selous Scouts, Grey Scouts, tsotsi, etc. with all the consequences. It is the advent of these groups which creates a 'disturbed area'. The people have means of distinguishing between true and fake Guerrillas. The criteria are not easy to come by but these are some of them: (a) the Guerrillas come in the evening; (b) they speak politely; (c) they knock softly; (d) they don't shake hands but keep a distance; (e) they ask for help politely.
3. The people are naive about the dangers of communism and the power game. But there is a great difficulty about speaking about communism: the Government, news media and courts speak of the Guerrillas as communists or communist inspired. The people conclude that the communists are on their side. Government propaganda is defeating its own aim. The people listen to Radio Maputo almost exclusively and are thus open to direct communist indoctrination. They disbelieve the local news media.
4. After a while, the people get tired of the presence of the Guerrillas: they disrupt the normal flow of life—many stores are closed, they can't sell their grain, their cattle are wandering around unattended.
5. They are annoyed by the atheistic doctrine of the minority groups.
6. 'Incidents' tend to lower the standing of the Guerrillas among the people. 7. The Guerrillas are dependent on the population for food. In disturbed areas, there is not enough to go round. Some Guerrilla groups are tempted to force the people to give what little they have.

III GUERRILLAS, THE MISSIONARY AND THE COMMUNITY

A. THE MISSIONARY

1. He/she feels insecure: "What sort of group am I going to run into?" They could be 'vakomana', minority groups, SF, Selous Scouts. Though there is greater likelihood of encountering 'vakomana' than the SF.
2. Because the missionary is able to move freely in the troubled areas, he is regarded as a traitor by the SF.
3. He lives in a state of conflicting conscience demands: atrocities are wrong but what about reporting when the lives of his people, and himself, are endangered by reporting.
4. He lives in danger of death: mines are indiscriminate.
5. If he avoids an area, he will develop a 'man on the run' syndrome.
6. New missionaries cannot come into an area: the missionary's safety depends on his being known by the people.
7. The Church must retain a presence. If a place is abandoned, it may not be possible to reopen it; it may be closed for good.
8. He may not be able to reach some communities. It is essential to develop alternative forms of communication. This has been done in some areas, e.g. by writing letters.
9. It is essential that the missionary stays. His presence is a comfort to and sign of solidarity with the people. It is often possible to do more than mere presence (cpr alternative forms of communication).
10. NB. The figure of the missionary is changing. In the affected areas, we no longer carry the people, they carry us. We depend on them for our safety. They take care of the missionary who has taken care of them and identified with them. Warnings are sent. Frequently the intermediaries are old women.
11. This is a difficult time, but also a time of grace. Many missionaries have matured and become men of faith.
12. For the communities too: they have suddenly learned to share prayer together, establish consensus, share responsibility. In a word, they have become real communities.

B. THE COMMUNITY

1. They suffer the brunt of the war.
2. Though some have fallen away, many have been strengthened in their faith and prayer. More and more are reading the Bible and using it as a basis for their prayer.
Even though there are some leaders, more have suddenly emerged with a real sense of purpose and commitment to the essentials. A system of communications has emerged. Sunday services are more consolidated and vital. Where services in
churches or school buildings are not possible, 'under the tree' services are taking place.

3. The social concern of communities had developed (helping the victims of war, for example) and this concern is not directed to members of the Church alone. There is fear of retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Suppose we say that the operational areas are part of the new Zimbabwe, the new order has already begun. This gives the community a chance that may never recur to prove itself a community for others. It must go out to the needs and distress of the people. Communities must be islands of Christian love and care. This is the priority; structures will follow.

Report by Fr J Amstutz, Superior General SMB, May 1977

Appendix VIII

GUIDELINES OF BEHAVIOUR DURING PRESENT WAR SITUATION

(Draft by Crisis Committee, Gwelo Diocese, 20.9.1977)

1 General Attitude of Mission and Staff

The present situation in this country is confronting us with special difficulties but also with new challenges. The Church may be called upon to strip off an old dress and to put on a new one. The gospel will have to be lived in a new setting. We are asked to change attitudes and patterns of behaviour as individual Christians, as priests, Brothers, and Sisters, and as communities of believers.

Discovering Christ's message as meaningful and relevant for the Christians at this present moment, we plant it as a seed to grow in future days in the heart of the nation of tomorrow. People will not forget a gospel which they have been living and sharing through a period of painful social and political changes. They will not easily abandon a Church which has gone along with them through the thick of troubles.

Let it be clear to everybody that we consider ourselves to be messengers of peace and of reconciliation. In the present armed conflict we cannot support the violence of either side. Nor can we condemn those who have come to the conclusion that the unjust conditions in this country can only be changed through force.

We are unarmed and non-violent, often misunderstood by both sides, at times the victims of violence ourselves. In this we share the dilemma of the people - the man in the middle. But we continue to work for peace which consists, for us "in the permanent effort not only to disarm violence and hatred but also to build up justice with love". (Road to Peace, p. 33.)

We have constantly to rethink the meaning of our Christian presence and we need, for doing so, a spirituality which is enlightened by the mystery of the Incarnation. In concrete, it means to us that we must identify ourselves more with the people around us: listen to them, to learn to think and feel with them, and even to anticipate their reactions to certain events.
2 Our Attitude Towards the Security Forces

We avoid all unnecessary contacts with members of the Security Forces, Army, CID, Special Branch, Uniformed Police.

We do all in our limited power to avoid the presence and stationing of Security Forces on mission grounds because their presence is compromising and exposing the mission. It attracts the guerrillas and may lead to an armed confrontation on or near the mission ground.

Guidelines of Behaviour

We avoid all actions which could bring the security forces to the mission, e.g., calling in the police for cases which could be handed over to the headman or chief.

We avoid unnecessary travelling on roads often used by army trucks.

We do not seek protection with the army.

We do not keep any guns for protection. This rule should be known and kept by each and every staff member.

We do not put up any security fence or install any alarm system because this would arouse the suspicion of the guerrillas and everybody and would be interpreted that we are on the side of the security forces. An atmosphere of friendship with the people surrounding the mission will be a far safer fence for us.

We do not travel in convoys, certainly not in an area where we are known. (For a longer trip in an unknown area one may decide differently)

We refuse any assistance offered by the security forces such as transport of supplies by army trucks or in a protected convoy.

We do not offer food or drinks to members of the Security Forces when they come to the mission.

We do not receive any members of the Security Forces inside the house, except if the member-in-charge requests an interview with the person in charge of the mission or with another staff member. In such cases, it would be prudent to take along a witness, if possible an African staff member, in order to avoid subsequent suspicion by the people.

We avoid whatever could even be interpreted by the guerrillas or the people as sympathy for or fraternising with the security forces: e.g., we would refuse the offer of a 'friendly' football match between an army team and a mission school team.

All this can bring us into a tense relationship with the Security Forces but these are the costs for our trying to stay out of the armed conflict. When we have to explain our attitude and have to decline any co-operation, we should do this in a firm but calm and non-aggressive way by pointing out that this is our only possible attitude since we are unarmed.

3 Our Attitude towards the freedom fighters

In order to have the right attitude towards the guerrillas, it is important that we get acquainted with their positive aims. For this information we do not rely only on the government-controlled mass media of this country and the propaganda spread against the guerrillas.
The attitude towards the guerrillas will also be reflected by the attitude we have towards the people in general. We therefore avoid any bossy attitudes as expressed in shouting at people but rather try to be friendly and to create harmony. Our attitude and behaviour becomes known to the guerrillas long before we ever happen to meet them. We learn to watch our language: we do not use the term terrorist; we refrain from negative criticism, we keep back with our judgements on social matters and current events. We do each other a big service by watching and correcting each other in this regard.

Appendix

The following rules might help to find the right approach when we happen to meet freedom fighters:
Remain calm and rather reserved.
Listen, and do not say much.
Do not oppose, do not argue.
If the guerrillas come to the mission publicly, we do not hide away and we do not interfere with their orders. We answer their requests as far as possible and without panic. We keep in mind that generally they do not come to create trouble but rather want to leave a good impression.
It might be possible to express to one of their leaders the wish that they should not come back to the mission as a group because of all the dangers this involves.
Our basic attitude to reporting the presence of guerrillas is guided by the following. We probably realise that our life has been in their hands and they have spared us. It would now be a dirty trick to report them. Reporting brings not only the person reporting but many more lives into acute physical danger.
If it is possible, the leader of a group visiting a mission should be approached to find out his attitude to reporting and to show him the serious consequences which not reporting might have for the whole mission and the people around it.
If they do not mind the reporting of their coming a few hours later, it is advisable to do reporting with the agreement of the mission staff.
The final decision whether to report or not stays with the person in charge of the place.
People under the care of the mission should be informed of such a decision so that, when interrogated by the Security Forces, they do not deny things which they have obviously seen or heard.
In case the guerrillas are totally opposed to reporting, one should not act against the orders of the guerrillas, considering the tragic consequences which reporting might have. It should also be considered that in areas where the Security Forces have previously ill-treated people, reporting would bring further suffering to the people and possibly antagonise them against the mission.
We must be aware that a mission cannot stay as an island, totally cut off from what is going on all around. At times it will need vital information. Should guerrillas send a message to meet them, then one should rather go or at least send a very trustworthy member of staff.
When needed, one should not be afraid of contacts but one should not be out simply to have contacts.

When one has had a contact, he does not talk about it. If he has to provide a service, he does it in secret and does not let anybody know about it.

4 Mission stations, staff and institutions. At no time was it more imperative than now to show that our mission stations and institutions are in the service of the people. Good relationships with the people on and around the mission are paramount.

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If there are any tensions and enmities, they should be settled without delay. All aspects of racial discrimination should be eliminated. The wages and working conditions of mission employees should be looked into and whatever does not meet the requirements of social justice should be corrected. All types of complaints should be dealt with seriously. The advice of trustworthy people should be asked for and listened to.

Mission staff members in the areas which have been affected by the war for some time, discover anew the meaning of community life and are finding strength in common (shared) prayer, staff recollections, staff masses etc. Let us be aware of all the chances these times give us for deepening our spiritual life and appreciating each other. Each member, particularly those in charge of outstations should feel welcome in the community. Everyone should feel free to talk about experiences, to ask for advice, to express fears.

Priests working from an out-centre should go back to the mission more often, to stay there for longer spells or to operate directly from the mission. Spirit of unity and care for each other is more important than being efficient and up to standards at work.

Individual or groups of staff members might at times need special attention and care. Members who feel afraid or are suffering from stress should not be belittled or left out but helped into an attitude of hope and confidence. They should be encouraged to take the necessary rest, to go for a holiday when this is needed. Short but frequent holidays seem to be better than longer holidays.

Although transfers should only be considered when absolutely necessary, a community may need someone new with the gift of prudence and assurance. Should there be a member on the staff who is harsh with people, shouts at them, treats workers, students or neighbours badly, or who cannot avoid offensive talking, he or she should be made aware of the personal dangers resulting from such behaviour and of the dangers facing possibly the whole mission. Should such a person be unable to change or have too bad a name among the people, it is better to convince the person to leave the country as soon as possible if he is an expatriate.

5 Travelling and transport

The situation in an area may become such that it is imperative to discontinue all motorised travelling on dust roads. In order to continue our pastoral service in
such an area, it is good to get used to cycling before this becomes the only means of getting around, and to make people accustomed to the sight of the pastoral worker on a bicycle. It can be helpful and prudent to take a companion along. The advantage of cycling, especially for European staff, is that one is easily distinguished from a member of the Security Forces whereas when walking, particularly with a rucksack, one may be mistaken for a soldier. Alternative ways of getting the indispensable supplies to the mission should be planned in good time. (e.g., Scotch cars on side roads).

If people warn us not to travel on a certain road or not to go to a specific place, Aippenclix such warning should be taken seriously and strictly adhered to for the time being. At a later stage we should inquire whether the situation has changed.

At times Christian charity will demand acts of courage, e.g., driving a sick person to the hospital during curfew hours or on a road which might be mined. A moment of silent reflection and prayer might bring us to the right decision.

6 Pastoral work

Although there are groups of guerrillas, or sometimes only one or a few individuals in a group, who are against Christianity, it is a fact that in most areas up to now they have interfered very little within the Churches. Many have shown their open sympathy and given us their assurance that they do not want to bring us into trouble, and have asked us, European staff included, to continue our work in the service of the people. Only we should not interfere with them.

We should avoid all negative preaching and rather work towards those aims which we have in common with the liberation movement, e.g., Progress in solidarity versus individual advancement

Concern for family, village, nation

Universal brotherhood

Leadership, out of altruism, not for profit

Concern for the poor, the masses of simple people

Social justice

Peace Hope

We show a positive attitude towards the vadzimu - belief and other aspects of Shona religion, integrate these elements into our worship.

We continue our pastoral contacts and visit the Christian communities as long as possible.

The celebration of the Holy Eucharist with some few Christians who are aware of their solidarity in Christ with all the groups and individual Christians cut off and scattered in the area, can turn into a deep experience of faith. An invisible unity is being built up.

We foster small prayer groups and family prayer as the only way for many Christians to experience the Church community at the difficult time.

We make early preparations to train local community leaders who can exercise those ministries needed for the survival of Christian communities which cannot be reached by a priest.
The Bishops' Circular 7/77 gives the guidelines for the selection and training of such leaders. Where the priests can no longer reach a community, the community should try ways and means of keeping in contact with the priest in charge of them in order to receive the necessary animation. The priest should encourage the Christians through written communication and thus keep in contact with the wider Church.

Appendix IX

INTERVIEW WITH ONE OF THE 10 AFRICAN SISTERS WHO STAYED WITH THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS OF ZANU (ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION) FROM 18 JULY UNTIL 7 SEPTEMBER 1979.

On July 18 about 40 personnel "disappeared" from Marymount Mission in the Mount Darwin area of Rhodesia. The group included ten sisters of the Little Company of Our Blessed Lady (LCBL) and one African brother. The Rhodesian media reported that they had been kidnapped by the guerrilla forces and there were fears that they would be harmed or even killed. The 29 lay personnel were released on 19 July but the sisters and brother were not heard of again until 7 September when they reappeared in Maputo, Mozambique and were handed over to Church authorities by officials of ZANU.

At the time of their release Robert Mugabe, the President of ZANU, issued the following statement in London:

1. Information reached our high command and was brought immediately to my attention, that the Smith-Muzorewa forces proposed to murder and massacre all religious and their staff at Marymount.

2. We were aware that the racist forces had previously massacred missionaries in our liberated areas and had attempted to blame it on ZANU and ZANLA (Zimbabwe African Liberation Army).

3. Our central committee and High Command could not stand idly by and watch the Selous Scouts carry out such criminal and bastardly acts.

4. Accordingly, I gave orders that these missionaries, our friends and supporters in this war, be immediately taken into our forces' protection and custody. They were accordingly removed from the mission station. You will all appreciate that given the brutal war conditions in Zimbabwe and the necessity of speed to assure the personal safety of these nuns and others at the mission, my commanders could not adequately explain to our friends why I was ordering removal from the station.

5. Having removed them from Marymount, my forces accorded them the respect and protection to which they were entitled. Every one of them is in excellent health. The apostolic delegate in Maputo, into whose hands we now surrender them, will, we are sure, confirm this.

Names of the Roman Catholic Religious:

Letwin Chabikwa Irene Rufaro Nhandara
Lyisa Augusto Dorothy Tatisai
Payasi Hatsukunya Modesta Maoresa
Appendix
Piate Dakutswa  Emerencia Bere
Farasia Rusururo  Emily Nyagwiro
Haman Toma
Sr Janice: When 40 of you disappeared from Marymount Mission in July the Rhodesian Regime reported that you had been kidnapped by what they called the "communist terrorists" and they suggested that you would probably be killed. Can you tell us the true story of what happened to you? Sr Irene Rufaro, LCBL: The ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) forces came to the mission on the 18 of July about half six. They came quietly to the mission and asked for the superior. They wanted to know where the hospital was and we took them to the hospital. They told us to pack all the medical supplies from the hospital. This we did with their help. They helped us since most of the things were very heavy to carry. We carried the things away quietly from the mission to a nearby village and from there we went to another place, maybe where they stay, and we got some food for the night and some blankets and we slept there. There were some mission teachers with us and the following morning the teachers were told to return to their homes since most of them were residents of the Mount Darwin area. They told us they were going to be with us so we stayed with them. They made sure we felt secure. They told us not to worry about anything and we travelled from the base where we had camped with them to the border, to the village near the border. There they gave us all the security; they gave us food; they gave us blankets. We slept in some of the village houses and we asked them where we were going. They told us they were taking us to Mozambique where we were wanted by their authorities. They kept us very reassured and took precautions that we not be endangered by anything - landmines or any other traps.
It was a tiring journey because we weren't used to walking long distances without proper rest. But they managed to cope with us. They were very patient with us. We had some old sisters, one ambuya 50 years old, and they would carry her on the motorbike and push her along up and down the hills. And they provided us with water from their cool bags and then we slept a night at one of the camps. Food was provided and blankets and we had security guards.
From there we went right out to another camp. I'm not used to the place so I'm not sure where exactly the places were. So we stayed overnight again. Food was provided and they made sure those who were sick got medical treatment. The comrades had tablets, bandages for sprains and those who were not feeling all right were helped.
From there we travelled to Tete where we rested and then got to their cars and then we were travelling all along by vehicles until we met the authorities.
Sr Janice: When you met the authorities, did they explain why they had taken you from the mission?
Sr Irene: They explained to us that it was for security reasons. Missionaries are being killed from time to time and the Government puts the blame on the ZANLA forces. The ZANLA forces operating in the country have their sources of information and they had heard that something was going to happen to us, our lives were in danger. The place is very isolated and there is no means of transport so they couldn't just tell us to move. So they thought it wise just to withdraw us from the mission to protect us from attack.

Sr Janice: And you were with the ZANLA forces almost two months. What was your impression of them?

Sr Irene: They are so unified and they are so determined in what they're doing. The co-operation between them was something very amazing. I wouldn't have expected it from the propaganda we had heard. We thought they were just disintegrated, that we'd find confusion in them, but no they've got principles and they're holding firm to these.

Sr Janice: Did getting to know them give you a better feeling about them from what you'd had before when you were often relying on propaganda from the Government?

Sr Irene: Very much. We really experienced that they were human, that they weren't murderers as we had heard from the regime. We never felt panicking that anything wrong would happen to us by the way they treated us. They respected us very much. We had heard reports that they harass people, that they're fond of women and this. But they took us as real sisters and they were behaved and well disciplined.

Sister Janice: We also often hear that they are opposed to the Church. The regime says that they are communists and want to do away with religion. How did you find their attitude toward the Church and toward religion?

Sr Irene: The high commanders explained to us what they thought of the Church. They told us they weren't against the Church but since the starting of the Church had something to do with the suppression of the people, they would rectify some of these things and try to straighten them out. When religion was brought into our country there were some things that we didn't understand but we just followed and this needs to be changed. They allowed us to pray. They'd ask us whether we had prayed or whether we were still praying and hoping for things to be better for them.

Sr Janice: The killing of missionaries is a very controversial issue and, as you said, the killings are usually blamed on the freedom fighters. What is your opinion of these incidents?

Sr Irene: My opinion is very contrary. Since I have stayed with the ZANLA forces for some time, I know the way they operate and their attitude towards religion. My evidence all suggests that they wouldn't do such things to religious people. They're very co-operative. They know exactly how to handle religion.

Appendix

In instances where people make mistakes they come to the right authorities to explain the problem and try to rectify it. But in the countryside in some places you
come across these people who just come in holding guns just the same as the ZANLA Forces. They tell you, we are this and we’re not satisfied with what you're doing, collaborating with white people and this and that so we have to do away with you.

Sr Janice: Did you yourselves experience any such murders of the missionaries?
Sr Irene: Some of us experienced one at Rupert's Mission, Lomagundi, where we had a priest and a brother in the mission and three young men came in the mission armed and they wanted to know where the priest was. They were directed to the priest and then all of a sudden we heard shooting. Then they came to the hospital where we were and they harassed and were shooting at us. They told us they had killed the white people because they were not introducing good things to the people and since we were working hand in hand with the white people they might do away with us too. Having stayed with the real freedom fighters we know this isn't the way they behave. Sr Janice: Is it true that the freedom fighters do not preach this kind of racism, that they tell people that they are not opposed to white people? Isn’t that part of the policy of ZANU?
Sr Irene: That is very exact. It's part of their principle teaching to the people. They tell the people that it's not because of the colour of a person's skin that they're fighting, but it’s because of one's mentality. They say we are all human and we should all share the same things despite the colour of the skin or your abilities as such.
Sr Janice: So you find the incident at St Rupert’s Mission didn’t appear to be done by ZANLA forces?
Sr Irene: Yes, because the three young men who came to the mission acted very differently from the ZANLA forces. When the ZANLA comrades come to a place they want to meet with the authorities. If there's anything wrong they take the whole group of people and explain to them. Usually in places where people like informers are said to be killed, the ZANLA forces tell exactly what has happened and everyone is aware that such a thing has been happening and is endangering the lives of the people.
Sr Janice: And what about the Rhodesian Security forces? How do they treat the people and how do they operate?
Sr Irene: The Rhodesian security forces bring a tension to the people. Wherever they go the people try to run away. They start shooting at people. They suspect them to be always with the ZANLA forces. And they don't feel very human with people. They have no feeling for the people and the people don't have

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security with the forces in Rhodesia. They feel very unsafe. They just question them at random. They take them to the police camps, they beat them, they torture them. So the people are always against the security forces.
Sr Janice: What do you see as the relationship that exists between the people and the ZANLA forces?
Sr Irene: The people and the ZANLA forces are just one. The parents in the local villages, they feel for the ZANLA forces they are children who are struggling for
them. They make every effort to assist them in whatever needs they have, materially, with information about the enemy and giving medical aid to anyone who is injured. They make sure he's safe. They protect him so that the war goes on.

Sr Janice: So you feel the freedom fighters have a lot of support in the countryside and control a lot of the country?

Sr Irene: They have a lot of control and a lot of support, especially out in the country where they are operating and where they lead masses of the people. The people are now free in some places. The army never goes to that place. It's the ZANLA forces and the people, trying to re-educate those people, since most of the schools have closed and the youth are just at home.

Sr Janice: You have had a very unique experience staying with the freedom fighters for almost two months and I'm wondering what is the most important thing you've learned from this experience?

Sr Irene: I have learned to be very determined in whatever decision I take in life. - experiencing the hard life the freedom fighters are having. They've totally dedicated themselves to do the work despite any hardships or physical danger they meet, they're ready for it. So I feel in the life I've been living there isn't much of that. Being under trees, all the rain, no food for several days because the situation doesn't allow anyone to cook, wild animals and everything. It means that one has really dedicated himself.

Sr Janice: What do you hope to do next with all the dedication and spirit that you've gained?

Sr Irene: I hope to be someone who's going to be really present in a society, participating as such with an influence that makes people really understand their relationship with others.

Appendix X

IN 1978 ZIMBABWE NEWS, THE OFFICIAL ORGAN OF ZANU CARRIED REPORTS OF TWO INTERVIEWS THE AUTHOR HAD WITH LEADERS OF THE PARTY.

ZANLA - "THE PEOPLE'S ARMY"

COMRADE TONGOGARA TALKS TO SISTER JANICE MCLAUGHLIN

What is the relation between the rural people and the ZANLA forces?

The fundamental task in armed struggle is to mobilize the masses to back you up. There are three phases of mobilization. The first phase is to get the people to accept the armed struggle, to eradicate their fears and to surmount their difficulties. The second phase is to make the people understand the party policy - what you are fighting for. This is the stage where the masses participate physically. You arm them if you are able. If not, there is a lot that they can do to complement the struggle. We get food from the people, clothes and information. Presently we are in the third phase of mobilization - that of creating political power, of involving the people in party organizations. We are setting up our own structures in the liberation areas in Zimbabwe. This is the phase of consolidation. It's decisive. We can't succeed without the cooperation of the masses. All of our
cadres have both political and military training and all are involved in mobilizing
the masses.
In the Western media the ZANLA forces are accused of being undisciplined and
are said to intimidate the masses.
The ZANLA disciplinary code guides us in all our operations. You're a party
watchdog in the field. You must mix with the masses, be polite with them and not
ill-treat them. You mustn't take anything by force. You must pay for what you get.
You must not take liberties with women. These are only some of our rules. If you
don't observe them, you are liable to punishment. We're very strict. We're a force
fighting to liberate the people, with the interests of the people at heart. If we
mistreat them we can't succeed. In the West you are often pictured as being more
radical than the political leadership in ZANU, as being a hard-line Marxist, and it
has been suggested that this will lead to splits in ZANU
Maybe what they are saying is that Tongo is one of the consistent freedom
fighters. I've been in this since the beginning. Probably because I had my
military training in a socialist country (China, to be precise), they say I'm a
communist. Because we are happy to go to China, they say we are Chinese.
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The imperialists never felt there would be armed struggle that would reach this
stage in Southern Africa. They know we have principles to have reached this
stage so they say it's communism. We have one pot, we eat together. Tongo
doesn't have his own private pot. If they want to interpret this as communism,
O.K. We plough one field together. Are they saying that Tongo must have his
own plot and Nhongo must have his plot?
They try to create divisions in ZANU that don't exist. I get my orders from
Comrade President Mugabe. I execute the orders from him, but the media focus
on those who execute rather than on those who plan and try to say that we're not
one. I'm a very obedient son who does what his father commands. There are often
reports of fighting between the ZANU and ZAPU forces inside Zimbabwe.
There is no basis for fighting between us. This type of thing comes from Ian
Smith. He would like to put a wedge between us, would like to split. It's the old
tactic of divide and rule.
Your forces are accused of committing atrocities against the whites.
We have learned that some of our greatest supporters are white. Many of the
white farmers have contributed more to the armed struggle than the Africans.
Smith even wondered why we hadn't attacked the farms in the north-east. The
white man who warned me where the enemy was appeared more comradely to me
than my African brother who would report me to the enemy. So it grew in our
minds that we are not fighting a racial war. We began to study who is our friend
and which is our enemy. The number one enemy is the one who points a gun at
us, regardless of colour. We are fighting to abolish racism, to make all people
equal.
These massacres are carried out by Smith and the Selous Scouts to discredit us
and turn the whites against us. It's not only the missionaries who are murdered
like this. Many teachers who support the armed struggle are killed and their death blamed on us. Troops in ZANLA uniforms come to the concentration camps and murder people.

We have captured many enemy agents and we don't kill them. We get hold of Sithole agents, of Muzorewa agents and of Smith agents. We feed them and take them back with us. We can't ill-treat captives. Once an enemy drops his gun we don't shoot him or we are liable for punishment. If we don't kill those who have killed our comrades, why would we kill the missionaries?

SMITH'S SELOUS SCOUTS ASSASSINATED MISSIONARIES (Excerpts from an interview with Robert Mugabe, President of ZANU)

McLaughlin: The churches in Africa are often accused of having worked hand in hand with colonialism. What is your view of the role the churches have played in Zimbabwe?

Mugabe: The accusation is justified to a very great extent. If you study the history of the church in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe and elsewhere in Africa, you will discover that originally the church tended to side with the colonial authorities. Missionaries came to Africa to spread the gospel but in the process of opening the way for themselves in Africa, they also opened the way to colonialism. Society became organized on the basis of race and the churches supported the racist and oppressive legislation to a very great extent. Land was divided between the races. In our own case the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and later the Land Tenure Act of 1969 assigned land purely on the basis of colour. The churches and schools were all divided on this basis. Whites were able to send their children to schools without paying the fees Africans were forced to pay, and naturally the best schools were for the whites. That's still the system in Rhodesia and the churches supported it on the whole. But there came a time, and I think this was a result of the rise of Nationalism in Zimbabwe, when the churches started to adjust. In gradual stages they worked against the racial patterns and their voice was heard in criticism of government laws.

The churches therefore, have played a role in the past which tended to support the regime and minority rule in our country, but by and large they have now adjusted to reality. We are happy to say that as we operate, we find much assistance and support from the church. Of course, the Dutch Reformed Church is opposed to majority rule, but even in their case, they have now Africanized and put Africans in control.

The killing of missionaries was widely publicized in the West and has resulted in a lot of negative opinion about the liberation forces who were blamed for the murders. Can you explain your stand on these incidents?

Well, it stands to reason that if we are committed to working in harmony with the missionaries and their institutions, we can't at the same time be working for their destruction and annihilation. We proceed from the principle that the war we are fighting is a just war which must necessarily be supported by all those dedicated
to the principles of justice and fair play in society, and accordingly we cannot work against missionaries who support these goals.

Also quite a high percentage of our people are devout Christians who practice their religious beliefs. We accept this reality. We are not there to persuade people to abandon their religious convictions. No. We are there to promote the good there is in Christianity.

Now there is this propaganda that we want to destroy the churches and that the missionaries at Musami and at Elim Misision in recent times have been killed by our forces. We are not responsible for those killings whatsoever. We have made full inquiries, and in every case the reports we received point to the possibility that these assassinations have been committed by the Selous Scouts.

It must be realized that some of the forces (Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith) has been recruiting, including mercenaries from Vietnam, have no shame or restraint when it comes to shooting blacks. They are just cowards in camouflage. They are conditioned to kill and they enjoy it. We believe that it is they who are responsible.

Obviously it's not possible for us to establish conclusively the fact that they have done it, but circumstantial evidence points in this direction.

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Then the question may be asked, really what do we stand to gain by killing missionaries? What do we ever stand to gain? Does that promote our military progress in any way? Aren't we capable of establishing, by virtue of purely logical reasons that an act of this nature would be a setback to our revolution? Let no one doubt us when we say we do not commit these acts of brutality.

We operate from the principle that the war we are fighting is a people's war and therefore derives its support from the masses. We can't at the same time be killing these masses - and when we talk of the masses, we don't just mean the blacks themselves. We mean everybody.

ZANU has stated that it is guided by Marxist-Leninist principles and this has aroused fears in some Christian circles that it will attempt to stamp out religion.

I don't understand how the Christian churches can be repelled by Marxism and Leninism. They may not accept perhaps what they call the godlessness of materialism, but the basis of organizing society which brings people to work together to avoid rampant individualism seems to be in harmony at least with the Catholic Church. I can't understand the Catholics saying that the basis of collective organisation is unChristian when in fact this is the manner in which they organize themselves. They work together. They live together. They don't have individual property. And this is precisely what we would like established.

I think the Christian churches must take a new look at the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. True, Marx might have written one or two things which are unpalatable, such as that religion is the opium of the masses, but Marx still conceded that people must be allowed freedom to believe as well as not to believe. Societies aspiring to Marxist Leninism allow religion to be practiced. rvejust come from Ethiopia where the majority of the people are Christian - either belonging to the
Orthodox church or to Western Christianity - and the government has accepted that.
I don't believe that Marxist Leninism runs counter to Christian practice, if one emphasizes practice. I think the organization of society on Marxist Leninist principles is the best thing that could ever occur in the sphere of trying to get people to work together toward building a harmonious society. The individualism of the West allows so many contradictions and we've had a perpetual state of conflict between those who have and those who have not.
While many churches support your goals, they often question the use of violence to attain them.
The church will be acting unfairly if it criticizes the violent aspect of the struggle. If people resort to violence for violence's sake, then obviously the church must raise her voice in criticism, but where people have pursued their struggle for liberation first through nonviolence, by appealing to the powers that be to improve their lot and bring about change that would satisfy the majority, then I cannot understand (the church's criticism).

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Although I had been informally gathering material for this study since 1977, the formal research was conducted from October 1988 to July 1991 while I was a graduate student at the University of Zimbabwe. During this time I interviewed more than 125 persons throughout Zimbabwe, concentrating on personnel from the four Catholic missions which are featured in the case studies and the guerrillas who had operated at them. I also had the privilege of interviewing Bishop Donal Lamont on a visit to Dublin in April 1989 and Bishop Aloysius Haene at Driefontein Mission in 1990.
Most of the interviews were conducted in English and in nearly all cases I used a tape recorder. Where one was not employed, I have referred, in the footnotes to my "informal discussions".
Archival research was carried out primarily in Zimbabwe, though I also made extensive use of the Bethlehem Mission Society Archives in Immensee, Switzerland, and the Archives of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, England.
President Robert Mugabe generously granted me permission to use the ZANU Archives in Harare. Though they were still in the process of being organised, I was able to locate a wealth of relevant material among the maze of uncatalogued papers, files, and boxes. I also made extensive use of the Archives of the Justice and Peace Commission and the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference, as well as the Jesuit Archives, the National Archives of Zimbabwe, and the Gweru Diocesan Archives located in the Bishops' House in Gweru.
I am grateful to the staff of all the above for their co-operation and assistance. Special thanks are due to Fr Patrick Lewis, SJ, Jesuit Archives; Fr Joseph Elsener, SMB, Bethlehem Archives; Fr Xavier Inglin, SMB, Gweru Diocesan Archives; and Comrades Bhami, Mtombeni, and their staff in the ZANU Archives, all of
whom made it a joy to search among mounds of paper for the proverbial needle in
the haystack.

I INTERVIEWS

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Information about the interviewees refers to the period between 1972 and 1980.
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