EMERGING NATIONALISM IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA
DOCUMENTS by
Ronald H. Chilcote
Hoover Institution Press
Stanford University Stanford, California

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, founded at Stanford University in 1919 by the late President Herbert Hoover, is a center for advanced study and research on public and international affairs in the twentieth century. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

Hoover Institution Publications 97 Maps reprinted from PORTUGUESE AFRICA, by Ronald H. Chilcote, with the permission of the publisher, Prentice-Hall
Standard Book Number 8179-1971-6 Library of Congress Card Number 71-155299 Printed in the United States of America Copyright 1972 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University All rights reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ..........
INTRODUCTION .
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED IN TEXT . . .
GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS USED IN TEXT .... CHAPTER I.
PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM: THE OFFICIAL
POSITION ON AFRICA ..... ...........
The Civilized Man's Burden, by António de Oliveira Salazar Unity and the
Nation, by António Jidlio de Castro Fernandes
The Organic Law of the Overseas Provinces A Policy of Integration, by Adriano
Moreira
The Fundamental Principles of Overseas Portugal
Integration and Lusotropicology, by Gilberto Freyre "Integration" in the
Lusitanian World . . .
CHAPTER II. VIEWS ON AFRICAN POLICY HELD BY THE
PORTUGUESE OPPOSITION . ... 
* lix
* lxv
* 1
2 5
28
Self-Determination for the Overseas Territories, by
Francisco da Cunha Leal ...... ...... 29
The Future of the Overseas Territories, by Manuel
José Homem de Mello ...... .......... 31
Colonialism, Nationalism, and Independence, by
Henrique Galvão ...... .......... 34
The FPLN and African Nationalism, statement by F. Piteira
Santos, M. Tito de Morais, and Rui Cabegadas . . . . 40
The Dialogue is Open, by Humberto Delgado... . . . 41
CHAPTER III. THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A MASS REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT .......... .......... . 43
I. Background
Statement to the Secretary General of the United Nations The Angolan Drama. . .
Struggle for Independence. . . . . .
. 44
Memorandum to African Liberation Committee of the
Organization of African Unity, by Agostinho Neto
Reminder on the Angolan Question to the Organization
of African Unity ...... ...........
Memorandum to the Conference of Heads of State and
of Governments of the OAU ... ........
Young Angolans, Beware! .... ........
Message to their Excellencies the Heads of State and
Government Participating in the Second Conference
of Non-aligned Nations ......

CHAPTER V. AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN PORTUGUESE GUINE, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, AND THE CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

I. Background

Massacres in Slo Tom6, by Buanga Fele (pseudonym of Mdrio de Andrade)

The Death Pangs of Imperialism, by Amilcar Cabral

The Rise of Nationalism, by Amilcar Cabral Cabo Verde is African Too, by Henri Lab6ry

The Situation in "Portuguese" Guin6, by Manuel Lopes da Silva

The Liberation of S?o Tom6 and Principe, by Miguel

III. Organization

Statutes of the PAIGC

Statutes of the Unilo Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guin6

Statutes of the Unilo Democratica das Mulheres

The FLING Charter

IV. Ideological Development

In Defense of the Land, by Amilcar Cabral

On the Contribution of the "Peoples" of Guin6 to Agricultural Production in Guin6, by Amilcar Cabral

Frente de Libertaglo da Guin6 e Cabo Verde, Partido
Africano da Independência .... ......
Movimento de Libertaggio da Guiné e Cabo Verde
Proclamation, by Amílcar Cabral et al. ....
The PAIGC Minor Program ..........
Memorandum to the Portuguese Government, by
Amílcar Cabral et al ........
Memorandum to the United Nations General Assembly,
by Amílcar Cabral .... .............
Declaration on the Present Status of the Fight for
Liberation in "Portuguese" Guinea and in the
Cape Verde Islands, by Amílcar Cabral ....
The National Fight for Liberation, by Amílcar Cabral
Developments in the Struggle for the National Liberation
of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands in
1964, by Amílcar Cabral . . . . . .
CHAPTER VI. AFRICAN CHALLENGE IN MOZAMBIQUE
* 350
* 350
* 352
* . 355
* . 358
* . 360
* . 367
* . 369
* . 372
* . 374
* . 377
I. Background ........ ................ 383
Brief History of Mozambique, by David J. M. Mabunda
and John Sakupwanya .......... 383
The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique, by
Eduardo Mondlane .......... ........ 391
Early Manifestations of Discontent ... ........ 400
The Mozambiqua Refugee Situation, by Janet Rae Mondlane 404
I. Leadership ........ ............ 409
The Portuguese Overseas Provinces, by Eduardo Mondlane . 410
Dissent on Mozambique, by Eduardo Mondlane . . . 411
Facts About Mozambique, by Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe .... 422
The Barbaric Colonial and Imperial Rule, by Mathew
Michinji Mmole and Lawrence Mallinga Mallinga . . . 426
. . . 429
III. Organization ........ ........
The FRELIMO Constitution ........
The UDENAMO Constitution .... ....
The FUNIPAMO Constitution and Rules .
The COREMO Constitution . . . . .
IV. Ideological Development.
Mogambique and Salazar's Government: Communiqué by Jaime Rivaz Sigauke
Resolutions of the First FRELIMO Congress. The FRELIMO Program.
Proclamation to the Mogambican People. The UDENAMO Program. Declaration of Dissolution of FRELIMO, by Mathew Michinji Mmole, Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, and Sabastene Sigauke.
The COREMO Program.

CHAPTER VII. UNITY EFFORTS AND RELATIONS AMONG GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA.

CHAPTER VIII. THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEST AGAINST PORTUGUESE RULE IN AFRICA.
I. The United Nations Challenge.
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
International Conference on Education (XXVI)
International Labour Organisation, Report
* * * 531
* * * 534
* * * 554
* * * 558
* * * 565
* * * 566
* * * 566
* * * 566
446
O * * *
O

II. Resolutions and Actions of other International and African Organizations .... ........ .. 569
APPENDIX. NOTES ON OPPOSITION, PRE-NATIONALIST AND NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTERESTS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA .. ........ .. 583
INDEX ........ ................. .. 613

PREFACE
This project to collect, translate, and edit documents of Portuguese African nationalist movements was formally initiated in 1963 with the encouragement of Dr. Peter Duignan, Curator of the African Collection of Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, and with the financial support of the Institution's Research and Publications Committee. Collection of documentary ephemera actually began as early as 1959 and continued during eight months' residence in Portugal during 1960-61, a visit to Brazil in the summer of 1964, and extensive travels throughout Africa in the summer of 1965. These documents are selected from the editor's more comprehensive collection,* which is referenced in the bibliography entitled Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Bibliography of Documentary Ephemera through 1965, Stanford: Bibliography Series XXXIX, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1969. For the most part these documents have been translated from French, Portuguese, and Spanish, although some are reproduced in their English version. Chapters I and II present views representative both of the Portuguese government and of the Portuguese opposition to the government. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI focus on the major black African movements from Angola, Portuguese Guind and the Cape Verde, Sao Tomé, and Príncipe Islands, and Mogambique. Chapter VII includes documentary material tracing the efforts to achieve unity made by several nationalist groups throughout the African territories. The last chapter contains a grouping of some of the major resolutions on Portuguese
Africa that have been approved by the United Nations and other international organizations. The appendix comprises annotated listings of the various nationalist organizations and their publications.

A number of persons and organizations have contributed significantly to this enterprise. For their assistance in building the documents collection, I wish to thank Afifio de Oliveira Aguas, Chairman of the Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal; Luís D’Almeida, representative of the Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA) in Algiers; Mário de Andrade, Algiers; Perry Anderson, editor of New Left


Review in London; Carlos Gongalves of the Angola Office, New York; Eduardo Webber, editor of The Angolan Student; A. J. Bosgra of the Actiecomitd Angola, Amsterdam; Aquino de Braganga, Algiers; the Centro de Estudos Angolanos, Algiers; Daniel-Jdlio Chipenda, representative of the MPLA in Dar es Salaam; Jose Chipenda of Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA) in New York; the Coordinating Secretariat of the International Student Conference (COSEC) of Leiden, Netherlands; Miguel Trovoada of the Comitê de Libertaio de Sf Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP) in Libreville, the Comitê de Soutien k l’Angola, Paris; the Confederagfo das OrganizagSes Nacionalistas das Col-ncias Portugu-sas (CONCP) in Rabat; Johnny Eduardo of the Gouvernement Rdvolutionnaire de l’Angola en Exil (GRAE) office in Algiers; the Frente de Luta pela Independ-nncia Nacional da Guin6 Bissau (FLING) in Dakar; Gil Fernandes; various members of the Frente de Libertaio de Mogambique (FRELIMO) in Dar es Salaam, including the late Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos, and the late Jaime Sigauke; Janet Mondlane and Betty King of the Instituto Mogambicano; the Frente Patri6tica de Libertaggo Nacional (FPLN), including the late General Humberto Delgado, Piteiro Santos, and Manuel Sertdrio; Henrique Galvqo of Sao Paulo; David and Jim Grenfell in Moerueke Kwilu, Congo; Emmanuel Kounzika of the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA) in Kinshasa; Jacques Laurer, Lausanne; S. Goujon, Geneva; Marcel Levaux, Paris; Josê Lima de Azevedo, former MPLA representative in Brazil; Joseph Massinga, FRELIMO representative in New York; Malcolm McVeigh; the Movimento de Defesa dos Interisses de Angola (MDIA) in Kinshasa; the MPLA in Brazzaville; the Mogambique African National Union (MANU) in Khartoum; the leaders of the Partido Africano da IndependAncia da Guin6 e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Conakry, especially Amflcar Cabral, his brother Luiz Cabral, and Aristides Pereira; Afifio Duarte of the PAIGC office in Algiers; the Comitê de Soutien in Paris; Paul Touba of UNEA; the COREMO in Lusaka and Cairo; Holden Roberto, Eduardo Pinnock, and the GRAE in Kinshasa; Jorge Valentim of
Oegatgeest, Netherlands, Srdgio Vieira of the FRELIMO office in Algiers; and the World Assembly of Youth, Brussels.

I am grateful to Mrs. Patricia Tsien, who assisted me in gathering United Nations documents. For permission to microfilm and photocopy their documents I am greatly indebted to Collin Gonze and George Houser of the American Committee on Africa; Winifred Armstrong, New York; and John Cooley of Casablanca; as well as Professors James Duffy of Brandeis University, John Marcum of Lincoln University, Immanuel Wallerstein of Columbia University, Douglas Wheeler of the University of New Hampshire, and I. William Zartman of New York University. Additionally Professor Marcum provided useful comments and information on Appendix A.

This extensive list is perhaps indicative of the great effort necessary to bring together a collection comprehensive in scope. Yet even after the generous efforts and cooperation of so many persons, there are still gaps in the collection.

Assisting me in the task of organizing and cataloging the materials were Sally McBean Harms and Elsa Johnson. I am grateful for their help and especially wish to thank research assistant Natalie Lippman, whose months of persistent and precise work brought great improvement to the bibliography. I must also thank Russell Bartley for the translation of one document from Russian; Kathryn McCormick for extensive translation assistance in the initial phase of the project; Hildeliza Arias, who carefully typed the manuscript; and Sharon Pardo, who edited the work for style and language consistency. Without the contribution of two other persons, Sarah K. Myers and my wife, Frances Bunker Chilcote, this project would have remained unfinished. Mrs. Myers translated into rough draft several hundreds of pages of documentary material; skilled as a translator, she has retained in English the style, expression, and content of the original. The temptation was great to edit and rewrite many of the documents and to correct misspellings in some of the titles, but we have adhered to our intention to present the material, however awkwardly expressed, in its original form. My wife helped coordinate the many phases of the project. Her demands for perfection, consistency, and scholarship have rendered substantial improvement to this work, and her unfailing support and advice have guided me from beginning to end in a project which we hope will serve as a foundation for future research on nationalism and related subjects in the Portuguese African territories.*

Lastly, I acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of Dr. Duignan throughout the project's various phases, as well as the generous financial support of the Hoover Institution, a University of California faculty fellowship which provided research and travel assistance in Africa during the summer of 1965; and a John Randolph and Dora Haynes Foundation grant which, combined with intramural research funds of the Riverside campus of the University of California, allowed for research, translation of documents, and typing of the manuscript.

*The editor's attention has turned to a second phase in the study of African nationalism in the Portuguese territories, specifically the content analysis of documents in his collection in an attempt to relate manifestations of nationalism

INTRODUCTION*

by
Ronald H. Chilcote

Despite the elusiveness of nationalism as a concept, it is clear that in the Third World it is a force which in all its manifestations provides a broad and powerful impetus toward development and change in society. In early stages of a nation's development, for example, nationalism tends to disrupt deeply rooted traditions while at the same time stimulating unification of previously dispersed elements and hastening the formation of complex and diverse organizations and institutions along autonomous lines. Such disruption and structural differentiation are most likely to occur, of course, if nationalism is accompanied by some radical reorientation, usually revolutionary and to some extent violent, that allows for the mobilization of people and resources to carry out committed goals. 1 Conversely, it should be noted that nationalist manifestations may also impede progress. Anxieties over imperialist penetration, for example, can result in stultifying restrictions on foreign exploitation of mineral resources. Such structures can sometimes prevent the development of potentially substantial exports that could produce foreign exchange for the purchase of capital goods--goods which in turn might stimulate economic growth in such vital areas as industrial diversification and expansion of job markets.

*We define nationalism as a complex of concepts valued among people who not only honor the symbols of nationality inherent in patriotism but accept the nation as the supreme arbiter of human activities. Nationalism is associated with such unifying phenomena as a single language or closely related dialects; a common heritage of customs and traditions; shared symbols of national experience, including flag, anthem, and so on; a more or less defined territorial entity; and a creed of loyalty derived from a common feeling or will associated with a consciousness of nation in the minds of the individual members.

Having thus defined nationalism, our objectives in this introductory essay are twofold: first, to relate nine types of nationalism to six conflicting nationalist

*I would like to express my appreciation for assistance on this introduction to Marie Zentai, who helped prepare the charts; to John Marcum for many helpful suggestions which prompted considerable revision of an earlier draft; and to Carole Norton for excellent copy editing.
perspectives of Portuguese Africa; and second, to focus on the evolution, leadership, organization, and ideology of certain specific nationalist movements, especially during the period 1945 through 1965.

Types of Nationalism and Conflicting Nationalist Perspectives

In the extensive and sometimes confusing literature on nationalism many types can be identified. Here, in an attempt to reconcile the diverse theories and concepts while employing Portuguese Africa as the example, we shall consider nine types of nationalism. We shall then examine six perspectives of nationalism in Portuguese Africa, relating these to the nine types as diagrammed in Figure 1 (see p. xix).

The first type, indigenous in nature, is submerged in primitive and tribal organizations and characterized by distinctive traditions and cultural patterns, frequently including a localized religion. Such organizations tend to be small and homogeneous, and to possess great cohesive strength by virtue of their social and political organization, system of beliefs and magical practices, and customary laws and ceremonies. Working and fighting together as a unit, the individual members manifest supreme loyalty and devotion to their common "nation."4 Obvious examples of these organizations in action can be seen in the isolated and sporadic resistance in the Congo Kingdom of northern Angola of tribal groups whose fluctuating rise and fall can be traced through several periods from the fifteenth century until the 1950s; in the Monomotapa or paramount chief resistance to Portuguese colonial and economic penetration in Mozambique, especially in the seventeenth century; and in the late nineteenth-century struggle near Lourenço Marques of Gungunhana and his renowned military leader, Maguiguana.5

A second type of nationalism, traditional in orientation, favors the preservation of aristocratic systems. Centered on a rudimentary abstract philosophy based on faith rather than reason, it upholds God as the creator and supreme arbiter of the nation and, harking back to systems shrouded in history, advocates that aristocrats of advanced nations foster native cultures of backward nations.6 The historical experience of Portugal itself perhaps best exemplifies the philosophy underlying this type of nationalism: Portugal's explorer-crusaders, according to the official view, not only discovered the world but fulfilled a special "mission" to transmit Catholicism and Lusitanian civilization to remote peoples. Thus Christian ideals are linked inseparably to Portuguese values and patriotism. The chief value is nationhood, conceived as a pan-Lusitanian community stretching around the world and embracing many races into a mystical cultural unity. The dissemination of this and other Portuguese values is fundamental to the expressed goal of the civilizing nation.7
A third type, religious or symbolic in nature, is characterized by its reliance on emotion-laden symbols. In its secularized form, this nationalism is tantamount to a religion whose god is the patron or personification of the national state, whose rites are performed for the sake of the whole community, whose spiritual mission is based on a collective faith and sense of destiny. Observation of public rites and ceremonies is expected, and symbols (the flag, for example) are worshipped. Portuguese nationalism even today, both in the metropole and in the African territories, tends to this type. It emphasizes emotion-laden symbols of nationality—the common historical traditions, language, religion, literature, and experiences—
and advocates with mystic, almost religious fervor the emulation of renowned past exploits of valor. 8

A fourth, humanitarian, type arises from eighteenth-century intellectual thought and is akin to traditional nationalism. It promises an escape from present evils to a millennium in the near future. It substitutes the natural for the supernatural and science for theology, and while exalting human reason it promises progress and perfection for the human race. In theory at least, the humanitarian aspect of traditional Portuguese policy in Africa was emphasized in the government’s 1961 decree abolishing the controversial Estatuto dos Incigenas: "The heterogeneous composition of the Portuguese people . . . marked our policy toward other societies and cultures, and imbued it from the start with a deep respect for the usage and customs of the populations we encountered."9

Liberal nationalism is a fifth type identified in the literature. Similar to humanitarian nationalism and originating in eighteenth-century England, liberal nationalism stresses political democracy, humanitarian values, and individual liberties; patriotism is an essential ingredient, and sovereignty affords the basis for the nation-state. Liberal nationalism ignores both historical and natural rights, is chiefly evolutionary in theory, and has tended to be supported by the industrial capitalist middle classes. 10 Traces of this nationalism were evident during the Portuguese Republic of 1910 to 1926.11

Bourgeois nationalism finds expression in two variants—the old and the new. Older forms of bourgeois nationalism have been supported by the commercial professional middle classes who profess national unification, political and economic liberalism, and cultural cosmopolitanism, but who believe in strengthening the nation through foreign investment, enterprise, and culture. Not surprisingly, this variant historically has prevailed in those parts of Portuguese Africa where investments are largely of foreign origin. In contrast, newer bourgeois nationalism is advocated by the "new upper-middle class of national bourgeoisie, " whose interests are rooted in private capital and enterprise tied to the nation rather than to foreign influences; in fact, its xenophobia gives this variant its nationalistic visibility. 12

Integral or totalitarian nationalism, aligned with authoritarian politics, constitutes a seventh type. This nationalism rejects liberalism, insists on patriotic allegiance, is hostile to alien influences, and exalts the nation as the stepping stone to a new order to be achieved through physical force, militarism, and imperialism. In Portugal, the integral nationalism manifested in the policies and actions of the metropolitan government is premised on an old Portuguese communal society which was based on a complex group of families organized into a patriarchal structure. The patriarchal nature of the parent society in turn structured and reinforced the principle of hierarchical authority exercised by administrators and missionaries who worked to achieve cohesion among the widely dispersed parts of the Portuguese empire. Thus, Portuguese integral nationalism has become a sort of supranationalism which conceives the colonies and metropole as a single nation, a national community bound by ties of mystical unity.
Jacobin or radical nationalism, born of the French Revolution but frequently identifiable in present-day liberation movements, is characterized by an attitude of suspicion and intolerance of internal dissent on the part of its adherents. It advocates disciplined political and economic centralization; popular sovereignty, liberty, and equality; and reliance on force and militarism to attain its ends. This nationalism, which evolved slowly in Portuguese Africa, merits some elaboration. It began among a small group of African intellectuals who found their way to universities in Lisbon and Coimbra after World War II. They were the assimilated or "civilized" Africans, generally mulatto, who had been educated in the Portuguese language, history, and geography, representatives of the New State's efforts to foment a colonial culture. Through legal associations established by their governments, these Africans were able to express demands for moderate reforms, and to focus attention on such issues as direct participation for the urban masses. Later, other Africans deeply if belatedly conscious of their long history of exploitation founded clandestine political movements in Angola, Guiné, and Mogambique. Africans at Portuguese universities had by now begun to debate and to form organizations which ultimately advocated independence and nationhood for their territories.

A few intellectuals, including the Angolan Mario de Andrade and the Mogambican Marcelino dos Santos, moved to Paris and became associated with French African advocates of nègritude and with others who, while maintaining an affinity to European cultural and material values, sought identification with an African culture traditional in tone but modern in content. Finally, frustrated by Portuguese intransigence, these African intellectuals resorted to the establishment of exile organizations. Out of this phase came plans for militant and revolutionary measures to resolve the impasse with Portuguese authorities; military action in 1961 and 1962 signalled the radicalization of the new nationalism.

A last type of nationalism, identified in the literature as technological, is dominant in industrializing countries in which progress is promoted through centralized planning and development. It views the development of heavy industry, especially of iron and steel refining and fabrication, as a panacea for developmental problems; and infrastructure, including transportation and power, is regarded as basic to all development. For instance Portugal's economic development, theoretically carried out in the framework of a corporate state, has been based since 1935 on several planning schemes. In the African territories, technological nationalism has laid stress on the need for an inventory of available resources, development of transport, agricultural irrigation, electric power, and colonization schemes.

These nine types of nationalism are identifiable in the makeup of at least six major and generally conflicting ideological positions in Portuguese Africa. Several general misconceptions may be clarified by Figure 1 (the pro- and anti-Portuguese Brazilian positions are identified because historically and culturally Portugal and Brazil are closely linked to each other as well as to Portuguese Africa) and by the following analysis.
First, we note that in Portuguese Africa nationalism connotes much more than a desire for independence; many other aims and values are involved. Second, nationalism is by no means merely black African in content and expression.

**Official Portuguese Nationalism**

Portuguese nationalism is characterized by a mysticism kindled in the belief that renowned past exploits of valor ought to be emulated in the present. Many writers trace the Portuguese spirit of nationality to the revolt of Viriatus, the Lusitanian shepherd who resisted the Romans in the second century B.C. Literary critic and writer Fidelino de Figueiredo once described the Portuguese position as an excessive glorification of the epic spirit, which, "though appealing, is highly misleading.,,5 The rationale of the position can be summed up as follows: Portugal, the oldest of nations in Europe maintaining original territorial boundaries, has since it attained independence in the twelfth century been blessed with a sense of mission. To remain independent, however, Portugal had to expand across the seas. That expansion, under the guidance of Henry the Navigator, not only liberated the African Continent from Arab domination; it also saved Africa for Europe. The Portuguese, by virtue of their multi-racial origins, have a unique capacity to live in all kinds of climates and conditions, and to assimilate peoples of all races into one nation of provinces scattered about the world: witness the fact that in Portuguese Africa today, as in the past, white and black mingle with a common fervent sense of national pride and cultural unity, with such an identity of interests and aspirations that disparate elements in the Lusitanian community inevitably coalesce. The great effectiveness of the presence of the Portuguese nation in Africa and throughout the empire is proclaimed by the patriotism of the people. The Portuguese must preserve their historical heritage and maintain continuity and solidarity with past, present, and future, for the survival of order in Africa is dependent on the moral unity of the Portuguese. Portuguese of the metropole and those overseas are at one in their views. For this reason problems which are unsurmountable for other peoples do not arise for the Portuguese, who rely on one another in times of stress, and whose moral unity is strengthened by their trust in hierarchal authority and their confidence in the unbreakable alliance of all Portuguese in the Lusitanian community. 16

A' Thus, according to our typology of nationalisms, Portuguese nationalism is at once indigenous (Viriatus and the Lusitanian tribe); traditional (preserving old values, based on faith, exalted by history); religious or symbolic (with emphasis on past triumphs, language, Catholicism, and so on); humanitarian (in theory and legislation); bourgeois (in its dependence on foreign capital to reinforce Portugal's hold on the African territories); integral-totalitarian (as manifested in authoritarian, militaristic, and imperialist policy); and technological (aims are implemented through central planning and establishment of economic infrastructure).

**Nationalism of the Portuguese Opposition**
The position of the Portuguese opposition is relatively complicated. Inside Portugal there are minor opposition factions within such strongholds of regime support as the Catholic Church; the small, wealthy group of entrepreneurs whose support for the regime has been rewarded with key economic concessions; and the military. However, the opposition of these factions (who were somewhat placated recently when MNmello Caetano was named prime minister to replace the ailing dictator António de Oliveira Salazar) has purely espoused any significant deviance from official nationalist policy in Africa. Among elements ostracized by the regime, the political opposition at home and in Africa generally has assumed a similar nationalist position. Disenchanted military figures, independent Catholics, and dissident monarchists, liberals, and such old-guard republicans as the well known critic Francisco de Cunha Leal have issued occasional manifestoes in an attempt to effect Portuguese policy changes in Africa through peaceful means. They have put forth moderate demands and sought negotiations with the government. But generally, these elements would never endorse a policy of independence for the territories. 18 Exiles in Brazil and elsewhere tend to a similar stance: their nationalism is tied to Portuguese mystique and tradition. Those exiles in Algiers who have organized into the Frente Patriótica de iUbertaplo Nacional (FPLN), however, support a different, more radical approach. 19 While the FPLN itself adheres to a strategy of politicizing the masses through manifestoes, radio programs, and other strictly peaceful means of disseminating information, it maintains ties with African nationalist organizations and frequently sends observers to their conferences. Moreover, the FPLN demands independence for the African territories. In summarizing the opposition's position, then, we can suggest that their nationalism vis-à-vis the African territories is traditional, religious or symbolic, bourgeois, and technical--i.e., it is strongly influenced by the Portuguese tradition, historical destiny, empire, and mystique in general. It could perhaps be demonstrated that even many of the FPLN members in Algiers sympathize with these nationalisms, although on the surface their nationalist perspectives appear to be essentially Jacobin or radical in nature (this appearance would be necessary to ensure their relations with Africans opposed to the regime). But in fact their nationalism probably comes closest to the liberal type in that their appeals consistently stress the need for political democracy, humanitarian values, individual liberties, and sometimes even compromise with the dictatorship. Colonial Portuguese Nationalism The nationalism of those Portuguese who have settled in the African territories generally approximates the official Portuguese position. There have been several conspicuous attempts to alter that position, however. For example, in 1947 Henrique Galvão, a colonial official who had lived much of his life in Africa, presented a significant report on African labor to a secret session of the Portuguese National Assembly. Focusing on the labor shortage resulting from widespread emigration, which he claimed was in turn a result of "the physical incapacity and decadence of the people, lack of medical care, undernourishment, a
declining birth rate, infant mortality, and disabilities and deaths resulting from work, " he pointed out that mass dislocation of workers and existing working conditions had brought the colonies to a "frightful demographic impoverishment."

His denunciation was in large measure aimed at the mother country's retention of policy-making and administrative functions in colonies which might better carry on under the guidance of naturalized Portuguese and others who had spent the greater part of their lives in Africa. Nationalism in the form of moderate social protest also has been manifested by the Catholic hierarchy in Angola and Mozambique. In Mozambique, for instance, the late Bishop of Beira, Sebastião Soares de Resende, concerned himself in several books and as publisher of the "liberal" newspaper Diário de Mocambique with the exploitation and plight of the African worker.

Nationalism of a similar sort has been evidenced among senior functionaries who, having become too "Angolan" or "Morambican" in their sentiments, have been ordered to return to the metropole. Conspicuous examples include the removal of the popular Governor-General A. V. Deslandes of Angola in the early sixties, and the unexplained departure from Mozambique of the equally popular Admiral Sarmento Rodrigues prior to the visit of the Portuguese President. Some writers have speculated that Lisbon's tight hold and policy of close identity with the territories may have contributed substantially to the latent tendency of many colonials to support Angolan and Moambican separatism. Deficiencies which became particularly apparent during the declining years of the Portuguese dictatorship and official delays in innovation and development, it is argued, have only served to stimulate what has long been the ultimate determination of Angola and Mozambique: to decide the future for themselves.

Some evidence of this development can be seen in the writings of wealthy Angolan industrialist Manuel Vinhas, who has called for policy changes, more autonomy for the territories, and certain other measures viewed with suspicion by Portuguese authorities. The historian Alexandre Lobato, representing Mozambique in the Portuguese National Assembly a few years ago, voiced similar sentiments on behalf of Portuguese in Mozambique.

Angolan knows how Angola has pleaded in vain for the government to grant it enough decentralization to govern itself. . . Angola wants to participate legitimately in national decisions . . . I feel that Mozambique is in complete agreement with the Angolan situation. A more sweeping critique of Portuguese policy has come from white Mozambicans organized into the Movimento Democratico de Mozambique; in April 1961 that organization petitioned the government to grant civil rights for all Africans, to end forced labor, and to make available more education for Africans.

The colonial Portuguese position thus reflects a similar yet different nationalism from that which guides either official Portuguese policy or the politics of the opposition. Traditional, religious or symbolic bourgeois, and technological nationalisms are clearly present in the colonial position, but liberal nationalism is
also evident, both in the opposition to Portuguese officialdom and in the growing pressure for autonomy.

Pro-Portuguese Brazilian Nationalism

Drawing upon the Portuguese assumptions of national integration, Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre has postulated the concept of Lusotropicology as a basis for the systematic study of ecological and social integration in a tropical environment. His thesis, developed in studies published by the Portuguese government, constitutes a substantial defense of official policy in Africa. Concisely summarized, his thesis is that Portuguese expansion in the fifteenth century heralded a new type of civilization. Since that time the Portuguese have been transforming the tropics, not by transplanting European values, but by themselves changing, body and soul, into Lusotropicals. Integration has tended to harmonize and to unify detached or disintegrated elements of society throughout the Portuguese empire. This integration has been achieved in part through miscegenation and in part through the process by which non-Europeans have been socially Christianized rather than culturally Europeanized. In other words, the Lusotropical civilization to which Portuguese in Africa have contributed so largely rests on a biological process of interpenetration of cultures. The conspicuous model of an evolving Lusotropical civilization is to be found in the Cape Verde Islands, where owing to the isolation of the archipelago and a prolific miscegenation between white Portuguese and black Africans, a mixed race has developed. Portuguese studies confirm that the Cape Verdean is "the most perfect Portuguese human being, " that in him the fusion of European and African has produced a racial and social harmony quite unknown elsewhere in the tropics.

Relating this position to our nationalist typology, we find a direct correlation with the official Portuguese position in the traditional, religious or symbolic, humanitarian, bourgeois, and technological types in evidence. Additionally, the Lusotropical thesis embodies many elements of integral-totalitarian nationalism.

Anti-Portuguese Brazilian Nationalism

Freyre also applied his Lusotropicism to the Brazilian experience. In Brazil, a slave-labor regime patriarchal in character but softened by Christian inspiration lasted until the late nineteenth century, and served to consolidate a Lusotropical civilization in which the master granted his slave protection and the opportunity to participate in community life. Brazil evolved as an advanced ethnic democracy, predominantly European in style but with a culture that absorbed from segments of its population many African and some Asian values. Because of this evolution, Brazil would seem to be in an ideal position to influence the development of the new Afro-Asian nations, and to apply the lessons of its own experience to the problems of leadership in the tropics. Although Brazilian nationalists tend to agree that Brazil is destined to assume the leadership of the tropical world, however, most disagree with Freyre's conclusion that it was primarily Portuguese colonial policy and influence which nourished the development of Brazil. For example, Brazilian historian José Honório Rodrigues certainly acknowledges that the role of the African Black in the economic and cultural development has made Brazil a nation neither aboriginized
nor Africanized but balanced and homogeneous. But whereas Freyre attempts to
demonstrate that miscegenation and societal cohesion are evidences of a
peculiarly Portuguese genius for adaptation, Rodrigues contends that such
developments in Brazil are essentially Brazilian in character.
This anti-Portuguese Brazilian position is akin to the pro-Portuguese Brazilian
position in its manifestation of traditional, religious or symbolic, humanitarian,
bourgeois, and technological nationalisms. It is also indigenous (in a historical
and cultural context), as is the official Portuguese position; but, like the
Portuguese opposition and the colonial Portuguese positions, it manifests liberal
nationalism as well.
Black African Nationalism
Today, nationalism among black African represents a culmination of several
evolving patterns of protest and resistance.
A first pattern is identifiable in the threads of black resistance to the Portuguese
presence in Africa. Historically that resistance, sporadic and geographically
scattered, usually represented defensive reaction to Portuguese military
campaigns domination of the slave trade, or penetration into local markets.
In the Portuguese Congo territory of northern Angola the resistance probably
began when, in the late fifteenth century, the Portuguese failed in their attempts to
convert the African king Nzinga a Nkuwu to their cause, although his son
Mbemba a Nzinga (Affonso I) cooperated with the European invaders throughout
his lengthy reign (ca. 1507-43). During the existence of the Congo kingdom there
were several noteworthy demonstrations of heroic resistance on the part of the
blacks: the abortive challenge by Mpanzu a Nzinga to the Portuguese-dominated
rule of Affonso I and the revolt against the king by Jorge Muxuebata at Mbanza;
the popular but unsuccessful revolt about 1570 by Mbula Matadi against the
Congo king Alvaro I and his Portuguese allies; the abortive attack against
Portuguese forces by King Antônio I and a large army of Africans (Antônio's
defeat assured the end of the Congo as a power in central Africa); and the 1913 to
1915 revolt by Alvarulante Buta in protest of the deportation of Congolese
laborers to Sao Tome.
Resistance in the Angolan kingdom included a decade of violence which began
about 1578 over attempts by Paulo Dias de Novaes to move up the Cuanza river
to Massangano; the defeat in 1590 of a Portuguese expedition at Angoleme
Aquitambo by an alliance of the Congo, Angola, and Matamba kingdoms; a series
of struggles against the Portuguese by Queen Nzinga Mbandi or Jinga (baptized
Anna de Souza Nzina in the seventeenth century; a period of economic
dominance of the interior by the Matamba kingdom in the eighteenth century; and
a protracted defensive struggle waged by Africans in the Dembos region from
1872 until 1919.33
In the kingdoms of the Benguela highlands, farther south, there were instances of
African resistance to Portuguese attempts to penetrate the interior in search of
minerals (the first Portuguese presidio was destroyed in 1684) and slaves (a
coalition of kingdoms successfully attacked the Portuguese fortress at Caconda in
1718), Here, too, Africans prevented the Portuguese from maintaining effective occupation after the war of 1774-76, which had been provoked by the intrusion of the European trader into the African economy; and they struggled valiantly from 1886 until about 1890 to maintain independence and autonomy by means of an alliance of kings (under Ekuikui II of Bailundo and Tchyoka of Bi6 and his successor Ndunduma I). The rebellion of the Cuanhama people from 1904 until 1915 was another manifestation of black resistance in the highlands.

In Portuguese Guinée during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries Portuguese traders and settlers found themselves subject to taxes and other restrictions imposed by local African rulers whose sovereignty on the coast was absolute. Subsequent major African rebellions against the Portuguese in the same area included that of the chiefs of Mata and Mompataz at Cacheu in 1679; the Papeis wars of 1697 and throughout the eighteenth century; and uprisings at Cacheu from May to December 1824, at Bissau in November 1842, at Farim in December 1846, and at Buba in 1880. Among the legendary heroes who resisted Portuguese pacification attempts in the late eighteenth century were B~car Guidalf, MussA Mol6, and Infali Sonc6. That Guinée was seriously threatened by the African insurgents and indeed relatively unpacified is demonstrated by the fact that the government was not able to proclaim dominance over the African tribes there until 1936. Thereafter, passive resistance was maintained until the first serious efforts to launch a nationalist movement were initiated in the fifties.

In Mogambique, resistance resulted from changing trade patterns, from penetration of the interior by Portuguese traders and settlers, and from the presence of numerous Portuguese military expeditions sent to pacify the territory in the late nineteenth century. For some time both before and after the Portuguese arrival in Mogambique at the end of the fifteenth century, Africans dominated the interior and conducted much of their trade with Arabs. A particularly persistent challenge to the Portuguese was the Monomotapa, or paramount chief, whose supremacy rested on the possession of the gold mines of Manica and on the gold trade with the Arabs at Sofala. It was largely in answer to this challenge that the Portuguese finally suppressed the Arab trade, controlling Sofala after 1505 to maintain trade ties with the interior African kingdoms. The anti-Portuguese hostility evident throughout the seventeenth century in Mogambique was manifested in particular by the African chiefs Chombe of the Sena region about 1613 and Changamire of the Batua kingdom at the end of the century, and was compounded when Arab uprisings at Mombasa, Zanaibar, and other strategic points threatened Portuguese control of trade along the coast. Later rebellions included that of the half-caste Joaquim Jos& da Cruz, who established headquarters at Massangano and levied tolls on traffic along the Zambezi; and that of Gungunhana in the late nineteenth century. Portuguese military expeditions were operating as late as 1918, and only in that year could the Portuguese announce that pacification had been accomplished in Mogambique. 36
A second pattern of black protest and resistance began among the rural peasantry of northern Angola, where dissidence evolved into organized opposition to Portuguese intervention in the selection of successors to the Congo kingdom. After the revolt of Tulante Buta, Portuguese authorities continued to influence the African monarchy, first through a respected Catholic, Alvaro Nezingu (1915-23), and later through Jogio Lengo (Lengho) or Dom Pedro VII (1923-55), also a Catholic. Pedro was viewed as a puppet king by the African Protestant opposition, and upon his death this opposition, led by Eduardo Pinock and drawing its adherents from the Matadi area, threw its support to a respected Protestant leader, Manuel Kiditu, nephew and namesake of the former king Dom Manuel Kiditu (1912-15). When their cause was thwarted by the Portuguese authorities, the Pinock group joined with Angolans living in Leopoldville to form the Uniào das Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA), probably in July 1957.

A third pattern of resistance emerged with the formation of religiously inspired pre-nationalist and nationalist groups among Bakongo separatists in the former Belgian Congo and also among Chokwe elements to the south. Some of these groups had their roots in messianic mass movements which frequently provided psychological and emotional outlets for the tensions created with alien rule. One of the many such movements which emerged in the former Portuguese Congo was the one led by Simão Toko, a leader born near Maquela do Zombo who was apparently influenced by a Baptist mission in Angola and the Salvation Army in Lopoldville. Eventually Portuguese authorities grew suspicious of the movement and exiled Toko to the Azores, but not before his ideas had spread. Tokoism especially influenced a subgroup of the Bakongos, the Bazombos who inhabit an area to the east of São Salvador. In late 1956 several Bazombos formed an ethnic mutual aid society known as the Associação Mutuelle des Ressortissants de Zombo (ASSOMIZO). One of the association's founders was Manuel Kounzika, who later organized the nationalist movement known as the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA). A fourth pattern of African protest and resistance found favor among the "assimilated" or "civilized" Africans (usually mulattoes), persons born in the Portuguese African territories who expressed their discontent and demands through journalism or through other channels provided by official and semi-official organizations. As Douglas Wheeler has noted, African resistance almost invariably took the form of armed violence until the late nineteenth century, when protest also was embodied in journalistic argumentation; and it was the verbalized frustration of the assimilado that gave rise to the socio-political alienation that eventually would transform itself into today's Angolan nationalism. After examining protest writings over two generations, Wheeler concludes that many of the fundamental assumptions of Angolan nationalism are actually Portuguese, not African, in character, and that loyalty to Portugal was a motivating factor behind early Angolan self-assertion and nationalism. During the early twentieth century, Africans and assimilados often articulated their dissatisfactions through
organizations established by the government. Eventually, during the thirties, they began to urge moderate reforms, and by the 1940s they had mounted a concerted campaign for direct participation for the urban masses. Inevitably, the dictatorship intervened in the associations and replaced elected leaders with administrative appointees, thus ensuring government control.

In his protest journalism, with its moderate attempts to pressure authorities to tolerate greater African participation in a white-dominated colonial society (expanded educational opportunities and services, for instance, were stressed), the assimilado was mixing traditional and religious or symbolic nationalism with humanitarian and liberal types. His efforts toward aggregation, which represented the beginnings of an attempt to develop greater participation and awareness among both the assimilado and black African populations, were similarly motivated. Whatever nationalism was manifested probably incorporated a deep respect for Portuguese culture and history. There is no evidence that the earliest associations desired to liberate themselves altogether from their colonial benefactors.

In the face of government interference, however, clandestine political movements had emerged in each of the African territories by the middle fifties. At the same time, African intellectuals (always assimilados and usually mulattoes) were studying at Portuguese universities, and in Lisbon they participated in discussions and dialogue at the controversial Casa dos Estudantes do Império, the semi-official center for Africans (which was condemned as subversive and closed by the government in 1965). Thereafter, some of these intellectuals such as the Angolan Mario de Andrade and the Mogambican Marcelino dos Santos settled in Paris where they established the Movimento Anti-Colonialista (MAC) in 1957. While their association with black African writers and poets in a European setting seemed to affirm their affinity to alien cultural and materialistic values, it also made them aware of how the adoption of such values could undermine their search for an identity that could be characterized as truly African. The search for African values advanced significantly when certain African intellectuals decided that they must break altogether from their alien milieu. This break introduced a fifth pattern into the evolving African protest and resistance. In the cultural sphere, Viriato da Cruz and others emphasized black Angola in A Mensagem, a magazine which appeared in the early fifties. That the publication was officially banned after its second issue signifies that even the government now was beginning to have doubts about its policy of favoring a "civilized" elite of African intellectuals. The intent of that policy had been to ensure cooperation and compromise. It was based on the belief that the apparent assimilation and commingling of African and European cultural values in the mulatto intelligentsia made them avatars of racial harmony and black-white cultural affinity. Lusotropicalism provided the theoretical framework for such a belief. But the mulatto intellectual MArio de Andrade had begun to denounce Lusotropicalism as a myth, and to argue that the Portuguese policy of assimilation
was indeed racist-motivated, that it effectively assured both "segregation and a systematic limitation of social ascension" in the African territories. To support his view he had cited the 1950 census, which revealed that less than one percent of all black Africans had achieved "civilized" or assimilated status. His statement was not only the first serious challenge by an Angolan writer to Lusotropical theory but also the first overt expression of African disenchantment with Portuguese mystique. Moreover, it established the thesis that the negricification of the African entails not only continued respect for sophisticated European culture but also the glorification of the Black in Africa and an accommodation of his aesthetic values. The alienation of other African intellectuals was natural and inevitable. One so affected was Amílcar Cabral, a Cape Verdean, educated as an agronomist in, Lisbon and married to a Portuguese, who had worked for the government for several years. Another was Agostinho Neto, a medical doctor and renowned poet, who was arrested as a subversive in 1960. Eventually, Neto and other important African literary figures found their way into exile, where many assumed leadership in one or another of the anti-Portuguese organizations whose proliferation formalized the break between African intellectuals and the Portuguese government. Headquartered outside the territories, such organizations were founded with the objective of seeking independence and national identity—preferably through negotiation, but if necessary through militant struggle.

In summary, this look at protest patterns past and present discloses that black nationalism in Portuguese Africa has embraced nearly all types of nationalism; indeed, integral nationalism appears to be the only type which cannot be counted. Indigenous nationalism was present in the centuries of sporadic, localized resistance and confrontation which almost always occurred as a result of Portuguese incursions. Traditional and religious or symbolic nationalisms influenced by the official Portuguese perspective of Portuguese Africa were manifested in assimilado protest literature. Humanitarian nationalist tendencies manifested in the protest literature were rooted in official theory concerning the Portuguese role in Africa. Liberal nationalism was expressed by assimilados who believed that political democracy and individual liberties were indeed possible within restrictive colonial society. Bourgeois nationalism was evident in some syncretic movements and self-help associations. Finally, contemporary national liberation movements advocate radical authoritarian solutions in their struggle for independence and nationhood, and at the same time they tend to be technologically oriented in the developmental plans they envision for the future.

Black Nationalist Political and Social Movements

Our concern in the remainder of this essay is to describe and analyze black nationalist movements through 1965, and to relate this discussion to the documents in this volume and in the collection from which those documents are selected. The Evolution of Black Nationalist Movements

International recognition of the decisive break between black African nationalists and Portuguese colonialism probably was formalized in 1958 at the All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra; the break was clearly evident at the second All-African Peoples Congress in Tunis, where the MAC was superseded by the
Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independência das Colónias Portuguesas (FRAIN). In April 1961, the FRAIN in turn was dissolved and replaced by the Conferência das Organizapções Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP). The CONCP coordinated several nationalist organizations in an effort to build a united front to end Portuguese colonialism and win immediate independence of the African territories. It included movements representing each Portuguese territory: the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA); the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC); the Movimento de Libertação da Guiné e Cabo Verde (MLGC); the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP); and the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO). In January 1962 a rival movement to the MPLA, the Uniao das Populações de Angola (UPA), joined with the Mouvement de Libération de la Guiné-é "Portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert (MLGCV) to form a paper alliance, the Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Português (FACCP), as a counterforce to the CONCP. These intra-African nationalist developments are diagrammed in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2
EVOLUTION OF INTRA-AFRICAN BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Date Founded
1957?
MAC
1960
1961 (first CONCP conference)
Casablanca 1962
1965 (second CONCP conference)
Dar es Salaam
FRAIN
CONCP ------ UGEAN
xxxii
FACCP
'I

Angola
In Angola, contemporary nationalist movements as of 1965 fell into five principal groupings. The first large grouping was the MPLA, which was established in December 1956 as a coalition of several movements, including the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA), an organization which its founder Viriato da Cruz claims was established in 1953 as the first nationalist revolutionary party in Angola to function illegally as a representative of the African masses; Cruz became secretary general of the MPLA. The MPIA established headquarters in Conakry in 1960, after several of its leaders were arrested in Angola. Two years later it moved to Léopoldville (Kinshasa today), and in 1963, following a bitter leadership crisis in which Cruz proclaimed his support for the rival movement headed by Holden Roberto, it established itself in
Brazzaville. There Agostinho Neto, who had escaped from a Portuguese prison in 1962, established the Frente Democratika para a Ubertago de Angola (FDLA), which grouped his MPLA faction and four smaller nationalist organizations: the Movimento Nacional Angolano; Unigio Nacional dos Trabalhadoros Angolanos (UNTA); Nigwizani A Kongo (NGWIZAKO); and the Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA). The FDLA soon disbanded, but Neto was able to reorganize the MPLA—despite the fact that the influential Mkrio de Andrade had by then departed to Algiers.

The second major movement was the UPA, established as the successor to the UPNA by Holden Roberto in 1958 in IMopoldville. The UPA led the mid-March 1961 rebellion in northern Angola which resulted in a widespread exodus of the peasant population and black nationalist occupation of large expanses of territory throughout much of the Portuguese Congo. In March 1962 the UPA joined with Emmanuel Kounzika's Partido Democratico de Angola (PDA) to form the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) and the Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE).

Uke the MPLA, Roberto's FNLA experienced internal division. The most serious defection was that of GRAE minister of Foreign affairs Jonas Savimbi, who resigned on July 16, 1964, after denouncing Roberto for favoritism toward the Bakongo tribe of northern Angola and for nepotism (claiming at the time that twelve of the nineteen GRAE posts were held by Bakongos, of whom seven allegedly were Robertos blood relatives). In March 1966 Savimbi formally announced the existence of the Uni~o Nacional para a Independ~ncia Total de Angola (UNITA) (although the organization had actually begun to function in 1965), headquartered in Zambia to direct attacks across the Angola border. On the basis of its claims to effective activity in the Moxico, Lunda, and Cuando-Cubango areas, le UNITA quickly established itself as a third major Angolan nationalist movement. Another defector from the MPLA, Marcos Kassinda, participated with GRAE defense minister Alexandre Taty in the ransacking and occupation of the exile government's headquarters in Iopoldville on the night of June 24-25, 1965. Kassinda established the coalition of five groups which calls itself the Conselho do Povo Angolano (CPA). The fifth grouping, consisting of five Bakongo secessionist groups, is known as the Front Patriotique pour

FIGURE 3
EVOLUTION OF BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND CABINDA*

| Date         | ComissEo de Luta das Juventudes contra o Comitd Federal Colonial 1948 Angola Negra Angolano do PCP em Angola S I ~ k Conselho do Libertaglo 1952 de Angola 1953-55 f PLUA / AASA UPNA |
NGWIZAKO
MLN- _ //
1956 MLA- - - MPLak1957 MINA
1958 I
\ I
1959 MLNA \ \\ 4
1960 (FCPPA)
CVAR - . . . - > I
1961-62
UNT 1963
1964 1965
ML
I
EPLA- . .
CAUNC,
ALLIAM
A
4(FDLA)--MPLA-AN
-PC A
ASSOMIZO
/ I / / I
/ I
AREC UPA
I -- --JUPA
EC ALIAZO NTOBAKOI
/PDA L - > MDIA'
I JDA I LGTA
\ I // MNA
/I I / I
GRAE-FNLA -- -- UNEA I I CUNA
ALNA--' CSLA CGTA
VL \ \ AMA--' GTI
AFLEC
SARA - - > FALN
_ MPLA,
Cruz- -) RCCKP, , PPAI ' I PNA From
UPRONA' \ ' I 'UGTA GRAE-FNLA
SFPIKP CA (CNL) UNITA
I - AV I Formally
4' I established,
4' *1966
*Details of the above relationships are elaborated in the appendix.
xxxiv
L’Independence du Kongodit Portugais (FPIKP). Both the CPA and the FPIKP were established about 1965.0

Portuguese Guin., Cape Verde, and Sao Tomé e Principe

Two groupings are active in Guinean black nationalist politics; one small organization represents black nationalists in Sao Tomé e Principe. The PAIGC was founded in 1956 by Rafael Barbosa, Amflcar Cabral, and others in an attempt to aggregate urban and rural workers. Cabral became secretary general of the movement, which established headquarters in Conakry after several fruitless attempts to unite with other nationalist movements operating out of Dakar. Its members participated in a dockworkers strike which was suppressed by the government in August 1959. Thereafter, the PAIGC shifted its action from demonstrations in cities to mobilization in rural areas. Guerrilla warfare launched in 1962 quickly established it as the most important nationalist movement in Guinea. A rival organization, the Frente de Luta pela Independencia Nacional da Guiné Bissau (FLING), was established in Dakar during the period July 5-August 2, 1962, as a coalition representing at least seven tribal-based nationalist groups. One of the FLING adherent groups—the Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné—claimed it had led raids across the Senegalese border in 1961, well before the PAIGC-initiated guerrilla campaigns began.51 The CLSTP, formed in September 1960 under the leadership of Miguel Trovoada and headquartered in Gabon, has failed to gain widespread support and so far has not engaged in effective militant action. The formation and evolution of these groups are detailed in Figure 4.

Mogambique

The major nationalist movement in Mozambique, the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO), was established in Dar es Salaam on June 25, 1962, a coalition of the Uniao DemocrAtica Nacional de Mozambique (UDENAMO, first established by Mozambicans in Salisbury, Rhodesia); the Uniao Nacional Africana de Mopambique Independente (UNAMI, formed about 1961 by leaders from the Tete region exiled in Nyasaland); and the Mozambique African National Union (MANU, founded in Mombasa, Kenya, in February 1961). FRELIMO was led by Eduardo Mondlane until his assassination in 1969. Despite internal dissension and the attendant withdrawal of certain elements of the founding groups, the FRELIMO succeeded in launching a guerrilla struggle on September 25, 1964, and thereby assuming leadership of the nationalist cause. The colony's other popular movement, the Comitê Revolucionario de Mozambique (COREMO), was formed in June 1965 as a coalition of what were at one time five organizations. It has headquarters in Lusaka under its president J. J. C. Gwambe. COREMO claims its independence struggle inside Movambique was launched on October 24, 1965.52 The evolution of black African nationalist movements in Mozambique is traced in Figure 5.

FIGURE 4
EVOLUTION OF BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN PORTUGUESE GUINE, CAPE VERDE, AND SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE*
PI
PAIGC
- UNTG
- -> MLGCV,
Conakry
- -- UDEMO
FARP
1964 1965
UDG UDCV
\ I
MLGCV,
Dakar
UPG
/ / MLGP?
FLGC <- - MLICV
I4 /
FUL UPLG
I I FLING--<
UGTG
t--ALNG I A/,
MLG,- - - RDAG Mendy
! FLG
<j URGP
I j

*Details are elaborated in the appendix.
xxxvi
Date Founded 1954 1956
CLSTP
UPICV "I

FIGURE 5
EVOLUTION OF BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN
MOCAMBIQUE*

Date Founded
Mogambique Makonde 1954 Union
Unífto Mukana de Mogambique
Ndelelo Negrofil o de Manica e Sofala
UDENAMO UPM
MANU UNAMI
I I
, I
COSERU
Núcleo dos Estudantes de Moçambique
UNEMO
--> FRELIMO
UDENAMO, MANC MANU I
Monomotapa
FUNIPAMO
UDENAMO, 
Mogambique
IC I
I I
MORECO
COREMO
-LIFEMO
MANU,
Khartoum
*Details are elaborated in the appendix.
xxxvii
1964 1965

4) 0
0 0 >
4) 0
0 0 r 0
2wQzQO$E'L
.W 4) N :m
i .ed
0 r.
W 4. 4) 4
>0
0 -4
E $ 0
-
M 0 a 0 0
44 14
cd 10 >,
R 4)
W
a 0
0 0 M
04
0
The appendix to this volume identifies and describes 235 opposition, prenationalist, and nationalist organizations in Portuguese Africa. Included are major organizations and their subsidiaries; ephemeral and short-lived movements; prenationalist movements whose opposition was not always openly manifested; legal and semi-legal organizations which grouped whites, mulattoes, or blacks; and nationalist movements and parties as well as guerrilla and military organizations. Some 65 percent of all the movements identified are Angolan, and the high total reflects the detailed information available on that territory. Although future research should reveal the existence of additional movements for the other territories, especially Mopambkiue, we can tentatively conclude that organized African nationalism in Angola was a reality soon after World War II, well before such trends were visible in Guiné and Mogambique.

Figure 7, based on an analysis of all the documents in this writer's collection, also affords some interesting comparisons. While there is no way of ascertaining at this time the total number of documents written and distributed by Portuguese nationalist leaders and movements since the end of World War II, it is certain that the documents analyzed comprise a sizable portion of all those available. Indeed, on the basis of my own collecting experience, 53 and aware that my particular approach may well have biased my sampling, I would conservatively estimate that the collection includes about 70 percent of all material issued by African nationalists during the two decades under study. It contains a total of 2,499 documents, of which nearly 90 percent were issued after 1960; what we find in the future may reveal a higher percentage of ephemeral documents published after 1960. About 40 percent were not strictly nationalist documents but were published by the United Nations. Included are 64 resolutions on the Portuguese African situation formulated by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Economic Commission for Africa. Of the other U. N. documents, 821 were published by the General Assembly and its committees, including 50 general documents, 66 on agenda items, 263 on plenary meetings. Two are reports of the General Committee; 5 of the First Committee; 8 of the Third Committee; 104 of the Fourth Committee; and 1 of the Sixth Committee. A total of 290 of the U. N. documents (generally petitions and oral testimony by African nationalists) were issued by two special committees which examined the Portuguese African situation in detail. Another
important contributor was the Security Council, which published 129 documents, most of them after the Angolan uprising of 1961. Slightly more than 30 percent of all the documents from all sources relate to Angola and the neighboring enclave of Cabinda. Although fewer than 7 percent of the Angola and Cabinda total were published before 1961, the largest output of nationalist manifestoes of the pre-1961 period was attributable to the Angolans. Much of the rather substantial documentation for the Cape Verdes and Guiné is the work of the prolific Amílcar Cabral. Some of it was produced before Cabral openly broke with the government and declared himself a member of the nationalist opposition.
Our totals are limited in many respects. For one thing, certain views are perhaps overrepresented for the simple reason that some movements tend to publish more documents than others. For instance, such movements as the MPLA and the PAIGC have many educated intellectuals in their ranks who are adept not only at writing down their ideas but also at finding outlets for wide distribution. Probably every mimeographed document in the collection was limited to a primary
distribution of several hundred, but many were prepared as press releases in the hope of attracting mass-media coverage. It may be that the quantity of documents and words issued correlates to some extent with the organizational effectiveness of a movement, but the fact that clandestine groups within the Portuguese African territories rarely publish documents in no way should be taken to suggest that they are either less sophisticated or less well organized than the movements in exile. Militant and revolutionary groups inside the territories tend to link with groups outside or to move their headquarters to a neighboring country; indeed, by the end of 1965 no significant nationalist revolutionary group was operating exclusively within a Portuguese territory. Other limitations are that the totals do not distinguish between the brief communiqués and the lengthy analysis, nor do they indicate the relative quality of the documents in terms of clarity, expression, and content.

Black Nationalist Leadership

For purposes of comparing and analyzing the contrasting leadership qualities of the major black nationalist personalities, the several distinguishable types of leadership which have emerged among the black African nationalist movements are roughly classifiable into three general types—intellectual, activist, and pragmatist. The first type, the intellectual or ideologue, tends to be highly attuned to the problems of his complex milieu, and to be ever watchful for solutions. While such a leader is by no means invariably a representative of the recognized intellectual class of his own native territory in Portuguese Africa, he tends to be; in other words, he is likely to have emerged from the mulatto assimilado class nurtured by the Portuguese regime during the forties and early fifties. His Marxism, if any, and in fact the entire complex of his personal ideological beliefs, tends to be subsumed in an intense, generalized commitment to rapid change and the search for a theoretical framework that will reflect his frustrations and resentments, support his nationalist sentiments, and accommodate his desired ends. The Angolans Mario Andrade and Viriato da Cruz, the Cape Verdean Amílcar Cabral, and the Mozambican Marcelino dos Santos are examples of this type. Doctrinal niceties are of little importance to the activist. He may find theory boring and intellectual discussion tedious, for he tends to prefer drama, challenge and, of course, physical action. The activist may come from any socio-economic group. He is usually a natural leader—strongly extroverted, possessed of a compelling personality that commands the loyalty of his followers, a shrewd judge of men, a tactician. Although perhaps not all of these particular characteristics are elements of his personality, the Angolan Holden Roberto probably best exemplifies this leadership type. The third type, the pragmatist, is the leader attracted to a nationalist movement because of the opportunity it affords for personal power and/or recognition. He may be the student who sees the possibility of gaining both intellectual and political authority in a disciplined organization (consider Jonas Savimbi, for example, who allied himself with Roberto, became a high official in the
movement, then defected to lead his own organization). He may be the worker who hopes to gain status as a representative of the proletariat. Or he may have military inclinations, aspirations to the leadership of a dedicated, powerful army (José Kalundungo and Alexandre Taty are such men; both defected from Roberto's movement--the latter after attempting to seize control).

While individual African leaders seem to fall rather readily into these three basic leadership types, the movements which they represent are not so clearcut in terms of leadership structure. The seven nationalist groupings analyzed in Figure 10, for instance (see p. xlvii), present a spectrum of leadership compositions, ranging from the movement dominated by a single figure (the PAIGC), through those dominated by one man with power shared with a ruling clique (the FNLA-GRAE and FRELIMO), that ruled by some collective leadership with small-clique control (the MPLA), and that ruled exclusively by a small clique (COREMO), to that represented wholly by collective leadership (CONCP).

Relating leadership composition to internal discipline and movement impact, we may infer that while collective leadership may be a goal of all nationalist movements desiring to stimulate internal unity and democratic decision-making, the real experience of movements in Portuguese Africa suggests that success is directly and positively related to the presence of dominant authority. The conspicuous case in point of this contention is the PAIGC, led by Amílcar Cabral, which has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in confronting the Portuguese. Cabral’s precise organization and his emphasis on strategy and tactics have allowed him to grapple effectively with the instability that accompanies guerrilla warfare. In contrast, collective leadership in times of stress may inevitably lead a movement to confusion and indecision, and perhaps even to eventual failure.

Figure 8 reveals Amílcar Cabral, Mário de Andrade, Holden Roberto, Eduardo Mondlane, Agostinho Neto, and Viriato da Cruz as the leaders most productive of published documents in the collection at hand. By whatever criteria, these six nationalists are indeed the principal figures of the major movements. It should be clear that the totals reflect the availability of sources, access or inaccessibility to certain documents, and bias in contacts with persons possessing relevant materials. The totals of documents do not necessarily indicate significance of leadership. For example, Marcos Kassanga, who appears on the list, is probably less important a leader than Jonas Savimbi or Eduardo Pinock, whose names are not included.

FIGURE 8
LEADERSHIP DOCUMENTS
1945-65*
Nationalist
Figure 9 compares and contrasts the leadership qualities of the six men. The
evaluations admittedly are subjective and somewhat tentative but they are drawn
from intensive reading of their writings or writings about them. These leaders,
with the exception of Roberto, were educated in the Portuguese system and all
maintained some degree of affinity to Portuguese culture, at least until the
decisive break of the late fifties and early sixties. As a Cape Verdean, Cabral was
perhaps the one most favored by the Portuguese, for whom he worked as an
agronomist. 55 Andrade, Cruz, and Neto represented ethnic groups of north
central Angola, Mondlane the southern Mogambican peoples, and Cabral the
Cape Verdeans. Each convincingly maintained a nationalist stance that embraced
the differing ethnic groups throughout his territory. Holden Roberto's
identification with Angola was less convincing: He had moved with his family
from Angola to the Congo when he was two years old, and furthermore, his close
personal tribal links, coupled with the dominance of Bakongo leadership in his
movement, somewhat tarnished his image as a leader with a truly national
perspective.
However, Roberto's willingness to take action, demonstrated by his movement's
success during 1961 through 1963, left no doubt about his position of strong
militancy. Cabral's success in Guind similarly demonstrated his very deep
commitment to violent action. The other leaders have from time to time advocated
guerrilla warfare and violence as the means to revolution but up to the mid-sixties
there was little evidence of any such actual involvement. The fact that Mondlane
in September 1964 backed up his call for action by opening the guerrilla offensive
in Mogambique, and that his ideological position then radicalized and grew more
militant, may have marked what was to be a new trend in his leadership.
Cabral's experience, and the deliberate and patient planning in both theory and
practice which brought him such unusual military gains in Guiné, rank him
highest in the list of administrators with organizational skill. Mondlane's claim to
high rank in this category is attested by his success in the military campaigns of
1964 and thereafter. The success of both leaders is partially attributable to
charismatic appeal, Cabral's de-emphasis of personal prestige notwithstanding.
Neto and Roberto also are notably charismatic leaders. Moreover, Cabral has been able to maintain especially strong control over his organization which, unlike the MPLA, FNLA-GRAE, and FRELIMO, has experienced no serious internal division as of this writing. In developmental orientation, Andrade, Cabral, and Cruz rank high because of the sophisticated post-independence plans and projects they envision for their nations. In the case of these three, such perspective may in part be a product of their adherence to Marxism. In any event, our assessment is based on documents presently available to us. It may be that the others have sophisticated plans, whether or not these may be in writing.

FIGURE 9
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF MAJOR BLACK NATIONALISTS (BASED ON DOCUMENTS THROUGH 1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative and Nationalist Identification with Organizational Developmental Controle Orientation</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Territorial Units</th>
<th>Militancyb</th>
<th>Skille</th>
<th>Charismad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mdrio de Andrade (Portuguese-educated and French-influenced)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amfcar Cabral (Cape Verdean and Portuguese-educated)</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viriato da Cruz (Portuguese-educated)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Mondlane (Portuguese- and American-educated)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostinho Neto (Portuguese-educated)</td>
<td>Medium strong</td>
<td>Medium strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holden Roberto (Congolese-educated, tribal-oriented)</td>
<td>Medium strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identification with territory is judged to be limited by educational and religious training in a foreign milieu (Portugal, Congo, France, and the United States), by tribal loyalties, and by discernible alien cultural orientation.

Degree of militancy dependent on commitment to guerrilla activities or other forms of violence.

Administrative and organizational skill based on analysis of party statutes and programs, effectiveness in recruitment and mobilizations, and extent of military success.
Charisma determined by image projected within party and among the general African population in respective territory, as reflected in views of observers.

Control evaluated on basis of leader's self-perceived ability to avoid internal party division and defections.

Developmental orientation determined by extent of projects and planning for an independent nation-state, as elaborated in leader's statements.

Nationalist Organizations
Organizational characteristics of seven major nationalist movements are detailed in Figure 10. Of the 440 documents in the general collection, slightly more than 10 percent were selected for the present volume. The number of documents selected to represent a given movement is generally proportional to the total available for that movement. The descriptions for each of the other eight categories included in the chart are tentative and subject to modification. They are based not only on the documents themselves, but on personal interviews, opinions and data from various informants, and general sources.

The assertion that ethnicity is a major determinant of certain movements' policies is not entirely without foundation, although criticisms on such grounds tend to be less telling when the movement achieves success in militant action which cuts across ethnic lines. Most seriously affected by such allegations have been the FNLA-GRAE, which is predominantly Bakongo and traditionally oriented toward Congolese society in northern Angola and in the Congo (Kinshasa) itself; and the PAIGC, whose Cape Verdean leadership frequently is accused of favoring its own insular interests over those of Guinea. The charge that racism contributes to nationalist policy is also bothersome. The fact that many mulattoes and only a few blacks in the leadership of the MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO, and the CONCP all once held privileged assimilado status under Portuguese administration gives rise to this charge, with the result that the UPA, for example, is often differentiated from the MPLA along racial lines, as is the PAIGC from the FLING and the COREMO from FRELIMO.

There is of course some correlation between racial character (and former assimilado status) and educational and cultural background. Mulattoes more frequently than black Africans have worked their way into the educational system and the African intelligentsia, in the process acquiring distinctive class interests that distinguish them from the rural peasant and urban working classes. These differences are noted in column 5 of Figure 10.

Religion was a relatively significant factor in the early stirrings of nationalist protest and struggle, especially in northern Angola where anti-Portuguese, anti-Catholic Protestant missionary influence was particularly strong. Holden Roberto, for example, a third-generation Protestant, attended mission schools and was graduated in 1943 from a French Protestant secondary school in Ldopoldville. Although Catholicism was an influence among Mbundu peoples, Protestant missionaries had substantial impact.

There is a tendency among the more important movements to establish nationally oriented, highly centralized (usually in a central or executive committee) organizations with mass affiliates (for women, labor, students, and so on) similar
in structure to the ruling single parties that dominated independent black Africa during the early sixties. Moreover, the degree of organizational centralization is related directly to the style of leadership (discussed above) and the degree of internal discipline. Thus the PAIGC, for instance--highly centralized, dominated by one leader, strongest as a disciplined party--is the most effective of all the movements. In contrast, the FLING and COREMO, which are little more than loose coalitions having some leadership division and weak discipline, are relatively ineffective. Both are small groups weakened by opportunist leaders and a reluctance to become intensively involved in the guerrilla struggle.

### Ideological Perspectives

The contrasting ideological perspectives reflected in Figure 11 are drawn from party programs and major policy statements. It may be that the lack of definitive statements from the FNLA-GRAE and related groups and from the FLING is owing to a genuine gap in the general collection of nationalist documents. More probably, though, the imprecise stance of these groups concerning the themes emphasized in Figure 11 relates to a tendency on the part of the former group to dedicate most of its attention to anti-Portuguese action and the exchange of polemics with rival nationalists, and to the general inactivity of the latter.

One notes, however, that all the movements are clearly anti-colonialist and antiimperialist, and all are in favor of immediate independence and self-determination, pan-Africanism, and Third World unity. Most of them have worked out a policy position on territorial unity and national defense. They also tend to have some conception of the type of regime that ought to be established after independence (although there is a general vagueness about future political institutions), and they are nearly unanimous in expressing concern for social justice and the protection of individual rights. Many of the movements have detailed programs for economic development, agrarian reform, education, and cultural life. What is especially interesting is that both the MPLA and PAIGC have set forth explicit and detailed policy for every issue examined in Figure 11. One feels that this attention to theory and this careful, elaborate planning of action must have been instrumental in whatever successes the two movements have enjoyed. The PAIGC in particular seems to have profited. In the liberated zones of Guinea, for example, that organization has already moved toward fulfillment of some of its objectives. Special committees in the interior supervise hospitals, health centers, and schools, and a projected literacy campaign will utilize special books of essays and poems devoted to the ideals of nationhood. In agriculture, rice and other production has increased in the liberated zones, and internal trade within the zones has been improved and food storage facilities established.
In this essay we have established, first, that nationalism in its many manifestations involves commitment that frequently revolves around patriotic symbols of the nation, and it sometimes is rooted in societal change and progress. Second, we have seen how the variants of nationalism are exemplified in the experience of Portugal.

and her African territories. And third, Portuguese African nationalism, which is commonly thought to be singularly black African in expression and content, is also very much a product of Portuguese national ideology, colonial ambitions, and imperial mystique; in fact, the Portuguese position and its re-enforcing thesis of Lusotropicology have considerably influenced the nationalism of virtually all positions opposed to the current regime. Contemporary black nationalism, now militant and violent in its antagonism to Portugal, also has roots in 500 years of sporadic and local tribal resistance to Portuguese economic domination and
exploitation, and in the frustrations of Africans, especially assimilados, whose demands for reform through legal and semi-legal channels availed but little or not at all in the face of official intransigence. Of the black nationalist movements formed since the end of World War II, more than half emerged among Angolan nationalists, who have also contributed a considerable share of the published documentation on the movements. Further, the major movements (with the conspicuous exception of Holden Roberto's FNLA-GRAE) were founded by assimilado intellectuals from the various territories who first exchanged ideas as students in Lisbon. Although intellectuals have dominated the formation of the black nationalist movements and played crucial leadership roles, activists and pragmatists have exercised leadership functions in and sometimes outright control of movements. We have identified a range of leadership compositions among the movements, from one-man domination to collective control. A detailed survey of the leadership qualities of six prominent nationalists indicates that their behavior and their effectiveness are determined by such factors as educational and cultural background, administrative skill, militancy, and charisma. Not only do these factors relate to a leader's ability to maintain control and discipline; they also apparently affect his readiness to elaborate plans and projects for future national development. An attempt to compare and contrast the principal features of black nationalist movements suggests that membership composition (i.e. ethnicity, race, class, religion, etc.), organizational structure, and leadership composition affect the general impact and effectiveness as well as the specific successes and failures of each movement. We have noted ideological similarities and differences as well, and our analysis suggests that well elaborated theory and planning relate positively to success or potential success.

Notes
3 This typology is summarized from Chilcote, op. cit. n1, pp. 504-12.
1895 (Lisbon, 1947); António Ennes, A guerra de Africa em 1895: memórias, 2d ed. (Lisbon: Gama, 1945); Joaquim Mousinho de Albuquerque, Mousinho de Albuquerque, 2 vols. (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colônias, 1934-35), and his A prisgo de Gungunhana (Lourenço Marques, 1896); and Ayres d'Ornellas, Campanha do Gungunhana 1895 (Lisbon: Escola Typografia das Oficinas de S–o José, 1930).

6Traditional nationalism is found especially in the philosophy of Edmund Burke (1729-97), according to Hayes, op. cit. n4, pp. 87-112.


8The mysticism and the allegiance to symbols of the national past received fresh support in the official propaganda and writings of the Salazar regime. Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar was but one of a number of Portuguese policy makers captured by the mystique of imperial destiny in the last few centuries.


10Hayes, op. cit. n4, pp. 121-68.


13Integral nationalism appeared with Mussolini in Italy, with Hitler in Germany, and with the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, and also has attended nationalist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Hayes (op. cit. n4) sees elements of integral nationalism in the ideas of August Comte but attributes its exposition principally to the doctrine of Charles Maurras. And indeed, the fascist leanings and corporativist ideology of the Salazar regime are linked by apologists to the philosophy of Maurras: see, for example, M. Derrick, The Portugal of Salazar (London: Paladin Press, 1938) and António Ferro, Salazar, Portugal and Her Leader (London: Faber and Faber, 1939).

14Among such organizations were the Liga Africana, formed in Lisbon in 1923; and the Liga Nacional Africana and the Grêmio Africano (later called Associação Regional dos Naturais de Angola), both established in Luanda six years later. About the same time in Mogambique, the Associagió Africana and the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique were established for assimilated mulatto and black Africans, while the Associação dos Naturais de Mogambique was created for Europeans born in Mogambique.

15See Fidelino de Figueiredo, Características da literatura Portuguesa (Lisbon, 1923).

17See Chilcote, op. cit. n16, pp. 34-38.

18Cunha Leal, a longtime opponent of Salazar, criticized colonial policy in his Oliveira Salazar, filomeno da camara e o império colonial Portugus (Lisbon, 1930), and in his A gadanha da morte: reflexões sobre os problemas euro-africanos (Lisbon, 1961) and A patria em perigo (Lisbon, 1962). Fernando Pacheco de Amorim, in his polemical arguments for "integration" of the overseas provinces in Três caminhos da política ultramarina (Coimbra, 1962) and Unidade ameaçada: o problema ultramarina (Coimbra, 1963), lashes out at both Leal and official policy. The FPLN, founded in 1962, attempts to coordinate its activities with those of the internal opposition while representing a loose coalition of the Portuguese Communist Party with individual liberals, socialists, Catholics, and monarchists.

20For example, see the bulletin FPLN Portugal (scattered issues for 1965 and 1966) and "Marcelo Caetano fidèle k la politique de Salazar" (Algiers: FPLN, January 1969; mimeographed). For its position on independence for the African territories, see the FPLN's "Memorandum a la Conference des Organisations Nationalistes des Colonies Portuigaises" (Algiers, October 1965; mimeographed).


22Despite his criticisms, Galvão never abandoned the notion that the colonies must remain under Portuguese control. This position is explicit in his letter to the author from São Paulo dated July 15, 1963, and in his "Communication dated 12 July from Captain Henrique Galvão" (New York: United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on Territories Under Portuguese Administration, A/AC. 108/R. 2, July 30, 1962).


24One of the few written discussions of this tendency toward self-determination is in Austin Coates, "Portuguese Roots in Africa," Optima, XV (March 1965), 1-15.


26Alexandre Lobato's statement was part of a lengthy debate with Lopes Roseira, deputy from Angola, in the National Assembly. See Portuguese National Assembly, Diário das Sessões, 58 (December 12, 1962), 1471-1502; 66 (January 9, 1963), 173544; and 67 (January 10, 1963), 1763-76. Among Lobato's books is A expansão portuguesa em Mogambique de 1498 a 1530, 3 vols. (Lisbon, 1954-60).

27Gilberto Freyre introduced the concept of Lusotropicology in Um brasileiro em terras portuguesas (Rio de Janeiro, 1953), and later expanded on his ideas in two works published by the Portuguese government, The Portuguese and the Tropics (Lisbon, 1961) and Portuguese Integration in the Tropics (Lisbon, 1961).
An example of one Portuguese effort to justify Lusotropical theory is Almerindo Lessa and Jacques Ruffiès, Seroantropologia das Ilhas de Cabo Verde (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar).


See José Honório Rodrigues, Brasil e África: outro horizonte (Rio de Janeiro, 1961 and 1964); and his "The Influence of Africa on Brazil and of Brazil on Africa" in Journal of African History, III, 1 (1962), 49-67. Various Brazilian nationalist positions have been reflected in fluctuating diplomatic relations between Brazil and Portugal: during the fifties Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek maintained consistently close ties with Portugal, whereas in the early sixties Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart supported demands for self-determination and opposed Portugal's role in Africa (one of Quadros' foreign policy advisors, Candido Mendes de Almeida, was the author of Nacionalismo e desenvolvimento (Rio de Janeiro, 1963)). Close ties were reestablished after 1964 under the military rule of Humberto Castelo Branco and Arthur Costa e Silva, and in July 1969 the Brazilian government cordially welcomed the visit of the new Prime Minister, Marcello Caetano.

Although Africans advocating independence and nationhood today are more deeply conscious than ever before of their exploited past, there has yet to be published a full account of their experience, carefully researched and documented. Until recently, what literature has been available on the subject has concentrated on Portuguese policy, role, and achievements-written for the most part from the Portuguese point of view by Portuguese, by apologists of the Portuguese position, or by others whose perspectives were narrowed by the documentary evidence available. An examination of the historical events involving African protest and resistance, especially of those which provoked violence and confrontation, should provide an excellent point of departure for the development of fresh perspectives. My Portuguese Africa (op. cit. n16) attempts to identify and delineate the threads of African response to the Portuguese presence. An Angolan study center in Algiers, Centro de Estudos Angolanos, has attempted an African documentation of Angolan history; see, for example, the Centro's mimeographed "História de Angola (Apontamentos)," July 1965, 163 p. Among historians who will soon publish studies reflecting a black African perspective in Portuguese Africa are David Birmingham and Jan Vansina whose contributions on Angola are substantial; James Duffy and Douglas Wheeler, whose most important writings so far have focused mainly on Portuguese policy and activity in Africa; and Edward Alpers, who is currently engaged in investigation which should contribute greatly to a black African perspective of Mozambique history. John Marcum has made substantial contributions to our understanding of developments since 1950.

Among basic historical works on the Portuguese Congo, see Duarte Lopes, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo (London, 1881) and Visconde de Paiva Manso, História do Congo (documentos) (Lisbon, 1877). The revolt of Alvaro Tulante Buta is described by John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: Anatomy


Important Portuguese works include Alfredo de Albuquerque Felner, Angola (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colônicas, 1940), which includes an appendix of useful documents; António de Oliveira de Cadornega, História geral das guerras angolanas, 3 vols. (Lisbon, 1940-42), significant despite some erroneous interpretations; and Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, 1482-1836, 4 vols. (Lobito: Livraria Magalhães, 1948-55).

34There is little in secondary literature to record resistance in the southern kingdoms, but there are some hints in Adrian C. Edwards, The Ovimbundu Under Two Sovereignties: A Study of Social Control and Social Change Among a People of Angola (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).


36See references cited in note 5.

37Details of these events are in Marcum, op. cit. n32, Vol. I, pp. 51-64.

38Marcum, op. cit. n32, pp. 76-83. See pp. 115-20 for the author's useful discussion of the Chokwe resistance.

39Douglas L. Wheeler, "Origins of African Nationalism in Angola: Assimilado Protest Writings, 1859-1929," paper presented to the University of California Colloquium, Riverside and Los Angeles, February 13, 1968. Wheeler cites as examples of protest writing the journalism of José de Fontes Pereira (1823-91); a book entitled Voz d'Angola clamando no deserto (Lisbon, 1901); the protest volumes of António de Assis Júnior, 1917-18; and articles from the colonial and national press in the 1920s.

40See note 14.

41The search for nègritude inspired poets, historians, and others to convene the first congress of black African writers and artists in Paris in 1956, and to establish the Société Africaine de Culture and its American affiliate, the American Society of African Culture, as well as the important cultural journal Presence Africaine.

42The Salazar regime attempted with varying degrees of success to cultivate a colonial literature. The number of Portuguese periodicals dedicated to colonial matters is ample, but few significant literary works have been produced in overseas Africa. The output of colonial literature has been restricted by the small
numbers of educated Africans and by the difficulty encountered by writers in
going original literary works published in Portugal.
43Writing under the pseudonym of Buanga Fele, Andrade set forth his views in
an article entitled "Qu'est-ce que le 'lusó tropicalismo'?" Présence Africaine, New

44For an analysis of Cabral 's thought and citations to his early writings, see
Ronald H. Chilcote, "The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral," The Journal of
Modern African Studies, VI, 3 (1968), 373-88.
45The nationalist movements are identified and described in some detail in the
appendix to this volume. The complete collection of documents is catalogued in
Ronald H. Chilcote, Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: A Bibliography of
Documentary Ephemera Through 1965 (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War,
46Although the UPA claimed credit for the March 15 rebellion, it should be
recalled that the MPLA provided some of the leadership for the February 4-6,
1961, uprising in Luanda.
47For his important statements, see Jonas Savimbi, "Déclaration de Monsieur
Jonas Savimbi, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du GRAE" (Brazzaville: Doc.
44/64, Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola, August 17, 1964); and
"Oai en est la révolution angolaise?,' article paru dans Remarques Congolaises et
Africaines, No. 21 du 25 novembre 1964" (Algiers: Etudes et Documents [2],
D61igation Permanente du Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola et
Algérie, October 1964).
48See Unió Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, "Constitution of
49See Conseil National de Liberation, "D-claration du Conseil National de
Liberation" (Ldopoldville, January 13, 1965).
50An up-to-date analysis of Angolan nationalism is John Marcum's "Tripolarity
in Angolan Nationalism," a paper presented to the University of California
Colloquium, Los Angeles and Riverside, March 1968. Marcum is preparing a
multi-volume study on the evolution of Angolan nationalism, to be published by
MIT Press. Recent interesting, informative, and occasionally insightful
journalistic accounts include Robert Davezies, La guerre d'Angola (Bordeaux:
Guy Ducros, 1968); Pierre A. Moser, La révolution angolaise (Tunis: Société
l'Action d'Édition et de Presse, 1966); and Pierre Pascal Rossi, Pour une guerre
oubliée (Paris: Julliard, 1969). Other sources concerning Angolan nationalist
movements are George Houser, "Nationalism Organizations in Angola," in John
A. Davis and James K. Baker, eds., Southern Africa in Transition (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 157-79; John Marcum, "The Angola Rebellion:
Africa Report, XII (November 1967), 8-22; Newton do Espírito Santo, "Os
movimentos nacionalistas angolanos," Revista Brasileira de Política
Internacional, VI (September 1963), 457-82; and Joro Baptista Nunes Pereira
Neto, "Movimentos subversivos de Angola--tentativa de esboço sociopolítico" in
Concerning the evolution of Guinean nationalism, some useful left-oriented journalistic accounts are Gérard Chaliand, Guinée "portugaise" et Cap Vert en lutte pour leur indépendance (Paris: Frangois Masper6, 1964), and Lutte armée en Afrique (Paris: Frangois Masper6, 1967).

After 1965 COREMO encountered internal difficulties. Gwambe was ousted as president in 1967, at which time he established the Partido Popular de Mogambique (PAPOMO).

My search for documents took me to the headquarters and the branch offices of the movements, necessitated an exchange of literally hundreds of letters with nationalists, and brought me into contact with nearly all scholars, journalists, and others vocationally concerned with black African nationalism in the Portuguese territories.

The high total for Cabral is attributable to the fact that his name routinely appears on most PAIGC documents, a clear indication of the dominant role and discipline he maintains in party affairs.

Because the Cape Verde Islands were first settled by the Portuguese, they "officially" have a culture different from and superior to mainland Africa, and therefore the islands' inhabitants have long been regarded as "civilized" Portuguese citizens. In contrast, until the early sixties only those other Africans who could attain assimilado status were officially considered "citizens."

Figure 11 is based on the following documents: Union of Angolan Populations, "Statutes" (n. d. ); Parti Démocrate de l'Angola, "Statuts, fonctionnement des commissions, règlement d'ordre intérieur du Parti Démocratie de l'Angola" (Leopoldville, November 17, 1965); Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola, Statuts et programme (Leopoldville, n. d. ); Front de Lutte pour l'Indépendance National de la Guinée, "Charte Préalambule" (Dakar, 1962?); Partido Africano da Independência na Guiné e "Portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert, Statuts et programme (Conakry, n. d. ); Conférence des Organisations Nationalistes des Colonies Portugaises, "Conférence des Organisations Nationalistes des Colonies Portugais" (Casablanca, April 18-20, 1961) and "Segunda Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas: resoluções" (Dar es Salaam, October 3-8, 1965); União Democrática Nacional de Mogambique, Constitution and programme (Cairo, 1963?); Frente de Libertagro de Mogambique, Estatutos e programa (Dar es Salaam, September 1963) and First Congress--Documents (Paris: Comité de Soutien a l'Angola et aux Peuples des Colonies Portugaises, September 23-28, 1962); and Comité Revolucionario de Mogambique, "Constituição" (Lusaka, 196?).

Amílcar Cabral, "Le d'éveloppement de la lutte de la libération nationale en Guiné e 'Portugaise' et aux Iles de Cap Vert en 1964" (Conakry, 1965), pp. 4-5.

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONAL ABBREVIATIONS
AND ACRONYMS USED IN TEXT
AASA ABAYO
AJEUNAL
ALIAZO
ALLIAMA ALNA ALNG AMA AMANGOLA ANANGO LA AREC
ASSOMIZO ATCAR
AV
CAUNC
CGTA CIR
CLA CLSTP CLTADP
CML CNL
COMCABI CONCP COREMO
COSERU CPA CRNA
CSA CSLA

Associagfto Africana do Sul de Angola Alianga dos Bakongos or Association pour le Maintien l'Unit6 et l'Expansion de la Langue Kikongo Alliance des Jeunes Angolais pour la Libert6 ou Alianga da Juventude Angolana para a Libertade Alianga dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo or Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo


CSRSA CUNA
CVAAR
DIRECO DRIL
ELA
ELNA E PLA
FACCP
FALN FAP FAPLE FARP
FCJNA FCPPA FDLA FLA FLEC
FLG FLGC
FLING FLNA FNA FNLA FPIKP FPLN FPLN FRAIN
FRELIMO FUJA FUJA FUL
FULA FUNIPAMO
Comité Secreto Revolucionário do Sul de Angola Comité Unidade Nacional Angolana or Comité de l’Unité National Angolaise
Corpo Voluntário Angolano de Assistência aos Refugiados
Grupo de Defesa da Região Costeira Diretório Revolucionário Ibérico de Libertação
Exército de Libertação de Angola Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola
Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Português Frente Angolana de Libertação
Nacional Frente de Acção Popular Frente Anti-Totalitário dos Portugueses
Libres Exiliados Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo or Forças Armées Révolutionnaires du Peuple
Front Commun des Parties Politiques de l’Angola Frente Democrata para a Libertação de Angola Frente de Angola ou Front de Libération de l’Angola
Front pour la Libération de l’Enclave de Cabinda Frente de Libertação da Guiné Frente de Libertação da Guiné Portuguesa e Cabo Verde Frente de Libertação de la Guinée-égalaise et du Cap-Vert
Frente de Libertação de Angola Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola Frente de Unidade Angolana
Frente da Juventude Cristã de Angola Frente da Juventude Democrática de Angola
Frente de Unidade da Juventude Patriótica de Libertação Nacional
Frente Unida de Juventude de Angola Front Unida de Juventude de Angola Front Uni de Libération de la Guinée-égalaise et du Cap Vert or Front Uni de Libération
Frente Unida para a Libertação de Angola Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Mogambique

GRAE
GRPL
JCA JCAP JDA JFPLN JMAE JMLPA JUPA
LA
LEJUREMO LGTA
LIFEMO LMI LNA LU
MABLA MAC MAJE MANC or
MANCO
MANU
MANU-Khartoum MAR MDIA
MDLPC MINA MING MLA MLEC
MLG MLGC or
MLGCV
Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio or Gouvernement Révolutionnaire de l’Angola en Exil Grupo Revolucionário Português de Libertação
Juventude Cristã de Angola Junta Central de Acção Patriótica Juventude Democrática de Angola Juventude da Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional
Junta Militar Angolano no Exilio Juventude de Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola Juventude da Unifto das Populag5es de Angola
Liga Africana
League of Revolutionary Mozambican Students and Youth Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola Liga Feminina de Mogambique Liga Mondrquica Independente Liga Nacional Africana Liga Ultramarina Movimento Afro-Brasileiro para a Libertagio de Angola Movimento Anti-Colonista Movimento Angolano de Juventude Estudante Mogambique African National Congress or Congreso Nacional Africano de Mogambique Mogambique African National Union
Mozambique African National Union Movimento de Aeg o Revolucionirio Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola or Mouvement de Ddfense des Int-r-ts de l'Angola Movimento Demoerdtico de Libertag--o de Portugal e Colfinias Movimento para a Independ-ncia Nacional de Angola Movimento de IndependNcia Nacional da Guind Portuguesa Movimento de Libertaglo de Angola Mouvement pour la Libfration de l'Enclave de Cabinda or Movimento de Libertagfto de Enclave de Cabinda Movimento de Libertaglo de Angola
Movimento de Libertagio da Guin6 e Cabo Verde or Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinde "Portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert

MPIA or MIA MPLA MPLA-AN
MRB MRR MSA MSL MUD MUDJ
NGWIZAKO NTOBAKO
OCA
OMA
OPO
PARA PCA PDA
PAIGC PLM PLUA PNA
PPA PSA
RCCKP RDAG RDJA
SAIA

SARA SCA SEE PE
SWANU SWAPO
UCLA
UDCV UDEMU UDENAMO UDG UDP
UEPF UGEAN
UGTA UGTGB UMA UMP UNA
UNAMI UNATA
UNEA UNEMO
UNITA UNTA UNTG
UPA UPG
UPG
UPICV
UPLG UPM
UPNA UPRONA
URGP
UTONA UWC
Servigo de AssistOncia aos Refugiados de Angola Sociedade Cultural de Angola
Section des Rencontres des Etudiants Portugais ?. l'Etranger South-West Africa
National Union South-West African Peoples' Organizations
Unilo Congolesa para a Libertaqo de Angola or Union Congolaise pour la
Liberation de l'Angola Unifo Democrdtica de Cabo Verde Uniffo Democrdtica
das Mulheres da Guiné e Cabo Verde Uniffo Democrdtica Nacional de
Mogambique Unilo Democrdtica da Guind or Union D'mocratique de la Guinde
Unidade Democrtica Portuguesa Union des Etudiants Portugais en France Unilo
Geral dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Dominaglo Colonial Portuguesa or
Union GCndrale des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire sous Domination Coloniale
Portugaise Union G6n–rale des Travailleurs Angolais
Unilo Unifo Unil0 Uniao Unio–o Uniao
Geral dos Trabalhadores da Guiné-Bissau das Mulheres da Angola de Mulheres
Portuguesas Nacional de Angola or Union Nationale Angolaise Nacional Africana
de Mogambique Independente dos Naturais de Angola Nacional dos Estudantes
Angolanos
Union Nationale des Etudiants du Mozambique or Unilo Nacional dos Estudantes
do Mogambique Unilo Nacional para a Independ–ncia Total de Angola Unifto
Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos
Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores da
Guine Unifó das Populações de Angola Unifó das Populações da Guiné or Union
des Populations de la Guinée Dite Portugaise
Unifó dos Povos da Guiné Unifó dos Povos das Ilhas de Cabo Verde or Union
des Peuples des Iles du Cap Vert
Uniao Populaire de Libération de la Guinée Portugaise Unifó Progressiva de
Mozambique Unifó das Populações do Norte de Angola Unifó Progressista de
Não em Angola Union des Ressortissants de la Guinée Portugaise or União dos
Cidadãos da Guiné Portuguesa Unifó dos Trabalhadores e Operários Negros de
Angola Ukwashi Wa Chokwe
Ixxiii

GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS
USED IN TEXT
adaptagtao--adaptation Administragtao Concelho--administrative council, a
governmental unit assimilado--assimilated, the selective
assimilation of the "qualified" African for Portuguese citizenship
bandhla--counsel, an African administrative post
caga ao negro--hunt for the black man caderneta indfgena--identification
book required for Africans capitagio--head tax chefe--chief, an African
administrative position
chibalo--see shibalo chbro--burial tax circunscrigtao--circumscription, an
administrative unit comprising
two to six districts or postos
concelho--a local unit of government contratado--contract laborer curadoria--tax
collectorship
dol--royal agreement; refers to that between the Portuguese and Congo
monarchies
escudo--Portuguese monetary unit worth
about three (U. S.) cents
Estatuto dos Indígenas--Portuguese "native" policy until 1962
6volue--the assimilated African gente de ligagto--African who cares for
women and aged
glebe--the roga farro, or free plantation imposto bragal--labor tax imposto
pessoal--personal tax indígena--native induna--headman liceu--secondary school
malhota--mallet; refers to a type of tax maquis--outlying district where Africans
live
moran a--see tabanca nlo-indígenas--non-native

neg6cios indígenas--native affairs palmatoria--palmer (switch) used by
the Portuguese to punish Africans palmeira--palm tree, refers to a type
of tax
prazeiro--settler who holds a land
concession
pjazo--land concession regedor--ruler
CHAPTER I
PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM: THE OFFICIAL POSITION ON AFRICA
The official Portuguese position overseas has evolved from the philosophy of imperial destiny and the colonial mystique that have guided policy-makers for many centuries. Accordingly, the Portuguese believe that their multiracial origin gives them a special capacity to live in many climates under many conditions and enables them to assimilate peoples of all races into a single Portuguese nation with provinces scattered about the world. Through enforcement of hierarchical authority, administrators and missionaries achieved cohesion among the various parts of the widely dispersed nation. In Africa and throughout the empire, according to the official view, the presence of the Portuguese nation is effective and proclaimed by the patriotism of the territorial peoples. In all parts of the Empire, the Portuguese have brought indigenous peoples into contact with their civilization, their Christian heritage and missionary activities, as well as with their economic achievements. The Portuguese must preserve this tradition and thus maintain continuity and solidarity with the past, present, and future. Unity is strengthened by the authority patterns that have always dominated Portuguese life. Additionally, confidence must continue in the unbreakable alliance of all Portuguese in the Lusitanian community.

The Portuguese position on Africa is delineated by the following excerpts from statements by government officials and from legislation. These documents emphasize legal and ideological points of view and are not intended to build a case for Portuguese policy in Africa. Additionally, the sparsity of documents in no way is meant to slight or undermine the Portuguese view, for the editor has focused the full collection upon African nationalism in the Portuguese territories. Documents on the official Portuguese position are included for background and contrast, and perhaps will assist the reader in comprehending the differences between the well-polarized positions of Portuguese and African. The documents portray Portuguese nationalism, but only in an "official" context; neither Church nor other non-government sources are quoted. Furthermore, the documents herein may not adequately reflect any existing sense of a Portuguese tradition in the territories nor do they fully reflect positive aspects of Portuguese rule in Africa. Although there are Africans who regard themselves as Portuguese, their views are rarely articulated and are not illustrated here. Also, the views of the descendents of Europeans, who may be expected to assume increasingly significant roles in the decisions and destiny of their territories, are not presented here.

The Civilized Man's Burden
by
Antonio de Oliveira Salazar
[Salazar, a former professor of economics at the University of Coimbra, assume the post of Finance Minister in 1928 after demanding and being granted broad
powers. In 1930 he took over the Colonial Ministry and in 1933 established the constitution under which he became Prime Minister, a position he held until 1968 when he was incapacitated by illness and replaced by Marcello Caetano. The following statement illustrates his emphasis upon past exploits, the Lusitanian community, multiracialism, and the unified Portuguese nation. The statement, slightly edited, is extracted from The Road for the Future, Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional de Informaçao, 1963, pp. 16-20.] The aspirations of the African peoples do not differ from those of the majority of communities spread throughout the world, which even today yearn for liberation from the cycle of underdevelopment in which they find themselves. Their objectives thus coincide with the problems of governance in their respective countries or territories. And, as is the case everywhere, when such problems are not solved, or when the pace of their solution fails to attain the rhythm desired by the people, governments immediately are faced with a political crisis because doubts are cast upon the effectiveness of the institutions and the competence of the bureaucracy. This phenomenon is all the more frequent the lower the technical level of the particular community, and this level, in turn, derives essentially from the degree of autonomous economic development that has been reached, since instruction and education are not to be extracted from the soil or plucked from trees, like fruit growing spontaneously. They are acquired by work. It seems, therefore, that there is no way out from the cycle of undevelopment other than through the toil of the peoples concerned, since programs of mass culture imposed by aliens and, offered as gifts to boot, will fail to overcome the material obstacles which such programs encounter and which prevent the attainment of spectacular results. If this notion is true—and I cannot see that anywhere on the globe or at any time in history it has been proved otherwise—it would seem that the criterion for African development ought not to ignore the need for entrusting the responsibilities of administration to those best qualified to assume them, and for ensuring the active support of a political sovereignty whose interest is to foster the progress of all.

This, however, has not been the general opinion. Rather, has it been held that the solution to the problems will be better and will be found if the responsibilities of government in all the African territories are transferred to the local inhabitants, the contention being that human societies completely fulfill themselves only when they become arbitrary mistresses of their own destinies. This theory has been given the name of self-determination, and the movement directed to its achievement has come to be regarded as a natural force described as "the Tide of History."

I do not propose to raise certain doubts, the first of which would be whether this doctrine, in practice, has sufficiently taken into account what to our mind should have been its chief justification—that is, the welfare of the interested parties. Nor will I seek answers to certain queries, such as who has been gaining most from the "wind of change," and whether the doctrine is at all times being applied; or whether, on the contrary, the international community has been apathetically
witnessing flagrant derogations of its principle. I shall confine myself to stating
our opinion.
Through a long tradition of association, we have come to know the virtues and the
capacities of some outstanding African tribes. Hence we do not doubt their
leaders' being fit for command, which in the Portuguese case they share and have
always shared during our common history. But we do not consider--and
experience is confirming our conviction--that these elites exist in sufficient
numbers in all fields and at all levels. It is so in the administration of government
as well as in private enterprise, without which the official administration would be
pointless. Now the aforementioned insufficiency prevents them from assuming
entirely on their own the complex management of public affairs under modern
conditions. This seems to be proved by the fact that, in certain lands, an
experiment is being carried out which appears to us to militate against the real
autonomy of the peoples concerned. Thus, while sovereign power is made over to
local inhabitants, basic economic enterprises and initiatives remain--and this
under the most favorable circumstances--in the hands of men who, because of
remaining nationals of the former colonial power, have now become aliens in the
country in which they serve. We are inclined to think that, when things are
stripped of their veils and reduced to their essentials, these new states run, the risk
of finding themselves in the throes of a subjection graver than that from which
they claim to have emancipated themselves. On the other hand. . ..we have been
witnessing, and I fear we shall be witnessing with growing frequency, a process
of retrogression in economic and social life and a return to certain practices which
are incompatible with the desired prosperity and progress....
The independence of African nations has, in general, been based on two erroneous
premises that will work to those nations' detriment: anti-white racism and the
alleged unity of the peoples of that continent. This latter supposition will tend to
subordinate the Negro to the Arab; black racism will tend to bring about the
rejection of all that the more progressive white men had brought in capital, labor,
and culture. It would be wiser to replace clear-cut segregation with the working
together which we have considered to be indispensable. For this reason we hold
that the economic, social, and political advancement of those territories will only
be possible on a multiracial

basis in which the responsibilities of leadership in all fields fall to the most
qualified, irrespective of their color.
I know we are accused of trying, by taking this stand, to ensure domination by the
white race in Africa, the basis for this accusation being the fact that our
multiracialism has not yet been implemented widely enough in the distribution of
responsibilities throughout the Portuguese provinces in Africa. It is true that we
are still far from attaining the point at which we might be fully satisfied with our
achievements. However, it cannot be denied that not only is the road we are
following the surest, but also the progress of the various Portuguese territories
tends to spread to the whole of their population and not merely to the many
groups already benefitted. It is impossible to deny this progress, since what has
been achieved can, in many instances, be favorably compared with that of other
African countries. And if our critics are so convinced that such is not the case, it is difficult to understand why they did not accept the suggestion that a trip for the purpose of studying overseas Portugal be undertaken by prominent foreign personalities, under the auspices of the United Nations. Unfortunately, harangues were preferred to a dispassionate study of the realities under debate—a project to which we gave our support. 

A word about Angola. We are being subjected there to attacks which, at first, were presented as an uprising of people anxious not to continue integrated in the Portuguese nation. However, the enthusiasm of the liberators of Africa did not allow them, except for a short time, to hide their intervention in the recruitment, financing and training of the foreign persons who infiltrate into Angola from neighboring states. Today, therefore, it is no longer possible to claim that what is happening in Angola is a revolt of a more or less nationalistic character. In point of fact, a war is being conducted by several states against Portugal in one of Portugal's overseas territories. Under the circumstances, two things must be considered certain. The first is that in such aggression, it is not only the Portuguese who are being attacked: one of the aggressors' aims is to weaken the positions—and not only the strategic positions—of the entire Western world. The second is that those who attack us, those who support the aggressors, and those who assist them by their indifference are acting against the real interest of the tribes in Angola simply by delaying their peaceful self-improvement and by attempting to sow there the seed of racial antagonism, which did not exist among us and which is today, as I specified above, the principal obstacle to progress and well-being in the African continent.

---

Unity and the Nation

by

António Júlio de Castro Fernandes

[A longtime supporter of Salazar, Castro Fernandes was chairman of the executive committee of the only authorized political organization in Portugal, the União Nacional. In mid-1965 he was engaged in overhauling the party machinery in an attempt to increase its "elite" membership to one hundred thousand. In the essay that follows, Castro Fernandes reflects on Portuguese nationalism and develops the thesis, so important to overseas policy, that the African territories are a part of the cultural unity, the identity of interests, and the aspirations that coalesce in the Lusitanian community. This selection is drawn from his essay, The Presence of Portugal in Africa, Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1961, pp. 23-45.]

The essential condition of our pursuing the efforts upon which we legitimately pride ourselves is peace—peace on the frontiers and in the hinterland, maintaining the integrity of the territory over which flies the Banner of the Quinas, and the indissoluble union of the people who dwell here and, within themselves, form a pluriarchal but fraternal community, linked by traditions and ideals, a constituent part of the Portuguese nation and inseparable from it.
Furthermore, we are sure that we can consider them as one in their patriotism, with no distinction between the Portuguese of various races and origins, who work side-by-side, confident in the virtue of their sacrifices and in the work, often rough and hard, in which they combine their efforts. We can count them as one. That is our great asset in this struggle in which we must persevere as must so many others who either inhabit the African world or have been drawn there by interest or sentiment.

In the past, we have always faced our problems squarely. The result has been that, through all the dangers and difficulties, we have found in this small outpost of Portugal, in this widely dispersed nation, the most astonishing cohesion, as if the distances between its parts did not exist....

It is senseless, therefore, to claim that the principle of nationalism is applicable to this or to that territory in which not even the embryo of a nationality ever existed. More than this: we see in each territory that what [sic.] is an inescapable fact is the plurality of the tribes. It is that which fosters the rivalries in the bosoms of the new countries still in process of formation. It is that which constitutes the skeleton of the political parties and which is hidden under the guise of democracy....

Our problems in Africa are not the same as those of other states who had or have responsibilities comparable with ours, but have refused to accept them when they seemed to be too burdensome or when misguided views led them to trace a factor of illegitimacy in the retention of their colonies.

The topic would be of a purely academic nature if the consequences did not touch us closely and if we could separate our provinces from the rest of the countries in Africa....

Only the judgment of history, after the passage of time has provided a true perspective, will be able to pronounce with impartiality upon the factors that are bringing about the systematic demission of the white man from Africa. But clear vision is necessary in order to act correctly and at the proper time. We cannot just relax with the comforting assurance that, in our case, things are different, that the essential factors of the problem are not the same.

The people in our overseas provinces, where there is no racial distinction with regard to the amount of civilization or of liberty they can enjoy, and wherein so much blood has flowed throughout the years, constitute firm and robust blocks, united for good or for ill, for good days and for difficult times.

We recognize the errors into which others stumble, for within our frontiers, in Portuguese territories, nationalism has only one meaning and does not need an adjective to define it. In no part of our overseas provinces is there any but Portuguese nationalism.

For, at the base of any nationalism there must exist the national factor, either apparent in the political structure, erected upon it, or repressed and powerless to express itself. There are living nations in full command of themselves, and nations enslaved under a foreign yoke. There are the free people of the West and the satellites of the great Communist powers.

We live on the margin of the ambiguities by which others are led astray. Like
them, we have no Negro nations, as such, within the limits in which Portuguese sovereignty is exercised—and it is in this negative aspect that the positions are alike. But, from a positive point of view, at any point in our Africa we know that there exists, profound and living, the national sentiment in which whites and blacks mingle with the same fervor and the same pride, the powerful sentiment of cultural unity, of identity of interests and aspirations that integrate the disparate elements in the Lusitanian community.

For this reason, the vocabulary we use is simpler and contributes towards the clarification of ideas. In our Africa, the presence of a nation, the Portuguese nation is effectual and is proclaimed by the indefectible patriotism of the people. Thus, we do not run the risk of being pushed off our course to the point of worrying about the idea that we dominate enslaved races and deny them the right to their own lives. We cannot fall into the error of those who perceive in every tribe influenced by fetishes a second Hungary to be saved, for our eyes are open and we are faced with other realities.

Our African experience is greater than that of other nations, longer and more comprehensive. We live more intimately with the natives and habituate ourselves to understanding them. Love is the path to understanding and, from the beginning, we have been obedient to the word of the Commandment and practiced it unreservedly in our dealings with the people we have brought into contact with Civilization....

We are in Africa. We refuse to subscribe to the policy of abandonment. We are obedient to a sentiment of responsibility which, even if we try to find a plausible excuse, forbids us to renounce that which cannot be renounced. Rights and advantages can be renounced; duties and obligations cannot be renounced. We are in Africa. It is our duty to remain—for ourselves, for the Western world to which we belong, for the natives who trust us and have been molded [sic.] in moral union with us. The dictates of conscience are with us, for we recognize our responsibility as the guard of historical heritage, brought into being by the sacrifices of many generations.

We have a feeling of continuity and solidarity among past, present, and future which prohibits us from admitting that one generation, merely in obedience to the figureheads now in vogue in the spheres of ideologies, can dissipate the patrimony that its ancestors amassed and generously bequeathed to its offspring. We have doubts as to the value of those "certainties" that are marked with a provisional stamp. We shall remain indefectibly faithful to the way of thinking of all those who served the interests of our country before us.

Access to the colonization of the great African spaces has been easier for others than for us, for they found empty areas awaiting occupation or were able to install themselves in the shelter of conventions that had meted out an unknown world. Our itinerary was longer and more difficult. We began by adventuring in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, braving the threats of fearsome legends, struggling with the tempests in fragile caravels, to round the promontories, to seek water supplies, to gain knowledge of the great continent.
Later, we founded our bases on the coast. But these achievements did not satisfy us as they might have done others. Before long we were adventuring through the unfriendly jungle, winning the land foot by foot and the people soul by soul. Apostles, soldiers, and merchants were the messengers of the Kings of Portugal and the ambassadors of the word of God.

For us, colonization was not merely for the purpose of building up commercial credits or prosperous factories: it was a service for God and Fatherland, a service to expand the dominion of Portugal and Christianity, represented by the great crosse, on the sails of our ships. It was the ecunenic meaning of Catholicism that revealed the mission to which we dedicated ourselves. In the primitive, superstitious heathens, benighted in their burden of customs and ingenuous cruelty, we found brothers to ransom and convert, soul to save, creatures of God that we had to educate and elevate to true human dignity.

We devoted ourselves to those to whom we had revealed a higher and more noble life, the value of peace and security, and the virtues of authority and order. We held them by what we did for their benefit, by the new perspectives we disclosed, and by the justice we taught them, for we were the instument of God to bring forth from the moral root of our Negro brothers the spark of the Spirit that transfigured it.

That informal side to our national character, a certain facility of manner that opens the door to intimacy that others could not open, our ungrudging liberality and, above all, our entire absence of racial prejudice—all these contributed to the colonists' associating themselves closely with the natives and becoming allied with them, even when there was no intermingling of the blood. This happened not only because the whites treated the blacks humanely but also because in the whites there was a deeply rooted notion of a family circle in which the broad concept of Romanism survived.

Thus, through successive generations, the Portuguese linked themselves to Afric, with indissoluble ties. They were Europeans who became also Africans, taking root in the land because they were in actual contact with it, acquiring the customs of a ranching life and, by the manifold forms of activity they exercised, making affirmation of the integral nature of their presence in every district. Certainly, in Africa we were soldiers and missionaries, merchants and farmers, but, before all and in the widest meaning of the word, we were men humanizing other men. A work of sentiment and not of calculation, what we have done in Africa and what was implanted in us there cannot have been motivated by cold rationalism. It would never be possible for us to reject the past, into which our very essence was projected, simply because we may have been led to this or that conclusion of a dialectic nature. By deciding against the wishes of the generations that preceded us, we should be deciding against something that is of far greater value than the fallible opinion formed under an influence that is merely transitory.

The dead, thirty generations of dead, certainly had greater rights than men who, on this or that day, have fortuitously hindered the administration of their heritage.
It is precisely for this reason that our constitution does not permit of the disposal of any part of Portuguese territory, either by cession or by any other means. In the course of the centuries, Portugal has acquired a definite form, which is not compatible with the alienation of territories, for this would be veritable mutilation. But that is not the only foundation for our intransigence, for it is not only ourselves for whom we feel responsible. We are representatives, in common with other nations, of the material and moral values of Western and Christian civilization, and we have no doubt that Africa cannot separate her destiny from that of Europe: firstly, because it received from Europe the message that renewed its moral world; secondly, because of the very evident solidarity of interests of the whites and the blacks; and, thirdly, because the necessities for the defense of Europe are not... [compatible with the African program of the Eastern powers].

Today, it may be that some states are finding it exceedingly difficult to maintain the Western position in Africa. However great the difficulties, the vital importance of the legitimate defense of this position is such that [the Western powers] must return, or others will take their place, in the same spirit and in obedience to the same necessity. On that day, the preservation of the African positions will be fundamental, for these positions will have a decisive influence in the reconstruction of the continent. On that day, those who today do not comprehend our resolution will admit that we were right.

Also, we feel it our duty to the native population in our territories to remain there. Our presence signifies civil peace, tranquility, and security, inestimable benefits upon which depend the lives and properties of each territory. We know the price that is being paid in- so many African countries for the illusion of liberty. We are in the presence of the struggles of parties, of tribes in conflict, of tumults and rebellions--all the sanguinary drama that is a spectacle of unbridled license and emancipation conferred on primitive instincts that are more animal than human.... By preserving the integrity of our territories, maintaining our vigilance, and safeguarding internal order, we can be certain of honoring the obligations that result from the real liberty and citizenship that the flag of Portugal guarantees to its people, without distinction of color or race.

The primary condition for the survival of our African order is the moral unity of the Portuguese. In this respect, we are much more fortunate than others, for whom discordant politics seem of greater importance than more essential matters. Apart from the Communists, who reject our Fatherland, there is no real divergence on fundamental questions. In obedience to the inner voice of patriotism, the imperative of national interest is respected by all.

There is no difference of views between the Portuguese of the metropolis and the overseas with reference to how they regard the future of the African provinces, and, for this reason, problems which are of so grave a character for others do not arise for us. For their defense, the civilized populations of our African territories
can count upon the entire solidarity of the metropolis, wherein the pro-Mozambique, pro Angola, and pro-Guinean feelings are those of the actual inhabitants of those countries.

The Portuguese rely upon each other, and it is this projection of their moral unity that is the primary factor of their confidence in themselves. But we must reinforce this unity, which is our great collective virtue, in readiness for the difficult hours which, God granting, may be no worse than times of care and preoccupation. Even if we are not directly hit by the repercussions of events in Africa—which, after all, is possible--during the critical period which is approaching, we shall require a comprehensive grasp of the situation, unwavering energy, absolute control of our nerves, and a voluntary acceptance of sacrifices and risks.

Those are the minimum requirements, at an hour when the question of Portugal’s survival or nonsurvival in its present world-wide extension is placed before us. Considering what is at stake, no one can consider such demands excessive. We must strengthen our unity, trust our heads of state who have the supreme responsibilities, and have confidence in the unbreakable alliance of all Portuguese of good-will.

The Organic Law of the Overseas Provinces
[Following are two of the nine chapters that constitute the Organic Law that was promulgated under the aegis of Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira. They are extracted from Organic Law of the Overseas Territories, Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1963, pp. 5-7.]

The Portuguese Overseas Provinces

Article I
I--Overseas Portugal comprises the parts of the territory of the nation mentioned under Article I of the Constitution and consists of eight provinces, corresponding to their geographical situation and historical tradition.

II--The area and the boundaries of each of the overseas provinces are stated in law and in the international treaties or conventions concerning them.

General Principles of Overseas Administration

Article II
I--The overseas provinces, as an integral part of the Portuguese State, form a community of interest among themselves and with the metropolis.

II--The solidarity between the overseas provinces and the metropolis involves particularly the obligation to contribute adequately to ensure the integrity and the defense of the whole nation and the objectives of national policy as defined in the common interest by the organs of sovereignty.

Article III
As a rule, the overseas provinces will be governed by special legislation.

Article IV
Administrative decentralization and financial autonomy are guaranteed to the overseas provinces as far as is compatible with the Constitution, their stage of development, and their own resources.

Article V
I--The overseas provinces have a political and administrative organization suited to their geographical situation and the conditions of their social structure as defined in a special statute enacted for each of them. Apart from all other necessary provisions, this statute will lay down the constitution, function, and powers of the several organs of government, their administrative division, and the nature, extent, and development of their public services.

II--When circumstances make it advisable, an administrative regime similar to that of the neighboring islands may be instituted in the respective statute.

III--To the extent made advisable by the particular characteristics of the State of India, its statute may contain provisions departing from the provisions of this Law as concerns the functions and the powers of the organs of government and other rules of administration.

Article VI
Political unity shall be maintained in each of the overseas provinces through the existence of a single capital and of the government of the province.

* * * *
A Policy of Integration
by
Adriano Moreira
[Adriano Moreira first achieved notoriety during his student days after he had been arrested and imprisoned briefly for "subversive" activities; he brought a lawsuit against the then Minister of War, Fernando Santos Costa, and charged the Minister with denying him proper medical care during his imprisonment. After his release, Moreira was allowed to enter the Overseas Ministry where, in 1961, he assumed the post of Minister for the Overseas Provinces. During 1961 and 1962, Moreira initiated broad reforms for the territories to decentralize colonial administration and to counter the international protest against Portuguese policies. Until his abrupt dismissal in December 1962, Moreira had been considered the likely successor to Prime Minister Salazar. His dismissal may have been prompted by pressure from Santos Costa, considered the eminence gris behind Salazar. Presently Moreira is Director of the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina in Lisbon. The following statement is extracted from an address to the Oporto Commercial Association on August 28, 1961. It was published as A Policy of Integration, Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1961, pp. 8-32.]

We believe, therefore, that Africa gained when we implanted there the ideas of State and of Nation, which were alien to its peoples. We think it was of incalculable benefit to it that some of its territories were integrated within one political unit together with European peoples who could supply Africa with what its peoples lacked at could not have obtained by themselves for a long time. It is our opinion, in short, that the Portuguese formula is the most beneficial formula for Africa south of the Sahara.

Indeed, the evolution taking place in societies such as those of black Africa cannot proceed without a permanent flow of specialized workers at every level and in all
se, tors, as irreplaceable instruments of economic development, or to carry out all the
different tasks of civilized life, or to lead and to professionally train ever wider
sections of the aboriginal populations, and so forth. This has been equally
recognized by those who take the line, for well-known economic reasons, that
independent countries must be created and the colonizer expelled; but all--white
and black--had to fall back on the only solution left to them, that of obtaining
technicians on a mercenary basis either through international organizations or
under bilateral agreements. We, however, continue to believe that a man serves
best when he serves his country, and for that reason we have no doubt as to the
advantage of our manner of looking at the needs of African territories. In these
needs we saw a sound reason for promoting the permanent settlement of European
Portuguese in lands overseas, where they do not go to sell their services but, on
the contrary, to lead a normal life, serving, together with the aborigines, one and
the same country and, therefore, common interests. Anyone who wishes to be fair
and impartial cannot have any doubt as to which of the two processes serves the
interests of mankind better, just as we have chosen and continue to follow the
path that shows less profit and involves more sacrifices and obligations. The
African peoples who took the other path are now learning by painful experience,
of which they are unfortunately not the only victims, that they are heading toward
a servitude imposed either by neocolonialism or by a return to primitive
conditions.
Accordingly, we believe it necessary to increase the settlement of our Africa by
European Portuguese who will make their home there and encounter in Africa a
true continuation of their country. As a matter of fact, this is not a new policy in
our provinces; it is only a recognition that there is ever greater reason for pursuing
the policy that has always been ours. Because the task is enormous and urgent,
however, and cannot be left to individual initiative, the need was felt to coordinate
the efforts of all provincial bodies to enable them, with the help of the emigration
services in continental Portugal, to realistically tackle this problem to which we
attach high priority .... On the other hand, as we clearly proclaim the high priority
of the problem of settlement by people from continental Portugal, we wish to
underline before the community of nations Portugal's decision to continue its
policy of multiracial integration, without which there will be neither peace nor
civilization in black Africa: a multiracial integration rejecting any idea of
mercenary motives, but, on the contrary, inspired--as always in the past--by the
belief in the equal dignity of all men, regardless of their color; a policy whose
benefits are patent in Brazil, the greatest land of the future, and of which our
provinces in the Atlantic and the East are already an unparalleled example. The
important modifications in our legal system, with which I shall now deal, cannot
be properly understood if one does not bear in mind this constant goal of
Portuguese overseas policy.
The ideal of multiracial societies, with equality for every race, always implied
respect, in the best Portuguese tradition, for the ways of life of the racial groups
integrated in the Portuguese people. From the charter of Afonso Mexica, in 1526,
to the political constitution now in force, legal sanction has always been given to this rule, which derives logically from a respect for the dignity of all men and which preceded by centuries the principles of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, of which the international organizations of our time are so proud. The legal provi-

sions intended to ensure this respect for the forms of family relationships, property, and inheritance peculiar to the various peoples to whom we extended our sovereignty, came to constitute a harmonious whole which received formal expression in the Estatuto dos Indígenas (Native Statute). This, however, had nothing to do with the Portuguese citizenship, which all acquired according to the same rules and which was always one of the reasons for their peaceful integration in a single nation and state.

Notwithstanding the circumstances of the moment, we believe there is no valid reason to interrupt the orderly fulfillment of our programs of internal affairs, and, therefore, we have decided to provide a definite solution to the problem of the Native Statute and to draw the conclusions from the studies to which I have referred. Inasmuch as the main reason for the Statute is to be found in the respect for the way of life of the various races, we concluded that it was now timely to repeal it, so it would be clearly understood that the Portuguese people are subject to a political law that is the same for everyone, without distinction of race, religion, or culture....

It was not a mere coincidence that led to the re-establishment, before the measure now to be enacted, of the normal functioning of municipal institutions, by the decree of June 12, 1961, putting into effect the principle of elections for the constitution of administrative bodies... the achievements of the municipal principle and the value of the inhabitants' intervention in running community affairs. The sense of civic responsibility, without which no institution can function, is a virtue deeply rooted in Portuguese overseas territories. ...

But, just as in the sphere of private law, our respect for traditional ways of life implies preserving the validity of usages and customs, so in the sphere of local administration we find it neither just nor timely to impose the municipal formula in all circumstances. At least, those who recently discovered the importance of community development and made it the program par excellence of subordinate agencies of the United Nations will be able to understand, perhaps with some disappointment, that once more they have come up with Portuguese solutions, and they will be forced to praise the realism that made us accept those regional institutions which, although not conforming to the municipal type, nonetheless likewise ensure the intervention of the inhabitants in administering local affairs. It is in that spirit that we have now reorganized the rural Regedorias, whose administrators will be elected in the traditional manner by the inhabitants....

Calling on the inhabitants to participate in running local affairs is consistent with the administrative decentralization and deconcentration on which we have prudently embarked, always taking account of the limitations imposed by the shortage of personnel throughout the tropics. We are constantly being urged by local bodies to channel our doctors, engineers, architects, agronomists,
economists, and jurists to Africa, where a great and wonderful task awaits them. That is why we have sought to install in each province organizations to deal with regional interests. We transferred [to Angola] the headquarters of the Maize Growers Association of Angola and we recently decreed the extinction of the agencies for cereals, for coffee, and for cotton, which operated from Lisbon, replacing them with institutes in each of the provinces concerned. Thereby, we seek to strengthen the administrative machinery responsible for initiating and directing regional development plans, including plans for the increased settlement which must accompany the growing importance of these products in the economy, in our economic structure which is intended to bring about the creation of a genuine common market for all Portugal.

Our only surprise is that this should seem a novelty to so many of our critics, who ignore the principle of provincial autonomy so solemnly recognized by the political Constitution of the Republic. Each one of the provinces has its own public law, with the administrative and financial autonomy prescribed by its respective Statute. It has legislative organs of its own, whose competence extends to all matters of exclusively provincial interest. That is why, in the provinces which have a Governor General, there is a Legislative Council.

This policy has led many people abroad, as a rule poorly informed and inclined to facilitate their work by the adoption of the simplest possible ideas, to ask how we propose to solve the land problem, having in mind the numerous disputes provoked in various parts of the world by the permanent settlement of individuals of different racial stock. Some of those thus concerned doubtless have in mind the experience of their own countries, where the problem was solved by the expeditious process of liquidating the aboriginal population. Influenced by their concern, such people sometimes wonder that we have not included in our program a spectacular land reform.

The truth is that we have no need whatsoever of a land reform. Due to the foresight of our administration, which did not allow appropriation of land for speculative purposes, there is a surplus of land, and our main problem is, rather, to utilize it according to rational planning. Such plans, intended on the one hand to stabilize nomadic agriculture and on the other to organize crops according to productivity [sic.], were, in addition, always inspired by a constant concern not to displace populations from their traditional region and to guarantee to each nucleus a zone of expansion sufficiently large to avoid the risk of any land disputes. Accordingly, we are about to enact the regulations governing the occupation and concession of land in the overseas provinces, on which the central services have been working since 1955, assisted in a decisive way by the provincial services. This law goes even further than we have ever done before to defend and guarantee the interests and rights of the populations to land which they occupy or farm: concessions may not be given to individuals who are not neighbors of a given Regedoria in an adjoining area five times the size of the said Regedoria; furthermore, any practice that may cause the displacement of populations will be severely punished; on the other hand, the common lands of a Regedoria may be converted into individual property of the neighbors of that Regedoria only when...
there has been a request to this effect from the Regedor concerned with the supporting vote of his councilors.

This does not mean that the neighbors of a Regedoria are forbidden to acquire real estate on an individual basis. On the contrary, and like every other Portuguese, the3 may acquire individual concessions in vacant lands under any title, even that of mere occupation. This particular title of acquisition, it may be noted, is not open to individuals who are not aboriginal. Present legislation already stipulates that where lands are individually occupied by someone who is a neighbor, he shall receive a title guaranteeing his possession and enjoyment of the land. Another step will now be take: in response to the concern for providing an effective guarantee for these rights. The latter will henceforth be registered in the appropriate registries, something which was not done heretofore.

No one can refuse to recognize that we continue to be guided by a lofty and responsible sense of mission in setting up so many protective regulations for the rights of the Regedorias and their neighbors, in a system stressing the rule of free option for written private law. It would be easier, and certainly more to the taste of those who think in oversimplified, geometrical terms and who are tireless defenders of general ideas, to submit everyone who wanted to benefit from legal protection for his real estate to the necessity of making a formal choice for written private law. Our aim and our duty, however, are to see to it that social justice prevails in all layers of the population, and we think we must always take into account the real circumstances of each individual and each group that make up the Portuguese people. It would be contrary to our traditions and our principles to adopt any regime that, directly or indirectly, did violence to the populations in this sphere of their private way of life.

This concern for social justice, so extensively proved by our actions, was recently responsible for a series of measures which should be looked at in the light of some of the laws about to be published. Some of the measures have to do with the problem I have already mentioned: the rational occupation of land and its utilization as a function of productivity. In connection with these aims, there arose everywhere a practice that subsequently came to be known as the question of compulsory crops and that involves, in particular, cotton and rice. For centuries we have been sufficiently more just and disinterested than the majority of peoples who had overseas responsibilities, to be able to recognize our mistakes, which were certainly far less serious than the crimes that have been, and are still being, committed against millions of men in the world and yet leave international bodies completely indifferent. But we can also be credited with the merit of actively and spontaneously seeking to remedy what we think is wrong, an attitude we would like to see in other peoples. Accordingly, by a decree of May 2, 1961, we abolished the compulsory growing of cotton, and we can announce that the legislative council of the province of Mogambique is now engaged in reorganizing the rice-growing areas with a view to bringing them under the general law. As regards labor, we know that our code, enacted many years ago, embodies a doctrine that has not been surpassed by the most modern international conventions drawn up under the authority of the International Labor Office. The
experts, despite their praiseworthy efforts and achievements, have not succeeded in formulating
general rules or technical principles that were not already to be found in the
Portuguese legal texts, for the simple reason that the latter always took their
inspiration from a respect for the dignity of the human personality. That is why
we have not had any difficulty in ratifying international conventions and are often
ahead of all our accusers. Thus, in June, 1955, the International Labor Conference
approved the agreement for the abolition of penal sanctions for breach-of-work
contracts, which we ratified in December, 1959. By a decree of June 30, 1960, it
was easy for us to amend our own legislation so as to revoke all penal sanctions
for breach-of-work contracts, and all Portuguese workers, without any distinction
whatever, became subjected exclusively to the sanctions of civil law. On June 17, 1960, we set uniform standards for the establishment of minimum
wages throughout Portuguese territory, and we made it a rule that there was to be
absolute contractual freedom to set wages above the legally guaranteed minimum.
On June 28, 1960, we made applicable to all overseas provinces the regulations
for safety and health in industry approved by the International Labor Office. We
ratified the international agreements concerning weekly days of rest, minimum
age at which minors are allowed to work in certain activities, discrimination in
employment or professions, and abolition of forced labor. ... Within a few
days we shall therefore be publishing a series of measures. The most
important of these measures is the repeal of the Native Statute, a law which was
of considerable usefulness and was the instrument of a policy inspired by the
highest sense of missionary responsibility. Not only the studies that have been
published on the indigenato now about to be abolished, but also, and above all,
the thousands of reports and memoranda that have accumulated in the files over
the years will remain to bear witness to the spirit of devotion and love for one's
neighbor which was interpreted by officials in the execution of the endless task of
struggling to leave men a little less unhappy than one finds them. Above all, the
civilizing effort, unparalleled elsewhere, and of which it may be said that in
Africa was carried out practically in the present century, bears witness, better than
words can do, to the right intention of the system and the genuineness of its
execution. All of this was possible only because the Portuguese overseas, in the
exercise of public or private activities, always clearly felt that they were the
instruments of a great national and civilizing mission. Without this philosophy,
the vast territories and the millions of individuals to whom we gave the benefits of
our nationality might not have been brought into contact with the main current of
history, and we know that if this action did not continue they would again be lost
to it. Therefore, as we decree the uniformity of political status for all Portuguese,
we do not think that our responsibilities have diminished. On the contrary, we do
so on the understanding that we have reached a stage in the evolution of our
country at which the historical task assigned to us can be facilitated by this
unification. We must, however, match the process of evolution of the overseas
territories, accelerated in large measure by the quantitatively and qualitatively
improved resources we have been able to bring to bear in the last decades, with
the intensive settlement of people from continental Portugal. For on this settlement depends the formation of the integrated multiracial communities without which Africa will have neither progress nor order nor civilization nor rights of man.

The Fundamental Principles of Overseas Portugal
[The four principles appear as Articles 133 to 136 of the Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Lisbon: Secretariado Nacional de InformagRo, 1957, p. 36. These principles were published in the 1930 Colonial Act and later were incorporated into the Constitution. They were drawn up by Salazar at a time when he held the post of Minister of the Colonies.]

It is intrinsic in the Portuguese Nation to fulfill its historic mission of colonizator in the lands of the Discoveries under their sovereignty and to diffuse among the populations inhabiting them the benefits of their civilization, as well as to exercise the moral influence enjoined on it by the Patronage of the East.

The Overseas Territories of Portugal shall be known as "provinces." Their politico-administrative organization shall be on lines best suited to their geographical situation and their social standards.

The Overseas Provinces, as an integral part of the Portuguese State, are united among themselves and with Metropolitan Portugal.

This unity between the Overseas Provinces and Metropolitan Portugal involves, in particular, the obligation to contribute in an adequate manner to the preservation of the integrity and the defense of the whole nation, and to the aims of national policy as defined, in the common interest, by the bodies in which sovereignty resides.

* * * *

Integration and Lusotropicology
by
Gilberto Freyre
[Freyre, the well-known Brazilian sociologist, has developed the concept of Lusotropicology, which provides "scientific" and theoretical justification of past and present Portuguese policy in its overseas possessions. The Freyre thesis is the basis for much discussion among Brazilians, Portuguese, and African nationalists. The selection below is taken from Freyre's Portuguese Integration in the Tropics, Lisbon: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1961, pp. 41-95.]

From the 15th century onward, a new type of civilization commenced, for which a characterization as Lusotropical is suggested in view of its singularly symbiotic character of union of European with Tropical--a union that in no other European [sic.] was ever so intense and symbiotic in its constancies in different tropical areas, although such symbiotic character was approached by Spaniards in the Phillipines and in certain regions of tropical America. Side by side with this new civilization, the European was acquiring and developing a new type of knowledge of the tropics, for which the characterization of Lusotropicology is suggested. This term would be used within a more vast system of the European's knowledge of the tropics, a Tropicology, and within another intermediate system,
Hispanotropicology or a Hispanology. I speak of the European, not because I am inclined toward any ethnocentric criterion of knowledge that might grant to the European people an ethnic superiority or supremacy over others, but because the highest and most complex human knowledge—at least in its scientific aspect—is that which for centuries has been expressed in European language....

This surpassing of the ethnic condition by the cultural characterizes the Lusotropical civilization; and if one day the Lusotropicology here suggested is developed into a science, one of its main objects of study will be this process of the surpassing of the ethnic condition by the cultural, by virtue of which the blackest of blacks of tropical Africa is considered Portuguese without having to renounce any of his dearest habits of an ecologically tropical man. It is not, however, certain that in the Lusotropicology aimed at, the half-breed will be considered a saint of saints, in this process of the cultural surpassing the ethnic—a process that arrives at the half-breed—and that miscegenation should be considered inseparable, from the beginning, from any and all Portuguese effort in the tropics .... Now, what we call Lusotropical civilization, when considered biologically, is no more than this: a common culture and social order to which men and groups of diverse ethnic and cultural origins contribute by interpenetration and by accommodation to a certain number of behavioral uniformities of the European and his descendant and successor in the tropics—uniformities established by the Lusitanian experience and experimentation. It can, therefore, be seen that it is a concept, a sociological concept, of Lusotropical civilization, of Lusotropic culture and social order that exceeds the mere political or rhetorical or sentimental concept of "Luso Brasilian" or "Lusiad community" which, even from the sociological point of view, does not attain consistency or relevance.

In fact, the tropical regions are becoming places adapted to European styles of civilization formerly held as incompatible with the tropics, thanks to various techniques that surmount inconveniences of climate and temperature, such as electrical refrigeration, air-conditioning, inoculation against endemic diseases. Thus may a culture of mainly European basis flourish in tropical areas. Only it will run the risk—let it be added for the benefit of those who rejoice at such European triumphs of technique over the tropics—of becoming to such an extent prophylactic in its cares that, instead of living dangerously but creatively, it will exist inexpressively and artificially under constant clinical cares. So what appears desirable is the use or utilization of those techniques, without making the European presence in tropical areas merely a victory of sanitary engineering completed by political art. It needs to be, in order to attain complete validity, a less precarious triumph: that of a social engineering completed not merely by the art of political transaction—in which the English have revealed themselves masters—but also by the art of cultural transaction, which has been a mainly Lusitanian art. In this manner it can be understood that the relations of man or of a foreign culture with an environment of which he, the man, does not wish to remain a guest, nor she, the foreign culture, a superimposition made possible only by technical artifices, is the relationship that represents what some
Anthropologists call "selective" reaction based on experience; and that experience, an expression of a new reality in which foreign values are brought into harmony with the native environment and cultures, becomes or has become vitalized. It is through that experience that there have been formed, in different tropical areas, diverse expressions of a single new reality--new since the 16th century--that can be characterized as Lusotropical, diverse expressions of a single symbiotic culture that can be called Lusotropical culture. ... Nobody is more fit to induce these transformations from the viewpoint of social science than the Portuguese of Europe, of the East, and of Africa, and their Brazilian successors. Even though their systematic science is precarious, they have been beneficially transforming the tropics without the pretense of changing them into a European or sub-European culture. And this is possible because, before trying to transform the tropics, they themselves have been changing into Lusotropicals in body and soul so to speak, that is, in culture in its widest anthropological and sociological meaning.

The integration of Brazil in the Lusotropical mould would represent an aggregate of peoples made similar and unified by their condition as peoples affected in a similar, if not identical, manner by hot environments or climates. Their similarity and solidarity result in advantages for their common defense against threats or attempts against their survival or their development. Provisionally, while the present system of international power relations lasts, their common tropical experiences would seem to give them the right to constitute a maximum Lusotropical power, and, persistently, a type of homogeneous civilization--with the admission, of course, of regional differences within its supranational unity--characterized by a mass of symbiotic relations of the European man, or the descendant or continuator of the man with European culture, with wholly tropical environments: nature, people, culture, or civilization. This political aspect would also be the object of a systematic study or a special science of tropical ecology, like the one here suggested under the name of Lusotropicology. Ideally, a possible Lusotropicology, which should be formed within the still-to-be-organized Tropicology, would have as an intermediate and necessary science Hispanotropicology, or simply Hispanology. With regard to methodology, time as a factor would be predominant over space. The Lusotropicological system would be similar to that suggested by Ortega y Gasset with regard to what he called Historiology. That is, we would have to start a priori from an analysis of the type of reality we wish to attempt to investigate. We must consider a space-time aggregate, space being conditioned by the tropical situation or ecology, and time by the action in the tropics of the Lusitanian man of European or, specifically, Iberian civilization. The Hispanic civilization, influenced by semitic cultures transmitted beliefs concerning the meaning and duration of existence to the tropical populations and cultures. These beliefs were quite different from those that sprang from capitalist Protestant ethics and dominated the non-European behavior of the Northern Europeans. The second element in the organization of the new science, the science conceived of as Lusotropicology, would be hypotheses connecting a priori analysis with
observable facts; the third, inductions directed by those same hypotheses; the
fourth, a vast periphery of rigorously empirical nature: description of pure facts
or, rather, of reality within the Lusotropic configuration.
Through the combination of these four elements, a Lusotropicological science
would be organized, within the Tropicological one, with Hispanology as a
necessary intermediary. The organizers would project, from a regional mass of
realities, hypotheses that the observable facts would confirm, giving them, besides
substance, form: or form-substance. In other words, the concept formed by
considering the ideal configuration of a symbiosis—the Lusotropic symbiosis—
would either be confirmed or not confirmed by its comparison with the
phenomena studied: the form of the objects, investigated and described as much as
possible in their substantial purity. Like other empirical sciences, this one, also,
would be a construction.

The two books—Aventura e potina and Um brasileiro em terras portuguesas—in
which are summarized what observations of Portuguese behavior in tropical areas
similar to Brazil that we were able to make on a quick voyage to the East and to
Africa, have originated diverse reactions in readers of the Portuguese language.
To some it seemed that in a few of those new pages, as well as in several of the
old ones, we are unjust toward the Lusitanian people; but to others, our attitude is
seen as a sentimental or romantic apologia rather than as an objective criticism of
that behavior. These very extremes seem to indicate that the truth must be
somewhere between and that we do not err in those books—whose defects we are
the first to acknowledge—either by scandalous injustices against Portugal and the
Portuguese, from whom we do not separate the Brazilians, or by an attitude of
systematic apology for all that is Lusitanian or Brazilian. However, we do not
claim, for either of those two books, virtues of perfect objectivity that would
assure us of the right to be considered absolutely impartial. We are perhaps
partial—in favor of the Portuguese and not against them, as the hypercritics of
Lusitanian behavior tend to be, some scrupulous objectivity or that which is
conventionally called scientific neutrality. In sciences dealing with man, such
neutrality is almost impossible when matters are viewed in their practical aspects,
and the scientist is forced to pass from the so-called pure to applied science, or
from social science to the social philosophy into which science is prolonged.
Fernando Pessoa said that there was "a great future" still reserved for Portugal. If
by Portugal is meant all the Lusotropic complex that has its principal, but not
exclusive, roots in the Portuguese lands of Europe, the poetical foresight presents
some sociological consistency. A new affirmation of Portuguese energies
amplified to mean Lusotropic energies is to be expected within the next decades
and it is, in truth, already sketched: Portuguese energies and Brazilian energies.

"Integration" in the Lusitanian World

[Rarely is there debate in the National Assembly. Occasionally, however, there is
opportunity for dialogue. The statements below are excerpts from such a dialogue
between Lopes Roseira, deputy from Angola, and Alexandre Lobato, a historian
of some distinction and a deputy from Mogambique. Lopes Roseira's pro-
Portuguese position on "integration" follows the traditional guidelines of New
State legislative theory concerning the overseas territories. Lobato's view coincides more with the reform ideas of Adriano Moreira and reflects perhaps a more sophistical conception of "integration" in the Lusitanian world. Lobato also calls for decentralization of authority and the right of Mogambique and other overseas territories to participate in "national" decision-making. These statements are translated from the official Digrio das Sess~es, 58 (December 12, 1962), 1471-1502; 66 (January 9, 1963), 1735-1744; and 67 (January 10, 1963), 1763-1776.

Speech in the National Assembly by Francisco Jos6 Lopes Roseira

... In essence, integration consists of developing action in all areas of human life aimed at total interpenetration of the races that compose the Portuguese nation, so that there may never again be any prejudice or differentiation based on skin color or place of origin. Politically, integration is served by very free decentralization, in which each person, according to his merit, has the right to participate in the administration, to defend local interests, and to have free access to any economic, social, technical, administrative, or political position. Integration does not provide for special administrative bodies for each territory; . . .it does not allow differentiated public bureaucracies for the metropolis and for each overseas province; it does not recognize rights and prerogatives that are not common to all servants of the nation. . . ; it does not mean that natives of the overseas provinces should no longer participate in metropolitan public life; . . . it does not provide for monetary diversity or economic differentiation between the metropolis and each overseas province; it does not allow organs other than those specified by constitutional statute; and, finally, it does not recognize the unitary nation as having diverse governmental bodies in the overseas provinces. Most important, public administrative practices are similar in all provinces and districts, whether they be of the metropolis or of the territories, so that once and for all Portugal ceases to be called colonialist and can become a real unitary state. Integration satisfactorily limits all paradoxical situations, while it opens up the territories to all governmental bodies and servants of the nation, making their presence real and permanent in national life. Integration admits and defends unity in diversity; it condemns segregation and differentiation; it respects religious beliefs; it protects freedom of work and exalts the dignity of the human being. Only thus will a sense of identity among the metropolitan and overseas provinces be achieved. Only thus will we attain a peace that will honor the nation and reintegrate the natives of the territories as esteemed and active members of the Portuguese community.

In a commentary on Angola transmitted by the National Radio, it was tersely affirmed that the political solution of integration had already been reached .... Distressing things were then said and published: It was stated that the only solution for the defense of territorial integrity was to maintain the status quo, whatever the cost might be, because there was money for that purpose; that only complete autonomy
metropolis. No other position can be defended; moreover, no other position can exist in the true national scene.

Finally, a fact that seems important, healthy, and enlightening to me: We have the impression in Mogambique that there is a great, responsible faction in the metropolis which is filled with apprehension by the direction that African matters are taking. You cannot imagine how this offends and hinders us. Yet we understand it, for we, too, are a part of the same live sentiment that fills the national ideal and thought and we, too, recognizing in our own selves the strong and long-suffering temperament of the Portuguese character, are uneasy and many times wonder how long the metropolis can continue its gigantic sacrifice, both for itself and for us.

It has already been written that Mogambique can only be Mogambique if it is Portugal, and no one is more aware than the people of Mogambique of that profound and elementary truth. It would be a lie, however, to suggest that all the peoples of Mogambique, as heterogeneous and culturally diverse as they are, are totally and equally aware enough to understand well their political, social, and cultural interests as Portuguese.

In this respect, our coalition still has an immense task to perform, and all our problems revolve around it. The conscientious and responsible opinion of the province feels, sees, knows that man is beginning to increase in value, as is proper, and life is starting to acquire stable, graded standards common to all. All that we ask and seek to demonstrate is that the present forms of government no longer have measures, extents, and procedures corresponding to the present necessities.

Our problem is not a political problem, although it may have political aspects. It is the problem of our way of living in the face of continued development and progress. We think that administrative decentralization would satisfy and guarantee the national interest in our sector and would reinforce national unity, because important responsibilities with respect to the interests of the local populations would become direct prerogatives of the provincial administration. No knowledgeable person from Mogambique thinks in terms of political autonomy separating the province from the metropolis. The current of opinion that defends Mogambique's full participation in national life through a voice in the consideration of problems, by continuous representation of the province and by its presence in the metropolis, in the proper manner and procedure, believes that the metropolis, because it is the metropolis, belongs by definition to the overseas territories. The metropolis is ours, and from that fact come our rights and our duties. May this serve as a basis for correcting an error that is taking root and seems alarming to me, an error that is eloquently expressed in the violent centralizing forms now praised by the attractive label of integration. "The nation is profoundly unitary"; we are certain of being in the vanguard of those who act in that spirit, for we live at the crossroads where insurmountable
obstacles can arise--obstacles that our realistic way of life tries to avoid. It is in our way of life that we base our certainty that national unity can be safeguarded and strengthened only by traditional and constitutional principles, whose application must continually be perfected to achieve the psychological integration, with the peoples and territories really equal, so that there may be an identity of national principles and thus, national unity.

CHAPTER II
THE AFRICAN POLICY VIEWS OF THE PORTUGUESE OPPOSITION
The Portuguese opposition has remained generally weak and disorganized because political parties and movements are not tolerated by the dictatorship. Within Portugal as of 1965, many opposition groups and intellectuals were coalesced in the Directório Democrata Social, comprised of military figures, independent Catholics, dissident monarchists, liberals, and old-guard republicans. The group was allowed to campaign during elections and to issue occasional manifestoes, its objective being to effect political changes through peaceful means, moderate demands, and negotiations with the government. Outside the Directório were monarchist groups that generally support the regime, socialists associated with the journal Seara Nova, and the small, but well-organized, Communist party.

In 1962, Portuguese exiles formed in Algiers the Frente Patridtica de Libertagao Nacional (FPLN) and a year later chose General Humberto Delgado as its president. The FPLN, which attempted to coordinate its activities with the internal opposition, was a loose coalition of individual liberals, socialists, Catholics, monarchists, and the Communist party, although, in mid-1964, the latter split over the Sino-Soviet dispute and a small pro-Peking faction defected to form the Frente de Acço Popular, which supported a policy of military struggle with the regime. The FPLN is a popular front dominated by Communists, but also representing the Movimento de Acço Revoluciondria, a non-Communist left movement established in mid-1962 as an outgrowth of student unrest within Portugal, and the Movimento de Resist–ncia Republicana, which is led by oppositionists of the Directório within Portugal. Three important independents, Manuel Sertório, Piteiro Santos, and José Maria Evedosa, serve on the FPLN's executive committee.

The opposition within Portugal and in exile has expressed its views on the possessions in Africa. The following statements are extracted from their writings.

Self-determination for the Overseas Territories
by Francisco Pinto da Cunha Leal
[Cunha Leal, a former finance minister under the Republic, has been a consistent critic of Salazar's African policy. In 1930, he stated that the designation of a "Portuguese colonial empire" was unsuitable and pretentious. In the 1960's, he continued his attack, arguing for a policy of self-determination for the overseas territories, which at the same time would be linked to the metropolis in a
federation of states. The following statement is from his A gadanha da morte, Lisbon, 1961, pp. 137-47.

... There are, consequently, two varieties of self-determination: tacit and expressed .... Among us exist two currents... 1) that of the "situationists" . . . [who] accept tacit self-determination, paying lip service. . . to this condition, sine qua non, of integration. . .2) that of the great majority, including most oppositionists, [who] accept the idea of expressed self-determination.

It is necessary, however, not to extract from this last current of opinion conclusions that may not be contained in it. In fact, expressed self-determination is of two varieties: negotiation and plebiscite. The first was that adopted by Great Britain, whether by Labor or by Conservative governments. It consists of facilitating and even inciting the formation of political parties in... each of its colonies .... The second variety of expressed self-determination— the plebiscite— was that which General De Gaulle's France preferred... each of its colonies being able to manifest its preference for one of three solutions:

1) the maintenance of the status quo in matters concerning political-economic relations with the guardian nation;
2) independence without political ties with the guardian nation;
3) or, lastly, an independence mitigated by the maintenance of confederate ties with the metropolis. . . the confederation, which I commend highly as the ideal solution,. . . would not be absolutely identical to the primitive Afro-French confederation... the states, resulting from the evolution of our overseas territories, must be biracial, with the predominance at first of the white race in the conducting of public business. After an extended time of peaceful and friendly living together, there would be some alteration of the positions of the two communities. Thus I would prefer the adoption of negotiated self-determination, in the British manner.

In our colonies--here I am unconstitutionally calling them colonies--if we do not allow the situation to deteriorate ... self-determination will have to be negotiated simultaneously with whites and blacks. Under normal conditions this phase would be delayed for dozens of years. But now ... our only salvation will consist of the urgent adoption of able colonial policies that will correct the errors, which, after three dozen unfortunate years of affability between the colonizing and the colonized races... ended in an explosion and a catastrophe unparalleled in our overseas history.

Metropolitan Portugal will have to put aside bureaucracy.... Above all, it is essential to shock both the natives and the colonizers into the conviction that an era of social justice must finally be born....

[Cunha Leal offers the following policy suggestions for consideration. I

1) In April 6, 1961, the white colonists of Mogambique directed a message to the president of the Republic: ". . .the undersigned want it understood that they feel themselves to be brothers of the Negroes .... Also they appeal for immediate banishment of the distinction between natives and non-natives ... and the immediate concession of citizenship to all the Negro Portuguese." . . I am of the
opinion that ... immediate and integral citizenship should be conceded to the entire population of Angola, without distinction of race or color.

2) It would also be important to prohibit the medieval system of forced labor of the natives in certain agricultural or other activities... and [to avoid] subordination to monoculture which may benefit the uncharitable feudal lords of contemporary economy....

3) We must eliminate the exploitation of coffee lands, making reparation... either by restitution of the lands robbed from their ancient proprietors or by payment of indemnities. ...

4) It would be wise... to regroup the native Angolan population, establishing villages in harmony with the agrarian, health, and provincial military services available. Each family, according to the number of its components, would be furnished parcels of... land [and] each settlement [would be granted] a vast amount of land as communal property. In each sector... the provincial government would try to construct schools... with instruction in Portuguese, for farming and industrial techniques....

5) The sobas [tribal chiefs] of the various villages of each district.. -would, every ten years, elect among themselves a representative... of the Negro community.

6) Minimum salaries would be fixed... for agricultural as well as industrial services. The recruitment of laborers for work outside their villages would have to be done obligatorily by the sobas.

7) The provincial government could not fix prices of products or articles produced by the natives without previously consulting the Council for the Defense of Native Interests. ...

8) The metropolitan government should provide credits... for public works projects and development .... All national banks, as well as business firms with activity centered in Angola, would be required to contribute amounts of at least ten percent of

their "social" capital and reserve funds, with the Banco de Portugal loaning up to fifty percent of such values.

9) Economic enterprise would be invited to invest....

10) There would be the elimination of legislation prohibiting the installation of establishments that would compete with metropolitan industry.

11) Firms would transfer their headquarters to, or establish branch headquarters in, Angola. This decentralization would allow the orientation of economic policy toward Angola and away from Portugal...

12) A maximum period of two years would be allowed for firms predominantly active in Angola to establish branch offices throughout the territory -...

13) A tariff union between Portugal and the overseas provinces would be decreed.

... the lines of my program are: the gradual and progressive introduction of the indigenous element in public government; the establishment of political parties among the natives.

The Future of the Overseas Territories
by
Manuel Josd Homem de Mello

[Homem de Mello, a former deputy in the National Assembly, favors structural changes that would permit Portugal to preserve its influence in the overseas territories. Portugal, he feels, should prepare the territories for eventual autonomy by establishing regional assemblies, by increasing educational programs to eliminate illiteracy, by promoting free trade unions and cooperative movements, and by instituting other reforms. The passage below is taken from his Portugal, o ultramar e o futuro, Lisbon, 1962, pp. 118-26.]

In order that what happened in India may not happen again, it is necessary for us to modernize and enhance the effectiveness of our overseas politics, whether with respect to political structure or to the more important areas of public administration.

Thus,
1) Political structure:
   a) . . . It is necessary to courageously make headway toward solutions that

In fact, if the ideas of those in power had been different, accepting as preferable the overseas policies which many (among whom I include myself) defend, and if the latter group had been defending the official concepts, it would have been equally impossible ... to manifest public disagreement.

In that case, the traitors would be those who govern today... ; patriots, those who defend the evolution of the territories so that they may come to be, in the more or less distant future, new Brazils. . . Here is the paradox--the terrible and lamentable paradox--which leads us to the intransigence installed in the high spheres of the state.

To conclude, today more than ever, it is necessary to accept and initiate constructive dialogue, recognizing that the country has the right to sound out the various currents of opinion that, in one manner or other, at all costs intend to serve and save it.

Colonialism, Nationalism, and Independence

by
Henrique Galvio

[As a former colonial officer and deputy in the National Assembly, Galvão criticized Portuguese labor practices in its African colonies. His condemnation of Portuguese policy eventually led to his arrest, imprisonment, and escape from Portugal. In early 1961 he led a small force of exiles in the sensational seizure of the luxury liner, "Santa Maria," an incident that appeared to be related to an African uprising in Luanda in early February. Like other Portuguese oppositionists, Galvão professes faith in the dream of a Lusitanian community including the African territories. He argues that the African nationalist movements and their leaders are unprepared for independence. Supported by "outsiders," the "so-called" nationalists are hostilely anti-Portuguese and not simply anti-Salazarist.

Galvão's views on the African situation were expressed in a written interview with the editor on July 15, 1963. At that time he responded to two questions, the
first calling for general comment on African nationalist movements and the second asking for an evaluation of the possibility of cooperation between the African movements and the Portuguese opposition, both in Portugal and in exile. I

The real significance of these recent occurrences, in the light of the profound truths that propagandists try to hide or distort, is that the open conflict between the numerous and irreconcilable leaders of the various so-called nationalist movements, on one hand, and the dictatorial government (which misinformed international opinion confuses with the Portuguese nation), on the other hand, is not only a conflict influenced by other adversaries whose interests are not really those of the people in question, but is also a conflict of two positions as extreme as they are indefensible with regard to the destiny of the people.

One tries to judge both sides' claims, but neither of the extreme positions involved in the conflict can result in solutions in the true interest of the Portuguese people, of the colonial people, and of Africa itself. These two extremist positions are enmeshed in a struggle in which opposing propagandists twist the objective data of every problem and corrupt the true humanitarian meaning, a struggle in which only the blood spilled is outside the web of lies. The climate of violence that the extremists are creating and the chasms that they are opening among the oppressed people of Portugal and of Africa will not produce, for either extreme, a victory that would bring to the people that minimum of liberty, of economic security, and of humanitarian freedom for which they have the right to hope. Nor can the situation created in Portuguese Africa during the last thirty years be maintained (much less evolve) as Salazar's dictatorship claims. Nor is it likely that the so-called nationalist groups (whose confusion of purposes, of ideas, and of personal ambitions has been shown) will be the ones to create a better situation, or at least one that is less unfortunate.

Only the Movimentos Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) have gained considerable international attention; the other nationalist groups, by their nature, are constantly forming and reforming, dividing and subdividing, appearing and disappearing. The MPLA, which imprudently aligned itself too much with Communist-supported elements (fortunately, perhaps not for ideological reasons but because of an error in calculation caused by precipitous opportunism), rightly came to be mistrusted by sectors whose point of view is more in line with that of the Western governments—who are not unaware how dangerous and tenacious support and alliances offered by Communist parties can be. The UPA, initially attracted to the example of Lumumba and enticed by opportunistic Soviet aid but since that time dissociated from the MPLA, seeks the support of the United States and, in general, of the great capitalist groupings who are interested in unifying the Congo to facilitate the effective control of their interests and of the neocolonial economic situation now well in progress in the former Belgian Congo, in which the Americans, Belgians, British, and Germans who are participating still do not fully understand the new divisions in this part of Africa.

Mirio de Andrade (the really outstanding figure of the movement), along with
Agostinho Neto and Viriato da Cruz, leads the MPLA; Holden Roberto leads the UPA (arbitrarily). Even though these men are really the highest-ranking members of their movements, neither (Roberto much less than Andrade) can measure up to the missions with which they are entrusted; neither represents the elite from which one can expect tomorrow anything demanded by independence; neither has the least bit of political competence or administrative experience; neither spread the ideas of national sentiment, which were diffused and almost expended in Angola, as the beginning of or preparation for a movement. Both were mere opportunists--driven less by nationalist sentiments (or by any other altruistic motive) than by resentment or personal ambition--who threw themselves into the current of African emancipation, but who did not participate in its profound and extensive formation. Both, from their extreme positions, wanted to achieve, quickly and at all costs, independence for their leaders, for their political and social selves, and for the few who accompany them (and this would by no means constitute real independence for the people). These movements and these men, so compromised as they are with interests that are not those of the colonies, of the Portuguese people, nor even of an Africa not only free but also humane, could only lead Angola from the present tyranny into a chaotic and most dangerous disorder--a disorder even more dangerous than that of the former Belgian Congo.

A clipping of a speech given by President Kennedy includes the following thought: "We want an Africa formed by a community of independent, stable governments where HUMAN RIGHTS OF NEGROES AND WHITES are equally respected and protected, where individuals are given the chance to choose the paths of nationality, free from opposition or interference by any other country. We do not want an Africa which is a puppet in the Cold War--or in a battlefield between the East and the West." It would be toward such an Africa that the democratic Portuguese would like to lead the Portuguese colonies, to reclaim the prestige of the country from the three ignominious decades of Salazar's government. But it is not toward such an Africa that the MPLA and the UPA could lead Angola (if indeed they could do anything more than exacerbate hatred!), for it is not of such an Africa that the political and economic interests (chiefly neocolonial) that support either movement are thinking.

Agostinho Neto, Mdrio de Andrade, and Viriato da Cruz, in spite of their lack of capability, are certainly more worthy of respect than Holden Roberto and his clan of barbarians. It was mostly the errors of the first three, especially the acceptance of communist leadership in their political struggle, that discredited them. Roberto, on the other hand, is beneath all human consideration and all moral respect--even more so since he is a puppet, and the interests that support him take advantage of his most serious defects.

Finally, neither movement commands enough support in Angola (other than in the limited area which comprises the district of the Congo) to justify their struggle as representatives of the "people of Angola." The solid majority of the population, comprising whites, blacks, and mestizos, feels for them no less hostility than they feel toward the Salazar regime ....
Among the movements that have been organized, or just spoken of, in other Portuguese colonies, the question [regarding African nationalist movements] can be said to relate more to the state of mind of certain factions than to actual efforts toward liberation, since all are weakened by the same inability to organize. In these various small "movements," which have neither international nor national recognition, there appear names of leaders who certainly are more capable than Andrade, Neto, Cruz, and Roberto: namely, Eduardo Mondlane and Sôcrates Discalos. Perhaps it is because they are more balanced, more realistic, and ideologically more sincere that they formed separate movements—and their solidarity with the MPLA and the UPA is relative and conditional.

As the general movement toward African emancipation aims toward a continental destiny, this divisive situation has not prevented the development of... a just cause, a respectable ideal, and a human problem. It merely means that the forces which are fighting for that cause, for that ideal, and which are facing that problem, do not measure up in capability, in organization, in balance, in good sense, and—least of all—in humanity. It is the cause of people, not simply the cause of leaders whose representative legitimacy has yet to be demonstrated. It seems to me that this question [on possibility of cooperation between African movements and Portuguese opposition] must be clarified in order to have a complete and dispassionate reply: What is the possibility of cooperation among the UPA, the MPLA, and the Partido Africano da Independência da Guinée e Cabo Verde (PAIGC, the Frente de Libertagão Nacional (FRELIMO), the Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA), and so forth? All these movements or groups are found to be deeply dissociated from one another, especially the MPLA and the UPA. Great efforts toward conciliation and toward the formation of a single united front have been made—not only on the part of the MPLA (in spite of its having taken the initiative in the spectacular break with the UPA on the grounds of the criminal and unclassifiably inhumane behavior rightly attributed to Holden Roberto), but also especially on the part of the governments and foreign African movements that wanted to cooperate with the so-called nationalistic movements in the Portuguese colonies. Propagandists more than once announced the success of these attempts; the truth is, however, that not only did the conciliation never come to pass, but also the leaderships of these movements are gradually revealing that they are completely irreconcilable.

Under these conditions, one can reply: How to effect or find a possibility for cooperation with movements that do not cooperate among themselves and constantly splinter? In addition, how to deal with movements without representative legitimacy? Having placed this consideration into context, we must yet note the circumstances that are involved in the Portuguese opposition before answering the question precisely, so that the reply may be understandable. The Portuguese opposition to the dictatorial regime of Salazar today consists (as it does in Spain and, generally, in all other countries in which an opposition exerts itself against a dictatorship) of two profoundly different political factions: the faction of democratic thought and feeling, intransigently anti-totalitarian, in which
are found the vast majority of Portuguese loyal to the centuries-old democratic and Christian traditions of the country; and a pro-Communist faction, clearly and strongly led by the Communist Party, consisting of the following groups: a distinct minority of declared Communist Party members; non-Party members who fraudulently call themselves the "democratic left" or "popular democrats" and who, as infiltrating agents of Communism, corrupt or occupy positions of authority in the democratic sector of the majority; and, finally, a small number of "innocent victims" who, though neither Communists nor pro-Communists, have weak ideological consciences or have no hope for change from a tyranny so long tolerated, and who naively feel that liberation will be achieved more rapidly through Communist leadership. The democratic, anti-totalitarian faction, which fortunately is now the stronger in numbers (shall we say, the more Portuguese), was weakened and disorganized during the three decades of the dictatorship, not only by the ferocious persecution that the repressive forces of the regime directed against it, but also by being abandoned by the great Western democratic powers, who not only were unaware that it represented the great mass of democratic, Christian, Western Portuguese but who also gave the dictator material and political support which contributed even further to the survival of the regime. It was because of these difficulties that the democratic faction, in organizing and maintaining itself, was infiltrated by the Communists--an infiltration which corrupted the faction, in part. The pro-Communist faction, led as it is by the Communist Party, always found in the Soviet bloc, whose purposes it serves, the support that the Western bloc failed to provide to the democratic current. Regarding the colonial question, the Portuguese faction of democratic thought (corresponding to the sentiments of the vast majority of Portuguese people) recognizes as sacred the people's right to self-determination (of which they themselves have clearly been deprived for more than thirty years). The pro-Communist faction supports and will support any and all movements, nationalist or not, legitimate or illegitimate, that are linked to the policy of social and administrative chaos practiced by Communism among the people of underdeveloped nations. It supports Andrade and all his followers; it would support Roberto, as it supported Lumumba and all those who operate under less stringent conditions than those needed for leading the colonies to an independence marked by order, progress, justice, and freedom. Having cleared up these points, we can now reply fully to the second question: "What are the possibilities of cooperation between the African movements and the Portuguese opposition, both in Portugal and in exile?"

As to the pro-Communist opposition (I do not know if I can rightly call it Portuguese), the possibilities for cooperation are great and there will be more vast and compromising concessions when the leaders of pro-Communist movements are ready to serve the purposes of a pro-Soviet policy in Africa. The leadership of this faction belongs, in fact, to the Communist Party, which naturally means that it will not be the feeling for the rights and legitimate interests of the people, their true freedom, their independence, their "de-colonization" that will be put forth as conditions for and objectives of cooperation.
Amid the confusion and the "game" of extra-national and extra-ideological interests now going on, it does not seem possible, much less easy, to effect cooperation between disjointed movements led by more or less neocolonial interests and the democratic opposition, which is conscious of its responsibilities, incompatible with all forms of hatred and all offense against humanity, preoccupied exclusively with the destiny of the people in question, and little interested in the ambitions of leaders. However, a discussion to prepare for cooperation is not impossible and could even prove useful with some of the movements that have been created (with the exception of a UPA headed by Holden Roberto), and especially with leaders such as Ddscalos, Mondlane, Agostinho Neto, and Cabral, once the following conditions were met:

--We recognize, with neither reserves nor subterfuge, the right to self-determination, humanely and progressively understood.

--The so-called nationalist leaders should depict themselves not as representatives "of the people" who, still deprived of the right to self-determination, can hardly choose their representatives (and only those representatives chosen by the people would be legitimate), but as representatives of separatist or nationalist political factions--the only aspect of representation that they can truly show.

--Likewise, the leaders of the Portuguese democratic faction should serve only as representatives of that faction, again since they are not directly chosen by the people.

--The discussion would try to arrive at a cooperative understanding that would lead toward union and forceful action in the sense of bringing about the single prerequisite condition for the possibility of recognizing and exercising the right of self-determination--in other words, the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship and the restoration to Portugal of the free exercise of democratic prerogatives since self-determination is impossible without the realization of this prerequisite.

--No compromise would be proposed or made on matters concerning the choice to be made by the people--keeping in mind, however, that implicit in the reciprocal acceptance of the discussion is the joint promise to accept as sacred the outcome of the choice made by the people, with proper guarantees against fraud.

--Declared or camouflaged representatives of any Communist or pro-Communist faction would be excluded from the discussion, so that the talks might be animated by a sincere intention to liberate the people--an intention incompatible with ideologies that have been called freedom-killing throughout the world.

* * * *

The FPLN and African Nationalism

[The following statement by F. Piteira Santos, M. Tito de Morais, and Rui Cabegadas, leaders of the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), is an attempt to demonstrate that cooperation between the Portuguese opposition and African nationalists is necessary in the struggle to end Salazarism and colonialism. The statement is extracted from "A oposição portuguesa e a conferência de Addis-Abeba," Algiers, June 15, 1963, pp. 3-5.]
The Frente Patriótica de Libertacao Nacional (FPLN), faithful to the policies set forth by the Junta Central de Acção Patriótica, reaffirmed the right of the people in the Portuguese colonies to self-determination and to independence, and stated that the following objectives are to be included in the struggle for the liberation of the Portuguese colonies:

--immediate cessation of military operations in Angola and withdrawal of expeditionary troops;
--immediate opening of negotiations with nationalist African organizations;
--establishment of democratic liberties in the Portuguese colonies, particularly freedom of political action for nationalist movements;
--liberation of all political prisoners of the Portuguese colonies.

The FPLN considers that, in the common struggle against the fascist and colonialist dictatorship of Salazar, it is necessary to establish contact between the FPLN and nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies and, whenever possible, to cooperate and negotiate with them.

The Addis-Ababa Conference directed a solemn warning to the "allies of the colonial powers," saying that "they must choose between their friendship with the African people and their support to the powers which oppress these people." This choice of friends, with all its consequences, must be imposed upon the great powers. Financial and military aid to the fascist government of Salazar must cease, for Salazar oppresses both Portuguese and Africans and kills both freedom and men who wish to be free in Portugal and in Africa. Arms supplied by NATO must cease ....

The noble courage of the decisions made at Addis-Ababa cannot be limited to the liberation of Africa alone. In Asia, in Latin America, in Europe there still exist enslaved peoples. The lesson that, in Addis-Ababa, the independent nations of Africa gave to Europe and to the world cannot be forgotten.

This past May 1, the people of Lisbon filled the streets, and for three hours thousands of unarmed men fought police in various locations throughout the city. They demanded a better standard of living, peace in Angola, and peace in Guind. Dozens of persons wounded and one dead, with nearly one hundred taken into custody, was the tragic total of the day. The people of Lisbon responded to the fascist colonial war, writing with their blood the word "peace."

On May 24, President Ahmed Ben Bella gave his moving speech--two days of fighting against colonialism, two moments of fighting against fascism. The blood shed in Lisbon and the words spoken in Addis-Ababa unite our two peoples with the same resolution: the colonial war must be ended; fascism must be banished. We fight on two different battle fronts, but we join in the same battle. In the struggle for the liberation of their countries, the African people are the natural allies of the Portuguese people. The decisions of Addis-Ababa also open new possibilities in the struggle for the liberation of the Portuguese people from the fascist government of Salazar.

The Dialogue Is Open

by

Humberto Delgado
[General Delgado received about 23 percent of the vote as an opposition candidate in the 1958 presidential elections. In exile he continued to be an effective opposition leader until his mysterious assassination in Spain in early 1965. In an interview with Suzanne Djabali in Maroc Information of November 28, 1961, Delgado expressed his concern for the establishment of a rapprochement with African nationalists. Delgado's view and that of Marcelino dos Santos are from Delgado's Tufro s–bre Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, 1962, pp. 112-13.]

Our 1960 program already contained the principle of self-determination. It could be said: Why did it not immediately recognize clearly the principle of independence, instead of self-determination, if the latter can mean the former? First, because words have a magic power for Latins, and even though self-determination can really mean pure and total independence, to utilize the word would be neither necessary nor intelligent from the psychological point of view. It would be giving a terrible weapon to the fascist enemy, which could claim that the opposition pressed the colonies to dissolve all bonds with the metropolis.

Today we need statesmen endowed with great mental ability, and not a medieval Salazar with despotic methods, who considers the whites as slaves and the Negroes as slaves of slaves, a man for whom the colonies are plantations, which some families exploit to their profit. What England learned, Salazar, with his passion for power, will never learn. Either we finish him or he will finish us, and with us, the country. A new type of freedom has invaded the world: political-economic freedom. The races dominated by the whites do not want to be dominated anymore, and they now know they cannot reach their objectives except with the conquest of independence or, at least, with a strong decentralization of the government.

[In the same newspaper, Marcelino dos Santos, an African youth and secretary of the Confertncia das OrganizagSes Nacionalistas das Colônicas Portuguesas (CONCP), declared:] We are ready for constructive cooperation with the Portuguese opposition on the condition that they recognize our right to self-determination and independence. We are sorry that Commander Galvfo declared last June that Angola is not ripe for independence and, lately in Sweden, that the Angolan nationalists "are Communists aided by Russia." Galvito is reiterating Salazar's arguments. We are pleased to declare that General Delgado took a position that allows us to expect an attitude that is in line with our aspirations. After this stand has been taken, discussion will be possible between us and General Delgado.

* * * *

CHAPTER III
THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A MASS REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
In 1954 (perhaps later—the date is questionable), the Unido das Populag~es do Norte de Angola (UPNA) was founded after Protestant Angolans in the former Belgian Congo failed in an attempt to have their nominee, Manuel Barros Nekaka,
named successor to the old Congo monarchy. Instead, the Portuguese supported a rival Catholic candidate, although six years later the Catholic monarchist movement evolved into a small political grouping, Ngwisako-Ngwizani hKongo, with headquarters in Leopoldville. In 1958, the Unio das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA) replaced the UPNA under the leadership of Holden Roberto (José Gilmore, pseudonym), nephew of Nekaka. After actively participating in the spontaneous outbreak of March 1961 in northern Angola, Roberto's UPA joined the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA), led by Emmanuel Kounzika and formerly known as the Alianga Zombo (Aliazo) and comprised of Bazombo migrants residing in the Congo. The coalition, Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA), was structured as a mass revolutionary party, with decision-making powers resting with Roberto as chairman of a five-man political bureau and also as commander-in-chief of the army. The mass party incorporated organizations of youth, labor, and women.

With headquarters in Leopoldville, the FNLA represented the peasant masses of Angolan migrants and refugees in the Congo as well as supporters in Northern Angola. A provisional Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE) was established in 1962, but, after a series of defections by leaders, it was clear that the party and army leadership was predominantly drawn from Roberto's Quicongo-speaking people of northern Angola. Thus the government-in-exile was vulnerable to charges levied on several fronts, with the MPLA dismissing it as a regional faction and the Portuguese government concurring by insisting that the uprising affected only a small part of the territory. Furthermore, the Protestant orientation of Roberto and other leaders bolstered the Portuguese contention that Protestant missionaries were to blame for the revolt.

Roberto's success was dependent upon relations with the Congo government. His friendship with Patrice Lumumba and especially Cyrille Adoula brought support. Apparently, however, after rejecting former Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu's desire to form a Bacondo state encompassing the lower Congo region and northern Angola, Roberto's movement encountered strained relations and police harassment.

I

BACKGROUND

Statement to the Secretary General of the United Nations

[The following statement, typed in French, was directed to the Secretary General of the United Nations from African dissidents in "São Salvador do Congo" in June 1957. This document includes detailed allegations of forced labor, lack of social services, expropriation of land, and so on. Although there is an official side of the story as well (recent economic advances, administrative and educational reforms), it is not included herein.]

To draw the attention of, and to make an appeal to, the humane and democratic sentiments of the United Nations, we, the undersigned, natives of the territory of the formerly independent Kingdom of the Congo, territory annexed to Angola since 1885, are respectfully taking the liberty of sending you the present petition in the name of the people of this territory, in the hope that the immense number of
efforts that you are making to protect the Rights of Man, without distinction as to race, will assist us.

Our ancestors welcomed the Portuguese with sympathy, expecting them to lend precious aid to the evolution of our territory, but, alas, it was a dream which was changed by slavery. At present, what justifies the colonization is the consent, the attachment of the indigenous peoples to those who are their civilized, their benefactors, and who are bringing them the key to a new and better world—of wellbeing, progress, and liberty. If the Portuguese government had been moved by the humane desire to help us along the way of progress, we would be the first to wish the continuance of their presence in our territory. Now, it is not thus; they have engendered misery, suffering, and despair. Whole peoples are emigrating abroad to shelter themselves from the most vicious colonialism that has ever existed. We regret having to pronounce these truths. In fact, our hospitality cannot be contested; the first whites who stepped on our soil were well received, and historic writings make it unnecessary for us to say more.

We present below a brief, authentic summary of certain very concrete facts on which our grievances are based.

1. Forced Labor
Certainly no country exists in the world in which women are enslaved as ours are and serve as beasts of burden in all the workings of the administration. The worst blow is that the poor women are forced to use their own tools to execute these hard jobs. Pregnant women, old women, and even ill women cannot be excused from these forced labors from dawn to dusk, and they are given no nourishment nor pay.

It is the same for us who are enlisted for the agricultural plantations of the Portuguese colonists and for other forced labor, including maintenance of automobile roads, bridge and causeway construction, etc., with no remuneration. Each village chief is obliged to furnish men; if he does not, he is severely punished. Numerous are our compatriots who have been felled by this servile regime prejudicial to men already physically weak, undernourished, and beaten during their work.

a. Mavoio—Copper mines
This is one of the principal places where native miners, treated as veritable slaves, are used; even boys from ten to twelve years old are found there.

b. Cuimba
Brick-kilns, where the work is directed by a public official of the Poste [district] of Cuimba, are constructed by laborers recruited from the following villages: Lomba, Mbanza-Cuimba, Tombocco, Boavista, Zamba, and Lumweno. These kilns are situated in the village of Kingemba, near the river Fuzia. The bricks are sold by the administration to the Sociedade de Plantações Agrícolas do Rio M’Bridge—Explora—Io Cuimba (CUFA) and to businessmen in the region. Also in this region are the lime-kilns situated in the village of Luleko, in the sector of Lungezi, near the M’Bridge falls. They operate under the control of a public official of the Poste de Cuimba, who is in charge of the sale of the material to
the CUFA and to colonists. The indigenous manpower in all these tasks is completely free.
c. Payment to CUFA laborers is made under the surveillance of an administration agent, who automatically holds back salaries with no justification.

2. Social Problems
   a. Health service
   This is the area in which social progress reveals great negligence. No dispensaries are found in the villages. In the whole region of S.o Salvador do Congo, for example, a single state hospital is open to the inhabitants, but it is far from fulfilling the needs of the sick; it is horribly dirty, and the sick must provide for their own needs.

   b. Education
   In spite of the 475 years of Portuguese presence in our territory, we do not possess one important school. Furthermore, our children desert the country as soon as they are thirteen, to avoid being enlisted to husk coffee and cacao. We cite the example of Bembe, Uige, Songo, Sanza-Pombo, Kwilu-Futa, Quissacandica. Because of this situation, the entire populace is condemned to the deepest obscuration.

3. Economic Factors
   We do not intend to dwell upon this important question, which is at the very heart of the problem. However, we must note that our standard of living is pitiable, and it is indispensable that the civilized world sympathize with our misery. Because of the total lack of industry and especially of paid labor, it is generally very difficult for us to pay our taxes, which amount to 120 francs per head, and also the labor tax of 125.70 francs. Since the beginning of these taxes, which date from 1907, we have been living in anguish. Men, whatever their family status, and old people pay the tax.
   In spite of the fact that they are paid by the administration, black messengers, called gentes de ligaggo, who are attached to the Post Chiefs [district officers] are in charge of women and the aged. This means that, in each village, the women and the aged are obliged to turn over a certain amount of money to the Post Chief to pay the messengers.
   Concerning the sale of our products, we are obliged to accept any price offered by the Portuguese businessmen. In some cases, the payments are replaced by pieces of cloth (one to two meters), whatever the amount of the products sold. This deplorable situation constitutes one of the principal causes for the exodus from our territory.

4. Injustices
   The word “justice” is completely unknown in our territory. Any individual committing an infraction is automatically arrested and forced to work for the administration for a length of time determined by the authorities. The punishments are inhumane, and the prisoners are neither fed nor clothed. In addition, deportations and exile are frequent, as, for example, in the case of our compatriots Ranca Ferro, John Wayiva, Liborio Nefwane, Figueira Lello, Pedro
Takasala, and many others, exiled for unjustified reasons. Whippings and beatings of both men and women continue in a barbaric manner. In general, the entire country lives in terror, and most of the time, to escape from the military expeditions and from being enlisted for forced labor and led to distant places, the men disperse and hide in the forests for days and nights.

In March 1956, in order to oppose the choice of an illegal king, several notables were arrested, tortured, and deported for awhile. Brought before a court in Luanda, some of them were freed. The ones retained, including Ambrozio Norman Luyanzi, Rosa Ginga, and Martins Kiditu, were taken to Ambrizete, where they suffered atrocities at the hands of the Portuguese authorities. After six months of penal servitude, they were freed and taken to Slo Salvador. But one of them, the elderly Ambrozio Norman Luyanzi, died soon after his arrival as a consequence of the bad treatment he had received.

5. Draconic Measures
In March 1956, a circular was published by the former king of the Congo, with the approval of the administrative authorities of Slo Salvador do Congo, by which access to the territory of Portuguese Congo was prohibited for all natives of the country living abroad who could not be present for the census of May 2-June 30, 1956. It was clearly specified by that circular that natives living abroad who were not present for the census would lose the rights to all their goods in the country, and their identity cards would expire. To our humble knowledge, that circular was never disapproved nor abrogated by higher authority.

6. Policy of Separation
The Portuguese colonial administration is causing discord among the inhabitants of our territory by separating the neighborhoods (quartiers). Catholics have been separated from Protestants, as, for example, in Slo Salvador do Congo, for more than half a century. "Guia," an official document which we are attaching to the present petition, shows the truth of our declaration.

7. Expropriation and Emigration
During 1932 and 1933, for reasons which the Portuguese colonial administration has kept secret, all our villages were moved. We were forced to construct other villages along automobile roads. Certain villages whose inhabitants were not able to move themselves in the time allowed by the administration were burned. These included: Mboma, Kindwalu, Lumbi, Yina, Kimbazi, Nkama, Lula die Bundu, Viaza, Ngandu, Seke, Mbanza-Mpangu, Nimeo, Lembia, Nkielelo, Luuvaluamu, Ntetembwa, Kinsende, Sango, Soko, and Matente.

Several plantations, belonging both to natives who abandoned the country and to those who were still living there, and which were situated near the sites of the former villages, were seized by the Portuguese--under the pretext that they were abandoned properties--and were portioned out among themselves. We cite the examples of Sanga, Luanika, Mbanza-Ntanda, Tenga, etc. No indemnity was paid--either for this expropriation or for the seizure of the plantations. Land seizure has continued to this day.
In 1914, through pacifist measures, the country asked the Portuguese colonial administration to stop the deportation of men to São Tomé, where they had been serving on plantations of coffee, cacao, etc. The administration did not agree and set loose a violent repression, which lasted a year and a half, in the course of which veritable mass-acres were committed among the masses. This extremely deplorable event provoked massive emigration of native peoples, who fled persecution and finally took refuge all along the frontier of the Belgian Congo. These villages included Divangamene, Wene, Zulu-Mongo, Tadi, Kiwa, Balu, Kuzi, Yongo, Kingemba, Lembwa, etc.

Numerous were the natives of our territory who abandoned their dear relatives (some of whom were quite aged), their villages, and forests full of memories to seek refuge elsewhere, where a most humane welcome and a benevolent hospitality were reserved for them. Far from their own country they enjoyed the liberty dear to every citizen of the land but not existing among them.

In conclusion, we insist before the United Nations that a mission be sent to our territory to investigate the truth of our petition, the principal aim of which is to demonstrate the moral and irreparable prejudice of the Portuguese colonial administration toward our people. This question, far from being political, is quite humanitarian, so we ask the United Nations to be objective enough to keep the issue out of the realm of sentimentalism. . .(See Psalms 15:1-5)

We mention that this petition is introduced not by what is called Angola, but rather by the Congo, which is a formerly independent territory and which, furthermore, has no treaty with Portugal. Also the Dol of Reverend Father Barroso was established without the consent of the people, and the poor king of the Congo at the time, Dom Pedro VI, who was illiterate and did not speak Portuguese, was consequently unaware of the perfidious terms of the letter that was forced upon him.

As a result, in our opinion it is dishonest to place our territory under the jurisdiction of a statute from which it does not benefit, especially when there is no consent of the inhabitants. . .

As a security measure, we have not published the names of the petitioners. May it please the United Nations to hear this voice, which is taking the risk of being forever quelled, to do all that is within its power to protect the Rights of Man, the fundamental principles of human dignity, and to help a people living under oppression and disinherited from all the benefits of contemporary civilization. Thus, justice will be done.

The Angolan Drama

[This document was distributed in eight mimeographed pages by the Unilo das Populações de Angola (UPA), presumably in Léopoldville during the late 1950's. It reflects the UPA's perspective of Angolan history.]

The subjugation of the former sovereign and independent African states has usually been the logical conclusion of fraudulent trade transactions or the
assertion of the right of the strongest over the weakest. One of the most characteristic cases of this diabolic colonization of an African people is undoubtedly the Portuguese colony of Angola. Angola, the largest of Portuguese African possessions, with her 1,246,700 square kilometers and her 4,145,184 inhabitants, of whom more than 300,000 are white, is a festering sore crying for prompt and effective treatment from the world at large. In Angola, as elsewhere, the abominable domination, by a handful of men of evil inspiration, of peoples formerly noted for their love of freedom and solidarity has come about after her discovery by explorers followed by Christian Evangelists, unscrupulous traders, and the army. Whatever the basis of justification used, the suppression by the so-called civilizers and their abettors is an all too familiar phenomenon. Colonization has always been, is, and will remain, undoubtedly, the negation to the human personality of its rights and liberties, the emasculation of national consciousness. Thus, the confiscation of private property, barbarity, oppression, force, deculturizations, dehumanization, exclusive economic regime, commercial enterprise, forced labor, whipping and lashing, terror, forced exodus, systematic extermination, obscurantism, people ill without hospitals, women without maternity homes, abusive taxation, unemployment--these are the evils perpetuated by Portugal's presence in Angola. But because, apart from precolonial historical realities of a given country, colonization engenders de facto nationalism, the breach of the liberation of peoples has wafted over Asia. The accession to independence of Liberia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, and--recently--Guinde proves uncontestably that Africa has not remained indifferent to that deep-seated movement which tends toward anti-colonization and anti-imperialism. Despite the cruelty that colonization entails, the peoples of Africa persist in their firm resolve to exterminate, right from the very roots, all traces of colonization, condemned by the universal conscience of all mankind.

I. Angola--a National Historical Entity

Angola, entirely composed of Bantu tribes, has its origins deeply embedded in history. It is indispensable, today, to recall the ancient history of Africa. Ethnologists and archeologists have incontestably established that when Egypt of the Pharaohs blossomed throughout the world with her science and wisdom, other states also flourished along the valley of the Nile and the Zambeze, while the rest of Africa, notably the valleys of the Congo, Niger, and Senegal, were covered with forests teeming with pygmies. After numerous invasions of the Nordic barbarians into Africa and the upheavals occasioned by the birth of Islam, Senegal African peoples from the Nile Valley came down to the forests of Central Africa. Such was the case of the Bacongos, a branch of the Punta-Ponda or Phoenicians, who formed a powerful empire named Manicongo in the hinterland of the Southwest Atlantic African shores, stretching from the Congo to the Zambeze. This vast and powerful empire was discovered by the Portuguese Diogo C5,o in 1482.
Like other multi-national units of ancient Africa, the Manicongo Empire enjoyed sound political organization and was, in fact, an agglomeration of kingdoms: Luanga, Cacongo, and Ngoio to the north of the River Zaire or Congo, Angola, and Matamba further to the south, Gabon or Ponguo in the north (Cameroon Frontier). Though economic and family ties placed Angola under the tutelage of the Manicongo Empire, it is nevertheless an incontestable historical fact that Angola fully enjoyed national sovereignty and independence. From 1509 to 1520, Catholic missionaries, Portuguese and Spanish, established themselves in the Manicongo Empire. The importance of the foreign politics of the Manicongo Empire and the Angola Kingdom was such that Portugal was obliged to enter into diplomatic relations, and, thus, the Portuguese Paulo Dias de Novais was accredited Ambassador to the Court of the Emperor of the Congo and to that of his nephew, King N’Gola (Angola). Diplomatic relations between the two states were soon to reach a high point [of tension]. The break in diplomatic relations between Portugal and King N’Gola (Angola) and, in 1520, the incident concerning the seizure of Portuguese Ambassador Balthazar de Castro, who was only freed upon the intervention of the Emperor of the Congo, testifies to the independence and power of the Angola Kingdom. Year by year relations became more and more fruitful within the same framework. Duarte Lopes in 1588, seconded by the Italian scientist, Pigafetta Filipo, was accredited Ambassador of the Emperor of the Congo to the Vatican. But the state of international affairs and the anxiety of the Portuguese, who were faced with the threat of Dutch competition, to obtain strongholds in Africa led to the occupation of Angola in 1575 by Paulo Dias de Novais. The King of Angola became subject to the King of Portugal, although his uncle, the Emperor of the Congo, continued to deal with Portugal as an equal. When Angola became effectively a Portuguese colony, the Governor of the city of Slo Salvador (capital of the Congo Empire) took care to maintain friendly and neighborly relations with the Emperor of the Congo. In 1659, Portugal even neutralized the Congo Empire by a pact of non-agression and mutual assistance between the Negro Emperor and the King of Portugal.

In 1885, when the Berlin Conference decided upon the carving up of Africa like a birthday cake, the Portuguese definitely set their hearts upon Angola, while a fraudulent transaction, as dishonest as it was diabolic, allowed them to colonize part of the Congo Empire. The rest of the Empire then fell under Belgian and French domination. Despite the new geographic delimitations resulting in the enlarging of ancient Angola, the new Angola territory, through its belonging to the Angola nation of former times, was a national historical entity. Hence arises the urge for both national independence and federalism in what is commonly called Angola.

II. Portuguese Colonialism
A prime factor in the evaluation of a colonized people is the paradoxical nature of colonialism: Its principal purpose is to direct the development of the colony to its own advantage, but the very presence of the colonizers awakens a broad spectrum of the natives’ consciousness. That is to say, the economic, political, cultural,
religious, and social manifestations of Portuguese colonization have greatly influenced the Angola nation in its present form. What are these manifestations?

A. Economic Manifestations
Every colonization is, above all, an exploitation of the national resources and soil of the colonized country to the advantage of the colonizer. The economic policy practised by Portugal in Angola is governed by what is now universally called the "Colonial Pact," whatever its outward manifestations. Produce of the soil and subsoil of Angola feed the Portuguese consumer market and, reciprocally, the products of Portugal have priority access to Angola markets. Industries are not nonexistent; some are even encouraged—for example, cotton spinning and weaving mills, sugar and cement factories, large plantations of coffee and cocoa, and the massive and abusive exploitation of copper, diamond, and gold mines. That is, industries are only established in Angola in so far as they do not duplicate Portuguese home industries. It is nothing more than the exclusive colonial system. Between Portugal and the Portuguese settlers in the various African territories of Angola and Mogambique there exists a close solidarity, as evidenced by the preferential customs tariffs. Portugal invites foreign capital for the commercial exploitation of Angola's resources, but she does not tolerate any foreign initiative that could bring about development of the colonial territories.

B. Political Manifestations
The political consequences of such an economy can be summarized by the following terms: political unification and departmentalization of Angola. Portugal, in effect, is a unitary state with one territory and one government. Consequently, Angola is considered to be part of the Portuguese national territory. But the population of this so-called unitary state is not homogeneous, for judicially it comprises, in effect, the following five categories.

--Portuguese born in Portugal.
--Portuguese born in Angola or Mogambique who are exempt from national service.
--Mulattoes enjoying the same privileges as the whites born in Africa.
--Assimilated Africans, assimilados, whose wives are exempt from forced labor and whose children enjoy the privilege of continuing their education in the all too rare secondary schools. In addition, these assimilados, paid like the last category of Angola people, have the privilege of paying taxes like the whites.
--And, quite naturally, the last category is the millions of black aborigines of Angola. This last group is separated from all the others by the color barrier, with all it entails of racial emasculation.

C. Cultural Assimilation
In the inevitable confrontation of Portuguese and Angola cultures, Portugal has always sought to make Portuguese culture predominant, and it would be no exaggeration to assert that Portugal practices the spiritual assimilation of the indigenous population, no doubt in order to cement Portuguese national unity, but most certainly also to stifle the national culture of the Angola people. Roman
Catholicism remains the state religion, and missionary zeal seeks to destroy the traditional culture and to make the colonized peoples brutish on the pretext of making them identical to the colonizers.

D. Social Consequences
A great deal could be said regarding the opulence of the colonizers and settlers in contrast to the latest misery of the colonized, but we content ourselves with only recalling briefly that forced labor, massive exodus, and systematic extinction of the Bantu race constitute the essence of the Portuguese social policy in Africa. In effect, a system of forced labor is applied. This system consists of recruiting men, women, and children, called contratados, in villages through African supervisors, called regedores, under the direction of the Post Chiefs and supplying them to the concessionary settlers, who employ this labor to work on coffee and cocoa plantations. More often than not, members of the same family toil away at different plantations, and very often at the end of their term of forced labor, which sometimes lasts 24 months, they are not reunited, some of them having been killed or having died in the course of their work. ..

E. Health
The health services are negligible. There are several black spots, the worst of which is sleeping sickness. There is one doctor to 80,000 people.

III. The National Problem of the People of Angola
The stark conclusion is that there is no one in Angola to dispute its claim to being regarded as a historically established state in the light of these facts. It is also evident that no one can deny to Angola its position as a nation with a certain degree of social development. If history has served as a buttress to this nation, the nation itself was forged as a result of Portuguese colonization, and the Angolan nation demands, with resolute determination, immediate political independence.

Indeed, the Portuguese colonial economic system, which makes Portugal the sole beneficiary of the products of the surface soil and the subsoil of Angola, with an oppressive internal protectionist policy, is fundamentally opposed to the interests of the indigenous masses who are fleeced and made to wallow in the most abject misery. Portuguese policy, which forces large masses into the channels of integration in utter contempt for their aspirations for liberty and justice, clearly leads to a political awakening and a craving for independence. The breaking-up and destruction of the rich and age-old tradition of Angola in favor of an imported culture leads the masses to claim more urgently every day a reestimate of their national culture. As colonization expanded and unified Angola, which in actual fact enjoyed unity before the European conquest, as it developed interchange and gave rise to the movement of population within the territory itself and the constant emigration of the working people of Angola, it promoted—in spite of itself—the development of a national consciousness that goes beyond the bounds of the original Bantu tribes. At the same time, the most barbarous forms of oppression and the scorched earth policy that Portugal practices in Angola have proved to be additional unifying factors and have automatically made the patriotism of the people of Angola wider and stronger. There is no point in failing to recognize the difference between what Angola is in 1958 and what it was in
1509. We are in the presence of a unique people with their own specific qualities, a people that have been stamped with special characteristics as a result of the establishment in their midst, since the 15th century, of people from Portugal. It is clear that this particular condition has, for a long time, compelled the Angolans to develop a certain attitude of revolt. The movement of "emancipation" at first consisted of an attempt to create family and civic ties among the Portuguese settlers who had established themselves in Angola and regarded Angola as their native land, while they looked upon Portugal as their country of origin. Later this movement admitted the masses of Angola's aboriginal population and tended to seek the right to develop a separate Angolan entity, but it did not claim an independent Angola. This explains the creation and evolution of the Liga Nacional Africana since 1929. But what exactly is this Liga Nacional Africana, which reflects the real anomalies of Portuguese colonization? This group is a pseudocultural association classifying the Angolan Portuguese, who are legally considered as Africans, mulattoes and assimilados (African Negroes), all bearing the name of "Africans." But it is not surprising to note that only whites and mulattoes form the Steering Committee, the African Negroes being in the position of poor relations who have no choice but to remain where they are.

It is clear that the consciousness of belonging to a nation, the existence of an Angolan national consciousness, could have turned the movement for emancipation into a plea for an independent Angolan state, as happened in America. But if the history of Angola has strengthened the patriotism of the aboriginal Bantu people, the Angolan elements of Portuguese origin have, on the other hand, by looking constantly to their ancient native land, postponed the birth of a new feeling of Angolan nationhood.

The historical movement for emancipation that was exemplified in the creation of the Liga Nacional Africana could not lead to independence, particularly as the numerical strength of the original Bantu people and the people of European origin played a decisive part. In this country, as in Algeria, the European section of the population is slow to appreciate the national consciousness, because they are faced with an indigenous people who have some knowledge of a higher social standard and because the harsh repression has not succeeded in whittling them down to a minority, as was the case with the "Red Indians" in America.

In 1928, the High Commissioner, Norton de Matos, in agreement with a certain section of colonial middle-class opinion in Angola, asked Portugal to grant independence to Angola. But his dismissal, coupled with the harsh reaction of Portugal, have proved that these events are, in fact, the real cause of the extreme indifference of those settlers who might have attained the real level of national consciousness that the historical movement requires.

It is a fact that the vast majority of the native Angolans of Bantu origin have realized the existence of the national consciousness, but could only sketch a program for the Angolan National Liberation Movement. Thus arose the União das Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA) in 1954. Taking into consideration Angola's history, which is quite different from that of any other Portuguese province, it was inevitable that the UPNA should very quickly exceed the limits
of its constitution. Indeed, by forcing its way north, south, east, and west, into every stratum of the Bantu section of the population, even the mulattoes, the national liberation movement, through secret organization, converted itself into the Uni-fo das Populações de Angola (UPA) in 1958, and its objective is unequivocal. The UPA makes a strong plea for:
--complete and immediate independence for Angola, dignity as against alienation;
--strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity, honor as against racial segregation and inhuman treatment.

IV. International Opinion

Any African Negro who attempts to raise his voice to put forward any claim whatsoever is imprisoned, beaten, or sent into one of the concentration camps that Portugal has set up on the island of Sio Tomé and in Angola (Forte Rossada, Baia dos Tigres, Silva P-hito). A quick glance at the number of revolts that have been stifled is enough to convince those who in their "naiveté" still imagine that the Portuguese colonists are choir boys.

In spite of the 1914 revolt that occurred in the north of Angola as a result of nationalist activities by Buta and his associates to check deportations to the islands of Sio Tome actually increased to more than 200,000 men. When the scandal was uncovered, only 10,000 were liberated and sent back to their villages, leaving many villages in Angola depopulated. It became obvious that the Portuguese of 1929, in spite of the march of time, was still the slave dealer who depopulated Africa to satisfy the needs of the Americas. Now the system has changed and the people of Angola are slaves in their own country.

The Luanda uprising of 1926 ended with the deportation of many militant nationalists, among whom was the patriotic leader, Espírito Santo, of blessed memory.

In effect, this means that in Angola the liberty of the individual, freedom of expression, freedom of worship, and freedom of association do not exist.

Consequently, a national liberation movement like the UPA cannot attain its full measure and force unless it becomes a strictly underground movement abroad, with help from outside aimed at enlisting international opinion in support of the nationalists of Angola. In fact, since its inception in 1954, the UPA has maintained a constant struggle with zeal and determination. The general discontent of the people was shown by the public demonstrations during December 1955, when the North systematically took a stand against the system of forced labor and constant abuses. In February 1956, Portugal reacted, making a series of arrests and deportations. Ambrosio Luyanzi was among the leaders who were martyred, and such patriots as Lello Figueira and Tibdrio Nefwane were exiled to the concentration camp of Silva P-hito.

The real iron curtain that separates Angola from the outside world has hardly encouraged any systematic international campaign in connection with the tragedy of Angola. However, the visit of a Ghana mission to Angola warmed the hearts of Angolans, who interpreted the gesture as a mark of active solidarity. The masses benefited from this visit of brother Ghanaians, even though it was followed by the
arrests of men, women, and children. People are still asking for the whereabouts of the patriotic leaders, Jdlio, Alfonso, Issias Kamutuke, Cunha, Alfredo Benga, Loureiro, Jolo Sequeira, and their families. But patriotism will express itself, and it is useless to fail to recognize as just the stand taken by so many members of the Angolan resistance movement; the people of Angola will not give in. In August 1958, the famous manifesto entitled "African Manifesto" appeared. This document condemned the horrors of five hundred years of Portuguese colonization and exhorted the people of Angola to act as one and assert with all dignity their right to self-determination, so that Angola might recover freedom, justice, and prosperity. Since the tragedy of Angola is already well known, the people of Angola deplore the attitude of silence adopted by the most competent international bodies. It is a pity, however, that in international affairs, Portuguese territories in Africa are considered as an integral part of Portugal without, of course, the Africans' having the least means of expressing their wish to be or not to be Portuguese. And yet no country that loves justice and freedom can fail to see that this conspiracy of silence is a contributory factor in the shameful crimes of the Portuguese, since it unquestionably creates the impression that the greater part of mankind holds sacred the most retrograde form of colonialism as practiced by Portugal.

In the name of the countless pleas from the voices of children, women, men—victims of the past and of the future—in short, in the name of all human beings who have been handled like beasts, who aspire to legitimate freedom and flatly denounce opportunism, the UPA appeals strongly and urgently to all democrats, to all philanthropic organizations of the world, and to all freedom-loving peoples to contribute at once toward the achievement, in tranquillity and dignity, of the political independence that is the deliberate choice of 4,145,184 Angolans and that is, in fact, the only guarantee under which their interests, a workable plan for African unity, and lasting peace in the world can be safeguarded.

* * * *

Struggle for Independence
(This statement is from The Struggle of Angola. Declaration of the Steering Committee of the Union of the Populations of Angola, Angola (Lopoldville ?), 1960, 18 p., and La lutte pour l'indépendance de l'Angola. Déclaration du Comité Directeur de l'Union des Populations de l'Angola, Angola (Lopoldville ?), 1960, 18 p. Both documents were prepared and published by the Unión das Populagens de Angola (UPA). Here the UPA is appealing to all segments of the Angolan population to unite in opposition to oppressive Portuguese rule.] For years the Portuguese colonialist policy has been to send to Angola all the poverty stricken, the failures from the metropolitan areas, and the poor and illiterate peasant families of Portugal in order to establish them as colonists on this land wrested from the native peoples. As a result, the natives, to whom the land rightfully belongs, know only the blackest misery. The influx of peasants has brought competition between Portuguese and African workers. To reduce the number of unemployed Portuguese, the colonial administration grants them a monopoly over all kinds of labor; taxi drivers,
waiters in hotels and restaurants, street sweepers, clerks in shops—all such occupations are reserved for Portuguese workers. In construction work, the foremen and artisans are all Portuguese, while only the unskilled labor is left to the Africans. Because of this gross discrimination, the Portuguese laborers are better paid and enjoy all the social advantages that are denied to their African colleagues.

All the Africans who fail to find work, either in the cities or in the country, are recruited with or without their consent as contratados. Thus, it is that today, in spite of the abolition of forced labor by the International Labour Conference held at Geneva in 1931, Portuguese colonialism upholds a slave economy, of which Angola is an outstanding example.

The forced labor market supports and, at the same time, undermines the economy of the country. Continued recourse to slavery is determined by an essential factor—the present-day state of agrarian and pre-industrial economy of Portugal and thus the shortage and lack of Portuguese capital in the control of colonial resources.

All sectors of Angolan activity are supported by a labor market based on contracts furnished by the official authorities.

Forced recruitment in itself constitutes a soul-searing sight, which recalls that of the days of trade in black slaves inaugurated on the coasts of West Africa by these same Portuguese people, following the example of the Carthaginians. No selection is made; no social position is taken into consideration; households with children are recruited and separated and assigned to different regions. At the end of a term of forced labor, the length of which is never defined because it is left to the discretion of the colonist, the members of a family may be unable to reunite because death, assassination, and often deportation—in cases of disobedience—have been perpetrated by the feudal masters, that is, the colonial administration and the colonist.

The UPA is obliged to confirm that the educational policy of the colonial government has placed the territory in a position of total obscurantism, that is to say, that it is unfavorable to Angola's emancipation, either social or political. No effort has been undertaken to give to all African children the education that, together with a favorable economy, would form the basic nourishment for the evolution of the people. Public instruction is divided into two categories: for the "civilized" and for the "uncivilized," which results in there being practically no education for the African community. This situation is fundamentally proven by the fact that the total number of primary school pupils in the colony of Angola amounts to only about 40,000 and that there are only four or five students from Angola at the universities in Portugal. Statistics concerning agricultural training are equally revealing: There is not a single African enrolled in the one agricultural training school of Angola.

It is evident that for the conditions existing in Angola, IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE of the territory would appear to be the normal solution, and relevant to the solution of all the problems of the Angolans. Independence would bring the following to the country: Internally, the country would become its own
master, that is, Angola would form an autonomous state, establish its own
democratic, responsible government, conforming to the traditions and needs of the
land--a government fully competent to direct public affairs and organize public
services, national economy, education, and public health in the best interests of all
its citizens and excluding all foreign interference; and in external affairs, Angola
would appear on the international scene to participate in world government and in
the building-up of the United States of Africa, thereby supporting the resolutions
of the All African Peoples' Conferences held at Accra and Tunis.

The UPA, conscious of its responsibility and the rights of the peoples of Angola,
declares that it is devoted in its activities to the realization and acquisition of the
immediate independence of the people, moreover, it is devoted to its acquisition
by pacific and democratic means. It will spare itself no sacrifice.

Consequently,

PEASANTS, UNEMPLOYED, FORCED LABORERS-Your duty is clear. You
are the most downtrodden. It is you who suffer most from colonial oppression.
That is why you have the greatest interest in the reestablishment of the Angolan
nation. For the past five centuries your ancestors, your parents and you yourselves
have been condemned to exert all your efforts for the enrichment of only the
Portuguese colonialists. You create the riches, but you have not the right to profit
from them. Your sweat is the grease of the colonist; your blood is sucked by the
colonial vampire; and you are left to languish in misery and humiliation.
The UPA formally pledges to bring an end to this mortal sickness of the territory
of Angola. It calls on all of you to contribute to the liquidation of Portuguese
colonialism in the national territory of Angola.

WOMEN-The women of Ghana, Guinea, Cameroun, Togo, Congo, and
Somaliland all participated in the heroic combat against colonialism. The hour is
past when the women remained at their firesides and were mere spectators of
events. Your husbands are not paid, your children are neither fed nor given
schooling; they serve only as machines to permit the colonists to live in
increasingly easy life, with the costs being the misery of the peoples of Angola.
You have the same rights as the men.
The UPA is determined to establish a democratic regime that will permit each
individual, regardless of sex, to develop his personality and contribute to the
development and productivity of the Angolan nation.

Most of the time you are requisitioned and made to work on forced labor projects.
The pitiless colonialist beast requires that you do the most inhumane and vile
labor.
The UPA considers that this scandal has lasted too long already, that the hour
has come when you should have a respectable and dignified lot in life. Wherever
you are, organize, prepare to follow and spread the orders of the UPA.
Erase fear and submission from your lives. You must prove to the occupying
power that you are conscious of the justice of your cause.

TRIBAL CMEFS-Certainly your position is difficult. For a long time you have
unknowingly served the colonialist's interests and permitted the exploitation of
the people, although your mission as chiefs was to protect and serve the people of Angola. Certain members of your group have permitted the recruitment of forced laborers and have supported the policy of heavy taxation. In a great portion of Angola their position has made them traitors.

The UPA is not ignorant of the terrible pressures you have suffered under colonialism, but it knows also that at this time, when a great movement is shaking Africa, you must not stand idly by. You must fully realize that the moment has come for you to make your choice between your country, your sons, your brothers on the one hand, and the colonists on the other. That is why we ask you to think carefully.

During the year 1960, all the African peoples are to unite their efforts for the eviction of colonialism from Africa. The African peoples and the people of Angola will be pitiless toward the men who have not been able to choose the side of justice and truth. From today onward, the people are judging you. All that you do against the people will be held against you. No longer will it be possible for a European to order a chief to blindly strike and punish his subjects at any moment and under any circumstances.

The end of despotism has come. You must understand.

YOUTH-You are the seeds of Angola; it is toward you that we all direct our hopes and our concerns. It is to you that we all look for new values—values that will make Angola's voice heard immediately in the concert of nations.

You must develop your national conscience and your human conscience. You must erase from your soul all traces of inferiority complex. You must no longer permit yourselves to be beaten down; you must take in your hands the destiny of your land and of your people. And you must stand ready as determined reserves to come to the aid of your elder brothers who are so enthusiastically setting in motion the battle for national liberation.

PORTUGUESE COLONISTS-The UPA is not the enemy of the Portuguese, but is against a system of plunder that robs our land of all existence as a nation and condemns 4.5 million inhabitants to illiteracy, humiliation and famine. The UPA is fighting with all its force against this system. It begs you not to oppose the advance of history.

Certain of your members have amassed colossal fortunes on the backs of the Angolans. They must be made to understand that the hour has come when they must make restitution to the Angolans for their land and their resources. As for the others, the UPA tells them that they may remain in Angola, in newly found peace, so that together we may work for the establishment of an Angolan Republic—a democratic and socially just Republic.

PORTUGUESE PEOPLE-You know, you are not ignorant of the lamentable state in which the people of Angola find themselves. Colonists who have come from Portugal, supported by the army and a pitiless administration, have brought an unbelievable reign of terror to a population of 4.5 million people.

The UPA calls upon all the democrats, workers, Christians, and men of good faith in Portugal to unite their efforts, to work against this disgrace to the twentieth century, which dishonors and disgraces the name of Portugal.
PORTUGUESE STATE-The regime that the UPA will establish in Angola will be democratic. It will be democratic because the power will be exercised by the people for the people. It will be socially just because the power will be exercised directly and specifically by the most needy masses. The lands will be distributed to those who work them.

The UPA will abolish all the special privileges and exceptions established by your representatives. The women will also have the right to vote. Privileges will be abolished; each person will have an equal right to education. Unemployment will be declared a national emergency and every means will be used to eradicate it.

Every male and female inhabitant of Angola, regardless of nationality, race, or religion, will have identical rights, both as individuals and in regard to their possessions.

The emancipating movement of the colonial peoples is strongly established. It has acquired extraordinary power in numbers and today is irresistible. Men who refuse to take into consideration the prodigious wave of independence that is sweeping the world are unrealistic and irresponsible.

The people of Africa, from Algeria to the Cape, have come to their feet with the cry and warning: "AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS."

The UPA is certain that you will fulfill your responsibilities. As for ourselves, we have already undertaken our own, and any resistance to the Movement is destined to be a total failure.

AFRICAN PEOPLES-Our continent, which is in the shape of an interrogation point, has in its heart the destiny of all of present-day mankind. For, so long in bondage, it is commencing to make its voice heard in the concert of nations. No African can remain indifferent to the existence of colonialism on our continent. Each one of us has a definite duty to perform: to liquidate the colonial regime, the colonialistic spirit, the colonial ideal, and to establish democracy in Africa, to construct the United States of Africa on the foundation of the autonomy of the democratic units that will compose it.

Taking into consideration the resolutions adopted at the Congresses of Bandung, Cairo, Accra, Tunis, and Conakry, and taking into account the watchwords of liberty, independence, and action in Africa, the UPA is determined to join battle against Portuguese colonialism and continue the fight to total victory. It expects all the independent African states to unconditionally aid and support its movement. It expects all men, all women to give their full support, for a free Africa is the common undertaking of the 200 million souls who make up the population of this great continent.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION-The UPA pledges itself to spare no effort in bringing to an end, by peaceful means, the reign of the occupying power, which controls the human and economic interests of the Portuguese.

Are not the people of Angola essentially a peace-loving people? In spite of repression, torture, oppression, exploitation, humiliation, in spite of slavery, the Angolan people have always given proof of absolute pacifism, not from moral
weakness, but because of their firm belief that between men there is always the possibility of a peaceful solution to any problem. And today it is time for the Portuguese to respond to this call.
The UPA calls upon the world to be its witness.
The solidly entrenched camp of colonialism, which is Angola today, is a disgrace to all of humanity. It is the duty of every man worthy of the name to participate in the restoration of human dignity in Angola.
The UPA calls upon all international organizations and bodies to bring pressure on Portugal so that the regime of exploitation and wilful genocide in Angola will cease, and so that the territory will recover its independence of ancient days.

LONG LIVE FREE AND INDEPENDENT ANGOLA! LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF AFRICA!

II
LEADERSHIP
Selected writings of two leaders, Holden Roberto and Emmanuel Kounzika, permit their ideas and intentions to be evaluated from a nationalistic standpoint. Both leaders represent the coalition Frente Nacional de Libertagqo de Angola (FNLA). The selections are excerpts from original documents and are presented in chronological order.

Holden Roberto
[Born on January 12, 1925, in the town of S–o Salvador in northern Angola, Roberto spent the greater part of his life attending Congo schools and working with the finance department of the Belgian Congo administration and with a Portuguese commercial firm in Ldopoldville. Thereafter he entered politics. The following excerpts are from a press interview in 1960.]
I went to work in the Belgian administration in the Congo as an official in the finance department in Ldopoldville. Then I went to Stanleyville, and then to Bukavu. I left the administration in 1952 and went to work for a commercial company--Portuguese--in Ldopoldville. Then I went into politics--that was in 1954....
I had to make four trips into Angola, and I noticed the difference between the living conditions in the Congo and in Angola. I realized that this injustice should not exist and that I must work to ameliorate this state of affairs in my country ....

I saw privation, forced labor. When I was living in Angola before, I was young and had no basis for comparison. After the Second World War, conditions in the Congo began to change, but Angola remained in the same stagnation as before. This stagnation struck me very forcibly. I could not see this injustice continue....
Our movement was founded in 1954. We were a group of seven persons who began it. We are all still alive and in action. For security reasons I shall not mention their names because some of them are living inside Angola. Our movement is called the UPA to show that it is not a tribal movement, but that is was founded on a national scale. The persons involved in its foundation came from different ethnic groups....
They [the Portuguese] knew of it straight away, but tried not to show their emotion. In 1956, they arrested several militants--who are still in exile today. Our movement was the first nationalist movement in Angola. Our aim is independence. In my language they call it Kimpwanza. We are completely opposed to integration with Portugal. The people of Angola and the people of Portugal are two completely different peoples--ethnically, linguistically, culturally, historically. Consequently, to wish to consider the two peoples as one is, as they say in a proverb in my language, to call a tree trunk a crocodile. Relations between Angola and Portugal must be those between independent sovereign states....

I left [the Congo] on September 12 in order to make our case known on the international level. I think that I can say, without exaggeration, that this aim has been realized. When I left I travelled through the Cameroun and Nigeria, to Accra, where I participated in the First All African Peoples' Conference. Then I travelled to the United States, where at the 14th U. N. General Assembly I established contact with [representatives of] the Afro-Asian states. My visit was then, however, clandestine, because if it had been public, reprisals might have been taken against my family. That was in 1959. I don't know if the Portuguese knew of my visit, but the rumor was circulating in the Congo and in Angola that I had gone to Accra en route to the United States....

I travelled to Tunis to attend the Second All African Peoples' Conference, where I was elected to the Steering Committee, which meets twice a year to consider African questions. Then I travelled to Ghana, Guinde, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo--not to speak of England, France, Switzerland, and Italy--before going to Ethiopia as a petitioner to the Second Conference of Independent African States. Now I have returned to New York to continue the work that was begun here last year....

I would simply like to say that the work that was begun here in 1959 has born fruit. This year, in contrast to last year, many voices spoke up about the Portuguese colonies. Take the African states, for example. This year all the African voices, without a single exception, spoke up on this question--that is to say, all 24 African states. In the Fourth Committee, they all chose to join with the Asian bloc. To these powerful voices were added those of Latin America. In the light of all the information that was given to them concerning the Portuguese colonies, certain European countries, which formerly showed solidarity with Portugal, were confronted with a question of conscience. Therefore, they could not avoid voting against Portugal, and Portugal found herself isolated more than ever. Certain delegates--I cite, for example, the delegate of Morocco--said to the Portuguese delegate that his country did not envy the isolation in which Portugal found herself placed during the debate in the Fourth Committee....

[The headquarters of the UPA] is in L6opoldville. That is because of the lack of liberty in Angola. But as soon as it becomes possible, we shall transfer our offices to Angola. I may add that we have a publication, A Voz da Naglo Angolana, which has a monthly circulation of twenty thousand. It is published in four
languages—French, Portuguese, Kikongo, and Kimbundu. I am the managing editor....
I do not smoke and I do not drink. Five years ago I used to enjoy soccer. I played in several international matches in Africa—notably against Rhodesia, Brazzaville, and Cameroun. I played on a team that represented the Province of Lopoldville....
I have read a good many books—including, for example, books by Nkrumah, Azikiwe, Nehru, and other leading writers of our times. I might also say that I was most impressed by a manuscript that was written by my grandfather. The story is this: when the Protestant missionaries first came to Angola, he was one of the first people with whom they were in contact. He cooperated closely with them, and helped them with the translation of the Bible. He also played a leading part in combating witchcraft and domestic slavery—perhaps because he was once sold as a slave himself. He personally wrote a manuscript against the slavery practiced by the Portuguese, and he wanted the missionaries to publish it. But they were afraid to do so lest it compromise their position in the country. I possess this manuscript. He was imprisoned for a year because of nationalist activities. During that time, he was chained with his hands and feet tightly bound together and was forced to eat as best he could. Nor could he see the light of day, as he was locked in a house. That was from 1914 to 1915. In reading his manuscript, I have been most impressed by the tenacity with which he carried on his fight for his ideas. It has constituted an inspiration to me in our struggle....

* * * *
Press Conference (1960)
[Given under the pseudonym of Jos6 Gilmore on June 10 (?), 1960, and issued as a three-page mimeographed release in France. Here Roberto describes the past activities of his movement, outlines its objectives, and appeals for international support.]

In the name of the Political Bureau of the Unilo das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA), I thank you for having responded to my invitation. You know of the serious events that have occurred in Africa these past few months. These events, all of which clear the way for the successive liberation of African territories, stem from a number of causes....
The UPA, which (for several years) has been fighting for the end of the regime of iniquity exercised by Portugal, has decided to appeal to world opinion, asking that each person accept his responsibilities. The UPA was established on July 11, 1954, formed by peasants who spontaneously and clandestinely grouped together to put an end to the systematic policy of expropriation being applied by the Portuguese colonists....
The UPA, which channelled all the bitterness and anger of the Angolan people, today expresses the national Angolan will. The UPA led its first great battle on December 25, 1955, when it called for a general strike among forced laborers. Of five million Angolans, there are still seven hundred thousand requisitioned Angolans who, led by guards, are sent to plantations of Portuguese colonists. On May 7, 1956, the UPA distributed tracts throughout the country inviting forced
laborers to join the general strike. For ten days not a single blow of a pickax was felt on the lands of the colonists. Certain colonists in the region of Uige did not hesitate to beat more than ten Angolan peasants to death. The Angolan people grieved again this month at burying more than twenty of their own. But the signal has been given. Workers, oppressed ones as always, be aware that there exists a force that will defend you and lead you to victory. In 1958, before the development of repression in Angola, the Executive Committee of the UPA decided to send abroad a delegate charged with informing world opinion of the racist, inhumane policy of Portuguese colonialism. Thus, in December 1958, Angola was admitted as a member of the All African Peoples' Conference. And thus the problem of the Portuguese colonies was discussed in the 14th General Assembly of the United Nations, when the claims of Portugal concerning the consideration of its colonies as an integral part of Portuguese territory were

unanimously rejected by the international organization. The UPA delegate was given a warm, brotherly reception by the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations. Following this debate, a committee of six member nations (Morocco, India, Mexico, the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands) was appointed to study the situation of territories that are not self-governed, in accordance with the principles of the Charter ....

Today, the UPA, aware of the responsibilities that it is assuming toward the Angolan people, toward Africa, and toward history, makes a solemn appeal to the Portuguese government and people to agree to negotiate as soon as possible on ending the colonial regime and recognizing national Angolan sovereignty. The UPA clearly states to the Portuguese government that it has decided to lead the glorious fight for the end of colonial oppression and for the blossoming of the Angolan personality. No compromise will be made on this point. We will first lead our struggle politically, because we feel that when all Africa is freed, as often as possible by peaceful means, Portugal must reject certain methods, as French colonialism is today illustrating. As the French colonialists are being fought and will sooner or later capitulate in the face of the extraordinary heroism of the Algerian people, so Portugal, if it chooses violence, will also recognize that one cannot effectively oppose the unanimous will of the Angolan people. The UPA speaks to the democrats of the world and asks them to help in putting an end to the oppression of five million men. It also speaks to world opinion and asks it to condemn Portuguese colonialism without reserve and to promote the triumph of liberty on this land of Africa, which has suffered for five hundred years.

Long live liberty!
Long live Angola!

Memorandum to the United Nations (1960)

[In October 1960, Roberto presented to the 15th U. N. General Assembly his "Memorandum on the Situation Regarding Angola and the Portuguese Colonies," Leopoldville, 1960, 5 p., mimeographed. More or less the same speech was delivered to the Addis Ababa conference of independent African nations that took place from June 14 to June 24, 1960.]
It is with full consciousness of the immensity of the noble task that is incumbent upon you that we address ourselves to you in the name of the people of Angola. Two important facts characterize the present general situation, in Angola in particular, and in the other Portuguese colonies in Africa in general. These are, on the one hand, the immense economic retardation, both social and political, which is maintained by the existence of forced labor, by the spoilation of the lands of the native inhabitants for the profit of the Portuguese colonists, by the total absence of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, by the Portuguese authorities’ refusal to recognize all the recommendations contained in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter relating to territories that are not selfgoverned and, on the other hand, the firm and resolute will of the African populations to reconquer their national independence within the framework of the African community.

Since the Portuguese colonialists know that the peoples of Africa wish to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism, they dispatch to Angola their cannons, their warships, their airplanes, and their troops. Not a day passes without the arrival in some African port, called Portuguese, of new reinforcements and new instruments of destruction. Thus, in Angola today, we find ourselves confronted with a situation that must be qualified as explosive: arrests, tortures, and deportations into the interior of Angola; the evacuation of the rural populations to the interior without concern for their future means of existence; the establishment of protective cordons along the length of the frontiers; the destruction of radio receivers to hinder the reception of foreign broadcasts. The virus that the Portuguese colonialists wish to ban from Angola is none other than the virus of freedom.

Numerous bellicose declarations from the highest Portuguese authorities match this organized repression. All the governmental newspapers daily reaffirm the will of the Portuguese government to maintain Portuguese domination over what are cynically called Portuguese Overseas Provinces....

Contrary to the allegations of Portugal, Angola and the other African territories under Portuguese domination are colonies, since a colonial territory, one must understand, is a territory dominated by a foreign power and in which, economically, socially, and from every other point of view, the indigenous population is exploited, dominated, and enslaved.

According to the terms of Article 134 of the Portuguese Constitution, Portuguese colonies are known as provinces. Article 135 of this same Constitution stipulates that the overseas provinces, as an integral part of the Portuguese state, are united among themselves and with Portugal. BEFORE 1951 THESE TERRITORIES WERE KNOWN UNDER THE NAME OF COLONIES, BUT THE NEW TERMINOLOGY OF PROVINCES WAS ESTABLISHED BY AN AMENDMENT OF JUNE 11, 1951, that is, after the creation of the United Nations, and with the intention of avoiding the circumstance whereby these territories would fall within U. N. jurisdiction in case of the eventual admission of the country of Salazar into the international organization.
Article 33 of the Portuguese Constitution speaks of the classic mission of Portugal, which is to extend the benefits of civilization to the overseas provinces. These are objectives that correspond singularly to one of the aims of the United Nations Charter. What the Charter asks for is information about the diffusion of the benefits of this civilization. If these are diffused, if there truly exists progress in the social and cultural domain, then let this information be supplied on this basis without the least apprehension.

It is impossible not to observe that the Portuguese thesis is destroyed by the facts and is not in harmony with the criteria mentioned in the Charter to determine whether or not a territory is self-governing; that is,

a) Sufficient political advancement of the populations to give them the power to decide the future destiny of the territory by democratic procedures.

b) The functioning of a representative system of government, with periodic elections in which the populations may fully participate, or other democratic procedures whereby the populations may freely express their will.

c) The enjoyment of individual rights, including:

i) The freedom of the individual and his capacity to participate and to have a voice in the government;

ii) The guarantee of fundamental rights, that is, freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of religion, and the right to a fair trial;

iii) Universal suffrage for adults;

iv) Freedom of the individual to be a member of political parties and, for all political parties, the right to participate freely in the political life of the territory.

d) The absence of any pressure on or coercion of the population so that it may be in a position that permits it to express its views freely as to the national or international status that it may desire (accession to independence, accession to other forms of autonomy, or free association as an integral part of the metropolitan territory or of another country).

Besides, all the fundamental liberties of man, as they are defined by the Universal Declaration of December 10, 1948, are violated by fascist laws. Thus it is that the fundamental principles of the NATO Treaty, which are to safeguard the freedom of national heritages and the civilizations of the populations, and which are founded on the principles of democracy, of individual freedom, and of the rule of law, are flouted by Portugal, which is, however, one of the founding members. It even follows that the constitutional rights of persons living under the Portuguese flag are not everywhere the same in that the Portuguese legislators have instituted different statuses: status as civilized and status as non-civilized. Thus, the civilized are the inhabitants of Portugal, of the Agores islands, of Madeira, Cabo Verde, Slo Tom6 and Pfrncipe, of Goa, Macao, and of Timor. The distinction between civilized and noncivilized persons is applied only to the inhabitants of Angola, Mogambique, and Portuguese Guinge, especially to the black inhabitants of the said territories who bear the heavy burdens of forced labor, of illiteracy, and of physical torture.

As we have just seen, the conditions existing in the Portuguese colonies leave no doubt as to their falling within the category of territories, as indicated in Article
73 of the Charter. The native inhabitants do not participate in political life and are, in general, hindered from obtaining an education, which is the basis of preparation for political life; they are refused virtually all right to vote; and the assimilados themselves are never eligible for election. In defining its Article 73--responsibilities of the administering powers as members of the United Nations, in relation to the peoples for whom they assume the administration--the Charter has given a magnificent illustration of its total adherence to the inalienable principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. In effect, the unequivocal recognition that the interests of the populations of the dependent territories should be the primary concern of the administering powers constitutes a solid base permitting the United Nations to cooperate in the peaceful solution of existing colonialism. Article 73 of the Charter, in this respect, must be interpreted as the will of all the peoples to establish among themselves bonds of solidarity and of friendship based on their absolute equality and respect for their national institutions. The United Nations would fail in its aim if it did not recognize the indivisibility of liberty and of peace in concerning itself with the re-establishment of the cultural identity of peoples deprived of their sovereignty and thus injured, with respect to both their identity and their dignity. It is clear that the principles so nobly inscribed in the Charter will not help the dependent peoples except to the degree to which the administering powers and all the members of the United Nations ensure that those principles are faithfully applied. But this is not the case, up to the present moment, with regard to Portugal and Spain.

There is no doubt that under the pressure of the Afro-Asian bloc and of the Latin American countries, the United Nations can exercise a healthy pressure on Portugal to bring it to a better conception of its role. At the moment when the whole of Africa is liberating itself, it is neither just nor normal that Portugal should tranquilly continue its domination over immense African, and even Asian, territories. Certainly, the people of Angola do not wait for independence to be offered them by the United Nations, but they feel that our brothers of Africa, Asia, and Latin America might consider a double action against Portuguese colonialism, as follows:

1. Within the framework of the Fourth Committee, the action undertaken since the 11th Session of the Assembly, reinforced at the 14th Session, begins to bear some fruits and should be pursued. The delegates of the countries of Africa, of Asia, and of Latin America owe it to themselves, furthermore, to speak out—in their discussions of a general nature about the information from non-self-governing territories on the conditions prevailing in territories under Portuguese domination, just as if Portugal had transmitted information. The information that we make it our duty to place at your disposal may be useful to you.

2. After the debacle of English, French, and Belgian colonialism, Portugal nowadays figures as a bastion of colonialism and a defender of colonialistic principles. Since decolonization is essentially a political problem, it is time to consider taking the question of the Portuguese colonies before the First Committee. An attempt in this direction must be made at this session. The fact that Portuguese repression has not yet attained the proportions of French repression in Algeria cannot constitute a
reason for those who wish to deny the inscription of the question of Portuguese colonialism on the agenda of the Assembly. Such an inscription, on the contrary, will constitute a contribution of great importance to the cause of independence and of freedom for the Portuguese colonies, and will be very much appreciated, notably by the Angolan people, whose revolt against colonial methods risks manifesting itself in an explosive manner.

Press Statement (1961)

Roberto's statement was distributed in English by the American Committee on Africa in New York and is dated March 15, 1961, the day on which rebellion broke out in northern Angola. He explains the rebellion as a response to forced labor conditions imposed by a Portuguese colonial regime. I thank you in the name of the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) and of its Executive Committee for having responded to my invitation in such numbers.

You are all aware that momentous events have taken place in Africa during these recent months. These events flow from the successive liberation of African territories and stem, notably, from the basic realization of a historic fact that, in a nutshell, is this: Africans will no longer accept the domination of foreigners. This is the will of African men and women who are resolutely prepared to fight under this slogan, cost what it may. At the same time, it must be recognized that there is no possibility, psychological or moral, for colonial powers to continue their domination of Africans, confronted as they are with the unanimous will of the democratically minded people, who are becoming the majority in this world of ours.

Very recently the Portuguese conducted a massacre of horrendous proportions in Angola. The UPA, which for years has been struggling against the iniquities practiced by the Portuguese, is carrying an appeal to international opinion in order to place before the world some knowledge of its responsibility to the Angolans.

The Portuguese have been quite sensitive to the charge of destruction and rape of their colony. They are apt to protest very loudly when it is pointed out that forced labor is an institution of the Portuguese colonial system. Their howls of denial, however, are the best evidence of the existence of the system they have been trying to keep hidden, and the whole world recognizes their angry protest as an open confession of their guilt.

Parenthetically, it is important to note that the decree on the abolition of forced labor was published in Angola as late as July 13, 1959, and only then because the first African Conference of the International Labour Organisation was being held in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The delay in the application of the decree is typical of the Portuguese disinclination to carry out in fact what Portugal feigns to be its policy. It is equally appropriate to point out that although Portugal has ratified the convention on Forced Labor, the labor system in Angola has not been modified accordingly; in fact, forced labor is on the increase. It is not necessary to point out that forced labor is nothing but slavery in modern dress.

In amplification, you must know that the African worker is obliged to abandon everything--his home, his family, his land, for the compulsory accomplishment of
work for a Portuguese master. For twelve months this unhappy deportee is some sort of beast of the field who may be turned out at any time of day to work. He is a deportee in the sense that the Portuguese authorities make sure each person selected for forced labor is sent to an outlying part of his region, far from home. Upon his return, moneyless and feeble, he all too often finds his home and family in a pitiable state and his lands confiscated on the pretext that they had been abandoned.

The recruitment of forced labor is nothing more nor less than a business affair for the benefit of a number of individuals who, of course, are members of the administration: district commissioners, secretaries, administrators and governors. These latter are hand in hand with the big companies and the colonials who offer small, and sometimes large, sums for their cooperation.

To crown it all, the African who is subjected to this sacrifice is not even paid a decent wage. After twelve months of dogged labor, he earns between one and two thousand escudos—a pitiful $35-70. As if this were not shameful enough, one half of his earnings is retained by his "employer" by requirement of the law for the payment of taxes that all workers must pay. The tax amounts to 245 escudos or $8.57, some 32 percent of his annual salary. The remainder is not the worker's to keep; deductions for purchases from the company store see to that. The worker is lucky to return to his home and family with the shirt on his back.

This, very briefly, is a picture of forced labor in Angola. What other name is there for this system, and how can it not be considered as genocide—this destruction of the home, this deportation from one's own soil. Is it not a systematic and deliberate policy of the destruction of African society in Angola? Is it not clear that the Portuguese are practicing this system with the objective of expropriating the entire territory of Angola?

Gentlemen: The Portuguese colonial regime, living in its own little dream world, proclaims incessantly that nothing will make it change its policy in Angola. Now, since the realization has dawned on them that the African peoples intend to cast off the yoke of colonialism, the Portuguese have been dispatching their guns, their warships, their combat aircraft, their soldiers. This is the Portuguese government's response to the unshakable will of the Africans of Angola! The Angolan people have multiplied their appeals to the Portuguese government for the end of the regime of slavery and for the construction of new relationships, man-to-man instead of master-to-slave, but the Salazar dictatorship responds with new methods of destruction.

We do not say to the Portuguese colonial, "You are a foreigner. Go away!" We do not say to him, "We are going to take over the running of the country and make you pay for your crimes and those of your ancestors." We do not want to supplant a hatred for the black with a new hatred for the white. We say to him, "We are Angolans; banish from our land all racism, all forms of oppression, of injustice, all attempts to keep our people in ignorance, and let us work together for the flowering of mankind and the enrichment of humanity." The colonial replies to us
that the Portuguese government supports him, that Portugal will never relinquish Angola and will resort to force to prevent us from being free. ... The colonial regime was established in violence and endures in violence. But this is no abstract violence or mere spiritual violence. The daily routine of the Portuguese colonizer expresses itself in forced labor, "deportations," assassinations, and racist hatred. This is a very real and painful violence. It affects not only the soul, but also the muscles, the blood. It is an avalanche of violence which knows no bounds and has engendered violence on the part of the Angolans-just anger that is aching to express itself.

It is the role of our party to look out for our peoples' destiny, to dam their tendencies to violence and channel them into constructive political action. For a human spirit, contemplating the unfolding of history corresponding to the universal level, violence must first of all be combated by the language of truth and reason.

But, alas, however much as we may deplore it, it sometimes happens that enslavement leads to the inducement of violence in the soul of the enslaved, but this is an indication of the latter's bestial existence. This is a defense mechanism, nothing more than an instinct for self-preservation.

The UPA has let the Portuguese government know in no uncertain terms of its decision to wage the combat for the end of the colonial regime. There is no compromise. We shall conduct our struggle first of all on the political level, because Portugal, unlike other colonial powers, has rejected any pacific methods that would lead to liberation as experienced in most of the rest of Africa. Other colonizers were not able to maintain their domination in the face of the will of the African peoples. Even

the use of violence will not permit the Portuguese to flout the unanimous will of the people of Angola. In an Africa fighting for liberty, there is no place for those who are unable to recognize the aspirations of the masses toward justice and liberty.

The UPA addresses itself to democratically minded people of the whole world and invites them to help end the oppression of 4.5 million people. We address ourselves to international opinion and request that Portuguese colonialism be condemned without reserve, that favor be found for the triumph of liberty in this African land that has suffered for five hundred years.

LONG LIVE LIBERTY!
LONG LIVE ANGOLA!
On the First Anniversary of the Revolution (1962)

[Excerpts from Roberto's speech delivered in Lgopoldville on March 15, 1962, were distributed in English by Angola Calling, the UPA bulletin published in New York City.]

The war we are now engaged in and which we shall conduct until the final victory is a just war. It is motivated not by hate or vengeance but by the strong determination of the Angolan nation to be free and independent in dignity and pride. The whole world knows that this war will end only with the final victory of
the Angolan people. Only a blind colonialism could ever believe that it could resist the emancipation movement sweeping all of Africa.
Yes, Africa is liberating itself and will soon be completely free. In another part of Africa, a valiant people--our Algerian brothers--are about to liberate themselves, earning at last a most striking victory over one of the most powerful countries in the world, because nothing can resist the African people's determination when they yearn for freedom and human dignity.
We know that Salazar's government is meeting with more and more problems because of this situation. That is why we must intensify our struggle, with confidence in a victory that will finally reconcile a free and independent Angolan people and the Portuguese people and eliminate colonialism and fascism. On the world level, the Portuguese economy is beginning to feel the repercussions of our revolutionary spirit.

In a part of Angola, forced labor has stopped. Over four thousand plantations have been burned down, and the communications question has become a serious problem in the north of the country.
In the United Nations, we won a magnificent victory: Ninety-nine countries voted against Portugal, thus showing their unanimous opposition to the Portuguese attitude. Even some of its oldest allies, like England, have voted in our favor thus approving our struggle.
On the internal level, a lot has been done during these past twelve months. The military and economic machinery of those who have everlastingly enriched themselves on the back of the Angolan people was destroyed.
The propaganda machinery repeats tirelessly that the war is over and the refugees are back in their homes. In spite of the Portuguese efforts to persuade the world that the war is over in Angola, we keep getting from the outside world news of battles that are taking place inland. Every battle you undertake is a flat contradiction of the Portuguese assertions.
Other brotherly people had the chance to attain freedom without paying the heavy tribute of blood. We have, unfortunately, had to follow the same path as the Algerians with the difference, however, that Portugal will never be able to resist for seven years.
Of all the countries of Africa, we ask help and support, even of those who did not pay the price we are paying. To all African countries still in slavery we say that this date must be for them, as well as for all the others, a date of pride and of hope. For it is out of African pride that we have resorted to arms to drive out the enemy from the national territory.
Five centuries of ruthless colonization did not succeed in dehumanizing our people because the African spirit never dies. Won't this be a cause for pride and hope for all our African brothers still under the rule of colonialism?
Let's pause a brief moment, my brothers, and let's think particularly of those in suffering, mainly in Mozambique, in Guinée so-called Portuguese, Cape Verde, and Rhodesia, and South Africa. We will pass on to them the freedom torch we are carrying.
And you, heroic fighters of the Angolan cause, as you fight, you dig the tomb of your oppressors. I want you now, men and women, children and old people, to wrap yourselves up in meditation and think of those who fell so you could live free. They fell in the field of honor for a just cause and their sons will live with freedom, without which life is nothing. I ask you to fight with the courage of your ancestors, and free Angola will live on forever after. Then the tears and the shame of five centuries will be washed out, and we shall hold up our heads to say: We are Angolans!

We are Africans!

Statement to the U. N. Special Committee (1962)

[Roberto's views were presented at the 33rd meeting of the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on May 24, 1962, and published by the United Nations as Document A/AC. 108/25 on August 9, 1962. He focuses on Portuguese colonialism and economic and social conditions before and after the uprising of March 1961.]

Since 1952, more than a score of African countries have regained or won their independence, and others will proclaim theirs in the months to come. But this movement, which historians unanimously consider one of the most rapid processes in history, has unfortunately been deflected from its course; as a result there are still large dirty patches on the map of liberty between the Transvaal and the Sahara, although this is the area where the movement has made the fastest progress. There is, however, one difference. In 1952 most of the African countries, if not all of them in certain respects, were the victims of a destiny in which their own wishes played no part whatever; yet, though that destiny was similar for all, it compelled each of them to act in isolation, like a family of prisoners who struggle alone, each by his own efforts, to break the bars of their cells. Today, however, when the seed sown in sorrow, with blood and tears, has borne its fruit, the African family, conscious of its obligations, has realized that its primary duty is that of complete solidarity with those of its children who are carrying on the fight for their freedom. We rejoice in this clear and realistic collective consciousness, and in the unanimous will to preserve this same solidarity in achieving Africa's true destiny. Thus the existence of the independent nations in Africa testifies to the truth that sooner or later right will triumph and that, in the mid-twentieth century, it is no longer possible for a minority to dominate, enslave and oppress others, whatever fallacious arguments it may advance.

The problem of the Portuguese colonies has already caused much ink to flow. Millions of words have already been spoken, and dozens of United Nations meetings have been devoted to this problem. Today we meet here, a few kilometers from Angola, with the distinguished members of the international organization whose foremost task is to defend the rights of oppressed peoples; and we do so to the disappointment and great disillusionment of those who steadily raised objections so that this mission might prove unsuccessful and have no outcome. But, thanks to your
persistent efforts, here you are, only a few steps from Angola; and you will thus
be able to serve as spokesmen for millions of souls that aspire for freedom and
independence.
As you know, Angola has lived under a colonial regime for five centuries.
Portugal's colonial policy is universally known, and all free minds are aware that
Portuguese domination is an insult to mankind. The indigenous Angolan has no
rights. He has only obligations to his master: obligations to work fourteen hours a
day; to keep silent when he is insulted and beaten; to acquiesce when he is
deported and his family scattered; and to pay tax, not because of his wealth, but
because he enjoys Portuguese protection; and so on.
There is nothing equivocal about Portuguese colonialism. On the contrary, it is
characterized by exceptional simplicity: the black must submit without a murmur
to the law of the Christian white man; it is the black man's glory and good fortune
to be enslaved by the Portuguese. The result, for the indigenous inhabitant, is no
political life, no participation in elections, no part in governing the country; the
indigenous masses constitute a pool of manpower available for forced labor at
will, with no present and no future. For the past five centuries, moreover,
Portuguese colonialism has worked tirelessly to decimate and brutalize the
indigenous population by fire and sword, by hunger or terrorism; hence, over the
generations, Portuguese colonialism has dominated millions of men in Angola.
The economic side of the Angolan situation is just as dramatic: 98 percent of the
indigenous population have an annual income of less than $25. In contrast, the
towns inhabited by the Portuguese are flourishing and building goes on apace,
because the Portuguese minority is making money out of Angola at a fearful rate,
and Angolan raw materials are making the fortunes of the Portuguese traders,
farmers, and businessmen. As for the human situation, 4.5 million Angolans are
living under the domination of 300 thousand Portuguese, whose chief
characteristics are arrogance and racism. For many decades, however, individual
Angolan patriots have been trying to initiate discussions with the Portuguese
authorities in order to study the possibilities of changing the colonial system. The
Portuguese reply to each overture has been prompt, brutal, and merciless: arrests,
deportations, forced labor, and executions.
In 1954, our movement was formed, with discussion and cooperation as its goal;
but as great upheavals succeeded one another in Africa and the world at large, and
as the Angolan people unanimously accepted our program, Portuguese
colonialism--instead of heeding the voice of reason and satisfying the legitimate
aspirations of the Angolan people in accordance with the various
recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly--plunged into a
merciless war.
For the past fifteen months, the effects of this decision on the national territory of
Angola have been horrifying. Several thousand are dead and tens of thousands
wounded; a few of the latter have managed to reach Congolese national territory,
but most have dragged themselves into the jungle to die and become the prey of
wild
beasts. Hundreds of square kilometers of plantations and crops laid waste by Portuguese barbarity; thousands of villages razed to the ground, hospitals shelled and destroyed; 200 thousand refugees in Congolese national territory in flight from the murderous will of Portuguese colonialism: Such is the record of the war policy pursued by Portugal in Angola.

For all these reasons the two major political parties, the genuine representatives of the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan indigenous masses--the Unifio das Populações de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA)--realizing the urgency created by the new and daily more difficult problems attendant upon the spread of the present armed conflict in Angola, resolved not only to join forces in a national liberation front, which they did on March 27, 1962, but also to set up a provisional government, now endorsed by the Angolan people in their struggle to carry on the Angolan revolution. And the provisional government of the Angolan Republic in exile, conscious of its role, has decided to lead the national resistance until final victory is achieved.

Although much blood has flowed since March 15, 1961, and for five centuries the Angolan people have had to count hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dead, the victims of Portuguese colonial barbarity, we have never ceased to believe that negotiation could have spared our country further battering. Even as the Portuguese authorities continuously proclaimed their will to exterminate the Angolan people, we have never ceased to advocate a meeting between the Angolan people's true representatives and the government of Portugal with a view to finding a solution in keeping both with the Angolan people's rights to independence and with the interests of the Portuguese government. That government has rejected all our offers and, in return, decided to step up its repressive measures against the Angolan people, who are in revolt against dictatorship and brutalization crowned by pillage, forced labor, and murder.

Letter to Neto (1962)

[On August 9, 1962, Roberto replied to a letter dated a day earlier from Agostinho Neto. The reply was mimeographed as two pages by Roberto's movement in Léopoldville. It illustrates the difficulty encountered in efforts to unite diverse nationalist movements. I]

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 8, 1962, and thank you for it. It is regrettable that one day after contact had been made between the Frente Nacional de Libertagão de Angola (FNLA) and your party, the Movimento Popular de Libertagão de Angola (MPLA), a letter indirectly taking up again the serious, calumnious, and biased accusations that have always kept us apart should come to me, thus destroying the hope that had arisen from our first meeting, in which it had been decided to establish a committee to study the eventual collaboration of our respective parties.

In view of this, I cannot fail to ask myself what moved you to send me such a letter, compromising almost all the chances, on which both of us had been counting, for a meeting in the near future. The prospects for such a meeting were made clear to you by our delegation when, after examining the documents presented to your delegation, you recognized (giving the impression of sincerity)
the guilt of the authors of these documents and the necessity for your party (the MPLA) to collaborate with the Front. You cannot deny this, because you signed, jointly with our delegation, a communiqué, the original of which is in our possession.

I am therefore surprised that a man such as you appeared to be, and whom we considered more reasonable than certain leaders of the MPLA, has judged that your letter, with all that it contains of an insinuating, vexating and provocative nature, would be more effective than the spirit that seemed to prevail at our first meeting. It was because of this spirit that a communiqué, too compromising to make public, had been agreed upon. Considering your latest feelings, I can no longer see the reason for this communiqué.

This being the case, and in the light of the insulting terms of your letter, allow me to tell you that the invitation you sent to me is, at the very least, inopportune for the time being.

In the body of your letter you indirectly make allusion to your imprisonment. Allow me to tell you that this should not need to be a slogan for a sincere patriot, because this is the treatment the colonialists reserve for all those who demand their right to freedom. Moreover, there are many other innocent compatriots with whom I collaborated for many years, whose names I must withhold because they are still courageously wallowing in the prisons, not having had a chance to regain their liberty as you have. If I, and many other real patriots, had once fallen into the hands of the Portuguese, liberation would have been nothing but a hallucination. There would have been no deportation--just pure and simple execution. The Angolan people know this and make their judgement.

As for the disorganization of Angolan nationalism that you cite in your letter--it exists only in your own imagination, which takes precedence over action in your party, the MPLA. Creation of confusion; a policy of systematic disparagement and defamation; an instinct of superiority; corruption--all characterize your party. A policy of this kind crowned with corruption cannot succeed, because the dispossessed millions of Angola will one day see, behind the dialectic of the MPLA, entrenched neocolonialism with which certain people intend to keep the people in perpetual slavery.

Consequently, there is no need to reply to your insinuations, which are unwarranted, just as are those of your guilty collaborators. I attach absolutely no importance to them.

Speech to U. N. Fourth Committee (1962)

[Roberto's speech of November 27, 1962, is translated from "Intervention de Mr. Holden Roberto, president du Comité Exécutif du Front National de Libération Angolaise, devant la 4e Commission des Nations Unies, le 27 novembre 1962," 15 p., mimeographed. Here the focus is on Portuguese atrocities and the problems of Angolans seeking refuge in the Congo (Léopoldville).]

On September 27, Mdrio Miguel, his wife Tereza, their children David and Joaquim, and their nephews Josè Bento and Ambrôzio Bento were arrested at the Kage checkpoint in the Cambamba forest. There, each one of them was
slaughtered, one after the other. On September 29, eighty-five persons perished in
the forest of Yina, Nova Caïpemba, following a bombardment. Every day
Portuguese aircraft spew napalm bombs by the hundreds; no region of our country
is spared. More than a thousand villages have already disappeared from the face
of the earth. On October 15 of this year, three Angolan families coming from
Quitexez, trying to reach the Republic of the Congo, were captured at the edge of
the M'Bridge river by a Portuguese patrol. Of the three families, among whom
there were nine children, only Joad Figueiredo was able to escape. He owed his
good fortune only to the twilight that was descending on the valley. Hidden in a
woods not far from the spot where his traveling companions had been arrested, he
was witness to the murder of the entire group, whose members were bayonetted by
the Portuguese soldiers; their bodies were subsequently thrown in the river. At the
hospital of the Moerbeke Sugar Company and at the hospital of the Evangelical
Medical Institute at Kimpese, in the Republic of the Congo, the children of
refugees are unceremoniously huddled together. One can see in these hospitals
three or four children sharing a bed, often reduced to mere skeletons, some of
them with their bellies horribly swollen, others in a state of complete prostration.
These are examples of four aspects of the Angolan people's daily life.

Those who do not quit the country are massacred, as indicated in a tract recently
dropped from Portuguese airplanes which says:

To the inhabitants of the villages of Kimmussungo, Lucala, Banza, Lende, Sanda,
Quincanga, Camba, Cau, Dio, and others: You see how our troops are rooting you
out everywhere, how they are obliged to kill you and your UPA leaders,
like Manuel Coxi, who, since the beginning of the troubles, are deceiving and
exploiting you. You have fifteen days to think things over and arrange your
affairs.

After this interval, if you do not surrender, you will be killed and exterminated,
just as you were in the month of August.

If you surrender, nothing bad will happen to you, for you will be received by the
troops as brothers. Remember the story of the prodigal son. Let God guide you
and show you that there is only one way to follow, the way of PEACE, in a life
shared with your white brothers.

Even those who take the road of exile are not spared, and the fate of those who
succeed in crossing the frontiers of Angola is hardly better.

These examples, selected at random from those quoted in the reports of the U. N.
Subcommittee for Inquiry on Angola and the U. N. Special Committee on
Territories under Portuguese Administration, are not quoted for the purpose of
eliciting your pity at the fate of the Angolan people.

In taking responsibility for the undertaking of an armed struggle on March 15,
1961, after having exhausted all peaceful means that would lead our people to
selfdetermination, the Unílo das Populações de Angola (UPA) at first and later
the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) realized the consequences of
this decision and the sacrifices that we would have to make. Our only reason for
painstakingly pointing out these several aspects of the Angolan people's daily life
is to set the scene of the drama in its true context. ...
Our struggle, contrary to never-ceasing claims on the part of the Portuguese press, is widening every day and the liberated zone is growing larger and larger. Officers of our army, trained in the Algerian underground, today are giving an entirely new look to the revolutionary apparatus. Furthermore, thanks to the unconditional help of our Congolese brothers, we now have at our disposal much greater possibilities for training. Despite the protests of the Portuguese government, the Congolese government has reaffirmed its posture of solidarity toward their brother people of Angola through the voice of Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko. Thus it is that in the framework of the FNLA, labor affairs occupy an important place. The Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA), the principal Angolan labor movement, today numbers 7,500 members and its presence is felt in the interior of the country, where it collaborates fully with the Angolan National Liberation Army. In July 1961, the FNLA established a medical organization for aid to refugees, called Servigo de Assistencia aos Refugiados de Angola (SARA). However, with the massive influx of refugees fleeing the bombardments in order to find refuge in the Congo, the situation of these people is becoming more and more serious and requires a rapid solution. It must be noted that from the month of September, from the onset of the rainy season to this day, some twenty thousand Angolans have crossed the border to swell the ranks of the refugees in the Congo. Nevertheless, in the framework of the preparation of the Angolan people's future, the FNLA will be continually opening primary and secondary schools. The number of students already enrolled has reached some thirty-five hundred boys and girls. Certain friendly countries have already promised their aid in supplying school materials. We hope that others will also help us solve, at least partially, the problem of schooling for the young Angolan refugees in the Congo. While we are attending to these tasks, the Salazar government, although still continuing to affirm that Angola is a province of Portugal and intensifying the "pacification," has nevertheless taken seriously the need for certain reforms. This constitutes in itself a confession of weakness, if not the absurdity of Portugal's arguments, especially when it is a fact that Lisbon never ceases to state that Angola is a paradise. It is also in that context that one must regard the recent Overseas Council that President Salazar has just held with his collaborators in Lisbon. On the Second Anniversary of the Revolution (1963) [Roberto's address is translated from "15 Mars 1961: deuxieme anniversaire de la revolution angolaise," L6opoldville (?), March 15, 1963, 5 p., mimeographed. His principal concerns are Portuguese intransigence, the Katanga question, and the refugee problem. ] For two years blood has been shed in Angola. No one can rejoice at seeing blood flowing from the breast of any member of the human race, whoever he may be. Since the end of World War II, the knell of colonial domination in Africa has
been tolling. This continent, yesterday arbitrarily divided into small territories, is being reborn through new nations that, one by one, are joining the ranks of independent countries.

This historic phenomenon has a number of causes. First, it is the concrete translation of a movement that is expressed in a concise formula: Africans no longer accept being exploited by foreigners. Next, it comes from the firm and resolute will of the men and women of Africa who wish to hasten this movement, whatever the cost. And finally, it comes from the moral and psychological impossibility of prolonged colonial domination when confronted, as the colonial powers are, by the unanimity of democrats who people the world.

In Angola, we first waged a political war, for we felt that at the moment when all Africa was being liberated—usually by peaceful means, Portugal would reject certain methods exemplified by other colonial powers. Our tracts, our speeches, our declarations, and our discourses, all testify to our determination. Now, the government of Mr. Salazar did not remain deaf to these appeals; it responded to us by intensifying the repression. As the Prime Minister has just said, we then saw the outbreak of a now classic phenomenon in the development of the struggle against colonialism: claims, repression, then fighting, which generally passes through three phases—criminal attacks, guerrilla warfare, and war itself. The result of this phenomenon has always been the triumph of liberty and the achievement of sovereignty. I do not believe that it can turn out otherwise for the Angolan people.

Unfortunately, the government of Mr. Salazar has not understood the lesson of history and persists in following an anachronistic policy. In the face of this situation, the only alternative was to oppose the hateful violence of the colonial presence with the legitimate violence of African nationalism. Fields of food crops bombed, streams poisoned, villages set afire, people burned alive, refugees machine-gunned or slashed to pieces by the beasts in the jungle—this has been the fate of our people for two years. In the face of such atrocities, can we not ask how our oppressors can claim to be civilized Christians? Our faith in the future of Angola, whatever it may be, is greater than the sacrifices that we have made and that we are ready to make to erase five centuries of cruel political, economic, cultural, and social exploitation. In no way do we want to be the object of confrontation of ideologies that are foreign to us, nor the victim of certain considerations of a strategic nature. But we cannot, in any event, be unaware of this reality. From now on we shall consider it in our plans, since we cannot witness our extermination with indifference.

Now that it is looking everywhere for material support and moral assurances, the Portuguese government vehemently rises up against the aid and support that our Congolese brothers give us. By doing this, Mr. Salazar's regime remains wilfully unaware of all the ethnic and cultural bonds that tie our two peoples together. All these ties have facilitated the peaceful settlement of thousands of Angolan refugees on several borders of the Congolese national soil. I must emphasize that the Congolese people have shared their daily bread with their brothers from Angola, despite the difficulties that they themselves are facing. This proves that
our common evolution has never been out of their sight. Among other things, the secession of South Katanga and its reabsorption show that this is so. It can be said, in fact, that

the presence of the regime of Mr. Salazar at the borders of the province of South Katanga did not facilitate the restoration of the territorial integrity of the Congo and the affirmation of the Congolese personality. The solution of the problem of Katanga raised great hopes among our people, because it marked the retreat of the imperialist forces and the defeat of the retrogressive forces of colonialism, through the mercenaries who believed they had found refuge in Angola. May they know that the storm of freedom breaking over Africa will not pass until leprous colonialism and imperialism have been completely exorcised from our continent. The barrier that they try to raise in South Africa today to quell the enthusiasm of the progressive forces will collapse before the awakening and the determination of the Africans.

As you know, the colonialists do not hesitate to utilize any argument whatsoever to justify themselves and to discredit the nationalists. Often, we are presented as racists opposed to the presence of Europeans. I would like to stress that not only the people of Angola but also the people of all Africa have never been racist. The example of the countries that have preceded us in independence and whose inhabitants, with all freedom, are today cooperating with their former colonizers suffices to show this.

We are often asked to define our position on the future of the Portuguese, especially the colonists, living on our soil. The system of peopling is a colonialist institution that we fight, but we do not fight the individuals. Quite the contrary; we ask them to prove their realism and comprehension to preserve the future. What we wish is to build, with the harmony of all men of good will, a free Angola, where racism, injustice, obscurantism, and forced labor are forever banished. Thus it clearly appears that the future of the Portuguese living in our country is in their own hands.

As for us, our course is clear: As long as the legitimate will of our people to decide their own future is opposed, we shall continue the fight, intensifying it, but we shall not miss any opportunity to alleviate the suffering of our people. The sacrifices that the Angolan people make every day, the courage that they show against an enemy whose weapons are superior, the aid that Angola finds among its friends, the growing support that our cause finds in the world at a time when universal reprobation is intensified against the war of extermination being waged by Portugal—all of these reassure us as to the future of our country.

The Prime Minister has declared just now in his speech that the refugees said to him that they have received the password to engage in the fight for independence. We gave this password on March 15, 1961, and the responsibility is wholly ours. If we feel the need to say it, it is so that you may know that we are the valid speakers. Today, more than ever, directions are fulfilled to the letter, whether in Angola or among our refugees. And when the time comes to call a halt to the combat, we shall do it, and our instructions will be followed, as they were two years ago.
The meeting that you are attending is not a festival, for while we are talking to you, Angolans are falling. You are attending, rather, a commemoration of the date of March 15, which remains engraved in golden letters in the annals of the history of the peoples fighting for their liberation. We once again confirm by this meeting that despite the two years already elapsed, we are moved by the same spirit and the same determination as we were on March 15, 1961. May Portugal know that nothing will impede the march of the Angolan people toward their destiny.

Press Conference (1963)

[Roberto's statement was delivered in Lőopoldville on September 4, 1963, and printed in Free Angola, an information bulletin published in New York. He stresses that the recent unity achieved among African nations at the summit meeting in Addis Ababa also strengthened the Angolan struggle and provided an insurmountable opposition to the Portuguese presence in Africa.]

Since our last meeting, several important developments have marked the evolution of the Angola problem. The moment has come to assess their real meaning and to take stock of the present situation. First, it is important to emphasize that all these events follow from the Addis Ababa Conference, which marked a real turning point in the Angolan affair. Before the African summit meeting, the continent was, in effect, divided over the Angolan problem. Certain countries, misled by deceitful propaganda, took a position contrary to that of other, better informed countries. The course of events since the meeting of the Commission of Dar es Salaam up to the recent conference in Dakar demonstrates the seriousness of the investigations of the Angolan affair carried out by the Africans, their lack of prejudice, and their ability to overcome preconceived ideas. That Africans have been able to find a common denominator for a problem such as the Angolan problem incontestably reinforces our struggle. It also demonstrates that, divided as they may be over certain problems, they rediscover their unity when it comes to fundamental issues. The commission established by the Dar es Salaam body was, in the beginning, a conciliation commission. It did not confine itself to such a role, however, but proceeded to carry out a broad inquiry as a prelude to the main part of its work. The results of this inquiry completely altered the meaning of its mission. It was thus able to make recommendations in conformity with the reality of the Angolan situation.

The endorsement of these recommendations by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Dakar is the logical result of the work of this Commission. Today the true Angolan cause has the unanimous support of all Africans. Given the recommendations of the Dakar Conference, we do not doubt that our brothers in other countries in Africa will adopt the same attitude as that of the Congo (Lőopoldville), Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Dahomey.

Before this African unanimity, before this radical invitation to liquidate Portuguese imperialism, we Angolans declare that we will not fail in our task and that the leprosy of colonialism will be erased from the surface of our national territory. This situation renders the Governo Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exflio...
(GRAE) the authentic representative of the Angolan people and therefore the only valid interlocutor.

Portugal thus finds itself placed in a new situation, which prevents it from invoking division among Angolan nationalist movements as an excuse for ignoring the real aspirations of our people. However, in his last speech Premier Salazar turned his back on reality. Portuguese colonialism, which imagines that it exists outside the confines of history, does not cease to proclaim that nothing will ever cause it to change its policy in Angola. One may lose himself in conjecture about the motives that have led the Portuguese Premier to adopt such an attitude. What Premier Salazar has not understood, given the tragic concept of life held by Portuguese colonialists, is that the Angolans want, above all, to be Africans. They do not wish to become Portuguese nor to resemble them.

I would now like to acquaint you with an important fact that we have not revealed heretofore. Faced with the turn of events taken by the Angolan affair following the Addis Ababa Conference, we gave instructions to the Exército de Libertaggo Nacional de Angola (ELNA) to slow down its military operations in order to create an atmosphere propitious for a détente and understanding. Unfortunately, the meaning of our action was not understood and our good will was taken as a sign of weakness. The recent speech of Premier Salazar is the best illustration of this.

It is also possible that the position of Premier Salazar is tactical, having for its aim a test of the solidarity of the Angolan nationalist movement and of its importance from an international standpoint. In adopting extreme positions, did Premier Salazar think he could shake our movement and open a breach in our ranks? We will reply to intransigence with intransigence, and to understanding with understanding. If, by misfortune, Premier Salazar is convinced of what he sets forth, the situation is even more serious because such a position can only lead us to an intensification of the war, to a deterioration of the present situation, and to a mortgaging of the future; and it is upon these factors that events will be determined during the weeks just ahead.

Realizing that it cannot pursue a policy that is universally scorned, the Portuguese government continues to announce that there will be elections in Angola, notably in expectation of the debates on the Angolan issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It seems that Portugal is seeking to anesthetize a part of world opinion with the magic of a word, "elections," while she continues a war she hopes to win.

Decidedly, Portuguese colonialism has not ended; rather, it is the Angolans who have changed. The necessary conditions for a free and democratic election by the Angolan people are far from being realized. I will cite, for example, the case of a million and a half emigrants and refugees who fled Angola because of the inhuman economic, political, and social conditions and who are currently living in the two Congos, in the Rhodesias, and in South-West Africa. There is no need to point out that these compatriots, whose participation in the life of the country is a sine qua non for a return to peace, cannot, without danger, regain their national soil so long as the war and repression continue.
We take this occasion to reaffirm that we will spare no effort in order to put an end to the bloodshed and to prevent a gulf of hatred from separating two peoples who are called upon to collaborate. Our insistence on cooperation is because we are convinced--African evolution confirms it--that our struggle cannot but lead to independence. However, the form and especially the spirit of this cooperation will be determined by the conditions under which we shall have obtained independence. It is quite evident that if this independence is the result of a military victory, it will cause us to be much more exacting; this is not what we wish.

We are pleased to announce the conditions that we consider as imperative in order to attain the objectives indicated above:

1. Acceptance by Portugal of the principle enunciated in Resolution No. 1514 of the General Assembly, recommending to the colonial powers, especially to Portugal, that they recognize the right to self-determination and independence for peoples under their domination.
3. Withdrawal of all Portuguese "pacification" forces.

We fully appreciate the efforts of those who wish to aid us to find a peaceful solution to our problem. But we cannot under any circumstances tolerate an initiative of any kind that does not take into account the will of the Angolan people.

In conclusion, I would like to say: Today, although our movement has never been stronger, both militarily and diplomatically, we renew our offer for peace. If we continue to meet with obtuseness and intransigence on the part of Portugal, we can only be led to an intensification of the war, and the means at our disposal today make this possible. If such is the case, we are obliged, as of here and now, to point out that Portugal must assume full responsibility for the consequences of the intensification of the armed conflict.

* * * *

On the Third Anniversary of the Revolution (1964)
[Roberto's speech was delivered in Ldopoldville on March 27, 1964, and was issued in the New York news bulletin, Free Angola. Written at the height of nationalist success, this document relates the internal Angolan struggle to international developments and Angolan relations with the Congo and other African states, the United States and NATO, the United Nations, and Portugal.] Despite almost unbearable suffering, despite the ever greater repression, despite all the difficulties that we face, the Angolan Revolution is entering its fourth year. Throughout these three years of combat, the Angolan people's hope of recovering their liberty has become greater. On this memorable day we are celebrating the anniversary of the Revolution. We place this demonstration under the symbol of
Addis Ababa. As testimony that the Angolan people are not alone in this gigantic struggle, we have present among us our brother, Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, to whom we render homage for his resolute support for our struggle, and African diplomats and representatives of friendly countries. Let our enemies be warned. Hope has been sustained by the perseverance and courage of our fighters, by the determination of our people, and by the daily reaffirmed support of our cause by, first, our African brothers and also by all freedom-loving peoples.

Thus it is that during these three years of struggle, especially during the recent months, we have been able to achieve success on the military as well as on the diplomatic level. On the military level, we have increased our pressure so much that the police have forbidden the Portuguese settlers to travel more than twenty kilometers from urban centers without military escort. We shall continue to intensify this pressure until the Portuguese so-called "pacification" forces no longer feel secure anywhere in the country, even in their barracks in the cities. On the diplomatic level, the Addis Ababa Conference marked a decisive turning-point in our struggle. The Conference recognized the legitimacy of our fight and unanimously decided to come to the aid of the Angolan people.

The Conciliation Commission designated by the Organization of African Unity recognized the Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE) as the sole Angolan spokesman. Many governments, African and non-African, have accorded de jure recognition to our government. The progress of our revolution gives us reason to believe that by the time of the next Conference of African Heads of State, all countries of our Continent and many others will follow this example. But assistance from Africa, for all its importance and effectiveness, is natural. The Angolan struggle is but a link in the great combat waged by Africa for its liberty. In these circumstances, we may better evaluate the accomplishments and success of our revolution by the reaction of the Portuguese masses themselves.

The Portuguese democratic front [an opposition movement], which fights the fascist regime of Salazar, has just declared unequivocally that it unconditionally supports our struggle. This development gives us great pleasure, for it has not always been the case, even though we have always persisted in affirming that we feel no enmity toward the Portuguese people. We are happy to see that the Portuguese democrats have finally realized that our combat is linked to their own. It is highly probable that the Salazar regime will not survive Angolan independence and that our independence will coincide with the liberation of the Portuguese people from dictatorship. We hope that the democratic Portuguese group will consider all the consequences of this situation and concretely seal our pact against the dictatorship of Salazar.

At the moment when some of the Portuguese people are grasping the true meaning and importance of our combat, it is inconceivable that some Angolans want to remain outside our struggle and continue to behave as "lone wolves." Certainly, this has been the case in many revolutions, but theoretical and personal initiatives have never impeded the people's progress. We do not despair, however, for the obligation of these brothers is to return to reason and to join in the combat
of the Angolan masses. All forces are needed in the people's struggle and we cannot allow ourselves to waste any opportunities. Our hope is all the greater since some brothers who were outside our movement have joined our ranks. These are our accomplishments, but we must not remain silent about our disappointments. First of all, there are those concerning the United Nations. At its last session, the U. N. General Assembly was not able to make an unconditional affirmation of its condemnation of Portugal. Whatever happens, we do not despair of seeing the United Nations impose the principles defined in its Charter, especially since we hope to be members of that organization some day. Our fighting determination remains, however, absolute and unshakable. We shall speak also of our disappointment vis-a-vis certain diplomats, especially the American ambassador in Lisbon. This diplomat dared to say that Angola is "an oasis of peace." Although we have only modest means, we invite this ambassador to come to the Congolese frontier, at our expense, to see the wounded refugees, burned by napalm, hungry and sick, who are fleeing the so-called land of peace, Angola. At a time when all Africa is pointing out the gravity of the situation in our country, such declarations constitute defiance of African opinion, in the same vein as the declarations of that American senator who alleged that Africans are not capable of governing themselves. We would like to believe, however, that those are personal positions, which in no way bind the attitude of the United States. We hope, also, that the members--all the members--of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which have voluntarily or involuntarily armed Portugal, are revising their policies and considering the situation with greater objectivity, if not with more realism. If this is not the case, the situation could become seriously complicated. We are not speaking of blackmail; this is neither in our customs nor in our plans. We are Angolans and Africans and nothing else. We want to be free and will take advantage of all opportunities open to us to attain that end. We will not overlook any opportunity; we will even ally ourselves with the devil, if necessary, inasmuch as one is always the devil of someone.

Such are our hopes, our disappointments, our policy, and our will.

Speech at Conference of Non-aligned Nations (1964)

[Roberto's address in Cairo during October 1964, was issued in the information bulletin, Free Angola. Arguing that armed struggle was imposed upon Angolans, Roberto calls upon all non-aligned nations to aid his cause.]

The order of business of this conference comprises the study of several problems. We are conscious of the extreme values of each one of them and of the great contribution that will result from the resolutions that you will adopt on the evolution of the international situation. The problems of peaceful co-existence, of general and complete disarmament, of the revision of inequalities in economic relations in the world, and of the new concept of the organization of the United Nations--these problems greatly concern the Angolan people.

However, because of the situation in which our country finds itself, we shall not be able to exercise all our responsibilities in the elaboration and application of all
the solutions that could be found appropriate for these problems until we achieve our complete and full independence. For us, there cannot be peace when people are subjected to colonial oppression, because there cannot be peaceful coexistence with colonialism. The problems that we Angolans confront daily—in an urgent and vital manner—concern, above all, the development of our armed struggle, the extension of our political action, and the increase of our military potential to achieve the reversal of a relationship built on force—thus liquidating colonial domination. For us, the primary condition for the attainment of peace and peaceful coexistence must be, above all, the liquidation of colonialism and the achievement of national independence by all peoples.

To maintain its domination, the government of Portugal has mobilized, against our people, most of its military potential. Moreover, the government of Portugal profits from support by the NATO clique, which continues to furnish huge amounts of military aid to the colonial army that is engaged in a war of piracy and genocide in our country. This army of 80,000, which is reinforced with mercenaries, tries, with the navy and air force, to repress through fire and bloodshed the irresistible movement of our people.

This colonial army has strewn terror across the country. I would not wish to describe before this august assembly all the forms of inhuman atrocities that are committed each day—the methods of torture, the chemical destruction of plants needed for food, thus condemning our people to starvation, and the methods of collective repression and other actions that have a hidden psychological effect. I will permit myself to say only that this war has already cost my country more than 100,000 men, that tens of thousands of Angolans are in prison or in concentration camps, that 500,000 others have fled the massacres by taking refuge in the Congo, where they are not secure since the colonial army pursues them there. Only at the end of last month, the Portuguese air force bombed a camp of refugees in the Congo for three days and dropped parachutists, who were instructed to physically liquidate the peaceful Angolans who had come to find refuge in their brother country, the Congo.

But whatever the forces that the Portuguese mobilize, whatever the forms and extension of the massacres that they perpetrate to stifle our movement of liberation, they will never be able to vanquish our people because the Angolan people are determined to mobilize all of their energies for liberation. In their combat, the Angolan people are one, and their foremost objective is national independence, full and complete. We have acquired forms of combat that permit us to strike very hard at the forces of repression in spite of the weak means at our disposal. Enriched by the experiences of our brother countries who have had the same fight as ours, we have already given some very hard blows to the forces of the repressive Portuguese.

Each day our movement becomes greater, while the repression continues to strengthen the will of our people to fight. But before the immensity of the forces that the Portuguese government mobilizes against us, we cannot alone carry the struggle, which is that of all the people who are striving for peace and justice. The time is past when one discusses the legitimacy of such struggles, for these are
dictated by the conditions that exist in each country. The time of formal condemnation of colonialism is past, for there is no divergence of views on this point. Without any doubt, there is a unanimity of opinion. The problem is to determine what concrete measures the non-aligned countries must take to aid and hasten our liberation.

We are not making war for the sake of war. The way of the armed struggle has been imposed on us. The present political position of the fascist regime of Salazar closes every possibility of regular peaceful negotiation of the problem. Since the outbreak of our fight in 1961, the Portuguese government has not changed its political position. Portugal always considers, despite good sense, that this integral part of Africa is a province of its country, in imitation of French colonialism, which pre-

tended that Algeria was an integral part of France.

The Portuguese government still refuses to consider the Govrnno da Repiblica de Angola no Exflo (GRAE), which is already recognized by 28 countries, as the valid representative with whom it should negotiate the political solution to this problem. Therefore, viewed realistically it will be a war of long duration. The solidarity and aid of the friendly countries could greatly help to hasten the hour of liberty and peace. We think that in this respect the countries present here can bring about a decisive contribution, as well as political action, by material support. The recognition of the GRAE by the members of this assembly can be a positive act.

For us to defend ourselves against genocide and to gain victory over the colonial forces, we need arms and financial means; and the more powerful this material aid, the more we shall hasten our liberation. Under the conditions of our struggle, when countries maintain diplomatic relations with the Salazar government, our people consider that to be an encouragement of the colonial policies of the Salazar government. The refusal of certain countries to apply the boycott resolution of the U. N. General Assembly against Portugal is considered to be an accessory to the genocide that is actually carried on in our country.

We think that the countries present here can contribute enormously toward a concerted political action and consequently influence the beginnings of an agreement between the forces of the Angolan people and of the Portuguese colonial regime. It is equally in accord to denounce with force the maneuvers of the imperialists and colonialists in South Arabia, in Southeast Asia, and in the Caribbean islands. In Southern Rhodesia some despairing attempts are being undertaken to proclaim a republic under the direction of the fascist Southern Rhodesians. In South Africa, the politics of Apartheid harden more and more and reinforce the apparatus of repression. In Angola, the colonialists try to liquidate the liberation movement by genocide. In their withdrawal, the colonialists, supported by the Apartheid camp, try to maintain, in the southern part of Africa, a bastion that I will call the Mason-Dixon Line, where they concentrate all their means to maintain their domination. The alliance between the governments of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal has become more and more evident. This alliance, founded on a fascist and racist ideology, must be met by an
even closer solidarity among the governments and all the people striving for freedom.
The Angolan people, as well as all the people who are struggling against colonialism, await, with great anticipation, the outcome of this conference, for they know that one of its objectives is the liquidation of colonialism. We pay homage to the heads of states and governments who have taken the initiative. We warmly thank President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the valiant Egyptian people for their fraternal hospitality...

* * * *

Emmanuel Kounzika

[Two statements made by the president of the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA) reflect his ideas as a leader of Angolan nationalists. The first, a press conference, has been translated from A Voz da Naglo Angolans, April 30, 1962, pp. 810. Kounzika describes in detail why and how his movement accepted some Angolan forces and rejected others in the formation of a coalition.]

On behalf of the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA) I thank you for coming to this press conference, called to confirm, officially, the formation of the Frente Nacional de Libertaggo de Angola (FNLA) by the PDA, the Governo Revolucion'rio de Angola no Exflio (GRAE), and the Unido das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA). At the same time, we wish to clear up the misunderstanding that certain individuals have concerning the formation of this coalition. The PDA announces that it is satisfied with the constitution of the coalition, which has been so ardently desired by Angolan patriots who are tired of the useless quarrels that have plagued our political organizations. We hardly thought that a front created by the PDA and the UPA, with its doors open to other parties, would not only be scorned, but, worse, would be opposed--and by a nationalist party like the Movimento Popular de Libertaggo de Angola (MPLA), which will not recognize the coalition because it was created by only a few PDA members, without the knowledge of Mr. Matumona, our second Vice-President, and Mr. Massaki, our President-General, who are now in Rhodesia. In case the MPLA does not know it, such a thing did not occur with our second Vice-President, Mr. Matumona; the PDA is not a party of aristocrats, but of the masses. The PDA does not act on behalf of Mr. Kounzika, nor Mr. Massaki, nor Mr. Matumona, but on behalf of the Angolan people, whose interests are above everything and everybody. Mr. Massaki, President-General, did not depart for Rhodesia without leaving us, in the bosom of the Committee, not only orders to act in his name but also the power of attorney to represent the interests of his own family before the administrative authorities! There is nothing more to say on that subject!

Angolan leaders must understand that their personal diatribes are not in the interests of the people whom they have undertaken to liberate. The continued attacks are nothing but a waste of time, and they allow the Portuguese army of destruction to advance. Angola is not the personal property of Roberto or Mdrio de Andrade. It belongs to all Angolans, be they blacks or mulattoes (and why
not?)--with the stipulation that the latter do not play their well-known, double-faced game, on one hand de-
claring themselves true Angolans, on the other, being docile instruments in the hands of their fathers, who use them to subjugate the Angolan people even more. The mulattoes are not the only ones likely to act that way, however. There are also blacks who seem to serve the interests of the people, but who, in the end, concern themselves only with their own interests.

But now that the MPLA is disowning today what it was trying yesterday to create with us, it will be most interesting to relate the course of the development of this coalition, whose success is evident to all. In November 1960, the UPA, the Alianga dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo (ALIAZO) (today the PDA), and the MPLA established the first coalition, with a view to joining forces. At that time, the MPLA was based in Conakry, but it was represented here by compatriots such as Antúnio J. Josias (who was the local President); Inocêncio Martins, Secretary; Cesário Martins, Treasurer; and Jorge de Freitas, Jordão de Aguiar, and José Bernardo Domingos Quiosa. After an initial effort the UPA withdrew its support. We were left with the MPLA until the day we received a visit from Eduardo Santos and Hugo de Menezes, coming from Conakry. Instead of upholding the already existing coalition, those two doctors said it was invalid because the Léopoldville committee was not worthy [sic. or competent [sic. I to make such compromises in the name of the MPLA!

But--a rather curious fact--with the very Léopoldville committee, which they had wrecked but not provided a substitute for (the general staff of the MPLA remaining in Conakry), they abolished the coalition that we had constituted and proposed that we form another, whose statutes had previously been worked out in Conakry. That was the only way they could destroy the coalition.

After this failure with the MPLA, we attempted to form another coalition with the Mouvement pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC), the Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA), NGWIZAKO-NGWIZANI h Konga (NGWIZAKO), and Ntobako. In due time, however, the Ntobako refused to join a coalition that, to its way of thinking, would neutralize its own efforts. Only the ALIAZO, the MLEC, the NGWIZAKO, and the MDIA reached an agreement. They were about to sign the constitution when the MDIA surprised us by announcing over the radio that they were sending a delegation, exclusively from their party, to Lisbon to ask for independence. It was another failure!

We received still another MPLA delegation from Conakry. It came to form a third coalition with us, even though their Léopoldville representatives had been declared incompetent. While the matter was still being negotiated, Azevedo Jdnior took advantage of the situation to propagandize for the MPLA when he went to Pointe Noire to accompany a contingent of MPLA members abroad. He declared to our local section that the MPLA had succeeded in gathering around it the ALIAZO, MLEC, and others, with the exception of the UPA, thus making those parties seem like satellites of the MPLA.
Shortly before the MPLA transferred its base to L6opoldville, it was announced to us that they had reorganized their Executive Committee and were nominating as Vice-President, Bernardo Domingos Quiosa--one of the patriots who, at the time, still enjoyed our confidence.

It happened, however, that after the arrival of the MPLA general staff in L6opoldville, the new Vice-President, Domingos Quiosa, was automatically removed from the Committee, which was made up of only the doctor-members tested in Lisbon or Conakry. This political instability in the bosom of the MPLA (which was due to the leaders’ scorn for members who not only had helped the MPLA become known, but also had helped it become established in L6opoldville) made us doubt its good intentions! Didn't they want to use us, as they had used others, as a mere trampoline for the realization of some policy unknown to us, and afterwards to dispense with our concurrence as though it were a common coin? With the arrival of Mdrio de Andrade, President of the MPLA, we held even more meetings to discuss the formation of a coalition. Andrade took the opportunity to tell us of UPA's negative response. We therefore concluded that if the UPA had agreed, the coalition would have been created without us, since we were purposely excluded from these negotiations.

At this point, in a press conference, Kassanga (Commander of the UPA army), driven by some unknown force, accused UPA leaders of dreadful things, and at the same time took the opportunity to invite other political organizations to join him in forming a liberation front. This was the objective, and the MPLA then found the appropriate moment to extend us an invitation—which, unhappily, named no date for a meeting—to form an MPLA-PDA-ELNA (Kassanga) coalition.

We were unalterably opposed to the formation of such a coalition, for Kassanga had no followers and we did not agree with him. He waited until one of his brothers died and he himself had joined another party before denouncing a ledger filled with names of dead Angolan compatriots. Inasmuch as he was once the commander of operations in the battlefield and he was present at all that happened, he is nothing more than an accomplice as far as we are concerned. This led us to refuse to even examine with the MPLA the possibilities of such an offensive coalition, and it also led us to accept the coalition that the UPA this time took the initiative to propose us.

Because the UPA was the only organization considered hostile to the formation of a coalition, we required and we were granted, without the least objection, the stipulation that all other Angolan parties be allowed to join. Thus the FNLA became a reality. However, when we were preparing to announce, in a press conference, the Convention which we had held, MPLA leaders, without first fully informing themselves of the conditions under which the FNLA had been written, put into action all the hostile means at their disposal to sabotage it, thus voluntarily excluding themselves from a coalition that had left its doors open, as is clearly seen in Article Two of our Convention. And lo, we finally play an honest role in the formation of the FNLA with
the UPA, both in relation to the MPLA and the other political parties who have today become adversaries of the coalition!
Since we are so seriously implicated in it, this is the occasion to declare that the coalition and the provisional government that stems from it are on their way, with or without other parties. We must oppose the obstinacy of the Lisbon government, which always disdained our claims and our right to self-determination, and we now have the machinery which symbolizes Angolan resistance to Portuguese oppression and our firm determination to make Portugal agree to negotiate Angolan independence with the GRAE.

The Progress of the Revolution
[Kounzika's remarks were delivered at a press conference in Léopoldville on July 30, 1965, and distributed as a nine-page mimeographed statement, "La r6volution angolaise et ses frames." His speech, a rational appeal for unity, was made after Alexandre Taty and Andrés Kassinda ransacked and briefly occupied GovArno Revolucionario de Angola no Exílio (GRAE) headquarters.]
Our faith in universal solidarity lets us believe that it would never be to the advantage of the Congolese people to one day see the Angolese Revolution suppressed, or crushed in the Congo, or forced to survive in another African country, as is desired by some, with all the consequences that would result from the transfer of our heavy burden of refugees, the presence of whom constitute a political opportunity both for us and for the Portuguese. It is not too much, then, to ask that the Congo be, and remain, for Angola what Tanzania, with all its political consequences, is for Mozambique and what Guinée and Senegal are for so-called Portuguese Guind.

We say that the refugees constitute a political opportunity. In fact, since the Portuguese authorities cannot crush the Angolan Revolution, they would like to deceive the public by persuading the refugees to return to Angola. The implication would be that the conditions which caused their exile have ceased to exist in an Angola on which--on the verge of independence--the Portuguese would impose autonomy, a regime that would be consecrated by the nomination of an Angolan leader to be elected by the same fascist procedures as those just used to give a second term to President Américo Tomaz because he is faithful to Salazar, who brought him to power.

This is why the Portuguese authorities are employing all possible means to win over any political milieu capable of making the refugees return. Here again, we refuse to believe that our brothers would agree to take part in such a stratagem, for they would be sacrificing our brotherhood to a mere temporary friendship and interest or, worse yet, would be betraying the Angolan Revolution in the eyes of the world.
Another very important problem of the Angolan Revolution is division, not only among Angolan nationalists or fighters but also in the African and other political milieu and among the advisers and friends of Angola who influence the struggle for independence....
There have been revolts in Angola. They are now supported by a revolution that was inevitable in a police state, since people who are generally mistreated will not
pass up any opportunity to free themselves from their chains and shake off the heavy yoke, which was so unjustly imposed upon them. Moreover, our Congolese brothers had to take the same road during the riots of January 4, 1959, which were paid for by several dead, some of whom were Angolan.

Once unleashed by a combination of circumstances such as those that prevail in Angola, revolution, which is a reaction against one system and the substitution of another, becomes a force against which no power can prevail and the nature of which is to fortify itself and to grow stronger because of the very resistance which it encounters... Revolutions are therefore... inevitable in a regime of oppression, humiliation, and spoilation such as that which has prevailed for five centuries in Angola and in the other Portuguese colonies. Let us see how Angolan nationalism is progressing.

It is certain that the fatal illness of African nationalism today is the division in the ranks of nationalists in all the African countries struggling for their independence. Angola's difficulty is that the division is not only in the Angolan organizations but, worse yet, in their divergent goals and opposing methods. In the other countries, all the parties, although opposed, are fighting for a single goal--the independence of their country and its integrity--and by identical means, but the Angolan parties are fighting here for Angola, here for "Portuguese Congo," there for Cabinda, and are thus not working in the interests of the fight for the independence of all Angola. ...

Fortunately, however, there do exist great political groups that although they are divided, are fighting for the same goal and are using identical, if not common, methods. And these great ensembles represent almost all Angola .... Although it is true that the different ethnic groups in Angola have been led by the Portuguese presence to cohabitate and to form a single people cohesive from the political, administrative, and economic points of view, these same people now constitute a nation that has become aware of its unity. They have developed feelings of solidarity and unity through the common suffering imposed upon them--namely, forced labor, deportations, continual exile of thousands of Angolans to strange regions or to the exterior,

and through other sacrifices made in common. This continual friction of ethnic groups or tribes was a necessary evil for the formation or the acquisition of our national awareness or, better, of our nation.... The Portuguese who tried to oppose the ethnic groups of Angola have finally recognized the role played in the Revolution by the union of these ethnic groups or tribes coming from the northern, southern, eastern, and western regions of Angola, who have sworn to no longer bend their backs for their masters.... This explains clearly the difficulties and the confusions that we are encountering in our fight for independence. Mr. Salazar himself clarified the problem in his speech [of February 18, 1965] by giving an explanation of the attitudes of the African countries--which attitudes he says are numerous--that understand the Portuguese position better and that feel obligated to support our fight for liberation--a fight which should also be that of all Africa .... Thus it is that through our weaknesses and our refusal to profit from the lessons of the country that
lodges us, [Congo] the Portuguese continue to create disorder in our ranks by creating ambiguous situations that tend to disorient our people.

To understand the meaning of such ambiguities, one needs only to see the attitude of Angolan organizations regarding the "famous coup d'etat" of Mr. Taty. The day after this coup d'etat, the same organizations that were opposed to each other's divergent goals and methods formed a chorus to "applaud" this most spectacular tour de force. But why did these organizations not work together with him whom they applauded? The answer is that the coup d'etat did not interest them except as it could paralyze the Angolan Revolution. It is, therefore, treason not only in regard to this Revolution but also, irony of fate, to Mr. Taty on the part of the organizations, of the parties, or of the neutral Angolans who encouraged him and then did not follow him, since, to our knowledge, neither the defenders of the Portuguese Congo nor those of Angola or Cabinda are found in his wake.

To paralyze the Angolan fight totally, so that there are neither gains nor losses, to make all the refugees return to Angola--this is the essence of the new policy--that is, the mistranslation of the Revolution, which the new actors wish to impose on the martyred Angolan people. If one unfortunately found oneself among those who are waiting for our organization, Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA), to consummate or consecrate the confusion, this was detrimental to his objective or his cause for he had adopted a goal and means contrary to those which we proposed. Today, more than ever, it is evident that support is given to Angolans, not because of the nobility of their goals and means, but by virtue of the affinities that tie the donors to their protégés, or by reason of the personal policies of these benefactors, which the Angolans only execute. As for us, we have neither of these opportunities, which are both deceitful and compromising. In fact, we are aware of the danger created by the foreign advisers who are behind the Angolan leaders and who buy the consciences of those leaders, thus making them the executives of the advisers' disparate policies, which are based, not on a concern for bringing about a just solution, but on the hatred that certain of these advisers feel for those Angolans who do not submit to their will.

As for Portuguese offers, which finally converted certain Angolans who profit from them, we reaffirm that we shall accept subsidies, aid, or donations from the Portuguese government only after independence, not the independence of a part of Angola, or of Cabinda, or of the so-called Portuguese Congo, which interests others, but of all Angola, which is our goal. Therefore, to make a deal with those who make themselves, consciously or unconsciously, instruments in the hands of the Portuguese authorities or of interested advisers, under the pressure of money, would be a worse evil than that which we are fighting within our disunited organizations.

The PDA, working in the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), which is composed of three organizations--the PDA, the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), and the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)--must exhaust all chances for a solution beneficial to Angola first and to itself later, since we remain convinced that the salvation of Angola lies in a single
coalition, having a common goal and means. No one leader, no more than one clan or one party, whoever he be and whatever their chances be today, can try to liberate Angola alone if he does not depend on all people—and the future will show that we are right in what we are saying today. We repeat that we have never claimed the paternity of the Revolution in order to play the role of the single cavalier; that honor we reserve for the Angolan people or for those who dispute it. For this reason, too, before forming the coalition with the UPA and today with the MPLA (Viriato), we exhausted all the ways of working with the Angolan political parties who today reproach us for such union, which has resulted in the FNLA and the Governo Revolucionrio de Angola no Exflio (GRAE). Furthermore, we are happy to show that the very people who have always peered at us from the protective shadows have not failed to carry within them the germs of division, which only await the propitious moment to appear. ...

We are not surprised, then... to learn of the formation of a so-called Conciliation Committee, whose goal is to reconcile the Angolan parties and to negotiate with Portugal. We challenge these fishermen in troubled waters to succeed—being judges of their own case—where we have failed with all the chances we have had, after thirteen discussion meetings with all the political groups known today. We say that these Angolans who await confused situations before they try to emerge are judging their own case, since no one is neutral in the Angolan Revolution except profiteers, idlers, and egoists who, preoccupied with their comfort and their security, repel every effort and every sacrifice, waiting for the propitious moment to profit from the fruit of others' labor.

As for negotiations with Portugal, many Angolans are now putting themselves in the limelight by extolling the negotiations to which they say they are more disposed than others. We say publicly that such declarations are made only to deceive the public and to exploit the credulity of our people who are already suffering in exile and to whom the glittering promises of such a panacea are made, as if their simple disposition to negotiate would obligate Portugal to comply. When and how did they understand or comprehend that Salazar was ready to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty to the Angolan people and that the true fighters refused? Not wanting to refer such leaders back to the recent speeches of Salazar, it should suffice for us to point out to the public that organizations calling themselves pacifist and enjoying the protection of Portugal go regularly to Lisbon... with the expectation of negotiating with the Portuguese government. They come back, not with independence, not even with any promise of a date, but, on the contrary, seeing themselves entrusted with the mission of making the refugees return to Angola as a return for the subsidies that Portugal grants them, since nothing is free. We are aware that not all independence is acquired by negotiations; in fact, it is always the colonizing power that is not ready for them, that must be forced into them, and this is what we are doing when we refuse to be transformed into
"Portuguese Africans"... or into a South Africa, where a white minority oppresses the black majority.
That is also why the will to free ourselves from the oppression of the Portuguese minority has made the Portuguese living in Angola say that we are racists. Far from that, we make war, not on the white race or on the Portuguese, but rather on a race of profiteers and oppressors, be they white, yellow, or black. Those Portuguese who sympathize sincerely with us and who are united with us in the same ideal of an independent Angola cannot be our enemies; on the contrary, those who are not against us are for us and with us. Many Portuguese from Angola are anxious beyond words about their Angolan nationality and already see us as those who will refuse it to them. This, too, is an unfounded fear, since no true son of the country, whatever color of skin he may have, will fail to benefit from the advantages that only a sovereign Angola will reserve for all its sons without discrimination. If we are fighting today, it is for a reversal of roles: instead of a situation that always favors a single Portuguese minority, there should be a change to benefit the majority, which is Angolan. Only the laws that Angola itself will make will give everyone the same chances, according to his capabilities and not to his membership in the social classes prevailing today in Angola, be he a native, an assimilado, or a Portuguese. The Portuguese of Angola, or the democratic Portuguese who are fighting for their freedom in Portugal, should not look upon our fight for liberation as a source of racial hatred. Quite the opposite, we ask them to understand and collaborate for common or identical objectives, since one finds one's true friends in times of misfortune.
At this same time, we must explain our position to those Angolan brothers working in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who are coming to ask us to help them become naturalized Congolese in order to continue enjoying the advantages that--according to them--may be refused to them in the near future, as foreigners. We say to them that we cannot hypothesize as to the future of Angola; and furthermore,
such naturalization reinforces the hemorrhage from which we are already suffering.
And now we make our confession or our self-criticism. It is clear that besides the difficulties that the enemies scatter along Angola's road to independence, there are others that originate in our lack of cohesion, both within the coalition and within the GRAE, when the latter institutions constitute today the sole index of union at a time when the Angolan parties and leaders do not seem to be ready for a single united coalition. The lack of cohesion results from the fact that each of the parties is striving to work for the benefit of itself or of its members, thus weakening the force that lies in union. Our enemies know just how to take advantage of our weak points because we do not present ourselves to them as a cohesive people... But the difficulties that arise within our ranks can be resolved only by us, ourselves, and we must be able to recognize our errors and our faults in order to remedy them, whatever the solutions to them be. Many believe that well-being can come only through a congress bringing together all the Angolan parties. Here we shall address ourselves to everyone's good judgment. A congress is truly
indispensable for the Angolan Revolution, for it is the only way of ending the opposition and of consecrating the triumph of the Revolution by giving the general policy a less obscure leadership through the adoption of resolutions, which would have the force of laws. But can such a congress of all the opposing parties, confined to eradicable positions, be realized?... Can the anarchy that symbolizes the plethora of our political parties, youth movements, unions, and social organizations consecrate the supreme goal of such a congress if each group exerts its efforts to defend, not an Angolan policy, but policies of its own? We do not exaggerate in saying that such a congress could create a worse situation than the one we already know.

But is that to say that there is no way of working toward such a congress that would be truly beneficial for Angola? We are convinced that the road lies in the holding of a national conference under the authority of the FNLA, to bring together all the institutions that depend on it, whose goal and methods are common. It is a question of whether the parties, youth organizations, student organizations, and labor unions belonging to it would accept the authority of the FNLA ....

***

III

ORGANIZATION The documents selected focus on the principal organizations associated with the movement led by Holden Roberto.

Statutes of the UPA

Article I

Definitions and Objectives:

a) The organization, which will be subject to the following statutes, will be called the União das Populações de Angola, abbreviated UPA.

b) The motto of UPA is "FOR THE NATIONAL, TERRITORIAL, AND SOCIAL LIBERATION OF ANGOLA."

Article II

Definition:

The União das Populações de Angola (UPA) is a political organization formed for all Africans originally from Angola, without discrimination as to sex, religion, age, ethnic origin, or domicile.

Objectives:

1) To obtain the territorial liberation of Angola.
2) To promote understanding and unity among all Angolans.
3) To fight in conjunction with all Angolan nationalist organizations, in a popular Union, for the liquidation in Angola of the Portuguese colonial regime and its colonialistic and imperialistic ties and for the attainment of the immediate and complete independence of Angola.
4) To mobilize world opinion in favor of the liberation of Angola, and to obtain, without compromise, all the moral and material aid that the fight for
liberation requires.
5) To defend and understand the demands of the masses of peasants and laborers for the installation in Angola of a democratic regime, based on social justice.
6) To cooperate with all organizations that fight for the emancipation of African people still under colonial domination.

Article III

Members:
a) All Africans of Angolan origin who accept the statutes and program of the organization and who strive for its fulfillment are eligible for membership.
b) Membership in the organization shall be at the proposal of two members in good standing and shall be subject to the approval of the Regional Committee.

Establishment of the FNLA

[On March 27, 1962, leaders of the Unigo das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democritico de Angola (PDA) joined to form a coalition. The following is a statement of their objectives.]

This meeting was called to announce that a step of greatest importance has been taken by our respective parties in our common struggle to free Angola from the colonial Portuguese regime: A Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA) has been formed. For several days our parties, aroused by nationalist spirit and guided by the firm will to fulfill their patriotic obligations to their people, have been meeting to apply themselves to the noble task of building, on a solid base, this Front whose formation we announce today. The delegates of the Unilo das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democritico de Angola (PDA), conscious that the formation of the FNLA is a fundamental necessity for our struggling people, spared no effort, working all night long. They arrived at the result that we are making known this morning.

It goes without saying that the formation of the FNLA is neither the first nor the last decisive step we shall take, since the war will continue until the leper of colonialism has been cast out of national Angolan soil—that is, until the final victory--

but it is the cornerstone upon which the Angola of tomorrow will be built. As you know, we regret the tragic events unfolding in Angola. All of it could have been avoided if the Portuguese government had not refused the hand that we continually extended to it for peaceful negotiations. Thus the responsibility for the streams of blood that are flowing rests with the Portuguese government. We men, women, and children of Angola, militants of our respective parties, have sworn to give our lives so that liberty may triumph in Angola. Today no force is capable of making us retreat--this must be clear in the minds of the Portuguese. Trusting in the final victory, which can only end in the triumph of our just cause, we are convinced that in spite of everything, this war--which is inspired neither by racism nor hatred--will see the reconciliation between free and sovereign Angolans and Portuguese, delivered not only from colonialism but also from the fascism of Salazar....

We, the undersigned, leaders of the UPA and of the PDA, formerly ALIAZO
meeting in Special Session on March 27, 1962, have agreed upon the adoption of the following measures:
Considering the existence of social injustice, of poor physical treatment, of humiliation, which have been the lot of the Angolan people for nearly five centuries of Portuguese colonialism;
Considering the negative attitude of the Portuguese government in regard to recognizing the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and in regard to negotiating with Angolan nationalist organizations, the authentic representatives of the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people, on the acquisition by Angola of national independence;
Considering the continued refusal of the Portuguese government to carry out the recommendations contained in the U. N. resolutions on Angola;
Considering the degree to which the armed struggle being carried on by the Angolan people has evolved, so that a real state of war exists in the northern portion of the country;
Considering, finally, the imminent necessity of uniting all active forces of the country in a national liberation front, capable of leading the revolution and of obtaining the necessary means to carry on the war for the immediate liquidation of colonialism in Angola;

WE DECIDE

1) To unite our forces in one national liberation front to hasten the independence of the country;

2) To group, in an Angolan national liberation front, all organizations truly representative of the Angolan people who accept the general policies of the front. Nevertheless, each candidate will be carefully studied by a committee whose powers are defined in the INTERNAL STATUTES;

3) To direct the struggle for Angolan national independence on the basis of fraternal collaboration among all Angolan ethnic groups, taking into account democratic principles and respect for the territorial integrity of the country;

4) To install, in an independent Angola, a democratic regime that will respect the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that will institute agrarian reform (based on the principle of the distribution of land to those who work it), a planned economy, and industrialization of the country, and that will contribute to the total liquidation of the colonial regime in all its forms on the African continent so that African unity can be a reality and an active force;

5) To adopt a policy of nonalignment and noncommitment as a basic principle in the foreign policy of the government, while at the same time reaffirming the desire of this government to collaborate loyally with all countries that are prepared to respect its sovereignty, that are inspired by principles of equality of all races and all nations, large and small, and that are equally interested in the preservation of
peace in the world.

Executive Organs and Their Powers
1) The National Council
2) The Committee
3) The Executive Committee
   a) The National Council will be the supreme organ of the FNLA and will define its general policies;
   b) The Committee, which will be created by the National Council, will serve as an intermediary between the National Council and the Executive Committee and will be responsible for supervising the latter;
   c) The Executive Committee will be the organ charged with carrying out the decisions of the National Council.

The National Council will consist of six members of each party and five representatives of the Army, and will be directed by an elected President.
The Executive Committee will be composed of six members, three from each party, and will be directed by a President, assisted by a Vice-President, a Secretary-General, a Deputy Secretary, a Commissar of Accounts, and a Treasurer.

The National Council and the Committees will meet alternately three times a year. Everything that is not laid down in this agreement will be contained in the Internal Statutes.

For the
Partido Democrdtico de Angola
For the
Unifo das PopulagSes de Angola
(signed) Emmanuel KOUNZIKA (signed) Holden ROBERTO
David LIVROMENTOS Rosdrio NETO
Dombele FERDINAND Alexandre TATY
LUBAKI Sebastien Jonas SAVIMBI
Domingo VETOKELE Josd LIAHUCA
SANDA MARTIN JOHNNY Eduardo
DONTONI Lulukilavo Antoine Pinnock J. EDUARDO
KIATALUA Norbert Vasco Jos4 Ant6nio
M'VILA Andr6 Fernando Pio Amaral
GOURGEL
KUMPESA Sim6n PAKA Francisco
[Capital letters are used here to indicate the name by which the individual is more commonly known.]

Principles of the Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola
[The LGTA was established about 1961 as one sector of the mass party led by Roberto. This statement is from the LGTA's "Dgcleration des principles," Iopoldville, undated, 2 p., mimeographed.]

Angolan workers,
African workers,
Workers everywhere:
The very nature of these historic times, during which the Angolan workers are forced to live under the oppression of Portuguese colonialism, has necessitated the creation of a workers' organization that can represent us, especially abroad, and that can lead the struggle of our enslaved country.

We therefore have decided to unfurl the Angolan workers' banner in all sectors of production within the country as well as among the fugitives without, thereby responding to the historic need to associate the struggle for independence of our country with an organization that groups together all plantation workers, mine workers, and workers in private industry as well as government workers. Integrated with the great international trade union family, these groups can join forces to denounce to the four corners of the earth the atrocities being committed in our country by the blind Portuguese colonialists. Our people, even today in the twentieth century, are suffering from slavery, forced labor without pay, and all manners of physical and moral repressions imposed on them by the Portuguese colonialists.

We have organized the LGTA so that the hungry and naked Angolan workers—slaves of despotism deprived of human rights and their own country's culture because the brutalities of the Portuguese exploiters have forced them into exile—might have an organization that will defend and protect them, and that, without paying too much attention now to immediate and purely economic remedies, can unite with the glorious army of liberation, which groups together all political and civic organizations fighting for the independence of our country.

The LGTA firmly believes that, in order to put an end to the evils that are exterminating our people, the only solution is to expel the Portuguese colonialists, who have been in our country for centuries and whose inhumane, ambitious, and greedy policies are draining our country of its natural wealth.

The LGTA, strictly a labor-union organization, groups together the Angolan workers of all political tendencies, without regard to religion or philosophical doctrine. We shall collaborate with all organizations and with persons of all opinions and all nationalities who will join with us in our struggle for independence. However, we refrain from any and all action that might in any way threaten our status as a completely free and independent trade union.

The LGTA, whose activities are already well under way in Angola, . . . will soon elaborate a broad labor program for the benefit of our collaborators in Angola, according to the particular industrial section to which they belong. At the proper time we shall decree a general strike. This strike will paralyze the entire country and will be the initial step toward a much greater all-out effort, which will constitute the cornerstone of the eviction of colonialism from our country.

As soon as the great majority of Angolan workers have united under the banner of the LGTA, the Liga will undertake a comprehensive educational program for its members and will organize labor-union schools whose goal will be to educate the refugee workers and to give these compatriots the culture so much needed.
Through these schools the LGTA will publish a newspaper, Le Travailleur Angolais—as well as other publications—exposing all the horrors going on in our country. This paper will also contribute to the education of our workers and will inform the general public, particularly the international trade unions with which we will be affiliated, regarding the activities of our labor organization, both within Angola and abroad. Internationally, the LGTA will maintain friendly relations with all the worker organizations, of any country, that show their solidarity with the workers of Angola.

In Africa, above all, the LGTA will do everything possible to take advantage of both the material and the moral support offered it by the labor unions of our neighboring countries, as we have done now in the case of the General Workers' Federation of the Congo, without whose collaboration the setting up of our Liga would not have been possible. The Liga will defend the principle of independence for African labor movements, but that does not in any way mean isolationism. We members of the African labor movement must not be divided among ourselves, if for no other reason than that since we all represent underdeveloped countries we should be united in the common cause.

Angolan workers at home and abroad: You should join the LGTA in order to accelerate our march toward the independence of our country, as the only means of establishing social justice, and to save you and your family from misery. Independence is the only way to put an end to forced labor on Angolan soil as well as to slavery, racial discrimination, exploitation, rape of our women, and mass assassination of our brothers—all of which are basic policies of the Portuguese colonialists in our country.

African workers: The presence of Portuguese colonialism on our soil not only is an insult to your dignity but also constitutes a permanent threat to the security of the independent African countries. The independence of Angola will constitute one more step toward the rehabilitation of Africa and its integration into the civilized world. Give moral and material support to your Angolan brethren and reinforce the struggle against colonialism and in favor of the liberation of Africa, particularly of Angola, which Portuguese colonialism has plunged into a blood bath.

Workers everywhere: The exploitation of Angola by the Portuguese colonialists, the genocide committed against the people by Portuguese military planes, and the moral support given to Portugal by certain countries to further the extermination of our people, who are fighting for liberty and social justice, constitute a serious threat to world peace, a threat for which the complete responsibility rests squarely on the Portuguese government. The Angolan workers raise the standard of battle under the banner of the LGTA, and today they call upon the working classes of all countries to manifest their solidarity with our workers. The struggle for independence of the Angolan people, whose triumph will liberate the working masses in the country and in the cities, is the fight for the independence of all the countries of the five continents.

The social liberation of our workers, today enslaved and hungry, will consolidate the acquisition of social justice for all workers of the world.
Workers everywhere: Your Angolan brethren call upon you to unite with them. "Independence and Social Justice."

Speech by Maria da Conceiçao Rosirio Neto, President of the Associacião das Mulheres de Angola (AMA)

[Translated from the French, this speech of December 22, 1963, was distributed in Léo-poléville by the Assogralao das Mulheres de Angola (AMA), the woman's political group affiliated with the FNLA mass party.]

Many of you are hearing for the first time of the Associação das Mulheres de Angola, the only women's organization recognized by the Govrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE). However, this association is as old as the Revolution itself. It is because we are aware of the important role that the Angolan women are called upon to play in the liberating fight that we have undertaken this initiative. Throughout African history, women have supported the struggles for liberation, and for the Angolan women it cannot be otherwise. This fight, which all Africa is waging, has several aspects. Certain of our sisters have had to take up weapons, as was the case in Algeria. Unfortunately, Angola is heading down the same path.

The Angolan women have likewise suffered from forced labor and illiteracy. This policy, which is followed with a rare ferocity, has obliged us to take up weapons and to fight alongside the true fighters for liberty on the battlefields. In the Angolan maquis our sisters, under enemy fire, are playing an important role in feeding our soldiers of the national liberation army. The imperialist and criminal war, which Portugal has imposed upon us, is increasing in intensity and is gaining in proportions day by day. Today some of our sisters have nothing to wear, and they cannot even clothe their children. They are thus exposed to infectious diseases, to which numerous Angolans have already succumbed.

This distribution of clothing on Christmas Eve is an opportunity for us to make our children forget the deprivations that this terrible war forces upon us. It is an opportunity for us to tell our children that the war continues, but we continue it with strong hope and firm determination, and thus our daily life continues along its course. The difficulties, the tears, will never divert us from our way.

In closing, we thank their Excellencies, the African ambassadors who have allowed this demonstration to take place today. The appeal that we made to our brothers to make our children rejoice was heard. It was heard as the appeal that we do not cease making to all Africa. The Conference of Addis Ababa is the shining proof of it, and the resolutions adopted there are the logical result for the good of all Africa.

Long live the Associação das Mulheres de Angola, AMA!

Long live the GRAE!

Long live united and independent Africa!

The GRAE Declaration of Principles

[The "Declaration of Principles" was distributed in 1962 by the Angola office in]
New York as three mimeographed pages. It calls for continued revolutionary struggle until independence is achieved and the development of relations with all sympathetic nations.

The Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE), which was established April 3, 1962, and which is provisionally located in Lopoldville, capital of the Republic of the Congo, and whose mandate will automatically end with the full and complete triumph of the Revolution and the adoption of the basic Charter of the new independent Republic of Angola, has as its specific mission:

a) To take all measures and make all decisions necessary to the success of the Angolan Revolution.

b) To establish all necessary contacts and strengthen already existing relations, not only with international agencies charged with safeguarding peace and assuring the triumph of justice and harmony in a world that must be freed for all time from fear and terror, but also with those African and Asian governments that have already earned the gratitude of the Angolan people because their attitude with respect to the Angolan Revolution has clearly shown that they have understood and realized that the struggle for independence, which this courageous and determined people are undertaking, is the struggle of all the peoples of the African continent.

c) To solicit early recognition by all governments which, because they are the jealous guardians of the territorial integrity of the African continent, know that they must be able to provide moral and material aid to mankind in the struggle to reconquer his liberty and construct his future, which will depend upon the success of his political and social movements.

d) To lead an independent Angola toward the establishment of a democratic and representative regime that will respect the Declaration of Human Rights; that will develop a constitution guaranteeing the rights of everyone; that will establish rule by law in the new Republic and will determine the type and priority of the reforms to be undertaken for the benefit of the nation; and that will create the institutions needed for the harmonious development of a truly democratic, political, and social regime.

No true unity of the African people can be realized as long as any region on the African continent continues to be sullied by the remains of colonialism. Unity is a monolithic bloc against which no outside powers can act. But this bloc, an irresistible and indestructible force, can be achieved only by the joining together of heterogeneous ethnic groups. It is for this reason that a battle for liberty and independence anywhere in Africa must become the battle of the entire African continent for the complete independence and unity of the African community.

The heroic and unprecedented struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola, which has already lasted one year, is the struggle of the entire African continent to free itself from exploitation by the colonialist powers. For almost five centuries, Angola, which is an integral part of the African community and of Africa's cultural heritage, has been a living hell for the native resident. He has lost all his rights and is subjected to willfully imposed taxes and forced labor. Angolans today live under conditions no better than those of
medieval serfs. Portuguese colonialism in Angola has been one of the most cruelly inhuman impositions in the history of colonialist peoples throughout the world. This is shown in the enforcement of rules that provide for Portugal's taking over all the national resources of Angola; in the total servitude of the native population, purposely maintained in a complete intellectual void, whereas Angolan natives had previously lived freely within their secular traditions and within the framework of their own national institutions and culture; and in the systematic stripping from the native of everything that constitutes the dignity of the human being.

This process of animalization of the native in order to achieve his blind submission to the colonial slave-holder and torturer has lasted for many years. But, because in the heart of the indigenous population there still existed a certain nostalgia for their lost liberty, the day came when their attitude toward the inhuman, savage master began to change. In the depths of their subconscious, something had stirred. Progressively, the native became aware of his situation, of what he had lost, of what he had become, of the situation in which he had been placed. And thus began the deterioration of his relations with the "master." As this deterioration progressed day by day, a crucial point was reached for the beginning of his struggle to reconquer his own individuality, for the casting off of all servitude, for the manifesting of his determination to fight for his liberty. The very ignorance of the colonialist—who has not made use of these first moments of deterioration in social rapport, who has not realized that it is in his own interest to humanize his system, however little—strengthened the initial movement of revolt to the point of its becoming a veritable full-scale, armed struggle against the occupier's forces of oppression. Since then, the Angolan masses have become fully aware of their power and potentialities.

And today, the Angolan people's armed struggle for independence no longer limits its field of battle to Angola; it has gone beyond national frontiers and is carried on throughout the continent wherever people's rights to independence and liberty are discussed and championed. The struggle is carried on before the international organizations, which are charged with the task of building a climate of true social justice in relationships among men, and which have come to realize and declare solemnly that "the subjection of a people to foreign domination and exploitation" is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and endangers the cause of peace and world cooperation. It is also made clear to the conscience of the African and Asian governments that the struggle of the Angolan people is the struggle of all the people of the African continent who are concerned with safeguarding the territorial integrity of the continent.

It is for all these reasons that the two large political parties of Angola—the Uniao das Populaguens de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA), the two authentic representatives of the Angolan people's legitimate aspirations in their struggle for independence—realized the need for action. Faced by new problems made more delicate each day by the extension of the struggle to the interior of Angola, the two parties not only united their forces in a national front
for liberation--this was done on March 27, 1962--but also have already established a provisional government, which is the sole government with a mandate from the people engaged in the armed struggle and which is the official representative of Angola at international organizations as well as in relations with brother and sympathetic countries.

Therefore, to all the free consciences of the world, to all the democratic governments of the world, to all the international organizations charged with safeguarding the peace of the world, the new provisional government of Angola, which has already taken all measures necessary for the organization of the regions in the interior of Angola that are under effective control of the Angolan Army of National Liberation, issues a stirring and confident appeal. It calls upon all the peoples of the African continent and throughout the rest of the world to lend their enthusiastic and unreserved support to the struggle led by the Angolan provisional government and the population of Angola, which it represents, in order to obtain definitive and rapid liberation of the national territory and recognition by all of the Angolan people's right to self-determination.

The GRAE
Prime Minister Vice Prime Minister (PDA) 2nd Vice Prime Minister Foreign Affairs Information Interior Finances (PDA) Social Affairs (PDA) Armament Education (PDA)
Holden ROBERTO Emmanuel KOUNZIKA Mgr. Manuel das Neves (Luanda)
Jonas SAVIMBI (South) Rosario NETO (Malanje) Dr. Josd LIAHUCA (South)
Emmanuel ZIKI Ferdinand DOMBELE P. John EDUARDO (PDA)
Secretaries of State
Foreign Affairs Information Interior Finances Social Affairs Education Armament
JOHNNY Eduardo (vacant)
Samuel SILVA (PDA) Maurice DOMBE LE (vacant)
VICTOR AFONSO (South) (vacant)
Other nominations will be announced later.
[Capital letters are used here to indicate the name by which the individual is more commonly known.]

* * * *

Statutes. Commission Functions, and Rules of Order of the Partido Democrdtico de Angola
[This PDA document is translated from "Statuts, fonctionnement des commissions, reglement d'ordre interieur du Parti D¢mocratique de l'Angola," L6opoldville, November 17, 1965, 16 p., mimeographed.]

Statutes
Chapter I
Structure
Preamble
Considering the centuries-old suffering that was imposed upon the Angolan people by the fascist Portuguese regime of oppression;
Considering the era of liberation of peoples and the aspirations of our people;
Considering the extent of the territory and the diversity of the ethnic groups that inhabit it;
Considering the political revolution of the country;
Keeping in mind the wish expressed by the people during the congress held on February 14, 1962, in Lopoldville (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the following has been resolved:
Article 1--Name--Partido Democrdtico de Angola or Parti Ddmocratique de l'Angola (PDA).
Article 2--Headquarters--Temporarily in Ldopoldville, capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Article 3--Fundamental Goals--The PDA has the following fundamental objectives:
   a) Preparation of the masses and formation of an Angolan elite.
   b) Defense of the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country in its present geographical configuration.
   c) Solemn commitment to promote and consolidate African unity in the spirit of the Charter of Addis Ababa.
   d) Struggle against all forms of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.
Article 4--Means of Action--To attain the objectives listed above, the PDA commits itself to conduct its activities by the following means:
   a) Fighting for independence using all means.
   b) Developing the spirit of fraternity and solidarity among all Angolans.
   c) Encouraging and aiding as much as possible the movements fighting for the liberation of their respective countries.
Article 5--Membership--Any native of Angola who approves the party policy may be a member of the PDA without distinction as to religious or philosophic beliefs.
Article 6--Expulsion--Any member accused of an act of high treason may be suspended or expelled from the party, after a meeting of the Executive Committee with two-thirds of the members present.
Article 7--Resignation--A member's resignation is not effective until it is approved by two-thirds of the Executive Committee.
Article 8--Keeping in mind the circumstances of the moment, the meetings of the Executive Committee are to be held at least once a month; in case of need, a general assembly may be called by this Committee.
Chapter II
Administrative Organization of the Party
Article 9--The PDA is comprised of seven main institutions, which are:
   1. The National Congress
   2. The Executive Committee
   3. The Political Bureau
   4. The Commissions
5. The Sections
6. The Youth Movement
7. The Women's Movement

Article 10--Roles of the Institutions--The National Congress is the highest body of the Party. Its mission is to elect the Executive Committee and to issue declarations on national problems and on all the choices of the Party. Its decisions are irrevocable.

Article 11--The National Congress is composed of representatives of all the institutions of the Party listed in Article 9.

Article 12--Convocation of the Congress--The Congress is called every three years for the election of the Executive Committee and at any other time that the latter judges necessary.

Article 13--The Executive Committee is the executive body of the Party. It directs the general activities of the movement and outlines the program of action in accordance with its goals. It studies the needs of the movement and the possibilities facing it. It has 33 members.

Article 14--The mandate of the Executive Committee is renewable every three years.

Article 15--The Executive Committee is composed of the following:
--President General
--Two Vice-Presidents General
--Secretary General
--Two Assistant Secretaries General
--Director of the Political Bureau
--Deputy Director of the Political Bureau
--Treasurer General
--Assistant Treasurer General
--Directors and members of the Commissions
--Advisers

Article 16--The Political Bureau is charged with studying the general policy of the Party and all cases not foreseen by the Congress.

Article 17--The Commissions are groups that work out and study certain problems of the Party. Five principal commissions exist within the Executive Committee. They are:
1. Commission on Information, the Press, and Documentation
2. Commission on Education and Cultural Affairs
3. Commission on Finances
4. Commission on Inspection and the Military
5. Commission on Propaganda

Article 18--The sections are the bodies of support and they serve as a liaison between
the Executive Committee and the people; their mission is to spread and apply the party program, see to the execution of the decisions and orders of the Executive Committee, and to pass on the wishes of the peoples whom they represent. They aid the Executive Committee by their initiatives and suggestions.

Article 19--The Section Committees are composed of fifteen members:
--One President
--Two Vice-Presidents
--One Secretary
--Two Assistant Secretaries
--One Propaganda Secretary
--One Treasurer
--Two Comptrollers
--Advisers

Article 20--The Youth Movement Committee (Juventude Democrática da Angola, JDA) is composed of twenty members:
--Secretary General
--Two Assistant Secretaries
--One Secretary of Political Affairs
--One Secretary of Information
--One Secretary of the Treasury
--One Secretary of Inspection
--One Treasurer General
--Two Comptrollers
--Advisers

Article 21--The Women's Movement (Movimento das Mulheres) is composed of fifteen members, divided as follows:
--President General
--Two Vice-Presidents General
--One Secretary General
--Two Assistant Secretaries General
--One Treasurer
--Two Comptrollers
--Advisers

Prerogatives

Article 22--The President General calls the meetings of the Executive Committee and of the general assemblies. With the Secretary General, he signs all official documents of the Party. He leads the debates; in discussions his voice predominates. He represents the Party in all domains.

Article 23--The Vice-Presidents assist the President General in his privileges and replace him in case he is absent.

Article 24--The Secretary General prepares the reports and correspondence of the Party, as well as the minutes of the meetings of the Executive Committee and of the Political Bureau. He keeps the documents of the Party. He coordinates the section activities; he oversees the execution of the resolutions made by the Executive Committee.
Article 25--The Assistant Secretaries General assist the Secretary General in his activities and replace him in case he is absent.

Article 26--The Treasurer keeps the Party funds, for which he is responsible. He works out the dues of the members, which he must enter into his account books. He justifies the state of the funds whenever he is requested to.

Article 27--The Advisers are charged with offering the members of the Committee their advice and the benefits of their experience in all domains.

Chapter III
Elections

Article 28--The members of the Executive Committee will be elected by secret vote during a National Congress. The members of the outgoing Committee may be reelected if they show the desire to present themselves as candidates.

Chapter IV
Resources of the Party

Article 29--Party funds come from:
1. Dues from active members
2. Dues from supporting members
3. Gifts
4. Sales of Party publications

Functions of the Political Bureau and of the Commissions of the Executive Committee

In order to realize a just division of labor and the best utilization of the abilities of the Party members, the Executive Committee is endowed by the working commissions functioning within it as follows:

Chapter I
Political Bureau

The Political Bureau is charged with studying the general policy of the Party. It is also within this Bureau that the cases which were not foreseen by the Congress are examined. Its goal is to study the politico-socio-economic status of the Party, of Angola, and of the world in general, as world policy can have repercussions on our country or on our organizations. From the results of its studies, it makes suggestions or recommendations or proposes to the Executive Committee solutions that it judges may be helpful for the success or the fulfillment of the objectives that the Party has determined for itself concerning the country.

The Political Bureau is composed of the following persons:
--The President General
--The Vice-Presidents General
--The Secretary General
--The Assistant Secretaries General
--The Director of the Political Bureau
--The Deputy Director of the Political Bureau
--The First Adviser General
The Members of the National Council of the FNLA
These persons are under the leadership of the Director of the Political Bureau. In his absence he is replaced by the Deputy Director of the Political Bureau. If both are absent, the Political Bureau may meet following the criteria defined in the Rules of Order.

Calling of the Bureau Meeting
The Director, in agreement with the President General, calls the meetings of the Political Bureau. In the absence of the latter, the Political Bureau may be called together with the agreement of one of the Vice-Presidents General.

Application of Decisions
During its meetings, decisions and resolutions are adopted by a majority of those present.

Minutes and reports are prepared by the Secretary General or by one of his Assistant Secretaries, who submits them to the Political Bureau for approval during the following meeting.

Chapter II
Working Commissions
To implement the effectiveness of policy and the study of certain problems of the Party, the Executive Committee is aided by the following working commissions:
1. Commission on Information, the Press, and Documentation
2. Commission on Education and Cultural Affairs
3. Commission on Finances
4. Commission on Inspection and the Military
5. Commission on Propaganda

Chapter III
Roles and Prerogatives of the Commissions
1. Commission on Information
   This commission is responsible for the diffusion of news concerning the Party, Angola, and Africa, as well as news relating to any international policy about which it should be judged necessary to instruct or inform the masses. To do this, the above commission publishes, under the authority and the responsibility of the Director of Information, a weekly bulletin called Mondo or the Voix Dmocratique de l’Angola, the mouthpiece of the Party. To that end, the commission maintains the Party library, where books, bulletins, newspapers, magazines, and other documents of the Party relative to the political, social, and economic situation of Angola, Africa, and other countries are kept.

Members of This Commission
KAZILUKI Augustin Director
SILVA Samuel Deputy Director
MINGIEDI Maurice Clerk

Members
MASSAKI André
SANSAO Alphonse

2. Commission on Education and Cultural Affairs
This commission concerns itself with education and the cultural affairs of the Party. To do this, it organizes training courses for various groups of people.
Special courses are foreseen for the education and instruction of adults of both sexes, as well as for the training of young people. There will be a program aimed at combating illiteracy, thus giving life to the national awakening and to the civil spirit of the masses in general.

In the framework of the general education of the masses, the commission is charged with the vulgarization of certain political, social, and economic ideas whose understanding would be judged necessary for the emancipation of the masses.

Concerning cultural affairs, the commission studies and puts to use the resources--artistic, historic, and folkloric--of our national patrimony as well as those of other civilizations and countries (African, European, and others), with a view to bringing them to the doors of our people for their expansion and their edification. With a view to promoting a spirit of mutual understanding among the peoples, particular interest is paid to the study of languages, both of Angola and of other countries. Therefore, we must first reach an agreement on the native languages such as Kikongo, Kimbundu, and Umbundu, and then on the other dialects. European languages such as Portuguese, French, English, German, and Spanish must be the object of special studies with a view to arousing interest in them among our people or our elite in order to expose our people to the understanding of other peoples.

Among the non-Angolan African languages, Swahili is of great importance because of its wide usage among African peoples as a veritable liaison.

Members of the Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSUMBU Martin</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWANZA Daniel</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTO Jos6</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members

ZIKI Emmanuel
KIAKU Andrd

3. Commission on Finances

Responsible for the finances of the Party, this commission periodically and at any time makes checks on the funds, both of the sections and of the Executive Committee of the Party.

Independently of the financial control, the commission works with the Treasurer General of the Party to seek all ways of assuring a healthy financial situation and especially to continually replenish the funds of the Party with the dues of members, beginning with all the leaders, since they should set an example. As a consequence, this commission has the obligation of overseeing the financial situation through periodic checks. At the opportune moment it should submit to the Executive Committee all its useful conclusions and suggestions in order to remedy any critical situation or, better yet, to ease the general financial situation of the Party.

Members of This Commission
4. Commission on Inspection and the Military
This commission is charged with the inspection of all our Sections, both local and in the interior, to keep them continually on their guard by keeping in contact with them. It serves as a liaison between the Executive Committee and the Section Committees. It investigates any case of a disturbing nature on which the Executive Committee does not have precise enough information to act effectively. Likewise, it is concerned with the safety and the security of the Party. To do this, the leaders of the commission perform an ad hoc service to hunt down our secret enemies, to remain attentive to the policy of the other Angolan political movements, and to sound out, using all means, Portuguese or world opinion in order to know the inner workings of Portuguese policy and its evolution in general.
Within the Party framework, this commission is concerned with the status of the military, for which it recruits or enlists members who are designated for military training. It oversees their interests in all cases, particularly in their movements around the country.
This commission looks after the refugees. It makes its report to the Executive Committee.
Members of This Commission
SANDA Martin Director
VETOKELE Domingos Deputy Director
PEMBELE Ferdinand Clerk

5. Commission on Propaganda
This commission arranges for propaganda and the transmission of Party passwords among the masses and among our representatives, whose dynamism and adherence to our policy it oversees and encourages.
To conform to the Party line of conduct, this commission should work in close collaboration with the Commission on Information.
The Executive Committee is informed by this commission of the activities and progress made by our representatives and is made directly aware of the problems of each section or problems common to all sections. This helps the Executive Committee to resolve the problems rapidly.
Likewise, this commission has a welcoming service, which consists of welcoming our representatives from the interior in the event that they are called to Party headquarters by the Executive Committee, for a Congress or for a specific mission.
This Commission Is Composed of
KIDIMBU Antoine NAKONGO Antoine NSEVANI Moreira
Director
Deputy Director Clerk
Member
PANDA Antoine Rules of Order
Chapter I General
Article 1 -- The present Rules of Order is a complementary document created in conformity with Article 42 of the Statutes and with the working commissions.

Article 2 -- Each member of the PDA is expected to know the Statutes and the Rules of Order of the Party.
Chapter II Meetings
Article 3 -- The presence of the members at meetings of the Executive Committee, the Political Bureau, and the commissions is obligatory. Three consecutive unexcused absences call for an explanation.
Article 4 -- Any member who does not conform to Article 3 of these Rules of Order will be subject to suspension, the length of which will be determined by the Executive Committee.
Article 5 -- The meetings of the Executive Committee begin at a fixed hour. If a quorum is not present, the President General may postpone the meeting for fifteen minutes. After this, the meeting is declared in session. In this event, the Committee is meeting in extraordinary session.
Article 6 -- Meetings of all institutions of the PDA begin with the reading of the minutes, in good and due form, of the preceding session.
Article 7 -- Decisions are made by a majority of those present.
Article 8 -- During each session, order, discipline, and courtesy are required.
Article 9 -- Each member has a right to speak. He asks for this right by raising his hand.
Article 10 -- The President General has the right to take the floor from any member who strays from the subject under debate or who violates Article 8 of this Order.
Article 11 -- The motion of order is accorded to a member when he wishes to clarify his thoughts, which may have been misinterpreted by a member, or to suggest a way of furthering the work.
Article 12 -- The commissions must respect the limits of their prerogatives as defined in the Functions of Working Commissions. This should not at all impede frank collaboration among them.
Article 13 -- No institution of the PDA is authorized to publicize speeches or communiqués contrary to the line of conduct of the Party.

Article 14 -- Each commission must present a report of its activities to the President
every two months.
Article 15--The Executive Committee must be informed of any mission abroad, except in cases of extreme emergency.
Article 16--Each member of an official mission at home or abroad must present his report to the Executive Committee no later than a week after the mission.

Chapter III
Political Bureau
Article 17--Before the convocation of the Political Bureau, the Director of the Political Bureau is to inform the Political Bureau members of the agenda.
Article 18--The Political Bureau is validly in session when two-thirds of its members are present.
Article 19--In the absence of the Director and the Deputy Director of the Political Bureau, the Secretary General, under the initiative of the President General, may convocate the Political Bureau.
Article 20--The Political Bureau will meet under the provisional leadership of a senior member, whose name will be announced by the Secretary General.
Article 21--The role of the senior members consists in electing another person among the Directors of the Commissions to lead the debate.
Article 22--After the session, the prerogatives granted by the latter are immediately ended.
Article 23--Decisions of the Political Bureau are confidential until they are approved by the Executive Committee.
Article 24--Any member accused of having divulged the secrets of the Political Bureau is subject to suspension.
Article 25--In case of prolonged absence of a Commission Director, the Deputy Director of the commission automatically replaces him in the Political Bureau.
Article 26--All the institutions of the Party must work in close collaboration with the Executive Committee.

Chapter IV
Finances
Article 27--The Party must have a bank account. Article 28--The Treasurer General may not keep more than 50,000 francs in his cash box. Anything more than this amount must be deposited in the bank. Article 29--There is, at Party headquarters, a petty cash fund of not more than 10,000 francs. This petty cash is administered by the Assistant Treasurer General under the control of the President and the Treasurer General. Article 30--The Commission on Finances must give the President a trimestral report on the general financial situation of the Party and a biannual budget.
Article 31--The Commission on Finances must present to the President an annual inventory of the personal property and the real estate of the Party.

Chapter V
Party Institutions
Article 32--Members may not belong simultaneously to the Executive Committee, the JDA, the MFDA, or the Section.
Article 33--The Section Committees, the JDA, and the MFDA must send, a written report of their activities to the Executive Committee every three months.
Article 34--Any differences among members of a Section Committee, the JDA, or the MFDA that might compromise the progress of the Party must be referred to the Executive Committee for settlement.
Article 35--The Rules of Order concerning the administrative personnel of the Party are covered in the service notes.

Chapter VI
Suspension and Expulsion
Article 36--By virtue of Article 6 of the PDA Statutes, the following acts are considered cases of high treason:
--divulging Party secrets
--divulging military secrets
--making pacts with the enemy
--corruption
--embezzlement and anything else of this nature that might compromise the existence of the Party.

Article 37--Any member accused in a case cited in Article 36 of these Rules of Order must be called before the Political Bureau for a hearing. The conclusions must be submitted to the Executive Committee for approval. While awaiting the decision of the Executive Committee, the member is suspended from his offices.

Article 38--The President General will, by letter, notify the interested member of the decision of the Executive Committee.

Chapter VII
Congress
Article 39--The Congress is called by the President General upon the request of the Executive Committee.

Article 40--The opening session is temporarily presided over by the President General until the formation of the Bureau of the Congress.

Article 41--The official delegations are:
--The Executive Committee, in full
--Each Section ................. three members
Article 42--All documents from the Congress must be kept in the archives of the Secretary General of the Party.

Chapter VIII
Miscellaneous
Article 43--Except for the Executive Committee, the term of office in PDA institutions is two years.
Article 44--The members of the Committees of the JDA, of the MFDA, and of the Sections may ask to succeed themselves, when their term of office expires, during a general assembly of all their members, with the participation of a delegation from the Executive Committee with consultative, not deliberative, power.

Article 45--All points that have not been covered in the present Rules of Order will appear in an appendix.

The FLEC Resolutions
[These resolutions are translated from "Congres des partis politiques cabindais tenu A Pointe-Noire République du Congo, Brazzaville du 2 au 4 a8ut 1963," Pointe Noire, August 1963, 4 p., mimeographed. They reflect discontentment among nationalist exiles from the Portuguese enclave of Cabinda.]

Resolutions:
Whereas all peoples are always free to seek conditions adequate to ensure their liberty, subsistence, and full development;
Whereas it was an accident of history that our ancestors, by the treaties of 1883, 1884, and 1885, made our country a protectorate of Portugal (the purpose of these treaties was simply to answer imperialistic demands made by the colonialist powers that met in Berlin, in 1885, to divide Africa among themselves);
Whereas neither the letter nor the spirit of these treaties has been respected by the protector nation, but, on the contrary, Portugal has taken advantage of the ignorance of the protected peoples to remake the nature of the bonds that had been established;
Whereas, furthermore, at the end of World War II (1940-1945), all the powers represented in San Francisco condemned colonialism; and explicitly recognized and solemnly proclaimed, in the United Nations Charter, the right of colonized peoples to decide their own future;
Whereas all colonial powers except Portugal, basing their actions on the Charter of San Francisco, have freed their former colonies;
Whereas the people of Cabinda have officially expressed to the Portuguese government their firm determination to achieve independence;
Whereas, in spite of repeated demands and continued resistance of the people of Cabinda, Portugal persists in considering Cabinda an overseas "Portuguese
province," by completely disregarding the legitimate aspirations of the natives, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter;
Whereas the legitimate claims of the people of Cabinda have been answered with massacres, all sorts of tortures, rapes, mass arrests, deportations, pillaging, and burning of entire villages;
And furthermore,
Whereas, in spite of seventy-eight years of colonization, Portugal has done nothing to ease the fate of the people of Cabinda, even though the other colonialist powers have made considerable progress in all domains in their former colonies;
Whereas this Portuguese policy, condemned by all the peoples of the free world, is irreconcilable with the legitimate interests and the harmonious development of the people of Cabinda, and, therefore, these people feel obliged to resort to any means to liberate themselves:
Present at the Congress of Pointe-Noire, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), August 2-4, 1963, and having examined the political, economic, and social situation stemming from the Portuguese colonial regime, the political parties of Cabinda listed below:
THE MOUVEMENT POUR LA LIBERATION DE L'ENCLAVE DE CABINDA (MLEC)
THE COMITE D'ACTION D'UNION NATIONALE DES CABINDAIS (CAUNC)
THE ALLIANCE DE MAYOMBE (ALLIAMA) have decided the following:
Resolution No. 1
The people of Cabinda, holding fast to the reaffirmation of their right to selfdetermination and to total, immediate, unconditional independence,
Declare, to that end, that they are ready to engage in constructive discussions with Portuguese authorities, with a view to determining the means of handing over power;
Ask, furthermore, for the organization of direct legislative elections, by universal suffrage, with the participation of Cabinda natives residing abroad, as well as of political refugees;
Demand the immediate withdrawal of all Portuguese troops and military bases in the Enclave of Cabinda;
Demand, furthermore, the immediate liberation of all arrested and deported Cabinda politicians, and their return to the country of their origin.
Resolution No. 2
To assure representation and defense in all domains and circumstances, the political parties named above have decided to form an Executive Committee.
Beyond the powers given it in the preceding paragraph, the Executive Committee directs the general policies of the Front pour la Librdration de l'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), created in L6opoldville, July 14, 1963, by the above-mentioned parties. In this effort, the Executive Committee will resort to any means that it deems necessary.
Resolution No. 3
The FLEC thanks all the member nations of the United Nations and other international organizations for the support that they have unceasingly given to the people of Cabinda. The FLEC expresses the desire to see international organizations in general, and especially the United Nations, continue and intensify their efforts toward the complete liquidation of colonialism and imperialism and toward the total elimination of slavery in all its forms. It earnestly appeals to all the countries in the world and asks them to dedicate themselves to the triumph of respect for civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the maintenance of international peace, tranquility, and security. The FLEC hopes that the complete liberation of all colonized peoples will bring a new era of justice, cooperation, solidarity, and international prosperity.

Resolution No. 4
Considering the special efforts of independent African nations toward the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and imperialism;
AConsidering the unanimous will of the African peoples to bring about the unity of Africa;
The FLEC sincerely thanks all the African nations moved by the common ideal of the unification of the African continent, manifested in the Charter of African Unity adopted at the Conference of Addis Ababa. The FLEC is convinced that all independent African nations will honor their commitments stemming from the adoption of the above-mentioned charter and that they will use all available means to combat all forms of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism. It asks all African nations to recognize the FLEC as the sole competent, representative, political organization defending the interests of the people of Cabinda.

Resolution No. 5
Considering that as long as they remain colonized, people cannot maintain sincere, friendly relations with the colonizing country, and that the result is a climate of mistrust, even enmity, irreconcilable to the spirit of our century, which is characterized by collaboration and solidarity among peoples;
The FLEC appeals to the understanding of the Portuguese government with a view to its respecting the right of the people of Cabinda to decide their own destiny—the only basis for a true friendship. The FLEC considers that since Cabinda can regain its liberty only by achieving total independence, the people of Cabinda have the right to refuse all collaboration with Portugal. Therefore, the FLEC proclaims that the nature of future bonds between free, independent Cabinda and Portugal can be defined only by the people in future elections.

Resolution No. 6
Concerning the economy and money, the FLEC adopts the maintenance of the current monetary system for a period yet to be determined. It extols the establishment of an economic and social commission charged with elaborating a plan of economic expansion encompassing principally the development of agriculture, fishing, livestock raising, and industry, both by exploiting the forests and the subsoil and by intensifying commerce. It solemnly commits itself to
guarantee the security of the person and goods of any foreigner desiring to invest and to install himself in the territory of Cabinda. It chooses to orient the economy of Cabinda toward the fulfillment of man's needs and not toward individual profit.

Resolution No. 7
Concerning the social framework, the FLEC extols the installation of modern medical and educational facilities destined to assure the full development of the people of Cabinda. In the area of labor, the FLEC envisions, on one hand, a struggle to lessen unemployment by installing full labor and, on the other hand, the application of an equitable salary policy, free from discrimination and complemented by a most favorable social security system.

Resolution No. 8
The above-mentioned political parties of Cabinda, represented by their respective delegates, solemnly undertake to respect the resolutions adopted during the present Congress and to not stray from the delineated line of conduct. The Executive Commission is charged with the execution of the resolutions adopted by the present Congress.

* * * *

The UNEA and the Student Sector
[Although at first its membership generally favored the Frente Nacional de Libertago de Angola (FNLA) and the Governo Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exfilio (GRAE), the UNEA later assumed a more independent and critical position, working for the unification of the many Angolan nationalist groups.]

The UNEA Constitution
[The UNEA constitution is translated from an undated, sixteen-page, mimeographed statement, "Constituglo da Unigo Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos."]

Preamble
The Angolan students meeting in Lucerne (Switzerland) on March 10-11, 1962, desiring to better coordinate their efforts in the fight against Portuguese colonialism in Angola and in the defense of their rights, decided to found a student organization with the name of the Unifo Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA).

Chapter I
Article 1--Definition:
The UNEA is a student organization, independent of any national political institution, representing all Angolan students at both the national and the international level, with no distinction as to age, academic level, sex, political preferences or choices, or religious beliefs.

Article 2--Independence:
a) The independence of the UNEA, as an organization, is functional and organic.
b) The independence of the UNEA does not conflict with free political choices by its members.

Chapter II
Goals of the UNEA
Article 1--At the National Level:
a) To promote national awareness and a feeling of mutual responsibility among students.
b) To inculcate in the students awareness of their patriotic and revolutionary duty regarding the fight for national independence.
c) To contribute to the unity, integrity, and personality of the nation.
d) To encourage academic progress and to defend the interests of the students.
e) To promote the campaign against illiteracy through education and teaching compatible with Angolan realities in particular and African realities in general.

Article 2--At International Level:
a) To be totally impartial regarding ideological disputes at the international level (with regard to both students and politics).
b) To establish relations with other national student unions and international student organizations and to collaborate within a framework of mutual respect.
c) To make known the name of Angola and of the Angolan Revolution in international circles.
d) To awaken interest in the revolutionary cause of Angola on the part of national and international student organizations and of philanthropic institutions.
e) To support, when necessary, the international and national student organizations in activities that fall within the limits of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Chapter III
Composition
Article 1--The UNEA is composed of Active, Associate, and Honorary members.
a) Active Members: To be an Active Member, the student must be:
   1. Angolan "by blood" and African by birth.
   2. A student of a university, of a school of higher education, or of a secondary school (having completed the first cycle or its equivalent).
b) Associate Members: To be an Associate Member, the student must be Angolan "by blood," African by birth, and at the primary level.
c) Honorary Members: To be an Honorary Member, a person either must be sympathetic with the UNEA as an organization or must have been an active member of the UNEA when he was a student.

Chapter IV
Structure
Article 1--The structure of the UNEA is as follows: Congress, Executive Committee, Consultative Committee, Assemblies, and Directing Committees of Sections and Sub-sections.
Article 2--The Congress:
a) The Congress is the legislative organ of the UNEA. It meets every two years, in the summer, upon the convocation of the Central Executive Committee of the UNEA.
b) The Congress is comprised of all the Active Members of the UNEA.
c) Participants in the Congress must be named by the Directing Committees.
Article 3--The Central Executive Committee:
a) The Central Executive Committee is the executive organ of the UNEA. It has the power to convoke Extraordinary Assemblies, after agreement with the Consultative Committee, in the event of an emergency when the Congress is not in session.
b) The Central Executive Committee is comprised of:
   1. President General
   2. Vice-President General
   3. Vice-President for Foreign Relations and Second Vice-President for Foreign Relations
   4. Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General
   5. Secretary for Information and Assistant Secretary for Information
   6. Secretary for Socio-Cultural Relations and Assistant Secretary for Socio-Cultural Relations
   7. Inspector of Finances
   8. Treasurer General.

Article 4--Consultative Committee:
a) The Consultative Committee is the organ of "control" over the Central Executive Committee of the UNEA and over the sections, functioning at both national and international levels with the powers delegated to it by the Congress.
b) The Consultative Committee is composed of five active members elected by the Continental Sections.

Article 5--The Sections:
a) The Section Assembly is the highest organ in the section.
b) The sections are groups of Angolan students, forming a single corps in each nation to represent the UNEA in that country.
c) A section is composed of a Section Assembly and a Directing Committee.
d) The Directing Committee, elected democratically by the Section Assembly, is the executive organ of a section.
e) For the formation of a section, there must be a minimum of ten students who meet the conditions listed in Article 1, Chapter III of this Constitution.
f) The resignation of a member from the Directing Committee, proposed by one or more of its members, when approved by two-thirds of the members of the Directing Committee and accepted by two-thirds of the Section Assembly, is ratified by the Central Executive Committee.
g) A section is formed according to a prior and formal authorization by the Central Executive Committee of the UNEA.

Article 6--The Sub-sections:
a) A sub-section is a group of at least five students who, not satisfying the above conditions for the formation of a section, may be authorized by the Central Executive Committee to function as a student nucleus under the direct control of the nearest section.
b) A sub-section is composed of an Assembly, which is its highest organ.
c) Groups of students who do not form sub-sections are integral parts of the nearest section. In case of doubt, the Central Executive Committee will
determine to which section any group belongs.
Chapter V
Functions
Article 1--The Congress, as the supreme legislative organ of the UNEA:
a) Approves and revises the Constitution and the Statutes of the UNEA.
b) Elects the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Consultative Committee or suspends them from their duties.
c) Outlines the general policy for conduct to be followed by the Central Executive Committee and the Consultative Committee.
d) Applies sanctions to members of the Central Executive Committee and the Consultative Committee.
e) Makes decisions in matters of great importance, with a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the delegates present.

Article 2--Dismissal of a member of the Central Executive Committee requested by two-thirds of the Committee must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the Consultative Committee.

Article 3--The Central Executive Committee:
a) Convokes the Congress at the end of two years.
b) Convokes the Extraordinary Assembly in cases of emergency during these two years, with the approval of the Consultative Committee.
c) Approves the creation of sections and sub-sections.
d) Defends the UNEA and its aspirations at the national and international levels.
e) Administers and oversees the property of the organization.
f) Implements all the decisions made in the Congress or in the Extraordinary Assembly.
g) Presents the Congress with the report of UNEA activities during its term of office.

Article 4--The President of the Central Executive Committee:
a) Presides over the meetings of the Central Executive Committee and the opening of the Congress or the Extraordinary Assembly.
b) Directs the work of the Central Executive Committee.
c) Represents the UNEA in large demonstrations on both national and international levels.
d) Is responsible for the good exercise and coordination of the functions of the directing body in cases of emergency.
e) Orders the directing body convoked whenever it is necessary and opportune.
f) Is responsible for presenting the General Assembly with a written report on the UNEA during his term of office.
g) Ratifies delegates to meetings, conferences, or congresses, nominated by the Vice-President for Foreign Relations.

Article 5--The General Vice-President:
a) Helps the President and substitutes for him, with all his powers, when the President cannot exercise them.
b) Oversees, with the Secretary General, the internal activities of the organization.
c) Oversees, with the Secretary General, the good academic conduct and the security of the students.

Article 6--The Vice-President for Foreign Relations:
a) Represents the UNEA at the international level.
b) Is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of good relations between the UNEA and other national and international organizations.
c) Gives scholarships, by the mandate of the Central Executive Committee and the Commission on Scholarships, and announces their amounts.

Article 7--The Secretary General:
a) Is responsible for the foreign and home correspondence of the Central Executive Committee.
b) Convokes the Congress or the Extraordinary Assembly, upon the order of the President General of the UNEA and in agreement with the Executive Committee, the Directing Committee, and the Consultative Committee.

Article 8--The Secretary for Information:
a) Informs Angolan students and non-student as well as student organizations throughout the world of UNEA activities, through a Boletim de Informacao or other publications.
b) Is responsible for the publications (newspapers, magazines, etc.).

Article 9--The Secretary for Socio-Cultural Relations:
a) Foments interest among Angolan students in the national culture and customs.
b) Works out recreation programs, both to earn money and to spread the Angolan culture.

Article 10--The Inspector of Finances:
a) Is responsible for controlling the financial transactions of the UNEA in general and of the Central Executive Committee in particular.
b) Demands and approves a weekly financial report from the sections of the UNEA.
c) Implements the payment of dues in the sections.
d) Publishes a financial report for the Central Executive Committee every six months, in collaboration with the Treasurer.
e) Outlines plans for earning and distributing money in collaboration with the Treasurer General of the UNEA Central Executive Committee and with the section Inspectors of Finances.
f) Works out a general budget for the organization in collaboration with the Executive Committee of the UNEA.

Article 11--The Treasurer:
a) Controls the receipt and expenditure of UNEA funds received from national and international organizations or from the sections and sub-sections of the UNEA.
b) Is responsible for the money received.
c) Aids the Inspector of Finances in making the weekly financial report.

Chapter VI
The Consultative Body
Single Article--The Consultative Body:
  a) Oversees the implementation of the principles outlined in the Constitution.
  b) Asks the Executive Committee to convocate an Extraordinary General Assembly
     when circumstances demand it.
  c) Is informed by the Central Executive Committee of the dismissal of a
     member of the Central Executive Committee as indicated in Article 2,
     Chapter V.

Chapter VII
Rights and Duties of the Members
Article 1--Members have the right:
  a) To be informed of all activities relating to the UNEA.
  b) To freely expound their ideas based on intelligent and constructive criticism
     and to vote freely in assemblies or meetings.
  c) To elect and to be elected, if they are active members, to any office of the
     Central Executive Committee, sections, or sub-sections.
  d) To enjoy all the privileges of the UNEA activities (scholarships,
     demonstrations, etc.).
  e) To belong to any party or political institution.

Article 2--Duties of members are:
  a) To respect and fully understand the norms of the Constitution and the
     recommendations of the Congress.
  b) To attend the meetings of the Congress, of the Extraordinary Assemblies,
     of the Section and Sub-section Assemblies.
  c) To sacrifice their time for the defense of the UNEA and of the nation in
     battle.
  d) To pay their dues faithfully according to the criteria that are established
     in each section or sub-section.
  e) To defend the reputation and philosophy of the UNEA at the national and
     international levels.
  f) To keep in mind the urgent necessities of the nation in battle, with respect
     to the existence of technical, civil, and military cadres, and to make the maximum
     effort to acquire responsible education that will be useful to the
     Angolan nation.

Article 3--The duties of the Central Executive Committee are:
  a) To observe and enforce the content of the Constitution.
  b) To defend the interests of students and of the UNEA.
  c) To maintain good relations with other national and international organizations.
  d) To be a good example to the members of the organization.

Article 4--The Central Executive Committee has the right:
  a) To demand from members the fulfillment of the norms of conduct established
     in this Constitution.

Chapter VIII
Sanctions
Single Article--Sanctions on the members:
a) Any member who does not live up to what has been established by the Constitution may lose one or more rights listed in the Constitution, according to the Rules of Order recommended in that Constitution.
b) Suspension of a member requires the recommendations of the Central Executive Committee.
c) Expulsion of a member requires the ratification of the Congress or the Extraordinary Assembly.
d) If a member is sanctioned unjustly by the Directing Committee, he may have recourse to the Central Executive Committee, which will inform the Consultative Committee.

Chapter IX
Single Article--No member of the Central Executive Committee or the Directing Committee may hold office in a party or other political institution or in an international organization.

Chapter X
Funds
Single Article--The funds of the UNEA come from members' dues, from gifts or subsidies from national and international student organizations, philanthropic organizations, or individuals, and from sums earned by its cultural programs. These funds will be used only for the benefit of the UNEA and of the fighting Angolan people in cases approved by the Central Executive Committee.

Chapter XI
Scholarships
Single Article--A special commission on scholarships, created by the Congress, will be charged with the management and equitable distribution of scholarships within the nation.

Chapter XII
Revision of the Constitution
Single Article-a) The Constitution may be revised and amended only in a Congress or an Extraordinary Assembly, with a two-thirds majority of the members present.
b) This Constitution became effective March 11, 1962; it was revised and amended May 12, 1963, and September 3, 1965.

UNEA Resolutions, 1963
[These resolutions, adopted by the Second General Assembly of the UNEA, are translated from an undated issue of A Voz do Estudante Angolano, pp. 15-18. The UNEA resolutions were approved in Rilgel on May 13, 1963.1

--Whereas colonialism, a system of exploitation and oppression, constitutes a denial and flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of Man and of Peoples consecrated in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
--Whereas Portugal practices massive and merciless extermination of those who have said "No" to its tyranny in the colonies;
Whereas the fascist Portuguese government persists in trying to annihilate the active forces of Angola by maintaining a group of students in exile, in Portugal and elsewhere, and by imprisoning, under inhumane conditions, some of our colleagues and compatriots who openly defended the rights of their brothers;

--Whereas Portuguese colonialism enslaves the people in darkness and illiteracy, is contemptuous of indigenous culture, and destroys the personality of the natives to achieve its only goal--exploitation and domination of those natives;

--Whereas Portuguese colonialism, for the reasons given above, opposes independence, national sovereignty, and the cultural, economic, and social development of the colonized peoples;

THE SECOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNEA, held in Rüigel (Switzerland), May 10-12, 1963,

1. Condemns all the Machiavellian maneuvers of colonialism in Africa and joins its brother students and the people of our country, who are still under guardianship, in our struggle for independence;

2. Condemns, with all its might, Portuguese colonialism, which camouflages the tragedy of Angolan realities and entrenches itself behind its decrepit, unjustified, and unjustifiable slogans;

3. Protests vehemently against the genocide perpetrated in Angola by Salazar's forces;

4. Supports and will continue to support the emancipating fight that its people are leading in the name of liberty, the fundamental right of Man;

5. Declares that the independence of Angola is a right that is essential to the achievement of access to learning, to total development of an authentic national culture, and to the progress of education;

6. Appeals to all national student unions and organizations to lend a strong hand in the immense task that the UNEA has undertaken--the reconquest of its patrimony;

7. Asks all friendly countries and governments for moral, material, and financial aid for the people of Angola, victims of an outrageously barbaric oppression and of the subversive action of the Salazar regime;

8. Keeping in mind the level of instruction in Angola and the number of refugee students in the sister Republic of the Congo, invites all organizations of good will to donate scholarships for individuals desiring to pursue their studies, in order to achieve the best for the Angola of tomorrow;

9. Demands liberation of all imprisoned Angolan patriots and asks for their liberty, as well as that of exiles, to participate in the normal life of all free citizens;

Finally, the General Assembly praises the united action led by the Angolan people throughout their territory.

UNEA Resolutions, 1964
The Extraordinary Assembly of the Uni~o Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA), held in Wisen (Switzerland) on May 2 and 3, 1964, resolved:
1. To reaffirm its support of the struggle for national liberation.
2. To demand that the Gov~rno Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exflio (GRAE) explain to the people and students its decision to admit Viriato da Cruz into the Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA).
3. To send a letter to the GRAE asking for explanation of the nonfulfillment of some of our wishes, informing it of our activities and presenting concrete proposals on current problems, to wit:
   a. reorganization of the information service by nominating qualified persons to these posts.
   b. a discussion between the Government and the students in order to promote genuine cooperation.
4. To express the hope that a student delegation be received in L6opoldville for a confidential discussion with the leaders on the general policies now being followed by the Government.
5. To express the hope that it be informed concerning the Government's plans for economic, political, and social action to achieve national independence.
6. To demand that a congress of all existing forces be held as soon as possible.

Student Unity

[The following document is extracted from a seven-page mimeographed statement in Angola 66, a newsletter published in Oegstgeest, Netherlands. It emphasizes unity among Angolan students in Africa and the United States.]

Angolan Students Reorganize to Hasten National Independence

From August 31 to September 3, 1965, Angolan students belonging to the Unif~o Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA) held an Extraordinary Assembly in Utrecht (the Netherlands). After making a constructive and conscientious analysis of the Angolan political situation, they declared themselves ready to continue the struggle for the total liberation of their country ....

Angolan students in the United States are supporting the results of the UNEA Congress. At a sectional general assembly held last November 24-27 in Philadelphia, they made a conscientious analysis of the results of the UNEA Congress and approved the new orientation of their revolutionary organization. Analyses of the Angolan crisis made by political personages representing Angolan organizations of differing viewpoints were presented to the students. The political position of the UNEA and the new Executive Committee is supported by an overwhelming majority ....

Angolan students in Africa are supporting the line of the UNEA. Angolan students living in Tanzania, Zambia, the Angolan province of Katanga, Ldopoldville, Brazzaville, Tunis, Algiers, and other regions of Africa sent messages of solidarity to the other Angolan students who have given a revolutionary orientation to the UNEA. These students believe that the Angolan crisis must be resolved by Angolans themselves, by their finding an area of agreement for all the fighting patriots....
IV
IDEOLOGY
These documents reflect the ideological formation and development of the Uniao das Populações de Angola (UPA), the Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA), and the Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE) as well as the divisions that led to the defection of important leaders and factions throughout the 1960's.

Colonialism and Africa
[This statement is from "Le colonialisme e l'Afrique," in A Voz da Naglo Angolana, I (September 15, 1960), 1, 11. Emphasis is on the oppression of colonial-dominated peoples.]
The movement toward the liberation of Africa cannot be resisted, suppressed, or channeled. The precipitous events and the revolutionary impulse of the oppressed peoples that breaks the bonds of force imposed by colonialists and their followers will carry through to their logical conclusions.

And so we witness today the appearance of A Voz da Nagao Angolana, a combat organ of the Uniao das Populações de Angola (UPA), in this independent brother land in which we are received most cordially. It is not a case—as you well know, dear readers and dear compatriots—as proceeding to criticize the colonial system. We who are colonized, speaking to others who are or were in the same situation, are not going to demonstrate that colonialism is abnormal, inhumane, and condemnable. It would be useless and ridiculous for us to want to convince you of the unacceptable character of colonial oppression. We would merely like to shed some light on what is justly called a regime imposed by force, since it was by force and against the will of the people that colonialism implanted itself. Thus a colonized people is, ideologically, presented as a stagnant people, impervious to reason, incapable of guiding their own interests, in need of the constant presence of a guardian and manager.

The evolution of colonized people is often interpreted as agitation with no plausible motive, and one is given the firm impression that humanity for these people arrived with the white colonists. Thus Angola, a country of 4.5 million inhabitants, has writhed under Portuguese domination for five centuries, under a system that encouraged the growth of the white population. To ensure white domination, the principle was established that 41D; yet each Portuguese colonist who arrived was given a land grant. Gradually all the good farm land passed into the hands of the whites. A second principle applied was that of forced labor. Any individual, no matter who he might be, can require and force anyone, at any time, to work fourteen consecutive hours. With these two principles enforced, a third was developed—that of "Angola as a Portuguese province." This policy of national negation, cultural persecution, and even the denying of the African personality is carried out with rare ferocity. Here and there, some few Angolans "cross the line" and are admitted into the ranks of Portuguese citizenry, but virtually the entire population lives submerged in a psychological and spiritual misery, which raises necessary questions in the universal conscience.
It is against this state of things that the Angolans have reacted for some years, but the colonial administration and the Portuguese colonists, jealous of their privileges, have desperately strangled the Angolans, trying to maintain a regime of force in the country by increasing the number of prisons, tortures, and massacres. The Portuguese colonists are unworthy of a country that wants to "Christianize" itself. The Lord with His holy kindness, in His infinite mercy, created the free man. The Bible contains no verse that permits the domination and exploitation of one man by another.

We know that what injustice breaks apart, justice will reassemble. We know that on our continent our miseries and hopes have no borders save the oceans. We are confident that 200 million men will see the restoration of their common fatherland and of their right to live in dignity and brotherhood. Today all Angolans, persecuted and humiliated for generations, are standing ready to show that they will fight for their lives. Meanwhile, we appeal to all to unite and to stop the injustices being done in Angola so that we may become free men, with our aspirations—even the most intimate—whatever direction they may take, fulfilled; so that the whip, the ferule, the forced labor, and the darkness may no longer be our only response from administrators and post chiefs. Let those who want to see the triumph of this ideal and who have nothing to lose but their slavery, those who want to work for the masses of our country, rescue the UPA, which is working disinterestedly toward the eventual rebirth of the joy of living as free men in our own country.

Communism and Africa

[This statement is from A Voz da Nagao Angolana, I (September 30, 1960), 1, 7. The document attempts to relate African nationalism to the "ideology" of human dignity and to rebut Western allegations that nationalism is identifiable with communism.]

Each time a nation rises up against colonialism, each time an African nation becomes aware of itself and makes itself known to those who thought it had been reduced to an aggregate of individual tribes, each time the winds of freedom and human dignity blow across a country, moribund colonialism can only fight back with accusations of Communism. This wearisome argument was invented by French colonialsists, developed by British colonialists, reviewed by Belgian colonialists, and could hardly escape the Portuguese colonialists; which is to say that the Portuguese present no original arguments or imaginative innovations—only those of their accomplices. To better their reputation in the West, which sometimes feels remorse for the crimes committed by the overseas "civilizers," the Portuguese at times take back their own accusations.

Everyone knows that to the French colonialists, Bourguiba, and their own Houphouet-Boigny were Communists; to the English colonialists, Kenyatta and Nkrumah were nothing more than agents in the service of the Communist powers; to the Belgian colonialists, the Congo had only to denounce slavery before it was definitely relegated to the ranks of those who take orders from Moscow and Peking; and likewise, the Belgian colonialists, without cause, considered Kasavubu a Communist. History has already shown that these grotesque
accusations were untrue. They would have been humorous, except that there were, unfortunately, obstinate ears to hear them.

There exists a certain tendency among responsible, reputedly serious Westerners to give credence to such rumors. It is common, on the other hand, for some colonists to try to prove to the African people that nationalism and the fight for dignity are identified with Communism. They even went so far as to make this convincing to certain Africans, who thus let themselves be seduced by Marxist and Communist ideology. In some places, many of those brother Africans say they would prefer this to colonialism. But the great majority of those who fight for the liberty of their country have no ideology save that of human dignity. It is universally accepted that Africa is imprisoned by its land and its religion, whatever it may be. It knows no ideology other than patriotism—and it is this which the West calls nationalism.

Let all who want to safeguard their friendship with the peoples of Africa—with the people of Angola—know that we are determined to be not only Africans but also masters of our own destinies and lands, and that we will not allow ourselves to be seduced by any foreign propaganda. We are Angolans, and this means that we are no more Communist than we are Portuguese. We are Africans who would die in order to continue being Africans.

The UPA and the Revolution

[This view is from A Voz da Nagio Angolana, II (July 13, 1961), 1, 2, 8. This document reflects the optimism of revolutionary Angolans a few months after their uprising against the Portuguese.]

Since the first outbreak of fighting in Angola, some of our Angolan brothers and some brother Africans have reproached our party for having resorted to arms for the triumph of our claims for integral national independence. We are likewise accused of belonging to the Eastern bloc because our party—the incarnation of the aspirations of our valiant people—discouraged by the replies to our appeals for peaceful negotiation and disheartened by the frequent injustices and tortures that have been inflicted upon our people for some five centuries, resolved to take up arms to put an end to a past made shameful by indignities and miseries.

Trusting in the hope that our people place in our liberation movement, we are not discouraged; we are even more heartened because the manifestations of solidarity and applause from different parts of Africa, Asia, America, and Europe clearly indicate that we are on the right road. Indeed, although the revolution is scarcely four months old, we are endowed with a judiciously structured organization, we are

aided by an army of twenty thousand, and we are carrying out a plan of action that will bring about the realization of popular African aspirations. Nothing can and nothing will be able to oppose the revolutionary action of the Unilo das Populagbes de Angola (UPA), in spite of the fascist Portuguese policy of terror.

Results were not long in coming, once the victorious efforts of our army and the aggravation of the extermination measures put into practice by Salazar’s courtiers incited those influenced by the spirit of justice and world peace to put pressure on
the United Nations to stop the Portuguese aggression against our people. Even some "pacifist" Angolan movements were forced to orient themselves by the results of our military action, denouncing, in their communiques and press conferences, Portugal's determination to exterminate the black. Thus, although they were "non-violent," reactionary, or, as before, mere obstructionists, they will fight for independence in spite of their profession of faith....

Memorandum to UAM

[This statement, an attempt to justify the Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA) exclusion of some nationalist groups, was presented in Libreville in September 1962, to the Conference of the Chief of States and Chiefs of Governments of the Union Africaine et Malgache.]

Everyone knows that the Angolan people, after exhausting all peaceful means at hand to acquire their universally recognized right to determine freely their own destiny, were obliged to engage in an armed struggle against colonialist forces endowed with modern and murderous armament. This disparity of force has in no way shaken our morale. The righteousness of our cause and the nationalist spirit emanating from every sector of the Angolan population have always constituted the real sources of our strength. Thus, the very circumstances that might have proved a serious handicap for us have only served to increase tenfold the strength of our fighting men and to consolidate the bases of our revolution.

In order to make this revolutionary action all the more effective, the FNLA was created. This organization has been provided with respectable groups--the National Council and the Executive Committee, capable of leading the Angolan Revolution toward its objectives. Since March 27, 1962, the Angolan national liberation army, which is directing the fighting in the interior of the country, has been a dependency of the FNLA. The front is composed of the two great parties of the Angolan masses,

the Unifto das Populag5es de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA). However, little one may know of the Angolan facts of life, it is clear that the institutions of the FNLA, the Revolutionary Directorate, and the Exército de Libertaglo Nacional de Angola (ELNA) constitute a representative United Front.

Certain African brothers of ours, in an attempt to justify their indifference to the Angolan problem--we deeply regret having to say this, but are not family reunions such as this convoked for the express purpose of getting to the heart of problems and clearing up ambiguities--certain of our African brothers have found all sorts of pretexts, principally a lack of union, which may or may not exist among the Angolan people, that permit them to wash their hands of any obligations they may have toward our people.

The simple fact that, day by day, the struggle in the interior of Angola becomes more bitterly intensified serves to deny such avowals. Those who preceded us on the revolutionary path know full well that it is not possible to lead any military operation at all unless the fighting force can depend upon total support from the people. We would have wished that this union were in fact total, and we are sparing no effort to attain that goal. It was stipulated in the FNLA Convention that
the goal of the organization was to unite in a national front all of the organizations truly representative of the Angolan people in order to hasten the hour of the liberation of our people. We are unhappily forced to state that, despite this attitude on our part, certain of our Angolan brothers have preferred to exclude themselves from our activities. We have no intention of throwing rocks at them, for our role is not to divide. Our struggle will continue, and we do not despair of some day seeing them join with the masses of the Angolan people.

We are also aware that certain brother countries have been misled by tendentious and biased propaganda on the part of certain Angolan demagogues whose only objectives are the realization of their own ambitions. These demagogues have unceasingly affirmed that the struggle of the Angolan people was moribund for the sole reason that it lacked their participation. Although their attitude is against the interests of our people, their doings cannot hinder the course of our revolution, which has never been nor will ever be a matter of personalities but, indeed, the affair of the people. Furthermore, the FNLA suggests that they take up more important tasks than displaying their rhetoric abroad— in a tissue of contradictions— in the newspapers, in pamphlets, and in speeches.

That is an easy enough thing to do, but that is not what good patriots should be doing now. Every day Angolans fall before the bullets of the enemy in order to elevate the name of the FNLA and what it represents: liberty and the independence of Angola. Only traitors and diversionists can allow themselves to sully the ideal that FNLA represents for every Angolan. We shall let history and the Angolan people, the only rightful judges, decide where their real interests lie.

Our brother peoples of the Congo, who have offered us their hospitality since gaining their independence, have just, in spite of their own difficulties, furnished us concrete material aid by putting at FNLA’s disposal a military training camp where all the new cadres of Angolan fighting men will be prepared and trained. Last August 28, at Lopoldville, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central Government of the Congo, our brother Justin Bomboko sitting here in our midst, took it upon himself to clarify the intent and meaning of this act....

As for our struggle, contrary to what the Salazar press unceasingly alleges, it is not and cannot be stifled. In fact, the struggle is spreading more each day and the liberated zone keeps growing. Officers of ELNA, trained in the Algerian guerrilla forces in Tunisia, have recently returned, and they are giving an entirely new orientation to the revolutionary apparatus.

The Portuguese land forces which, during the early days of the struggle, harassed the always too large and easily locatable ELNA patrols, find before them today, an army that is ubiquitous but uncapturable, an army that pursues and attacks the enemy before the latter is aware of its presence. This change in our tactics of warfare has caused a considerable reduction in the activities of the occupying forces. They can make little progress, and that only rarely and with hesitation. In order to compensate for failures on the ground, the Portuguese aviation has bombed the forest and villages for entire days, reducing to ashes dozens of innocent villagers who, very often, are on their way to the Congo.
It must be noted, as emphasized in the report of the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, that a large part of the arms and material used by Portugal to perpetuate its rule over us was supplied by NATO countries. Inasmuch as these arms were in the hands of the Portuguese colonialists, they were employed against African nationalist movements, no matter what assurances to the contrary the Portuguese may choose to give. We draw the attention of the Atlantic Pact members, particularly the United States, to this serious situation, and we call on them not to furnish the Portuguese authorities with any more arms, which they will use to massacre our people. This situation is truly ironic since the members of this organization affirm that their essential aim is the safeguarding of human liberty.

Even though we pursue armed struggle in order to realize the national aspirations of our people, we are not hostile to peaceful methods. Very much to the contrary, time and again we have offered the Portuguese government possibilities for a rapprochement in terms of the realities of our times. We have appealed to it—and the entire world has joined us in our efforts—in every possible way for a peaceful settlement of the Angolan problem. To all of these appeals the Lisbon government has replied: "Angola is a province of Portugal."

At the same time that she affirms this position, Portugal is aware of the weakness, if not the absurdity, of her arguments. That explains, to a large degree, the reforms hastily announced last year by Adriano Moreira, Portuguese Overseas Minister. Far from settling the problem, these reforms have had the effect of revealing to the world the real intentions of the Portuguese authorities. They tend, under the new mask of legality, to perpetuate discrimination under the laws regulating the Blacks and the Whites and to maintain the colonial regime intact. What should have been a tremendous innovation, a true reform—universal suffrage—was simply replaced by the right of the Africans of Angola to election to, and eligibility for, the so-called Angolan Assembly.

Now, the colonial administration, charged with organizing these alleged reforms, is actually at the service of the important settlers who have at their command a powerful apparatus for repression—the Portuguese Army. It goes without saying that true free elections could not take place under these circumstances. In regard to these alleged reforms, the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration declared in its report: "It is not by Portuguese reforms that the situation in these territories can be ameliorated or the problem resolved...."

This statement has not hindered the Portuguese authorities from persisting in their attitude and intensifying their policy of repression. Every day Angolans are imprisoned and murdered. The conflict between us and the Portuguese authorities is simply the struggle of a people, who have decided to end colonial slavery, against their oppressors, who are hurling themselves with all the means at their disposal against our patriotic fervor in order to conserve their own privileges. It is therein that the true Angolan problem resides.

We reaffirm before your Conference that in its desire to spare the Angolan people new suffering, FNLA is disposed, as it has always been, to a peaceful settlement...
of the Angolan problem. However, if we were to take this path, we would be abandoning the claims of the Angolan people, in favor of the Portuguese people themselves; we must defend the interests of the Angolan masses and preserve the gains already acquired through the revolution. Actually, no cooperation can be established between the two countries so long as the legitimate claims of our people are not satisfied.

Angolan Nationalist Organizations


In February 1954, the União das Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA), which became the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) in 1958, was founded secretly by the Angolans of the northern districts and by exiles in the Congo. On March 15, 1961, the UPA directors, supported by Lumumba, launched the national war of independence from over twenty places along the Congo border, the only border open in all the northern region from Ambriz to the Cuango River (regions still held by our 25,000 guerrillas). On March 27, 1962, the UPA and the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA) created a Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA). On April 5, 1962, at Léopoldville, the two parties joined in drawing up the constitution of a provisional government, the GRAE, presided over by Holden Roberto. Dependent upon GRAE is the heroic Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (ELNA), which has controlled one sixth of Angolan territory since March 15, 1961.

FNLA is supported essentially by the black peasants, who have been subjected to forced labor, defrauded of their land, and classed as "noncivilized" by Salazar's racist government. These peasants constitute ninety-three percent of the total population of Angola. The working class—still quite small—sides with the peasantry because of the colonial economy of the country. The most active elements are organized in the Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA), which has 3,311 members.

The students who support FNLA organized themselves into the União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEIA). The women, who have liberated themselves from colonial servitude, have entered political life with their Associagão das Mulheres de Angola (AMA).

It would be ridiculous to pretend that tribalism was the decisive factor in initiating the fighting. In reality, it was geography: the only open border was that with the Congo, which separated the Angolan Bakongos from the Congolese Bakongos; the imperialists dominated the other territories that have a common border with Angola (Katanga, Northern Rhodesia, South West Africa). Since it is presently impossible to use these territories to establish military bases and safe shelters for the nonfighting Angolan population, the FNLA is obliged to lengthen the lines of communication from the Congolese border and carry the war south, little by little,
in the direction of the Angolan compatriots in other tribes who, lacking sufficient arms, have not yet launched military operations on the same scale as those going on in the districts nearer the Congo.
The leftist Europeans (participants in the Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA) because some come from the former Angolan communist party and some voluntarily call themselves Marxists, welcoming the friendship of the socialist countries) must understand this war as both "peasant and northern" in origin. The MPLA realized that their military weakness in the interior of Angola sprang from their urban and central roots in the region of Luanda, the capital; therefore, they especially recruited their members from the Angolan population classed as "civilized" by the colonial regime; i.e. the half-castes and the assimilados (whose numbers rose to 26,000 and 30,000, respectively, in 1950). From 1956, those who were overflowing with patriotic sentiment were able to organize, because they had the benefit of education, a framework of a minority party open to new ideas. They sometimes even had the sympathy of some inhabitants of the regions around the urban centers.

But they never got very far in this region. Their lack of support was principally due to the privileged position granted to the half-castes and the assimilados by the colonialists (education, exemption from forced labor, official recognition of property ownership and of liberal professions, existing civil rights, and a standard of living far superior to that of the exploited peasant mass). This ordinance [granting these privileges] dug a social and psychological trench between them and the oppressed peasant mass.

It is understandable that many of the peasants believe that after independence, the MPLA (from the standpoint of non-industrialization of the country and of the weakness of the national capital) will form the basis for a class of compradores [consumers] if they are allowed to monopolize the leadership of the revolution in the name of their cultural superiority. (Agostinho Neto, Mário de Andrade, and Viriato da Cruz are to be appreciated as poets.) And this [is how they are regarded] in spite of their Marxist ideas -- M. Houphouet-Boigny, after all, was well established as a Communist in the French parliament in 1946.

This is why the FNLA, and before it the UPA, has never varied its insistence on the need for unity of all the Angolan national forces. The FNLA legally created a committee to examine the eventual candidacy of new organizations. The deliberations of this committee are open to the candidates that wish to affiliate with the FNLA. The FNLA is ready to modify these statutes, if necessary, in order to facilitate a new affiliation.

But all the old organizations and parties must permit the integration of their forces into the FNLA under a collective leadership and must not desire to subsist autonomously as a simple cartel that will follow their personal goals. (Such was the policy in the constitutions of Viet-Minh and National Liberation Front.) The leaders of the FNLA and enlightened militants do not confuse the sincere patriots who fight in the MPLA with the half-castes who, remaining on Portugal's side, were given arms to use against the Africans on March 15 and the days following.
Furthermore, the FNLA assures the members of the MPLA that their integration with the FNLA would not mean the nonrealization of the ideals of the "Major Program" of their party. Since their program is not essentially different from that of the FNLA, we will present it in our next bulletin. Only the awakening of the peasantry in the course of an armed struggle resolutely turned toward the future by one liberation army can create an independent Angola, a nation capable of avoiding the traps of neocolonialism.

* * * *

Memorandum to African Conference

Liberation of African countries still under colonial domination is at one and the same time a preliminary and a dynamic determining element for African unity. If proof of this is needed, the unanimous agreement of all Africa on the principle of decolonization suffices to prove it. Nevertheless, divergencies remain on the manner of helping the countries that are fighting for their independence. Through the voices of their representatives, the people of fighting Angola insist on setting forth their views on this problem, which is vital to the liberation movements. Thus they wish to make their contribution to the debates of Addis Ababa, on the basis of two years of struggle and of suffering....

We consider possible a democratic, peaceful, and negotiated solution to the problem of self-determination for the Angolan people. Portugal should have the realism to understand that such a solution is the only one advantageous to Portuguese interests. It will realize one day that continuance of a colonial war in Angola risks undermining once and for all its chances of cooperation with Africa. The war that we are conducting is directed against colonialism and not against the Portuguese people, just as Africa is mobilized against the colonialistic forces of Europe and America and not against their peoples. Thus far, we have carried on our struggle with limited means. But our revolution has now reached a stage that requires increased aid from Africa. We have come here particularly to ask certain brotherly countries to go beyond the stage of profession of policy, and to give us some real assistance.

More than a score of African countries have recovered or gained their independence since 1950; others will be proclaiming it in coming months. But this movement, which historians consider to be one of the most rapid processes to have taken place anywhere, is unfortunately encountering an inflexible attitude in the southern part of Africa. The difference, however, compared with 1950, is that destiny then imposed upon each country the rigors of an isolated action. But today, because the seeds sown in pain, tears, and blood have borne their fruit, the great African family has awakened to the realization that its first duty is to help those of its children who are still engaged in the fight for liberation.
We have drawn up a concrete plan for solutions to our immediate and long-term needs. However, we wish to affirm here and now that aid must not be subject to ideological pressures, since this would constitute an interference in our affairs or a speculation on the future of our revolution. We are thankful that the assistance provided us so far has conformed to this spirit. The tendency, emerging from this Conference, to favor the establishment of an interAfrican organization to aid freedom fighters is a recognition of reality.

Reasonable assistance will permit us to draw up long-term plans of action and thus to increase the efficiency of our armed struggle. Also, we can better organize the aid to our refugees, whose numbers are increasing constantly. These are our immediate objectives. Although less urgent, other problems vie for our attention. For example, there is the formation of cadres. Never have we doubted the outcome of our struggle, and that is why we intend to prepare our people for the responsibilities of sovereignty.

The coordination of the efforts made by southern African liberation movements would allow us to oppose the solidarity of the colonialists and more strongly affirm the entire continent's unanimous will for freedom. Nobody is ignorant of the fact that the southern part of Africa still under colonial domination is the strongbox and jewel case of the whole African continent. It is the region that the colonialists persist in trying to keep. It is with awareness of this fact that we envisage convoking very soon, in Lopoldville, representatives from all the southern African liberation movements that have decided to take up arms for the freedom of their country.

We are happy to emphasize that the Congo, which is a real crossroads for Africa on the path to liberation, already has assured us of its cooperation and its support in this vast undertaking. We wish to bring about a truly organized plan for the struggle on all levels--diplomatic, military, refugee aid, training of cadres. Such measures would permit us to prepare our integration within the African unity--an integration we have already chosen, but which we cannot form today on the same terms as those countries that already have acquired their sovereignty.

We wish to express our gratitude to His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, to his government, and to his people for the unselfish assistance they always have accorded to Angola, as well as for the warm and fraternal welcome they have given us during all our visits.

* * * *

Resignation Statement
by
Jonas Savimbi
[The resignation statement made on July 16, 1964, in Cairo by Savimbi, Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE) Foreign Affairs Minister, was printed by the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) as "Declaration ..." Doc 44/64, Brazzaville, August 16, 1964, 2 p., mimeographed.]

The problem of the liberation of Angola is entering into its fourth year without the establishment of a common plan of action for the Angolan patriots in the interior as well as abroad. This situation has lasted far too long and should last no longer.
Examining the route traveled from 1960—when the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville) achieved independence—until the present time, we see that the division within the nationalist movement has rendered all progress toward liberation impossible. All attempts to regroup the different and multiple political parties into a single coalition having failed, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) felt it should follow the example of the Congo (Léopoldville) in recognizing the GRAE. We believed then that that decision would hasten unity among the Angolan patriots and thus hasten the hour of national liberation. Our African brothers now liberated from the colonial yoke know very well how difficult it is to unify nationalist forces. However, they are also aware that unity of forces active in the struggle is indispensable for victory. ...

The divided forces hinder the mobilization of the Angolan masses. A fight for liberation without the participation of the masses is condemned to failure sooner or later. Only the popular masses constitute durable support for a liberation fight against an enemy like Portugal, which has the benefit of material and moral support from the colonialist and imperialist powers. We pay homage to the African countries that have recognized the GRAE, in their concern to endow the fight for liberation of Angola with a political instrument capable of organizing the armed conflict and bringing it the diplomatic support indispensable to the mobilization of world opinion.

I should like to draw your special attention to the fact that since these objectives have not been attained, it is the duty of all Angolans especially and of all Africans in general to study the problem again and to propose solutions. I feel that in a fight for liberation such as ours, there is no equation that is resolved in advance. Never in the history of African liberation movements has solidarity among the African countries been as marked as it is for Angola.

Never have nationalists had to face an enemy like Portugal, an underdeveloped country still. On the other hand, never has there been as great confusion among the ranks of nationalists as there is in the case of Angola. The revolution is not a mechanical process. Regardless of the material aid given to a liberation movement, it is destined to fail, as I have just said, if there is no mobilization of popular masses and union among the fighting forces. Any pretext to justify the stagnation of the struggle will be in vain. Help yourself and heaven will aid you. Certain African countries refuse to study the Angolan problem again, keeping in mind the Angolan realities. These realities are:

--Lack of aid to the forces of harassment in the interior of Angola.
--Lack of unity among nationalist movements.
--Changes in the countries bordering Angola.
--Lack of a program issued by a congress including all the active Angolan forces.
--The ever-increasing threat of neocolonialism in southern Africa.
--Ineffectiveness of the Angolan government in exile.
--Considering especially the fact that the GRAE, far from intensifying military action and regrouping the popular masses—the only way to hasten the liberation
of Angola--limits itself to empty speeches, -I. Jonas Savimbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GRAE, in accord with my conscience, hereby, before the highest African court, resign from my duties, which are not in the interest of the Angolan people and of the objectives of the brother countries that have made sacrifices to aid the Angolan cause.

Where Is the Angolan Revolution?
by
Jonas Savimbi

[Savimbi's statement of October 1964 is translated from the Movimento Popular de Libertaggio de Angola (MPLA) 's "Où est la Révolution Angolaise ?" Algiers, 1964?, 10 p., mimeographed. This document is a devastating indictment of Holden Roberto and his movement, its ties with the United States, and its ethnic base of tribes from northern Angola.]

156
My response is not intended to analyze completely the problems behind Angolan nationalism. I have tried only to clarify the multiple factors that motivated my resignation from my duties within the Gov~rno Revolucionrio de Angola no Exilio (GRAE).
To that end, I shall discuss five principal points:
1. American imperialism within the Unilo das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA) and the GRAE.
2. Unity among the Angolan nationalist movements.
3. The present so-called "democratization" of the UPA and the GRAE.
4. The causes for military failure.
5. My position regarding Angolan nationalism.

1. American Imperialism
The political career of Holden Roberto began in 1959 with his departure for the United States, where he made numerous friends. After his return to the Congo in July 1960, he became friendly with Messrs. Kandolo, Nendaka, and Mobutu, the very people who were to betray Lumumba to Tshombe in 1961. Kandolo, who handed over documents concerning Patrice Lumumba to American spies, is the same person who defended Holden Roberto when he was accused of having ties with Patrice Lumumba. It is paradoxical that the same hand that helped kill the patriot Lumumba should, for no reason, protect Holden Roberto.
The UPA and the GRAE have always enjoyed the unconditional support of the Adoula government, of which Kandolo, Nendaka, Albert N'Dele, and Mobutu are the mainstays. The pro-Americanism of Adoula is a secret from no one.
The American government has always been interested in imposing Holden Roberto as the leader of the Angolan people. My month-long trip to New York late in 1961 showed me the determination of the Americans to back Holden Roberto as a leader or, in case of failure, to utilize him as a buffer among the divided Angolan nationalists. Considering this, Holden Roberto, along with other acts:
--Hired Carlos Kassel, an anti-Castro militant. Kassel served Tunisia at the
side of Ahmed Tlili (then Secretary General of the UGTT), who Roberto followed in 1961 as adviser on labor questions. In 1962 Carlos Kassel succeeded in creating the Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA), which does not represent the Angolan proletariat at all. The LGTA is affiliated with the CISL, thus permitting the powerful material aid of the AFL-CIO (USA), one of the leaders of which, Erwin Brown, is in contact with Holden Roberto. This aid directly benefits the UPA. Carlos Kassel undertook several missions in the name of the GRAE, including advising the GRAE representatives in Algiers, along with Johny Pinock. After the announcement of Fidel Castro’s visit to Algeria last year, Kassel was asked to leave Algerian territory. Carlos Kassel has since confined his duties to Léopoldville.

--Granted American journalists exclusive visits to the maquis, who were active before 1964 (see Garrison’s articles in the New York Times).

--Hired Mr. Muller, an American citizen and in charge of public relations in the Adoula government, as personal adviser.

--Likewise took as personal adviser John Marcum, who visited northern Angola in 1962 under the protection of the Angolan liberation army. John Marcum is Director of the African Program at Lincoln University (Pennsylvania) and adviser to Averill Harriman on the question of the Portuguese colonies.

--Hired Charlie Dorkins, late in 1962, to install a transmitter at the Kinkuzu base. He remains closely connected with the GRAE.

--Participated, late in 1963, in meetings organized by Adoula and also attended by Averill Harriman and Bahri (of Tunisia).

--Had eleven Angolans, who will soon create his personal security guard, trained by the counter-espionage service of Israel.

--Hired Bernhardt Manhertz, in April of 1964, to lead the Exército de Libertaglo Nacional de Angola (ELNA). This officer served in South Vietnam in the American army.

The creation of a section, at the American Embassy in Léopoldville, charged with the Angolan question and directed by Messrs. Heatter and Devnis [sic?], is due not to change but to these men’s personal contacts with Holden Roberto. The forces that were behind Adoula are the same as those that placed Tshombe at the head of a puppet government that is working against the Congolese people. I refer you to the speech of Holden Roberto published by the Agence France-Presse, in July 1964, in which he announced that his movement had the support of Tshombe.

Experience within the movement, greater awareness of the conduct of individuals, and materialistic analysis of revolutions have convinced me that no progressiveness is possible with individuals who have surrendered to American interests and who can have no logistic base other than Léopoldville, which is in the hands of neocolonialists and notorious agents of imperialism. On these bases, how can we take seriously Holden Roberto’s empty talk of voyages to Moscow and Peking?

2. Unity
The leaders of the MPLA and the UPA have copies of my letter written in February 1961, in which I stated my refusal to participate in either movement until unity was achieved. The armed conflict that, in 1961, was led by the UPA gave rise to hope for a true fight, on both the military and ideological levels, with possibilities of extending guerrilla warfare throughout the Angolan territory and gaining the support of the popular masses. This was my motivation for joining the UPA at the end of 1961.

We remember how attempts to regroup the Angolan movements failed--at the conference of all African peoples held in Tunis in 1960; at the Monrovia Conference, early in 1961; at the UGETA Congress in Algiers in September 1962, when the shameful incident took place between Holden Roberto and Eduardo dos Santos, representative of the MPLA in Algiers; at the Commission of Conciliation in Lopoldville in July 1963; at the summit reconsideration of the Angolan problem in Cairo in July of this year, which ended up in the creation of a so-called Commission of Three (Ghana, the United Arab Republic, and Congo-Brazzaville). This commission has not yet made known the results of its work.

3. The So-called "Democratization"

As for the democratization of the GRAE "institutions," which my departure should now bring about, I should like to recall that the Executive Committee of the UPA, the propelling force behind the GRAE, is composed of the following: Holden Roberto--President General. Native of Slo Salvador. John Edouard Pinock--Counselor General. Native of Slo Salvador. Cousin of Holden Roberto.

Rosdrio Neto--Vice-President General. Native of Malange. Jolo Baptista--Secretary General (a post that I occupied for 18 months). Native of S~o Salvador.

Maurice Dombele--Assistant Secretary General. Native of Koboko-Maquela.

* --Political Director. *(Now unknown after the successive resignations of Anfbal de Melo, presently in charge of information for the MPLA, and of Dr. Jos6 Liahuca.)

Sebasti~o Roberto--Deputy Political Director. Native of Sao Salvador. Brother of Holden Roberto.


Buralho Lulendo--Inspector General. Director of the Feminine Movement and Treasurer. Native of Slo Salvador.


Alfonso Masseko--Assistant Administrative Secretary. Native of Maquela.
Sim~o Freitas--Secretary of the Feminine Movement. Native of Sao Salvador. Cousin of Holden Roberto and Assistant Chief of Security, trained in Israel.

Eduardo Macenda Vieira--Assistant Secretary of the Feminine Movement. Native of Slo Salvador. Cousin of Holden Roberto, as well as representative in Algeria.

Note: With the exception of Malange and Cabinda, the villages cited are found in the extreme northwestern zone of Angola, and they are inhabited by the same ethnic group, the Bakongos, whose uncontested chief is J. Kasavubu. For your information, the names of the five principal ethnic groups in Angola, in order of importance, are Ovimbundu, Kimbundu, Bakongo, Lunda-Kioko-Tchokue, Ganguela (no tribe of Bailundo exists). It is evident that tribalism should not be exploited by the leaders, since all the people must participate in the Revolution. The flagrant tribalism of Holden Roberto is shown by the birthplaces of the members of his government.

4. Causes for the Military Failure
I should begin by recalling that in September 1960, President Ben Bella gave one hundred tons of weapons to the GRAE. Since that date, the world has heard no news of the recrudescence of armed fighting in the interior of the country.
A revolution is not a mechanical act that depends exclusively on foreign aid. Our analysis of the dismantlement of the revolutionary army and of the end of military activities in the interior of Angola has led us to three conclusions:
1. Collusion between Holden Roberto and the American imperialists, who placed Bernhardt Manhertz at the head of the liberation army.
2. American infiltration in the maquis who were active in the past. I cite, for example, the arrest by the Portuguese forces of Commander Antoine Muandazi, in his neighborhood of Serra da Canda (Angola), some days after he had given an interview to the American journalist Lloyd Garrison.
3. Total absence of political awareness in the army, which was nothing more than an instrument of personal propaganda for Mr. Roberto. I cite the example of the photographs taken at the Kinkouzu (Congo) base by American journalists and published in the occidental press, arousing great furor. I likewise cite the case of the twentyfive soldiers sent to Tunis in 1962 to train in the Arm~e de Lib6ration Algerienne, of whom only five were not Bakongos and only ten had finished their primary education. The others did not know how to read. These soldiers later constituted the general staff of the ELNA.
4. Inculcation of the mercenary spirit among soldiers by paying them a salary each time they returned to L6opoldville after an incursion into Angola. This is one of the errors that led them to fear thrusting very far into the interior of Angola. If they did, they would be unable to return for their salary. Because of this, the soldiers were regrouped at the Congo-Angola border, thus forming a frontier army. I cite the example of the mission sent at the end of 1962, in collaboration
with the Adoula government and the ONUC mission, which furnished transportation, weapons, and money, to attack the Benguela railroad. This was supposed to put an end to the secession of Katanga, since the arms designated for Tshomb6 were passing along this Angolan railroad. This mission, composed of three officers of the Angolan army (ELNA), returned two months after its departure, having exhausted its funds at the frontier and without having made a single attack. One of these three officers, Pires, is now a member of the general staff of the ELNA.

5. Lack of support for the forces of harassment in the interior of Angola. The guerrilla army should live and progress into the interior with the total support of the population. By its undisciplined acts, a politically unaware army only increases the terror of the people. I maintain that, in northern Angola, these soldiers have assassinated numerous innocent civilians who should have been the nucleus of support for the army and who were physically suppressed for the sole reason that they were not of the same tribe as Mr. Holden Roberto (Bakongo). This was particularly so in the case of forced laborers coming from southern and central Angola to work on the coffee plantations. We should remember that it was these workers who revolted against their bosses on March 15, 1961.

6. Lack of discipline due to the political unawareness of the army. I cite the case of an officer, Abreu, who spent more than a month at the Congo-Angola border killing buffalos with army ammunition. He later sold them in Matadi. No disciplinary action was taken against him. This officer, Abreu, is today a member of the general staff of the army (ELNA).

5. My Position Regarding Angolan Nationalists
In my speech in Cairo announcing my resignation, I said that I would like to see a congress of active Angolan forces called, to:

a) Analyze the historic conditions under which the revolutionary fight should be developed.

b) Unify the liberation movement around a revolutionary program, in a structured coalition that would constitute a vanguard movement in the fight against Portuguese colonialism and its allies.

c) Build, within the country, a trained and politically aware liberation army capable of mobilizing the popular masses and/or radically changing the struggle.

d) Condemn the border army, which is incapable of winning the popular masses over to the national cause.

e) Analyze the political situation in the countries bordering Angola, to determine which of them can be effective support bases for the fight within our country.

f) Analyze and define the role that Angolan emigrants to the Congo play (and should play), particularly those who settled in the Congo more than a generation ago and who tend, with the aid of their Congolese friends, to monopolize the supposed power abroad.

g) Place at the head of the revolution a collective and democratic leadership that excludes verbalism and personalism.

h) Determine, without ambiguity, which international groups having solidarity are capable of supporting the Angolan people in their fight.
i) Analyze, concretely, the political errors committed during the four years of struggle and draw a lesson from them for the future.

In the present context of Congolese policy, an Angolan nationalist is not permitted to make contacts with a power led by the notorious agents of imperialism, such as

Tshombg' and his associates, whatever the tactical reasons may be. The Angolan people must give their unreserved moral support to the Congolese nationalists who are fighting to re-establish their sovereignty in dignity and in true national independence. The Angolan people should pay permanent homage to the memory of Patrice Lumumba, who outlined the only way to bring peace and liberty to the great Congo. Imperialists should realize that neither the hordes of marionettes thrust onto nationalist legs nor the fallacious declarations of their faithful friends will impede the awakening of our popular masses and the final triumph of "Liberty, the Fatherland, and Unity."

In Conclusion
The indispensable calling of a congress of active forces should result in the formation of a UNITED COALITION, in which all the truly representative political organizations would be represented, to fight effectively against our common enemy: Portuguese colonialism.

Speech to the Press
by
José Kalundungo—Chief of the General Staff of the Exercito de Libertaglo Nacional de Angola (ELNA)
and
Dr. José J. Liahuca—Former Director of the Servigo de AssistAncia aos Refugiados de Angola (SARA)
[These resignation statements were distributed by the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo Nacional de Angola (MPLA) as "Dclaraition kt la presse," Algiers and Brazzaville, October 2, 1964, 7 p., mimeographed. Both men attack the movement of Holden Roberto.]
recommended me; this is to briefly respond to the accusations of certain leaders of
the GRAE.

Holden Roberto was proclaimed Commander-in-Chief of the ELNA in 1961, and
since then he has unceasingly sabotaged the reorganization of the Army. To show
you Mr. Holden's attachment to tribalistic principles, we need only tell you that of
the twenty-two officers trained in Algeria, only six belonged to ethnic groups
different from his own.

Holden Roberto has always used the base at Kinkouzu for propaganda and never
as a training school for the cadres. Although he claimed to have trained an army
of 25,000, in reality, we never trained, altogether, more than 3,000 men at the
Kinkouzu base. The majority of these soldiers were kept in the camp for some
months without participating in combat, since he wanted them at the base at the
disposition of photographers, who were for the most part Americans. We wonder,
*furthermore*, why Holden Roberto, after having refused Algerian volunteers,
accepted the services of the North American officer, Bernardt Manhertz.

The base at Kinkouzu is Holden Roberto's property. The Partido Democrdtico de
Angola (PDA), which has never participated actively, never had more than thirty
soldiers per thousand. It was impossible to maintain order in the camp at
Kinkouzu because, on the average, four out of every ten days were days of
fasting. The majority of the military men were completely unclothed. We never
understood what the leaders of the GRAE were doing with the money they were
receiving from the Dar es Salaam Liberation Committee.

The base at Kinkouzu has little autonomy since, at the least difficulty, Holden
Roberto had the Congolese soldiers intervene. Thus, during the regime of Mr.
Adoula, the Armge Nationale Congolaise intervened in our camp twice, arresting
Angolan soldiers who were then interned in the camps at Luzumu. Sixty-five of
these never returned. We are forced to conclude that they were purely and simply
liquidated. The Armge Nationale Congolaise also intervened during the regime of
Mr. Tshombe and took away seven officers.

163

I am hereby making an urgent appeal to African and world opinion to exert
pressure on the Congolese government to liberate immediately these officers,
whose names follow:

1. Alberto Sipata (former Commander in the zone of Cabinda)
2. Abel Alfredo
3. Agostinho Alberto
4. Girmino Albino S. Paulo Cardoso
6. Víctor Benguela
7. José Indcio

In addition to these officers, whose lives are in danger, the Congolese are still
keeping hundreds of Angolans imprisoned because they support an organized
fight and unity of all Angolan patriots.

Some soldiers of the Armde Nationale du Congo (Lopoldville) from Camp
Hardy de Thysville, at the request of Holden Roberto, arrested and took to the
base at Kinkouzu 325 Angolan militants who had decided to abandon the Angolan
military base as a symbol of protest against the trampling of the war by Holden Roberto. As always, he made them false promises—that a boat would be found to take them to Katanga if they would go back to the base. Today, we know that threats of death are weighing on these men. Instead of fulfilling his promises, Holden Roberto gave instructions to the militants of his tribe to kill these 325 nationalists one by one, secretly, in the Congo or in the so-called service missions within Angola.

I call the attention of the Angolan people and of the whole world to the tragic fate that awaits those Angolans. Holden Roberto has never joined the maquis, as he claims everywhere. Quite the contrary: he is guilty of the physical liquidation of thousands of soldiers solely because they were not from his tribe....

I issue a solemn appeal to the Angolan people for real unity in order to create a true fighting coalition against our common enemy, all forms of Portuguese colonialism.

Our past errors are enough.

ANGOLAN SOLDIERS, DO NOT FOLLOW THE DIVISIONS AMONG ANGOLAN NATIONALISTS THAT ARE KILLING THE TRUE FIGHTERS FOR Liberty.

(Dr. Jos6 Liahuca)

I submitted my voluntary resignation from the medical post as Director of the SARA last July 25 to protest the general disorganization and the trampling of the fight for the liberation of Angola under the leadership of Holden Roberto. It is now clear to everyone that the 1963 reconciliation committee of the Organization of African Unity

164 (OAU) failed in its mission to unify the Frente Nacional de Libertagao de Angola (FNLA) and the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) by entrusting the leadership of the struggle to the FNLA. Since then, we have watched the decline of the military fight, the decrease of medico-social assistance to the refugees, and the disappearance of schools for children. The head of the GRAE failed not only in the armed conflict but also in the schooling of children, in the training of cadres, and in the civic education of the people.

In spite of the financial aid the GRAE receives from the OAU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, only one school has opened, with a half day session three times a week, for the children of Angolan refugees. The plan for a school for cadres, which was to have opened a year ago, has not been executed. We wonder what the leaders of the GRAE have done with the numerous scholarships donated by several countries through the United Nations for students from the Portuguese colonies.

At the medico-social level, it suffices to say that there are only seven dispensaries, almost all situated in the Central Congo; there are none in the border provinces of Sud-Kasai, Katanga, and Lualaba; a single first-aid post functions in Kwango. The GRAE never opened a dispensary for the refugees in the Congo (Brazzaville). Furthermore, how can we resolve the problem of assistance to more than 500,000 refugees with only three doctors and some male nurses, the
majority of whom received but four months "training" in Israel? Moreover, the head of the GRAE, through the government of the Congo (Brazzaville), ordered the closing of eleven schools and twenty-three dispensaries for the refugees. Thus ten Angolan doctors were forced to abandon thousands of their brothers to their tragic fate: to die of hunger, of exposure, of illness and organic misery. In view of this strange course of action—elimination of irreplaceable services, we wonder if the head of the GRAE is really interested in the destiny of the Angolan people. He has never gone to the border to visit the refugees in the Congo; nevertheless, he requests money on their behalf from the OAU and philanthropic organizations of several states; and it is of them that he speaks in his memoranda to the United Nations, at African conferences, at press conferences. But he never does anything at all to ease their fate.

Holden Roberto is trying vainly to defame those who refuse to collaborate with him in dividing the people, in paralyzing the Revolution. He classes them as agents of the imperialists, be they North American or Portuguese, and he is also eager to say that they are acting through solidarity of tribes or university students. But the Angolan people no longer believe this attempt at self-justification, since the facts are there and no maneuver can camouflage the disorganization of the Revolution. Contrary to his affirmations, we are and we shall continue to be agents of the Angolan people who are fighting for their liberty. These are the aims of the people that we defend:
--To liberate the country from the Portuguese colonial yoke;
--To promote true and sincere unity among Angolan political parties, in order to increase the fighting force;
--To hasten independence;
--To avoid fratricidal fights and tribalism in the present and in the future;
--To aid in the formation of technical and political cadres to better structure the Revolution and to lead the people to victory through progress.

We are fighting for a solution to the problem of the refugees, for the schooling of children, for medico-social assistance, and for civic education. In the interest of the Angolan people, the arbitrary arrests of Angolans by the head of the GRAE, with the complicity of the security police and the gendarmes of the Congo (Léopoldville), must cease, as must the searches, from which not even the PDA headquarters and the homes of Emmanuel Kounzika, First Vice-Prime Minister of the GRAE, and Sandra Martin, Secretary of State for the Interior, have been spared....

The Revolution and Foreign Considerations

[The Govrno Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE) issued this definitive summary of its activities as "La révolution angolaise dans le contexte africain et extra-africain," Léopoldville, March 15, 1965, 12 p., mimeographed.] In 1963, after acquainting itself with the realities of the Angolan revolution, the Committee of Nine (the OAU Freedom Committee), recommended that all African nations belonging to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) consider the Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA), which created the Govrno Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE), as the only movement truly
representing the Angolan fight for independence. The Committee also recommended that those nations discourage other Angolan groups that are unimportant but are determined to survive outside the FNLA. Certain African states--Ghana and the former French Congo (under Youlou)--could hardly conceal their opposition, for various "reasons," to the recommendations. Ghana felt that the FNLA was "an instrument of the Americans" and to recognize it as representing Angolan nationalism was treason. Ghana worked to dissolve the GRAE (beginning by refusing to recognize and aid it) by both fair and unfair means (through the press, slanderous diplomatic campaigns, boycotts of the activities of the Freedom Committee of the OAU, etc.).

FNLA leaders, surprised and indignant at the attitude of leaders of a country in the vanguard of the continental liberation struggle, did not know how to change Ghana's position. To their many notes asking for explanation, Dr. Nkrumah replied with ever increasing hostility. Anxious to avoid a futile conflict between two African nations (Angola and Ghana) fighting for the same cause (political and economic liberation and African unity), FNLA leaders paid little attention to the slanderous campaign launched by Ghana. They merely let the Ghanaian authorities know that the pretexts they were using in their campaigns of disparagement were absurd and extremely weak: The Americans, true masters of Angola, would hardly need four, five, or six years (or more) of armed fighting against themselves to substitute Angolan puppets for Portuguese fascists. The FNLA also declared that the attitude of the Ghanaian government was a severe blow to the fight for the independence of Angola and of Africa. But Ghana merely doubled its attacks. In Lagos, at the Council of Ministers of the OAU in February 1964, and at the Conference of African Chiefs of State held in Cairo in July of the same year, the representatives of Ghana distinguished themselves by their gossip and outrageous stands with regard to the GRAE. At that point Holden Roberto, President of the GRAE, denounced the aggressive paternalism of Dr. Nkrumah before all the African Chiefs of State, meeting behind closed doors in the Egyptian capital. "Dr. Nkrumah," he stated, "proposed a 'course of action' humiliating and unacceptable to any African freedom fighter worthy of his name: that I transfer the seat of the provisional Angolan government and the headquarters of the Angolan liberation army to Accra (Ghana), thus sheltering them from imperialistic lust and from the reactionary and neocolonialistic currents manifest in central Africa, notably in the former Belgian Congo. I replied that even with ultramodern means it would be impracticable to free Angola by armed fighting directed from Ghana..."

Before Ghana, Youlou's Congo was attacking the FNLA, but for different reasons. According to Father Youlou, the FNLA was in the service of international Communism (the Portuguese-American version). "But in the back of Youlou's mind," Holden told the African heads of state in Cairo, "was a territorial quarrel--he wanted Cabinda, and he encouraged Angolan politicians from Cabinda to talk of secession..."

Did the Movimento Popular de Libertaggo de Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto, and now known as the Frente Democratica para a Libertaçao de Angola
we point out that the MPLA was installed in Brazzaville, then under the rule of Father Youlou--make concessions to Youlou concerning Cabinda to gain the favor he had been refusing them? We do not have enough proof to say positively that this was the case. Still, Father Youlou's wholehearted support of the MPLA surprised observers: Father Youlou was far from being progressive (and could even have been considered reactionary). How else could his simultaneous support of a so-called "progressive" movement and his hostility toward the FNLA, accused of being *moderate" movement, be explained?

But the aversion of the former Belgian Congo to the FNLA and the GRAE did not disappear with Father Youlou's fall: The new Congo leaders, going beyond the recommendations of the OAU, chose to give the MPLA offices, a training base for seventy military leaders, and all its political favors. On the other hand, President Massamba-Ddbat was slow in answering numerous letters sent by the FNLA asking for authorization to set up offices in Congolese territory. Then, certainly having studied the mass of MPLA papers, tracts, communiqués, and bulletins abusing the FNLA, his government launched an intense anti-FNLA campaign. Did President Massamba-Ddbat inherit the territorial designs of his predecessor, Youlou?

Be that as it may, his attitudes toward the FNLA and the GRAE were very similar to those of Ghana. The two countries synchronized their attacks on these two Angolan groups and made known their support of the MPLA, support that constituted a bulwark for that Angolan group. And each time the occasion arose in African, regional, or international conferences, Ghana and the former French Congo violently attacked the GRAE and eulogized the imaginary "progress" of the MPLA in its struggle....

During the OAU Conference in Cairo and on the initiative of certain African heads of state, a Subcommission of three countries was established to "reinforce" the Committee of Nine in its efforts to "unify Angolan nationalism." As if by chance, this Subcommission was composed of Ghana and the former French Congo (which were overtly hostile to the FNLA and the GRAE), along with the United Arab Republic, already a member of the Committee of Nine, which joined them for appearance's sake.

The Report of the Subcommission

The Subcommission was to have met for the first time in Cairo, two days before the Conference of Non-aligned Nations. But for unknown reasons, the GRAE delegation was informed that the meeting was postponed. After this Conference, just as the GRAE delegation was leaving, it was informed that the meeting was going to take place the following morning. In a note addressed to the Subcommission, the GRAE delegation replied that it could not possibly delay its departure, because of other obligations elsewhere, and that the FNLA remained willing to collaborate fully with the Subcommission.

The Subcommission went to Brazzaville, seat of the MPLA. From Brazzaville, without passing through Ldopoldville, where the FNLA awaited it, it went directly to Dar es Salaam (with its conclusions, however partisan they were, in its possession). Only the late arrival of the GRAE delegation to the meetings that
took place in the Tanzanian capital enabled the Committee of Nine to adopt [without protest from GRAE] the report presented by Brazzaville and Ghana, in which the MPLA was eulogized.

The reason for the Subcommission's refusal to go to Ldopoldville to contact the FNLA, as it had the MPLA, is unknown. In any case, it seems unlikely that the Brazzaville delegates within the Subcommission refused to go "to Tshombg's" for fear of wounding their revolutionary self-esteem, since the former French Congo had

been seated with Tshomb6 in Addis-Ababa some months earlier, and since later, in Nouakchott, the same Congo ratified the resolution supporting Tshomb4. As for the Ghana delegates, their country still maintains normal diplomatic relations with Leopoldville.

At any rate, the Committee of Nine adopted the report of the Subcommission, which authorized the "dividing of Angolan political emigration" and even authorized the division of Angolan territory, by describing the MPLA as the "liberator" of Cabinda (which must be aided materially and technically), where the FNLA still commands some important scrub-land and where its soldiers daily inflict very heavy loses upon the enemy.

Certain friends of the Angolan cause (whom we reproach for their perilous unions, their estimations, and their very superficial inferences) described the adoption of the partisan report by the Committee of Nine as a "heart-rendering review," a "progressive decision." Since this report was unanimously adopted by the members of the Committee of Nine, can one say that Tshomb6 himself was becoming "progressive"? The Congo is a member of the Committee in question. The FNLA informed the Committee of Nine and all the member states of the OAU of the consequences of such measures. In the near future, all hope for the unification of Angolan leaders could dissolve, and later, hope for cooperative action--encouraged by the OAU--among rival military factions in the interior of Angola would likewise vanish, much to the joy of the colonialists. It is true, as often claimed, that Africa and the world have already given Angola more than enough time to unite. In spite of some Angolans' good will, the motivations of this "division" make unity among Angolan political emigres much more difficult than one would suppose, especially when socalled friends of Angola work at widening the splits that exist among the different groups. At any rate, the FNLA is not convinced that the best solution is to separately arm existing groups. Only the encouragement and the support of some brother or friendly countries have really maintained certain Angolan groups outside the FNLA since the OAU made its recommendations in 1963.

Happily, the Council of Ministers of the OAU, meeting in Nairobi on February 26, 1965, did not adopt the report [of the Subcommission].

The Policy of the USSR Toward the FNLA

Among the friendly countries that went beyond the recommendations of the OAU is the Soviet Union. After a rather illogical analysis (or, rather, one too loyal to revisionism), the Soviet Union semi-clandestinely aided a movement no longer of the peasant masses and workers, but of men whom only the USSR's propaganda
made Marxists. After the Committee of Nine had adopted the Brazzaville and Ghana report favoring the MPLA, the USSR, picking up the ball, made serious as well as ridiculous accusations, saying that the GRAE had placed men at the disposition of Tshomb6 to fight against the Congolese patriots and that, therefore, "it was retracting its support

(which it had never given) from the GRAE, to support the MPLA." In clearer terms, the USSR found a rather propitious occasion to make "official" its support of the MPLA.....
The Error of Our Congolese Brothers
Unfortunately, Moscow's allegations were echoed by certain fellow revolutionaries of the Congo. Since they are most interested in the Congolese problem, they should have been the first to denounce what they called "collusion" between the GRAE and Tshomb6. But because their "denunciation" followed that of the USSR, the GRAE decided to ignore the accusations. Some of our fellow Congolese revolutionaries declared that there were Angolans among the ranks of Tshomb6. If this is true, the GRAE is concerned about Angolans fighting for interests that are far from their own. But we must not forget that Mr. Tshomb6 has means and possibilities for obtaining Angolans from the Portuguese authorities and for enlisting them in his army. There are deluded compatriots everywhere in the world, even in the Congo. .. The GRAE is far from becoming Tshomb6's ally. Everything separates the two parties: choices, objectives, ideologies....
The FNLA and Unity Among Angolan Political Emigr6s
Contrary to what its detractors declare, the FNLA is essentially a movement of the peasant masses. It bases its action on the legitimate aspirations and the revolutionary faith of these masses, and it imbibes its energy from them. The FNLA is the people of Angola. The speeches and accusations made against the FNLA by those who should have supported it were detrimental to the fight of the Angolan people. As Holden Roberto recently stated to the news agency Afrique-Nouvelle, "the Angolan Revolution is not guided by financial feudalism, nor even by the colonized bourgeoisie created by the Portuguese colonialists; it is the work of the peasant masses and is followed sympathetically by workers in the towns...."
The FNLA is trying to be an organization of unity for the popular masses, the peasantry, and even the lower middle class, and the assimilados, once the latter two classes accept this unity under the direction of the working class, of the peasant masses. After achieving the liberation of the country, the FNLA's objective will be to create a social and economic democracy, led by the working class and based on an alliance of the peasants with the other classes. This is what distinguishes the FNLA from the other Angolan groups. In this difference we can properly look for the true cause of what is called "division of Angolan nationalism" and what the FNLA justly calls "division among Angolan political emigres." The other reasons or considerations that have been invoked are ludicrous ....
At most, the FNLA has always wished that the decisions of the OAU were worthy of the organization and of the trust that the people, all the African people, place in
it. More precisely, the FNLA wishes that the decisions of the OAU were objective and

were based on truth, not on the advice or the frame of mind of certain member nations, no matter how great their influence. In short, the decisions of the OAU should be based on the extent of action of such and such a movement in the interior, on the battlefields, and not on the importance of the foreign propaganda based on these movements....

The OAU is a useful step toward the liberation and unification of the African continent, and the fact that it contains within it countries with differing regimes and ideologies is an encouraging sign of the possibility that they make work together harmoniously in the future. Nevertheless, the FNLA will not be impeded, no matter how much it is denounced as a part of maneuvers by certain OAU member nations who, for personal reasons, try to involve the OAU in undertakings that could have serious consequences affecting African liberation and unity. The FNLA also deplores that organization's failure to carry out its obligations prescribed in its Charter concerning liberation movements.

The Angolan fight for freedom can become more vigorous if each country belonging to the OAU conscientiously fulfills its duties. Unfortunately, the FNLA must recognize that except for financial aid (which has been far from consistent), it has so far received nothing from the OAU but recognition, some sincere and some ambiguous, by other African states. The Angolan people know that they must rely on themselves above all, but it would be an error to state that they can achieve victory without international aid. A true popular revolution cannot be victorious without various forms of aid—especially from international revolutionary forces. Likewise, it is impossible to consolidate the victories acquired if this aid is not obtained. Therefore, the FNLA does not count solely on the aid of African nations. African and international solidarity will be the proof of victory in the struggle of the Angolan people, the fight of all the peoples of the Third World. ...

The GRAE and the CONCP

[The Gov~rno Revoluciongrio de Angola no Exflio (GRAE) issued this statement of position as "Le GRAE et la CONCP. ..," Ldopoldville, April 17, 1965, 7 p., mimeographed.] The GRAE dates back to the creation of that group called the Confer~ncia das Organizag6es Nacionalistas das Col6nias Portuguesas (CONCP), which includes the Partido Africano da IndependIncia da Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), the Frente de Liber-

taeao de Mogambique (FRELIMO), and the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) (Agostinho Neto's faction). We must remember that all the organizations in the Portuguese colonies were invited to participate in the meeting at Rabat that was to give birth to the CONCP. Those invited included the Uniao das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA), whose President is Holden Roberto (present head of the GRAE), and the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA), led by Emmanuel Kounzika (Vice-President of the GRAE). These two movements along
with the dissident faction of the MPLA, form the Frente Nacional de Libertagio de Angola (FNLA) from which came the GRAE. Each of these movements, whose headquarters were (and still are) in Lgopoldville, sent a letter to the Conference organizers, saying that their representatives could not leave the Congo (Ldopoldville) and enter the Kingdom of Morocco .... Yet the invitations issued to these movements were only a political ruse, since the spirit and the general strategy of what was to be called the CONCP had been outlined well before the meeting.

The meeting took place, therefore, without the participation of those movements, which had already moved on to direct action, to armed fighting against Portuguese colonialism in Angola .... During this meeting, resolutions were passed that were insulting to those not present, describing them as pro-Western, pro-colonialist, or as organizations in the pay of American imperialism (the eternal insult), at a time when certain of those not present were the only ones fighting with their weapons in hand!

But in time, the CONCP revealed its true make-up: a group of old friends (from the colonies or from Portugal)--we point out, for example, that Amficar Cabral was a high public official of the colonial administration in Angola--who belong to the same privileged "class" (assimilados by birth or adoption), thanks to which they enjoyed advantages under the colonial regime, advantages that permitted all, or at least the majority, of the leaders of the parties within the CONCP to obtain their higher education in Portugal.

As a result, positions taken by the CONCP with reference to nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies have always been tarnished by partiality, by subjectivity. One proof of the friendly ties that govern the general policy of this circle is the presence in the secretariat of a certain Aquino Rey Braganga, a Goan (now editor of Revolution Africaine) in charge of propaganda--for which he does not hesitate to utilize the Algerian organ in a way contrary to the spirit of the FLN and the Algerian government, since Goa is no longer a colony. How else can the presence of this celebrated schemer within the secretariat of the CONCP be explained?

Because of its strange orientation, the CONCP lost its character and its value in the eyes of the other Angolan movements, which no longer find any reason to join it .... Since the creation of FNLA, it has been the principal target of the CONCP. Bombarded by a thousand accusations, it is the exclusive victim of the most violent attacks, since the CONCP does not attack its principal enemy: Portuguese colonialism. Furthermore, since the FNLA does not identify itself with the criteria on which this circle is based, it has never shown the least desire to belong to it.

This is also the occasion to say that "it has grown outside this circle and it is behaving well. .. ." Therefore, upon reading a communiqud published in Brazzaville by the MPLA (Agostinho Neto) concerning a meeting of the CONCP, the GRAE was surprised to see that superfluous mention was made of the GRAE's elimination from this meeting. It was claimed that the preparatory committee of the CONCP
unanimously decided that the presence of the GRAE was not desirable because the political line it follows is not (surely not!) that of the CONCP. For example, during his recent trip to Algiers, Amilcar Cabral, Secretary General of the PAIGC, held a press conference during which Johnny Eduardo, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chief of the GRAE Mission to Algeria, asked him which criteria should govern collaboration and cooperation among the nationalist movements of the Portuguese colonies—those of friendship, those of propaganda put out by these movements, or those of the intensity and the depth of armed actions within their respective countries. To which Mr. Cabral (while refusing to answer the questions dealing with criteria of friendship) responded evasively that "the CONCP brings together the only movements that have effectively joined the program of armed conflict against colonialism." That was evasive, first, because whatever ill will one may have toward the FNLA, its power in Angola cannot be denied; and second, the CONCP was created at a time when none of its member groups were actually leading effective armed combat against Portuguese colonialism.

If the "program" of the CONCP is that of armed conflict, how can this organization be presented as the "coalition" bringing together the only nationalist movements leading the armed fight against Portuguese colonialism, in view of the fact that among the political emigrants from the Portuguese colonies (be they from Angola, Guiné, or Mozambique) there exists—we must have the political courage to recognize it—this division, which everyone knows of and deplores? Thus, for example, everyone is aware that, in spite of MPLA (Agostinho Neto) and propaganda, the FNLA is indisputably more powerful and its political and military action is more effective and greater than that of any other Angolan group whatsoever. Everyone is aware that in "Portuguese" Guiné alongside the PAIGC is the Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné Bissau (FLING), which, if we believe their communiqués, is fighting with weapons in hand. Everyone is aware that in Mozambique there exist the FRELIMO (a member of the CONCP), the Uniao Democrática Nacional de Mozambique (UDENAMO) (split into two dissident factions), and the Mozambican African National Congress (MANC), the last two (the two UDENAMOs and the MANC) of which have just formed the Comité Revolucionario de Mozambique (COREMO) and likewise declare that they are waging armed conflict against Portuguese colonialism. We cannot, therefore, validly contest the representativeness of these "remote" movements without at the same time contesting the representativeness of the CONCP.

A point must be clarified here: The GRAE does not ask the CONCP to accept within it all the movements that declare their readiness for or commitment to armed conflict against colonialism. First, there must be a thorough investigation, so that we may know the truth in each case. The GRAE poses the question again: What has been done with regard to the MPLA (AN)? Did this investigation—if one was made—conclude that the MPLA (AN) is an organization waging armed conflict in Angola; or is it, rather, the most representative, the most popular organization? Or
is the presence of the MPLA (AN) within the CONCP based simply on doctrinal propaganda?

Under pressure from the MPLA (AN), the CONCP uses an impotent and unconvincing weapon against the FNLA and the GRAE, that of senseless, ridiculous accusations. It says, for example, that the GRAE is a reactionary instrument of American imperialists. Naturally, it has never backed up its accusations with tangible proof. But, assuming the CONCP wants to be consistent in the "principles" it proclaims, how can it base its exclusion of the GRAE, for example, on these accusations (which also show the political feebleness of their authors) when the same accusations are formulated against Dr. Eduardo Mondlane (that is, of having passed almost half his life in the United States of America and of being "supported" by several American groups)?

If it is necessary to make a political analysis, based on irrefutable proofs, the GRAE would send the CONCP to the convention held by the Frente Democratia para a Libertaio de Angola (FDLA), bringing together the MPLA (AN) and the known Angolan pro-colonialist parties, such as the Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA), the Movimento Nacional Angolano (MNA), the NGWIZAKO, not to mention the behind-the-scenes relations between the MPLA (AN) and the Portuguese colonialist milieu. Two small illustrations of these relations are the constant movements within Angola of certain MPLA leaders (notably the departure for Luanda of the Chief of the General Staff of the MPLA "army" on March 1, 1965) and the contact that took place two years ago between that group and Manuel Vinhas, one of the largest Portuguese industrialists in Angola.

Another suspicious example is the escape of Dr. Agostinho Neto, MPLA President, from the Portuguese prisons--thanks, it's said, to the "militant" complicity of Portuguese progressives (!), the same Portuguese progressives who could not help their Portuguese brothers escape from the prisons of Salazar--and his flight from Portugal accompanied by his whole family. Evidently this does not constitute, in the eyes of the CONCP, a political blemish that it must take into consideration. What the CONCP feels it must consider are the unjustified accusations made against Holden Roberto and the GRAE. Is the GRAE in Léopoldville? Holden Roberto is Tshombé's friend. He is the "Tshombé" of Angola. Surely, the memorandum that the MPLA (AN) sent jointly with the MDIA, the MNA, and the NGWIZAKO-NGWIZANI k Kongó (NGWIZAKO) to Tshombé, "congratulating him on his designation as the head of the Congolese government and asking him to revise the attitude of the Congolese authorities regarding Angolan movements," is not an "analysis"; it must, therefore, not be considered as such. And yet, although the MPLA (AN) no longer spreads rumors about the FDLA, these exist.

By sending that memorandum to Tshombé or by not denouncing it, the MPLA (AN) recognized that armed struggle for the national liberation of Angola can be effectively
led only from the Congo (Ldopoldville) (and Zambia), because of the immense logistical advantages offered by the frontier between that country (and Zambia) and Angola. In addition, the imposing mass of Angolan refugees (856,000, according to the official statistics) in the Congo (Ldopoldville) presents an important psychological and political opportunity. The presence of Tshombé in Lgopoldville is not the reason for the presence of the GRAE in the Congolese capital. The GRAE was in Ldopoldville before Tshombé. Is Mr. Tshombé an obstacle? An ambush? This is part of the struggle, of the fight. In a revolution, one must be aware not only of the facilities but also, and especially, of the ambushes.

In conclusion, the GRAE feels that the CONCP must not found its doctrine on the preceding accusations and considerations if it wishes to "pose" as a serious organization representing the African peoples of the Portuguese colonies in their struggle against colonialism.

A meeting of the CONCP is scheduled, it is said, for next May in Dar es Salaam. What criteria will the participants use this time to examine the situation? Will they use a minimum of objectivity and impartiality concerning the political and military situation of the Portuguese colonies? Will they base their study on the partisan or whimsical reports that will be presented by the members of the circle? On intrigues, on ruses? Are they going to meet solely to regild the political coat of arms of certain member groups of the CONCP? Or to try to give substance to the imaginary "successes" of the MPLA (AN) in Cabinda? Or will they meet to condemn, not Portuguese colonialism, but nationalist movements other than the MPLA (AN), who are engaged in the same or even more effective armed combat against Portuguese colonialism?

To face a common enemy—Portuguese colonialism—liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies should establish frank, loyal cooperation and collaboration, based on unity of action and not on intrigues, slander, or personal friendships. One should not take a partisan point of view when considering the struggle of millions of human beings who are sacrificing themselves with heroism and abnegation.

Consequently, the GRAE proposes a broad debate that would be open to all the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies, all the movements that are really for revolutionary violence, excluding no one. The participants could set aside all the falsities, the all too often whimsical considerations that only widen the split which separates these movements—to the joy and benefit of only the colonialists and imperialists.

After consultations among the different nationalist movements, this debate, which the GRAE proposes, could take place, in an African country, even in Dar es Salaam. The debate would produce either a change in the present structure of the CONCP, transforming it into a true coalition of all the movements in the Portuguese colonies that have chosen armed conflict, or the pure and simple replacement of the CNCP by a new organization whose structure would be adapted to the realities of armed conflict.
in each country under Portuguese colonial domination: a new organization, larger and therefore more representative.

In addition to the power that such an organization would bestow on the coordinated action against colonialism made by common peoples of the Portuguese colonies, it could contribute a second positive goal: an attempt to resolve the differences among the movements in a country, and even (why not?) to unite them sooner or later. Regarding this last point, the GRAE feels that any meeting not considering this reality, this necessity, is tarnished by guilty partiality and does not bind the Angolan people fighting for national liberation under the indisputably most effective leadership of the FNLA. From now on, the GRAE must forcefully emphasize the informality characterizing the CONCP and its decisions, both past and future.

CHAPTER IV
NATIONALIST POLITICS AND THE ANGOLAN INTELLIGENTSIA

In December 1956, the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) emerged as an indigenous nationalist movement—an amalgamation of several parties, including the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA), established in 1953 by Viriato da Cruz. At first the MPLA issued propaganda leaflets setting forth its policy. After the arrest of several of its leaders in late March 1959, however, the MPLA established headquarters in Conakry, where it remained until October 1961, when it moved to Lopoldville.

The MPLA tactic of the united front which marked its origin was applied with the establishment of coalitions of nationalist parties from all the Portuguese territories, the first being formed at Tunis during January 1960 and the second at Rabat during April 1961. The tactic was also utilized during a leadership crisis in July 1963, at which time Cruz denounced MPLA president Agostinho Neto for collaboration with the Portuguese. Cruz established a provisional executive committee to run the party, but later proclaimed his support for the MPLA's rival, the Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA). Neto immediately formed the Frente Democrdtica para a Libertaglo de Angola (FDLA), which grouped the MPLA together with four smaller organizations, all of which promptly split, with one faction of each remaining with the FDLA and the other declaring itself either independent of the FDLA or desirous of adhering to the FNLA.

The MPLA following comes from the "assimilated" mulatto elite of the Angolan cities. Granted citizenship, this elite had access to education denied most black Africans and, although opposed to the Salazar dictatorship, at first it assumed an ambivalent position on national independence for Angola. However, its role in the abortive Luanda uprising during early February 1961 foreshadowed the rebellion throughout northern Angola a month later.

176

BACKGROUND

[The Centro de Estudos Angolanos in Algiers has attempted to rewrite Angolan history with an African perspective. A portion of the Center's contribution follows]
Angolan nationalism has its deepest roots in the struggles of the African peoples against the colonialistic invader. These struggles began in 1575, when Ngola Kiluanje led the first battles against the Portuguese [Dias] Novais. From that date until today the battles have continued, one after another, gradually becoming more successful, and using experience gained from the previous ones. As experience accumulated, the struggles against the invader changed and extended into other fields--politics, culture, etc. Relations between the exploited and the exploiters also changed. The exploiters gradually became more adept at and increased their exploitation. The exploited suffered more and learned how to fight better. Therefore, we must understand the present Angolan revolution as the final consequence of all these transformations. We must understand Angolan nationalism as the transformation and consolidation of the experiences gained from the struggle, from the awakenings that occurred here and there. Ngola Kiluanje fought the Portuguese because his people did not want to be invaded and dominated by foreigners. Jinga gave new direction to the battle, for the first time teaching the lesson that a fight is victorious only if the people are united. Ngola Kanini perfected the tactic of attack upon the colonialists' economic centers. The peoples of Kissama were the first to engage in armed revolt against the occupiers. The Dembos perfected that tactic. The Jagas used guerrillas. Ekuikui II of the Bailundo tried to create economic bases to assure the independence of his people. Mandume was able to exploit the contradictions among the imperialists and to effect unequaled popular mobilization. The people of Humbi learned to recognize colonialistic lies and were able to overcome the weakness of their leaders; they finally established a clearly anti-colonialist policy in the kingdom. Mutyia Kevela of the Bailundo and Tulante Buta of the Congo were chiefs who effected great popular mobilization and were able to fight against all types of oppression of the masses. Dozens, or hundreds, of battles fought by the people through slave revolts, workers strikes, and we know not what else, contributed to the growing efficiency of the struggle. Thus the people learned how to fight in each epoch and how the exploiters manage their exploitation and repression.

In addition to these struggles, we must also consider the revolts initiated by exiles and businessmen, such as the revolt of 1667 or the revolt at the Presidio de Massangano against the regime imposed by the Brazilians, who were hindering economic progress. We must also consider the growth of bourgeois political movements in the nineteenth century, which were already asking for the independence of Angola or which demanded that Angola be separated from Brazil, as well as the intellectual movements among Angolan bourgeoisie in 1885 and 1890 that supported freedom for slaves, a national culture, freedom for women, etc.

All this vast movement constituted the deep roots of Angolan nationalism. In the period that we are to study (1940-1960), Angolan nationalism began to take a new, more revolutionary form--the fruit of past experiences and the particular
conditions of the era. As early as 1929, a great movement based on popular demands was beginning to form. This led to the foundation of the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA) and the Grêmio Africano, which later became the Associagão dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA). These organizations permitted the more aware Africans in the cities, principally Luanda, to carry out the work of organizing and awakening the masses. But there was no unity within these organizations, due to the existence of two different social classes, not completely allied. The African bourgeoisie led these associations, for the elements representing the working masses constituted only a small portion of the enrolled individuals. Because of this division, two political factions were formed in the associations: One was the reformist faction, which desired a legal battle; the other was the revolutionary faction, which wanted more action against the oppression and which also wanted the associations to become mass organizations—that is, organizations whose base is primarily the popular masses. The revolutionary faction wanted the associations and the movements to extend into the interior and to spread to the poor peasants and the workers. The reformist faction was principally defended by elderly people who had lived in the golden years of the African bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century. The revolutionary faction was principally defended by the young, who wanted to liberate the oppressed masses. The controversy between these two factions worsened. Finally, the colonial authorities found an opportunity to draw the associations and even the administrators into their confidence. The reformist faction gradually became more isolated and finally became absorbed and approved by the colonial authorities. The Liga Nacional Africana was most affected by this controversy and by the colonialists' reaction. The ANANGOLA was dominated—with difficulty—by the revolutionary faction. The militants of this faction, having difficulties in the legal fight because of growing colonial repression, had to enter into a clandestine and semi-legal struggle. Clandestine literacy schools were created in the Muceques of Luanda; the militants began to investigate and spread the African national culture, which the colonialists wanted to eradicate. They began to write pamphlets calling upon the people to learn and to prepare to fight openly against oppression, for independence. Magazines like Mensagem (1949) and Cultura (1957) appeared, in which, in spite of censorship, keen militants could carry on the work of awakening (a semi-legal fight). Information concerning the nature of fascism and the effects of colonialism on a national culture, etc., was spread. Work was even sought abroad, in order to call the attention of the world to the misery of an Angolan people exploited by colonialism. Clear and courageous slogans began to be heard, such as: "FIGHT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA," "AFRICAN MASS ORGANIZATIONS," "LIQUIDATION OF THE ARTIFICIAL BARRIERS BETWEEN 'INDIGENAS' AND 'ASSIMILADOS.'"
In Nova Lisboa, about 1954, similar attempts were made. The Associaggo Africana do Sul de Angola (AASA) was created and tried to establish branches in other southern cities. But there, too, the police and the authorities became aware of these undertakings and threatened them by spreading corruption and sabotaging until they found a pretext to send administrative commissions. But none of these organizations was yet a true party for the clandestine fight. It was in this atmosphere, early in 1953, that the first nationalist political party was born: Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA). This party published a manifesto asking the Angolans to organize themselves clandestinely. After publishing some pamphlets calling for unity and fight, certain leaders of PLUA and other organizations finally created the Movimento Popular de Libertagfto de Angola (MPLA) in December 1956. Other parties that were formed, such as the Movimento de Independ~ncia Nacional de Angola (MINA), united with the MPLA and enlarged its base. The MPLA was, in truth, the first party of the masses. But other events had created another nationalist faction, which developed differently. In northern Angola, the popular masses tried to organize themselves. Messianic movements of a religious character, such as the movement of Simao Toko, began to appear there. Even tribal organizations appeared, as a result of a struggle against the reality of the Angolan Congo and against the help that reality gave to the colonialists. Thus, in 1955, there was considerable discontent in the Congo with Dom Antdnio III, the king of the Kivusi clan, who was supported by the authorities and by the Catholic missions. Popular movements to depose Dom Ant6nio developed, but the Portuguese authorities repressed such activities. Partly as a result of the discontent, a cultural and mutual aid movement arose among the Congolese emigrants to the Congo (I6opoldville): the Uniio das PopulagSes do Norte de Angola (UPNA), which later became the UniQo das Populag~es de Angola (UPA). With time and with the development of Angolan political activity in northern Angola and in Lopoldville, other organizations were being formed, such as the Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo (ALIAZO) in 1960, the Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA) in 1962, etc. But these organizations either were still tribal movements or were dominated by reformist factions. The political awareness that had developed in Luanda and in some places in northern Angola was not yet adequately extended into the interior. Where these new movements appeared there were still backward factions and feelings--remains of the former resistance--which turned out to be more powerful than the meager pamphlet-writing activities of the true parties. In truth, the only party that offered conditions necessary for the development of activities with a national character was the MPLA, in which the petty bourgeoisie and the masses of urban laborers participated with great political awareness. In 1958, the pamphlet-writing activity in Angola increased considerably. Everywhere, particularly in Luanda, there was talk of an armed revolution. Clandestine pamphlets appeared, exhorting armed conflict for the liberation of Angola. The character of colonialism was denounced, and the masses were called
upon the revolt. In addition, the legal and semi-legal anti-colonial fight carried on by the newspapers, by the older organizations, by football clubs, etc., was more intense than ever.

Again there was talk of an African culture. Expositions of Black art were held; there were lectures on the achievements of the African cultures in Angola; there were expositions of paintings denouncing colonial exploitation; clearly anti-colonial and anti-racist stories and poems were published; revolutionary Angolan artists and writers were born again--and were better. The Sociedade Cultural de Angola, in Luanda, and the Casa dos Estudantes do Império in Lisbon (an association of students from the colonies studying in Portugal) became substitutes for Mensagem, which the Portuguese authorities had destroyed. Political propaganda, clandestine work, and the appeal for the mobilization of the masses reached other Angolan cities, although not with the vigor that was needed. In the fishing city of Mogmedes, the PIDE, a fascist political police force, began using repression in an attempt to destroy all the revolutionary factions before they could take shape. In Nova Lisboa, Benguela, and Lobito, the most aware Angolan elements, sympathetic to the MPLA, tried to accomplish the mobilization of the masses that the historic moment demanded.

At the height of this period of agitation, which lasted from 1950 to 1960, more colonists from Portugal arrived to increase Portuguese forces fighting the Angolan resistance, fighting the revolution led by Africans. In Angola, however, there already were many whites born in the colony. Many of them had lived with the Black elements of the city since childhood; many of them had no access to the means of enrichment that were generally in the hands of the large companies; many of them were not deceived by the colonialists' granting them a situation of privilege over their former Black companions. Therefore, some whites born in Angola--and even some who came from Portugal, as a result of the beneficial influence of the class struggle in their country--were active militants in this period of intense political struggle.

But the Portuguese police were equally active. In May of 1959, mass imprisonments began. Trials were conducted against the known leaders of the MPLA and against progressive Portuguese who were working in Angola. In July 1960, the police arrested the most outstanding Angolan militant: Agostinho Neto. His imprisonment gave rise to a great demonstration in the region of Icolo and Bengo, his birthplace,

but the demonstration was brutally repressed, producing the first martyrs in the fight for Angolan liberation: thirty dead and two hundred wounded.

Meanwhile, December 1960, the overseas leaders of the MPLA made a final appeal to the Angolan masses for revolution. A few months later, the tragic episode of the Baixa de Kassanje occurred. The Kassanje reclaimed its place in the history of Angola. For many years the people of Kassanje were obliged to grow cotton, as were the peoples of Icolo and Bengo. The price at which cotton was bought from them was ridiculous. Misery grew in Baixa de Kassanje as rapidly as the revolutionary propaganda. In January 1961, the people of Baixa de Kassanje struck for higher cotton prices from the Belgian company COTONANG.
The colonialists repressed the strike with aerial bombardment, using American napalm bombs, which destroyed more than seventeen towns and killed more than 20,000 Africans.

Finally, having exhausted all peaceful methods, the people of the capital began armed conflict in Angola on February 4, 1961, the date of the attack on the prisons of Luanda. Young people and workers of the capital, led by MPLA militants, threw themselves into the attack on the jails of Luanda to liberate the political prisoners. It was the beginning of the armed conflict for the liberation of Angola. Days later, the peasant masses of the north rose up in arms against Portuguese colonial domination.

The heroic Angolan people placed themselves in the revolutionary vanguard beside the other peoples of the world in the final fight against oppression. A long and painful period of Angola's history was ending. A new period was being born; it began sadly but it will see the Angolan people's victory over colonial oppression and the beginning of the construction of a country of freedom and prosperity for the Angolan people.

The MPLA's Historical Perspective

[The following statement is extracted from the Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola, Angola. Exploitation esclavagiste. Resistance Nationale. L'opoldville (?), 1961, pp. 5-42. It reflects pre-20th century Portuguese colonialism viewed from an African perspective.]

The territory that today constitutes Angola included the Kingdoms of the Congo, Ngola, Lunda, and Benguela, among others. Historians have dealt chiefly with the Congo. The founder of the Kingdom of the Congo was Wene, son of Nima Nizina, who reigned to the north of the River Zai're (the Congo). Dynastic differences led Wene to cross the river and conquer the natives in order to create, about 1270, the Kingdom of the Congo.

Eight kings had succeeded Wene when the Portuguese arrived. The last of them, Nzinga Nkuwu, present when the first Europeans landed, lived in Mbanza Kongo, now called Sao Salvador. The Kingdom of the Congo was divided into provinces, which were governed by trusted nobles who were distinguished for their feats in war. The principal provinces were Nsundi, Mbamba, Mbata, Mpangu, Mpemba, Kiowa, Soyo, and Wandu. The provinces enjoyed a great deal of political and economic autonomy, their attachment to the central power being shown mainly by participation in wars and regular payment of taxes. The provinces, in turn, were divided into departments, each headed by a district governor. The king had the power to name, discharge, and ratify the election of governors as he wished.

The entire society of the kingdom enjoyed the same legal status, although affairs of state were delegated to the nobility. Justice was exercised by the political chiefs and judgments were public. The accused had the right to a defense.

From the economic point of view, virtually the entire population actively engaged in production. The principal commodities were agricultural, they were produced with rudimentary tools and destined for personal consumption... Descent was
through the maternal line, the economic and political heir being the nephew, the son of a sister.

This then, is a look at the Kingdom of the Congo as it was in 1482, when Diogo Cao landed at the mouth of the River Zaire. Very little has been written on the political and economic physiognomy of the other kingdoms that constituted what is now Angola. What knowledge we do have was gleaned from the correspondence between the Portuguese and these kingdoms.

Having learned of the existence of the Kingdom of the Congo as a result of Diogo Cao's voyage in 1482, the King of Portugal, Dom Joao II, decided to send a diplomatic mission, which arrived at the mouth of the Congo on March 28, 1491. The Portuguese mission and the King of the Congo engaged in discussions in Mbanza Congo, the capital. An agreement was reached there, under which Portugal was to give technical assistance to the Kingdom of the Congo in exchange for commercial facilities. In accordance with these agreements, the Portuguese, who were for the most part missionaries, began to settle in factories (trading depots) along the coast of the kingdom, where they established their bases for later penetration into the interior of the country.

Up until 1520, ships from Lisbon and Sao Tome came frequently, bringing articles of little value, such as mirrors, jewels, wine, etc., which were exchanged for copper, ivory, and Africans. The Portuguese had founded commercial establishments, at Sao Tome and Sao Jorge da Mina, that needed slave labor to develop a sugar industry. The Portuguese at Sao Tome, aware of the great slave potential of the Kingdom of the Congo, obtained a monopoly on commercial exploitation of the kingdom and established an important merchant marine.

By their even deeper and more frequent infiltration into the Kingdom of the Congo, the Portuguese sought not only to establish new commercial agreements, but also, and especially, to destroy existing institutions, in order to establish conditions favorable for future military actions, and to weaken the country demographically by interesting the local nobility in slave trading.

According to Henrique Galvo, "the conflicts and intrigues in which even the religious communities became involved illustrate the traders' lust, provoked by the settlement of the Portuguese at various points in South Africa. These conflicts also precipitated the inevitable collapse of the African Empire of the Congo and shifted Portuguese commerce and its political influence from the valley of the Zaire toward the south, toward the valley of the Cuanza, due to demands for slave labor in the flourishing captaincy of Sao Tome."

During the first half of the sixteenth century, the Society of Jesus [Jesuits] established itself in the American colonies. Its large plantations on that continent had a growing need for manpower in order to prosper. The Society of Jesus saw an ideal source of manpower in the Kingdom of the Congo, but in order to achieve its goal and establish direct slave trade, it had to eliminate competition from the Portuguese already established in the Congo and on the islands of Sao Tome. The Society of Jesus failed in its efforts to intensify direct slave trade between America and the Kingdom of the Congo. In 1520, it appealed to the King
of Portugal to enter into negotiations with the Kingdom of Ngola. This kingdom occupied the valley of the Cuanza. Its capital was Pungo Andongo. Toward this end, a Portuguese diplomatic mission was sent to Pungo Andongo, under the command of Paulo Dias de Novais, who took advantage of his visit to the King of Ngola to make a complete inventory of the region's wealth and possibilities for exploitation. On his return to Portugal, Paulo Dias de Novais informed his king that the Kingdom of Ngola would be a profitable source of slaves and interested the king in exploiting the famed silver mines of Cambambe. In 1575, with the agreement and the financial support of the Society of Jesus, Paulo Dias de Novais took advantage of disputes between the kings of Congo and Ngola to establish himself at Luanda, site of the beach of cowries (jimjmimbu), where these shells, used as money in the Congo, were found. Influenced by the Jesuits, who saw war as the best way of obtaining the manpower needed on the South American plantations, Paulo Dias de Novais opened hostilities against the King of Ngola, establishing as his first objective the occupation of the Cambambe silver mines. He died fourteen years later, after several reversals and without having attained his objective.

Many long military campaigns followed in the Kingdom of Ngola and the other kingdoms, during which the Portuguese benefited from their superiority in weapons and from the political and economic disorganization which they provoked. Gradually, as the Portuguese penetrated the interior of Angola, they increased the slave trade bound for America. According to Father Dieudoni, fifteen million Negroes were sent to the plantations of South America. The slave trade was officially abolished only in 1836, twenty-one years after the signing of the International Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye. The division of Africa by the great imperialist powers of the era, sanctioned in Berlin on February 26, 1885, gave Portugal nearly all the conditions it needed for occupying what is now Angola.... After the Conference of Berlin (1885), the Portuguese began to extend their power beyond the rather small parcels of land that they occupied on the coast of Angola. Portuguese military campaigns did not have continued success until after the Paris Peace Conference (1919), during which the imperialist powers requested measures against the acquisition of arms and munitions by the patriotic forces of Africa and were able to establish agreements to that effect.

The character assumed by the Portuguese military occupation can be summed up thus: after each victory, physical liquidation of African chiefs and immediate destruction of the traditional structure (political, economic, and social) of the conquered peoples....

Angolan Nationalism
by Mario de Andrade
[The Angolan intellectual and poet, Mdrio de Andrade was associated with the Paris journal, Pr4sence Africaine during the 1950's, at which time he also participated in the founding of the MPLA. He served the MPLA as acting president until Agostinho Neto's return from imprisonment in Portugal in 1962. In
1963, he refused to respond to claims made by two MPLA factions that he supported them and temporarily withdrew from the MPLA until mid-1965, by which time Neto had reconstituted his movement in Brazzaville. His statement on Angolan nationalism appeared in mimeographed form and also in Tribuna Socialista (Paris), 6-7, (February-March 1963), 26-35 and in Voice of Africa (Accra), IV, (March-April 1964), 23-32.[

Today the people of the "Third World" have become protagonists in history. They have created a new balance in international relations and have provoked worldwide reactions. The entire world is convinced that any event concerning nations is fundamental for all mankind. Angola, yesterday unknown in international public opinion, a country that few persons can locate on a map, has made its definitive entrance onto the stage of history, at a time when armed combat has been initiated in that part of Africa. It is not my intention here to analyze the program that the political parties propose to carry out or the tactics used to intensify the struggle. I shall try to place this vast movement of national liberation in its general context and to indicate historical references as well as the various manifestations that brought about the fight now developing in Angola. The African struggle for liberation presents some particular characteristics, owing to the colonial context in which it occurs. All the consequences of the struggle for African independence and dignity can be analyzed only by keeping in mind the nature of the regime governing the corresponding colonizing country. In dealing with the evolution of the nationalist movement in a Portuguese colony, it is important to point out two essential factors that have seriously hampered the development of the movement. In the first place, isolation, imposed by the colonial system and by the character of the institutions in power in Portugal for thirty-three years, has been able to maintain in Angola one of the most obscure zones of silence in Africa. Secrecy, the second continuous factor, deprived political organizations from contact with the masses.

It can generally be said that the events that unfolded in African regions bound to colonial powers such as France, Belgium, and England engaged world attention to the detriment of the Portuguese colonies. At the same time, the Salazar regime was perfecting its system of propaganda and mystique, with the intention of supporting the theory of territorial integration and of spiritual assimilation. For these reasons, the Portuguese colonies were the only regions in Africa in which the fight for independence never acquired a legal character. Thus, for thirty years, there has been no representation of the masses with a political party or a leader. In fact, the appearance of a leader is a recent phenomenon in the evolution of Angolan nationalism. During political campaigns in Portuguese presidential elections there were speeches, sometimes violent ones, by Angolan orators who denounced the miserable living conditions of the masses. This was especially so during the electoral campaign of 1948, but it was only an episode and not, as in other African areas, a constant in political life, openly organized into a political party fighting the colonial administration. This is the principal reason why, for a long time, the Portuguese authorities have been the only ones to speak to the world on their colonial policy.
The spectacular eruption of Angolan nationalism, expressing itself in armed combat, has demonstrated the insignificance of the Portuguese government propaganda. According to the arguments of theorists favoring Portuguese colonialism or the Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre, national sentiment could never be aroused in the "overseas provinces." Racial brotherhood, the understanding of the colonizer, the coexistence of white and black communities in Angola for five centuries, were bound to nullify, or at least prevent, the consequences of African nationalism in this country. The present reality makes these arguments very doubtful. Nevertheless, Lisbon officials pretend that nationalistic activity in Angola is the work of foreigners or Angolans who have emigrated to the former Belgian or French Congos. The course of the Angolan liberation movement flatly contradicts these ideas. Let us review its stages.

Among the problems that the liberal Portuguese monarchy faced in 1856 was the effective occupation of its colonies. This occupation was intensified through the decisions of the Berlin Conference. After 1885, numerous military campaigns took place, during which Portuguese troops suffered sad defeats before the fierce resistance of the African populations in Angola. An example of the exact extent of this resistance is the war of the Dembos people, whose refusal to submit was considered by Portuguese historians as a "national shame." Fifteen successive expeditions were necessary to complete the "pacification" of a region that, in 1916, contained 55,792 inhabitants. The Dembos towns began their fight against the Portuguese army in 1872, rising up against the colonial administration, which was continually practicing abuses in their levying of taxes and exploitation of small trade. Between 1872 and 1907, the Portuguese made no progress in their attempts to establish military posts. One great expedition (the celebrated column of 1907, commanded by Captain Jolo de Almeida), although twenty times larger than preceding expeditions, was completely annihilated by nationalist forces. Other expeditions in 1909, 1913, and 1918 suffered the same fate. Finally, in October 1919, the Portuguese, utilizing Angolans from other regions and soldiers from Mogambique, succeeded in temporarily subduing the resistance of the Dembos region.

Thus, Angolan nationalism has its origins in the wars waged by rural populations against Portuguese troops as well as in the struggle carried on by the country's publicists and intellectuals during the years that preceded Salazar's rise to power. When the military occupation had achieved its goal, the Portuguese troops dedicated themselves to physically eliminating traditional chiefs and to destroying tribal structure, in order to impose direct domination more thoroughly. Administrative occupation, which began in 1922, was accompanied by expropriation of lands and possessions, by imposition of the sovereignty tax, and by forced labor. In this phase the last popular armed resistance occurred when revolts erupted at various places in the country in 1924 and 1939.

At the same time, Angolans living in urban areas, and considered assimilated, organized another kind of fight. Mainly public officials, business employees, small landowners, artisans and workers, they carried out, through the press and
regional associations, political action that denounced colonial pillage. The fight became bloody. Various African publicists were condemned to the loss of political and civil rights and were even deported.

Salazar’s rise to power dealt a mortal blow to all political activity in Angola. Nevertheless, in 1929, the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA) and the Grêmio Africano, later called the Associagão Regional dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA) were founded. Their objectives were focused on gaining better economic and social conditions through legal pressure. As the number of settlers grew steadily and Portuguese control extended over all areas of Angolan life, most of the members of these associations realized the impossibility of openly fighting the colonial administration by reformist means. These associations were the scene of divisions and controversies in our parents’ generation. It was a historic situation, which required a radical change in the fighting methods used to oppose colonial domination.

The minority that defended the use of legal claims sought support in the colonial administration, which in turn used these candidates for treason in order to increase the division among Angolans. Others, however, urged political activity and aligned themselves with the “native” masses. Two means of achieving this were proposed: Either the two organizations should admit Angolans who lacked political and civil rights as members, or they should extend their social, cultural, and political action to the popular masses. After a while a leadership crisis developed, especially in the LNA. The minority, which opposed any dealings with the masses, abandoned the struggle.

Taking advantage of the crisis, Portuguese authorities, by corruption and by moral and physical pressures, were able to infiltrate political police agents into these associations and to replace chosen leaders with administrative commissions named by the governor general of the colony. Little by little, the old generation lost all hope of winning its fight against the Portuguese administration.

Toward the end of World War II, a new era opened in the Angolan nationalist movement. In about 1948, Angolan youths in Luanda, after examining the preceding political experiences in light of the new situation, made a noisy entrance onto the public scene. The youths began to use the legal associations to develop programs designed for the great African mass and thus bridge the gap created between "civilized" and "native" Angolans. A literacy campaign was organized and some talented youths began to imbue cultural works with nationalistic sentiment. Cultural magazines and newspapers shaped a political awakening.

Then Angolan political movements began arising and developing—in a climate of police terror. Some serious studies on the international situation and on the nature of fascism were made in Angola. These were spread throughout the country by groups of enthusiastic city youths, among whom was born the idea of creating clandestine nationalistic organizations. The Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA) was created in 1953. And in December 1953, leaders of the PLUA and of other organizations published a manifesto appealing for the formation of a vast coalition, the organization of which gave rise to the
Movimento Popular de Libertagio de Angola (MPLA). After a brief analysis of the process followed in the colonial domination of African peoples, the manifesto analyzed the essential characteristics of Portuguese domination of Angola in its political, economic, social, and cultural aspects: "We are humiliated as individuals and as a people," declared the manifesto, which also denounced the new trend of Portuguese colonial policy based on genocide of the Angolan people, subjection of the masses to forced labor, destruction of tribes, lack of health assistance, and the frightening infant mortality rate. Recently, it added, Portuguese colonial oppression has been aggravated by the penetration of financial capital, monopolies, and international "trusts" into Angola. Because of this situation, it asked Angolans to organize themselves and to fight on all fronts and under any circumstances "for the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism, in order to convert Angola into an independent state and to establish a democratic government, a coalition government of all the forces that are fighting against Portuguese colonialism. Nevertheless, Portuguese colonialism will not fall without a battle. There is only one way to achieve liberation of the Angolan people--armed revolution. But this struggle will achieve its objective only if a single front of all anti-imperialist forces in Angola coalesces the varied political opinions or philosophical tendencies and forms the largest possible popular Angolan liberation movement. This movement will be constituted only by the incorporation of all Angolan patriots in one single organization or association. The movement will be the sum of the activities of the Angolan organizations."

These are the ideas that spread throughout the country. Workers, laborers, public officials, intellectuals, and religious personalities joined the MPLA program. Later, other organizations were created, such as, in 1958, the Movimento de Independência Nacional de Angola (MINA), which joined the MPLA. Among the nationalistic tendencies that were seen among the emigrants to the Congo, we must point out the messianic movement of Simlo Toko. Born in Angola in 1917, this religious leader had emigrated to the Congo (Ldopoldville), where he created and developed the organization known by his name. The movement, whose basic objective was peaceful disobedience of laws enacted by the colonial administration, had many followers within Angola. Expelled from the Congo and back in his native country, Simqto Toko and his followers were persecuted by the Portuguese authorities and were deported to the concentration camp in Bahia dos Tigres.

In Ldopoldville and Brazzaville, various other groups based on ethnic and cultural ties gave rise to associations and later to real Angolan nationalist movements, which were helped by the political evolution of these regions. We cite, among others, the Unifo das PopulaqSes do Norte de Angola (UPNA), which in 1958 became the Unilo das Populag5es de Angola (UPA), the Alianga dos Naturais do Enclave de Cabinda (AREC), today called the Movimento de Libertago de Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC), and the Alianza dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo (ALIAZ0).
Regarding activity in the interior, let us now consider the essential events that occurred after 1956 in the life of Angolan nationalist movements. Ready to face a political situation in which there were clear signs of nationalist activity, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) was established in the colony at the beginning of 1957. The persecution of Angolan nationalists then acquired a new character of methodical organization. The year 1958 was marked by great political activity. Through pamphlets, plans of action, anticolonial proclamations, and clandestine schools, the agitation of the Angolan masses grew, disturbing the Portuguese. The population of Luanda remembers Easter Sunday of 1959 as a tragic date in the annals of Angolan nationalism. On March 29 of that year, the PIDE unleashed a spectacular terror operation against the African masses of the capital: the arrest of all known nationalists and those suspected of participating in the political movements, followed by outrages against the peaceful population. In the city of Luanda, on April 26, 1959, the Portuguese Undersecretary of State for Aviation presided over the installation of the Air Force, sent to bolster the defensive capacity of the "overseas provinces." The ceremony consisted of a demonstration showing the destructive power of military weapons. The Angolan press was delirious. The Comércio de Angola, for example, dedicated an entire issue to the demonstrations, calling them the "First Festival of the Air Force in Angola."

Shortly afterward, the PIDE was sure it had uncovered a vast plot within Angola and prepared a trial of fifty-seven persons (including seven Europeans), which was called the "trial of the 50." The first of three separate cases involved fifteen Angolans (one of them living in Pointe Noire), a Ghanaian, a North American Negro, and a Cuban Negro. The second dealt with seven Portuguese, and in the last, thirty-two Angolan nationalists were accused, of whom twenty were being held in Luanda and twelve were living in the Congo, Brazil, Europe, and elsewhere. The accused belonging to very different social groups: public officials, business employees, laborers, intellectuals, and students. Reading the [trial] testimony made me realize that the Angolan nationalistic movement was at a crossroads and that it was imperative to give it a totally new aspect-creating, on one hand, clandestine structure and, on the other, a united front for Angolan liberation. If there had not been a PIDE roundup, the Angolan situation would have seemed far more consistent, since nationalist forces were at the point of becoming unified. The trial began at the end of 1959, but the date of the sentencing, which was first set for March 7, 1960, was put off several times. In August 1960, to disguise the national character of the Angolan fight, the PIDE ordered the courts to judge the seven Portuguese accused of having distributed clandestine pamphlets asking for the independence of the colony. The seven were condemned to prison for three months to three years and were denied political rights for fifteen years. The Supreme Court of Lisbon reviewed the trial and raised the penalties to a maximum of five years.

On December 5 of the same year, the Military Tribunal of Luanda made a mockery of trying twenty nationalists belonging to the MPLA and other
clandestine groups. During this trial all kinds of irregularities were committed: lawyers were not authorized to visit their clients, nor to consult the proceedings, nor to listen to the witnesses for the defense. The accused, aware of their rights as nationalists, claimed that a foreign court had no right to judge them. Using this attitude as pretext, the majority of Portuguese lawyers refused to defend the accused for reasons of... patriotism. Only Almeida Valadas and Maria do Carmo Medina valiantly continued their mission. The PIDE brought a charge against the two lawyers. On December 21, the court condemned the twenty Angolans to prison sentences of three to ten years and the loss of political rights for fifteen years. After the "trial of the 50," the myth of the total loyalty of the "Angolan natives" was left on very shaky foundations. It was the first official acknowledgment of the existence of an independence movement solidly organized throughout the country, and from then on work was considerably eased for those who were trying to inform international opinion on the reality of Angolan nationalism. Nationalists in other Portuguese colonies also searched for a means of liberating their respective countries. To this end, a search was made for means of obtaining unity of action among the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. A first coalition, called the Movimento Anti-Colonialista (MAC), was created in Europe under the impulse of workers belonging to the MPLA and to the Partido Africano da Independência de Angola (PAIGC) and of nationalists from Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé, and Príncipe. At the Second Conference of African Peoples, in January 1960, the MPLA and the PAIGC founded the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência de Angola (FRAIN), and the MAC was dissolved. The FRAIN in turn disappeared at the Conferência das Organizações Nacionais das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP). It was during this "African Year" that Angolan nationalist movements found the support needed to establish permanent foreign offices, in contact with the independent African governments. Portuguese reactions to the proclamation of independence of the Congo (Léopoldville) are well known: "In the framework of a preventive military action, the colonial power is multiplying patrols and aerial forces to protect the borders of Angola." In a speech on June 13, 1960, the MPLA declared that it would consider as a first sign of the Portuguese government's abandoning its policy of force the "immediate recognition of the right to self-determination for the Angolan people, the establishment of political liberties, the convocation, by the end of 1960, of a round table to find a peaceful solution to the colonial problem in Angola with representation from all Angolan political parties and from the Portuguese government." The positions of the MPLA and the other Angolan organizations were clear at a moment when everything indicated that, if necessary, the Salazar government was ready to drown in blood any nationalistic uprising provoking it. The colonial administration and the Portuguese government responded to the conflict by reinforcing the repressive machinery rather than by discussion. In November 1960, twenty-nine political prisoners, chiefly from Cabinda, were executed in the courtyard of a jail.
From within Angola came urgent calls: the popular masses were insistently calling for organized plans of active self-defense. In the face of both widespread repression of and pressure from the Angolan masses, the MPLA, in agreement with other organizations in the Portuguese colonies, especially the PAIGC and the Goan Political Convention, held a press conference in London on December 6, 1960, at which the MPLA's attitude toward Portuguese obstinacy was defined. We reiterated that the Portuguese government, instead of considering suggestions concerning a peaceful solution to the colonial question, had intensified its war preparations.

For some time the people of Luanda had been thinking of freeing the MPLA leaders and other arrested nationalists. The atmosphere of terror that reigned in the country and the efforts of the workers explain the daring attack on military and civil prisons in February of 1961. This attack, apparently suicidal, was of importance not only in the interior, but also outside Angola. It was the act that really started popular insurrection throughout the country. The repressive forces were not long in extracting a lesson from these events. On February 5, in answer to provocation during the burial of some Portuguese soldiers, they massacred some three thousand Angolans.

Other events, little known by the international public, occurred during that February. In Baixa de Cassange, in the district of Malange, several nationalists, who had been able to escape from Luanda after the above incidents, organized plantation workers against the abusive practices of the COTTONANG company. Attacks were directed against European businessmen, official residences of the regional government, and a Catholic mission. However, very few whites died. Here also the reaction of the Portuguese forces was brutal: Whole towns were bombarded and, according to some sources, the number of victims was more than 10,000.

Conclusions

I have briefly related the history of the nationalist movement in Angola—its actions of protest and the reactions of the colonial administration. My intention has been to point out the basic stages in the formation of Angolan national awareness, without considering the present party fights. For this reason I have ended with the events of March 15, which constitute a new chapter in the history of Angolan nationalism.

At first, the fight for liberation was a resistance to military occupation of the land by the Portuguese. Until Salazar's rise to power, nationalists also fought legally, but their claims brought little response from the outside world. During the last thirty years, Angolan nationalism has faced the most ferocious regime of colonial exploitation that Africa has known. It was the era of clandestine struggle. During this period, the Angolan people gained strength and arranged alliances abroad. All this contributed to the outbreak of armed fighting.

In closing, some conclusions on the present state of Angolan nationalism are necessary:

1) It is a question of stifled nationalism, which had developed in an atmosphere of secrecy. Finding it impossible to build an organization among the rural masses in
their first phase, nationalists mainly influenced urban masses and cultured minorities.

On the other hand, the administration dedicated itself to creating an abyss between the "natives" and those who were "civilized." The majority of secret organizations adopted the group as their basic unit, the real cell in the defense of the interests of the African community.

2) The messianic movement of Simao Toko advocated civil disobedience. But it can be said that from its earliest days, the Angolan nationalist movement presented its claims in a revolutionary style. In their publications, the parties demanded an end to the colonial system rather than betterment of living conditions for the colonized people. This attitude is understandable if we keep in mind the obstinant and unrealistic Portuguese colonial policy. In other words, the reaction of the Portuguese administration and the persistence of the oldest vices of colonialism--forced labor, illiteracy, economic and social misery, and racial discrimination--obliged Angolan nationalists to take a radical position. The popular masses were not impressed by certain measures of social promotion, which the colonial power introduced in the country, from time to time, such as the naming, in 1953, of two representatives of "native interests" to the Legislative Council of the colony. In reality, the so-called representatives of the natives were powerless to solve the problems of the African peoples.

3) The organizations that have arisen in the country have always been completely independent of the parties of the "metrople."

4) Several distinct currents have appeared in Angolan nationalism: a domestic faction, a "border" faction (in the two Congos), and a foreign faction (especially in Portugal and other European countries). In recent years there has been a general coordination of all these factions, which was interrupted by the arrests made in 1959. From now on the acceleration of the process of gaining Angolan independence will depend on a new union of all these factors.

These are some of the characteristics of Angolan nationalism. It is also fitting to underline the role of Angolan nationalists in the formation of national awareness in the other Portuguese colonies. The Casablanca Conference of April 18, 1961, was the culmination of efforts made by nationalists in Angola to group together all the forces that oppose Portuguese nationalism in Africa. Direct action as an effective means for destroying the Portuguese colonial system came into being with the inspiration of Angolan nationalists, the prime movers of all nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies.

* * * *

II LEADERSHIP

The following are selections from the writings of three African nationalists and intellectuals. All three have been associated with the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA), although Andrade temporarily withdrew from the movement in 1963-1965 and Viriato da Cruz turned to the nationalist movement led by Holden Roberto.
Freedom Shall Come to Angola, Too
by
Mdrio de Andrade
[Andrade's article appeared in the September 6, 1961, issue of Pravda and is often cited as alleged evidence of his Communist ties and of the role that Angolan Communists played in the early formation of a nationalist movement.]
The African countries that find themselves under the rule of Portugal have long been considered a "silent zone." But even in them, the situation has been changing rapidly in recent years. The movement for emancipation has been developing on an ever broader scale in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mogambique, "Portuguese" Guin6, and in other territories.

In their struggle for freedom, the peoples of the Portuguese colonies have run into special difficulties. Portugal is the oldest colonial power on the African continent, already having oppressed our peoples for some five hundred years. Moreover, Portugal today is an unmistakable fascist state. The situation in Portugal itself, as in her colonies, has drawn world attention once again with respect to the insurrection on the ship "Santa Marfa." Although there is no direct connection between the Angolan liberation movement and the insurrection on the "Santa Marfa," the peoples of the Portuguese colonies ardently desire success for the Portuguese fighters against the fascist Salazar dictatorship.

At present, the savage regime of terror in Portugal has spread to its colonies. In this regard, it should be further pointed out that Portugal's economy depends on the exploitation of her colonies, which explains the irreconcilable attitude of the Portuguese ruling circles toward the independence of our countries. Here is why the struggle of the Angolan people and of other Portuguese colonies for independence assumes an especially complex character.

The Portuguese occupation was accompanied by the expropriation of the Africans' land and property, the imposition on the population of extreme taxation, and the legalization of a system of forced labor, which means, in practice, actual slavery. About percent of Angola's African population has neither civil nor political rights.

Although, according to the official version, it is considered that Portugal completed the seizure of Angola in 1922, armed resistance by the Angolans against the foreign invaders has not ceased even yet.

After twenty years and parallel with the unorganized, spontaneous actions of the popular masses, there has begun to appear a political activity among even the officials, merchants, artisans, and workers, who, for the most part, are concentrated in the cities of Angola. As a result, there have sprung up such organizations as the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA), the Associago Regional dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA), the Associago Africana do Sul de Angola (AASA), and others. All these organizations, however, were of a revolutionary character, setting themselves the task of obtaining from the colonial powers social and economic improvements in the life of the Africans. It soon became evident to the majority of the members of these organizations that obtaining such changes through reforms while under the colonial regime was an impossibility. Remaining
in the minority, the advocates of reformism began to seek support within the colonial administration. The latter began to use these people in its own interests in order to intensify still further the arising discord.

Meanwhile, however, the majority of conscientious Angolans continued to develop a political activity that bound them closer to the vast popular masses. In 1948, the organized youth of the Angolan capital (Luanda), having assimilated the experience of political strife accumulated in the country, set up the following goals:

* 1) to make use of legal organizations for the development of [political] activity by the vast, popular masses;
* 2) to fight for equal rights for all Angolans;
* 3) to begin a campaign against illiteracy, to add national support to the works of young writers, and to turn out propaganda for the independence of Angola.

The young people attained several successes while implementing their aims. Their activities promoted an increase in political consciousness among the Angolans, and the colonial administration brought down upon the young activists new and terrible repressions.

In October 1955, an underground Marxist group was formed. True, its young leaders lacked sufficient political experience, especially under such difficult conditions as those that exist in the Portuguese colonies. Nevertheless, this group was fortunate in obtaining well-known successes in the dissemination of Marxist doctrine among the people.

In 1956, the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA) was formed and adopted a program very similar to that of the Angolan Marxists. This new organization soon gained many followers.

The leaders of the former Marxist group and the PLUA formed, in December 1956, the MPLA.

The authority of the colonialists will not fall without a fierce struggle. Therefore, there is only one way to emancipate the Angolan people--revolutionary struggle. But struggle can be crowned with success only if all the anti-imperialistic forces of Angola create a single front--a broad popular movement for the liberation of Angola.

Since 1957, the fascist terror has become still greater. The Portuguese Gestapo--PIDE--has been given the direct task of smashing all popular organizations, of suffocating the entire popular movement in Angola.

The criminal activities of the Portuguese colonialists in our country are wellknown to the entire world. In particular, our comrade, doctor, and remarkable poet Agostinho Neto, who had already been imprisoned earlier, was again thrown into jail by order of the Salazar satraps.

In answer to the terror, the MPLA called upon all the patriotic organizations of Angola to unite. The MPLA party also addressed an appeal to the Portuguese government in which it demanded, in particular, a solemn and urgent recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination and the convocation of a "round table" of representatives from all the political parties of Angola and from
the Portuguese government in order to discuss the peaceful settlement of colonial problems in our country. However, the Salazar government, as before, rejected the demand of the Angolan people. So much the worse for it! History shall not fail to demonstrate our rightness. We know that victory in the righteous struggle of our people is not far off now. We are certain that the principles of the Declaration on the Concession of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, will triumph even in our long-suffering fatherland. Guaranteeing this is the unswerving desire of the Angolan people for freedom, the powerful national liberation movement, (and) the support of all progressive humanity.  

* * * *

Statement to the United Nations  
by  
Mário de Andrade  
[Andrade's statement was presented to the thirty-second meeting of the U.N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, held at Leopoldville on May 24, 1962. He argues that Portuguese reforms in Africa represent no change in repressive colonial policy. ]

Under the plan for "accelerated white settlement," many families of Portuguese soldiers serving in Angola left Lisbon for Angola, on February 28, 1962. On March 1 in the National Assembly, Admiral Henrique Tenreiro stressed the need to increase the number of naval units serving in the colonies. Although, up to December 1961, the Portuguese government refused to comply with the decisions and recommendations of the U. N. General Assembly and Security Council, it nevertheless undertook legislative reforms, such as the revocation of the statute of indigenous persons, that were ostensibly in keeping with some U. N. recommendations. The extension of the franchise to Africans who can read and write will remain theoretical as long as the fascist emergency régime necessitated by the colonial war continues. Nor should it be forgotten that, in two-thirds of the territory of Angola, almost all of the African adult population (both male and female) has left and taken refuge in neighboring territories.

The colonial administration, under cover of collaboration with the army, has intensified its repellent features, even in areas declared to be under military control, by taking repressive measures against Africans accused of nationalistic activities-measures that involve the use of torture and corporal punishment and that almost always result in the death of the victim.

The purpose of the so-called psycho-social campaign that the colonial army continues to wage is not merely to induce Africans who have taken refuge abroad or in the woods to return to work for the economic enterprises of the colonists. In fact, the groups of Angolans that have actually given themselves up to the Portuguese authorities have been subjected to selection procedures, which usually end in their assignment to compulsory labor. Those Angolans who have shown themselves incapable of resubmitting to arbitrary and despotic rule are invariably detained and not infrequently die. There is every reason to believe that the Portuguese authorities wish to continue the old methods of exploitation.
The Portuguese authorities, far from having put an end to repressive measures against the Angolan people, are still detaining in their prisons Angolans accused of political activities. These prisoners are subjected to torture and sentenced to imprisonment and internment measures for terms of, on the average, more than ten years. However, if we consider how the Portuguese authorities have applied their internment and security measures in practice, the Angolan political prisoners hitherto sentenced may, in fact, be said to have received life terms.

The Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA) was the first Angolan political organization to give the Angolan people the slogan of "direct action" against Portuguese colonialism. It did so at a press conference held on December 6, 1960, in the House of Commons in London, under the auspices of the Movimento AntiColonista (MAC). It was the MPLA that started the armed insurrection in Angola on February 4, 5, and 6, 1961. These two events, which marked Angolan nationalism's first irreversible break with the reformist illusions previously cherished by some other Angolan nationalistic organizations, confirmed the political maturity of the Angolan people and placed the MPLA clearly at the head of the revolutionary movement in Angola.

The MPLA was the first nationalist organization to develop intensive political activities for the masses within the country. Proof of this is that it is the political group which has been the most heavily hit by colonial repression at all organizational levels. The majority of the nationalists in the Portuguese prisons belong to the MPLA....

The MPLA has about 50,000 card-carrying, active members and several thousands of other active members who, for obvious reasons connected with the nature of clandestine political work, do not have cards. The rule governing admission to membership in the MPLA gives this movement a national character and mission:

Admission:

Article V--All Africans of Angola who approve its program and Constitution and who undertake to carry out its policies through their daily activity may be members of the MPLA.

In accordance with both the letter and the spirit of Article V of the aforementioned Constitution, the MPLA does not have the slightest desire to make itself the single party in Angola or to create and foster rivalries among the other Angolan political organizations.

Thousands of active MPLA members are fighting at the side of the people wherever the war against Portuguese colonialism is being waged. More than a party, the MPLA is a movement. But it cannot be defined as an ideological, class, regional, or tribal movement. The MPLA is a national movement that, by virtue of the range and actual composition of its members, is called upon to represent the whole Angolan nation. By definition, by the methods it uses and the objectives it seeks to attain, it is intended to be a democratic movement--a movement that bases its policy on the
experience and creative thought of its active members and leaders as well as on the experience of all the African peoples in the anti-colonialist struggle.

A rapid review of the diplomatic activities of the MPLA will give some indication of the direction we wish to give to the foreign policy of an independent Angola. First, we have stressed the need for the governments of the independent African countries to make the Angolan question one of their central concerns. We have said, and we say again, that the solution of the Angolan problem will be African or else the problem will not be solved. The success of our national liberation struggle depends on its being a concrete expression of African solidarity. Thus, the events taking place in Africa strongly affect the development of the Angolan question and either accelerate or delay the triumph of the nationalist movements. Although we have been attracted most often by the dynamism of the countries belonging to the Casablanca group, we have nevertheless always wished to avoid making the Angolan question the pretext for any preferences among our African brothers. And although in the past we may have had insufficiently strong contacts with countries outside the Casablanca group, this does not justify anyone in asserting that we are unwilling to cooperate with or request assistance from other African countries. In hopes of awakening the sympathy of the world anti-colonialist movements and achieving world-wide solidarity in the triumph of our cause, we have appealed to all the forces likely to come to our assistance. ...

We are now at a turning point in the history of Angolan nationalism. Marked by many vicissitudes, the armed struggle is now suffering from the effects of the division of the nationalist forces. Unity is the major asset of a colonized people in arms. Nothing worthwhile can be accomplished in Angola until this major problem has been solved. Perhaps the dynamics of war (to use a current expression) will provide a solution to the disputes now rending Angolan nationalism. As for the intrigues in which Angola is already the stake, we do not follow the Angolan nationalist movements that see the West as the only choice and seek assistance from only that source. Undoubtedly, all these divisions, intrigues, and misunderstandings have given credence to false ideas concerning the foreign policy of the MPLA. For that reason, it is necessary to clarify and even to redefine our position in that respect. Our basic principle is the unity of the nationalist forces within the country and of all the forces fighting Portuguese colonialism. Witness the work already accomplished, with our active support, at the conference of the nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies. At a time when the African countries themselves are attempting to draw up a program of campaign for African unity, the MPLA declares that this is its objective also. We wish to march together with the African forces, which view reorganization, cooperation and solidarity from the standpoint of a common history and situation. We propose that our independent African brothers should help us to plan our domestic action so that African solidarity may play an effective part in the Angolan question. During this phase of the national liberation struggle, there is no question of pledging our policy to either of the two blocs dividing the world. The only promise we make in relation to the two blocs is that we will honestly seek to exclude attempts at
establishing a cold-war climate among the Angolan nationalists and to prevent the complications of international intrigues in the Angola of tomorrow. But we shall continue to mobilize international opinion against our direct enemy, Portuguese colonialism, and to appeal to the solidarity of all anti-colonialist organizations. In doing so, we adopt the same attitude as that of most of the governments of the non-aligned world. Thus, the positive neutrality that we practice in foreign policy does not conceal a deliberate choice of ideology and cannot be considered a blackmail tactic. On the contrary, it is a realistic attitude and the only conduct possible in a world fraught with danger, in which the peoples still under foreign domination would have much to lose if they became involved in the rivalry between the two blocs.

Responsibilities of the Black Intellectual
by
Viriato da Cruz

[Cruz's statement, translated from Presence Africaine, 27-28, June-July 1959, pp. 321-39, is one of a small number of writings published before 1961 by Africans in Angola. In refuting the Portuguese policy of racial assimilation, Cruz calls upon black African intellectuals to unite in the struggle for independence of their nations.]

In the colonies, all that is not already entirely Portuguese is doomed to be so. "Spiritual assimilation" of the native through education is desired; consequently, the colonizer cannot [permit himself to] recognize the permanence and development of what is black-African. He still has difficulty in adjusting to the circumstances. Adaptation with regard for indigenous ways and customs is limited by the ethics and dictates of humanity, as well as by the imperatives of the free exercise of Portuguese sovereignty. Authorities do try, as much as possible, to mold indigenous customs into harmony with the fundamental principles governing Portuguese rights, both public and private. They attempt to promote a prudent evolution of black institutions consistent with those principles. . and, in a general way, to train the blacks for the teaching and effort necessary to achieve the transformation of their primitive customs and practices, as well as to increase their activities and integration into the community, a means of access to citizenship. The teaching, which will be specifically designated for natives, should have the general goals of moral, civic, intellectual, and physical education established by law, as well as the acquisition of work habits and aptitudes, harmony between the sexes, and acceptance of the social conditions and conventions that govern regional economies. The teaching to which this article refers will be aimed at spreading the Portuguese language, but in doing so, the use of African languages may be authorized.

Those who do not reflect deeply and who judge merely by appearances declare that there is no racial discrimination in Angola. This is, in fact, the truth; there is no deep horizontal discrimination (as there is in the United States) nor vertical discrimination (as in South Africa) .... Dispossessed of all power (economic, political, cultural), imprisoned between impregnable walls with only one exit,
through which efforts are made to lead him to "spiritual assimilation," rationed in all spheres by Portuguese colonizers who are absolute masters in Angola, the native has no chance to change under his own initiative and by his own force. He is always restricted by either natural elements or the will of the colonizer. For this reason, there exists in Angola an invisible, excessive, and brutal pattern of behavior (in South Africa, for example, this is glaring) to which natives are expected to conform.

But this assimilation, by which it is hoped that the African will attain the highest summits of spirituality, in practice tends more to deny what is African than to make available to the native the existing, necessary means for assimilating what is Portuguese. In this sense, the promotion of the native is nothing more than pure theory. The spoilation of the native's material goods, the cultural and moral alienation of which he is the victim--these are the crude fundamentals of the past and present realities of Portugal's colonialistic action.

In conclusion, we believe that the principal duty of the black intellectual lies in reuniting himself with his people, so that together they may overcome the forces that are working against them and their culture. ...

In the fight against colonialism, African unity is the strongest weapon on our continent. The union of everyone will be an indispensable condition for material and spiritual progress as well as for the safeguarding of liberty and peaceful working conditions for our peoples .... Several views on the possible future development of Africa have been set forth:

a) East African nations allied with non-Communist Asian nations, and West African nations with the Atlantic Community;
b) An Arab bloc in North African and a black federation south of the Sahara;
c) A close, firm alliance of Africa and Europe behind the protective shield of the United States;
d) Former metropolises [mother countries of colonies] forming blocs with their former colonies;
e) All Africa forming a federal bloc.

Indeed, both the progress of free African peoples and the just interests of former metropolises require the establishment and development of various relationships among the different entities. But we believe that, for the African people, no type of relations established with the former metropolises can be more advantageous than those among the African people themselves. Local economic development seems to us to be more decisive and important than the very best commercial relations between former colonies and former metropolises. In the interior of Africa, the liquidation of obstacles that hinder the improvement of each African country will be achieved only by the liquidation of obstacles that hinder the improvement of Africa as a continent .... During the colonial period itself, what impeded the economic activity of the colonizers was not the difficulties caused by methods of communication, which do not always logically conform to the most pressing economic and geographic demands; nor was it the customs' barriers, which commercially isolated the African colonies from each other; nor the sometimes
disadvantageous demographic distribution. But what was lacking was effective, close, permanent collaboration among the various colonialistic nations. Is this not all the more true when it is a question of rapid and substantial economic development in the liberated African nations? Because, in the future, evaluating a developed global African economy will be different from evaluating the sum of the economic units of each part of Africa. This unity will be something new. It will permit the realization of the potential of the African character and we shall be able to profit from that potential under the best of conditions at a maximum rate. What is certain for African economy is equally certain for African culture and civilization. We cannot develop the potential inherent in the best of our culture without consistently using that culture and without achieving the organic unity of all men of African culture....

We believe, therefore, that it is the duty of black writers and artists to strive to make known, clearly and precisely, the unity of an independent and democratic Africa, where men of all races may live with dignity so long as they respect the foundations of this independent, democratic unity. It is evident that our different peoples will recognize and respect the origins of foreigners living with them and will apply to them the principles applied to Africans living in Europe. ... Accordingly, we feel that it will be the duty of black writers and artists to fight for the independence of their countries and, at the same time, for the reforms that will give us the necessary means for spreading and raising the level of instruction and culture--a duty not only for adult men, youths, and children, but also for women. ... We must beware of attempts to "graft" Western culture to the various African cultures; at the right moment, we must denounce these injurious attempts and the criminal outrages this "grafting" allows. The responsibility of black writers and artists is a very extensive subject .... We consider it necessary to establish ethical principles for black writers and artists. We feel that these principles:

1) Should be courageously expressed--as should be our will to recapture our place in the world;
2) Should be expressed with a spirit that is creative, complete, fecund, and truly ours--as should be the spirit with which we shall reconstruct our communities;
3) Should be expressed with the independence that is the unsubdued force of freedom and with sentiments elevated by brotherhood and by respect for the sacred necessity to seek the peaceful coexistence of all men.

Other societies, brothers among themselves, must have similar principles so that, come what may, we blacks can live together--in dignity--with the rest of humanity.

Speech to Second Conference of Solidarity With Afro-Asian Peoples
by Viriato da Cruz

[Viriato da Cruz, founder of the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA) in 1953 and later of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), presented the following comments to the Second Conference, in
Conakry, on April 11-15, 1960. He appeals for African support in the struggle against Portugal.

Liberty is won in battle.

This has always been the deep conviction of Angolan patriots.

An important segment of world opinion is convinced that the Angolan people are conducting a tenacious battle (although few details are known) against Portuguese colonialism.

The permanent secretariat of the conference mentioned in this report that, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the Angolan uprisings are the result of massacres, and that complete silence has surrounded the atrocities that have been committed there.

Yes, we must say it: In several Angolan regions (notably Luanda and Catete), there have been insurrections, which the Portuguese army has savagely suppressed.

For some time, Portuguese colonialism has utilized an ignoble weapon new to modern colonial repression: the poisoning of African people. In Angola, where the opposition to Portuguese domination is very intense, agents or allies of Portuguese colonialism are selling poisoned food to the Africans. It seems to us that this suffices to give an idea of the barbaric character of Portuguese colonialism. Undoubtedly, you know that a fascist dictatorship reigns in all Portuguese colonies. In practice, this means trampling upon and violating the fundamental rights and liberties of man. No legal political parties! No African workers' unions! No freedom of information and of the press! In addition, this means that the struggle for progress and the liberty of our people can be only highly clandestine. We have even had to create clandestine schools simply in order to teach illiterates to read. To this, backward Portuguese colonialism responds with an obscurantist policy of persecution and the closing of hundreds of these schools throughout Angola. Angolan patriots are constantly imprisoned, dragged before military tribunals and charged with "high treason," which carries a penalty of up to twenty-five years in prison. Many of them are tortured or assassinated, or deported to places from which they never return.

We do not wish to be pitied for what we have to say. Our people realize full well that nothing or no one should nor can replace them in the vanguard struggle that they are waging. But, dear comrades, the majority of our people are convinced that the nature of Portuguese colonialism is such that it cannot permit the peaceful methods we should like to pursue in order to obtain our independence. Following these methods would condemn them to a domination without hope of liberation. The hatred our people have for Portuguese colonialism can explode at any moment. If such an explosion were to occur, the direct response of our people to colonial domination would be transformed from sporadic to systematic action.

This would be war: a war imposed by the barbaric tyranny of Portugal.

It is said--and we believe it--that the liberty of a continent and liberty throughout the world are indivisible. It can be asked: What can Africans and Asians concretely and effectively do to aid the just struggle of our people--a struggle fought under conditions unequalled in all Africa?
We confidently hope:
--That Asians and Africans increase their active vigilance over the conduct of Portuguese colonialism;
--That the Afro-Asian peoples will give concrete and unconditional support to the struggle of the Angolan people against Portuguese colonialism;
--That the Afro-Asian peoples will press their respective governments to take certain diplomatic measures against Portugal--even to the point of breaking diplomatic and commercial relations;
--That Portugal, by virtue of its colonial policy, will be declared the enemy of all the Afro-Asian world;
--That this conference, in accordance with the report of the permanent secretariat, will give its special attention to the question of Portuguese colonialism and that it will launch a special campaign against it, so that the tyrants will be thrown out of the countries they have usurped and that the peoples of these countries will recover their legitimate rights.
To struggle for the liberty of a people, to struggle to earn the solidarity of brother peoples, to use this solidarity as an aid for the development of the popular struggle--these are the purposes of the organization which we represent here: the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola.

LONG LIVE EFFECTIVE AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY!
LONG LIVE LIBERTY AND PEACE!
DOWN WITH COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM!
Problems of the Angolan Revolution
by
Viriato da Cruz
[In July 1963, a desperate leadership crisis split the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA). At that time, Cruz denounced MPLA president, Agostinho Neto, for collaboration with the Portuguese and established a provisional executive committee to run the party. Later, however, Cruz proclaimed his support for the revolutionary Angolan government in exile led by Holden Roberto. The following analysis of Angolan developments was written after the MPLA split and appeared in Revolution, I, (January 1964), 11-22, and also in Voice of Africa, IV, (September-October 1964), 18-24.] Portuguese methods of integrating Africans in a vast social and economic system explain, to a certain extent, the nature of the awakening of the Angolan masses' anticolonial consciousness, as well as the forms taken by the insurrection, its deficiencies, and its problems.
But these methods are in turn explained by the determining factors of the old establishment of Portuguese fascism, which found itself faced with the necessity of working out a compromise between, on one hand, the wealthy Catholic monarchists (who were especially interested in colonial exploitation) and, on the other hand, the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the rising fascism in Europe. In making such a compromise, the aim was to exploit the colonies, to "effectively occupy" them, and thus try to avoid their loss to other imperialistic systems.
Portuguese Mentality
Hence the Portuguese bourgeoisie cannot help but hope to accelerate the rate of accumulation of capital and try to overcome, as rapidly as possible, the great relative delay in making this accumulation. Since foreign capital already largely dominated Portugal, the aims of the country's bourgeoisie required the increasing concentration of capital; the suppression of political freedom for the middle classes and their condemnation to exploitation; the refusal of all rights to the working class, doomed to merciless exploitation; the unchecked centralization of power; and finally state intervention in all fields of national life. Within this framework, violence and arbitrary measures are the logical means by which the dominant classes ward off any threat to the status quo.

Thus, it is understandable that the state's necessity to take these measures should end in legalizing and putting into general practice in the colonies policies aimed at the annihilation of Africans (brutality, ferocious exploitation, and a refusal to recognize the movement of history), while continuing the hypocrisy of assimilation. This kind of colonialism produced a radical oppression of the Angolan masses of such scope that from it could only emerge violence, a sharp class distinction, the impatient assault of the exploited against the external aspects of alienation. Thus one has an idea of the subjective conditions of the masses at the moment the armed movement began.

The socio-political and cultural consequences of Portuguese "assimilation" played, and still play, an important role in the development of Angolan nationalism, because its principal leaders are classed as assimilados. In order to understand the relations between Angolan parties and leaders, it is important to note here and now that the assimilated sector does not, in general, have a homogeneous socio-economic and ethnic content. Through mere observation, one can divide the sector into two groups: the purely functional group and the assimilated group destined, in the colonial context, for social and economic success.

In the first group are the civil servants and employees in trade and industry. In the second group are the "assimilated" who, thanks to state scholarships, missions, or the privileged situation of their families, specialize in different professional branches in Portugal. Because of their psychology and the influence of the social functions for which they prepare, the majority of the members of this group behave in the same fashion as do the petit-bourgeoisie.

Because the majority of the "assimilated" in the functional group are exploited in the colony, they refuse colonialism in their active behavior, whereas the majority of the "assimilated" in the second group oppose colonialism because of patriotism, self-interest, or solidarity. The latter "assimilated" had been sent to Portugal while youths, sheltered from direct exploitative relationships, and had been more integrated into Portuguese society than any other African group.

Each of these two groups leans, therefore, toward different solutions to the colonial problems, in keeping with their respective interests and social situations.

On January 4, 5, and 6, 1959—just before the armed struggle began in Angola—there were riots in L6opoldville involving the Angolan masses, during which
shops of Portuguese tradesmen were sacked, mainly by Angolan nationalists. Moreover, the Bakongo of Angola had been affiliated with the Abako of the Congo since 1950 and were in agreement with the aims of that association. The Parties
However, well before the founding of the Abako, Angolan emigrants in the Congo had created a mutual aid association on an ethnic basis. As some Angolans think, it may well be that the Angolan groups--perhaps because of their situation as proletarians and emigrants--were the forerunners of this type of association in Léopoldville. The growth of the Angolan Bakongo associations, connected with the appearance of nationalism in the Congo, gave rise to Uniao das Populações do Norte de Angola (UPNA), which became, following the 1958 Pan-African conference in Accra, the Unilo das Populações de Angola (UPA). During the Congolese struggle for national independence, the Bakongo of Angola, as well as Angolans of other ethnic groups, realized that independence for the Congo would sound the death knell of colonial domination in Angola. The Angolans sent funds--by the millions--to the treasuries of the principal Congolese parties. Also, thousands of Angolans actively participated in politics at the side of the Congolese. For the Angolans--those living within the country as well as those abroad--the independence of the Congo portended, above all, an irreparable breakdown of the repressive state apparatus in Angola. In fact, after the Congo became independent, numerous Angolans shuttled back and forth between Luanda and Léopoldville on political missions. The violent incidents that took place in Luanda in February 1961 inaugurated a new migratory current: a growing stream of Angolan political emigrés to the Congo. During all that month, violence erupted again and again in Angola's Cuanza Norte district. The Angolan nationalistic organizations were born in the cities of Luanda and Léopoldville. After thirty years of activity in the two legal associations, the majority of "assimilated" Africans in Luanda were disturbed by the realization that their economic and social situation was continually growing worse. At that time, almost the entire African population of Luanda made up one poor mass, composed of people dispossessed and ruined.

By 1955, the European population [in Africa] had increased twelve-fold since 1900, and had more than doubled since 1940. The competition from European settlers brought a progressive deterioration in the economic and social conditions under which the majority of Africans urbanized for several generations lived. They were reduced to the level of the peasants who had recently emigrated to the cities, where they found only underemployment and insecurity. From the natural rivalry between African and European workers, sharpened by the policies of capitalist firms in Angola, came increased discrimination and racial conflicts because the fact that the great majority of Portuguese settlers belonged to the lower social strata encouraged their trying to benefit from their "racial quality."
Portuguese authorities foiled the attempts made by young Africans in Luanda (beginning in 1948) that were aimed either at developing literary trends of an indigenous and nationalistic character or at integrating the non-assimilated masses into the legal African associations. However, contacts between young Angolans and young Brazilian writers resulted in the clandestine introduction of books and magazines into Angola. These publications stimulated a section of the youthful population to debate on the great postwar problems: the social question, fascism and democracy, colonialism and self-determination, etc. Having realized that action through effective legal channels was barred, and having learned, moreover, from their failures, these youths began clandestine political action in 1955, with national independence as their goal. Thus was born the MPLA.

The independence of Ghana and the acquaintance of the nationalist youth of Luanda with the manifesto "African Conscience," published in July 1956 by a group of Congolese in Ldopoldville, strengthened the youths' conviction that Africa had entered an irreversible era of national independence. The almost complete liquidation of a social gap between a large number of those urban Angolans who were (purely functionally) "assimilated" and the masses--peasants who were constantly moving from the countryside to the shanty-towns--aided in establishing the MPLA on a large scale in Luanda. Beginning in March 1959, however, waves of arrests in Luanda made it impossible for the MPLA (in other words, the proletariat of Luanda and other Angolan cities) to effectively lead the armed peasant movement.

Because of the nature of colonial domination over Angola--an exploitation by economic interests--the revolutionary movement was destined to clash with a "front" of powerful imperialists. Thus it was indispensable for Angolan nationalism to have not only the verbal but also the concrete support of the world's revolutionary forces and, especially, that of the Portuguese proletariat and people. However, this concrete support has been practically nil.

The only illegally organized party in Portugal is the Communist Party, and it is relatively small in numbers and has notorious deficiencies. "The majority of (Portuguese) political trends have not been transformed into structured parties. There exists a large number of anti-fascist groups and individuals enjoying a more or less extensive influence." The Communist Party of Portugal has, however, had no appreciable influence in either the preparation or the launching of the Angolan revolutionary movement.

At the end of 1962, the Frente Patriótico de Libertação Nacional (FPLN) was formed, bringing together socialists, communists, republicans, Catholics, progressives and liberal monarchists. It has a major weakness in organization, and it seems that as long as there are also problems of leadership, there is no reason to believe that this Front would benefit less from the struggle of colonial people if it were to give them concrete support.

The settler community (with only a few exceptions) reacted to the beginning of the African insurrection with extreme violence, actively as well as psychologically. After the riot of February 4, organized groups of civilian settlers competed with the state's repressive forces in terrorizing the indigenous
population. The murderous fury of the settlers took on a clearly racist aspect. From March to May 1961 in northern Angola, organized, armed settlers exceeded the forces of the colonial army in the number of killings and repressive violence. It was not rare to see civilian settlers shoot African landowners and tradesmen for the sole purpose of eliminating business competitors. In addition to racism and the defense of the privileged, this war of colonial reconquest marked the colonists' return to the primitive accumulation of capital, in procedure as well as motivation. Because of this reaction, and because of the fact that Portuguese colonists and the [white] settler community became synonymous with class domination and exploitation, it is understandable that, in the consciousness of the peasant masses, the race conflict won over a simple class struggle as the manifestation of colonial domination. However, despite the impossibility of the peasants' becoming aware of the economic basis of their struggles, the truth is that in Angola the capitalistic process of exploitation spared only a microscopic African bourgeoisie, which, moreover, lacked political influence. Dominant classes, privileged conditions, and race were, therefore, one and the same.

For more than a year now, important changes have been taking place within Angolan nationalism. The most notable external sign of these changes was the recognition, beginning on June 23, 1963, given by numerous African countries to the Gov~rno Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exlió (GRAE), formed in March 1962 by the Frente Nacional de Libertago de Angola (FNLA). As is known, the most important of these changes was the progressive deterioration of the MPLA over the past year. Among the causes of this disintegration are:

1. A struggle between the interests of different social strata. Indeed, the MPLA was the Angolan organization that quite visibly united people from all African social strata, black as well as mulatto Angolans. The MPLA, in particular, brought together an even more significant number of intellectuals and assimilados destined for social and economic success.

In spite of the development of the Angolan Revolution, members of the MPLA formed blocs on the basis of their respective interests, origins, social situations, political situations, and social aspirations. Each bloc offered its own solutions to problems of organization and ideology, to problems of united front tactics, of external alliances, of the socio-economic structures of Angola after independence, etc. Moreover, after the armed struggle had begun, the Angolans were faced with colonialistic propaganda in which the Portuguese imputed a "basically racist" character to the armed movement of the masses. The various Angolan strata and social groups reacted differently to this allegation.

A number of intellectuals and students, members of the MPLA, were afraid to look directly at the inhuman colonial conditions that had shaped the Angolan peasants; they were impressed by a stronger affirmation by the peasants of the values and symbols of their traditional cultures; they were incapable of understanding that--as Marx had observed--"the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has
never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language. " These members of the MPLA panicked before the movement of the masses and voiced excessive criticism of the "racist excesses" of the fighting peasants.

2. A struggle for the leadership of the MPLA. Certain intellectuals and assimilados became convinced that, in order to lead the revolution along a "decent" road and thus avoid the excesses of the peasants and in order to guarantee the "progressive" result of the revolution, their presence in the leadership of the MPLA and the revolutionary movement in general was indispensable. Their conviction was not based on their having rid themselves of the deficiencies and prejudices of their colonial education, or on their having shown a capability for directing the revolution, or on their having a true link with the masses. For them a professional diploma and their own self-concept were valid criteria. In these nationalists' opinion, the salvation of the revolution would be guaranteed basically by the union of the "spirit" (a group of educated and "assimilated" individuals) with the "mass without spirit" (the ignorant peasantry and proletariat). This solution represents the old arrogant and reactionary duality. Some nationalists, fearing that a result of the popular revolution would be a drastic change in the conditions under which they had acquired privileges and advantages, opposed a mass revolution, but avoided an overt defense of their privileges. Either they argued that the Portuguese "cadres' (basically, a part of the social base supporting Portuguese colonialism in Angola) were indispensable or they challenged the value of the nationalistic parties and leaders that were more linked with masses, under the pretext that the revolution under way would not immediately result in socialism. In reality, these demagogic positions served as a motivation for fractional activities aimed at seizing the leadership or the MPLA.

3. A struggle to impose new tactics. As is well known, there has been no success in creating a single united front, particularly one including the two Angolan parties, the MPLA and the FNLA. The FNLA always maintained that the MPLA had no military forces within Angola [to explain the FNLA reluctance for unity]. It hid the true motives behind its refusal to help make it easier for the MPLA to cross the northern frontier into Angola and its attachment to certain aims, values and alliances incompatible with the MPLA: that is, its interest in strengthening the hegemony it held in a part of northern Angola.

Hence, the MPLA was confronted with a difficult problem: The augmentation of its military forces required penetration into Angola, but that depended on an understanding with the FNLA, which, however, refused to make such an agreement. Therefore, the MPLA could only work harder to overcome its difficulties. Nevertheless, in view of this situation, certain cadres and leaders of the MPLA, [the intellectuals and assimilados] holding the positions cited above, supported the MPLA's using new tactics with the objective of seizing power in Angola. The supporters of this view put forward two arguments: 1) The FNLA would constantly increase its military forces and 2) The Western supporters of the
FNLA would openly aid it, at the proper moment, to take power in Angola. In general, the new tactics consisted of stressing the importance of the military exploits of the MPLA through propaganda in an effort to obtain strong support in the West for the MPLA and to put an end to the aid given the FNLA.

4. The use of myths. Because of the exaggerated propaganda about the liberation of Dr. Neto that the MPLA had made for two years, Dr. Neto's personality had assumed the proportions of a myth for numerous leaders and members of the MPLA. After his flight from Portugal (May 1962), Dr. Neto, while maintaining the myth about himself, accepted the new arguments and tactics, thus giving them an authority whose true limitations were revealed only by the accumulation of failures during the ensuing year. The representatives of the new arguments and tactics finally took over the effective domination of the organization, seizing the funds of the MPLA and legalizing their new situations at the national conference held in Léopoldville in December 1962. However, by pushing through its electoral list, with thirty-nine votes out of seventy delegates, that bloc made official the division within the MPLA and provided additional reasons for an opposition to its new policy. The renewal of old relationships between several of the new leaders and several from the Portuguese "Left," linked with the revisionist trend, accelerated division within the MPLA. Members were constantly being suspended and expelled--due to the arbitrary methods of the new disciplinary principles called "synthesis of the political and the military"--and were being labeled by the diplomats of the MPLA as adversaries of the political trends, parties, and interests for which the new leadership demanded support. Thus intrigue played an increasing role in implementing the new policy. The National Political Council (the organization's highest body) and the Control Commission, created by the December 1962 MPLA conference, were never set up. The group responsible for the movement's external relations seized the material assets of the organization, with the intention of appearing as a genuine driving force at the moment when it would be at the head of the MPLA. For this reason, important military measures were taken between the month of August and the end of the conference of December 1, 1962. However, the profound division within the MPLA was already well known in Léopoldville, and the chances of resolving the problems disappeared during January 1963. The situation thus created obliged scores of well-trained MPLA soldiers to enlist in the ranks of the FNLA, where they taught the use of arms to thousands of Angolan peasants. The FNLA, therefore, benefited indirectly from the disintegration of the MPLA. The recognition of the GRAE by the Congolese government--a foreseeable event after Youlou and Adoula issued their joint communiqué of June 8--further pushed the leadership of the MPLA into a policy that was both naive and adventurous.

On the eve of the meeting in Léopoldville of the Committee of Conciliation appointed by the Committee of Coordination in Dar es Salaam, the leaders of the MPLA, observing the party's division and its isolation from the masses, tried to create the appearance of mass support. On July 8, they formed a Frente Democrática para a Libertação de Angola (FDLA) with four other Angolan
groups, including two long known for their contacts with the Portuguese colonial administration.

It can then be understood why the group controlling the MPLA, by means of false accusations, led the Congolese police to arrest, on July 8, forty-three Angolans belonging to a group within the MPLA that, three days earlier, had withdrawn its support for the controlling group's policy and had proposed a plan for the rapid recovery and reunification of the organization. These actions taken by the leaders of the MPLA, in fact resulted in the mortal lowering of the moral and political authority of that organization in the eyes of Congolese authorities.

The Committee of Conciliation's decision to consider the FNLA as the only Angolan fighting front and to recommend recognition of the GRAE to African states was certainly based on the fact that disintegration within the MPLA prevented it from satisfying the pressing demands of the armed struggle. It would obviously be erroneous to conclude only that Angolan intellectuals cannot or must not play a role in the revolution. They have their place; and the importance of their positive contribution to struggle depends only on their re-education in a revolutionary sense. In our opinion, the upheavals that have taken place within the MPLA are historically significant as a primary and elementary clarification of the problem of the driving forces and the directing forces of the revolution, and as a confirmation that the ideology and the policy of the petit-bourgeoisie cannot effectively advance the revolution.

The moving force of Angola's national liberation movement lies in the violent contradictions provoked by the establishment and development of capitalism in that country. Although the progressive and revolutionary armed struggle of the masses plays a leading role, it is not, in itself, sufficient to guarantee "full success."

Portuguese colonialism is in a particular position in the struggle between the powers that have risen to first place after the last imperialistic war (United States, West Germany... ) and the powers that have descended in rank to second place (Britain, France... ). This position partially explains not only the delay in beginning decolonization of the Portuguese colonial empire, but also the nature of the results obtained in the first phase of the Portuguese colonies' struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

Portugal, as a semi-colony of Britain, already ranked as a second-place nation among the colonial powers of the 19th century. It was not truly a competitor in the monopoly capitalism practiced by first-ranking powers of that time. It is correct to state that "the role of foreign capital in Portuguese colonialism is unique," and that "no other colonial system ever permitted such dispossession from within."

Although Angola is the direct state and juridical dependency of Portugal, it is also financially and economically dependent on numerous non-Portuguese interests--British, American, West German, Belgian, French, Dutch, Swiss, the Vatican, Brazilian, South African, etc.

The Portuguese "open door" policy does not incite great desire in absent or underrepresented financial groups for a share in the marketing or the exploitation of Angola's raw materials and production. Portugal's credit has not been damaged.
Quite to the contrary, the colonial war can continue only because of credit from
diverse sources. Besides the more than one hundred million dollars lent in 1962
by U. S., West German, and French banks, Portugal obtained twenty-five million
dollars credit from the World Bank. If, as Portugal's Minister of Finance believes,
this latter loan represents an international value judgment on the "economic and
financial stability" and the "available resources" of Portugal, one is led to believe
that Portugal does its best to reconcile its own domination over its colonies with
their economic annexation by international monopolies. The Portuguese position
on self-determination is sufficiently explained by the fragility of Portugal's
economic structure, its genuine incapacity to safeguard its commercial, industrial,
and financial positions, and its powerlessness to find positions to which it can
withdraw and from which it can continue to enslave its former colonies through
subsidies, should it be evicted from its African domains.
As the sole Angolan fighting front, the FNLA alone has been responsible, since
August 1963, for the future of the Angolan Revolution. Will it succeed in igniting
all the Angolan revolutionaries? Will it become a vast organization, politically,
ideologically, and organizationally united, functioning well and serving as an
effective base for the armed struggle? Will it succeed in transforming the
peasants, in raising their level of revolutionary consciousness? Will it succeed,
while the armed struggle is going on, in resolving the vital problems of the
peasantry, the principal source of fighters? Can it spread the armed struggle
throughout the entire territory of Angola? Will it have the courage to use for the
benefit of the people of Angola the support of a sincere revolutionary
internationalism? These are the questions now being
raised by all the fighters of Angola.

Angola in Historical Perspective
by
Agostinho Neto

[Agostinho Neto, poet and doctor with a degree in medicine from the University
of Coimbra, was imprisoned by Portuguese police in 1952, 1955-1957, and
1960-1963. His return to L4opoldville in 1963 led to the split in the ranks of the
Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA). As president of the
MPLA, he assisted the movement in its attempts to reconstitute itself after 1963.
His historical interpretation is translated from his "Le development historique de
la situation en Angola," a speech presented to a national seminar of Angolan
youth in L-opoldville during April 1963.]
The history of the Angolan situation since the establishment of fascist power in
Portugal is precisely dictated by a series of political and military actions aimed at
the liquidation of a machinery of colonial repression. For Angolans, clandestine
action means the resumption of a long battle against Portuguese domination. From
the time of Portuguese penetration, our history has been marked by great feats of
resistance. The list of Angolan heroes heightens the prestige of all those martyrs
who cover the pages of African history with glory. Whether it is the story of
Queen Jinga or of the anonymous fighters among the people of Dembos, who
defeated fifteen successive Portuguese expeditions at the beginning of this
century, important movements of an insurrectional nature filled a long period of our history, practically from the fifteenth century until 1922. At that time, the intensity of nationalistic fervor successfully confronted the military power of Portuguese colonialists. During the first years of the administrative occupation of our country, which was accompanied by the establishment of direct domination, several armed revolts exploded here and there. In order to fight the expropriation of their lands and their possessions, the imposition of the sovereignty tax, and the system of forced labor, there was an entire generation that used the latest legal weapons--the press and regional associations. Our parents faced an extremely difficult situation, for when Salazar came to power, they failed to find other methods and means of defense.

In 1929, this generation, which had given life to the legal organizations, was at a crossroads. Already the germ of division was established within Africa in the associations. In the conflict between partisans of legal claims and partisans of political activity tied to the masses, the latter were in the majority, thus opening a new era in the fight against Portuguese colonialism.

It was the post-war Angolan youth who relit the torch of the centuries-old national resistance and presented the new alternatives with which to attack the Angolan problem--both nationally and internationally. Through cultural programs with a nationalistic content and by the creation of clandestine political groups, this generation opened the first modern front in the fight against colonial obscurantism. In 1953, as we know, the first structured Angolan party was born--the Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA). Police terrorism, the control of the Portuguese over all sectors of the economic and social life of the country, the massive presence of colonists--in a word, the colonialist arbitration--all this necessitated a grouping together of all nationalistic Angolan forces. These factors, in addition to the examination of our particular situation and to the evolution of Africa as a whole, led the leaders of the PLUA and other organizations to found the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in December 1956.

Furthermore, the Portuguese colonial administration quickly understood the danger of such a unitary movement, which was spreading the slogans of revolutionary battle throughout the country by means of a single front of all nationalistic forces. Thus, since the beginning of 1957, the PIDE has been based in the colony. It organized the manhunt for all Angolan nationalists. To all political manifestations, led by nationalists in their clandestine schools, to all perceptible agitation, seen in the tracts that passed around the country, the PIDE responded with the methods for which it is famous--imprisonment and quick liquidation. Feeble echoes of this police situation were heard by other nations and the United Nations.

It seemed necessary to back up the difficult fight waged by the nationalists in the interior of the country with the organization of a foreign nationalist network. Our movement, together with the nationalist organizations in Guiné, Mocambique, and the islands of São Tomé and Cape Verde, perceived the importance of a fighting coalition against the common enemy.
In 1959, towns like Luanda resembled vast firing ranges. The spectacular intimidation organized by the armed forces was a good indication that the Portuguese government was looking for a pretext to quell the popular insurrection and to launch a war of extermination against the Angolan people. The entire Portuguese colonial policy had one objective: the development of a strong military system ready to intervene at the slightest popular manifestation. Meanwhile, the Portuguese government propagandized that everything was going well in Angola--a paradise. Imprisonments continued, one right after another, up until the preparation of a political trial, the "trial of the 50," which in itself was a categorical contradiction to the Portuguese allegations that feelings of national independence were foreign to the people of Angola. Reacting to the support that the Angolan nationalist movements found in independent African nations during 1960, Portuguese colonialists could only reinforce the surveillance of their colonies, especially of the borders of Angola. Virtually no well-known Angolan nationalist remained freely functional after the proclamation of independence by the Republic of Congo. Then, to counter the repression and to affirm the right of the Angolan people to independence, the popular masses had only one alternative: organization of active self-defense. We were the first to proclaim direct action against Portuguese colonialism on December 6, 1960, along with the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and the Political Convention of Goa. MPLA workers were going to make the Angolan problem known on February 4, 1961, by attacking the military and civil prisons in Luanda. Incontestably, that date marked the first phase of armed fighting against Portuguese colonialism. The rest of our history belongs to the present. Internally, the present situation is characterized by technical easing of the guerrilla war and by politicalization of party followers, while the Portuguese government applies its colonial laws and is actively seeking the collaboration of traitors. We are in the second phase of our fight—the revolutionary phase—which necessarily must result in our triumph over Portuguese colonialism through a peaceful solution based on the minimal conditions that we have already set forth, namely: "the recognition of the right of Angola to selfdetermination and to independence; the liberation of political prisoners; the withdrawal of all Portuguese armed forces to their original bases; the guarantee of free elections by the creation of a legislative body; and the establishment of a date to mark the end of colonial domination." Cooperation with a government that refuses to conform to the resolutions of the United Nations and that wages a war of extermination is absurd. The Committee on Decolonization of the United Nations recently had that experience. At this stage of Portuguese obstinacy, there is only one solution at the level of international organizations: recourse to the clauses of the Charter that invite member nations to effect a boycott on a country such as Portugal.
Angolan youth was always at the head of clandestine organizations whose action unfurled the flag of liberation that startled all of Angola. It was not only the tracts scattered in all the towns and villages, on all the corners, calling for organization of the resistance, denouncing the crimes of the colonialist authorities. It was not just the little magazines, the literary movements, and the folkloric groups that carried to every Angolan the fighting slogan, a message of faith in the future. It was, and still is, also the clandestine schools, furiously sought by the colonialists, who are aware that from these schools come new consciences mobilized by the Revolution. The thousands of young teachers assassinated at the start of our armed fight furnish the proof of that. It was also the sporting events, through which the Angolan youth were able to organize themselves and to seize every occasion to develop everywhere a revolutionary spirit among our people and to spread the slogans of the Revolution. In all these areas the youth has been and is still active. Finally, the Angolan youth contributed greatly to the insurrection launched on February 4 in Luanda, which won over the Baixa de Cassange and all of Northern Angola. Today it is obvious that youth plays a primary role in the leadership of Angolan political organizations. From the north of Angola to the south, youth continues to organize resistance in all areas. At the borders our youth keep the colonialist army in a constant state of alarm. In spite of its power, the colonialist army is incapable of dominating the situation and is continually losing its morale. It is the youth who, stirring up international solidarity, have succeeded in sending to friendly countries hundreds of young Angolans who are being trained to permit them to rapidly become the backbone of our country once it is independent. In addition, our people have complete confidence in our youth. We see youth meeting here today, aware of the burdens (importance) of its responsibilities. We are sure that they will not betray the hope of the Angolan people.

Of course, internal difficulties hinder our struggle for national liberation; one of them is the multiplicity of political groups that act separately. The MPLA, for its part, has never ceased to point out this danger, which impairs our chances for a rapid triumph over Portuguese colonialism. Is it necessary to recall here the many moves made in this domain--appeals to the Angolan nationalist parties, recourses to the good offices of African chiefs of state? The Executive Committee of the MPLA believes that the youth of Angola is in the best position to dedicate itself to unity. Seminars of this type constitute an excellent occasion to debate the present and the future of the situation in our country, to work out plans together and to emerge with a unity of views. We firmly believe that it will be possible for you to achieve united revolutionary action, since you will understand each other with a unity of views concerning the realization of the immediate objective of our fight--the national independence of Angola.

A plan of action? It is all found in the very commitment of the youth to the political and military fight, the commitment that our various nationalistic organizations claim. Organic alliances must nourish themselves naturally, for the factors that dominate our daily life, at the political, military, and social levels, impose themselves on all of the Angolan people. In a country like ours, in which a
framework is lacking, it would be irresponsible, even criminal, not to help all young Angolans find the basis for united action. When the Angolan people dedicate themselves to one single objective--national independence--we must take up the task of organizing ourselves in a single revolutionary spirit that permits the most rapid possible liberation of our fatherland. We invite you to mobilize yourselves around this slogan: FOR A SINGLE OBJECTIVE, A SINGLE PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION!

The battle being waged against Portuguese colonialism will make the whole of Africa independent, we have repeatedly declared. But this battle cannot be a powerful factor in African unity until the day that Angolan political movements have brought about the inevitable front of national liberation. We are committed to unity. No one can try to liberate Angola by relying exclusively on his party, his region, his tribe, or even his foreign allies .... Unity is the business of all Angolans, whatever they are, wherever they are. Our contribution to the rehabilitation of the African continent and to the working out of a new humanism is likewise dependent on our national unity.

Today our fundamental choices are well known:
--the satisfaction of the claims of the popular masses;
--the Revolution will not be the expression of just one social class. It is the alliance of all nationalist forces on which the future of independent Angola depends;
--condemnation of tribalism, regionalism, sectarianism, and racial and religious intolerance.
--the fight to safeguard national unity and the territorial integrity of our country within its present borders.

We have thus defined the role that falls to the JMPLA in the fight for national liberation:
--to become one of the prime movers of harmony and unity among Angolans by the reinforcement of ties with other youth organizations;
--to explain the movement's doctrine of revolutionary struggle;
--to recruit followers;
--to take charge of the re-evaluation and the spread of national culture.

This is how the MPLA perceives the historical growth of our situation and the context within which we find our seminar. You are the strength of the future. You must remain united around the vital need to liberate our common fatherland. I am certain that you will not fail in your revolutionary duty to contribute all your energies this week to a better understanding among yourselves and to disentangling the paths that must necessarily lead to our national understanding.

LONG LIVE ANGOLA!
LONG LIVE THE YOUTH OF ANGOLA!
FOR A SINGLE OBJECTIVE, A SINGLE PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION!

* * *
The FDLA and Unity
by
Agostinho Neto
[Neto's important press conference was disseminated by the Frente Democrética para a Libertação de Angola as "Conferência de Imprensa do Dr. Agostinho Neto," in Léopoldville on July 10, 1963.]

The Frente Democrática para a Libertação de Angola (FDLA) has just been created. It includes the Movimento Nacional Angolano (MNA), the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the NGWIZAKO-NGWIZANI 6. Kongo (NGWIZAKO), and the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA). All these nationalist organizations, among them a trade union, after almost two months of negotiations agreed to unite in a democratic coalition, adopting a common policy for the liberation of our country, but maintaining the personality of each organization. The organizations integrated into the FDLA are grateful to the government of the sister Republic of the Congo for the welcome and hospitality it has given us and for its permission to conduct our political activity here. We declare that we will keep our activities within the strict framework of the law and that we will respect the laws of the country that welcomes us.

The agreement at which the nationalist organizations arrived was based on the following fourteen principles:
1) Complete liquidation, by all available means, of Portuguese colonialism in Angola.
2) Consolidation of national independence, through a policy of nonalignment.
3) Struggle against all forms of neocolonialism.
4) Establishment in Angola of a democratic regime, in which the fundamental rights of man will be guaranteed.
5) Admission into the Frente of all organizations wishing to join it...
6) Intensification of both the armed and diplomatic fights.
7) Formation of a Political Council, which must approve all opinions issued in the name of the Frente.
8) Formation of a single liberation army under a single military command.
9) Formation of a single organization for social assistance and for the education of the masses.
10) Condemnation of fratricidal fighting and of all manifestations of tribalism and religious and racial intolerance.
11) Development of the spirit of brotherhood and mutual assistance among Angolans of all social classes.
12) Constant defense of national unity and of the territorial integrity of the country.
13) Solemn and active dedication to the realization of African unity, in the spirit of the Charter of Addis-Ababa.
14) Respect for the personality of each organization belonging to the Frente.
This FDLA aids in the gathering together of Angolan nationalists, in obtaining collaboration in the fight against Portuguese colonialism, and in organizing the masses in the interior and outside our country. This FDLA will not oppose any other nationalist organization and should actively try to achieve the union of all of them in a single coalition. This Frente is ready to negotiate immediately and unconditionally with nationalist organizations in order to reach an agreement. More concretely, the FDLA is ready to negotiate immediately and unconditionally with the Frente Nacional de Libertação Nacional (FNLA), made up of the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA), in order to form a single coalition.

As for the Governo Revolucionário Angolano no Exílio (GRAE), its recognition by the Congolese government allows us to believe that the latter, after the historic Conference of Addis-Ababa, tried to place in the hands of Angolan nationalism a useful instrument for accelerating the decolonization of Africa. This GRAE will be able to contribute to the resolution of the present problems of our struggle. It is desirable that this Governo, recognized by the Congolese government, be given sufficient and necessary representation for it to be recognized by all African states and, principally for it to make itself known to all Angolans. We wish to say that the integration of the representatives of the FDLA into the GRAE is necessary. We also wish to say that the FDLA is ready to participate in the GRAE.

The Conference of Heads of State in Addis-Ababa proclaimed the unity of Africa and prepared the essential bases for the establishment of the common lines needed for a concerted policy. From the resolutions of this Conference came the decision to aid still dependent nations to free themselves of the colonial yoke. That aid can really contribute to the rapid realization of our desire for independence. Our unification is the sine qua non for this aid.

All the organizations united within the FDLA are agreed to uphold the political claims and to demand the immediate concession of independence, by supporting the armed fight. The FDLA feels that negotiation is one possible way of bringing peace to our fatherland. The only condition is that the leaders of the Portuguese policy stop their blind obstinacy and recognize the right of our people to self-determination and to independence. Only then will we speak of negotiation. The FDLA rejects, meanwhile, any solution of a reformist character that aims at deceiving our people and at perpetuating any form of foreign domination. We are certain that the formation of the FDLA will constitute the surest pledge for the strengthening of our struggle and for speeding up the process of the independence of our country.

I. ORGANIZATION

The first of the three documents below is translated from the French in Statuts et Programme, Léopoldville (?), 196?, pp. 1-17. The second deals with the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) split in July 1963, which resulted in Agostinho Neto's formation of the Frente Democratica para a Libertação de Angola (FDLA). The text of the agreement between Neto's MPLA faction and several other smaller groups is translated from the Portuguese and
French versions issued in mimeographed form in Lopoldville on July 7 and July 8, 1963, respectively. The third document includes the statutes of the Corpo Voluntá rio Angolano de Assistência dos Refugiados (CVAAR), an MPLA affiliate concerned with the refugee program in the Congo. The statutes are from a two-page mimeographed statement issued in Lopoldville during August 1961.

**MPLA Statutes and By-laws**

**Statutes**

**Name--Seat--Definition**


**Article 3: Definition:** The MPLA is a political organization comprising Africans of Angolan origin, without discrimination as to sex, age, ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or place of residence.

**Article 4: The MPLA has the following objectives:**

The struggle, with all patriotic Angolan organizations in the largest popular union, for the liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination in Angola and of all colonialistic and imperialistic agreements, and for the achievement of complete and immediate independence for Angola. The defense and fulfillment of the claims of all Angolan social classes oppressed and exploited by the colonial regime, especially the claims of the masses of peasants and laborers who make up almost the entire population of Angola.

**Membership**

**Article 5:** Membership in the MPLA is open to all Angolan Africans who approve the plans and statutes and who commit themselves to carry out the policies of the MPLA in their daily activities.

**Article 6:** Each Angolan belongs to a group designated by two of its members approved by the Group Assembly and sanctioned by the Planning Committee.

**Structure and Organization**

**Article 7:** The Group is the basic organizational unit of the MPLA.

**Article 8:** The organization of the MPLA contains the following levels: Nation, Zone, District, and Locality.

**Article 9:** The national level has an Executive Committee. The Zone, District, and Local levels will each have a Planning Committee.

**Article 10:** The Congress is the supreme body of the MPLA.

**Article 11:** The Executive Committee is elected by the Congress of the MPLA. The Planning Committees of the Zones, Districts, and Localities are elected, respectively, by the Conferences of Delegates of the Zones, the Districts, and the Localities.

**Article 12:** The Executive Committee and the Planning Committees are responsible to the respective superior executive bodies, in their sphere of action, for
carrying out the resolutions of the superior bodies and for the practical application of MPLA policies.

Duration of Authority of the Committees at the Different Levels

Article 13: The Congress of the MPLA decides, according to the circumstances at the time, the duration of the authority of the Committees at the different levels.

Method of Work

Article 14: The method of work of the MPLA is based on the following principles:
a) Spirit of democracy;
b) Unity of action;
c) Spirit of responsibility;
d) Criticism and self-criticism;
e) Mutual assistance.

Finances

Article 15: The resources of the MPLA come mainly from assessments and subscriptions of members, and also from donations.

Omissions

Article 16: Omissions from the present statutes are resolved by order of departments:
a) By the General Internal By-laws of the MPLA; and
b) By the deliberations of the Executive Committee.

Article 17: The General Internal By-laws of the MPLA are formulated by the Executive Committee and approved by the Congress.

Modifications and Dissolution

Article 18: The Congress of the MPLA alone may modify the present Statutes.

Article 19: In all phases of the development of Angolan history, the MPLA proposes to develop patriotic action, in which the constant objective will be the defense of the rights of the peasant and laboring masses, the well-being and the happiness of the Angolan people.

The National Conference may not dissolve the MPLA.

Only the absolute majority of four-fifths of the member delegates of a Congress may decide upon the dissolution of the MPLA and the disposition of its possessions.

223

At the present time, Portuguese colonialists and their agents are the avowed enemies of the Angolan people. They employ all means to maintain Portuguese sovereignty in Angola and the oppression and exploitation of the Angolan people—violence, assassinations, Machiavellism, military force, political and economic power, obscurantism.

The FDLA

The Frente Democrática para a Libertaglo de Angola (FDLA) is composed of two principal bodies:
1) the National Council
2) the Executive Committee

The National Council

Jurisdiction and Composition

The National Council is the supreme body of the Frente.

a) It established the program and determines general policies, conforming to the principles of the Frente.
b) It sees to the execution of general policies by the Executive Committee.
c) It is composed of six members from each organization belonging to the Frente, nine of whom form the Executive Committee.
d) It is directed by a Political Council composed of a President, assisted by VicePresidents.

The term of office of the National Council is one year.
The Presidency of the National Council, lasting one month, rotates among the members of the Political Council.

The Executive Committee

The Executive Committee is the body responsible for executing the decisions made by the National Council.

It is composed of nine members from the organizations belonging to the Frente.

Composition of the Executive Committee

1) President of the Frente
2) First Vice-President of the Frente
3) Second Vice-President of the Frente
4) Secretary for Foreign Relations
5) Secretary of War
6) Secretary of Finances [the Treasury]
7) Secretary for Information, the Press, Propaganda, and Cultural Affairs
8) Secretary for Social Affairs
9) Secretary of the Interior.

The Chief Executive, President of the Frente, directs the policy of the FDLA, in accordance with the members of the College of Secretaries [Cabinet].

Each Secretary is seconded by an Assistant Secretary who is not a member of the National Council.

Statutes

Article 1: Conflicts arising among member organizations of the Frente are arbitrated by the National Council.

Article 2: The suspension or exclusion of a member organization from the Frente can only be pronounced by the Council after that organization has presented its defense and its justification for the deeds for which it is reproached.

Article 3: Omissions to the present agreement are enumerated in the internal bylaws, to which Article 8 refers.

Article 4: A member organization that decides to retire from the Frente should notify the President of the National Council in writing at least thirty days in advance.
Article 5: The dissolution of the Frente is decided by the National Council with a two-thirds majority of all member organizations.

Article 6: The funds of the Frente come from donations and contributions by member organizations.

Article 7: In case of dissolution of the Frente, funds coming from contributions will be divided in equal parts.

Article 8: Internal by-laws will complement the present agreement.

Article 9: Problems not foreseen in the present agreement and in the internal bylaws will be submitted to the National Council for deliberation and decision.

Article 10: The FDLA is ready to negotiate with all other nationalist organizations for the formation of a broad coalition.

Article 11: The present agreement enters into force on the day it is approved by the assembled delegates from all the organizations.

Composition of the National Council of the FDLA

Movimento Nacional Angolano (MNA) Francisco Mayembe Jos6 Tito
Edouard Tshimpy Jolo Lenge
Alberto Gomes Daniel Nolo

Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) Agostinho Neto Armindo de Freitas Daniel Chipenda Jos6 Aguiar Manuel Miguel Mdrio de Andrade

NGWIZANI k Kongo (NGWIZAKO) Emmanuel Loureiro Antoine Menga Albert Matundu Pierre Milton M'vulu Augusto Monteiro Casimiro Edouardo Milokwa

Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA) Pascal Luvualu
Bernard Dombele
Emile M'bide Dongala
Miguel Luzolo
Henri Kumfundu
Simon Luyindula

Composition of the Political Council Francisco Mayembe .......... President

..................... MNA

Daniel Chipenda ............First Vice-President ........ MPLA

Pierre Milton M'vulu .... Second Vice-President .......... NGWIZAKO
Emile M'bide Dongala Third Vice-President .......... UNTA

Composition of the Executive Committee President ................. Dr. Agostinho Neto ........ MPLA
First Vice-President .......... Emmanuel Loureiro .......... NGWIZAKO
Second Vice-President .......... Pascal Luvualu .......... UNTA
Secretary for Foreign Relations ...Mdrio de Andrade ........ MPLA
Secretary of War .......... Armando de Freitas .......... MPLA
Secretary for Finances [Treasury] Secretary for Information, the Press, Propaganda, and Cultural Affairs .......... Jos6 Tito ................. MNA
Statutes of the CVAAR
Article 1: Name--Corpo Voluntário Angolano de Assistência dos Refugiados (CVAAR).
Article 2: Headquarters--Angola
Article 3: Definition--The CVAAR is a humanitarian and non-political organization founded by Africans from Angola; it accepts the cooperation of all people without any bias concerning one's race, sex, birthplace, political ideas, or religious beliefs.
Article 4: Purpose--The CVAAR has the following aims:
1) To assist the refugees through health teaching and measures, protection of mother and child, and free distribution of drugs, food, and clothing;
2) To fight illiteracy among the refugees;
3) To secure measures to grant and increase the means of relief for the refugees in their present locations.
Article 5: Service--The CVAAR technical aid to the Angolan refugees is entirely free.
Article 6: Budget--The CVAAR resources come mainly from gifts and subscriptions of individuals or groups willing to help, unconditionally, the Angolan refugees.
Article 7: Membership--Everyone can work through the CVAAR, without any bias, if he fulfills the requirements for a good achievement of the CVAAR purpose. Membership requires the approval of the CVAAR Steering Committee.
Article 8: Organization--The Assembly is the highest body of the CVAAR. The CVAAR is led by a Steering Committee of thirteen members, elected according to the CVAAR internal laws; five men of the Steering Committee will form the Executive Committee.
Article 9: Assembly--The assembly is formed by the CVAAR personnel. The Assembly meets once a year to elect the CVAAR Steering Committee and to study its activity reports.
Article 10: Internal Laws--The CVAAR internal laws are formulated by the Steering Committee and approved by the CVAAR Assembly.

Article 11: Omissions--All matters that were not foreseen by these Statutes should be solved by the internal laws and by the CVAAR Steering Committee.

IV
IDEOLOGY
The ideology of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and affiliated groups is traced through a series of documents, commencing with the party program and including statements to the United Nations and the Portuguese
government. Also included are statements on the party's efforts to unify the divisive nationalist ranks.

The MPLA Programs
[Translated from Statuts et programme, Leopoldville (?), 196?, pp. 6-18]

Minimum Plan
The MPLA is fighting for the realization of the following minimum plan:

a) The urgently needed creation of an Angolan liberation coalition that would group together in one large union all political parties, all popular organizations, all armed forces, all eminent personalities in the country, all religious organizations, all national or ethnic minorities in Angola, all African social classes, all Angolans residing abroad, without distinction as to political leanings, wealth, sex, or age, in order to continue:

b) The struggle, BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, for the liquidation of the Portuguese colonial domination in Angola and of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism, as well as for the complete and immediate independence of the Angolan nation.

c) The constant and fundamental defense of the interests of the peasant and laboring masses, the two most important groups in the country, who, together, make up almost the entire population of Angola.

d) Its alliances with all progressive forces in the world, in order to win the sympathy and the assistance of all peoples for the cause of the liberation of the Angolan people.

Major Plan
The MPLA is fighting for the realization of the following major plan:

I. Complete and Immediate Independence:
The liquidation in Angola, BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, of Portuguese colonial domination and of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism.

A fight in common with all Angolan patriotic forces, in a vast popular movement, so that the Angolan people may attain power and establish a republican, democratic regime based on total independence.

Abolition of all privileges granted by the colonial regime to the Portuguese and other foreigners.

/ Sovereignty of the Angolan state will belong entirely and solely to the Angolan people, without distinction as to ethnic origin, class, sex, age, political leanings, religious beliefs, or philosophical convictions. The Angolan nation will have the sacred and inviolable right to decide its own future, in the political, economic, diplomatic, military, cultural, and any other field.

Revision of the Angolan position in all treaties, agreements, and alliances to
which Portugal has committed the country without the free consent of the Angolan people.
A popular union to liquidate all attempts at imperialist aggression and all acts and maneuvers designed to impair the independence, sovereignty, unity, or territorial integrity of Angola.
Establishment of peace in Angola, based on a regime of social justice and on the recognition by other countries of the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola.

II. National Unity:
To guarantee the equality of all ethnic groups in Angola, to reinforce the union and the brotherly assistance among them.
To oppose resolutely any effort to divide the Angolan people.
To create a situation allowing the return of hundreds of thousands of Angolans who were obliged to exile themselves because of the colonial regime.
To allow autonomy in regions where national minorities live in dense groups and have an individual character.
Each national or ethnic minority will have the right to use its own language, to create its own writing, and to preserve or renew its cultural patrimony.
In the interest of the entire Angolan nation, to instigate and develop economic and social solidarity, as well as normal relations—economic, social, and cultural—among all autonomous regions and all national or ethnic minorities in Angola.
To guarantee Angolan citizens freedom of movement throughout the national territory.

III. African Unity:
Total solidarity with all African peoples who are fighting for their complete independence, especially with the peoples and political movements fighting Portuguese colonialism.
Contribution to the unity of all peoples of the African continent based on respect, liberty, dignity, and these peoples' right to political, economic, and social progress.
Union of African peoples based on a freely expressed popular will and on democratic and peaceful methods.

IV. Democratic Regime:
A republican, democratic, and secular regime for Angola.
The guarantee of freedom of expression, of conscience, of worship; freedom of the press, of assembly, of association, of residence, of communication, etc., for all Angolans.
Each Angolan citizen—without distinction by nationality or ethnic group, sex, social category, cultural level, profession, wealth, religious beliefs, or philosophical convictions—will enjoy the right to vote at the age of eighteen and the right of eligibility [to hold office] at the age of twenty-one.

A electoral regime based on universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.

The Assembly of Angolan peoples will be the supreme organ of legislative power of the state.

The Assembly of Angolan peoples will be set up by general free elections. In these general free elections, legal political parties will be able to present their candidates either on a common list or separately.

The Assembly of Angolan peoples will work out the first constitution of the Republic of Angola.

All members of the Assembly of Angolan peoples will enjoy parliamentary immunity.

The Assembly of Angolan peoples will designate a coalition government to effectively reinforce union among national or ethnic minorities, different regions in the country, different social classes and different political parties, and to express the will of the nation in favor of liberty and progress for Angola and against political, economic, territorial, or cultural bonds with foreign interests.

The government of the Republic of Angola will be the supreme organ of executive power of the state.

The government of the Republic of Angola will derive its power from the Assembly of Angolan peoples and will answer for its policies to this Assembly.

Each autonomous region will have the right to adopt methods suited to its conditions, but not contrary to the general welfare of Angola. Africanization of staff and all administrative machinery of the country.

Guarantees of protection, according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for all foreigners who respect the laws enforced in the country.

V. Economic Reconstruction and Development of Production:

Development by stages and organized planning of the Angolan economy. Transformation of Angola into an economically independent country, industrial, modern, prosperous, and strong.

Development of agriculture, with special emphasis on the liquidation of monoculture, on the progressive increase of agricultural productivity, and on the progressive mechanization of labor in the fields.

Creation and progressive development of state commercial and industrial enterprises, of buying and selling cooperatives, and of production cooperatives.

Progressive creation of heavy and light industries for the production of articles of common consumption by the people.

Exploitation by the state of energy resources in the country.

Restoration and development of traditional African industries.

Abolition of privileges given by the colonial regime to Portuguese economic enterprises and to other foreign enterprises.

Development of means of communication and transportation.

Protection of private industry and commerce.
Encouragement of private industries and commerce useful to the economy of the state and the life of the people.
Enterprises exploited by foreigners will have to conform to the new laws in force in Angola.
Protection of economic enterprises exploited by foreigners, which are useful to the life, to the progress, and to the reinforcement of the true independence of the Angolan people.
Intensive development of economic relations between towns and rural areas, to obtain the progressive amelioration of living conditions in the country and the elevation of living standards for the peasants.
Effective implementation of a policy that considers the interests of both employees and employers.
Creation of a National Bank and a national currency. Avoidance of inflation and the establishment of a stable currency.

State control, in the interest of all the people, of Angolan foreign commerce.
Revision of Angola's so-called debt to Portugal. To combat the deficit of the commercial balance of Angola. To balance the receipts and expenditures of the country.
Abolition of the fiscal system instituted by the Portuguese colonialists and the creation of a new, just, fiscal system, both rational and simple.
Adjustment and stabilization of prices.
Fight against speculation.
VI. Agrarian Reform:
Initiation of agrarian reform to lessen injustices, to liquidate the private monopoly on production of consumable agricultural products, and to establish the principle that land belongs to the one who farms it.
Nationalization of land belonging to adversaries of the popular movement for complete, immediate independence for Angola, and of land belonging to traitors and declared enemies of the independent, democratic Angolan state.
Definition of the limits of private rural property, keeping in mind the agrarian situation of each locality.
After the revision of ownership titles, purchase by the state, at a fair price, of lands in excess of the limits established by the law.
Distribution of land to landless peasants and to those who do not have sufficient land.
Beneficiaries of legally divided expropriated lands will not have to pay either the former owners or the state.
The protection of rights won by the peasants during the popular struggle for Angolan independence.
VII. Social Policy of Justice and Progress:
State protection of the rights of laborers, of peasants, and of all social classes that are actively defending the independence of Angola, the sovereignty and the unity of Angolan people, and the territorial integrity of the country.
Immediate abolition of forced labor.
Respect for the effective independence of labor unions and legal organizations of workers. 

Institution of an eight-hour work day and progressive application of the principle of new laws protecting laborers. 

State establishment of a minimum wage for laborers and rigorous application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. Abolition of all discrimination by sex, age, or ethnic origin. 

Protection of the churches, of places and objects of worship, of legally recognized religious institutions. 

Complete equality of rights, without distinction by sex, on all levels--political, economic, social, and cultural. Women will have exactly the same rights as men. 

State assistance to women in childbirth and to children. 

Application of social assistance. Assistance to all Angolan citizens who are destitute victims of illness or involuntary unemployment, or who are suffering from old age or invalidism. 

Progressive elimination of unemployment. Guarantees of work to laborers, employers, public officials, and youths who have finished their studies. 

Special assistance to all made invalid by their active participation in the fight for Angolan independence. Assistance to the families of those who will have died for the Angolan nation. 

VIII. Development of Education and Culture: 
Elimination of colonialist and imperialist education and culture. Vigorous educational reforms. Development of education and culture in the service of liberty and peaceful progress for the Angolan people. 

Vigorous and rapid efforts against illiteracy throughout the country. 

Public education authorized and directly guided by the state. 

Effective, progressive, and compulsory, free primary education. 

Development of secondary, technical, and professional training. Creation of higher education. 

Establishment of cultural relations with foreign countries. Formation and training of technical staffs necessary for the construction of the country. 

Encouragement and improvement of the sciences, technology, letters, and the arts. 

Rural institutions to provide effective and sufficient medical and sanitary assistance to the peasant populations. Balanced development, at the national level, of services for medical and sanitary assistance. 

Abolition of prostitution and alcoholism. 

Stimulation of and assistance for progressive youth activities. 

Encouragement and protection, throughout the country, of physical culture. 

IX. National Defense: 
Creation of an army of national defense, with sufficient troops, intimately tied to the people and entirely commanded by Angolan citizens. 

Immediate, qualified arming, equipping, and training of the army. Establishment of a new method of military and political instruction for the army and uniformity of this instruction. Establishment of democratic relations between officers and

X. Independent, Peaceful Foreign Policy:
Establishment and maintenance of diplomatic relations with all nations in the world, based on these principles: mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in domestic affairs, equality and reciprocity above all, and peaceful coexistence.
Respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Nonalignment with military blocs.
Special "good neighbor" relations and collaboration with nations bordering Angola.
Protection of Angolans living abroad.

* * * *

Appeal to the United Nations
by
Mário de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz
[This appeal was issued by the Movimento Popular de Libertaggo de Angola (MPLA) on September 13, 1960. Excerpts from the eight-page mimeographed statement are given below. He attempts to demonstrate that as a member of the United Nations Portugal has violated the spirit of the U. N. Charter. ]

It is common nowadays to say that African political awakening has committed the European powers to a program of decolonization in black Africa. We are in an epoch that is witnessing the abandonment of the spirit of domination of one people by another. The facts are there; they are irrefutable.
The national forces of black Africa have altered the position of the colonial powers, who are forced to seek a solution to interracial conflicts in a discussion with representatives of the interests of the African peoples. It is generally admitted that the wind of change which has seized the African continent constitutes in itself a source of new balances of power in our world; the only risk of violent conflict can come from anachronistic oppositions to the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, aspirations that are themselves in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, the present rulers of Portugal have nothing but scorn for those British, French, or Belgians whom they consider turncoats and hawkers of empires. For the Portuguese rulers intend to remain forever masters of those areas that, for the last ten years, they have called the "overseas provinces." In fact it was only under the new Constitution adopted June 11, 1951, that Portugal, in a unilateral decision, integrated her colonies, which had been designated as such until that date.

Although the beginning of Article 133 stipulates: "It is of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out the historic function of colonizing the lands of the Discoveries under its sovereignty." Article 135 of the same constitution proclaims: "The overseas provinces, as an integral part of the Portuguese State, are united among themselves and with the metropolis." It will be observed, not
without surprise, that this decision, made only a few years before the admission of Portugal to the United Nations, was officially excused by the necessity of "not wounding the ear of an international public opinion that was more and more anti-colonialist."

It is scarcely imaginable that a backward and, in certain respects, retrogressive country like Portugal, where the illiteracy figure is as high as 44 percent, still claims to accomplish "a civilizing mission" in Africa and denies to the peoples of Cape Verde, of "Portuguese" Guind, of Sfo Tomé and Principe, of Angola and of Mogambique their right to self-determination.

What is even less imaginable is that the Portuguese representatives to international organizations, on the orders of their government, have sought desperately since 1956 to protect Portugal from the obligations of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter by means of the legalistic trick cited above....

Special laws such as the Native Statute, which affects some 99 percent of the population of these countries, and the Native Labor Code introduce--by their very titles--racial discrimination between the populations of the so-called metropolis and those of what is called "overseas." According to the official definition, natives are, by law, "persons of black race, or their descendants, born or living in Guind, Angola, and Mogambique, who do not yet possess either the qualifications or the personal and social habits required for the integral application of the public and private law of Portuguese citizens" (from the Statute of Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Guin6, Angola, and Mogambique, Article 2).

Portuguese law does not permit to natives living in the framework of tribal organization anything but the usufruct of lands strictly necessary for their settlement and for their culture. A system of forced labor, accompanied by methods inherited from slavery, continues to be practiced at the expense of native populations sold by the administrative authorities to European farmers and companies....

The natives have the right to only the most rudimentary education. On the basis of the Missionary Agreement signed between Portugal and the Holy See, May 7, 1940, native education was entrusted entirely to Catholic missions. Nevertheless, the Portuguese government, in the same agreement, insisted that "teaching should follow the doctrinal orientation established by the Portuguese political Constitution" and that it should be "ruled by the plans and programs adopted by the governments of these colonies"; that since these "plans and programs have as their aim the perfect nationalization" (in the sense of Portugalization, of course) "and moralization of the natives," it "falls to the government, through the intermediary of the educational services of the respective colony, to indicate what technical knowledge should, in each region, preferably be dispensed to the natives"; that "in the schools, teaching and the employment of the Portuguese language should be obligatory."

The figures for illiteracy in these countries surpass 99 percent. Finally, it is not surprising that the natives have not, even theoretically, the right to participate in public life and to direct the affairs of their respective countries. And even the progress of assimilation, of which the Portuguese authorities are so proud, is
laughable: After five centuries of the "civilizing mission," the number of black people considered to be Portuguese citizens and officially designated civilized is scarcely higher than 0.3 percent....

Against the colonial truth, Portugal erects a mystique; against realities, a constitutional dogma. This is medieval casuistry. That Portugal is politically a unitary state, regardless of the geographic situation of her "provinces," and that "all parts of her territories are independent with the Nation"--such affirmations run counter to every known interpretation of the concept of a "nation." Only persons who are blind, self-seeking, or of bad faith can prove a national identity (other than in the statements contained in the articles of the Portuguese constitution) between the inhabitants of the provinces of Portugal and the Bantus of Angola.

Besides, the Movimento Popular de Libertag o de Angola (MPLA) has already drawn international attention to the preparations for war being made by the Portuguese government in Angola (see the communiqu6 attached). Consequently, the MPLA considers that:
1. Under cover of constitutional laws, the present rulers of Portugal are violating the spirit of the United Nations Charter and transgressing against the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. In their acts they do not recognize the primacy of the interests of the indigenous peoples of Africa over those of the Portuguese minority.
2. To maintain their political, social, and economic privileges, these leaders do not hesitate to use methods of massive extermination against populations who only demand their natural and inalienable rights. It is quite clear that such an attitude can have grave consequences, of a kind that will endanger international peace and security. This danger is especially serious in Angola.

It is our duty to draw to the attention of the international organization the repercussions that bloody events in Angola cannot fail to have in this region of Africa, where peace is already threatened by apartheid in the Union of South Africa, not to mention events in the Congo. It seems to us that the complications that have developed in the Congo should, while there is still time, serve as a warning of perhaps even more serious dramas in Angola.

In view of the national awakening of the Angolan people that is channeled into necessarily clandestine political activity, we are of the opinion that it would now be appropriate to invite Portugal to recognize the right to self-determination of the Angolan people as well as that of all the peoples at present under Portuguese domination.

In the hope of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the conflicts that arise between the African peoples and the Portuguese colonial administration, the MPLA calls on the member states of the United Nations to:

1. Consider the "Portuguese overseas provinces" as non-autonomous territories and hence to oblige Portugal to satisfy all the requirements of Article 73;
2. Taking into account the danger of war, which weighs particularly heavily on Angola, to put the question of the territories under Portuguese domination on the agenda of the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Guided by the principles of Afro-Asian solidarity, we issue a special and pressing appeal to the Afro-Asian states that are members of the United Nations to exert all their endeavors to this end.

Because of their colonial position, the African countries under the domination of Portugal will not be able to contribute to the enterprise of African unity. We think that the cause of peace, freedom, and understanding among the peoples will triumph.

* * * *

Memorandum to the African Governments on the Formation of the So-called Provisional Government of Angola (GRAE)
[This document was distributed by the Executive Committee of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) as "Memorandum aux gouvernements africains ... " Léopoldville, April 15, 1962, 15 p., mimeographed. It reviews an attempt to unify divided nationalist forces.]

The Executive Committee of the MPLA has composed this memorandum not so much because of loyalty to the patriotic principles that the MPLA upholds as because it wishes to safeguard the interests of the Angolan people. The MPLA feels a duty to respond in a constructive manner to the concern of the African governments over the division of Angolan nationalist forces. This concern emphasizes the fact that the destiny of Angola must necessarily involve the destiny of all Africa.

On this subject, the MPLA recalls an act that reveals the uneasiness of the African nations as to the future of Angola: during the United Nations' Sixteenth General Assembly, at the start of the Angolan problem, the delegates from our brother nations took steps to bring together the representatives of the MPLA and the Uniao das Populagães de Angola (UPA) and to persuade them to work together. At that time it was lawful for the members of the Afro-Asian group to pass judgment on the Angolan nationalist organizations that, citing most fallacious arguments, hindered the achievement of unity among Angolan nationalists.

The purpose of this memorandum is to:

1. Recall the steps taken toward the formation of a coalition of all Angolan nationalist organizations and the opposition encountered in attempting to accomplish this task.

2. Show the character and the nature, which are prejudicial to the interests of Angola and Africa, of the organizations behind the formation of the so-called Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE) on April 5, 1962.

3. Alert the African states to the dangers inherent in the eventual recognition of the so-called GRAE, which would surely perpetuate division among Angolan nationalists and prolong foreign intervention in the Angolan question.

Therefore, the MPLA, faithful to the rights of oppressed peoples and to the highest principles behind the fight for African emancipation, denounces the anti-
national and non-representative character of that false "government." The MPLA solemnly declares that under no circumstances can it declare approval of the so-called GRAE.

The struggle for Angolan independence is faced with the temporary superiority of the military and repressive machinery of our enemy, Portuguese colonialism. It is faced with the material, financial, and diplomatic aid that the enemy continually receives from its allies. Therefore, the MPLA leaders, established within the country, analyzed the conditions under which the Angolan revolution must be carried out, and, since 1956, have recognized that the strategy must be based on the creation of a united coalition of all nationalist forces.

Furthermore, it has been clearly shown in the spirit of our leaders, as well as in the political texts of the MPLA, that a united coalition, as an instrument of liberation, would aid the people in forging a solid national awareness and would constitute the best weapon of attrition against the repressive forces. The national and open character of such a coalition, its ability to include all the nationalist organizations and to mobilize all the national energies has been seen as the surest guarantee of the success of our cause.

MPLA Efforts Toward Constituting an Angolan Coalition for Liberation

The idea of a united coalition has always played a role in the activities of the MPLA. In press releases, in communiqués to its members, to the Angolan people, and to the United Nations, in memoranda to the heads of state and of governments, the MPLA has unceasingly expressed its willingness to form a united coalition for liberation. One can read, for example, this passage from the memorandum sent to the Conference of Heads of State of Non-aligned Nations (Belgrade, September 1961):

At this stage in the struggle for liberation of the Angolan people, the MPLA considers intensification and elevation of the fight at both the political and military levels as supremely important. But this action must be undertaken through a coalition for Angolan liberation, the operation of which has not yet been worked out with the other nationalist organizations. The MPLA unceasingly appeals to all responsible members of Angolan nationalist movements to hold a conference of unity in the near future. We believe that independence acquired through the present armed conflict and on the basis of a united fighting front will have the best chance of liberating Angola from all foreign domination and from all forms of exploitation.

On February 4, 1961, when armed conflict broke out in Angola, the MPLA, loyal to these principles of unity and having the masses and the leaders grouped together in a vast democratic gathering, decided to intensify personal contacts with the leaders of other Angolan nationalist organizations by presenting to them propositions and suggestions for a conference on unity. Thus it was that, at Ldopoldville in April 1961, two members of the MPLA Executive Committee, invested with full powers, negotiated with the leaders of the UPA, the Alianga dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo (ALIAZO), and the
Mouvement pour la Liberation de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC) concerning a program, agreement, and statutes for the creation of a coalition. The draft of the common program proposed by the MPLA contained two basic objectives:

To fight, using all means, for the independence of Angola, through the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and of all the vestiges of colonialism and imperialism in Angola.

To attain, preserve, and reinforce all the conditions necessary for the full realization of the Angolans' right to self-determination, so they may freely determine their political status and the direction of their economic, social, and cultural development.

The draft of the agreement to create an Angolan coalition for liberation said:

The MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and the UPA, wishing to contribute all their forces to the conquest of independence for their common fatherland--Angola--and firmly convinced that it would be best if this objective were attained by the broadest union of all Angolan patriotic forces so that the independence of Angola may rest upon unity of the people, upon brotherly collaboration among all ethnic groups in Angola, upon democratic order, and upon territorial integrity of the country, have freely decided to sign the present pact:

Article I--The MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and the UPA, having decided to create the Frente de Libertacao de Angola (FLA), whose statutes they have approved in full and without reservation (and which statutes constitute an instrument inseparable from the present agreement), establish the basic principles for relations among all member organizations of the FLA.

Article II--The MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and the UPA intend to consolidate and enlarge the FLA throughout the Angolan territory, in order to obtain within it the greatest and freest adherence of the Angolan popular masses, in order to gather together all the Angolan patriotic organizations, and in order to gain worldwide sympathy for the cause of the Angolan people and an active solidarity of peoples who cherish liberty.

Article III--The MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and the UPA approve without reservation the attached "common program" of the FLA, which aims at uniting all the Angolan people in the struggle for independence, for national unity, and for the territorial integrity of Angola.

Article IV--The present agreement will become effective after notes have been exchanged among the MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and the UPA, announcing that the agreement has been ratified by the proper executive bodies of the aforementioned organizations.

Article V--The present agreement has been reached in Iopoldville on [date not available] of April 1961, and appears in two languages, Portuguese and French, the two texts being equal.

The statutes of the coalition were drafted as follows:

Article I. Name: Frente de Libertacao de Angola

Article II. The Frente, created by the MPLA, the ALIAZO, the MLEC, and
the UPA, gathers together in one great union all political movements, all popular organizations, the armed forces, eminent personages of the country, religious organizations, all ethnic groups and social classes, and Angolans living abroad, without distinction as to political preferences, wealth, sex, or age.

Article M. The objectives of the FLA are:
To attain the immediate and complete independence of Angola, using all necessary means.
To defend and ensure the total and inalienable sovereignty of the Angolan people, national unity, the territorial integrity of Angola, and the exercise of democracy in the political life of the country, using all necessary means.
The MPLA defended the principle that the coalition, created democratically, should reflect a great union of all Angolan nationalist forces. In fact, the MPLA foresaw that the coalition, through its activities, could evolve toward an Angolan government during the fight for liberation. A simple reading of the documents reproduced here suffices to prove the spirit of conciliation, the good faith, the political seriousness of the MPLA. Approval of the coalition's constitution by the nationalist organizations will naturally contribute to the most effective development of the fight of the Angolan people ...

The irreconcilable enemy of the MPLA is Portuguese colonialism; the objective of the battle unceasingly waged by the MPLA is the independence of Angola, to be attained through a revolution that destroys the colonial regime. The MPLA declares that the future independence of Angola, as well as the complete achievement of African unity, depends on unity among the people and among all the fighting forces of Angolan nationalism.

The MPLA denounces the UPA and Partido Democrdtico de Angola (PDA) coalition and the so-called GRAE, not so much because they are a diversionary maneuver as because they attack the unity of the people and the fighting integrity of Angolan nationalism.

The MPLA believes that respect for unity and national independence are the elements necessary to the morale, the rights, and the values of colonial peoples.

The MPLA feels that the need for a government is seen in the present status of the Angolan liberation movement. But the MPLA believes that the authenticity and the legitimacy of such a government must come from investiture agreed upon, without discrimination, by all the Angolan people in order to guarantee representation of the entire nation. In other words, a true government must carry out its nation-wide mandate by making the liberation of Angola the work of all Angolans and not of a fraction of the people, however important they are.

The Angolan nation deserves a government born of popular will, which can thereby guarantee to place itself at the service of the entire nation. The Angolan revolution, whose objectives are the independence of Angola and the inauguration of a democratic regime guaranteeing equality without discrimination of any sort for all citizens of the fatherland, must not be transformed into a secessionist or idealistic civil war.
The UPA-PDA coalition and the so-called GRAE, which sprang from it, being by nature anti-unitarian, discriminatory, and arbitrary, can only perpetuate division among Angolan nationalists and extend the fratricidal fight already begun in Angola by the UPA. The MPLA will fight division among Angolan nationalists under any circumstances.

* * * *

Petition From the Mouvement de Defense des Intérêts de l’Angola
Presented to the U. N. Trusteeship Commission
by
Jean Pierre Bala and Augustin Kaziluki

[The authors presented their petition to the 17th session of the U. N. General Assembly. Dated November 28, 1962, at New York, the petition was distributed by the MDIA as "Petition du Mouvement ... ," Ldopoldville, 1962, 8 p., mimeographed. Founded in March 1961 as a splinter group of the Uniao das Populagbes de Angola (UPA), the MDIA advocated immediate independence but also collaboration with Portugal after independence. Although different ideologically from the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola, the MDIA in the proposal below offers a program for an independent government that is similar to proposals of the MPLA before the war of 1961.]

The awakening of the territories known collectively as the "Portuguese Province of Angola" demands from nationalists aware of their historic role a feeling of increased responsibility for their duties and their charges. Since its creation, our organization, the Mouvement de Defense des Intérêts de l’Angola (MDIA), has always practiced the pacifist policy of open hands with which we wished to prepare a happy future for all. When it became necessary to choose war or to force negotiation, keeping in mind that a war between the "Angolans" and the "Portuguese," would generate misery and anarchy, our party preferred to send an emissary to Lisbon to try to make contact with the representatives of the Portuguese government. In line with our constructive pacifist policy, our organization three times contacted central government authorities at Lisbon through Jean Pierre Bala, President and former Secretary General [of the MDIA], in the hope of finding a compromise on the problem of independence for our country, Angola.

With the same goal in mind, two delegations were sent to Luanda to contact the local government.

Having profited from our sojourn in Angola, we notified the Portuguese government and the United Nations that:

--The problem posed in Angola must be considered in light of the truth.

--Angolans need peace, not war. In place of grief and misery, the Angolans desire their independence in order, peace, and harmony.

In spite of our pacifist and constructive policy of nonviolence and open hands, the leaders of the Portuguese government showed no signs of good will. Quite the
contrary: with no qualms they continue their policy of destruction, for none of their false promises have been fulfilled.

From the height of this tribune we ask the intervention of the United Nations and of the countries friendly to Portugal to persuade it to overcome its stubbornness, to renounce its policy of hesitation, and to devote itself to the noble way of negotiation. We believe that the prestige of Portugal will not be lowered at all.

The MDIA solemnly declares that the Portuguese government alone will bear the consequences of breaking the good relations existing between the leaders of the MDIA and the leaders in Lisbon. We reaffirm that we will place the entire responsibility on the Portuguese government for not honoring its commitments.

Faithful to the commitments made concerning the people that we have the honor of representing, to the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, and to the Charter of the United Nations, we therefore declare the following:

1. Considering the right of the people to decide their own future,
2. Considering that Article 73 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and to independence,
3. Considering the degree of evolution of the Angolan peoples after five centuries of the Portuguese presence in Angola and the legitimate claims of the colonized peoples whom we represent,
4. Considering that the Portuguese government is a co-signer of the Pact of Berlin and of the United Nations Charter,
5. Considering the right of the Angolan people to determine freely the political, administrative, economic, and social structures of their country,
6. Considering that the Portuguese presence in Angola was conditioned by a simple treaty of friendship that aimed:
   --at opening up our backward country to civilization;
   --at ensuring to our peoples political, economic, and social progress, to allow them self-determination and independence in prosperity and peace,
7. Considering the refusal of the Portuguese government to approve and support the political aspirations of our peoples, and [considering] the lack of application in Angola of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man,
8. Seeing the attitude adopted by the leaders in Lisbon toward the investigation commissions sent to Angola by the United Nations,
9. Considering the climate of mistrust that is perpetuated in Angola, a climate that has permitted the outbreak of inhumane acts, which deepen the split between the native peoples and the Europeans,
10. Considering that it is still not too late for a rebirth of the spirit of collaboration that would permit the two peoples--Angolan and Portuguese--to link their destinies "in all liberty" by mutual support during the achievement of their respective vocations within the traditions dear to each.
11. In light of the preceding considerations, our political organization, the MDIA, reaffirms its position favoring total independence of Angola and calls for a round table no later than January 5, 1963, at which the representatives of the people and the qualified leaders of the Portuguese government will determine the timing of the transfer of powers.

Furthermore, we reject the resolutions made by the Overseas Council, which met in Lisbon last October, in regard to revision of the legal framework of all the territories under Portuguese domination. They do not take into consideration the aspirations of the people we represent.

Consequently, we suggest the points listed below, which we consider essential for the upcoming negotiations.

A. At the political level

Angola will be a federal nation provided with solid institutions guaranteeing a real and viable democracy, capable of ensuring order, security, respect for national and international public and private commitments, as well as the protection of persons and goods.

Considering the extension of the territory as well as the manners and customs followed by the peoples of the country, we feel that Angola should have a federal structure in order to ensure a just appreciation of regional questions and to safeguard national unity.

At the level of the present "councils," the existing administrative subdivisions will be retained in principle, while the subdivisions called Districts will be replaced by autonomous provinces, each comprising two or three of the present Districts.

There will be, therefore, six provinces, which may be considered as federated states:

1. The State of Cabinda--one District--chief town, Cabinda
2. The State of Kongo--presently Zaire, Uize, Luanda, and North Cuanza--chief town, Carmona
3. The State of Malange--presently Malange and Lunda--chief town, Malange
4. The State of Benguela--presently South Cuanza, Huambo, and Benguela--chief town, Benguela
5. The State of Bi6--presently Bid, Cuambe, Cabando, and Moxico--chief town, Silva Porto

Each state will have an average population of approximately 800,000 inhabitants. Each federated state will have a State Council, the members of which will be elected by direct vote, and which will have regional legislative power.

Each state's executive power will reside in a team of secretaries presided over by a governor elected by the State Council. These secretaries (non-official) will have well-defined powers. They will be placed at the head of the various services in each federated state.

We envision for each federated state the following positions of responsibility:

1. The Presidency--(State Governor) --elected
2. The Vice-Presidency--(State Lieutenant Governor)--elected--state affairs. A State Court presided over by an Attorney General will have the judicial power in each federated state. Creation of an inferior court as well as other district courts.

Power of the Federal Nation
Since each of the federated states will have its own constitutional rules, patterned after the national constitution, the Federal Republic of Angola will have a legislative power, an executive power, and a judiciary power:

I. Legislative power
Since the Federal Republic of Angola has a dual structure (Nation in its global unity; States with their particular autonomy), legislative power should include:

National Council
The National Council will have priority over the State Councils, which will be elected by universal, direct vote. The president of the National Council should be elected by the members composing the chamber, which is the highest national legislative organ.
The Council of State, which will ratify the national legislation, will be composed of one representative from each state, elected by the State Councils. They will be seated together with the national deputies and with them will form the Parliament of Angola.

H. Executive power
The Executive power (federal or national government) will be implemented by a ministerial team presided over by a Prime Minister. Their prerogatives will extend constitutionally to all matters of federal interest, such as:

1. Foreign Affairs
2. Army
3. Interior
4. Education
5. Justice
6. Economy and Foreign Trade
7. Finances
8. Information and Tourism
9. Labor and Social Welfare
10. Economy, Industrial Production, Mines, and Telecommunications

11. Civil Service
12. Public Works and Transportation
13. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
14. Public Health

III. Federal Judicial Power
The third branch of the federal government, which is consultative and judicial, will include a Higher Magistrative Council or a Higher Judicial Council.
The President of the Republic, who will guarantee the independence of judicial authority, will head this Council. The Minister of Justice, his keeper of the seals, will be the Vice-President of this organ.
The federal courts are:
--Supreme Court
Courts of appeals
Military jurisdictions
The afore-mentioned Council will guide the judicial activities of the Public Minister, the Police Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Prison Service, etc. . . . It is understood that one must add to the above other powers that will be determined by the Constitution of Angola.

B. At the social and cultural level
--Total revision of the labor legislation that is not in keeping with the demands of the modern world.
--Institution of a decent wage by the establishment of a legal minimum wage so that everyone may live decently.
--Revision of the state bank and legislation concerning the minimum wage. This equitable salary policy, exempt from all discrimination, will be complemented by the best possible social security program. We will absorb the unemployed by establishing full employment complemented by a system of indemnification for involuntary unemployment.
We will establish a policy encouraging social investments (cultural circles, dispensaries-hospitals).

C. At the cultural level
We shall combat illiteracy by setting up a system of education permitting every young person to receive at least primary education and permitting the best students to continue on with secondary and higher education. All primary education will be compulsory and free. Rational training of Angolan technicians will be speeded up.

D. At the economic level
Angola is endowed with an economic structure that has a very developed and sufficiently solid basis. Thus there are in Angola:
--Seventeen seaports, the three most important being Lobito, Luanda, and Mogmedes, which can receive ocean-going vessels;
--Five railroads, one of which, the Benguela line, links Angola with Katanga and Central Africa;
--Adequate airports, including that of Luanda, which will shortly be ready to receive the Boeing intercontinental planes;
--A great network of suitable roads.

1. Agricultural production
Angola is an essentially agricultural country and, because of the diversity of climatic zones, all crops are possible on a greater or lesser scale. The principal agricultural products are coffee, sisal, sugar, manioc, palmetto, coconuts, corn,
bananas, etc.... Of all the products, coffee occupies a choice place and represents 45 percent of the total exports. In order of importance, sugar and cotton follow coffee. There are also sugar refineries and textile factories in Angola. The majority of Africans and Europeans in Angola make their livelihood from these agricultural activities. Agriculture is the basis for several industries and for most of the commercial and transportation activities.

2. Mineral production

Although the present government is not involved in the exploitation of minerals, there is diamond mining in Luanda and copper mining in Mavoio (Congo), iron and manganese in Quitota, Cuima, and Cassinya, and petroleum and gold in several regions. These mining deposits, which are a source of revenue for the development of the country, greatly interest us. When our country achieves its international sovereignty, we shall ask for foreign aid in this investment area.

3. Industrial production and other sources of revenue

Besides the agricultural and mineral production, there are other industries in Angola, less important but with good prospects for development, which are established in the principal urban centers. Among these are:

--Cement factories in Luanda and Lobito,
--Beer breweries in Luanda,
--Textile factories in Luanda.

Finally, there are also less important industries such as india-rubber, cigarettes, pork-butchery, dairying, tanning, construction firms, and factories for the extraction and refining of petroleum in Luanda.

Animal husbandry is well-developed in Angola. Cows, cattle, goats, horses, sheeps, pigs, hogs, donkeys, mules, and camels are raised. Animal husbandry is one of the potential sources of wealth in which Angola may take pride. Another source of revenue in the country is fish. Angola's fishing industry is second in size to only South Africa. The principal fishing centers are Mogmedes, Benguela, Baia dos Tigres, and Porto Alexandre, where the ancillary industries are located.

Although the traditional basis of the economy of all African countries in general and of Angola in particular is agriculture and animal husbandry, we believe that the prospects are good for a viable state open to all men of good will. In independent Angola, we will practice the open-door economic policy. Any man of any nationality will be welcome in Angola so long as he respects the laws of the country and does not become involved in the internal affairs of our state. We appeal for public and private investments. To the investors, we promise and guarantee protection for them and their goods. Aid from national and foreign capitals will serve to endow the country with an industrial and agricultural infrastructure permitting it not only to make use of the existing natural resources, but also to benefit the native Angolan, socially and culturally. In independent Angola the system of privilege that is presently in force will not be tolerated. Equal pay for equal work. All forms of discrimination will be banned.

--Considering the continual efforts of the Angolan people to discuss the future of their country with qualified representatives of Lisbon,
--Considering the reticence of Portugal as to the possibility of its granting independence to the Angolan people,
--The MDIA for the last time calls the attention of the Portuguese government to the effort of good will, objectivity, and maturity which the MDIA leaders are making;
--The leaders of the MDIA have shown that they are extremely patient, and they place all responsibility on Portugal in the event that they find themselves obliged to renounce all possibilities of understanding and eventual collaboration;
--The leaders of the MDIA could function in the framework of existing and future relations between our two countries;
--Nevertheless, the Central Committee hopes, this time, to be able, with Portugal, to reach an honorable solution to the fundamental problems of our country and, with the least possible delay, to arrive at concrete decisions that will allow Angola to move out of its present impasse.

First National Conference of the MPLA

[Translation is from the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) pamphlet, Premibre conférence nationale du Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA), Léopoldville (?), December 1962, pp. 9-26. This important document includes the MPLA program.]

I  The MPLA in the Fight for National Liberation of Angola
The MPLA arose from a group of nationalist forces that were fighting within our country for the independence of Angola. The 1956 December Manifesto still left the door open for the proliferation, inevitable in that era, of political movements and groups that did not operate under a unified leadership. At the end of 1959, the opportunity to create a national coalition arose. The various Angolan political units decided to group themselves around the MPLA. But the imprisonment of nationalist leaders paralyzed this attempt. A delegation of the MPLA with residence outside Angola assumed the task of giving an international dimension to the Angolan question, in spite of the difficulties encountered in the attempts to promote union among nationalist forces within Angola. It is an incontestable fact that the leaders of our organization are concerned with providing the struggle for liberation with a major program to follow during the phase of independence. It is no less true that the Movement suffered from the lack of guidelines for action at that moment in the fight for national liberation. To apply strictly the objectives of the major program, it was necessary to create an organized framework of political doctrine. Only a political doctrine will permit MPLA workers to dedicate themselves to the realization of the objectives that we assigned ourselves. Such a doctrine, forged in and leading to action, is the best guarantee against easy recourse to ideological polemics among some and sectarianism among others.

1. Colonial oppression and national resistance
In examining any aspect of the Portuguese colonial presence in Angola, one discovers that all sectors of the country's population contributed to increasing the
prosperity of a minority of colonists, to the detriment of the most elementary needs of Angolans. From the economic standpoint, for example, what characterizes Angola is the existence of a capitalist sector, dominated by the colonists and by the capital from international monopolies, and the existence of a traditional African sector, poor, pre-capitalist, and deprived of a means of growth. The majority of cultivated lands, all branches of industry, big business, 90 percent of small business, banks, and financial capital belong to the capitalist sector. Agricultural exploitation, predominantly realized through monoculture, is based on the great plantations and the great concessionary companies belonging exclusively to colonists. Likewise, Europeans hold almost all of the high positions in the colony. The African sector, essentially agricultural, is composed of poor peasants who, after the systematic expropriation practiced by colonialism, were settled on ten hectares of barely fertile lands, whereas the smallest amount of land owned by colonists is three times larger.

The colonial demand for "white immigration," which is growing at an accelerated rate, progressively limits the African. Moreover, the colonial administration obliges the Angolan peasants to participate in the exportation of certain products; the peasants devote themselves to raising crops that they sell, under administrative coercion, at a price free from competition, fixed by the monopolistic enterprises.

Thus, on February 4, 1961, groups of patriots led by MPLA workers attacked the military and civil prisons in which the leaders of Angolan nationalism were being held. That event brought about the decision of the peasants in Northern Angola to revolt on March 15 of the same year. The peasant masses in the districts of Congo, Malange, North Cuanza, and South Cuanza, using only rudimentary weapons, succeeded in liberating a portion of their territory. But the lack of military and political preparation of those peasants; the lack of constant political recruiting on the part of nationalist organizations; the lack of weapons and of ammunition; the influence of racist, tribalistic propaganda of certain Angolan political parties in some combat zones— all these factors, aggravated by the division of Angolan nationalism, permitted the colonial army to organize a counteroffensive and to reoccupy most of the commercial and administrative centers.

2. Colonial reformism
The armed fight waged by the Angolan people and the international isolation of Portugal led Salazar's government to introduce certain modifications into the colonial policy. These "reforms" were, in fact, designed to find a solution to the grave economic and political problems that arose with the outbreak of war in Angola, as well as to satisfy the needs of Portugal's allies. To meet the manpower needs resulting from the flight of the rural population to the forests or to the Congo, the Portuguese colonialists organized "psychosocial campaigns," which were especially designed to "clear the land." The "Native Statute" was abrogated but without any amelioration of the social condition of the Angolans. The same was true for the new code on rural labor ....
3. Unity of Angolan nationalism
An essential point in our policy remains the appeal for unity among Angolan nationalist forces. At each important step in the fight for national liberation, these appeals have been renewed. We have let no opportunity pass for introducing a dialogue with the leaders of the various fighting Angolan political groups. If police repression had not restrained the nationalist movement in our country, the emergence of a coalition united around the MPLA would have become a reality in the first months of 1960. Although it is true that at that time fusion of nationalist Angolan movements faced no obstacles within Angola, problems arose in other countries in which Angolan emigrants were established; namely, in the Republics of the Congo (Léopoldville and Brazzaville). Aware of the fact that division among nationalist forces could endanger the success of the fight for national liberation, the MPLA launched a campaign to create a united coalition of all political movements around a minimum program of fighting against Portuguese colonialism.

During the second All-African People's Conference held in Tunis in January 1960, two MPLA leaders and the chief Unigo das Populações de Angola (UPA) leader signed an agreement of principle, establishing the necessity for coordinating the fight against Portuguese colonialism. In December of the same year, the first "Appeal for Unity" was sent by the MPLA to all the organizations. Since the outbreak of armed fighting, we have intensified personal contacts with leaders of other political groups, hoping to convocate a Conference on Unity. MPLA workers and international groups were largely informed of the measures we took toward that end. The plans for agreement and the program and statutes of a coalition were submitted and discussed, especially with the leaders of the Aliança dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo (ALIAZO), the UPA, and the Movement pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC). In spite of pressure from several African governments, the UPA never took steps toward a discussion of concrete possibilities for the realization of a coalition. Quite the contrary, the formation of the UPA and the Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA) coalition, which aimed at excluding the MPLA, as well as the UPA attitude during the meeting last August, confirmed the spirit of intransigency and the partisan character of the UPA.

Our position is clear: We are for the organized formation of a united coalition on the basis of a minimum program of fighting for national independence, worked out by common agreement. Within this coalition, the MPLA will keep its political personality.

4. The Angolan problem abroad
The MPLA has tried to reflect the growth of the Angolan problem in all its aspects through its diplomatic activity. Denunciation of the colonial system in the framework of the Portuguese fascist regime, the defense of a policy in accord with popular aspirations, and the search for wide support of the fight for national liberation have guided the MPLA missions abroad.
First, our manifestations of solidarity with nationalist movements fighting Portuguese colonialism dated from 1958, with the creation of the Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC); later, of the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional das Colónias Portuguesas (FRAIN); and finally, with the organization born at the Conference of Casablanca held in April 1961—the Conferencia das Organizagões Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP)....

5. General orientation
The MPLA, a movement that fights basically for the fulfillment of the claims of the popular masses, has special responsibilities in its orientation toward the masses. Constant devotion and necessary courage can be demanded of its leaders, to place it in the front ranks of the fight for independence and to equal the level of the people's sacrifices for the total liberation of Angola. Resistance must be intensified in all areas and by all means. Since peasants constitute the most exploited and largest social class in Angola, the MPLA must see that they are sufficiently represented in the management of the Movement and in the groups that are waging the battle within the country.

The fundamental objective of our revolution must be the fulfillment of the aspirations of the workers, especially of the peasant masses. The MPLA will be able to play its role as the vanguard Movement only when it can work out a plan of action, guided by a just appreciation of all the elements comprising Angolan society. The experience of countries that have recently achieved their national independence shows that our revolution cannot be the expression of just one class. The future of independent Angola depends on an alliance of all national forces. At this stage of the fight for national liberation, our Movement must bring about this alliance based on a program that satisfies the aspirations of the productive masses, to make it the basis for the revolution. All the conditions used until now by the colonialists to dominate the Angolan people must be completely eliminated from our country. The MPLA is trying to revive the cultures and traditions of Angola, for they arouse a unified spirit of resistance against Portuguese colonialists.

The MPLA is fighting against racial and religious intolerance, tribalism, and regionalism. Fighting among brothers must clearly be denounced as a factor aiding Portuguese colonialism in its campaign of genocide. Collaboration of all Angolans in the fight must constitute one of the conditions on which national unity is forged. Only national unity will be a sure guarantee of the preservation of Angolan independence against attacks by political and economic forces that, at this precise moment, are trying to divide our territory and are trying also to ensure their domination over the various sectors of the Angolan economy.

255
It is evident that the economic potential of Angola can be utilized only when the Angolan state has the capital and technicians to begin its exploitation. There are few Angolans with sufficient capital to invest in the economy of the country and to satisfy the needs and possibilities of economic development. Although resorting, in a first phase, to foreign investments, the MPLA will seek to oppose
financial investments and technical assistance that could compromise the political
and economic freedom of the country. Respect for the life and possessions of the
Portuguese, as well as of other foreigners, depends on their attitude during the
fight for national liberation.
In independent Angola, there will be room for all ethnic groups, all religious
beliefs, and guarantees for ethnic minorities, who, by their cultures and traditions,
constitute a specific regional entity....
The type of regime that the MPLA extols for Angola must represent the will of
the people. It must guarantee the people control of power, and it must fully satisfy
their aspirations within the general framework of the republic and the social
democracy. To attain this objective, independence must be won under the best
political conditions. This is why an eventual negotiation with the Portuguese
government must be based on the fulfillment of the following minimal conditions:
a) Recognition of the right of Angola to self-determination and to independence.
National and international sovereignty for Angola.
b) Withdrawal of all armed forces to their original bases.
c) Safeguarding of territorial unity and integrity.
d) Unconditional liberation of all political prisoners and the return to Angola of
all refugees and exiles.
e) Guarantees of the exercise of democratic rights, and liberty for political and
union activities.
f) Setting a date and guarantees for the election of a national parliament based on
the right to vote equally, directly, and secretly.
g) Election of government bodies in all towns and villages.
h) Setting a definite date for Angolan independence.
We are trying not to confuse the battle being waged against Portuguese
colonialism with the Portuguese people themselves. In fact, we encourage the
democratic Portuguese opposition in its own struggle for the overthrow of the
fascist Salazar regime, since such opposition is manifested by actions in favor of
the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and to independence. There
are no organized liaisons between the MPLA and the democratic Portuguese
opposition. Nevertheless, we are always open to discussion and political
confrontation on our methods of fighting. The MPLA appreciates the effort of the
democratic opposition regarding the colonial demystification of the Portuguese
people. Likewise, the MPLA encourages the action of political groups led by
Portuguese progressives born in Angola who aim at neutralizing the aid that the
colonialists are giving to the forces of repression and are ready to fight for the
same objectives as those of the Angolan nationalist movements....

The positive neutrality we practice in our foreign policy conceals no deliberate
ideological choice, nor can it be considered as a blackmailing tactic. Quite the
contrary, this neutrality is realistic affirmation and constitutes the only possible
orientation in a world full of threats, where people still under foreign domination
have much to lose if they engage in the game of competition between the two
social systems. During this phase of national liberation, it is not a question of
involving our policy with either system. The only compromise that we are making
Today is to try sincerely to stop efforts to establish a cold war among Angolan nationalists and to anticipate the complications of international intrigues in independent Angola. We are the beneficiaries of aid from all the countries that are advancing the struggle for the liberation of the Angolan people, without impeding the pursuit of our essential objectives. It is not a question of pledging the future of Angola!

The five principles listed below will guide the foreign policy of the MPLA:
1. Creation of a militant diplomacy that, by its character and by the methods used, will be the reflection of our political and military organization.
2. Coordination of direct action against the common enemy with the nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies within the bodies already created--the CONCP.
3. Reinforcement of our African alliances with the nationalist movements in countries that are fighting for their independence, especially with those of Central and South Africa; condemnation of the Salazar-Verwoerd-Welensky alliance; and increase of our numbers in independent African nations.
4. Reaffirmation of our policy of nonalignment with the policy of blocs.
5. Internationalization of the Angolan problem by the reduction of our enemy's field; effective contribution to the isolation of Portugal on the world scene by active participation in the organization of a diplomatic and economic boycott.

To sum up: By clarifying the fundamental objective of our fight for independence and by defining our positions on national unity, territorial integrity, the conditions governing negotiations with Portugal, or our foreign policy, this policy is meant to preserve the popular content of the aspirations of the social classes that are the most often affected by colonial exploitation in Angola.

II
The Program of Action of the MPLA
The activities of the MPLA never cease increasing.
Within the country itself, the groups are multiplying and the ties that unite the Movement with secretly organized mass organizations are becoming stronger and stronger. In the [District of] Congo alone, there are over 65,000 MPLA workers; militants from the interior and from the frontier are making contact with our mass organizations. The financial contributions from those who emigrated because of the national liberation struggle are increasing; the refugees, aided by the Corpo Volunt-rio Angolano de Assist-ncia aos Refugiados (CVAAR) posts, are gaining confidence in the objectives that our Movement has established. The army, which is being reorganized, has recently increased its effective forces of men and materials and has raised the level of its technical training. In the Congo, the mass auxiliary organizations of the Movement (women, youth, workers) have entered into a phase of steppedup restructuring. Workers are entering into discussions of the problems of the MPLA.
But the Movement's expansion and triumphs were not complete. During the first phase, which is now ending, there were deficiencies and errors that must be acknowledged to demonstrate our political integrity and the respect we owe to the workers, as well as to remedy the present situation. Taken together, the
deficiencies are explained as caused by unforeseen circumstances in the fight for national liberation: a large number of the leaders and the staff found themselves in prisons; the material and technical means were reduced; and the political situation in the Republic of the Congo no longer permits important aid to Angolan nationalists.

In the north, although the idea of national unity won over the majority of the population, tribalism and racism remained serious obstacles to agreement among the patriots of fighting Angola. Effective Portuguese military forces increased steadily. On our part, we have had difficulties in opening up new battlefronts. We did not realize soon enough that the thousands of workers of the Movement would not risk their lives in the front lines unless their leaders were willing to do the same.

Within the MPLA, the army was a distinct body, separated from the political group. The method of labor used permitted negligence and carelessly finished tasks. The rhythm was slow. Work schedules were not respected. The time allowed for the accomplishment of missions was not fixed. There was nobody to control the execution of political directives and of the program of action. Workers did not have an opportunity to discuss, in a climate of companionship and within the constituted bodies, fundamental and daily questions concerning the Movement. The logical outcome of this fact was that the leadership could not be fully aware of the internal problems of the Movement. There was no training of new political leaders at the highest level. Legislation did not correspond to the practical needs of the fight. Thus the statutes and the internal rules were systematically violated. Discipline was not strict. Vigilance was relaxed against saboteurs and enemies of the Movement and of the national cause. Criticism was not timely, and it was not based on the principle of criticism for more solid unity. The prestige of the leaders and the cohesion of the Movement suffered greatly. The authority of the constituted agencies of the Movement was lessened. There was no close liaison between the department of foreign affairs, responsible to the president, and the department of internal affairs, guided by the secretary general. The delineation of powers established by the by-laws had created a dual leadership, which led to duplication of duties and impeded the effective exercise of collective leadership. Such were the principal errors that, little by little, sapped the internal strength of our organization.

Without betraying the principles and the objectives that the MPLA has already established (liquidation, by any means possible, of Portuguese colonial domination in Angola, the attainment of immediate and complete independence, the installation of a regime capable of satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people, especially of the most oppressed and exploited social classes), we must work out a plan for immediate action, based on the experience gained through daily contact with the living realities of our struggle and guided by the following principles:

1. The MPLA is a mass movement. The MPLA plan must mobilize all Angolan peoples in a fight without truce against oppressive colonialism until a regime of social justice and national progress is established.
2. The MPLA is a revolutionary movement. The MPLA plan aims at the complete destruction of the colonial machinery and of all forms of domination.
3. Generalization of active discipline at all levels in the MPLA.
4. Priority of the domestic scene over the international scene. Action outside the country complements the plan that is developing within Angola.
5. Priority of politics over the military. All the problems of the Movement, including those of a military nature, will be judged and resolved in light of the adopted policy.
6. To build in the present the foundations of the future nation. The MPLA will follow a policy of training of staff members.
7. Organized planning of work at all levels. The general lines of the plan embrace two areas in which the fight for national liberation is developing—domestic and foreign—while respecting their single nature.

Action Within Angola

Our principal field of action is the national territory. All the organized planning and all the orientation of the fight must reflect the needs of the Angolan people. The MPLA will have the following immediate goals:
1. To establish the MPLA throughout the national territory, especially in the rural areas. Mobilization of the peasants for the fight under the slogan of AGRARIAN REFORM and of the social promotion of the masses. Both in the past and in the present, it is the peasant masses who suffer most directly from exploitation by the colonial system. That is why they will fight with great courage until they obtain land, which is their basic claim. In Northern Angola these masses constitute the most advanced forces of the movement toward national liberation. The peasant masses must be mobilized and made politically conscious so that they may become vanguard military detachments, overcoming their tribalistic sentiments, their myths, and their prejudices. Agencies of the MPLA established within the country must be the embryos of revolutionary power.
2. To awaken an insurrectional spirit among the people through patient explanations.
3. To use all available means of legal fighting (claims, protests, strikes, etc.) to maintain the insurrectional state of our people. To develop the clandestine struggle in urban centers.
4. To promote a campaign for the mobilization of hesitant Angolans by the denunciation and liquidation of traitors.
5. To develop and support mass organizations.
6. To create among civilians self-defense groups that teach the people to defend themselves and to collaborate with the militants.
7. To create a climate of insecurity in colonialist areas.
8. To create a psychological plan to neutralize the colonists.
9. To develop a psychological plan aimed at persuading Angolans in the Portuguese army to collaborate in the struggle for national liberation.
10. To develop a campaign of explanation within the Portuguese army.
11. To develop a campaign of explanation among the Portuguese people.
12. To create free zones that will constitute bases for attack and political administrative centers for the people.
13. To intensify the armed fight and to raise its level.
14. To develop national awareness.
15. To create a permanent committee on unity, which will take the initiative in promoting the spirit of unity among Angolan nationalist organizations and in keeping the awareness of this necessity always alive.

Action Outside Angola
The problem of Angolans who find themselves abroad merits special attention. Our struggle demands the participation of every Angolan, without discrimination.

The essential aspects of our plan of action are political and military mobilization and formation of staffs in order to fulfill our needs during the two phases of our struggle: national independence and reconstruction of the country.

Action in the Two Congos
The plan to be developed in these two countries fundamentally aims at hastening the return of Angolan emigrants and the formation of political and military staffs.
This objective must be attained in the shortest possible time by the elevation of the political and military level of the army, by the reinforcement of our military positions in the interior and at the borders, by urgent and effective planning for equipping the fighting forces, and by systematic reconnaissance missions into the interior to protect the masses and bolster their self-defense. It is very important to develop a feeling of national unity among our people and to strengthen their bonds with the peoples of the two Republics of Congo.

Action concerning refugees. Our action must include the following aspects:

1. Medical and Sanitary Assistance
Medical and sanitary assistance carried out through our agency, the CVAAR, partially fulfills today the objectives of the first phase, and must be extended by the following:
Adoption of an effective system of information and propaganda in the interior and abroad, designed for the acquisition of funds and gifts.

An increase in delegations of doctors and nurses to the border and the organization of a permanent staff of doctors in the border centers.
Rigorous control over the life and growth of the CVAAR.
Creation of local assistance units, including nurses, teachers, and agricultural technicians.
Training of sanitary technicians adapted to the needs of the armed fight.
Politicizing and militarization of the technical staff.
Official recognition of the CVAAR by international assistance organizations.

Educational Assistance
This is inadequately carried out by the CVAAR. The two great obstacles to the
development of this branch of assistance are the lack of capable teachers and the lack of classrooms.
Therefore, it is necessary to:
Make an urgent immediate appeal to Angolan nationalists to agree to the solution of these problems.
Launch a campaign of information among Angolan owners of unused rooms, explaining the national necessity of putting them into use as classrooms.
Work out an educational plan.
Recruit salaried personnel for teaching positions.
Politicize and militarize the technical staff.

Professional Assistance
CVAAR action has been minimal in this area. We must facilitate work for the peasants and professionals in arts and offices. This can be done by acquiring tools and seeds and taking steps to obtain the land.
The creation of workshops for the young.
The training of agricultural specialists.

Financial Assistance
This means of assistance must be exercised with greatest care and only in cases of obvious incapacity or great illness.
Action concerning emigrants. The emigrant, or the Angolan long established in the Congo, must be incorporated by the following principles:
Strict liaison with refugees.
Instruction in the Portuguese and Angolan languages and in the diffusion of the national culture.
Integration of emigrants into the political, economic, and social realities of Angola.
Contact with Congolese authorities.
Instruction in the French language given to the refugees by the emigrants.
Aid to refugees with respect to lodging, and political and military environment.
Organization of the masses.
Unions: They will be created in the form of workers' leagues to operate clandestinely or, possibly, legally. Their job will be to instill in workers and peasants a spirit of agreement concerning the revolutionary plan of the Movement. Training must be stimulated for trade-unionists who will be charged with reawakening an interest in union questions among the people in order to impede division among Angolan laborers.
JMPLA: Once again our youth are playing a vanguard role in the fight for national liberation. Essentially, they must:
1. Become the motivating power of agreement and unity among Angolans by reinforcing ties with the youth of other organizations.
2. Develop the revolutionary doctrine and fight of the Movement.
3. Participate in the recruitment of staff.
4. Take charge of the spread of national culture and renewal of esteem for it.
Women: Within our Movement there is a women's organization—the OMA—which, in spite of the efforts of our workers, has had limited programs. With regard to this organization, we must take steps toward rapidly recovering the Angolan women for the struggle. The Angolan woman should be mobilized for the following purposes:

- Social and sanitary assistance.
- Education.
- Political and military recruitment.
- Technical and political training
- Participation in the agencies of leadership.

Children: It is not enough to develop only the spirit of brotherhood and companionship among children; it is also necessary to inculcate the spirit of discipline and sacrifice for the people and for equal rights in the revolution. Angolan children must be made to understand the necessity and the finality of the fight for national liberation. Children can become valuable auxiliaries in free zones.

Action Outside the Congo

1. Inclusion of Angolans abroad: MPLA workers abroad must consider themselves entirely at the disposition of the Movement and must be ready to submit themselves to political and military discipline. It is the duty of MPLA workers abroad to:
   - Represent and defend the Movement.
   - Spread information and propaganda on MPLA policy.

2. Representation of the MPLA abroad:
   - Amplification of the foreign network of MPLA representations abroad.
   - Formation of international committees for aid.
   - Participation in international conferences in delegations sanctioned by the executive committee.

3. Centers of Documentation: To establish centers of documentation (historical, legislative, cultural, etc.) of Angola and its people. These centers remain under the foreign representations of the MPLA.

III

Organization of the MPLA

It seemed necessary to structure the MPLA, in response to the demands of the dynamic fight for national liberation, according to the following principles:

1. Creation of simple, global bodies, keeping in mind the areas of domestic and foreign plans of action where the effort of the fight for national liberation is exercised;
2. Generalization of military discipline at all levels within the bodies of the MPLA, in accord with the establishment of a synthesis of politics and the military;
3. Priority of domestic affairs over foreign affairs;
4. Exercise of collective leadership based on individual responsibility.
5. Effective practice of the principle of democratic centralism.

Here then, are the new organic bodies of the MPLA:
1. The National Political Council, the supreme body, comprising seventy delegates, direct representatives of the working mass. Ten members elected by the Council assume the leadership of the control commission.

2. The Executive Committee, composed of one president, two vice-presidents, and the heads of the departments of:
   - war;
   - foreign affairs;
   - staff and organization;
   - information;
   - social affairs;
   - economy and finances;
   - security.

3. The Politico-Military Committee is formed by the:
   - president;
   - the first vice-president;
   - chiefs of the departments of war, foreign affairs, staff and organizations, and economy and finance.

The departments are divided into subdepartments, sections, and subsections:

Honorary Presidium: Considering the need to honor, to raise the prestige of, and to recognize the most famous nationalists who, in Portuguese prisons, are condemned for adhering to the national cause, the First National Conference has decided to enlarge the Presidium of Honor. The National Political Council will nominate the members of this Presidium of Honor.

Basic structure: The Conference has kept the present structure with the following alterations: the District--reflecting the Portuguese administrative division--is replaced by the sector; the region has been created. The basic political structure, which coincides with the military structure, is therefore:

- Nation;
- Region;
- Zone;
- Sector;
- Locality.

By-laws and Statutes: The new Executive Committee formed by the Conference has been charged with preparing the new Statutes and internal by-laws of the MPLA, keeping in mind that the organizational modifications adopted by a technical commission must be approved by the National Political Council.

Elections: The Conference insisted on the principles of individual competence, the spirit of sacrifice, and loyalty to the revolutionary principles as the criteria that must govern the choice of workers for the execution of the administrative tasks of the MPLA.

Appendix
Preparatory Committee for the First National Conference

Agostinho Neto Medrio de Andrade Lucio Lara Eduardo Santos Matias Migueis
Viriato da Cruz Gentil Viana Desiderio da Grapa Manuel Videira Manuel Boal
Domingo dos Santos
Composition of the Delegates
President Honorary
Agostinho Neto
Directing Committee
Mario de Andrade
Eduardo Santos
Lucio Lara
Matias Migueis
Deolinda de Almeida Domingos F. da Silva
José Miguel
Graca Tavares
Desidério da Graga
Georges Manteyas Freitas
José Bernardo Domingos
João Vieira Lopes
Viriato da Cruz
National Political Council
Amdricio Boava Manjila Jorge Jordo Aguiar Manuel Lima Francisco de Assis Machado
Kukia André Gentil Viana
Preparatory Committee
Manuel Videira
Domingos dos Santos
Manuel Rodrigues Boal
* * * *

Meeting Between the FNLA and the MPLA
[The following exchange took place in Lopoldville on August 5, 1962, and the record of it was distributed jointly by the two parties in mimeographed form.]
It is exactly 10:45 a.m., in the hall of the BUBETTA, situated at the corner of Cabinda Avenue and Wangata Avenue. The following members of the Frente Nacional de Libertagdo de Angola (FNLA) and the Movimento Popular de Libertagdo de Angola (MPLA) take their places:.....
Dr. Neto begins by saying:
My dear brothers, we have come together here to find a way to bring us together, to unite our forces, because this period through which our country is passing is extremely serious and decisive for the future of the entire Angolan people. We know that our valiant people are carrying on a life and death struggle against Portuguese colonialism. We also know that some of our brothers are now in Portuguese prisons; others have been killed in cold blood.
[The knowledge that this period is critical] inspired those who fought and died for the liberation of our martyred country.
(A minute of silence is observed by the two delegations, and then Mr. Neto continues.)
Perhaps you know the representatives who are here from the MPLA (he presents each of them). On our part, we would like to know the authority of your delegation... Can we undertake real discussions here, or will everything have to be submitted to your Assembly for ratification?

MATUMONA (FNLA): We are happy to have you with us today, Dr. Neto, and without delay, in the name of the FNLA, I wish to present our delegation to you (this is done). And now to proceed with the agenda, I turn the floor over to my friend Savimbi.

SAVIMBI (FNLA): We are very glad to have with us Dr. Neto, one of the renowned fighters for the liberation of our dear country who was imprisoned. At yesterday's meeting of our National Council, I was asked to present you, Dr. Neto, with our warm greetings upon the occasion of your return to your Angolan brothers in the fight for liberation. I have been chosen to be a spokesman for our delegation today, along with my brother, Matumona, chief of our delegation. We have been given full authority to act in the name of the FNLA. But my friends in the Front [FNLA] have also

asked that before proceeding to the discussions, the following points be clarified:  
1. The signature of Mr. M. Matias is not the same on the three letters (the first two addressing separate invitations to the Unito das Populações de Angola (UPA) and the Partido Demócrata de Angola (PDA) and the last inviting us in our capacity as members of the FNLA).

(Dr. Neto examines the three letters, compares them, and notes that the signature of the last letter is not that of M. Matias, and says: "When the letter had to be signed, Mr. Matias was absent and Mr. Graga Tavares signed it instead.")

2. If the MPLA has asked Dr. Neto to preside over the delegation of the MPLA, does it consider this meeting as taking place with the FNLA or with the UPA and PDA as separate parties?

3. Is the delegation of the MPLA duly empowered, in view of the absence of Messrs. Mário de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz (this absence has led us to leave out Messrs. Holden and Kounzika)?

DR. NETO (MPLA): The MPLA delegation, as I have already explained, has full authority to act in the absence of certain members of the Executive Committee. I wish to add that all the members of the Executive Committee of the MPLA enjoy the same prerogatives. Also, the letters were first addressed to the parties separately, and then to the FNLA. We found that addressing ourselves to the parties instead of to the FNLA endangered the chances of our being able to meet, and we therefore resolved to deal directly with the Front in order to arrive at an... agreement...

MATUMONA (FNLA): Does this mean that the MPLA recognizes the FNLA? DR. NETO (MPLA): Let me recall that we recognize that the FNLA is a reality because, had we not done so, we would have endangered the possibilities of our getting together. We know that we are communicating with the FNLA as such. But there is one thing I would like to know: Do the parties that have united recognize the authority of the FNLA or are decisions of the FNLA still contested by the two parties?
MATUMONA (FNLA): The problem doesn't exist: It was precisely to get that idea out of your minds that we insisted on your writing to the FNLA and not to the parties individually.

DR. NETO (MPLA): We are here to pursue the idea conceived by Dr. Nkrumah, who once expressed a wish that the Angolans would form a "united command." Despite the fact that I don't care for the term (command), I wish to summarize the feelings of the MPLA on the following three points:
1. Total fusion of the three parties
2. Simple collaboration between the FNLA and the MPLA
3. Military alliance between the three parties individually or between the FNLA and the MPLA.

We can organize our forces to form a supranational organism by completely fusing our parties (this is what I, myself, favor) or by creating "a single military command." If we are fighting for common objectives and for common reasons, I don't see why we should keep ourselves apart. It is still very early to be divided into different groups, because our struggle is a long one. It was this realization that moved the MPLA to make contact with the FNLA.

SAVIMBI (FNLA): I would like to know if Dr. Neto's [recent] prolonged absence will not hinder the fruitful continuation of our talks since the Dr. is certainly not aware of a number of things that occurred during that period. I would also like to know if you are now President of the MPLA.

DR. NETO: I was arrested in 1960. At that time I was President of the Executive Committee of the MPLA inside the country. It was to avoid being followed and jeopardizing ourselves with the police that the title of Honorary President was given to me. For the time being I remain Honorary President of the MPLA and Mr. Mdrio de Andrade, the President.

SAVIMBI: I followed with interest the differences between the FNLA and the MPLA and would, therefore, like to know if the MPLA recognizes the FNLA despite the memorandum against the Front that was sent to all independent African countries. I would also like to know what its attitude will be in the future vis-a-vis this document.

DR. NETO: My reply on this matter will be brief. The FNLA is not representative, since it groups only A plus B. This does not mean that its existence is not real. It is only representativeness that the Front is lacking, and that we would like to give it by encompassing A plus B plus C.

ZIKI (FNLA): There is a contradiction between what you said at the outset about recognizing the Front...

DR. NETO: There is no contradiction, because the MPLA recognizes the Front, that is, its reality, but not its representativeness. The MPLA does not agree with the leaders of the FNLA when they claim that the Front is the only valid representative of Angola, when at the same time other nationalist forces are not included in it...

MATUMONA: What does the MPLA have to say about its documents adversely criticizing the FNLA, and what attitude will it adopt vis-a-vis these documents now that it wishes to collaborate with the FNLA?
DR. NETO: The MPLA also acknowledges these documents, because other parties have issued similar ones against the MPLA. If we had to take into account accusations formulated thus by one side against the other, I would say that even in prison I suffered from this. But we must forget everything in order to arrive at anything.

JOHNNY (FNLA): But the documents of the MPLA contest not only the representativeness of the FNLA, but also--and this is extremely serious--the representativeness of the political organizations that united to form this Front as well as of the leaders of these organizations, whom the MPLA calls foreigners. These accusations are not of the same order as those which were formulated by other political parties against the MPLA and which were born solely out of political adversity. One cannot understand the entire situation without making a prior analysis. Knowledge of the accusations might damage the MPLA in the eyes of international groups before whom they would like to appear stronger than the other Angolan organizations, when the reverse is true.

DR. NETO: It would be tiresome to go into all the details of accusations, which at any rate, as I have pointed out, have been made by both sides. Let us forget the past.

MATUMONA: I insist on knowing what attitude the MPLA will adopt vis-à-vis these documents against the FNLA when it is asking for collaboration with those whom it does not cease to revile. As for the accusations themselves, the volume of accusations made by the MPLA is greater than those made by the FNLA. We have presented here a document containing very serious accusations made by the MPLA against the FNLA. We would like to see our brothers present any similar document emanating from the FNLA.

AZEVEDO (MPLA): It is preferable not to go into a lengthy analysis of what has been said. Let us first move directly to the formation of a Front, and then we can compose a final communiqué from both sides "erasing" all that has been said or done.

DR. NETO: Let us make the great effort of forgetting everything; the analysis made by the MPLA, the UPA, or the PDA will come afterwards. For the moment the essential task must be accomplished; the rest can be done later.

JOHNNY: Let us admit that this would be the same as building in sand. One doesn't ally positive with negative elements without producing a short circuit. Let us begin at the beginning. I ask the MPLA to retract the accusations it has continually made against us.

DR. NETO: Our reasoning is different, but I think that we must forget everything in the interests of the people, because, after all, we are working for them.

JOHNNY: Then the MPLA knows that in presenting the picture they have of us, it has been betraying the real interests of the people. Okay, that is its final position? Is it now a question of joining the Front, or is a new front to be created...? This is a simple request for clarity, which does not eliminate the necessity for analyzing the offenses committed against us by the MPLA. It is hoped that we can finally start
with a basis of sincerity.
DR. NETO: Our presence here testifies to our recognition of its existence. We only raise a question about its lack of representativeness. It is necessary for C to join A plus B to attain impartiality and representativeness, which the FNLA is lacking. We could keep the old statutes or make new ones.
SAVIMBI: To sum up then, the MPLA recognizes the existence of the Front. The FNLA finds it normal to accept the MPLA in the Front. But the FNLA cannot ignore certain things that could upset the smooth operation of the Front, and it is for this reason that I insist upon an analysis of the documents. Misunderstandings that are not cleared up could give birth to an explosion from within the Front and injure the interests of the people, as we are all aware.
DR. NETO: The MPLA delegation wishes to arrive at one of three objectives:
1. The fusion of the parties,
2. The creation of a basis for collaboration among the parties,
3. The creation of a single military command.
I want to know now whether it is really you who will state the position of the FNLA concerning these three objectives and which one you prefer, or will you have to submit the question to your council!
MATUMONA: We are a delegation, with a mandate to discuss with you, but everything involving decisions must come from the National Council of the FNLA. We will make our report to it, and for the moment I think if we have nothing further to say, we ought to close the meeting.
DR. NETO: I am surprised by the quick decision of my brother (Matumona) to put such a brusque end to the talks when I see that nothing positive has yet been accomplished! Nevertheless, I suggest that before parting, we sign a draft communiqué to be given to the press. Are my brothers of the FNLA agreed?
(After discussions, a draft communiqué was adopted by the two delegations.)
* * * *
Memorandum to African Liberation Committee
of the Organization of African Unity
by
Agostinho Neto
[This document, an appeal for recognition by the OAU committee, was published in English by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in August 1963, at Dakar. Reproduced below are pages 13-18 of the mimeographed statement.]
_ƒ_ Rather than a party, the MPLA is a movement. But it cannot be defined as an ideological, class, regional, or tribal movement. For a free and independent Angola of tomorrow, the MPLA's program includes the necessity to guarantee the exercise of freedoms and rights defined in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the respect of private property, the cooperation of all Angolan social classes within a system of social justice, the establishment of a state with a democratic structure, and function, and a national coalition government that respects the principles of the United Nations Charter and practices an independent foreign policy. The positive neutralism expressed in our foregoing policy does not
hide any deliberate choice of one ideology and cannot be considered as a policy of blackmail.

During this phase of national liberation there is no question of linking our policy to such or such a system. The only agreement that we undertake today is that we will sincerely endeavor to forestall any attempt at initiating a cold war between the Angolan nationalists and to prevent the complications of international intrigues in an independent Angola.

The assertion that the fighting forces of the MPLA are inferior to those of the Frente Nacional de Libertaggo de Angola (FNLA) is devoid of all foundation and does not correspond to the objective reality of the situation within Angola. In effect, and after the general expansion of the struggle in March 1961, two groups have installed themselves among the population in a state of insurrection. One, under the Unito das Populag6es de Angola (UPA), occupies a triangle having as its corners Sqo Salvador, Bessa Monteiro, and Bembe, an area which had been populated exclusively by Angolans of the Kikongo. The other, under the flag of the MPLA, occupies the regions peripheral to Luanda and has large concentrations further in the interior, at Nambuangongo and Dembos.

The Portuguese counteroffensive initiated in the month of April 1961 obliged the population to take refuge in the forests and join the macuis. After a serious study of the new strategic situation, the MPLA, aided closely by the authorities of the brother countries of Africa, adopted and defined some effective and urgent measures, of which the principal ones are:

1. The formation in Morocco and Algeria of a corps of well-trained youth for the guerrilla forces; this corps was assigned to revitalize the maquisards of the MPLA, who were camped in the forest, in order to improve the military level of the resistance. Almost three hundred recruits have been trained in this manner.
2. The formation of a corps of political monitors assigned the task of making the general population as well as the maquisards aware of the struggle in which we are engaged and of creating among them a political consciousness. Already one hundred monitors are working among our people.
3. The establishment of surgical facilities all along the border between Angola and the Congo and the formation of a corps of nurses.
4. The formation of a military command.
5. A request for a military base in the Republic of the Congo. The military camp would be used for training the thousands of nationalists who daily volunteer to serve in the army of the MPLA--the Ex~rcito Popular de Libertago de Angola (EPLA). In spite of their repeated promises, the Congolese authorities have not authorized such a base; the UPA, however, has had one since 1962.
6. A request to the Republic of the Congo for authorization to legally transit arms and munitions to M PLA maquis.

As of now, only the UPA has such an authorization, which has been promised to the MPLA and the lack of which has sometimes obliged us to work under dangerous as well as painful conditions.

The MPLA maintains a policy open to unification of the fighting forces in Angola, in the hope of preventing a fratricidal struggle. Nevertheless, the UPA
has twice ambushed maquis of the MPLA--first on October 9, 1962, and again on April 28, 1963.

Since January 1963, when the MPLA opened a front in Cabinda, the Portuguese colonialists in that area have been unable to rest, thanks to the actions of the maquisards. The forces of the EPLA have undertaken other big battles near the Kwango river in the region of Malanga and Luanda (the cotton zone). Other battles of lesser importance have taken place in the zone near Lobito (central Angola) and P--rto Alexandre (southern Angola). Installed in the forests and mountains, the MPLA maquisards, led by the two hundred and fifty militants trained in Morocco and Algeria together with the two hundred guerrillas trained on the frontier by our military cadres, are the most hardened forces.

We know that the heroic fight undertaken by the Angolan people for their national liberation suffers from deficiencies caused principally by the division among Angolan nationalist groups and by the painful conditions under which the MPLA must work in the Republic of the Congo (Ldopoldville).

The irreconcilable enemy of the MPLA is Portuguese colonialism. The objective of the MPLA's struggle is to continue seeking the independence of Angola through a revolution that destroys the colonial regime. The MPLA firmly believes that the essential condition, not only for a victorious revolution and the future independence of Angola, but also for the realization of African unity, is the unity of the Angolan people and all the fighting forces of Angolan nationalism.

The Angolan nation merits a government of the popular will that, by the process of its formation, could guarantee that it would work in the service of the whole nation.

Reminder on the Angolan Question to the Organization of African Unity

[These excerpts from this Movimento Popular de Libertago de Angola (MPLA) document support the party's bid for recognition. The document, dated February 24, 1964, was issued at Lagos and contained twenty-three mimeographed pages.]

A Setting Apart of MPLA Would Be Contrary to the Supreme Interests of Angola


The MPLA was the first Angolan political organization to command the Angolan people to take "direct action" against Portuguese colonialism; this it did on December 6, 1960, at the House of Commons in London, through a press conference sponsored by the Movement for Colonial Freedom. The MPLA launched the armed insurrection in Angola on February 4, 5, and 6, 1961. Those two events, which marked the first irreversible rupture in relations between Angolan nationalism and the Portuguese colonial regime, confirmed the Angolan people's political maturity and incontestably placed the MPLA at the head of Angola's revolutionary movement. The fact that the MPLA was the first Angolan nationalist organization to develop intense political activity among the Angolan
masses is shown by its having been founded within the country itself in 1956, and by its having been the political organization that was hit the hardest at all levels by colonial repression. Most of the nationalistic people in the colonialist's prisons today belong to MPLA.

MPLA has about seventy thousand card-carrying members and several thousand other members who, because of the necessity to work underground, do not have their cards.... Thousands of MPLA militants are fighting side by side with the masses in all regions where there is war against Portuguese colonialism. Rather than a party, MPLA is a movement. However, it cannot be defined as an ideological, class, regional, or tribal movement. MPLA is a national movement representing, by the composition of its membership, the universality of the Angolan nation. It has always been a democratic movement--by definition and in methods and goals. It is a movement that built a doctrine founded upon experience gained from anticolonialist struggles among all African peoples. Its program for tomorrow's free and independent Angola includes the need to assure the most basic freedoms and rights defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: right to private property, cooperation of all social classes [in a system] based on social justice, right to a state with a democratic structure and function, right to a government of national coalition that respects the principles of the United Nations Charter and has an independent foreign policy [consistent with] African unity.

The MPLA could establish a concrete basis for overcoming the difficulties that, since February 4, 1961, have hindered the nationalist forces' development. We felt that the negative aspects of the insurrection were characterized by the following: a localized resistance, absence of a single command, lack of movement toward political aims, and division within the nationalist movement. It was then necessary to plan for measures that would change the conditions under which the Angolan masses were fighting and that would increase both the political and the military fighting. At the same time, it was necessary for groups within Angola to bear the brunt of attacks by the colonial army and still maintain positive military activity.

Thus the MPLA has speeded up the training of soldiers, utilized guerrilla techniques, engaged the people in political and military activities, and reinforced its organization inside Angola. Moreover, the MPLA has achieved a true mobilization of its militants for the armed fight, established a military structure adapted to the conditions of the struggle, and enhanced its control over the national territory.

Several regional chiefs affiliated themselves with our organization. Clandestine activity is daily increasing in Angolan towns, despite constant arrests. Thousands of MPLA members maintain an active nucleus of resistance in more than fifty villages, using all kinds of weapons and ammunition, which the Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola (EPLA) carries to them in spite of difficulties. Their activity helps to keep most of the colonial army in the northwestern region of Angola. The EPLA has created an operational command that has guerrilla units to train civilians. People from all national levels participate in these units, and the
MPLA has had them trained in Algeria and Morocco, thanks to our brother's solidarity.

Since January 1963, the MPLA has maintained another battlefront in the Cabinda enclave, at the Congo-Brazzaville border. Guerrillas in this region have already proved their military capacity through the battles they have fought against the Portuguese colonial army.

The statement, "MPLA fighting forces are much inferior to [those of] UPA" has no foundation and does not correspond to the objective reality of the struggle in Angola. In fact, after March 1961, two groups developed among the people in rebellion. One of them, under Unigo das Populagbes de Angola (UPA) influence, occupies a triangle encompassed by São Salvador, Bessa Monteiro, and Bembe, inhabited exclusively by Kikongo-speaking Angolans. The other group, under the MPLA flag, is found in the region around Luanda and has its largest inland concentrations in Nambuangongo and Dembos and in towns and some villages in the central and southern sections of the country.

Obstruction of MPLA Activities Carried On in Léopoldville and UPA Fratricidal Activity

Under orders from their leaders, some armed UPA groups have devoted themselves to a fratricidal activity, which the MPLA has denounced several times. Those who doubted the truth of our complaint were given the chance to judge for themselves last April, when the Léopoldville press met the survivors of two MPLA columns who were ambushed by the UPA while carrying supplies to our maquis in the Nambuangongo region. Moreover, it is not only MPLA soldiers who must avoid the fratricidal activity of UPA groups. Women and men coming from the Angolan interior to join MPLA ranks must avoid not only the colonial patrol forces but also UPA groups, because upon falling into the hands of either, they meet the same fate: torture and death....

What the Goodwill Mission Did Not Take Into Consideration

The Goodwill Mission was aware that the Congo (Léopoldville) government had granted to the FNLA a training camp at Kinkouzou and facilities for the transportation of weapons. Yet it did not take into consideration the fact that a promise to MPLA leaders had been made several times by Mr. Adoula....

Undoubtedly, the Mission had a difficult task. From the beginning it faced Mr. Adoula's irrevocable position. At the garden party given upon the Mission's arrival, Mr. Adoula warned its members against any attempt to make him revise his decision. For him "there is nothing but FNLA/GRAE."

Delegates from the Mission warned the MPLA of their difficulties with Mr. Adoula. The Mission chose the easiest way.... The Mission could have worked for conciliation despite the opposition it had found. . . . It could have won the gratefulness of a fighting people who hopes for much from African solidarity.

Since the fight in Angola is both a political and military one, the efficiency of the struggling forces is a function of the degree of politicalization of the military and is dependent on the degree of control over the military forces held by a political organization solidly structured, active, and rooted in the masses. Otherwise, one
does not attain the necessary politicalization of the masses, does not achieve the enthusiastic enrollment of militants and guerrillas. The struggle halts or even retrogresses ...

THE MPLA HAS PROVEN ITSELF A TRUE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. ITS ACTION IN ALL FIELDS OF ACTIVITY IS ABOUT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT WILL ACCELERATE THE DEFEAT OF ITS EVER-PRESENT ENEMY--PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM--AND THAT WILL GUARANTEE THE FUTURE MAINTENANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE CONCERNED WITH THE PEOPLE'S HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING.

ALL ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE THE MPLA FROM THE ANGOLAN POLITICAL SCENE ARE, THEN, CONTRARY TO THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE'S SUPREME INTERESTS AND, THEREFORE, WILL ENCOUNTER A FIRM OPPOSITION FROM THE ANGOLANS AND FROM MPLA MILITANTS.

II

Dangerous Consequences of a Simple Acceptance of the Goodwill Mission's Recommendations

The Angola liberation movement is not only a revolutionary explosion; it is also an expression of the anger and hate of a humiliated people. Its roots, deeply buried, slowly accumulated during centuries of persistent resistance to Portuguese occupation.

Several times the Angolan people stood up against colonial violence and exploitation. If, since February 4, 1961, the manifestations of Angola's desire for national liberation have increased, it is because, for the first time, the Angolan people's struggle is supported by a doctrine, a philosophy of freedom and democracy. Regional political organizations, with a very narrow social foundation and without revolutionary roots and philosophy, cannot attain the goals set by our people. The goals of the battle undertaken by the Angolan people are national independence, happiness, unity, and the integrity of Angola. It is nonsense to think that the Angolans can let themselves reject those goals. Any attempts to or methods used to impose on the Angolan people a "government" that does not result from dynamic struggle can only create conditions leading to the installation in Angola of what is known as "Congolization," a situation in which colonialists are given the opportunity to regain control over a country already nominally independent.

Without comment, we describe here some acts of the Congo (LUopoldville) government that show how the conclusions of the Goodwill Mission and the recommendations of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers in Dakar have favored and are favoring imperialistic intervention in the process of Angolan national liberation:

In March 1963, two columns of MPLA guerrillas were making their way to Angola through a region between L6opoldville and an important zone of resistance for the MPLA forces in Lunda (Angola). They were arrested and
physically mistreated by Congolese government forces and were then transferred, under inhumane conditions, to Luluabourg. Their military equipment and the relief material they were carrying for the Angolans evacuated to the Lunda jungle were seized. All the Angolan money that these columns were carrying was stolen and distributed among the Congolese within full view of our brothers! In June 1963, the gendarmes, under orders issued by the Congolese national security forces, searched the quarters of the MPLA army in Binza-Lopoldville and seized both weapons and explosives. In September 1963, MPLA president, Agostinho Neto, and a member of the Steering Committee, Léucle Lara, were arrested for "using false documents..." since they had passports from brotherly African countries! In the same month MPLA was ordered to pay fines because of the weapons seized in June! Still in September, Luiz d'Azevedo Jnior, the MPLA official responsible for relations with the Congo (Lopoldville) government, was arrested without justification by order of Lopoldville authorities. In October 1963, an armed police force suddenly closed the dispensary of the Corpo Voluntário Angolano de Assistência aos Refugiados (CVAAR). The MPLA headquarters in Lopoldville was closed in November, under the pretext that the MPLA did not belong to the "parties forming the government in exile." On November 22, an armed force acting under UPA instructions entered a CVAAR residence in Lopoldville and brutally arrested the president of the Angolan youth movement, Daniel Chipenda, as well as an MPLA military official, Antônio Condesse. Since November 22, Congolese police and gendarme forces have continued to make similar arrests and to commit brutalities. They have directed all kinds of humiliation against Angolans living in Lopoldville and suspected of belonging to the MPLA. At the end of the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA) Congress on February 4, 1964, the secretary general of the trade union organization was arrested by Congolese security forces, at the request of Mr. Holden.

All these persecutions mean DIRECT INTERFERENCE in the Angolan people's political orientation. All this solidifies the imperialist policy of intervention at Africa's key points.

DAKAR RECOMMENDATIONS CONFIRMING THE GOODWILL MISSION'S CONCLUSIONS HAVE ENCOURAGED AND SEEMINGLY MADE LEGAL ALL THIS BIAS AND DISORDER DIRECTED AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF ANGOLA'S AFRICAN PEOPLE!

Between July 1963, when the Goodwill Mission met, and the present time, when the African states that were represented in Addis Ababa are ready to carry out the Dakar recommendations, some events took place that clearly revealed not only the injustice of driving the MPLA from the Angolan political scene (outside Angola...), but also the inefficiency of the FNLA/GRAE as the "only force fighting for Angolan liberation."

Today Portuguese arrogance increases despite the FNLA's ridiculous and desperate noise about "... thousands of Portuguese soldiers killed in dozens of battles, tanks and war planes put out of order, prisoners taken, tons of bazookas, arms and machine guns seized from the enemy." As a result of the error made in
Dakar about Angola, Portugal became more obdurate in her resolve to keep us--Africans--in the pit where we have fallen. It is true that the collective boycott of Portugal imposed by our elder brethren is effective. That is one of the main victories resulting from Addis Ababa.

However, at the eighteenth session of the U. N. General Assembly, the Portuguese delegates succeeded in initiating talks between the African group and Portugal, during which one segment of our brethren was convinced of Portugal's goodwill whereas the rest, having understood the uselessness of such talks, broke them off. In reaffirmation of our belief that it is up to the Angolan political organizations to discuss Angola's future with our people's oppressor, the MPLA declares its indignation that the Angolan resolution of the eighteenth session was one of Angola's weakest at the United Nations. Portugal knows that the FNLA, incapacitated by its anti-democratic nature, cannot, in any way, lead the Angolan people to victory. Rather, the FNLA will desperately search for a negotiated solution because of the colonialists' relative advantage of force. Such measures would bring about a deceptive internal autonomy or independence of the neocolonial type.

The FNLA's recent statements about the "good settler" are flagrant proof that demobilization is being planned by Holden Roberto's forces. Internally, the UPA (GRAE) is losing the trust of the masses. Its leaders can no longer move freely about in places where the UPA used to be very popular. Its training camp became a place of mutinies caused by tribalism or other biases, which have already caused or led to casualties....

Conclusion
Aware of the realities of the struggle for the Angolan people's liberation, the MPLA General Conference, held from January 3 to 10, 1964, in Brazzaville, in its final statement:
--Solemnly CALLS the attention of the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, and particularly of each African state, to the grave incidents, already witnessed in our liberation struggle, that occurred as a result of the biased and unrealistic choice of the GRAE, a group that is far from being representative of the Angolan people, as the only valid recipient of aid provided by Africans for the Angolan people.
--EARNESTLY REQUESTS brotherly countries and governments to analyze the impact of this situation on Angolan nationalism. Already one notices similar maneuvers in the Congo (L6opoldville) to make southern Africa a center for the plans of large international trusts.
--APPEALS to the governments of the brotherly countries to pressure the government of the Republic of the Congo (L6opoldville) to allow the MPLA to resume its activities there. The MPLA has widely proved to be worthy of the trust placed in it by the Angolan people who feel the MPLA is able to cope with the exigencies of the national liberation struggle.
Aware of its responsibilites toward the Angolan people, who gave it a mandate signed with blood and suffering, the MPLA reaffirms its positions of principles,
THE DAKAR RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT ANGOLA MUST BE REVISED.
MPLA DEMANDS MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. IN SUCH A GRAVE SITUATION, PURELY FORMAL ARGUMENTS MUST NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE REVISION REQUIRED BY REASON!
DECISIONS ALREADY MADE SHOULD NOT RESTRICT THE AID TO BE GRANTED, WHICH MUST BE GIVEN TO ALL VALID ANGolan MOVEMENTS....
Memorandum to the Conference of Heads of State and of Governments of the OAU
[Entitled "Memorandum k la Conference. . . " this eleven-page mimeographed document was distributed by the Movimento Popular de Libertaq~o de Angola (MPLA)

in Cairo on July 17, 1964. Excerpts are from pages 1, 9-11.]
One of the fundamental principles of the MPLA has always been the coordination of its efforts with those of its brother nations, with the aim of eliminating the last retreats of colonialism in Africa and especially the Portuguese domination of Angola. Our policy was rewarded by the historic Addis Ababa decisions concerning decolonization, for, just as the MPLA had always proposed, the independent states of Africa devised a common plan for aid to the movements seeking liberation and combatting colonialism. The question of Angola continues to be the object of particular attention from all worthy African leaders. Meanwhile, the complexity of the Angolan question has prevented complete understanding of it, and there has arisen a delicate situation, which demands from the highest body of the OAU all the great wisdom of which it alone is the trustee. The MPLA has repeatedly presented to the proper bodies of the OAU pertinent questions concerning the status of the Angolan problem. The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAU, held in Lagos on February 24, 1964, was presented with a very detailed memorandum that showed the negative aspects of the attempt to remove the MPLA from the Angolan political scene and asked the OAU to prevent the dangerous consequences stemming from it. The existence of this situation is why the solutions sought until now for the Angolan problem have not been successful in imparting to our struggle the required rhythm and effectiveness, and why the MPLA is sending the worthy heads of state and government of the OAU this memorandum to:
I. Affirm the capabilities and the revolutionary activity of the MPLA, demonstrated during the bloody conflict stemming from the Angolan people's opposition to Portuguese colonialism. 
II. ASK LIBERTY OF ACTION FOR THE MPLA IN ALL AFRICAN NATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN COUNTRIES BORDERING ANGOLA, SO THAT OUR STRUGGLE MAY DEVELOP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR TRUE CAPABILITIES.
The MPLA, therefore, will recall briefly some important facts that will permit
the honorable heads of state and of government of the brother nations of Africa to pass judgment on its principles, its methods, its activities, and on the reception accorded it by the Angolan people.

The MPLA refrains from insisting on judgment of the action and the recommendations of the Goodwill Mission, which was sent to Leopoldville in June 1963 to reconcile Angolan nationalists. Our opinion on this subject has already been expressed several times in various documents that we have had the honor of sending to the African governments and to the various bodies of the OAU. The Goodwill Mission was prevented from thoroughly examining the Angolan problem by the special conditions under which it worked. Circumstances did not permit the Goodwill Mission to go into the interior of Angola, or even to the frontiers (where more than four hundred thousand Angolan refugees are located), and make an investigation of the situation, which would surely have led to their arriving at different conclusions. The disastrous consequences of their recommendations are too evident today, and they leave no room for doubt on the part of those who are truly interested in the cause of our national liberation. The MPLA does not intend to mention this question again.

The essential thing now is to find a formula capable of [promoting action without] impeding the active participation of any Angolan revolutionary force in the process of national liberation. This formula would have as its basic element the reinforcement of revolutionary action against Portuguese colonialism.

The experience gained by the Angolan people during their struggle permits the MPLA to point out to the honorable African heads of state and of governments that by granting the same battle conditions to every Angolan organization deeply committed to the struggle for national liberation, the Angolan nationalist movement can be reinforced in such a way as to transform it into a single patriotic faction, essentially devoted to the task of liquidating colonial domination. The opposite tactic, the practical establishment of unequal conditions among the several nationalist factions, especially with regard to a political movement such as the MPLA, whose revolutionary capabilities and devotion cannot be questioned, will furnish no positive and concrete support and will only increase a waste of energies in actions that are far from a decisive contribution to liquidating the enemy.

In revolutionary action, basic agreement must be perfect and complete. The numerous factions of the people that are suffering most directly from the arbitrary measures and atrocities of domination join in common action, through their liberty of action; this leads them to unity, to organization, and to increasingly complete definition of the objectives to be attained. The separation of national forces can only contribute to stagnating their efforts in laborious and almost always ineffective activities.

The events of recent months are characterized mainly by withdrawal from the armed conflict and by an increase in the number of Angolans who, becoming skeptical about the outcome of their heroic fight, are seeking refuge in the Congo. The decline in armed action even permitted the departure of a Portuguese
batallion from Angola to Guin6 (Bissau) and the transfer of the Nazi commander, Schultz, from Angola to Guin6 (Bissau), where he is now governor.

Enriched by the fighting experience of its people, the MPLA, which has the greatest awareness of the total Angolan problem, firmly opposes and will always contest any formula that results in the placing of responsibility for the leadership of the fight upon a faction of the Angolan nationalist forces. The union of all revolutionary forces is necessary in battle, but will reach the level and intensity desired by the honorable African heads of state and government--who, at this moment, have the historic responsibility of aiding the emancipation of our peoples--only through freedom of action

282

for all nationalist forces sincerely dedicated to the fight for national independence in their respective countries.

If our armed conflict, however effective, has not been able to develop as much as desired, it is because we have been forced into a politico-military activity due to certain well-known circumstances that have systematically resulted in an unbalanced relationship with other nationalist forces capable of facilitating the elimination of our organization. And, at a certain moment, imperialism has preferred to present Africa with de facto recognition for a faction of Angolan nationalist forces and to thus find a legal basis for direct repressive action against the Angolans by some Africans who should best understand and support our action.

Precisely because the MPLA is a movement with a broad social base, widely supported by the masses; precisely because of the enormous task that was accomplished in spite of the lack of means at its disposition; because of the quality and quantity of its cadres; because of the force of its principles; and, finally, because of the understanding of the people and of the government of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the MPLA has been able to endure all these difficulties and continue to maintain itself as a nationalist movement committed to the attainment of national liberation. Thus it will remain until the rights of its people are recognized and exercised. Because of the MPLA's truly national origin, of its defense of the interests of the oppressed majority of Angola, of its choice of nonalignment, of its African character directed toward progress, of its serious political and military activities, of its democratic structure, of the size of its cadres, already trained or now being trained, because of all this, the obstacles hindering MPLA activities can only cause a dangerous setback to Angolan nationalist forces.

The MPLA claims a sacred right: FREEDOM OF ACTION to work for the national independence of its country, in all African nations, under the same conditions as all other Angolan nationalist organizations.

The MPLA believes in the wisdom and the devotion of the OAU to the cause of liberation of Africa. The MPLA hopes that concern for justice and love of liberty may inspire the African leaders in their task of facilitating for the Angolan people the development of the conditions in which they can fight and can be free.
CONSEQUENTLY, the MPLA sums up its petition with just one point: FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THE MPLA.
Concretely, the MPLA asks that the Council of Ministers of the OAU: recommend to the governments of African nations, especially to the governments of bordering nations, freedom of action for all Angolan organizations without discrimination.
LONG LIVE UNITED AND INDEPENDENT ANGOLA!

LONG LIVE AFRICAN UNITY!
Young Angolans, Beware!

[This document, "Jeune Angolais, reste vigilant" was issued by the Juventude de Movimento Popular de Libertago de Angola (JMPLA) at Brazzaville in three mimeographed pages on July 3, 1964.]
The crossroads at which the Angolan people's struggle has arrived merits serious study by all nationalists until a solution is found. Why isn't the fight advancing? The JMPLA calls for all young Angolans to think a little and to see where the root of the trouble is.
It was normal for African nations to think that by recognizing Holden they were going to contribute to the acceleration of the Angolan struggle. But, just as the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) foresaw, the African nations were deceived. They have produced another division within Angolan nationalism.
Holden and his group had everything they needed to step up the fight in the interior. His friend Adoula helped him chase the MPLA from the Congo (L-opoldville). The MPLA set itself up in Brazzaville, thanks to the hospitality and the revolutionary understanding of the people and the government of the Congo (Brazzaville). Holden received thirty-five thousand pounds sterling from the Committee of Nine and one hundred tons of weapons from the Algerian government. Why isn't the fight advancing? Are the Angolans worn out? No, the Angolan people have never renounced the fight. We witness hundreds of Angolans arriving from the interior and asking us to furnish arms, since Holden doesn't give weapons to them. Where are the one hundred tons of weapons that the people and the government of Algeria gave to the Angolan people?
Adoula and Holden, friends since childhood, sold themselves to the Americans. They must obey their patrons. Holden is not concerned with fighting, since the Americans don't want any kind of revolution at all in Angola. They have had experience over a long period of time, and they know that they always lose ground in countries where there is a true revolution. They know that a struggling people acquire political experience and that it will thus be more difficult to rob them.

284 Angola is very rich; we know that. It has petroleum, gold, diamonds, wolfram, iron, manganese, and other minerals. The Americans are not interested in the Angolans' having economic, political, cultural, and social independence—that is, total independence.
They are interested in our having a puppet independence through which they can continue to exploit us at will. That is why they must chose between the real Angolans and men pledged to them, Angolans in appearance only, who are fighting for the interests of those who pay them. In Angola they have chosen Holden and his hirelings, enemies of the Angolan people, but friends of money. Young Angolans, the enemies of the revolution carry their lies quite far, but these stories are always unmasked by the people themselves. The unmasking of Holden has begun and should continue. Today there are countries that have recognized him but who tell us that they have not given recognition to Holden himself, but to an "Angolan Government," which serves as the instrument of the fighting Angolan people. Holden, unmasked, is revealed as the man of the Americans who has hindered the fight of the Angolan people. Seeing himself lost, he is trying to deceive both Angolans and international groups by declaring that he is not the Americans' man and by announcing his probable visit to Moscow and Peking, as if changing sides were enough [to clear him].

Young Angolans, think, look, and make an honorable decision.

The MPLA is established in Brazzaville and has spared no efforts to overcome the barriers that Adoula has placed in its way and to put its weapons, one by one, in the hands of the people. The enemies of the Angolan people attack the MPLA by saying that it is not fighting, that it is holding back the revolution, that it is only a paper movement.

The JMPLA invites those who are interested to visit our maquis in order to see people who wholeheartedly support the MPLA and who continue to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. The MPLA is sure that only armed conflict will lead the Angolan people to independence. The Portuguese continue to insist that there is no fighting in Angola, that there are no refugees in the Congo, that the fights breaking out from time to time are the work of foreigners. In this way, the Portuguese are trying to deceive the Angolans in the interior by keeping from them the truth about the battle we are waging. The last attacks made by the MPLA, which resulted in significant Portuguese defeats, were reported by them as being UPA attacks and were described as foreigners' combat.

The Adoula government is going to fall. Another government will take over; we must not deceive ourselves about that, although the imperialists continue maneuvering to guarantee their objectives. But one cannot always deceive the Congolese people, who, we are sure, will win and will aid the Angolan people in liquidating the common enemy.

Young Angolans, the JMPLA is fighting, but it recognizes that a united front is needed. The JMPLA calls the attention of true revolutionaries to the need for a CONGRESS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, which will reinforce our struggle. We have already received hundreds of responses to the questionnaire that we sent to Angolans of all political tendencies, and everyone answers YES to the question concerning the congress. We shall soon publish the findings resulting from the questionnaire.

We continue to denounce traitors to the Angolan people. Loyalty requires that all Angolans who are aware of the need for a real revolution in Angola, give the
Angolan people TRAINING, FOOD, CLOTHING, and PEACE to help fulfill the needs of these people.
The JMPLA has decided to continue the struggle to liquidate Portuguese colonial domination and all colonialistic and imperialistic relations and the fight to win complete and immediate independence for Angola.
Young Angolans, we are fighting for unity among Angolan peoples and for the integrity of the nation; we are fighting against tribalism, racial intolerance, regionalism, and religious or sexual discrimination.
Let us unite under the same torch, the torch of liberty for our suffering people.
Agreement and union among all young Angolans is a necessity, as is solidarity with all youth who love liberty and world peace.
LONG LIVE ANGOLAN YOUTH!
LONG LIVE THE CONGRESS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES!
LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF ANGOLAN PEOPLES!
LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE!
VICTORY OR DEATH!

* * * *

Message to Their Excellencies the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Second Conference of Non-aligned Nations [This statement was issued as four mimeographed pages by the Movimento Popular de Liberaglo de Angola (MPLA) in Cairo on October 5, 1964. ]
We no longer live in an age favoring domination of vast regions of the globe by one group of countries. In fact, the period characterized by the well-known methods that culminated in the possession and exploitation of more than three quarters of mankind has ended. The development of national liberation movements is included among the essential factors that have contributed to hastening the march of history in this sense. Today, mankind is crossing the threshold of a period characterized by the establishment of conditions that instigate the development of new relations among the peoples of the world and that can serve as a basis for technical and material progress in societies recently liberated from relationships of the classic colonial type.
However, the state of these new conditions, now arising in the world, and the progress made by the national liberation movements have not yet sufficed to permit the complete elimination of all forms and manifestations of colonialism. Southern Africa continues to be a region where African nationalist forces confront the international monopolies that control the subsoil of that area, considered the richest of the African continent. Therefore, this vast region is still the focal point for a whole series of contradictions in regard to economic privileges, a focal point capable of endangering the victories already won by the majority of African peoples.
Salazar's government generally considers the contradictions existing in southern Africa as advantageous to his colonial policy. These contradictions have been instrumental in helping Salazar keep the support of the NATO powers which he needs to facilitate his maintenance of an army of some sixty thousand in Angola. They also permit him to manage the financial societies that sustain the reactionary
policy of the dominant castes in Pretoria and Salisbury. Thus, a military bloc composed, at least, of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal has been formed. The suggestion made by the government of Pretoria, and given wide coverage in Salazar's press, that the countries of southern Africa constitute a common market, Lisbon's extraordinary "comprehension" of Ian Smith's whims concerning the unilateral declaration of independence made by Southern Rhodesia, and the presence of Portuguese soldiers among the mercenaries acting in the Congo (Léopoldville) are the essential elements of a conspiracy against the just aspirations for national independence and emancipation held by the peoples of Angola, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. This sinister campaign encourages the Portuguese leaders to systematically violate the United Nations resolutions on the right to self-determination and to national independence for peoples who are still subjected to colonial exploitation and domination. The independent nations present at this conference cannot remain mere spectators of the strengthening of this collusion that directly threatens their freedom and their very existence. World peace remains a meaningless expression as long as there exist situations, such as the one in southern Africa, that can endanger the future of all peoples.

Although the new political and social systems established in most of the newly independent nations represent a gigantic step toward the total liberation of our peoples, they have not resulted in creation of the conditions most favorable for the final assault on the Portuguese colonial fortresses. The imperialists have managed to utilize certain contradictions within the new nations to sabotage the activities of the national liberation movements and to promote the organizations that are acting as instruments of their political and economic domination over our countries. In this context, the MPLA is one of the African nationalist organizations most affected by the repressive and reactionary forces.

In addition to suffering from the repression practiced by the Portuguese colonialists, who have assassinated or immobilized in prisons or concentration camps thousands of our workers, the MPLA has been the favorite target of reaction since 1962, when the party was established in the Congo (Léopoldville). The world already knows of a whole series of acts—discriminatory measures, false promises, dilatory attitudes, hindrances to the maquisards' movements, closing of offices, defamation campaigns, speeches slandering its most devoted leaders, arrests of leaders, seizure of war materiel, fratricidal attacks—that were aimed at weakening and, finally, invalidating the MPLA with regard to the struggle for national liberation.

The MPLA has been able to endure in spite of these obstacles inspired by imperialists and can still proclaim itself a force indispensable for the victory of the Angolan people because of the political strength accumulated during its long period of activity defending the claims of the Angolan masses most exploited by the Portuguese colonial system. It is this strength that has allowed the MPLA to successfully take advantage of the political change in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) in order to establish MPLA bases. From these bases will emerge
revolutionary action fatal to the colonial plans for continuing to impose a domination incompatible with our dignity as Angolans, as Africans, and as men. Because of its strictly national origin, its broad social base, the quantity and quality of its workers, and the principles that govern its policy, the MPLA has emerged in the role of leader and supporter of the politico-military activities of the Angolan people and has thereby become indispensable to all those who support the fight for liberation. Its indisputable influence throughout the national territory continues to grow. The justice of its political policy may be judged by the continuous, massive support given to it by the peasant masses, who see in independence the possibility of an agrarian reform that will return to them the lands they make fertile with their own hands. The presence of politically mature and experienced urban elements within the MPLA has provided for the political awakening of thousands of Angolans who are working for the formation of a true national conscience, the basis for the economic, social, and political development of the future Angolan nation. Women and young people are constantly effecting contributions in the political, military, and social fields.

The change in conditions in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) has permitted the MPLA to consolidate its organization and to throw itself profoundly and with renewed energy into the sacred task of liberating the fatherland. Our maquisards have also been able to intensify their action. In three months, more than a hundred Portuguese soldiers have been removed from combat—killed or wounded—and an appreciable amount of enemy logistical material has been destroyed. Commandos have led numerous important sabotage operations and have even been able to make repeated captures of traitors who were serving as guides for the enemy.

Several persons, including a journalist from Revolution Africaine, have visited our maquis. These persons have been able to appreciate the seriousness of MPLA activity, at both the military and the political level. The struggle of the Angolan people has entered a new phase. The essential conditions for organized, national, and popular progress, for a centralized movement led by men capable of attaining final victory, have now been met. The abrupt appearance of Portuguese soldiers, operating in what has been called the "triangle pourri," in zones where one can verify the pressure being exerted by the MPLA testifies to the force acquired by our politico-military activities.

All this action will best be transformed into a decisive and irresistible movement if an Angolan national liberation front can lend its dynamism. The MPLA is aware that Angola's best chances for liberating itself from all domination and from all forms of foreign exploitation will be found in the growth of the present conditions of armed conflict under a single coalition.

In accordance with the principles of action defended by the MPLA, we would like your Conference to take the following steps regarding Portuguese colonialism and the struggle for liberation that we are leading:

I. Reaffirmation of the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and to national independence.
II. Increased indirect or direct political and material support to the Angolan liberation movements that are fighting for real independence.

III. Pressure on the allies of Portugal (NATO) to cease immediately their diplomatic, material, and financial aid to that country.

IV. Exertion of influence, such as that already exercised by certain participating nations, promoting complete freedom of action for the MPLA.

We are certain that the Conference of Non-aligned Nations will achieve outstanding success, especially in the contribution it will make toward the liquidation of colonialism.

* * * *

Resolution on the Report of the "Committee of Three" (Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, and the UAR) on the Reconciliation of Political Parties in Angola

[The Organization of African Unity (OAU) decision of November 25, 1964, made in Dar es Salaam, was reprinted by the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) as "Resolution..." Brazzaville, 1964, 2 p., mimeographed.]

The Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa meeting in extraordinary session in Dar es Salaam on November 24 and 25, 1964:

--Having studied the report of the "Committee of Three"--Ghana, CongoBrazzaville, and the United Arab Republic (UAR)--on reconciliation between the MPLA and the Frente Nacional de Libertagto de Angola (FNLA) in Angola;

--Recalling that the Committee for the Liberation of Africa is charged with aiding the movements fighting for unconditional liberty of all African territories still under foreign domination;

--Having accepted the conclusions of the report of the "Committee of Three" and having decided to submit them for the approval of the next Council of Ministers of the OAU, in Nairobi,

--DECIDES, in the meantime, in hopes of reinforcing the struggle for liberation in Angola, to give, in addition to assistance granted to the Gov~r~n~o Revolucionario de Angola no Exflio (GRAE), technical and material aid to the fighting front opened by the MPLA in the enclave of Cabinda and in Angola.

* * * *

Report of the Committee of Conciliation Between GRAE and MPLA

[The Organization of African Unity (OAU) report was reprinted by the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) as "Rapport du Comit6 de Conciliation. .. Brazzaville, 1964, 3 p., mimeographed.]

By virtue of a decision made by the First Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo in June 1964, a tripartite commission, composed of Ghana, the Congo (Brazzaville), and the United Arab Republic (UAR), was established to seek a means of achieving "agreement, cooperation, or unity" among the different liberation movements in Angola. In other words, it fell
to the commission to bring about reconciliation among the various movements, especially between the MPLA and the Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exílio (GRAE), with the aim of creating a unified coalition, be it political or military.

The commission met in Cairo on October 12-14, 1964. It felt the best procedure would be to first arrange separate meetings with representatives of the GRAE and the MPLA, at which they would be asked to outline their concept of conciliation. It should be noted that Mr. Holden, head of the GRAE, became recalcitrant and refused to appear before the commission. He argued that the commission did not concern him and, consequently, he was not obliged to cooperate with it. The commission took note of this attitude and decided to proceed with its preliminary interview with the MPLA representatives, who emphasized the following salient facts:

1. Mr. Holden had undertaken no attempt at conciliation with their movement; on the contrary, he saw to it that the movements were kept apart.
2. They were ready to join the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in discussions having as an objective the achievement of a unified coalition; the two movements would participate in the meeting as equals.
3. This unified coalition could be political or military; the essential factor was to be the unification of efforts in order to consolidate the struggle for the total independence of Angola.

At the end of the first phase of its work, the commission received a letter from the GRAE stating that Mr. Holden had decided to reconsider his previous attitude toward the commission. The letter stipulated that the GRAE, in consideration of the spirit underlying the recommendations made by the subcommittee of the Committee of Nine, which had met in Léopoldville in 1963 (recommendations ratified unanimously by the Council of Ministers of the OAU at Dakar in August of the same year and approved by the entire assembly of the African heads of state in July 1964) declared itself at the disposition of the special commission to facilitate its task. The letter also stated that the GRAE fully supported the efforts to achieve reconciliation among different Angolan groups at that moment deployed in a strictly national framework.

The committee asked the Secretary General of the OAU to contact Mr. Holden again and ask him to be in Dar es Salaam on November 10, 1964, to attend a meeting in regard to conciliation. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the meeting had to be postponed until November 23. The Executive Secretary of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, who accompanied the committee, was asked to inform Mr. Holden personally of the delay and to invite him to come to Dar es Salaam on November 23, 1964.

Since representatives of the MPLA had presented evidence that they enjoyed great national support in Angola and that their military activities covered part of Cabinda, the commission felt that, to carry out its mission, it was indispensable to visit the general headquarters of the MPLA in the Congo (Brazzaville) in order to judge the true value of the afore-mentioned testimony. The commission went to
Brazzaville, where it took the opportunity to visit the offices of the MPLA and examine the activities and the administrative organization of the movement. From Brazzaville the commission felt it would be useful to journey as far as the frontier of the Congo (Brazzaville) and Cabinda in order to visit the military bases and training centers of the movement. It visited one of the bases closest to the frontier. The commission was invited to visit the more distant bases and even to go into the interior of Cabinda. Convinced of the seriousness of the MPLA activities, the commission did not feel it was necessary, in spite of the insistence of the MPLA maquisards, to exhaustively investigate the other bases. During these visits the commission was able to talk with numerous MPLA supporters, from members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the youngest militants and members of the maquis. It drew the following conclusions:

1. The MPLA already possesses a military, political, and administrative organization.
2. The MPLA militants are motivated by a highly developed national and patriotic sentiment, but they lack the material means necessary to achieve their objective, the total liberation of Angola.
3. Although the leaders of the MPLA realize the importance of the stakes, they are also aware that their military potential is limited. Therefore, they content themselves for the moment with restrained military action, which could be gradually increased as they receive the necessary military materiel.

The commission held its third session in Dar es Salaam on November 23, 1964, as noted. It intended to make another attempt to reconcile the MPLA and the GRAE. Unfortunately, only the MPLA representatives were present. The leadership of the GRAE gave no reasons for its absence. The commission thus drew up its report and decided to present it to the Committee of Liberation during its extraordinary session on November 24, 1964.

Being convinced that the struggle for the total liberation of Angola must not be unconditionally subordinated to unity among the different liberation movements, and acting in agreement with the spirit that animated the deliberations of the first Conference of Heads of State, the commission made the following recommendations:

1. The MPLA is a serious movement, active and capable of leading an effective campaign. Therefore, it deserves aid and assistance from the Committee of Coordination.
2. The assistance that could be given it by the Committee of Nine would be of two kinds:
   a. Technical assistance:
      --Intensification of training
      --Highly coordinated technical military assistance.
   b. Material assistance
3. The Committee of Liberation should, in the meantime, continue to seek ways and means of achieving conciliation between the two movements.

MPLA Recognized by the OAU
The Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, known as the Committee of Nine of the OAU, with its headquarters at Dar es Salaam, has recognized the MPLA and has unanimously decided to grant it technical and material aid. This fact should be explained.

This decision was made following the second meeting of the Chiefs of State, in July 1964, in Cairo. In its examination of the status of Angolan nationalism, this group discovered that the so-called "Angolan government," erroneously recognized by some countries, was not carrying out its functions. It is incapable of furthering the struggle; it is incapable of serving as a focal point to unite the liberation movements; quite the contrary, it is the fundamental element of division. It is an instrument of imperialism, for its policies are those of foreign powers and thus constitute no threat at all to Portuguese colonialism.

The Govrno Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exfilio (GRAE) is decomposing. It does not have the trust of the people; it is even hated by them, because of the assassinations, the imprisonments, and the persecutions that it perpetrates against Angolans. It is public knowledge that the so-called GRAE utilizes for other purposes the funds granted it as aid for the task of achieving the liberation of Angola.

Supported by the government of Ldopoldville, the GRAE is nothing more than an obstacle to our struggle for liberation. On the other hand, the MPLA, after having overcome a crisis, after having suffered a powerful imperialist attack, has reorganized and increased its force. It is, as of now, the sole political body that organizes guerrillas in the Angolan territory and that exercises significant influence on the popular masses. Its desire for unity has already been proven. All this has been shown. The Committee of Nine, therefore, felt obliged to approve by unanimous vote the sending of technical and material aid to the MPLA.

Thus the MPLA gained its freedom of action and the aid to which it has a right. The MPLA is a force that believes in itself .... and that deliberately walks at the head of Angolan nationalism, with an orientation governed by justice. The adversaries of the MPLA have been silent about this important fact of Angolan policy. It has not lost its significance, however. It is, nonetheless, a step forward for Angolan nationalism. Thus, Angola today has new possibilities against Portuguese colonialism. The militants of the MPLA will be able to prove themselves worthy of the aid they have received and will utilize it effectively in the fight against colonialism and against imperialism, the fight for the complete independence of their country. The courage manifested by AFRICA, with the goal of saving Angola from neocolonialism, will certainly continue to be manifested until the attitudes that only a few months ago, threw our country into confusion are completely cleared up.

Memorandum on the Angolan Question Presented to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs

[The Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) distributed its statement "Memorandum on... " in Nairobi, February 26, 1965, 4 p., mimeographed. ]

The conclusions of the honorable Committee of Three, which was created by the African heads of state and government during the meeting held in Cairo in July 1964, have been adopted by the Committee of Liberation; the latter group decided, during

its November 25, 1964, session in Dar es Salaam, to approve technical and material aid for the MPLA. Those resolutions of the Committee constitute an act of clear-sightedness and justice with regard to the patriotic efforts of the MPLA, and they reflect the desire of Africa to see the last vestiges of classic colonial domination of our continent completely abolished.

The MPLA is convinced that the resolutions of the Committee will aid the leadership bodies of the OAU to find the solutions best adapted to the development of the fight for national liberation, under conditions permitting the quickest possible complete victory for the African peoples still subjected to classic colonial domination. The Political Bureau and the Executive Committee of the MPLA feel this is an opportune time to bring to the attention of the Council of Ministers of the OAU certain factors in the present situation of Angolan nationalism, so that the Council may best ensure the defense of the highest interests of the Angolan people.

The group traditionally opposed to liberty and independence for African peoples find in the persistence and tenacity of Portuguese colonial domination a fertile field for the development of plans and initiation of actions intended to create situations of political insecurity and uncertainty in certain countries bordering Angola. The regime's endurance also consolidates the politico-military alliances that Portugal uses to slow the rate of progress toward national liberation. In addition to the systematic aid given Portugal by NATO, the Portuguese government has, in fact, reawakened the interest of certain Western powers in the exploitation of the subsoil of Angola, in order to obtain closer support for its colonial policy. This has made it possible for Portugal to reach agreements allowing it to maintain German troops in its territory, to utilize hospitals in Bonn to care for those wounded in Angola and Guiné (Bissau), to construct supply depots, to buy arms (purchases of $100 million in 1964), and to reinforce the aggressive bloc to which, besides Portugal, the white minorities of Rhodesia and South Africa belong.

In a speech given last February 18 during a meeting of the Portuguese União Nacional [official Portuguese party], Salazar reaffirmed the intention of the Portuguese government not to modify its colonialistic policy. Furthermore, and we emphasize the gravity, while reproaching the nations bordering the Portuguese colonies for the hospitality they extend to the patriots, Salazar threatened to extend his war into even these countries. Inspired by American action in Vietnam, he said, "the right of pursuit is beginning to be considered by the powers as entirely justifiable behavior."
These provocative statements have already found concrete expression in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), where the brother government recently foiled a plot to which Portugal was not a stranger…. This degree of international involvement shows that the Angolan problem has become more than just a fight against Portuguese colonialism; it has joined a broader context from which springs the confrontation of all Africa and the last bastion of imperialist resistance on our continent. Foreign comprehension of African problems led the powers that possess the greatest mobility on our continent to work to separate the Angolan national liberation movement from its guiding force, thus trying to keep the status quo that assures their privileges in southern Africa.

Since July 1963, collusion between imperialist forces and the government of Léopoldville has succeeded in lessening the mobility of the MPLA in Congolese territory. We believe it would be useless to repeat the list of discriminatory measures that struck our movement and led to the prohibition of all activities along the frontier between the Congo (Léopoldville) and Angola. But the MPLA was able to overcome all the obstacles and difficulties set up along its road, and today it declares it is the only force that is fighting, weapons in hand, against Portuguese colonialism in the national territory. This is possible because the MPLA, enjoying the support of the different groups and classes that constitute Angolan society, is a movement deeply rooted in Angola, endowed with a solid structure and provided with militants with a very highly developed degree of national awareness, profoundly concerned with the democratic evolution of their country. The politico-military actions of the MPLA are being carried on today along two fronts:

The Northern Front, where a nucleus of military resistance continues to harass the enemy greatly, in spite of the revolutionaries' enormous disadvantage in weaponry and in spite of the fact that the present government of Léopoldville has not given them logistic support or opportunities to replenish war supplies, medicines, and other articles indispensable to the development of our struggle. The Portuguese military forces have tried, in every possible way, to abolish the advanced core of our maquisards, who constitute a pole of attraction for the population in zones of the country experiencing less intense military action or in zones involved in a struggle still political only.

The Front in Cabinda is now the principal scene of MPLA military activities. Despite insufficient weaponry and financing, the MPLA is successfully pursuing guerrilla operations in that region. Since August 1964, our maquisards have put out of combat two hundred and eighteen Portuguese soldiers, one hundred and ninety-eight of whom were killed; they have destroyed one tank, sixteen trucks, and two jeeps; they have recaptured two enemy military camps and five forestry concessions made to foreigners; and they have carried out ninety-seven reconnaissance missions and eleven ambushes and surprise raids. They now control an important part of the territory of Angola.

These successes of the MPLA have provoked articles in the colonialist press urging reinforcement of the colonial army contingents in Cabinda. The December
issue of the Angolan magazine Noticias, in an article entitled "Cry of Alarm in Cabinda," drew the attention of Portuguese official circles to the situation in this zone, at the same time expressing great uneasiness about the decline in the economic situation. The present state of our fight for national liberation obliges us to ask the OAU to increase its material aid to the MPLA and to take the steps necessary to correct the errors that African and international groups have made as a result of the recognition that has been given to a false "Angolan government in exile," a government not at all representative and that lacks the least capability to take the initiative on the battlefield. If this situation continues, it can only make progress in our fight for national liberation more difficult.

The MPLA believes in the OAU's wisdom and devotion to the cause of the liberation of Africa. The MPLA hopes that a sense of justice and a love of liberty will inspire the Council of Ministers in its task of securing for the Angolan people the best possible conditions for fighting and free action.

In consideration of all that has just been expounded, the MPLA limits its petition to the following points:

1. Sufficient material aid to be given exclusively to the MPLA, the only Angolan nationalist organization that is fighting, weapons in hand, against Portuguese colonialism.
2. Freedom of action for the MPLA in other African nations, especially in the countries bordering Angola.
3. Reconsideration of the recognition accorded the so-called Gov~rno Revolucionario de Angola no Exflio (GRAE).

* * * *

CHAPTER V
AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN PORTUGUESE GUINE, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, AND THE CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

Nationalism emanated from officially recognized recreational organizations within which there arose and persisted protest and dissent concerning national political matters. In 1954, Cabo Verde and Guiné commercial and civil service employees established the first clandestine nationalist organization, the Movimento para a Independencia Nacional da Guind Portuguesa. It was ineffective and was succeeded in September 1956 by the Partido Africano da Independencia de Angola e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). In 1959, Henri Lab~ry established in Dakar a group based on the participation of exiles, the Frente de Libertaglo da Guind Portuguesa e Cabo Verde (FLGC). At about the same time a rival group, the Movimento de Libertaglo da Guind (MLG), was formed by Frangois Mendy KANKOILA. A year later, in 1960, Amfclar Cabral, head of the clandestine PAIGC, established an affiliate of the party in Conakry. Called the Movimento de Libertaglo da Guind e Cabo Verde (MLGCV), it rallied exile elements in Conakry and Dakar, including those connected with Labdry. The MLGCV's attempt at uniting the various factions failed, but in July 1961 several exile groups, including those led by Cabral and Labdry, formed the Front Uni de
The 1953 massacre of an estimated one thousand Africans in Slo Tomé prompted the Angolan intellectual Mdrio de Andrade to review the event. The excerpts are from his article that appeared in Présence Africaine, 1-2, (April-July 1955), 146-52. Andrade's statement reflects colonial conditions prior to the military struggle initiated in 1962.

After the official abolition of slavery, land owners apparently secretly brought workers from the African coast onto the island. The year 1867 officially marked the entrance of Angolan blacks into a servile regime. They were forced laborers, and through them the roga* was born. But the natives of the island reacted against the system of labor imposed on those cultivating the rogas and they set out to make their living cultivating parts of what was left of the broad lands, the glbbes or rogas forro, meaning "free plantations."

In the 1946 report made by Governor Carlos Gorgulho, one can read: "The native, with rare exceptions, has only very limited parcels of land on which he lives and grows only what he needs to feed himself. Rather, it is in public services that, as artisans or workers, natives seek work. They are seldom employed as farm workers, not for lack of opportunity, but because they are basically opposed to the systems of contracts established on those plantations and especially to the regime of labor and discipline practiced there, different from those that they enjoy in public service."

*Roqa: vast cleared lands turned into agricultural plantations.

The agricultural exploitation of SMo Tomd rests essentially on "forced" labor, and thus restricts the progress not only of other poor classes of natives, but also of the so-called lower-middle class employed in the local bureaucracy of colonial administration... The forced laborer is in fact, however, an outcast, a foreigner in the island community: obligatory labor on thi- rogas blinds him to all perspective; the island is always the end of a sad voyage in the hold of a ship and the beginning of a life that saps his energy....

From this game of force were born the conflicts; in this atmosphere unfolded the events, officially known as "revolts," that resulted in the massacres of Sao Tomd. "The Market-town of Trinidad, 30 Plantations, Cax-ò Grande, and the Night of February 1"
We shall report here the facts as described by eye witnesses, in particular by a Portuguese lawyer who was going to plead the case of some small landowners of the island who were demanding damages. Events began with the appearance of an article, signed by the inspector of native affairs, in which he tried to define the problem of contract labor and native manpower and in which he objected to the prerogatives of citizenship given to the natives of São Tomé. The article aroused discontent among the native masses. They saw in the inspector's discussion a clear intention to officially reduce them to the same status as that held by forced laborers on plantations and by laborers on public works. Posters threatening to assassinate the governor were placed at several spots in the town and its environs.

Thereupon, the administration began an organized campaign of provocation. In Caxito Grande, a village near Trindade, the police made round-ups, the usual method for the recruitment, by force, of the manpower needed for work the government proposed to accomplish.

During the night of the following day, the provocations in Trindade were intensified. A rumor spread that a group of natives armed with large knives intended to kill the governor and all white men, to carry off white women and, finally, to institute a government formed by a black engineer (a small landowner on the island) and two Europeans (also landowners), all three of whom were well known as opposition men. Imprisonsments and shots followed the rumor.

There was a general distribution of arms to the white population of the island. It was the incident of February 4 that really unleashed the homicidal furor: a white second-lieutenant was sent to patrol Trindade. Because of all his Portuguese heroism, he tried to penetrate the underbrush alone. While doing so, he was assassinated by three natives who were hiding in a tree, two of whom were then killed by soldiers. The third was led away dying.

Then? Reprisals, mass arrests, the Portuguese avenging their white officer. More than one thousand dead. Between February 5 and dawn of the following day, thirty of forty-five persons in one prison died of asphyxiation. Most of the people of São Amaro (in the north of the island) went to town to protest, carrying white flags. All the men were arrested, and three were murdered in front of the others.

With regard to punishments inflicted, an extract from a speech written in a hospital by a sixty-year-old public official suffices as an illustration:

When we arrived at the beach of Fernão Dias, my companion and I were forced to take off our shoes and socks. Next, a cable a meter and a half long was attached to my waist, and one of my companions had the other end of it tied around his waist. We were forced to carry mud from an embankment that was part of the marsh. We were forced to carry rocks, every man with a can on his head. Those who were directing this operation were overseers, all common law criminals. When they saw us with cans on our heads, they began to beat us on our backs and other parts of our bodies with whips made from strips of rubber. Each time my companion, Quintero, was whipped, he ran, dragging me along, and when it was my turn, I dragged him. All this in a mad running back-and-forth, each
one trying to escape the blows. The maxim "divide and conquer" was true here. The large planters incited the Black forced laborers to pillage and even to fight against the natives of the island. Furthermore, those considered responsible for the "troubles" were deported to the island of Principe.
All this seems to have continued at the same pace until a lawyer arrived on the island. He came thanks to the application of some simple laws to put a stop to the outbreaks of police excesses. The criminals, however, remained unpunished, especially the Governor, C. Gorgulho: the Journal Oficial of June 11, 1953, barely mentioned his resignation and praised him "for eminent services during his term as governor" [sic.]. To top it off, the court in São Tomé accused three natives of being implicated in the death of the white second lieutenant and condemned two of them to twenty-eight years exile and the third to two years in a correctional prison. The truth was unveiled in tracts published by clandestine parties existing in Portugal; otherwise, it is clear that the Portuguese press (controlled by the fascist censor) changed the facts to present "their" truth.
In the last analysis:
a) The incidents in São Tomé conform entirely to the Portuguese colonialistic tradition: violence, pillage, racism, and unfortunate police provocations to hide the gravity of problems resulting from economic exploitation.
b) Governor Gorgulho's aim was not only to reduce to one level the fate of the popular masses (both natives and immigrants), but also to deal a mortal blow to the limited economic progress made by some blacks and to prevent any possibility of democratic organization.
c) Legal action temporarily eased the situation. The violence and the state of siege have now ended, but the problem of manpower, which is at the heart of the question, remains the same. A demagogic campaign of obscurantism was conducted in the Portuguese press. It emphasized investments in the new economic plan for São Tomé in order to turn attention away from the real reason for the massacres. Even though the dead cannot rise up, all those men annihilated by the pillage and piracy practiced by the men representing the first "colonizers" of the Negro continent stand as accusers. And yet, in spite of these facts, there are dunces who still persist in believing in the "civilizing" mission of the Portuguese...

The Death Pangs of Imperialism

by

Amílcar Cabral

[Cabral's statement is translated from Rapport général sur la lutte de libération nationale, Conakry (?), July 1961, pp. 18-23. Here he analyzes the historical background of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism and their relationship to English capital. He then evaluates the impact of these phenomena on life in the Cape Verde Islands and in Portuguese Guind.]
The destruction of colonialism and the struggle against imperialism constitutes one of the outstanding characteristics of our times. The intensive development of capitalism in the second half of the nineteenth century, based on monopolies and
the competition for raw materials, led to the first great partition of the globe at the turn of the century. Africa was divided among half a dozen European powers, principally England, France, and Germany. Having overcome the African peoples by force, they began to steal the material and human wealth of our continent through war and the technical superiority of their means of production.

But imperialism, or the monopolistic stage of capitalism, could not escape its own contradictions, and after World War I, the victorious powers proceeded to a new division of the globe, characterized in particular by strengthening of the colonial positions of England and France and by the exclusion of Germany from direct exploitation of African peoples and countries. During the final phase of that global conflict, the victory of the October Revolution, leading to the final implantation of socialism

over one-sixth of the world's land area, dealt the first great blow to imperialism. Deprived of sources for raw materials and excess profits, German financiers devoted their capital, allied with that of Italy and Japan, to an effort to solve the problem the shortest way: by colonizing the European nations themselves. Although World War II was the result of that antagonism characterizing the development of imperialism, it decisively influenced the destiny of peoples, principally of African peoples. Along with the strengthening of the socialist camp--another outstanding characteristic of our times--dependent peoples were awakened to the fight for liberation; the final phase in the liquidation of imperialism was thus begun. Since arriving at the final solution of this new conflict may take some time, there is no doubt that the outstanding characteristic--let us say, the principal motivating force--of the history being made now is something more than the class struggle in capitalist countries or the antagonism among these countries. That force is the fight for liberation being waged by colonial peoples; that fight, that conflict on three continents, integrates our struggle for national liberation against Portuguese colonialism.

In view of the power wielded by the principal imperialistic nations, one cannot help but ask how Portugal, an underdeveloped and backward nation, could keep its colonies in spite of the partition to which the world was subjected. Portuguese colonialism was able to survive because England supported the ambitions of Portugal, which became a virtual English colony, especially after the Treaty of Methuen (1703).

England had an interest in the Portuguese colonies, not only for the exploitation of their economic resources, but also for their occupation as bases along the route to the Orient, which enabled England to maintain absolute control over the Indian Ocean. To counter the envy of the other colonialist powers and to defend its interests in the Portuguese colonies, England took the best course of action: a defense of the "rights" of its semi-colony. Thus, for example, Portugal gave private enterprise, dominated by English capital, sovereign rights over an area corresponding to 17 percent of the territory of Mozambique. Thus, before World War II, English investments in the Portuguese colonies were evaluated at more than twenty-five million pounds sterling.
The prostitution of the African nations that Portugal dominated was a common practice instigated by a colonial policy faced with imperialist interests. Only with aid from these interests was Portuguese colonialism able to survive in Africa. Furthermore, legal plans authorizing the sale of Guiné, Mogambique, Macao, and Timor for 1,250 million escudos were made, but they were rejected by the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies (1883 and 1891), proving the appetites of Portuguese colonialists. The Duke of Palmela, for example, offered the town of Lourenço Marques to England in exchange for its aid in the cause of Portuguese liberalism.

In reality, Portugal was employed by world imperialism; she was only a rather envious guardian of our countries' human and material resources. That is the real reason for the survival of Portuguese colonies in Africa. Thus, the presence of Portugal was, and still is, dependent on the presence of other colonizing powers, principally England. It is not by chance or in sympathy for the Portuguese government that the British government aids Portugal in the war of extermination being waged in Angola; it is in defense of the interests of English capital.

The progressive extinction of British and French colonialism and the international isolation of the fascist Portuguese government augur well for the victory of our liberation struggle. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that the forces of world imperialism, especially the capitalists directly interested in the wealth of the Portuguese colonies, are the principal support of Portuguese colonialists. Therefore, in battling the Portuguese colonialists, we are battling imperialism. That is one of the principal reasons for the difficulty and the possible length of our struggle.

But today imperialism is plunged into the deepest contradictions: it is feeling the pangs of death. The formal changes that it is obliged to undergo are proof of its present weakness and decomposition. As a result of the material conditions of our times, reinforced by the growing superiority of progressive forces, imperialism will be totally annihilated. Nevertheless, we may be sure that this will not occur without a struggle. By fighting against Portuguese colonialism, the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde are making an effective contribution to hastening the total liquidation of imperialism. In this historic mission, our peoples join with other African peoples and all anti-imperialist forces in the world.

On the basis of our legitimate right to rebel against foreign domination, our peoples have unleashed a political battle of liberation that will take any form needed for its development. Our struggle is a continuation of that tradition of patriotic resistance found in the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. Although often overcome by the force of weapons, the spirit of resistance within the people of Guiné has never ceased to manifest itself: revolts, passive resistance, mass emigrations to neighboring territories, and, in the case of our Bissagós brother of Canhabaque, total refusal to pay the Portuguese sovereignty tax. Our people have won great victories over the technical superiority of Portuguese weapons. Against
colonialist troops, our people have fought courageously to the limit of their strength. Since the period of slavery in the Cape Verde Islands, innumerable revolts have marked the hatred of the people for Portuguese domination. More than once the people have rebelled against the masters of the land and protested foreign domination by demonstrations, strikes, and revolts, principally in Sao Tiago, Sao Ant~o, and Sao Vicente. Our struggle is merely the continuation of that led by our peoples against Portuguese colonialists. In Guin6 and the Cape Verde Islands, the situation is rapidly becoming more serious as a result of increased Portuguese oppression and the enhancement of our struggle for liberation. In Guin6, after the massacre of Pijiguiti docks (Bissau, August 3, 1959), during which Portuguese soldiers and civilians cut down tens of striking workers from Guin6, a wave of repression and terror, planned and led by the political police (PIDE), made the lives and the struggle of the people of Guin6 even more difficult. At the same time, the colonial administration succeeded in creating, by increasing the exportation of rice at the expense of many of the people of Guin6, a new weapon of oppression: famine. Not content with these measures, whose evident purpose was to destroy the firm desire of the people of Guin6 to free themselves from colonial domination, the Portuguese government feverishly prepared to drown in blood any attempt at insurrection on the part of these people. Besides police and military repression, the colonial administration has recently utilized nonviolent tactics--gifts, bribery, visits of "traditional chiefs" to Portugal, scholarship grants, special radio broadcasts for the "natives," creation of dissidence and quarrels among the different ethnic groups--to win over a part of the population and thus to "divide and conquer." Having suffered defeat in several "meetings" held to sound out feeling about the presence of Portugal, and disconcerted by the people's firm intention to terminate Portuguese domination, the colonial administration is preparing to eliminate some of the traditional chieftaincies. It is also trying to exercise direct action and better control over the popular masses and guarantee their submission by granting special authority to some African traitors. To guarantee the support of certain powers, the Portuguese government granted extensive facilities to non-Portuguese investors for the colonialistic exploitation of human and natural resources (petroleum, bauxite, etc.) in Guin6. Furthermore, the Portuguese government wants to establish NATO military bases in Guin6 and the Cape Verde Islands, envisioning the possibility of reinforcing the means available for repression of our people. The Portuguese government wishes to develop a plan calling for the immediate installation of thousands of Portuguese families in Guin6 as colonists. Portugal feels that by increasing the European population, it can impede the progress of our struggle for liberation. In the Cape Verde Islands, in addition to the measures of repression adopted by the colonial administration and by the PIDE, the Portuguese government again let nearly ten thousand persons die of hunger in 1958-59. The population of Cabo Verde, which suffered a decrease of thirty thousand to forty thousand persons in a
period of just six years (1942-1947), all dead of famine, is still at the mercy of agricultural crises and still suffers the exportation of thousands of its children as contract laborers to Portuguese plantations in other colonies. Unemployment has reached catastrophic levels, principally in So Vicente, where hundreds of workers have been fired by English companies.

The peasants, who constitute the majority of the population—and the entire population of the agricultural islands (Slo Tiago, Sfo Ant~o, Slo Nicolau, F~o)—live at the mercy of the rains, while the "economic development plan" is merely a myth, a source of enrichment for the colonial authorities. Resources that would favor the economy of the countries, such as the great port of Slo Vicente, the airport in Santa Maria, and the wealth of the sea, are not used to their best advantage or are badly managed—and are never used for the benefit of the local populations. Mass clandestine emigration to Senegal is clear proof of the desperate situation in which the people of Cabo Verde are obliged to live. This situation, like that in Guind, has become very difficult to support in the face of police repression unleashed by Portuguese colonialists in hopes of containing our struggle for liberation.

In Guin6, agricultural production—the only basis for the economy, which is otherwise supported by the cultivation of earthnuts—is progressively declining. Thousands of peasants are abandoning their homes to seek peace and the means to attain the minimum necessities of life in neighboring countries. Thus thousands of Balanta are going to the Republic of Guin6, while cultivators of earthnuts are establishing themselves in the Republic of Senegal. In the urban areas, where the repression is greatest, workers for the state and for private enterprises have been suspended. Hundreds of workers have been fired without justification. Many enterprises, especially in the bush, are abandoning their activities, having been strangled by the CUF monopoly (the true master of Guin6) or impelled by fear of Portuguese repression as a consequence of our struggle for liberation. Every day the political situation becomes more tenuous. Guin6 lives today in a virtual state of siege, for all the colonists are armed and the native populations are subjected to frequent provocation by soldiers and by the colonial police.

II
LEADERSHIP

Selections from the writings of five nationalist leaders follow below. Amflcar Cabral was educated as an agronomist in Lisbon, where he associated with African students from Angola and Mogambique. Upon graduating with honors from the Instituto Superior de Agronomia in 1950, he served the government in Guin6 and Angola before voluntarily going into exile. Henri Lab6ry lived much of his life in Guin6 but, like Cabral, is a Cape Verdiean by descent. He attended Lisbon schools and, before exiling himself to Senegal, visited Portugal several times during the 1950's. Frangois Mendy is a Manjaca leader of the militant Movimento de Libertaglo da Guin6 (MLG) faction of the Frente de Luta pela
Independência Nacional da Guiné Bissau (FLING). Manuel Lopes da Silva was a leader of the União das Populações da Guiné (UPG), also associated with FLING. Miguel Trovoada is president of the Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP).

The Rise of Nationalism

by Amílcar Cabral

[Cabral's essay is extracted from pages 26-34 of Rapport général sur la lutte de libération nationale, Conakry (?), July 1961. In great detail he traces the evolution of nationalism and his movement's struggle in Portuguese Guiné.]

In 1956, after several attempts at fighting legally had failed, certain workers and intellectuals of Guiné and Cabo Verde decided to create our clandestine party to fight illegally, but they hardly foresaw the rapid development, the success, and the general approval their initiative would attain. In truth, our party has greatly increased in strength, especially since 1958; it has spread over the majority of our countries and has consolidated its positions. It has definitely penetrated the popular masses, thus guaranteeing the success of its revolutionary action. This evolution of our party, extraordinary considering the political and social conditions of our countries, has been made possible by the political policy clearly outlined by the party leadership, which has always been able to combine revolutionary theory and practice, and by the devotion, courage, and spirit of sacrifice of many workers.

The development of our fighting organization has accelerated and attained the essential objectives outlined by the party leaders. We shall not relate in detail the different phases of the party's development, which parallels the development of our struggle for liberation; we shall only recall that our party has been obliged to overcome the following stages in its evolution:

At home:

a) Creation. Mobilization and organization of the popular masses in the urban areas. Unity of all nationalists.

b) Growth. Mobilization and organization of the rural popular masses.

c) Training for the final phase of our struggle for liberation

Abroad:

a) Denunciation of Portuguese colonialism before world groups. Mobilization of international opinion against the Portuguese colonialists.

b) Fighting against Portuguese colonialists from within international organizations, principally the United Nations. Isolation and condemnation of Portuguese colonialists.

c) Mobilization and organization of patriotic forces existing abroad. Liaison and coordination of their activity with that of the party. Consolidation of unity among all forces and their collaboration with the party.

We now face the task of training for the final phase of the struggle for liberation and the consolidation of the unity among forces existing abroad and their
collaboration with the party. We are sure that accomplishment of this task will shortly lead to the victory of our people over colonialism. In spite of the particularly difficult conditions surrounding the development of the struggle for liberation of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, we can affirm that the revolutionary work of our party, both at home and abroad, is crowned with success.

At home, our party has mobilized and organized large popular masses, consistently elevating the nationalist spirit of these masses and deepening the political awareness of its workers. Faced with secondary contradictions in our society and the perfidious maneuvers of colonialists trying to "divide and conquer" us, our party has sought and established a unity based on a common ideal of national liberation. Thus we have rallied all nationalist and anti-colonialist forces from all social classes of our people. This unity among all ethnic groups of Guiné as well as between the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde—which the party considers fundamental to our fight—has been a decisive blow to Portuguese colonialism, which has tried for centuries to create an atmosphere favoring the utilization of certain ethnic groups of Guiné and Cabo Verde against the interests of our people. It has used these groups against each other in the past. Today, with the exception of certain traitors, who appear in any battle, the Portuguese colonialists can count on only their own forces to face the revolutionary, liberating action of our people.

The Papeis, Fulas, Mandingas, Balantas, Manjacas, and others; those people called "civilized" and "native"; Christians, Moslems, and cultists; the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde—all are united in the same ideal, suffer together in the criminal prisons of the political police (PIDE), face the assaults and provocations of the colonial army, and march together toward final victory of our people over the colonial yoke. That unity has been a decisive victory for our party against the Portuguese colonialists.

At Bissau, in September 1959, our party, together with another organization, formed a coalition to fight for liberation, which all our countries' nationalists and anti-colonialists could join. By preventing certain possible divisions of a political or ideological nature, our coalition has given all African nationalists in our countries the chance to fight foreign domination as a single bloc. In this sense, the efforts of our party have produced the best possible results: The organization with which it combined to create the coalition was eventually dissolved, its members being absorbed into our party. Today some of their leaders are among the top leaders of our party. It is in this framework of our united coalition that the party chooses its members and leads our struggle for liberation at home.

Organized in strict secrecy, our party developed slowly at first because of the necessity for combatting the destructive measures of repression taken by the colonial police. Slowly but surely our party built its organization, established the necessary bases for wider activity, and managed, during four years of existence, to escape direct repression by the colonial political police.
Considering the zone as the common territorial unit, one can say that our party is present in all regions of our countries. Widely supported by the popular masses and having the peasant farmers and the urban workers as its principal strength, our party today can be called indestructible. We are aware of our strength, of the real possibility that we can serve—and serve well—the fundamental interests of our people: national liberation and the advancement of cultural progress.

In the general framework of the Portuguese colonies, our party is one of the most structured, strongest, and active organizations. Considering the difficulties of our working in secrecy and under threat of the most violent repression, our party welcomes a comparison with any other political organization in any still-dependent African country with regard to degree of mobilization and organization of the masses or to degree of ideological political awareness of workers.

From the moment that it became structured with sufficient bases to enlarge its activities, our party began to spread propaganda and arouse discontent throughout the country, with excellent results. This campaign was realized both orally and in writing.

In describing the extent of these efforts, it is enough to point out that, in the few months between December 1960 and April 1961, our party distributed some five thousand copies of documents containing agitating studies of discontent and some nine thousand tracts. In the face of such massive and simultaneous distribution of written material in various regions in the country, the colonial authorities twice decided to alert their military forces, convinced that these tracts and documents had been dropped from airplanes. On Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve, all Portuguese colonists received a message from our party. Only the courage and devotion of our workers and our people made the completion of such a task possible.

Despite the fierce repression to which we have been subjected, our party has been able to hold regular meetings and, in several zones (including Bissau), hold meetings of tens of persons (even hundreds, in the bush) to discuss the problems of our struggle, to organize and train our workers, to increase the political awareness of the popular masses. In the thousands of documents distributed, as well as in the meetings held throughout the country, our party has always sought not only to arouse the masses for the struggle, but also to give them political training by outlining the path of our struggle, by training their spirits for the great work of national liberation, by increasing their love for their African fatherland, by making it clear that the principal objective of our struggle is the securing of progress for our country, independence being just one indispensable step to attaining this objective.

In addition to mobilizing and organizing the masses for the struggle, our party has accomplished the difficult task of exploiting the contradictions existing within the Portuguese colonial media. We have sought to use existing antagonisms to divide the Portuguese themselves as much as possible and to separate the colonialists from the Africans who serve them, to turn against them the African forces and resources with which they maintain their domination. Our party can state that it has achieved positive results in this task.
Furthermore, our party has obtained the support, collaboration, and even the enlistment of those Africans employed by Portuguese colonists, who, enjoying a privileged situation, were indecisive about our struggle. We must say that young people have played and are playing an increasingly decisive role in our party. We can state that our party is a party of young people. The great support that it receives from the students and youth of our country is irrefutable proof of this reality and also a reason for confidence in the future of our party. Furthermore, the women of our country are contributing to the struggle through our party and our coalition. This fact, which merits closer attention, is encouraging, for the woman of our culture is an essential, if not the most important, element of society, essential in maintaining its vitality, essential in conserving and strengthening our African personality.

Of course, our party's actions have not always met with success. Several errors were committed; the most serious concerned vigilance over our brothers who serve the colonialists or personal ambitions and interests. Because of some of these errors, especially as a result of not stopping activity undertaken by African colonialist agents and opportunists, our party was dealt some rude blows and has not been able to complete several important tasks. Through criticism and self-examination, reinforced by the constantly growing political awareness of our workers, we have been able to correct the previous errors and to prevent new ones. By reinforcing our vigilance, by unmasking colonial agents and opportunistic Africans, we have been able to prevent new blows from the enemy and to defend and reinforce our unity.

Considering the situation of secrecy and violent military and police repression in which our fight is developing, we obviously cannot report all that our party has done at home, for that would compromise its future. Yet the verified, constant agitation within our country, especially since 1960, and the security and military measures of repression adopted by the Portuguese colonialists are clear proof of the revolutionary work accomplished by our party. Today, although prisons and concentration camps are full of African patriots; although the number of Portuguese military forces in Angola is almost double the number of European civilians (not counting African soldiers); although repression has become more inhumane in both form and degree than ever; and in spite of the tortures and the assassinations, our party and our people are stronger than ever and are more sure of the ultimate victory of our cause.

Nothing can disturb or halt the revolutionary work of our party. There can be only one resolution of the situation that the Portuguese colonialists have created and that we have transformed in the service of our people: total, rapid liquidation of Portuguese domination.

In collaboration with nationalist organizations in other Portuguese colonies, our party has played a decisive international role by denouncing the crimes of Portuguese colonialism, has mobilized world opinion against our oppressors, and has obtained great prestige for our people and for our struggle. The name of our
party and the facts concerning its revolutionary activities are known throughout the world.

By creating the Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC), with other African nationalist organizations, our party laid down the bases for unity among peoples dominated by Portugal in their common struggle against Portuguese colonialism. By creating the Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional das Colônias Portuguesas (FRAIN) with the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), our party has contributed to making an objective reality of this unity and to advancing considerably the struggle to liquidate Portuguese colonialism. By unmasking the crimes of Portuguese colonialism in London and in other capitals of the world, our party has contributed to the isolation of Portuguese colonialists by international opinion. Through articles, pamphlets, and press and radio interviews, our party has made known the conditions under which our peoples and those of other Portuguese colonies are existing, has interested the world's public in the life of our peoples, and has finally consolidated our position in the battle against the Portuguese government.

Through work done for the United Nations and for certain governments, particularly of African and Asiatic countries, our party has contributed to the denunciation of Portuguese colonialists within that international organization and to the disgraceful defeat that they suffered in both the Trusteeship Council and the Fifteenth General Assembly, held in December 1960.

By participating in several conferences and international congresses, our party has placed our peoples at the vanguard of the struggle for the total liberation of Africa from imperialism. By taking part in the discussion of the basic problems of our struggle, our party, representing our peoples, has effectively aided the study and the solution of some of those problems, especially those concerning the Congo, Algeria, Laos, Cuba, and neocolonialists. Our party is an effective member of the Conférence des Peuples Africains and of the Conseil de Solidarité des Peuples Afro-Asiatiques. Our party was present in Accra, in Tunis, and in Cairo, serving the interests of our peoples, of Portuguese colonies, of Africa, and of peace in the world. Our party maintains close and permanent relations with the most important organizations in the world, especially with those serving progress and prosperity.

With reference to the common struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, our party has been the basis for organization and realization of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP) (Casablanca, April 1961), which was most successful internationally. With that conference and the creation of its permanent Secretariat, in which our party is represented, the peoples of the Portuguese colonies have achieved a great victory over their common enemy and have concretely reinforced their fighting unity.

Through its intense international activity, our party has hastened the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism, has made the world aware of the peoples of Guinea and Cabo Verde and their struggle for liberation, has obtained the support needed for the development of our fight, and has effectively served world peace, progress of all peoples, and the fight against imperialism.
Abroad, particularly in neighboring countries, our party spares no effort to serve our struggle. In the Republic of Guinea it has mobilized the emigrants from Guinea and Cabo Verde and has given them what they need to work in the service of our peoples.

After the installation of the secretariat general of our party in Conakry (May 1960), our struggle entered a phase of great progress, the main repercussions of which are manifested within our country. Working closely with the emigrants living in Casamance, our party has contributed effectively to the development of their action within our struggle. With the integration of the Conakry and Zinguinchor movements into our coalition, our party has achieved the unity of a considerable portion of the patriotic forces in our country, whose action it coordinates. Unity has always been a fundamental concern of our party. In several documents and through several initiatives, our party has proclaimed the necessity to form a solid union of all patriotic forces of Guinea and Cabo Verde in order to continue the struggle for national liberation. This fundamental concern of our party led us to achieve unity among all emigrants living in the Republic of Guinea, and has thus reinforced our struggle.

With the appeal launched last May, and immediately supported by all nationalist organizations in Guinea and Cabo Verde, our party laid down the basis for the realization of this conference and for the final union of all our forces, the concentration of all our efforts around the central objective of the life of our peoples.

Furthermore, our party, in close collaboration with the Mouvement de Conakry, has proceeded to the training of staffs, both for the struggle and for the future of our peoples. As a result, we can now count on a worthy staff who can be compared favorably with the best African staffs. More than a dozen workers have had union training, eight young men from Guinea on party scholarships are now studying in Europe, and tens of other youths are scholarship candidates for the next academic year.

With regard to communication, our party, which keeps the world informed about our life, organizes Sunday programs over Radio Guinea in Portuguese creole and in one of the other languages of our country. Furthermore, our party has created its own press organ—the magazine Libertaggo—modest and poor like our peoples, but courageous like our struggle.

As far as mass organizations are concerned, our party laid down the bases for the creation of the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UNTG), which has become a reality and is a part of the Federation Syndicale Pan-Africaine. Furthermore, our party is on the way to establishing the bases for the creation of the União Democrática das Mulheres da Guiné e Cabo Verde (UDEMU), an organization for our women that will be able to play an important role in the development of our struggle and in the future of our peoples. An organization of young people will also be created soon. We are certain that all these organizations will become part of the united coalition and will contribute greatly to the liberation and progress of our people.
We must also mention that our party, in collaboration with the MPLA and the students from Portuguese colonies residing in Europe, has laid the framework for the creation of the Uni5io Geral dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Domina!.o Portuguesa (UGEAN). The UGEAN belongs to the international student organizations and effectively serves the interests of the youth and students of African nations dominated by the Portuguese.

Concerning relations with the Portuguese people and the Portuguese government, our party has adopted a realistic and constructive policy in the interest of our peoples and of world peace, a policy that is open to possibilities for fruitful collaboration between our peoples and the Portuguese peoples.

* * * *

Cabo Verde Is African Too

by

Henri Lab~ry

[Labdry's views are from Afrique Nouvelle, March 30, 1960. Here he emphasized the African background and culture of the native of the Cape Verde Islands. ]

The history of man shows that colonization is of some benefit in regard to positive material realizations, but that it also contains, at the moral level, a negative and inhuman aspect. In this regard, there are few examples equal to the one that Portuguese colonization furnishes. Of all seemingly peaceful European colonizations, it is the most totalitarian, to use a fashionable term, the most absolute, the most Draconian.

For centuries, Africans in territories labelled Portuguese suffered, on their spirit and on their flesh, such criminal attempts and violences that their personality was progressively broken down. Those who have been colonized by the Portuguese have lost almost all awareness of being African, of having an African patrimony, with its own values and its own biological and psychological characteristics. This loss, deliberately encouraged by the colonizing power, made it seem to the African as if only a black who has become "civilized," like the "whites," is a man in the true sense of the word....

From the Creole Badiu of the Cape Verde Islands to Bantu in Mogambique, pass among the inhabitants of Portuguese Guin6, S5o Tom4 and Prfncipe, and Angola--review them all and you will see that nowhere is the native entirely a citizen and that he wallows in the most revolting misery and illiteracy. If one considers all that has happened since the first Portuguese penetrations into Africa, that is, from the fifteenth century until the present time, one acquires a more objective view of the so-called civilizing, and later emancipating, role of the Portuguese in Africa. It has been nothing but a fraud. Coldly analyzed, it is, furthermore, not at all surprising that a country such as Portugal, underdeveloped, in arrears itself, the poorest--with Spain--in Europe, could not give a better account of its civilizing role.

But what is worse, because it is cruel, intolerable and unjustifiable, is the oppression under which they maintain their colonial peoples, an oppression made even more suffocating since the all-powerful Salazar began to rule. These are
times of liberty and peace, in which each man is free to choose his own destiny, in which each

nation, in Africa, especially, is trying to declare itself. One asks where the
despotism of Salazar will lead, and when, finally, the peoples of Cabo Verde,
Guind, Sao Tomé, Angola, and Mogambique will burst their chains, break their
silence, make their voices heard, and tell the world how eager they have been for
liberty. All during the Portuguese colonial system, and especially under Salazar's
system of the last thirty-five years, thousands of men have become familiar with
the famous and infernal prisons of the government and its no less famous Policia
Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE); members of youth and student
movements have met the same fate, simply for having wanted to claim a little
liberty, a little more dignity ... Even as the former French and English colonies are
reaching the end of foreign occupation, Portugal, with impunity, continues to send
its lamentable fishermen and lottery ticket vendors to occupy the African soil.
Today I want only to call attention to the valiant people of Guiné and Cabo Verde
exiled in Mali and to encourage the nationalist movement they are now forming. I
would like to exhort them to work and to make the complete journey to the goal
they have assigned themselves, in which the primary objective is the liberation of
their countries. Comrades, here you are in a free country. You are brothers of the
same continent; you could achieve a positive result from your claims. Be equal to
your task. In the international organizations, I am sure that you will obtain
unconditional support from all the independent nations of Africa, and those on the
way to being so, for the defense and conquest of your just and noble cause.
On this subject, recall a speech given in Paris recently by President Senghor
during which he made the following response to a question from South American
journalists (Brazilians among others) in regard to Portuguese Guiné: "Mali is an
open Federation. We claim nothing. Self-determination should be enjoyed by
everyone. If the people of Portuguese Guiné wish to join us, we will welcome
them with open arms."

In ending this article, I recall for the people of Cape Verde the profession of faith
made by the Frente de Libertaglo das Ilhas de Cabo Verde, part of the Frente de
Libertago da Guiné Portuguesa e Cabo Verde (FLGC) now being formed.... This
movement has as its goal the arousing in the spirit of each person of Cabo Verde
the desire:
1. to work for the independence of his country;
2. to liberate from suffering and misery his brothers still under the yoke of
dictatorial Portuguese colonialism;
3. to integrate Cabo Verde into the most viable and best balanced political and
economic whole.
Each member must convince himself that Cabo Verde is an African land, that he
is an African. He must disregard the amount of European blood running in his
veins, since this biological factor has not spared him from the worst kind of
suffering, but has instilled in his heart the ardent desire to fight for "liberty,
equality, and the betterment of his condition."
The first demand to be formulated, in following the example of the former French colonies, is the opening of negotiations concerning the granting of independence to our country with the support and the peaceful guarantee of the United Nations, which will avoid any bloodshed. Each citizen of Cabo Verde must, from today on, consider himself as a needed soldier, mobilized for the safeguarding and honor of his country. As a soldier, he must arm himself with courage, faith, and energy to put an end to our submission, to our ancestral passivism. He must awaken his brothers on the immense African continent; he must make the barriers of centuries-old prejudice fall in order to bring about the unity of Africa, the land of his birth. And when this great country has again found itself, reborn and rehabilitated in the eyes of the world, he will change from a soldier into a worker freely and fraternally united with all other sons of Africa.

Independence for Guind
by
Francois Mendy

[Mendy presented the following statement to the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on August 21, 1962.]

Our movement's aim is to achieve the independence of our country as quickly as possible. We would like to achieve that independence without bloodshed, because armed conflict is not, as some may think, a pleasure for the nationalists but is often merely a situation of fact. That is why we strive to find means of negotiating with Portugal for our independence. That is what distinguishes us from our comrades who, as you know, broke with us about a month ago primarily because we say that we neither desire nor seek an armed struggle. However, if the interests of our country require it, tomorrow or the day after, we shall not hesitate to engage in battle. What we want is that our country one day be administered democratically and that our people be able to live there like men, enjoying all human rights.

As for present conditions in our country, that is, the social situation, it must be said that the same old repression still occurs in the countryside. Nothing new has happened except that, as we know from the information sent to us from the interior, Portugal is carrying on an ever-increasing campaign of conciliation of the chiefs.

For instance, a certain number of chiefs have recently been sent to Lisbon where they have been very well treated.

You know that we have established organizations wherever our people are, in Africa and even in Europe—wherever our compatriots are to be found. We know that the Portuguese government has its agents everywhere. They make no attempt at concealment, since they go quite openly to Lisbon, and they try to convince our compatriots that those who seek the independence of the territory are nothing but lunatics. Thus Portugal carries on a policy of conciliation of the chiefs, but in regard to the population in general it is the same old story, namely, repression. There is, however, one new fact. This year, since the events of last July, we have noted the appearance of schools in the villages. We welcome this Portuguese
effort, but we think that there is much more to be done in this direction. Schools must be opened, but also the administrative system must be rendered more flexible. You know that so far the people of the country have been able to pay their taxes, but usually they only manage to do so because of the work they do outside the country, in Senegal or in the Conakry region. That is how they earn the money to pay their taxes to the Portuguese. If they have to leave, it is because they cannot find work in the country itself.

The standard of living in the territory is very low, and this explains why so many of the people emigrate. No doubt you have noted the emigrants here in Senegal, but if we were able to show you the entire mass of Guineans who are here, you would be horrified. In ever greater numbers people are leaving their country for Senegal or Conakry because they cannot find work at home. No workers are being hired. You know that in our country there is no contract between the employer and the unskilled laborer—and I speak of unskilled laborers because one cannot speak of skilled workmen. When a colonist has some work to be done, he calls upon the peasants and, when the work is finished, he gives them a pitiful wage. That is why there was a riot among the dock workers at Bissau in 1958.

The really new fact is that the people are more and more beginning to organize themselves. Between October and January, five hundred of our people were sent for training. We afterwards assigned them to the interior; they belonged to all tribes.

It must be noted that our country's inhabitants are beginning to understand that the endurance of the colonial regime is due to the divisions among our people themselves, and they have begun to organize. It is only abroad, I believe, that divisions or rivalries exist among different groups.

We came here to explain to you our views, not only our grievances. We do not ask you merely to see what is happening, we ask you to do something for our country. We think that Portuguese colonialism can last only as long as it is supported. We are certain that Portugal by itself cannot hold on in Angola, in so-called Portuguese Guinea, or in Mozambique. I have played a small part in the war in Algeria, and I know that if France could not hold on in Algeria, Portugal could not hold on in those territories if it were not supported by other powers. We therefore ask the United Nations to take action to stop those powers from continuing to aid Portugal. We ask it to take action to ensure that the other countries, which say they are against Portugal and desire the end of colonialism, put real pressure on Portugal. We know very well that colonialism persists solely because of the complicity of others. That is an admitted fact. It seems that all the other countries say, "So long as there is no war, we do not have to worry. There is a situation of fact. Independence will come one day." They tell us unendingly that our independence will come one day, but we do not think we can continue to live under a colonial regime. We ask those powers that proclaim their desire to see our country liberated to take concrete action to help us.

As for us, we are a movement desiring the independence of the country. What divides us from our comrades of Bissau is the fact that we shall take up arms...
when we think it necessary to do so. That may be in a week, it may be in a month, but it will be only when we think it is necessary. We think that Portugal will not be the only one to be held responsible; the United Nations will have its share of responsibility as will those countries that make a great show of their desire for our independence but that, in fact, do absolutely nothing for us. These are the views we wished to submit to you. We said that we did not come to express our grievances to you or to tell you what is happening in our country. What we have sought to do has been to show you your responsibilities.

The Situation in "Portuguese" Guind

by

Manuel Lopes da Silva

[Lopes da Silva presented his comments to the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on August 9, 1962. This document contains useful details on African resistance to Portuguese rule and traces the evolution of the movement known as the Unilo das PopulagSes da Guind (UPG).] The situation that has prevailed for almost four years in "Portuguese" Guind is extremely alarming; increasing terrorist action against our peoples, colonialism against nationalism, terror, shame, oppression, conspiracy, and confusion. With false affirmations of solidarity and brotherly feeling, the fascist Portuguese government naively hopes to preserve the last colonial bastion in Africa.

Portugal, instigator of a most sinister colonialism based on the cruelest exploitation ever witnessed in any epoch or clime, indulges in the luxury of describing itself--and how cynically--as the "most exemplary" representative of the "colonial systems," as the nation that has succeeded in discovering the best type of "communal life" shared by black and white, colonizer and colonized.... There can, of course, never be lasting coexistence under a regime of caste division, prejudice, and privilege--under a regime, in short, that is depraved, corrupt, vicious, and perverse. To speak of the inhumanity, cruelty, and dishonesty of the Portuguese government is merely a waste of time, since no honest person can, today, remain in doubt as to all that has happened and is happening in the so-called "Portuguese Overseas Provinces."...

Portugal will very soon become convinced that at the present time there is no place left for colonialism and the imperialist ideas inherent in it. Portugal must finally realize that it is no longer possible to develop new Brazils, much less to manufacture communities that, in the real sense of the term, have never existed. Brazil does indeed exist--but as an independent state and a manifestation of democracy. Portugal continues proclaiming to the four winds its determination with respect to the colonial peoples--its intention to persecute, with cruelty, barbarism, and blood baths, the peaceful popular masses who are merely claiming their right to self-determination and independence.

We demand that Portugal speedily put an end to its policy of genocide in our country. With the sole purpose of misleading world opinion and discrediting the United Nations, Portugal is increasing the number of its false statements claiming the institution of non-existent policies of progress, peace, and fraternity, and other absurdities. Portugal is anxious to defend its colonial position, irrespective of
form or method, at all costs and by any means. It has followed conventional practice in adopting the policy of sowing discord among the various races in our country, setting some against others and encouraging racialism and tribalism. Its purpose in so doing is clearly to create an atmosphere similar to that in the former Belgian Congo. With respect to this situation, the United Nations must take measures to prevent Portugal from achieving its aims. Independence--that inescapable development that Portugal is trying to delay and frustrate--must not in our country be accompanied by fratricidal struggles and disorders, which as a corollary would result in new international problems. We must all work to block the plans of the Portuguese colonialists.

On the assumption that the colonialists will obdurately hold to their principles and reject all methods of peaceful cooperation for the settlement of the colonial problem of Guiné--which course they seem to have chosen to follow to the final breaking point--we submit to the Committee the following suggestions and proposals:

1) that means be found to initiate democratic negotiations between the parties concerned--colonizers and colonized, specifically in this case, the Portuguese government and the Unido das Populações da Guine (UPG);
2) that our country be given fiscal self-determination.

In this first phase of the struggle for freedom, our political position, based on democratic and liberal principles, is clearly defined: recognition by the colonizers of our people's right to self-determination is a prerequisite to discussion. In addition, we will abstain from any doctrinal contests or power struggles between West and East. However, we will accept, irrespective of its source and provided that no political strings are attached, any assistance that will enable us to throw off the yoke of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.

First and foremost, we seek free cooperation with all states that are friendly to our cause and our quest for freedom and that hence favor respect for human dignity, as defined and enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.... Not only is the Portuguese dictatorship following a blind alley in its colonial policy; it also constitutes a very grave danger for the African peoples. The regime drifts, a prey to chance happenings and the movement of tides, like a stricken vessel with no helmsman, lost in the storm and desperately seeking some providential help.

To show the truth of this sad picture, we may merely point out:

a) that the regime can no longer be self-sufficient for any length of time and can definitely not remain in a permanent "state of emergency" declared and implemented by the armed forces without outside assistance;
b) that the regime cannot be economically self-sufficient without the help of the entire Portuguese colonial empire; however, economic activity in that empire is in an unprecedented state of stagnation, in all stages of production and development;
c) that the regime, which is utterly rotten and doomed, fears any political change, as well as reprisals for the acts of barbarism and excess committed during the thirty-five long years of its existence;
d) that on "colonial questions" the regime is in full agreement with the opposition. Both aim at safeguarding the economic interests of the empire, although the opposition, which pretends to be liberal, claims that it favors a "democratic" solution for the "Overseas Provinces". ...

To cope with the present situation, the colonial government has just adopted a new procedure for acquiring funds. In addition to the heavy taxes already levied on the population, it is instituting others. It is paradoxical that it is in the taxes paid by the "natives" that the economy of the country finds its salvation, for no burden is considered too heavy for them: first the malhota tax, then the indigena tax, and now the capitation (head) tax. There are others, such as the marriage tax, the ch~ro (burial) tax, and the palmeira (palm-tree) tax. The other inhabitants, the so-called "civilized" part of the population, pay a mere eighteen escudos a year per head, and that is all. For the "natives" the minimum capitation tax levied is two hundred and eighteen escudos. Because of the tribal system under which they live, countless heads of families pay ten or fifteen times that amount annually. Owing to the colonial authorities' arbitrary method of tax collection and the system of forced labor, the majority's standard of living remains exceedingly low.

Another factor affecting this standard of living is the system used to manipulate "colonial" commodities such as groundnuts, palm cabbage, palm oil, leather, and rice. The trade in these commodities is carried on by classical methods: The peasant sells them to small traders of Lebanese or Portuguese nationality at an absurdly low price, and finally they reach the GOUVEIA, ULTRAMARINA, and BARBOSAS monopolies, which export them to the motherland and elsewhere. Needless to say, the aforesaid firms do not return the profits derived from these operations to the country but send them to swell their bank reserves in Lisbon or Oporto....

The social structure of the colony is varied. It is intrinsically disadvantageous for the indigenous inhabitants, reflecting as it does the effects of profound schisms in community sentiment and solidarity. As has been said earlier, we find here "divisionism" in its various forms: racialism, tribalism, division by class, and so on.

The proportion of indigenous inhabitants working in the administration is only some 2 or 3 percent, at most, of the population of about 550,000, and the posts to which they are assigned are of less importance than those reserved for other, nonnative personnel. The dictatorship has been careful to avoid granting the indigenous inhabitants a greater share in the administration in order to prevent them from officially acquiring knowledge of the dishonest acts of colonial agents and colonizers themselves, thus avoiding possible nationalistic outbursts. In most of the government services, it is usual to encounter Portuguese officials, the majority of whom are practically illiterate.

Let us further note the existence in the colony of a representative assembly called the "Conselho Do Governo," in which Guineans are either not represented or are represented only by Portuguese or Lebanese who have a modest cultural level or by one or two Guineans who have espoused the cause of colonialism and are treated as tolerados.... It should be added that the peoples of so-called
"Portuguese" Guineans do not have the right to elect their own organs of local government.
Let us recall also that in the field of health almost everything remains to be done. Hospitals and medical personnel are inadequate; incompetent and unskilled doctors are responsible for the deaths of thousands of persons in our hospitals; the drugs and instruments needed for modern hospital operation are lacking; and the rate of infant mortality is alarmingly high. The few Guinean male nurses and midwives, who are called upon to give their utmost in their work, are poorly paid and at the mercy of the doctors' whims....
A most important branch of social life, education, has scarcely developed, and its level is extremely low. Only rudimentary education is provided, and the government studiously avoids training higher-ranking African staff in the government who might be capable of effectively opposing the regime. Only a few primary schools have existed for any length of time; as a result of [pressure created by] our policy, secondary education and an agricultural training center were recently initiated. These facts explain why the population has remained at a low intellectual level. Thanks to

the personal efforts of some individuals, there are indeed in the colony some twenty university-trained intellectuals and about fifty persons with secondary education. But proportionally they represent only slightly more than 0.01 percent of the population, a pitiful figure. It should also be emphasized that the Portuguese government does nothing to promote higher education, the cost of which falls upon the family and the individuals concerned. Accordingly, higher education is open only to the offspring of well-to-do families or to such as succeed in securing it through their own determination. Until a short time ago, only three scholarships were available for poor students. Recently that figure has been increased to eight. Unfortunately, these scholarships are usually granted only to students of foreign extraction and to Portuguese. Even in this field, therefore, the evil and depressing influence of colonial policy is apparent.
Economically, the Portuguese have for centuries past applied a single system in Guiné: profit from the use of agricultural resources and from the exploitation of small industries. For the development of agriculture, the government relies on plans for land reclamation and on the distribution of selected seeds. In principle, these methods aim at improving production, both in quantity and in quality. The reclamation of land is carried out on a small scale, owing to the primitive methods brought to bear; it is achieved through the use of "native" labor and primitive dikes; the resulting procedure is slow and outdated. The consequence is a titanic struggle between man and nature, which in time recovers the lands that have been wrested from it. With regard to industrial development, the government has attempted to promote the exploitation of forest and maritime resources. There are a few sawmills and a small fishing industry, and we have already referred to the rice-husking and vegetable oil industries.
We shall now take a constructive look at all these activities from the standpoint of general development and consider the country's own potential and the output that might be obtained if its resources were carefully exploited by adequate, modern
methods. Guiné, essentially an agricultural colony at present, could have
developed substantially if a measure of industrialization had been applied to it.
That course has been instrumental in producing the development and progress
seen today in all the formerly colonial African territories and in those that are
about to become independent. Refusing to admit this fact, Portugal confines itself
to exploiting the black population according to the classical methods of old-style
colonialism. Although the country's industrialization has hardly begun, there is no
real reason to prevent the investment of foreign capital. But the Portuguese
government's partiality for keeping its colonies in a backward condition is
notorious. Thus there is no cause for surprise.
The honorable representatives to the United Nations will notice that in our
statement to the Fourth Committee we gave a detailed account of our people's
opposition to, and its heroic struggle against, the Portuguese invasion. This
struggle has never ceased; therefore, the "pacification" was followed by the
revolts of Nhacra in 1925 and 1933, by those of Suzana in 1934, 1936, 1941,
1945, and 1952, as well as by the strike of workers belonging to UPG resulting in
their massacre at Bissau on August 3, 1959, and by other small popular uprisings that were bloodily suppressed by
Portuguese colonialist criminals. Reference should also be made to the feat
performed by our compatriots in the Bijagós Islands. As a symbol of their refusal
to recognize and submit to Portuguese sovereignty, they refuse to pay "taxes" and
behave with complete independence on their islands.
On last January 18, the Felupe peoples in the Suzana zone, at our request, refused
to pay taxes to the colonial authorities. In reply, the colonial military forces took
immediate action to quell what they termed "subversion." The ensuing savage
repression cost the lives of two Felupe people and produced an exodus to the
Senegalese frontier at Oussouye. In two days, 1,160 refugees arrived, as follows:
--on January 18: 213 men, 198 women, and 275 children; --on January 19: 100
men, 130 women, and 200 children.
The Senegalese authorities can confirm the accuracy of these figures. This influx
has further swollen the considerable number of previous refugees, amounting to
about ten thousand.
Again we must refer to our statement in the Fourth Committee, and in doing so,
we ask the honorable representatives to note that we have on many occasions
attempted to enter into negotiations with the Portuguese government--witness, in
particular, our letter of June 16, 1960. But the blind obstinacy of that government
lends no encouragement to such contacts, let alone to negotiations. You may be
able to secure better results from the Portuguese government in that sense. The
United Nations should do everything in its power to achieve that goal. The
inescapable alternative will be the creation of another center of disturbance in
Africa, and innocent persons will pay with their lives for mistakes not of their
making. For a year now, in our daily broadcasts over Radio Dakar, we have
incessantly appealed to the Portuguese government and called on all peace-loving
and freedom-loving peoples to assist us in peacefully bringing about the
independence of our country. But the broadcasts have brought no encouraging
results, and we are very apprehensive about the tragedy that might take place at any moment in so-called "Portuguese" Guinea. It would seem that the world's conscience reacts to tragic situations only after bloody disturbances erupt and engender an atmosphere of hatred between the communities involved and undermine the stability of world peace. In other words, it seems that there must be bloodshed and loss of life before responsible groups throughout the world will speak their minds and give practical proof of their solidarity. We say to the honorable representatives assembled here that our people, like all the other rebellious peoples of Africa, are prepared to pay for independence and dignity with their lives, if necessary.

We have already, in our statement presented to the Fourth Committee on November 11, 1961, explained the historical background of our movement, the most representative movement in the whole of Guinea. We will merely recall that our movement is a reincarnation of the former Liga da Guinea, which was founded in 1911 and illegally dissolved in 1915 by Governor Oliveira Duque. It was reborn in 1956 under the name of Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée-Portugaise." It became the Uniao dos Povos da Guinée (UPG) during the pooling of our efforts with the Uniao Democrita d de Cabo Verde (UDCV), which took place within the Movimento de Libertação da Guinea e Cabo Verde (or MLGC, under which appellation we appeared before the United Nations in November 1961). Following the dissolution of the MLGC Coordination Bureau (an action confirming the individuality of the two movements but not interfering with their ties of friendship), it finally adopted the name of Uniao das Populações da Guinée (UPG).

The Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe
by
Miguel Trovoada

[Trovoada presented his views to the U. N. Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on September 4, 1962. He is president of the Comité de Libertacao de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP).]

Like all the other Portuguese colonies, the colony of São Tomé and Príncipe became an "overseas province" in 1951 through a legal-political fiction that Salazar's government introduced into Portuguese constitutional law. So far as we are concerned, however, this transformation, dictated by the exigencies of Portuguese politics and diplomacy in relation to the United Nations Charter rather than by a desire for any real changes in the country's political, social, economic, administrative, and cultural life, has been without effect. Moreover, this is not the first time that Portugal has tried, by means of legislation unilaterally drawn up, to engage in absurdly mysterious maneuvers in order to stifle the voice of our people's consciousness. Hence the reforms recently introduced by the Portuguese government offer nothing new so far as we are concerned.

Almost a century ago, the indigenous people on the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe were made Portuguese citizens de jure. This declaration of Portuguese citizenship implied that the indigenous people of São Tomé and Príncipe would have complete equality with the Portuguese themselves, that any form of racial
discrimination and its economic and social consequences would be eliminated, and that bonds of subjection would be removed. In reality, however, the indigenous inhabitants, like their brothers in Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique, were subject to the Statute concerning the Status of Indigenous Persons and paid a poll tax of one hundred and twenty escudos to the Portuguese state until 1955. Only minor government officials and business employees were exempt from this obligation. In other words, as in Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique, the African population, despite the general grant of citizenship, were divided into two groups—the indígenas and the assimilados. The former group comprises the great mass of the working population, who live in wretched conditions and are subjected to great physical and psychological pressure aimed at forcing them to accept a labor contract—in other words, forced labor, which is still more arduous—as in the case of the workers who come from Angola, the Cape Verde Archipelago, and Mozambique as contract laborers (contratados) for the colonial agricultural plantations (rogas). This majority of the population (more than 80 percent) exercise no political rights and, even in the exercise of their civil rights, encounter economic barriers that are sometimes insurmountable. Although racial discrimination is not sanctioned by the Portuguese codes of law, it is apparent in daily life at every turn and is the natural consequence of savage economic discrimination. More than five-sixths of the cultivable land is held by large agricultural companies. The upper and middle ranks in public service and in private enterprise are filled by the Portuguese. Until a secondary school (1ceu.) was established in São Tomé (1952), completion of the first cycle of secondary school studies and, later, of the second cycle was required for admittance to posts in the administration. Now, to avoid competition, these posts are filled purely by nomination, and not by competition, as they used to be. Further evidence of economic discrimination is to be seen in voluminous legislation concerning trade in general and the sale of commodities in particular that was enacted to harm the business of the small traders and the rural proletariat. For instance, a deposit of several thousand escudos must be made in order to receive permission to import or export goods, and only the large companies can afford such a deposit. In this way, the small traders are forced to purchase goods wholesale from the Portuguese. Again, anyone who wishes to sell agricultural products (cacao, copra, palm oil, etc.) at the market price fixed by the administration must be in possession of a certain document, a kind of title-deed to real property; but to obtain it he must comply with lengthy and arduous legal formalities and, in addition, a declaration of land ownership immediately renders him liable to income tax. Small landowners and laborers, who are paid in kind, therefore prefer to deal directly with the small traders, although this means selling at an extremely low price. Forced labor on the agricultural estates is one of the most striking features of economic and social life in São Tomé and Príncipe. After creating the myth that the indigenous inhabitants of São Tomé and Príncipe were inherently lazy and averse to manual labor, the Portuguese had an excuse for importing laborers from
other colonies in order to solve the alleged manpower problem. But how can we reconcile this manpower shortage with the fact that so many people are out of work? There exist private road-building companies that employ groups of workers for three or four weeks at a time on a rotation system, allegedly in order to give everyone a little work from time to time.

This leads us to explore the real reasons for this modern version of the slave trade. In a plantation colony with an economy based essentially on a single crop (cacao), and in a country so rugged that it is difficult to introduce new techniques into agricultural production, abundant manpower is vital; but labor must also be as cheap as possible, so as to provide the greatest possible profits for the plantation masters. That is why, with the indigenous inhabitants of Sao Tomé and Príncipe systematically refusing to submit to forced labor, the Portuguese brought laborers from Angola, Cabo Verde, and Mozambique. They hoped to compel the people of Sao Tomé and Príncipe, through unemployment and other pressures, to sign labor contracts. Because this scheme proved a failure, and because of their own domestic needs, the other colonies, with the exception of Cabo Verde, stopped sending laborers.

The colonial administration then turned to active measures and used other methods of persuasion. During one of these operations, on February 3 and 4, 1953, the colonial army mobilized Portuguese officials and traders to perpetrate one of the worst massacres in the history of world colonialism. The reckoning shows more than one thousand Africans killed, including forty who were suffocated in a small room and others who were electrocuted. Houses occupied by pregnant women and children were burned down after being looted; old people were assaulted; young women were raped, etc.

Now, however, new factors have been superimposed on the internal status quo: the psychological atmosphere of war and police repression. Since the Angolan nationalists took up arms against the Portuguese to reconquer their freedom, Portugal has been concentrating troops and war materiel in Sao Tomé. According to various dispatches from “Lusitania,” the Portuguese press agency, further supplies of arms and ammunition were sent to Sao Tomé during May and August of 1961, and more recently in February 1962. In addition, the strength of the political police (PIDE) has been trebled, and rural police units have recently been stationed in all villages. This has led to a succession of arbitrary arrests, and the settlers, encouraged by their stronger position and by the Portuguese administration and army, are engaging in acts of provocation against the Africans. The distribution of weapons to Europeans (who are trained in their use at the sports clubs), displays of military power, acts of provocation, etc., are subjecting Portuguese-African relations to an increasing strain that is liable to produce a disaster.

The CLSTP is the nationalist organization set up within the country, in September 1960, to work for a peaceful solution to the problem of Sao Tomé and Príncipe. Despite the conditions of secrecy in which we are forced to work, we strive to instruct the people in the nature and objectives of the fascist acts of provocation and the arbitrary measures to which they are subjected. We hope to keep the
people calm in order to avert their reacting in a way that would afford a pretext for Portugal to unleash a savage armed repression under which the African population might be crushed.

CLSTP is seeking, and will always seek, some possibility for reaching a peaceful solution to the colonial problem in Sio Tomé and Príncipe.

We know full well the fascist nature of Portuguese colonialism and the idea of destruction with which it is imbued, which was clearly demonstrated by the senseless burning of the fortress of Sao Jolo Baptista d'Anda in Dahomey and the napalm bombing of Angolese villages. We are aware of our geographical position and the realities of our population figures. That is why we continue to appeal to all the nations of the world, especially to those that have recently experienced colonial domination, to support with every means at their command the rightful claims of the people of Sio Tomé and Príncipe. All we ask of Portugal is recognition of our inalienable and indefensible right to self-determination and the establishment of conditions and safeguards necessary for the free and democratic exercise of that natural right.

Our people, conquered four hundred and ninety years ago through trickery and because of the technical superiority of Portuguese weapons, have never failed to show their hostility toward the aggressor. During the colonial period of our history there were a number of episodes in which our people were ranged against the Portuguese settlers in armed conflict. This means that, despite the efforts made to uproot us, despite the powerful propaganda machine set up to support such political frauds as integration, assimilation, etc., we have always succeeded in keeping alive our African personality. That is the foundation of our staunch will to continue the fight now begun to reconquer our freedom and dignity. Thus far, Portugal has brushed aside all our demands.

We, therefore, place all our hopes in the United Nations and in the active solidarity of the independent African states. We rely on them to be effective. We tell you our hopes and we ask you to make every effort for the immediate implementation of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its fifteenth session on December 14, 1961, concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries.

We ask the United Nations, through its various specialized agencies, to order inquiries into:
a) labor conditions and the situation of the workers on the agricultural plantations of Sio Tomé and Príncipe.
b) the reasons why the mortality rate, particularly among infants, is so high in our country.

We believe that the United Nations, in its own Charter, prescribes specific measures for the implementation of this resolution. In the belief that the Portuguese government will continue to disregard United Nations recommendations, as it has done heretofore, we ask the United Nations to adopt economic and diplomatic sanctions against Portugal at the earliest possible moment.

* * * *
III
ORGANIZATION
Important official documents of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and its labor and women affiliates, the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UNTG) and the União Democrática das Mulheres da Guiné e Cabo Verde (UDEMU), as well of the Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné Bissau (FLING), follow below. The PAIGC statutes are translated from Statuts et programme (Conakry, 1962 ?). The UNTG statutes are from Estatutos (Conakry, 1962). The UDEMU statutes are from Statuts (Conakry, n. d.). The FLING charter is from Charte préambule (Dakar, 1962 ?). Statutes of the PAIGC
1. An autonomous political party is hereby created in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, known as the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) with its seat in Bissau.
2. The PAIGC is a political organization of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands and carries out its activities in those two countries.
3. The PAIGC arouses interest in and supports the creation of organizations and movements of national liberation among emigrants from Guiné and Cabo Verde residing abroad.
4. The objectives of the PAIGC are:
   -- The immediate conquest of national independence for "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.
   -- The "democratization" and emancipation of the African peoples of those countries, for centuries exploited by Portuguese colonialism.
   -- The realization of rapid economic progress and of a true social and cultural elevation of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands.
5. For the conquest of the national independence of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands, the PAIGC mobilizes, organizes, and directs the popular masses of Guiné and Cabo Verde in the struggle for total liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination.
6. The PAIGC reserves the right to create with other organizations, parties, movements, or fronts of anti-colonial struggle in "Portuguese" Guiné, the Cape Verde Islands, or other countries under Portuguese colonial domination, a united coalition to fight against Portuguese colonialism and to hasten its total liquidation.
7. Membership in the PAIGC is open to anyone over fifteen from Guiné or Cabo Verde who accepts its statutes, takes the oath of membership in the Party, and pays his dues regularly.
8. All members of the PAIGC will pay monthly dues, the amount of which is fixed by the Congress.
9. The PAIGC is organized on the basis of territory (Regions and Zones) and place of work or residence (Sections and Groups). For purposes of the organization of the PAIGC, "Portuguese" Guiné is divided into six Regions and
thirteen Zones, and the archipelago of Cabo Verde, into two Regions and nine Zones.

10. The guiding principle on which the organic structure of the PAIGC is based is democratic centralism. The bodies within the Party work on the principle of collective leadership.

11. The basic organ of the PAIGC is the Group. The Group is created in places of work, such as companies, factories, mines, workshops, business offices, public service offices, shops, farms, docks, schools, etc., and in places of residence, such as streets, neighborhoods, villages, "tabanca," etc ... any time that there are at least three Party members. The task of the Group is:

--To arouse and organize the popular masses, to spread among them propaganda on the Party viewpoints, to bring about the realization of the Party's program.
--To be aware of and to transmit to superior bodies of the Party the feelings and the demands of the people, to persuade Party members to participate actively in solving the people's problems.
--To recruit members, to see that they pay their dues, to control their actions, to develop among them the spirit of criticism and self-criticism, and to contribute to the education of the masses in general.

The creation of a Group must be approved by the Section Committee. The Group Assembly is the superior body of the basic organ. It meets once a week, elects the Group Secretariat, and chooses delegates for the Section Conference. The Group Secretariat directs the daily activities of the basic organ. Its term is one year, but it can be recalled from office at any time by the Assembly that elected it.

12. The Section is created in the places of work or residence. It is formed of five Groups. The creation of a Section must be approved by the Zone Committee.

The Section Conference is the superior body of the Section. It ordinarily meets once a month. The Section Conference deals with questions concerning the Section, and elects the Section Committee and the Delegates to the Zone Conference.

The Section Committee, which directs the Section, is formed of five members and has a one-year term. It meets twice a month and is responsible to the Section Conference and the superior bodies of the Party. It carries out the resolutions of the Section Conference, assures the fulfillment of directives from superior bodies of the Party, creates base organizations, guides and controls the work of the Groups, foments the spirit of criticism and self-criticism, and directs studies aimed at improving the theoretical training of Party members.

The Section Committee elects from within itself a Secretariat of three members responsible for the daily work of the leadership and for control over carrying out of the resolutions of the superior bodies of the Party. The Section Committee organizes a Finance Commission to receive the dues from Groups and to remit the proper percentage to the Zone Committee.

13. The Zone is made up of Sections existing within a territorial division of the Party. The superior body of the Zone is the Zone Conference. Convoked by the Zone Committee, it meets twice a year to choose Delegates to the Regional
Conference, to elect the Zone Committee, and to discuss subjects on the agenda. The Zone Conference can meet in extraordinary sessions upon convocation by the superior bodies of the Party or upon the demand of at least two-thirds of the members of the Party in the Zone.

The Zone Conference is the leading body of the Zone; its term is one year, it meets at least once every two months, and it is responsible to the superior bodies of the Party and to the Zone Conference. The Zone Committee carries out the resolutions of the Zone Conference, assures the fulfillment of the directives of the superior bodies of the Party, guides and controls the work of the Sections, and foments the spirit of criticism and self-criticism as well as the theoretical training of the Party members.

The Zone Committee is composed of fifteen members. The Committee elects a Secretariat of from five to seven of these members to oversee the daily work involved in guiding and controlling the fulfillment of Party resolutions. It organizes a Finance Commission to receive the dues from the Sections and to remit the proper percentage to the Regional Committee.

14. The Region is made up of at least two Zones. The superior body of the Region is the Regional Conference. It ordinarily meets once every six months, upon convocation by the Regional Committee, to choose the Delegates to the National Conference, to elect the Regional Committee, and to consider the subjects on the agenda. The Regional Conference may meet in extraordinary session upon convocation by the superior bodies of the Party or upon the demand of at least two-thirds of the members in the Region, providing that this demand is approved by the National Committee.

The Regional Committee is the body of leadership within the Region. Its term is one year, it meets every three months, and it is responsible to the Regional Conference and to the superior bodies of the Party. It carries out the resolutions of the Regional Conference, guides and controls the activities of the Party in the Zones, and foments the spirit of criticism and self-criticism as well as the theoretical training of Party members. The Regional Committee, composed of five representatives from each Zone, elects a Secretariat of from five to seven of its members, who oversee the daily work involved in guiding and controlling the fulfillment of Party resolutions. It organizes a Finance Commission to receive the dues from the Zones and to remit the proper percentage to the National Committee.

15. The highest body of the PAIGC in each country is the National Conference. It ordinarily meets every year, upon convocation by the National Committee, to:

--Discuss, correct, and approve the report of the National Committee.
--Examine the Party strategy and tactics for the country, and propose changes to the Central Committee.
--Elect the National Committee.
--Choose Delegates to the Congress, in accordance with the standards fixed by the Central Committee.

The National Conference may meet in extraordinary session upon the request of
the Central Committee, or upon the request of several Zones whose joint membership numbers at least two-thirds of all Party members in the country. The National Committee is the executive body of the Party in each country. It ordinarily meets every four months and can hold extraordinary sessions upon convocation by the majority of its members. Its term is one year.
The National Committee is responsible to the higher bodies of the Party and to the National Conference. It carries out the resolutions of the National Conference, assures the fulfillment of the Party program at the national level, guides and controls the activity of the Regions, and names and may replace press agents for the Party in the Regions.
The National Committee, composed of nine members, elects a Secretariat of five of these members who oversee the work of the leaders. It organizes a Control Commission and a Finance Commission. The Control Commission oversees the fulfillment of the Party program in the country; the Finance Commission receives the dues from the Regions, develops the financial resources of the Party in the country, and remits to the National Committee the portion of the dues designated for the Central Committee.

16. The highest body of the PAIGC is the Congress. Its ordinary sessions are held every three years, upon convocation by the Central Committee.
The Congress has the authority to:
--Discuss, correct, and approve the report of the Central Committee.
--Examine, modify, and establish the political policy, the program, and the Statutes of the Party.
--Define the Party strategy and tactics to be used in relation to the fundamental questions of the current political situation.
--Elect the Central Committee.
Extraordinary sessions of the Congress may be held upon the request of the Central Committee or of several Party organizations whose membership numbers at least two-thirds of the total membership.
The number of Delegates to the Congress is fixed by the Central Committee.
During the Sessions of the Congress, its Presidium exercises the functions of the Central Committee.
During the year that precedes the Congress, all important subjects and problems are to be fully discussed by all Party organizations before being debated by this Congress.
The decisions of the Congress are valid and obligatory for the whole Party and cannot be modified, replaced, or revoked except by another Congress.

17. Between Congresses, the highest governing body of the PAIGC is the Central Committee, whose term is three years.
The Central Committee comprises thirty members and fifteen alternates. It ordinarily meets every six months, upon convocation of its President. It may meet in extraordinary session upon convocation by the majority of its members or by its President, but with prior approval by the Political Department. The Central Committee carries out the resolutions of the Congress and guides, controls, and coordinates the activity of the Party through its Departments.
The Central Committee designates a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary and two Treasurers, who together make up the Secretariat.

The Central Committee contains seven Departments:
- Political and Foreign Affairs
- Control
- Organization and Domestic Affairs
- Defense and Security
- Economy and Finances
- Information and Propaganda
- Social and Cultural

Each Department is directed by a Secretariat of five members, with the exception of the Political and Foreign Affairs Department, whose Secretariat is composed of fifteen members. The Central Committee may recruit any Party member to work in the different departments, subject to prior approval by the Political Department. The Secretariat of the Political and Foreign Affairs Department is called the Secretariat General. It is responsible for the political doctrine of the Party, for the rigorous fulfillment of the Party program, and for Party relations abroad; it also directs the activities of the other Departments. From its members it elects a Secretary General and an Adjutant Secretary General, whose appointments must be confirmed by the Central Committee.

The Political Department may create special groups of political leaders in the Regions or in very important Zones where the action of the Party is not effective. It may also send organizers there to increase Party effectiveness. The political leaders may be recalled after the fulfillment of their mission.

Until the first Congress is held, and in view of the clandestine situation imposed upon the PAIGC by the Portuguese colonial domination:

a. The number of members composing the Central Committee may be different from that indicated in the Statutes;

b. Some of the Party leaders, especially in the Secretariat General, may establish themselves outside "Portuguese” Guind and the Cape Verde Islands, depending on the needs of the liberation struggle and the measures necessary to ensure the safety of the leaders.

18. By-laws elaborated by the Political Department, approved by the Central Committee, and submitted to the Congress for ratification should fix in detail the standards of Party operations at all levels.

19. The funds of the Party come from the members' dues, from subsidies, from donations, and from Party earnings.

20. The dissolution of the PAIGC can be effected only by the Congress, and then only with approval by a two-thirds majority of the members in good standing. In any case, the PAIGC cannot be dissolved before the conquest of national independence for the peoples of "Portuguese” Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.

* * * *

Statutes of the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné
Constitution and Goals.
The União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UNTG) is an organization of the working classes of Guiné, comprising mainly field workers and salaried workers in urban centers. The UNTG includes workmen, field workers, employees, and intellectual workers of Guiné in its ranks without distinction as to origin, nationality, sex, political opinions, or religious beliefs.

The UNTG defends the interests of the workmen, field workers, employees, and intellectuals and fights unceasingly for the betterment of the workers' living conditions.

The UNTG courageously dedicates itself to the struggle for the liberation of Guiné and proposes to continue, after the termination of foreign domination, the fight for the consolidation of national independence and for the peaceful achievement of progress and happiness for the workers of Guiné.

The UNTG recognizes the role of vanguard that the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) plays in the fight for the liberation of Guiné, through its revolutionary action in mobilizing, organizing, and leading the popular masses in the battle for national independence.

The UNTG is a member of the Federação Sindical Pan-Africana and approves and defends its decisions, which aim at decolonization, total independence, progress, and unity among African peoples.

The UNTG maintains excellent relationships of friendship and solidarity with other national and international labor organizations in the interest of the common fight of all workers for the progress of humanity and for peace among peoples.

The UNTG is dedicated to a joint cultural program in participation with the masses and to the political education of workmen, field workers, employees, intellectuals, and their families. It aids the workers by constantly raising their general level of education and culture. Equally, it seeks to raise the professional level of the workers by creating special courses and by sending the best workers abroad for more complete training.

The UNTG is using all its strength in the fight for the protection of workers' rights, including the right to work for all who can work and the complete abolition of forced labor; for the determination of just salaries based on the principle of equal pay for equal work; for the limitation of the work day, in accordance with the needs of progress and the interests of the workers; for the progressive elimination of differences between city and field workers; for the creation of social welfare projects providing rest, recreation, and culture for the workmen, field workers, employees, and intellectuals.

The UNTG energetically fights against parasitism within the family of workers and fights for the utilization of all work capabilities.
The UNTG defends equality for all citizens, without distinction as to sex or age; it seeks to mobilize women and young people for active participation in all aspects of national life; it is concerned with the constant betterment of living and working conditions for women; and it aids workmen, field workers, employees, and intellectuals in the patriotic education of their children.

The UNTG is developing, together with its members, a spirit of criticism and self-criticism, directed especially against all the weaknesses in union affairs. Together with the governmental and economic organizations, it defends the highest interests of the workmen, field workers, employees, and intellectuals in labor matters.

The UNTG reserves the right to form a federation with labor organizations of the archipelago of Cabo Verde.

Rights and Duties of the Members.

1. Each worker, workman, field worker, employee, or intellectual of Guind may join a union.
2. Admission into a union may be initiated during a meeting of a labor group, through the presentation of a request to join and payment of the inscription fee. Admission must be approved by the Regional Committee.
3. The member receives a union card as proof of his membership. This card is given him by the UNTG through the respective base organization.
4. Each worker is a member of a base labor organization, and if he changes jobs, he must notify the organization to which he belongs of his leaving and have himself enrolled in the new organization.
5. A union member has the following rights:
   a. To participate in meetings of the membership of the labor organization to which he belongs, taking part in the respective decisions.
   b. To participate in the election of and be elected to all union congresses, conferences, assemblies, or positions of leadership, and to demand reports from union leaders of their activities.
   c. To submit to union leaders questions and propositions on the betterment of union labor; and to criticize the activity of the union press.
   d. To resort to the unions for the defense of his rights, in case of violation of the collective agreement and of the national laws related to work or to social assistance; to ask for union assistance and protection in all conflicts arising from the exercise of his union activity.
   e. To demand that he be able to participate personally whenever union leaders or meetings of the membership convene to make a decision on an activity or on his behavior.
6. The union member has the following duties:
   a. To act promptly in behalf of union objectives and tasks and for the complete realization of union decisions.
   b. To utilize all his energy in fulfilling the national economic plan and the joint labor agreements; to combat all breaches of discipline or dishonesty in production and in the economy, in defense of national workers’ interests.
   c. To constantly perfect his capabilities and professional knowledge, to raise
his cultural level, and to seek new methods for improving production.

d. To respect the statutes of the UNTG and to pay his union dues punctually.

When a member, by his own will, is three months behind in the payment of his dues, he loses his union rights and privileges.

7. During the period in which a member fulfills his military service in the armed forces or in other groups defending Guin4, in which he enters or is a part of a production cooperative of artisans or farmers, or in which he studies in a university, high school, or professional institution, his affiliation with the UNTG is considered suspended. This period is counted in the duration of his membership in the UNTG.

8. A member who finally or temporarily leaves his job, because of illness, invalidism, or old age, can continue to be affiliated with the UNTG as long as he pays the dues corresponding to him. The same is true for women temporarily suspending their work due to pregnancy.

9. In cases of infraction of the statutes and decisions, of violation of union discipline, or of failure to pay dues, union bodies can apply the following corrective measures:

a. warning,
   b. reprimand,
   c. censure,
   d. temporary suspension, and finally
   e. expulsion from the union.

10. Union leaders must invite to meetings of members or of union leaders, those members against whom union corrective measures are to be taken. A member has the right to be present when a corrective measure against him is adopted and the right to appeal to higher union leaders.

11. Assemblies of members cannot make decisions against a member of a higher managing body; in such a case, the proper leaders must be advised and corrective measures must be taken by them.

12. Resolutions regarding expulsion of members must be made with the greatest care. Any decision on expulsion made in an assembly of members must be approved by a superior managing body. If the decision is approved, the union card is taken from the member being corrected. After a period of observation, the member may present a new request for membership; the approval of the superior managing body is necessary for the reinstatement of a member.

Structure and Directing Bodies.

National Congress:

13. The highest union body in Guin6 is the National Congress of the UNTG, which ordinarily meets once every three years, upon convocation by the National Committee, to:

a. Discuss, criticize, and approve the reports on the activities of the National Committee.

b. Elaborate upon or review the statutes of the UNTG.

c. Review the general plans of action of the UNTG and make any alterations.
necessitated by changing conditions in the country.

d. Elect the National Committee.

14. Extraordinary Congresses may be called by the National Committee or by several base unions whose members constitute at least two-thirds of the UNTG membership.

National Committee:

15. Between National Congresses, the National Committee of the UNTG is the supreme body of unionism in Guinea.

16. The National Committee of the UNTG, which has a mandate of three years, is composed of the following members:
   --Secretary General
   --Administrative Secretary  --Secretary of the Treasury
   --Secretary for Organization and Propaganda
   --Secretary for Insurance and Control
   --Secretary for Information and Culture
   --Secretary for Union Questions.

17. The National Committee of the UNTG has the power to:
   a. Execute decisions made by the National Congress.
   b. Lead all union activity in the country.
   c. Convoke and organize the National Congress.

18. As long as it remains clandestine, and until its First National Congress is held, the UNTG will be led by a provisional National Committee, elected from among its union staffs.

Base Unions:

19. The base union is composed of workers who are active in undertaking, administering, or establishing a program of education.

20. If a program of education that is undertaken, administered, or established has ten or more workers, a base union can be constituted. If there are fewer than ten workers, they may join a neighboring union as an equal branch or form a base organization with other workers who are in the same situation.

21. When, in a joint undertaking, administration, or establishment of an educational program, there are workers of different professions in sufficient number, more than one union can be organized.

Local Assembly and Delegates:

22. The assembly of members is the supreme organ of the base unions.

23. This assembly meets whenever necessary and must meet at the beginning of each year to elect Delegates to the Regional Council and to the National Council of the UNTG.

24. Delegates of a base union are authorized to:
   a. Represent their organization in the Regional Council.
   b. Serve as intermediaries between workers and the leaders who undertake, administer, or establish an educational program, in all matters relating
to work.
25. The union delegates from the same educational program undertaken, administered, or established may form or elect among themselves a Local Committee for the coordination of their activities and the study of the problems common to all workers of the educational program.

Regional Council:
26. The Regional Council of the UNTG is the meeting of all Delegates from the base unions in the region.
27. The Regional Council must meet twice a year, and may hold extraordinary sessions if convoked by the Regional Committee or at the request of several base organizations whose members constitute two-thirds of the workers in the region affiliated with the UNTG.
28. The Regional Council has the power to:
   a. Sanction corrective measures applied by the base unions.
   b. Discuss, criticize, and approve the annual report prepared by the Regional Committee and present it to the National Conference of the UNTG.
   c. Elect the Regional Committee.
   d. Elect the Control Commissions in the region.
29. The Regional Council of the UNTG, in accordance with the development of national and regional union activity, can create Professional Departments within itself.

Regional Committee:
30. The Regional Committee of the UNTG is the regional executive union body.
31. The Regional Committee, elected for one year, can be stripped of any of its functions in the performance of which it ceases to enjoy the confidence of the base organizations.
32. The Regional Committee of the UNTG has the power to:
   a. Promote and control the execution of the decisions of higher managing bodies of the UNTG.
   b. Watch zealously over the fulfillment of the statutes.
   c. Give an opinion on all regional union problems, whose solution is up to the National Committee.
   d. Resolve disputes presented to the base unions or transmit them to the National Committee.
33. The Regional Committee is composed of the following members:
   --Secretary General
   --Secretary of the Treasury --Administrative Secretary
   --Secretary for Insurance and Control
   --Secretary for Organization and Propaganda
   --Secretary for Information and Culture
   --Secretary for Social Questions.

National Conferences:
34. The National Conference of the UNTG is the meeting of all Regional Councils of the nation. It meets once a year to:
   a. Discuss, criticize, and approve the annual reports, balances, and accounts of the Regional Committees.
   b. Approve the budgets of the Regional Committees.
   c. Examine the annual balances and accounts of the National Committee and approve the budget of this body for the new year.
   d. Elect the Central Control Commission.
   e. Guide the progress of union activity in the nation toward the complete fulfillment of the plans and decisions of the National Congress of the UNTG.

Finances:
35. The financial resources of the UNTG are derived from:
   a. Enrollment fees and monthly dues;
   b. Subsidies and donations;
   c. Its own receipts.
36. To cover its expenses, the National Committee of the UNTG receives from the Regional Committees a portion of their receipts.
The amount of this share is determined by the National Congress of the UNTG.
37. The right to disburse UNTG funds belongs to the National Committee and the Regional Committees, who cannot exceed the expenditures allowed for in the respective budgets without authorization by the National Conference of the UNTG.
The National Committee and the Regional Committees are responsible for incoming funds, for the preservation of material, and for their proper utilization.

Control Commissions:
38. The Control Commissions are the controlling bodies of the LUNTG.
39. The members of the Control Commissions are elected by the Regional Councils at the beginning of each year, and they cannot belong to either the National Committee or a Regional Committee.
40. The National Conference annually elects a Central Control Commission, which controls the activity of the National Committee of the UNTG and supervises the Control Commissions.
41. The Central Control Commission and the Control Commissions have the power to:
   a. Verify respect for the statutes and for democracy within the union.
   b. Control the execution of the union budget.
   c. Verify the balances and examine the accounts of the Committees.
   d. Verify the attention given to the letters, propositions, criticisms, or complaints presented by workers.
42. The Central Control Commission and every one of the Control Commissions elects a President and a Secretary from its members. The Central Control Commission and the Control Commissions present reports on their activities to the Congresses, Conferences, Regional Councils, or Assemblies of members.
43. The Presidents of the Central Control Commission and of the Control Commissions can participate, with a consultative vote, in the meetings of the National Committee and the Regional Committees, respectively.

44. In addition to the permanent commissions, special commissions may be created during the year to explain or control certain problems, upon the request of a base organization or of a Regional Council.

**Internal By-laws:**

45. Internal By-laws, worked out by the National Committee and submitted to the National Congress for ratification, establish the standards for the functioning of the UNTG.

* * * *

**Statutes of the Uniíto Democrática das Mulheres**

1. The Uniíto Democrática das Mulheres (UDEMU) is the popular organization that brings together all the women of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands without distinction as to origin, ethnic background, wealth, social class, political opinion, or religious belief.

2. The principal objective of the UDEMU is the complete emancipation of the women of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. As a first step, it has dedicated itself to active participation in the struggle for national liberation and to the complete decolonization of the peoples of these countries. The UDEMU recognizes the role of vanguard taken by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guinea e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in the fight for the national liberation of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands through its revolutionary efforts to mobilize, organize, and lead the popular masses against colonial domination.

3. To realize its objective, the UDEMU:
   a. Is mobilizing women for active participation in the fight for rapid and complete elimination of Portuguese colonialism, for decolonization, and for peaceful development of the progress and well-being of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands.
   b. Is actively and constantly defending the economic, political, social, and cultural interests of its members.
   c. Is fighting for progressive and complete equality in status with men--in the family, in work, and in public activities; is fighting against all factors and circumstances prejudicial to the dignity of women.
   d. Is constantly engaged in efforts to raise the cultural and educational level, as well as the professional and political awareness, of women.
   e. Is fighting to put into practice measures concerning the security of expectant and new mothers, the protection of children, and the establishment of day nurseries, kindergartens, and other social welfare projects.
   f. Is combatting all kinds of parasitism within the family and is struggling for the economic independence of women.
   g. Is establishing and developing bonds of friendship, solidarity, and brotherly collaboration with similar organizations, in the interest of the common struggle of women for their emancipation, for peace among peoples,
and for the progress of humanity.

4. The UDEMU is an active member of the Fédération des Femmes de l'Afrique Occidentale and reserves the right to affiliate itself with other international women's organizations.

5. The UDEMU is organized on the bases of territory and place of residence. The territorial organizations in the UDEMU are the nation and the zone. The local organization is the section.

The UDEMU is organizing citizens of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands living abroad. The overseas organizations function as sections of the UDEMU.

The principle governing leadership for all the organizations of the UDEMU is democratic centralism: free discussion within the organizations, rigorous enforcement of decisions made by voice majority, election of leaders for all posts, subordination of the lower bodies to the higher bodies, and central authority residing in the highest leadership group of the UDEMU.

6. The base organization of the UDEMU is the Section, which is established in places of residence such as the ward or neighborhood (in urban zones), and the village, tabanca or moranga (in rural areas).

Abroad, the Section will include all the members living in the same country, and will provide for the creation of Subsections.

The highest organ of the basic organization is the Section Meeting, which will assemble once a week. The Meeting elects the Section Committee and names the delegates to the Zone Assembly.

The Section Committee holds office for one year, it directs the daily activities of the base organization, and it comprises a President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and two Accountants. The Section Committee can be dissolved at any time by the Section Meeting.

7. The Zone is made up of Sections existing within a territorial unit of the UDEMU.

The highest body of the Zone is the Zone Assembly, which meets once every three months. The Zone Assembly judges and approves trimestral reports from the Sections, considers those problems concerning Section activities that are expressly included in the agenda, and names the delegates to the National Conference.

The Zone Committee, composed of the Section Presidents, is the executive body of the Zone. It holds office for one year, it meets once a month, it carries out the resolutions of the Zone Assembly, it creates other organizations, and it guides and controls the work of the Sections. The Zone Committee elects from among its members a secretariat of seven members whose job it is to oversee the leadership and to control the fulfillment of the resolutions of the Assembly. It names a financial committee to receive dues from the Sections, to pass on to the National Committee its share of the dues, and to oversee the finances of the UDEMU at the Zone level.
8. In each country or nation, the highest organ of the UDEMU is the National Conference, whose yearly meetings are called by the National Committee to:
--Discuss, correct, and approve the reports of the National Committee;
--Study and make decisions on those problems concerning the national, zone, or base organizations that are expressly included in the agenda;
--Elect the National Committee and indicate the functions of each member of that Committee;
--Appoint the delegates to the Congress;
--Work out the annual program of the UDEMU;
--Fix the dues and indicate the share that will be given to each organization level.

Between National Conferences, the National Committee is the highest body of leadership of the UDEMU in each country. It meets once every three months or when called by the National President.

During its mandate of one year, it applies the resolutions of the National Conference, sees that the program of the UDEMU is carried out, and guides and controls work in the Zones.

The National Committee elects from among its members a Secretariat of seven members, who carry out the tasks of leadership and organize a Control Commission to oversee the execution of the annual program and a Financial Commission to receive dues from the Zones, to pass on to the Principal Committee its share of the dues, and to develop the finances of the UDEMU at the national level.

9. The supreme organ of the UDEMU is the Congress of Women of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, whose biennial meetings are called by the National Committee. The Congress:
--Discusses, corrects, and approves the reports of the Principal Committee;
--Reviews, modifies, and approves the general program and statutes of the UDEMU;
--Elects the Principal Committee;
--Studies and resolves those problems expressly included in the agenda that concern the national organizations.

The Congress may be called into extraordinary session by the Principal Committee or upon the request of a number of organizations within the UDEMU whose members constitute at least two-thirds of the total membership. The number of delegates to the Committee is fixed by the Principal Committee.

10. Between Congresses, the highest leadership body of the UDEMU is the Principal Committee, which meets every four months and has a mandate of two years. It may be called into extraordinary session by the Principal President, reflecting the will of at least two-thirds of the Committee's members. The Principal Committee is divided into the Departments necessary for its activities, which must include at least the following: Organization and Propaganda, Administration and Finances, Social Affairs, Culture and Information, Reports and External Affairs, and Control.
The Executive Committee of the Principal Committee is composed of a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary-General, an Assistant Secretary-General, a Treasurer, and two Assistants. The Executive Committee assures, in the name of the Principal Committee, the life and functioning of the UDEMU, coordinates its activities in the two countries, names the departmental leaders, and may create commissions to study and resolve special problems concerning the activities and growth of the UDEMU.

11. Any woman over fourteen may become a member of the JDEMU. A woman may be admitted as a member of the UDEMU during a meeting of the Section Committee, after she has petitioned for membership and has paid her enrollment fee. Her admission must be approved by the Section Meeting. The member receives as documentary proof of membership a UDEMU card, issued by the National Committee through the Section Committee. When a member changes residence, she must communicate this fact to her base organization and have herself enrolled in the Section corresponding to her new residence. Membership in the UDEMU may be lost by expulsion or by duly justified resignation.

12. A member of the UDEMU has the following rights:
--To participate in the meetings of the base organizations and in their respective decisions;
--To participate in the elections and be elected for all offices, delegations, and representations of the UDEMU.
--To propose measures concerning the improvement and activities of the UDEMU and criticize the bodies of leadership during meetings, assemblies, conferences, congresses, and in the UDEMU publications.
--To have recourse to the UDEMU for the defense of her economic, political, social, and cultural rights.
--To demand personal participation in any case where the bodies of leadership make decisions concerning her activities or behavior as a member of the UDEMU.

13. A member of the UDEMU has the following duties:
--To act promptly in the service of the objectives and tasks of the UDEMU, in order to put effectively into practice the decisions made by the leadership bodies.
--To participate actively in the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guind and the Cape Verde Islands.
--To always act in accord with the defense of the dignity and complete emancipation of women.
--To constantly perfect her professional skills and knowledge and to raise her level of culture.
--To respect the statutes of the UDEMU and to pay her dues promptly. All members more than three months behind in dues payment lose their rights and privileges as members of the UDEMU.
14. In case of infraction of statutes, violation of discipline, or failure to pay dues, the bodies of leadership may, as a corrective measure, apply the following sanctions: warning, reprimand, censure, suspension, and, as an extreme measure, expulsion. Expulsion or exclusion is decided upon by the Zone Committee, upon presentation of proof of the infraction committed. Decisions concerning expulsion must be made with caution and be confirmed by the National Committee. An expelled member may return to the UDEMU after a probationary period during which the improvement of her conduct, on the basis of self-criticism, is under surveillance. The member must again petition for membership, and the petition must be confirmed by the National Committee. A member may appeal to higher leadership bodies concerning any sanction made against her.

15. The funds of the UDEMU are derived from dues, enrollment fees, subsidies, gifts, and the income of the organization itself. A general budget will determine the spending of UDEMU funds at each national level, with the agreement of the Zones and Sections, for each year. Expenses may be included in the budget only with the authorization of the National Committee as ratified by the Principal Committee. The conservation and the utilization of the goods of the UDEMU are the responsibility of the National Committee. Internal by-laws, worked out by the Principal Committee and submitted to the Congress for ratification, will establish, in detail, the standards for the functioning of the UDEMU.

16. During the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and of the Cape Verde Islands, the UDEMU will devote itself principally to the extension of this fight and to the active participation of its members in the conquest of national independence. Until the first Congress or National Conference is held, the UDEMU is to be led by a Provisional Principal Committee. The Provisional Principal Committee has as its primary task the development of the organization of the UDEMU and the assurance of the active participation of women in the fight for national liberation. In view of the Portuguese colonial repression, the Provisional Principal Committee may establish its office abroad, preferably in a neighboring country. When a portion of the national territory has been liberated, the headquarters of the UDEMU will be set up there. Only the Congress may dissolve the UDEMU, with the approval of a two-thirds majority of the organization members in good standing. In the event that the UDEMU is dissolved, the disposition of its goods will be determined by the Congress.

17. During the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and of the Cape Verde Islands, the UDEMU will devote itself principally to the extension of this fight and to the active participation of its members in the conquest of national independence.

18. Until the first Congress or National Conference is held, the UDEMU is to be led by a Provisional Principal Committee. The Provisional Principal Committee has as its primary task the development of the organization of the UDEMU and the assurance of the active participation of women in the fight for national liberation. In view of the Portuguese colonial repression, the Provisional Principal Committee may establish its office abroad, preferably in a neighboring country. When a portion of the national territory has been liberated, the headquarters of the UDEMU will be set up there. Only the Congress may dissolve the UDEMU, with the approval of a two-thirds majority of the organization members in good standing. In the event that the UDEMU is dissolved, the disposition of its goods will be determined by the Congress.

19. In view of the Portuguese colonial repression, the Provisional Principal Committee may establish its office abroad, preferably in a neighboring country. When a portion of the national territory has been liberated, the headquarters of the UDEMU will be set up there. Only the Congress may dissolve the UDEMU, with the approval of a two-thirds majority of the organization members in good standing. In the event that the UDEMU is dissolved, the disposition of its goods will be determined by the Congress.

The FLING Charter

Preamble

Because unity is one of the fundamental conditions for the success of all those who are struggling for a just cause,
Because the inevitable victory of the African peoples of so-called "Portuguese" Guiné over the destruction and corruption of Portuguese colonialism rests upon the unity of all nationalist forces, Because the time for independence has come and because immediate and total independence of "Portuguese" Guiné is one of the fundamental requirements for the realization of viable African unity and "Portuguese" Guiné can serve as the base for economic, social, and political aggression against the colonialists,

Because the Portuguese government refuses to negotiate, And because nationalist leaders have undeniably shown that to engage in endless monologue is to betray the best interests of the people, The nationalist leaders of "Portuguese" Guiné, after making several appeals for unity through all the Guinean revolutionary movements calling for national independence, and in order to conform to the will of all the people of "Portuguese" Guiné, decided, during conferences held in Dakar, July 5 to August 3, 1962, to create a coalition for the reconquest of ancestral lands and of African dignity. This coalition fighting for the total liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination has been created by the nationalist organizations of "Portuguese" Guiné listed below:

--Movimento de Libertaglo da Guiné (MLG)
--Movimento de Libertago da Guiné (MLG, Bissau)
--Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné (MLG, Conakry)
--Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de la Guinée dite Portugaise (RDAG) and
--the Unilo das PopulagSes da Guiné (UPG--Bissau)

The coalition is to be called:
--FRENTE DE LUTA PELA INDEPENDENCIA NATIONAL DA GUINE (FLING)
--FRONT DE LUTTE POUR L'INDEPENDANCE NATIONALE DE LA GUINE (FLING)

Basic Principles
The FLING is a revolutionary organization open to all nationalist organizations of "Portuguese" Guiné and to all people of good will, with the restriction that they have strict respect for the legitimate aspirations of the people of "Portuguese" Guiné.

FLING clearly states its desire to collaborate with all the patriotic and democratic Portuguese forces in the world, including those within Portugal, with the obvious condition that they first recognize the right to self-determination for the people of "Portuguese" Guiné. On this occasion FLING reaffirms the position held by the nationalist organizations constituting it: FLING will not fail to distinguish between oppressed people of Portugal and the fascist and colonialist Portuguese government.

The objective of FLING is the forcible reconquest of the national independence of "Portuguese" Guiné.
FLING will establish effective bonds of friendship and solidarity with all peoples struggling for their national independence (those under English, Spanish, etc., colonial domination) and especially with the peoples of the other Portuguese colonies: Angola, Slo Tomé and Principe, the Cape Verde Islands, Mogambique, and Timor.

Within this framework, FLING is ready to participate in a conference with fighting coalitions created in the other Portuguese colonies. The aim of the conference would be to set up an even larger ensemble, based on cooperation and solidarity, to fight against Portuguese colonialism.

FLING must not, however, be obliged to wait for the agreement of any one government or of any one organization before undertaking its armed fight against Portuguese colonialists, since it is more aware than ever that a country's struggle for national independence rests first of all upon the revolutionary organizations of the people of that country.

FLING is equally convinced that it will not stand alone in that battle. Since "Portuguese" Guiné is an integral part of Africa, FLING continues to believe firmly in the concrete and positive positions that the independent nations of Africa will take.

The Battle

In reality, the fascist and colonialist Portuguese government has always ignored the emancipation of Africa.

Throughout Africa, former colonies are becoming independent, sovereign nations. Only the Portuguese colonies remain in slavery, obscurantism, and misery, in spite of the firm determination of the people of these countries to liberate themselves from the Portuguese colonialist yoke at any cost.

In view of all the efforts already undertaken by the member nationalist movements to obtain a peaceful settlement of the demand for the total liberation and independence of "Portuguese" Guiné, FLING resolutely commits itself to the method that the Portuguese government imposes upon it: armed combat.

For this fight, which appears difficult but which can end only in victory, FLING has decided to mobilize all the people of "Portuguese" Guiné, to do all it can to provide them with arms and leaders capable of directing a united effort and producing the rapid elimination of Portuguese colonial domination.

With this foundation based on armed combat and the creation of a military organization, FLING will appeal to all peoples who believe in justice, peace, and liberty, particularly to the African and Asiatic nations, for immediate and concrete support. (For this same reason FLING is placing all its trust in its sister republics of Senegal and Guiné.) Furthermore, FLING believes that these two countries, tied to "Portuguese" Guiné by so many bonds (historic, ethnic, economic, etc.), will not hesitate to shoulder their responsibilities toward the people of fighting Guiné, as Tunisia and Morocco did toward fighting Algeria, and as the Congo has done now toward Angola.

FLING reaffirms that it will utilize all the means at its disposal to attain the immediate and total independence of "Portuguese" Guiné.
Organization
FLING is headed by a Revolutionary Council and a Revolutionary Committee:
--The Revolutionary Council is the supreme body of FLING. It is composed of eight representatives from the organizations belonging to FLING.
--The Revolutionary Committee is the executive body of FLING.
The armed combat is conducted by a national army, led by a general staff responsible to the Revolutionary Council, under the control of the Revolutionary Committee.
The composition and the functions of all these bodies, as well as all the matters not covered in this Charter, will be dealt with in the Internal By-laws.

Conclusion
The armed combat that the people of "Portuguese" Guiné and FLING are waging has as its principal objective, after liberation, the realization of national independence. Thus it is a just and sacred fight. Likewise, it is one of the essential factors in the true and total realization of long-desired African unity, and it is inscribed ipso facto in the framework of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the liquidation of colonialism.
FLING is more convinced than ever of its success and places all its confidence in the people of "Portuguese" Guiné and in itself. It is equally convinced that the nations of the world who have known foreign domination, especially the now-independent African and Asian nations, will not remain indifferent to this struggle.

FOR THE DIGNITY AND THE LIBERTY OF THE AFRICAN AND ASIAN PEOPLES,
FOR AFRO-ASIAN UNITY AND SOLIDARITY,
FOR PEACE IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE WORLD,
LONG LIVE INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN GUINE!
LONG LIVE FLING!
* * * *

IV
IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The following statements trace the ideological thought and development of Amfícar Cabral and his movement, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), beginning with his writings as a student in Lisbon and continuing with other writings published while he was an agronomist for the Portuguese government and later when he became a nationalist leader and revolutionary.

In Defense of the Land
by
Amfícar Cabral
[The following statement, one of Cabral's earliest writings, focuses on the problems of land and man in the Cape Verde Islands where the author was born. The statement is from "Em defesa da terra," Cabo Verde: Boletim de Propaganda e Informagio, I (November 1949), 2-5.]
Due to the present situation in Cabo Verde, it is clear that the first step that must be taken is the defense of man. This requires a series of effective measures, planned and executed in full awareness of reality. One of the measures—in our opinion the most important—which will at once and forever guarantee the life that the people of Cabo Verde deserve, is defense of the land. Without fear of contradiction, we can even declare that, in an environment such as Cabo Verde in which agriculture is the mainspring of the economy, defending the land is the most efficient way of defending man. Thus, in spite of being aware that the present moment is essentially characterized by a general hope in an imminent revival and should be a moment of neither lamentations nor discouraging criticism, we venture to make reference to a most serious problem—soil erosion—one of the greatest enemies of man in Cabo Verde, where the phenomenon has acquired truly ruinous aspects. We believe, however, that singling out the problem, as the surgeon does when he introduces the scalpel into the body of a patient to discover the source of the illness, is, at least, the first step toward a satisfactory and life-giving cure. . . .

Cabo Verde has long suffered from droughts and all the effects inherent in them, but is not rare to hear elderly persons refer to former times of abundance when singing rivers ran through leafy valleys, the higher slopes of which were covered with the most varied vegetation, when fine springs fed the irrigation canals, when there were abundant millet and French bean crops, etc., etc. We must add that little or none of this remains today. If anyone tries to refute our opinion, principally in regard to productivity, by claiming that the small quantities of produce obtained now are due more to lack of rains than to erosion, we demand proof of the fact through a comparison of the statistics of past and recent years with reference to production and rainfall. If elementary statistics are lacking, an inquiry should be made among experienced and capable individuals who have lived long enough to be able to make such a comparison.

No. Erosion has left its mark there, on the slopes of the barren mountains, in the desiccated valleys, in the springs that disappeared, in the lands no longer cultivated because they became sterile, in a thousand and one places we do not have space in this discussion to mention. And there is more: We note the facility and frequency with which waterfalls flow now, abundant but more clayey than ever, slight amounts of rainfall being enough to create great falls of water that did not appear before. This proves that the capacity for water retention and infiltration has been greatly reduced. With rains so abundant and regular as those of this year, it was to be hoped that the springs would sooner or later flow again but, as we have shown, so much time has passed that many of the springs remained dry. In all these phenomena, and in many more that could be cited, we must see erosion as the indirect, if not the absolute, cause.

Having referred generally to the causes and the consequences of erosion in Cabo Verde, the question naturally arises: Is it not possible to stop or prevent erosion? Is there any way of stopping the ball that, thrown from a great distance, rolls threateningly down the inclined plane of the life of the archipelago?
Yes. In Cabo Verde, as in many other regions of Africa, erosion has become extremely serious. We ourselves believe--and we are careful not to exaggerate--that, coming to terms with the definitive function of the phenomenon, erosion is one of the causes of the present climatic characteristics; and, thinking of the future--which is what most interests us--thinking of the destruction of the soil by the rain waters that encounter no obstacles to their action, we are not sure whether Cabo Verde suffers more when it rains or when it does not rain (it is evident that we sentimentally prefer the rains).

Aware of the evil that erosion has caused and is still causing in the archipelago, anyone who is concerned with the well-being of the people of Cabo Verde will see the defense of the land as a prime necessity, because no measure taken to obtain the resurgence of agriculture in Cabo Verde will be effective unless erosion is fought. Such a fight, in defense of the land, may possibly have a successful prognosis if it is conducted with full awareness of the realities that govern the phenomenon. Other peoples have been successful in using scientific knowledge in the service of general wellbeing. It is certain that such a job requires great expenditures of energy and money, but, as they say, for great ills, great remedies. And we, people of Portugal, people of Cabo Verde, beginning the fight against erosion, defending the land and the man of Cabo Verde--elements undoubtedly essential to the Portuguese world--can do no more than join the great movement against erosion that has developed in the present period of the life of man. Such a fight cannot be undertaken privately or individually; it must be a widespread attack based on serious studies carried on “in loco” and executed under the supervision of the government, with the effective collaboration of all. Only thus will we be victorious in this imminent fight, from which we cannot flee.

We do not want to end these observations without citing some of the modern methods that can be used to fight the illness to which we have made brief reference. These methods are: a) in semi-arid regions such as present-day Cabo Verde, as a first step, the utilization of rain water with the least possible loss; b) the building up of lands for cultivation, of the modern or bench terrace type; c) the construction of dikes along the watercourses (here we point out the excellence of the constructions instituted by former Governor Jolo de Figueiredo); d) the construction of dams and cisterns; e) reforestation with species better adapted to Cabo Verde; f) rationalization of agriculture, with the establishment of a system of farming adapted to Cabo Verde; g) the construction of retaining walls on steep slopes; h) research on the adaptation of contour cultivation; i) strip farming, etc.

As we see, there are many means that can be utilized to effectively fight erosion in Cabo Verde, a step that--we repeat--must be taken because of the gravity of the problem in the archipelago.

On the Contribution of the 'Peoples" of Guiné to Agricultural Production in Guiné

by

Amílcar Cabral
One of the characteristics of Guind is its great variety of peoples. Although they are slowly disappearing in spite of living hermitically, one still finds several black African peoples whose origins are a historic-ethnological problem. There is flagrant diversity, ranging from skin color to dwelling and town types, from language to religion or beliefs, from clothing to eating customs, from agricultural implements to marriage laws, from division of labor to the sharing of wealth— from the economic in infrastructure to the social superstructure. But present in all the peoples and dominating that diversity, both in the cultural and material realms, is the influence of an identical politico-social situation and an identical livelihood-agriculture.

The peoples of Guind are farmers. Guind makes its living from the labor of those who, secularly and socially anonymous, basing their work on tradition and on empiric knowledge of agriculture, using only rudimentary implements, cultivate the land and are, therefore, the essential element of the economy of Guind. Agriculture, the too often demeaned agriculture of the native, is not only the basis for the economy of Guind; it is the economy itself. Without it, there would be no food, no commerce, no industry. Hence the importance of the activities of the native farmer. Hence the necessity for knowing about all aspects of that activity before one tries to aid it, to improve it, to transform it so that those who perform it may raise its level of social importance to its level of economic importance. The agricultural survey now being concluded will give us information on several quantitative and qualitative aspects of the agriculture of Guind.

The real contribution of each "people" to agricultural production in Guind is an interesting aspect to study and become acquainted with. Such interest is evident. Since it is certain that the "peoples" of Guind are farmers, and that, theoretically, the economic strength of each "people" is only as great as its agricultural contribution, that strength (or value) can be well-defined only by knowing what each "people" actually does. Evidently, this knowledge creates another differentiation among the peoples of Guind, precisely in the area that, combined with the politico-social situation, ties them together: the area of agriculture. The current survey is the first phase of the study of the contribution of the peoples of Guind to agricultural production. Study and comparison of areas under cultivation, analysis and interpretation of the agricultural exploitation of the family, comparative study (quantitative and qualitative) of production and income from agriculture of each "people"—these are tasks that are indispensable to the knowledge of the contribution referred to above ....

In conclusion:

a. Only 12.21 percent of Guind's 3, 363, 700 hectares (excluding the liquid area) is under cultivation.
b. Generally, the most (and least) populated areas correspond to the most (and least) cultivated areas. The exceptions are the Fula and Bijag6 peoples, who change positions with the Balanta and Nal peoples, respectively.

c. Analogous to the populational scale, the following scale can be established showing, in decreasing order, the various "peoples" in relation to their contribution to the total cultivated area:

1. Balanta
2. Fula
3. Mandinga
4. Manjaco
5. Mancanha
6. Papel
7. Beafada
8. Felupe
9. Mansoanca
10. Balanta-man6
11. Baiote
12. Nal6
13. Bijag6
14. Pajadinca
15. Sosso
16. Saracol6
17. Cassanga
18. Banhum

d. It can be seen that:
--The Balanta, Fula, Beafada, Balanta-man6, Sosso, Cassanga, and Banhum "peoples" have the same relative position on this scale as on the populational scale.
--The Manjaco, Papel, Bijag6, and Saracol6 "peoples" have a lower position on the scale of cultivated areas than on the populational scale.
--However, it is not enough to consider the population factor when inferring differences in contribution to the total cultivated area. One "people" with a given population can cultivate a greater (or lesser) area than that cultivated by another which has a greater (or lesser) population. Such a fact suggests the importance of studying the characteristics of family agricultural exploitation (agricultural techniques, cultivated area, productivity) for the full knowledge of the economic value of each "people."

e. The first four "peoples" (Balanta, Fula, Mandinga, and Manjaco) contribute 86.99 percent (almost 9/10) of the total cultivated area. Because of that fact and because these four "peoples" form the background of the population of Guind, with agricultural activity in almost all the Circunscrig6es and Concelhos... their work is the real incentive for agricultural production, and they are therefore the principal creators of wealth in Guind.

f. The Mancanha, Papel, Beafada, and Felupe "peoples" contribute 9.40 percent of the total cultivated area, and the other ten "peoples" contribute 3.61 percent. These "peoples" have a small representation in the populational field (each comprises less than 1 percent of the total population), with the exception of the Bijag6 and Balanta-man6 "peoples."

g. Based on these conclusions, the agricultural "peoples" of Guind can be classified in relation to their contribution to the total cultivated area:
--Peoples of principal contribution: Balanta, Fula, Madinga, and Manjaco.
--Peoples of secondary contribution: Mancanha, Papel, Beafada, and Felupe.
Peoples of subsidiary contribution: the rest. This classification does not imply superiority or inferiority in any of the peoples in relation to the others. It simply refers to their contribution to the total cultivated area, one of the essential elements of agricultural production, of the economy of Guiné.

Precisely because this differentiation is found in the economic field against the backdrop of an identical politico-social situation and an extremely low standard of living in all categories, it transcends the ethnic and cultural diversity and it will have, necessarily, a preponderant projection in the economic, and therefore general, evolution of Guiné.

Frente de Libertagao da Guiné e Cabo Verde,
Partido Africano da Independência

[The following message appeals to Portuguese settlers in the Cape Verde Islands and Portuguese Guiné to join nationalist forces in opposing Portuguese colonialism. It was signed by Amfílcar Cabral and others in "Frente de Libertagao da Guiné e Cabo Verde, Partido Africano da Independência," n. p., October 1960.]

Message to the Portuguese Colonists in Guiné and Cape Verde
We send you this message in the deepest spirit of human understanding and brotherhood. The situation is grave, and each man and woman must find the courage to conscientiously shoulder his responsibilities as he contemplates the aspirations, the rights, and the struggle of the African peoples.

Your colonialist ancestors conquered Guiné by force. They enslaved, they sold, they massacred, they dominated, and they exploited the people of Guiné for five centuries. Today, in defense of certain Portuguese and non-Portuguese enterprises, the colonialists persecute, arrest, torture, and massacre the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde, who are fighting to reclaim the liberty and dignity of the people of Guiné.

With the slaves wrested from Africa, especially from Guiné, the slave-traders and Portuguese colonialists created a marketplace for the slave trade in Cabo Verde. Once freed from slavery, the Africans of Cabo Verde and their descendants earned through their labors the right to control their future and the resources of the archipelago, which is today their fatherland. But the Portuguese colonialists do not recognize the right of the people of Cabo Verde to build for themselves, in liberty and in national independence, a life of progress in which they will never again fall victims to the exploitation, misery, and hunger that Portuguese colonialism has imposed upon them.

The peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde, united by bonds of blood and history that can never be destroyed, are determined to put an end to Portuguese colonial domination. Our peoples want to build, in peace and dignity, a free African fatherland, a democratic and progressive land, in which any human being, of any origin, will have the opportunity to freely develop his natural character and to effectively contribute to the progress of all.
But Portuguese colonialists obstinately maintain their odious domination over our peoples. To do this, they persecute, they arrest, they torture, and they massacre; they foment hunger and misery and ignorance; and they constantly increase their armed forces in cynical preparation for continuing the blood baths with which they repress all attempts at liberation made by our peoples. You know all this, because you are either agents or witnesses of all that happens in our lands. You took part in, or were witnesses to, the massacre on the docks of Pijiguiti (Bissau, August 3, 1959). You were present when more than thirty thousand people of Cabo Verde died, decimated by hunger between 1942 and 1947. But there are things that we must tell you now, so that tomorrow none of you will be able to claim as an excuse that you did not know.

Our people will terminate Portuguese colonialism—and soon. Our people are not fighting to take revenge upon those who actually committed the crimes of Portuguese colonialism; they are fighting to reclaim their liberty and dignity—elements fundamental to their being human. For that same reason—because it is our human nature and the very foundation of our struggle—we sympathetically view your problem at this grave and decisive moment. And we are certain that some, if not all, of you will understand the aspirations, the rights, and the struggle of our people.

We make a distinction between Portuguese colonialism and Portuguese colonists, just as we distinguish between a cart and its wheels. A cart cannot run without wheels. Portuguese colonialism cannot function without colonists. You have been the wheels of the old and hateful cart of Portuguese colonialism, which attempts to continue running against all the realities of history, at the expense of the material and human resources of our lands, at the expense of the exploitation and destruction of our peoples. But the Portuguese colonists are being deceived, for our peoples will completely eliminate Portuguese colonialism. You must not let yourselves be deceived; you must not continue to be simple pieces of an anachronistic mechanism condemned to disappear. You must prove that you are good men.

Under the protection of colonial violence, you have been and you continue to be masters in relation to the peoples of our lands. You became accustomed to dealing with and controlling our lives and our goods with a degree of inhumanity only rarely alleviated by the empathy or good will of a very few. Many of you will never free your consciences of the crimes you committed against our peoples, privately or as agents of colonialism. Others of you were understanding, even progressive men in your fatherland, but once you arrived in our lands, you forgot your good sense and reason and adapted yourselves comfortably to the demands and to the crimes of the colonialists. The color of your skin has always been sufficient to guarantee your supremacy and privilege in our lands, leading to white contempt for the feelings, rights, culture, civilization, and just aspirations of our peoples. Today, as a result of our fight for liberation, you are anguished at the prospect of a radical change in your position.

But things will change, whatever the cost. Our peoples are going to become masters of their own destinies. In the meantime, your anguish need not exist if
you want and know how to act as conscientious men and thus stop playing the
part of unconscious cogs in the machine that domi
nates and exploits our peoples. Everything depends on the position you adopt in relation to our fight for
liberation. We, who are not hypocrites like the Portuguese colonialists, have
already guaranteed that the just interests of all foreigners--Portuguese and non-
Portuguese--who live and work in our lands will be respected after the liberation
of our peoples. We wish to live in peace and to cooperate with all the peoples of
the world; we desire friendship and collaboration with all men who respect the
sacred rights of our peoples.
PORTUGUESE COLONISTS OF GUINE AND CABO VERDE!
The days of Portuguese colonialism are numbered, and you know it. As
conscientious men, you must not let your destiny be linked to the destiny of
Portuguese colonialism! Do not continue to be the mercenaries of an unjust and
lost cause; do not continue to allow the Portuguese colonialist enterprises to use
the inglorious sacrifice of yourself and your families to defend their despicable
interests! If you do not have the courage to support our struggle, preserve your
dignity as men and refuse to serve the Portuguese colonialists; take a position of
neutrality regarding our struggle for liberation!
It is up to you, however, to determine your own destiny in the free, democratic,
and progressive fatherland that our peoples will build after rapidly and totally
destroying the detestable Portuguese colonialism. Your situation tomorrow
depends entirely upon what you do today. You may be certain that from now on
our peoples will not fail to exercise the most rigorous justice with regard to each
one of you.
LONG LIVE FRIENDSHIP, EQUALITY, AND PEACEFUL
COLLABORATION
AMONG ALL PEOPLES!
LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION OF ALL OPPRESSED
PEOPLES!

DOWN WITH PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM!
LONG LIVE THE PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDENCIA!
Movimento de Libertagio da Guin6 e Cabo Verde
Proclamation
by
Amflcar Cabral et al.
[This document outlines the relationship of the Movimento de Libertagio da
Guin6 e Cabo Verde (MLGCV) to the Partido Africano da Independencia da
Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) as of late 1960. It was written by Cabral and others
as "Movimento de Libertagio da Guin6 e Cabo Verde--proclamago," Conakry,
November 1960.]
Movimento de Libertag~o da Guind e Cabo Verde (MLGCV) is a patriotic
African organization created by the people of Guind and Cabo Verde residing in
the Republic of Guinde. The MLGCV is a section of the Frente de Libertagio da
Guind Portuguesa e Cabo Verde (FLGC). The principal objective of the MLGCV
is "to effectively support the struggle for liberation being carried on by the
peoples of Guinea and Cabo Verde against Portuguese colonialism and to participate actively in this struggle for the immediate conquest of the national independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde” (Article 4 of the MLGCV Statutes).

After having studied in detail the present situation of the struggle for the liberation of our peoples, as well as the declaration of the PAIGC dated last October 15; and

CONSIDERING that we must quickly put an end to Portuguese colonialism in our lands and that to do so our struggle must enter into a new phase;

CONSIDERING that both in our countries and abroad the situation is advantageous for the rapid elimination of Portuguese colonialism, and that the hour at which we shall terminate the hateful Portuguese domination is rapidly approaching;

CONSIDERING that it is our own peoples who must free themselves from Portuguese colonialism in order to regain their liberty and dignity and peacefully build a life of progress;

CONSIDERING that the Portuguese colonialists are resorting to using any means available in an attempt to maintain their barbaric domination over our peoples and that we also have the right and the duty to use any means to destroy their forces and expel them from our lands;

CONSIDERING that to attain that sacred end it is indispensable to mobilize and unite all our forces around a single, strong group of leaders and to place them wholly and unconditionally at the service of our struggle for liberation;

CONSIDERING that some natives of our countries who have emigrated are trying to split our unified forces abroad in order to further goals that have nothing in common with the fundamental interests of our peoples; and

CONSIDERING that the solidarity of African and Afro-Asiatic peoples is becoming stronger and more effective every day through their united fight against colonialism and imperialism; the MOVIMENTO DE LIBERTACAO DA GUINE E CABO VERDE

1. PROCLAIMS its firm decision to take advantage of all the factors abroad that favor our courageous struggle for liberation in order to hasten the conquest of national independence in Guinea and Cabo Verde;

2. AFFIRMS proudly its certainty that the liberation of our peoples from hateful Portuguese colonial domination is a task for our own peoples who, like all African peoples, will be able to regain their liberty and dignity with honor, in order to bring about a life of peace and progress.

3. PROCLAIMS its total adherence to the Frente de Libertaggo da Guiné Portuguesa e Cabo Verde (FLGC) and its unconditional support for the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC).

4. DECLARES that all its members are entirely at the disposition of our struggle for liberation, in order that, using any means possible and fighting alongside our people they may help destroy the forces of the Portuguese colonialists and expel them from our lands within a short time.
5. CALLS upon all the patriotic forces of Guiné and Cabo Verde, both within the countries and abroad, to organize themselves as well as possible, to proceed to full mobilization of the popular masses, and to unite themselves for combat through our FLGC, led by the PAIGC.

6. CONDEMNS vigorously all compatriots or natives of our lands who have tried or are trying to split our unified forces in order to further goals that have nothing in common with the sacred interests of our peoples—and who, therefore, serve only the interests of the colonialists.

7. PROCLAIMS, finally, its unshakable confidence in the active friendship and solidarity of African and Asiatic peoples with our cause, especially in the brotherly support and aid from the peoples of our neighboring countries. ON WITH THE FIGHT FOR LIQUIDATION OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM!

LONG LIVE THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF GUINE AND CABO VERDE!

LONG LIVE THE FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DA GUINE PORTUGUESA E CABO VERDE!

LONG LIVE THE PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDENCIA!

LONG LIVE THE MOVIMENTO DE LIBERTACAO DA GUINE E CABO VERDE!

DOWN WITH PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM!

The PAIGC Minor Program

[The important "minor" and "major" programs of the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) were originally published in the PAIGC's Statuts et programme, Conakry, n.d., pp. 19-27.]

1. Structural union of all nationalist and patriotic forces of "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands in order to liquidate Portuguese imperialist domination in these two African nations.

2. Structural union of nationalist and patriotic forces of Guiné and Cabo Verde at home and abroad in the fight for the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.

3. Effective alliance with nationalist and patriotic organizations in other Portuguese colonies for mutual support and coordination of the fight for liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. Collaboration with African, Asian, and Latin American peoples who are fighting against colonialism and imperialism.

4. Effective training based on mobilization and organization of the popular masses to fight against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.

5. Struggle—and only if necessary, armed conflict—for the rapid and total destruction of the Portuguese colonial forces in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands and for the conquest of complete national independence for the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. Fight against imperialism.

6. Structural union of all political, union, and mass organizations in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands, to build a life of peace, well-being, and progress for the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde. In this union will be the
permanent defense of the interests of the peasants and urban workers who make up almost the entire population.

7. During the fight for liberation and after the conquest of national independence, collaboration with all the progressive anti-colonial and anti-imperialist forces of the world for the construction of a life of peace and progress for all peoples.

The PAIGC Major Program

I. Immediate, total independence

1. Immediate conquest, using any necessary means, of national, total, and unconditional independence for the people of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands.

2. Conquest of power, in "Portuguese" Guinea, by the people of "Portuguese" Guinea, and in the Cape Verde Islands, by the people of Cabo Verde.

3. Termination of all colonialistic or imperialistic relationships; and end to all the Portuguese and foreign prerogatives over the popular masses; revision or revocation of all agreements, treaties, alliances, concessions, made by the Portuguese colonialists involving "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands.

4. National and international sovereignty of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands. Economic, political, diplomatic, military, and cultural independence.

5. Permanent vigilance, based on the will of the people, to prevent or destroy any attempts by imperialists and colonialists to re-establish themselves, in new forms, in "Portuguese" Guinea and in the Cape Verde Islands.

II. National unity in "Portuguese" Guinea and in the Cape Verde Islands

1. Equal rights and duties, solid union and fraternal collaboration among the citizens, whether considered individually, by social class, or by ethnic groups. Prohibition and extermination of all attempts to divide the people.

2. Economic, political, social, and cultural unity.

In "Portuguese" Guinea this unity will take into consideration the social and cultural characteristics of the diverse ethnic groups, whatever their population. In the Cape Verde Islands, each island or group of similar islands in close proximity will be able to enjoy a certain administrative autonomy, always within the framework of unity and national solidarity.

3. The return to "Portuguese" Guinea of all emigrants who wish to return to their country. The return to the Cape Verde Islands of exiled emigrants or workers who wish to return to their country. Free circulation of citizens throughout the national territory.

III. Unity between the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands

1. After the conquest of national independence in "Portuguese" Guinea and in the Cape Verde Islands, union of the peoples of these countries for the construction of a strong and progressive African fatherland based on opportunely consulted popular will.

The form of union between the two peoples will be established by their legitimate, freely elected representatives.
3. Equal rights and duties, solid union, and fraternal collaboration between the peoples of Guind and Cabo Verde. Prohibition and extermination of all attempts to divide the two peoples.

IV. African unity

1. After the conquest of national independence and if desired by freely manifested national will, to fight for the unity of African peoples, considered as a whole or by continental regions, always governed by respect for liberty, dignity, and these peoples' right to political, economic, social, and cultural progress.

2. To combat any attempt by any nation whatsoever to annex or put pressure on the people of "Portuguese" Guiné or the Cape Verde Islands.

3. Defense of the rights and the political, economic, social, and cultural gains of the popular masses in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands is the fundamental condition for the realization of unity with other African peoples.

V. Democratic, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist regime

1. A republican, democratic, lay, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist regime.

2. Establishment of fundamental liberties, respect for the rights of man, and guarantees of the exercise of these liberties and rights.

3. Equality of citizens before the law, with no distinction as to nationality or ethnic group, sex, social origin, cultural level, profession, wealth, religious beliefs, or philosophical convictions.

Men and women will enjoy equality with regard to the family, work, and public activities.

4. All individuals or individual groups who, by their actions or conduct, favor colonialism, imperialism, or the destruction of the people's unity will be deprived of their fundamental liberties, by whatever means necessary.

5. General, free elections of organs of power based on universal, direct, and secret suffrage.

6. Total elimination of the colonial administrative structure and establishment of a national, democratic structure by the internal administration of the country.

7. Protection of the persons of all foreigners living and working in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands who operate with respect for the current laws.

VI. Economic independence, a structured economy, and the development of production

1. Termination of all colonialistic or imperialistic relationships. Conquest of economic independence for "Portuguese" Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.

2. Harmonious planning and development of the economy. Economic activity will be directed according to the principles of democratic centralism.

3. Four types of ownership: state, cooperative, private, and personal. The natural resources; the principal means of production and of communications; social security; the radio and the other means of broadcasting, of imparting information, and of spreading culture will be considered as belonging to the nation of "Portuguese" Guiné and of the Cape Verde Islands and will be employed in accordance with the needs.
of rapid economic development.
Voluntary cooperative exploitation of the land and agricultural production, of the
production of consumer goods, and of handicrafts.
Private exploitation can be developed as needed to promote progress, on the
condition that it be useful to the rapid economic development of "Portuguese"
Guind and of the Cape Verde Islands.
Personal property--especially individual consumer goods, houses, and savings
earned through work--will be inviolable.
4. Development and modernization of agriculture. Transformation of the present
system in order to end the one-crop agricultural economy and to erase the
obligatory character of earth-nut cultivation in "Portuguese" Guind and maize
cultivation in the Cape Verde Islands. Struggle against agricultural crises,
drought, floods, and famine.
5. Agrarian reform in the Cape Verde Islands, with private rural property to be
limited in extent so that all peasants may have enough land to work. In
"Portuguese" Guind4, to profit from the traditional agricultural structures and to
create new ones that will permit the land to be used in a manner that will most
benefit the people's progress.
6. Both in "Portuguese" Guind and in the Cape Verde Islands, confiscation of
lands and other possessions of proven enemies of the people's liberty and of
national independence.
7. Development of modern industry and commerce. Progressive establishment of
state commercial and industrial enterprises. Development of an African artisan
class. State control of foreign trade and coordination of domestic commerce. Price
adjustment and stabilization. Elimination of speculation and unjust profits.
Harmony between urban and rural economic activities.
8. Budgetary equilibrium. Creation of a new fiscal system. Creation of a national
currency, stabilized and free from inflation.
VII. Justice and progress for all
A. At the social level:
1. Progressive elimination of man's exploitation of man, of all forms of
subservience of the human person for the profit of individuals, groups, or classes.
Elimination of misery, ignorance, fear, prostitution, and alcoholism.
2. Protection of the rights of workers and guarantee of work for all who can work.
Abolition of forced labor in "Portuguese" Guin4 and of exportation of forced
laborers or laborers taken "under contract" to the Cape Verde Islands.
3. Just salaries and fees based on the principle of equal pay for equal work.
Positive competition in work. Limitation of the length of the work day consistent
with the progress that must be made, but also with the interests of the workers.
Progressive elimination of the differences between [working conditions for]
urban and agricultural workers.
4. Freedoms for union and guarantees for their effective exercise. Participation
and creative initiative on the part of the popular masses effective in all levels of
national leadership. Instigation and support of both urban and rural mass organizations, principally those of women, youth, and students.

5. Social assistance for all unemployed, invalid, or ill citizens involuntarily in need. All institutions of public health and hygiene will be directed or controlled by the state.

6. Establishment of social services to be tied to the productive activity. Protection for pregnant women and infants. Protection for the aged. Rest, recreation, and culture for manual, intellectual, and agricultural workers.

B. At the educational and cultural level:

1. Educational centers and technical institutes will be considered as possessions of the nation and, as such, will be directed or controlled by the State. Educational reform, development of secondary and technical education, creation of universities and of scientific and technical institutes.


3. Total elimination of the complexes created by colonialism, of the consequences of colonialistic culture and exploitation.

4. In "Portuguese" Guinea, stimulation of the use of native languages and of the creole dialect; creation of a script for these languages. In Cabo Verde, stimulation of and a script for the creole dialect. Development of the cultures of the various ethnic groups and of the people of Cabo Verde. Protection and development of literature and the national arts.

5. Utilization of all the gains and discoveries of value made by human culture for the progress of the peoples of Guinea and of Cabo Verde. Contribution of these peoples' culture to humanity in general.


7. Religious freedom; freedom to have or not have a religion. Protection of churches and mosques, of places and objects of worship, of legal religious institutions. Independence for religious personnel.

VIII. Effective national defense based on the people themselves

1. Creation of the groups necessary for an effective national defense: army, navy, and air force, tied to the people and led by national citizens. The fighters for the conquest of independence will form the central core of national defense.

2. Democratic system within the armed forces. Discipline. Close collaboration between the armed forces and the political powers.

3. All the people must participate in the vigilance and the defense against colonialism, imperialism, and the enemies of the people's unity and progress.

4. Absolute prohibition of foreign military bases in the national territory.

IX. International policy to be developed in the interest of the nation, of Africa, of peace, and of the progress of humanity

1. Peaceful collaboration with all the peoples of the world, with respect for the principles of mutual respect, national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
nonaggression and noninterference in domestic affairs, equality and reciprocity, and peaceful coexistence.
Development of economic and cultural agreements with all peoples whose governments accept and respect these principles.
3. Nonalignment with military blocs.
4. Protection for natives of Guind and Cabo Verde residing abroad.

* * * *

Memorandum to the Portuguese Government
by
Amflcar Cabral et al.
[The following document sets forth nationalist demands to the Portuguese government and at the same time calls for a peaceful settlement. Written by Cabral and others, it was published as "Memorandum enviado ao govdrno português pelo Partido Africano da Independência," Conakry, December 1, 1960.]

We believe in the desirability and the real possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict between our people and the Portuguese government, and we are aware of the justice of our position and of the invincibility of our forces. We also believe that the Portuguese government will certainly have the common sense not to go so far as to commit the error of pushing the Portuguese people into the inglorious sacrifice of a colonial war in Guind and Cabo Verde. Therefore, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), faithfully interpreting the just aspirations of the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde, takes the initiative and proposes to the Portuguese government that the following measures permitting peaceful elimination of colonial domination in our lands be realized immediately:

2. Immediate withdrawal of Portuguese armed forces and political police (PIDE) from the territories of Guiné and Cabo Verde.
3. Total and unconditional amnesty and immediate release of all political prisoners.
4. Freedom of thought, assembly, association, and the press; political freedom and the freedom to form political parties and unions; and guarantees for the effective exercise of these liberties without distinction as to culture, sex, age, or wealth.
5. Universal suffrage for the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde without discrimination as to race, type of culture or civilization, sex, or wealth; one person, one vote.

6. Establishment of a House of Representatives in Guiné, on the basis of one representative per 30,000 inhabitants.
7. Establishment of a House of Representatives in Cabo Verde, on the basis of one representative per 10,000 inhabitants.
8. Both in Guiné and Cabo Verde, the House of Representatives must be elected through universal, direct, and secret suffrage in general, free elections controlled by a special United Nations commission. This commission should be composed of representatives of African nations.
9. Immediately following their establishment, the two Houses of Representatives must have a joint meeting to study and decide upon the possibility, bases, and form of realizing the structural union of the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde, a union based on their blood and historic ties and taking into consideration African unity.
10. If union is desired,
   a. Establishment of a Parliament with Deputies from Guiné and Cabo Verde, chosen from among the members previously elected for the Houses of Representatives, in accordance with bases decided upon in the joint meeting of the Houses. The Parliament thus constituted will be the supreme body of legislative power in Guiné and Cabo Verde.
   b. Organization of the government of Guiné and Cabo Verde, by the newly constituted Parliament, in accordance with the bases decided upon in the joint meeting of the two Houses of Representatives. The government thus organized will be the supreme body of executive power in Guiné and Cabo Verde.
   c. Execution of any other decisions made by the joint meeting of the two Houses of Representatives.
11. If union is not desired,
   a. Transformation of the Houses of Representatives into National Assemblies. The National Assembly of Guiné and the National Assembly of Cabo Verde will be the supreme bodies of legislative power in Guiné and Cabo Verde, respectively.
   b. Organization of the government of Guiné by the National Assembly of Guiné, and the government of Cabo Verde by the National Assembly of Cabo Verde. Each of these governments will be the supreme body of executive power in Guiné and Cabo Verde, respectively.
12. All matters concerning the life of the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde, including, obviously, relations with other countries, must be resolved and controlled by the people themselves, through their legitimate representatives. This condition is the indispensable basis upon which the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde will be able to guide their own destiny at any time and in complete freedom.

These are the concrete, constructive propositions that the PAIGC feels it must present, in the name of the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde, to the Portuguese government at this grave and decisive moment. To permit world groups to judge the amount of responsibility attributable to the Portuguese government in the evolution of the conflict in question, our people and the PAIGC must publicize this memorandum as widely as possible. The Portuguese government will surely understand our position. Memorandum to the United Nations General Assembly
by
Amflcar Cabral

[The following document is one of several appeals presented by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) to the U. N. General Assembly. It was written by Cabral as "Memorandum L Assembleia Geral da Organizaggo das Nag5es Unidas," Conakry, September 26, 1961.]

In December 1960, the PAIGC, faithfully interpreting the aspirations of the peoples of our countries for liberty, progress, and peace, presented the Portuguese government with a memorandum containing concrete and constructive proposals for the elimination of colonial domination. "The Portuguese colonialists responded to the just aspirations of our peoples in a barbaric manner, increasing repression, mass imprisonments, tortures, and massacres; they feverishly made preparations to unleash a colonial war of extermination and genocide in Guiné and Cabo Verde. Faced with the fiercely negative and repressive position of the Portuguese government (which refuses to adopt a peaceful solution to the elimination of colonial domination in our countries), the PAIGC, in memory of the fifty African workers massacred by colonialist forces during a strike in Bissau on August 3, 1959, chose August 3, 1961, to proclaim the passage of our national revolution from the phase of political fighting to that of national insurrection—to direct action against colonial forces.

Prisons and concentration camps are filled with more than two thousand patriots. Nationalists, those poorly armed or without weapons, as well as simple persons who desire only to live in peace, fall in action each day, cut down by the modern and powerful means available to Portuguese colonial forces, who have increased their repression and now massacre defenseless populations, beat down all suspects, burn our villages, and are preparing for a long colonial war of extermination. But no amount of force can make us waver in our decision or prevent the rapid and total elimination of colonial domination in our countries.

This unshakable determination of our peoples, who have mobilized and organized along with the peoples of other Portuguese colonies, prompted the Portuguese government to institute colonial reforms last August, in the hope of maintaining its odious domination in Africa and of improving its moral position before world opinion. Desperation prevented the Portuguese colonialists from seeing that by their reforms, they themselves were denouncing the absurdity of the colonial situation that they created and disastrously try to maintain.

Before the United Nations General Assembly, the PAIGC, in the name of the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde,

Interpreting the firm will of our peoples to free themselves from the Portuguese colonialist yoke by any means necessary,
Considering that the fifteenth United Nations General Assembly clearly decided, in December 1960, the legal status of the territories occupied by Portugal and finally buried the myth of "overseas provinces."
Recognizing that, in the face of the grave and critical situation that now threatens the world, a new focus of war could be fatal to international peace and security,
Considering that it would be absolutely impossible for Portugal to wage colonial wars without the concrete support and material aid of some of its allies, especially the nations of NATO and South Africa,

Finally, considering the resolutions of the fifteenth United Nations General Assembly on the granting of independence to colonial peoples:

Declares the unalterable determination of the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde to progressively develop direct action against the Portuguese colonial forces until foreign domination is completely eliminated;

Reaffirms that the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde are always ready to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict created by the colonial government of Portugal;

Declares that the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde are not fighting for colonial reforms but for the reclamation of their human liberty and dignity, and that they therefore reject all legislative measures adopted by the fascist-colonialist government of Portugal in its criminal fantasy of maintaining its odious domination of our countries;

Denounces the collaboration and material aid given to Portugal by the NATO nations and by South Africa;

Denounces the presence of Spanish soldiers and weapons in the colonial army of Guiné;

Proposes that Portugal be required to immediately comply with the resolution on the granting of independence to colonial peoples adopted by the fifteenth United Nations General Assembly. In this regard, the PAIGC hopes that Portugal will be required to take the following measures:

1. Solemn and immediate recognition of the rights of the peoples of Guiné and Cabo Verde to self-determination and to national independence.
2. Immediate withdrawal of Portuguese armed forces and the political police (PIDE) from Guiné and Cabo Verde.
3. Total and unconditional amnesty for and immediate release of all political prisoners in Guiné and Cabo Verde.
4. A referendum in Guiné and Cabo Verde to permit the peoples of those nations to determine their own destiny and to elect their legitimate representatives.
5. The presence, in Guiné and Cabo Verde, of a special United Nations commission, comprising representatives of African nations, to control the referendum and to guarantee the effective exercise of the fundamental rights of man.

Waits insistently for the Security Council to take concrete steps to safeguard the authority of the United Nations and to prevent Portugal from being able to continue committing undisciplined and contemptible acts against the highest international body.

* * * *

Declaration on the Present Status of the Fight for Liberation
in "Portuguese" Guiné and in the Cape Verde Islands
by
Amílcar Cabral

[Cabral's statement outlines the planning of his party prior to the outbreak of war with the Portuguese administration. The following document is entitled "Déclaration sur la situation actuelle de la lutte de libération en Guinée-Portugaise et aux Îles du Cap-Vert," Conakry, January 20, 1962.]

During 1961, our struggle for national liberation has progressed considerably, while the Portuguese colonialists have suffered important defeats, in both Guinée and Cabo Verde as well as in the other colonies.

1. In both our countries, our party succeeded in carrying out its plans for the development of all aspects of this struggle, imposed by the colonialists themselves. The unity of our peoples is more solid than ever, and nothing will be able to shake it. The popular masses--including members from all social classes--are mobilized and organized, and they are ready to follow the orders of the party. The forces of Portuguese repression were often shaken by the courageous resistance of the people, who, in both rural and urban areas, openly demonstrated their desire to end colonial domination. Pressured by the popular masses, the colonialists were obliged to free a considerable number of the imprisoned patriots and to enact some urgent "reforms." Our peoples showed their contempt of these "reforms," which fool no one: in both Guinée and Cabo Verde, the party registered many new members, especially among the youth and women. Furthermore, the direct action planned by the party and begun in Guind on August 3, 1961, has become daily more fruitful. Our people have shown that they can successfully employ violence for liberation to combat the criminal violence of the Portuguese colonialists; they have learned that we can destroy the Portuguese soldiers, despite the superiority of their war materiel. We are destroying, as we have in the past, the colonialists' means of communications (roads, bridges, telephone lines, etc.), following one of the party's commands for the current phase of our struggle: to reinforce our organization on all levels and to create difficulties for the colonialists.

As a result of the concrete action of our party, our people have become more determined than ever to quickly end foreign domination. Their courage, spirit of sacrifice, determination and earnestness in action, political awareness, and preparation for the struggle have grown considerably. Among the colonialists a spirit of defeat and feeling of isolation, as well as contradictions, even among the armed forces, are growing. Having lost the confidence of African troops, the Portuguese command encounters daily manifestations of fear and revolt among the Portuguese troops themselves, and some cases of desertion have been recorded.

We must point out that, in spite of the increase in repression, the conditions created by our own actions in the interior are very favorable. Although our party is aware of the difficulties inherent in our struggle and, therefore, daily reinforces its revolutionary vigilance, it has continually intensified the preparation of its members and the popular masses for the worst.

2. Abroad, our party has played a decisive role in the reinforcement of unity among sincere patriots and in the defense of our peoples' interests against all
enemies of their liberty and their progress. We have reinforced our collaboration with nationalist organizations of other Portuguese colonies, as well as strengthened the international solidarity offered us, especially with regard to the African and AfroAsian nations. Our party abroad has obtained results in all aspects of the important task of aiding the struggle that is developing within our countries.

Each day we see more manifestations of solidarity on the part of people who love liberty and peace. In contrast, the Portuguese colonialists, who have suffered notable defeats in Angola and Goa, find themselves daily more isolated, and they show their desperation clearly. However, we do not forget that Portuguese colonialists are still supported by powerful imperialist forces and that Portugal is a member of NATO. We must increase our vigilance against attempts to establish a new form of colonialism within our borders, against the opportunists and all enemies of the unity, liberty, and progress of our peoples. We must always maintain our awareness of what is false, and we must be able to distinguish unequivocally between our friends and our enemies.

3. On the threshold of a new year of fighting, our peoples and our party are determined to put a quick end to Portuguese domination. It is our duty in the common struggle to aid progress for all humanity, especially in the struggle to achieve the total liberation of Africa and the stabilization of national independence for already liberated independent nations. To carry out our determination we shall use any means necessary, and we shall depend upon our own forces—the inexhaustible forces of a people mobilized and organized for the battle to achieve national liberation.

Nevertheless, we retain the right to count on the unconditional support and concrete aid from peoples desiring peace and liberty, especially from African peoples and their governments. Furthermore, we have already seen proof of that support, notably political and moral support. Our party, faithfully construing the feelings of fraternity toward and trust in the peoples of "Portuguese" Guinea and Cabo Verde, is convinced that concrete support from peoples desiring peace and liberty, particularly from our African brothers, will be given us for the urgently needed development of our struggle.

As shown by the concrete conditions of our countries, by the international situation, and by our present degree of progress, our struggle is moving unceasingly forward: step by step, our peoples will liquidate all the bases of Portuguese colonial domination. No force will be able to prevent the success of our struggle for national liberation.

The National Fight for Liberation
by
Amilcar Cabral
[The following document outlines the accomplishments of the nationalist struggle as of mid-1962. It was written by Cabral as "Le peuple de la Guinée Portugaise" devant l'organisation des Nations Unies," Conakry, June 1962, pp. 64-65.]
Although it is still primarily in the process of development, the fight for liberation engaged in by the people of "Portuguese" Guiné has already had certain positive results that, having strengthened the movement considerably, may be regarded as victories. For example:

a) It has increased political awareness among the African masses, who have never been permitted to exercise those essential functions of man--thought and political action.

b) It has intensified the feeling of unity among all Africans without distinction and continuing to do so to an ever greater extent every day. In this connection, two facts are especially noteworthy. First, the struggle has erased the differences--many of which are carefully cultivated by the colonialists--between certain ethnic groups in "Portuguese" Guiné, which are now united in the pursuit of national liberation and progress. Second, it has destroyed an important weapon on which the Portuguese colonialists were relying in their effort to "resist" the overwhelming desire for freedom on the part of the people of "Portuguese" Guiné: the conflict, often superficial and always based on material considerations, that has been fomented between the Cabo Verde minority, whom the colonialists deliberately favored in public service employment, and the assimilados among the native majority. Today, the people of Guiné and the people of Cabo Verde, whether behind prison walls or in hiding in the bush, are increasingly strengthening their unity, sharing a common ideal, and acting together for the cause of national liberation and progress.

c) It has developed and is strengthening the national consciousness of a free and just fatherland for which all ethnic groups, all religious communities, all men, all women are fighting.

d) Gradually overcoming the psychological complexes engendered by colonial exploitation, it has enabled the "marginal" human beings who are the product of colonialism to recover their personalities as Africans. In "Portuguese" Guiné, it has reawakened a feeling of confidence in the future among the Africans, in general.

e) It has acquainted the rest of the world with the character of "Portuguese" Guiné as an African nation, has given its people prestige, and has won them the sympathy and friendship of other peoples.

f) It has had a continuous strong influence on the development of the fight for liberation in the Cape Verde Islands, whose people are indissolubly linked to those of "Portuguese" Guiné by ties of history and of blood.

g) It has encouraged the fight for liberation engaged in by peoples of other Portuguese colonies, has materially assisted the people of Angola in their struggle by making it necessary for the Portuguese colonialists to divert some of their troops from that country, and, in general, has served the cause of Africa's liberation from foreign rule.

In addition to these results, however, the struggle of the people of "Portuguese" Guiné has begun to have a significant effect on the actions of the Portuguese colonialists themselves. For example:
h) It has helped to bring about a gradual deterioration in the economy of Portugal with regard to its being a nation oppressing other nations, for in carrying out its repressive policies Portugal is obliged to spend more and more money and is meeting with increasingly stubborn resistance from those nations.

i) It has shaken the morale and upset the material life of the families of the colonists, who, with the consent of the authorities, have sent most of the European women and children back to Portugal because of growing insecurity.

j) It has obliged the colonial authorities to spend considerable amounts bribing certain Africans and has caused them to lose confidence in the indigenous troops, in whom they formerly placed great trust, and even to lose confidence in some of their own collaborators.

k) It has obliged the Portuguese state, for the first time in history, to nominate certain Africans to posts of responsibility, including that of deputy in "Portuguese" Guinea.

l) It has helped to bring about a decline in the income from colonial commercial and financial enterprises and to increase considerably the colony's unfavorable balance of trade during the past three years, thereby aggravating Portugal's economic situation.

m) It has provoked and deepened differences of opinion among Europeans living in "Portuguese" Guinea, particularly among members of the Portuguese army, from whose ranks there have been a number of desertions.

n) It has obliged the administrative authorities to abandon certain repressive measures, such as those applied in connection with the collection of taxes, and has been one of the causes, together with the United Nations resolution on decolonization, of the promulgation of the "Reforms" of 1961 (Part I) and the repeal, if only in theory, of the Estatuto dos Indígenas.

These are some of the results already achieved by the struggle for liberation of the people of "Portuguese" Guinea. Its most significant result, however, lies in the fact that it opened up for the people of "Portuguese" Guinea new and serious chances for the success of a historical development encompassing liberty and progress, and this is an irreversible trend.

The people of "Portuguese" Guinea consider that the re-establishment of international legality in their country—with respect for the right of self-determination, the elimination of colonialism, and the attainment of national independence—depends essentially on the following factors:

1. Their own desire and determination to free themselves from the colonial yoke, as shown through the use of the means and the human material resources that are available to them for the attainment of this goal;

2. The attitude and conduct (moral, political, and legal) of the Portuguese government as a party directly concerned in the matter;

3. International politics: specific international action (positive or negative), taken by governments (considered individually or as members of international assemblies) as well as by the United Nations, that is determined by conditions both within "Portuguese" Guinea and abroad;
4. The time required for the contradictions inherent in each of the above factors, which are constantly in a state of flux, to be defined, to develop, and to straighten themselves out, whether by peaceful or non-peaceful means.

* * * *

Developments in the Struggle for the National Liberation of "Portuguese" Guind and the Cape Verde Islands in 1964 by Amilcar Cabral

[ Cabral reviewed the achievements of his movement's struggle with the Portuguese in "Le developpement de la lutte nationale en Guinée 'Portugaise' et aux Iles du Cap Vert en 1964," Conakry, 1965 (?). ]

Two major events characterize and synthesize, because of both their content and consequences, the developments of 1964 in our struggle for national liberation—in the activities of our fighting organization: the Battle of Como and the First Party Congress held during February in one of the liberated regions in the south of our country.

The coincidence in time and in the geographical proximity of these two events (we held the Party Congress on February 13-17; 1964, at the same moment that the Battle of Como was reaching its culmination, and no more than fifteen kilometers from the coastal island of Como), clearly shows the dynamic interdependence of the two fundamental aspects of our struggle—armed combat and political action. It also demonstrates the success and progress already achieved in our fight for liberation by early 1964, that is, within one year of the outbreak of armed fighting.

The Battle of Como

Since our communiqués have opportunely presented fully detailed reports of the facts concerning the Battle of Como, we shall limit ourselves in this report to the essential aspects of the historic event.

By the beginning of 1964, the reconquest of the island of Como—the first portion of national territory liberated by our forces—had become a fundamental, even vital, necessity in the military and political plans of the Portuguese authorities. On one hand, the island was strategically indispensable to the reconquest and effective control of the liberated south. On the other hand, the political effect of such a reconquest would be great, especially among our people—for the inhabitants of Como, like those of the zone of Mores, were known throughout the country for their fierce dedication to the fight and their indefatigable zeal for the cause of our Party.

In January 1964, after having recourse to all the means available—air, sea, and infantry—and having gathered a total of three thousand well-equipped men, of whom about two thousand were hand-picked soldiers transferred from Angola, the Portuguese colonialists initiated their attempt to reconquest the island. The Portuguese general staff moved from Lisbon to Bissau to follow the operations closely.
After seventy-five days of combat, during which our forces showed every type of heroism and sacrifice, we succeeded in driving the enemy forces toward the sea, inflicting on them the most costly defeat in the history of Portuguese colonialism and causing heavy loss of life. We estimated these losses at six hundred and fifty-eight men, but some Portuguese deserters, and even some soldiers who took part in the battle, claim that at least nine hundred of their colleagues were killed or subsequently died of wounds suffered at Como.

The Battle of Como was a test even more of ourselves than of the Portuguese colonialists. In reality, it made us aware of our own strength; of our fighters' and our people's capacity for resistance under most difficult battle conditions; of the moral, even military, weakness of the enemy; of the political consciousness and the fierce determination of the civil population (men, women, and children) in the liberated regions--now definitely liberated--not to fall under Portuguese domination again.

The Party Congress
During the Battle of Como and only a few kilometers from the theater of operations, a large number of staff workers and delegates assembled. Some sixty of these were principal political and military leaders of our organization. We succeeded not only in encouraging our fighters and our people, but also in clearly proving the irreversible success of our fight.

For seven days (considering also the preliminary meetings) almost all the party staff workers, as well as delegates from all regions of the country, were able to meet, despite cannonades and Portuguese airplanes, to discuss the fundamental problems of our life and our battle. The nature of these problems and the outcome of the decisions made there, at the political, military, economic, and social levels, gave that Congress a historic character and brought a new spirit of vitality and confidence to the activities of our Party. The enthusiasm with which the popular masses welcomed the Congress and the number of initiatives that accompanied or followed it were yet another proof of the political awareness of our people.

By carrying out the resolutions and decisions of our Congress, we have made great progress in the year 1964, thus significantly changing the situation in our country. Furthermore, by submitting the deficiencies and errors of the Party to severe criticism and sincere self-criticism, our Congress discovered which measures would eliminate these faults. Thus our organization became stronger than ever during 1964.

Among the principal accomplishments in 1964 we cite:
1. At the political and administrative level
   --Reorganization of both the base organizations and the leadership bodies of the Party. Effective establishment of the Party Section Committees and other local leadership bodies, and the adaptation of the Departments of the Central Committee to the new requirements of our life and our struggle. In the liberated regions, transfer of power to local bodies and the creation of Special Administrative Committees (civil status, justice, education, health, etc.).
Reinforcement of political efforts aimed at the popular masses, especially in the regions not yet liberated, with the goal of continually raising their level of political awareness.

Definite progress in the mobilization and organization of the popular masses in the Cape Verde Islands, where, we can now state, almost all the young laborers and students are ready to follow the orders of the Party and to fight for independence. This fact allows us to envision a profound transformation of the struggle in the not-so-distant future in that portion of our national territory: that is, the commitment to armed conflict.

Elimination of enemy maneuvers intended to divide and demobilize our people through the creation of puppet movements.

2. At the military level

Reorganization of the armed conflict, primarily through the restructuring and redistribution of our armed forces and through the creation of interregional commands and of a central body of leadership (the Council of War).

Creation of the Forgas Armadas Revoluciondrias do Povo (FARP), composed of guerrillas, militias, and the Popular Army. Putting into action several units of our Popular Army, a maneuver that, along with the intensification of guerrilla action, completely upset the enemy's plans for the dry season.

Enlargement and multiplication of the battlefronts, which were established in all the regions not yet liberated, profoundly transforming the physiognomy of the war--the enemy must henceforth fight throughout the country--and also opening new perspectives for the development of our struggle for liberation.

Intensification and increased frequency of our attacks against Portuguese barracks, with our fighters' now using the most effective means for destroying the enemy forces.

Training of special military units and staff members for the battle in the Cape Verde Islands.

Important victories by our fighters, notably in the regions of Gabu (the fief of certain traditional chiefs who, until then, favored the Portuguese colonialists), Bod (the principal zone of bauxite deposits, in the southeast of the country, which is almost entirely controlled by our forces), Canchungo (in the western part of the country, where the mandjaque population, led by the Party, finally managed to launch their armed combat), and Sao Domingos and the contiguous regions along the northern border. Furthermore, our fighters, who destroyed several Portuguese barracks in liberated regions and elsewhere, increased the enemy losses through their operations and sometimes seized substantial quantities of materiel.

Consolidation of our positions in the liberated regions, strengthened by the attainment of most effective means of defense. The enemy's various efforts to reoccupy portions of these regions were total failures. Furthermore, we intensified the isolation of enemy barracks still located within the liberated regions. The success of our fight in 1964 radically transformed the military position of the country. Since we have begun a new phase of our fight, these successes are of even greater importance because the intensification of our armed actions has not brought with it a significant increase in losses.
3. At the economic level
--Increase of agricultural production in all liberated regions, especially the production of rice, which has risen by almost 20 percent in certain zones.
--Cultivation of new land and of several farms abandoned by colonists or other farmers.
--Establishment of internal commerce within liberated regions through the creation of "people's shops" for the purchase of agricultural products and products of local artisans and for providing the people with articles of prime necessity.
--Liquidation of one of the principal colonial companies--the Société Commerciale d'Outre-Mer--which our battle deprived of its concessions, particularly those in the southern part of the country. Liquidation of almost all the facilities of the first colonial company--the CUF--established in the interior of the country, through the insecurity created by our forces, especially in the northern urban centers. Furthermore, the outbreak of general armed fighting in Gabu (center for the production of groundnuts) and the intensification of our action throughout the north have provoked almost complete paralysis in ground-nut trade, the raising and selling of ground-nuts having become impossible because our forces control the trade routes.
--Working out of detailed reports on economic conditions in Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands and on the perspectives for the development of our country.
--Elaboration of a project for the creation of a center for the study of the development of Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands.
Our economic resistance, considerably increased during 1964--reconstruction of the economy in the liberated regions, destruction of elements essential to the colonial economy--is the basis for the great crisis facing local commerce and the scarcity of consumer goods in urban areas, particularly in Bissau.

4. At the social level
--Creation, under local Party management, of Sections and Special Committees in charge of social affairs in liberated regions.
--Opening of a fifty-bed hospital for sick and wounded fighters as well as several dispensaries at the principal guerrilla bases to assist the fighters and the people.
--Training of auxiliary workers for sanitary assistance. Several male nurses and some thirty fighting nurses, trained in 1964, are, for the most part, already at the front.
--Establishment of an experimental boarding school in Conakry for the best students from schools in the interior of the country.
--Establishment of several schools in the liberated regions, attended by more than two thousand children. Intensification of adult literacy programs.
--Publication of a reader to be used in our schools and the literacy campaign and publication of a book of poems about the fight.
--Participation of students on vacation and candidates for scholarships in the educational effort in the liberated zones.
--Free distribution of thousands of notebooks and other school supplies.
* * * *
CHAPTER VI
AFRICAN CHALLENGE IN MOCAMBIQUE

Nationalism in Mozambique is rooted in the pattern of localized tribal resistance that characterized the African population during the first half of the twentieth century. It also evolved within several African associations as a manifestation of discontent with Portuguese rule. O Brado Africano was established early in the 1920's as one of the first African weeklies on the continent. The Grêmio Africano, an association established for "civilized" mulattoes or mixed Africans, later became known as the Associacao Africana. The Instituto Negrófilo, with a membership of black Africans, was later renamed the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mozambique and was finally banned in 1965 for "subversion and terrorism." The Associacao dos Naturais de Mozambique was founded, supported, and controlled by whites born in Mozambique, although in the 1950's it began to encourage membership for blacks and eventually adopted a policy supporting social integration and favoring independence from Portuguese rule. Outside Mozambique, nationalists organized several movements whose principal common objective was immediate independence for the territory. Among these movements were the Uniao Democratica Nacional de Moambique (UDENAMO), first established on October 2, 1969, by exiled nationalists working in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia; the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), an amalgamation of several small groups that took place during February 1961 in Mombasa, Kenya; and the Uniao Africana de Mozambique Independente (UNAMI), established in Malawi by exiled leaders from the Tete region. In June 1962, UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI joined forces as the Frente de Libertaglo de Mozambique (FRELIMO) under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane. Several schisms developed following the expulsion of several FRELIMO leaders, but the Frente remained the most important nationalist group and in September 1964 initiated its guerrilla war against the Portuguese in Mozambique.

I
BACKGROUND

Brief History of Mozambique

by

David J. M. Mabunda and John Sakupwanya

[The following statement, an African interpretation of Mozambique's history, was part of a petition presented to the United Nations by the UDENAMO and is entitled The UDENAMO at the United Nations, Cairo: Office of the Mozambique National Democratic Union, November 1963, pp. 5-12.]

Four hundred and sixty-five years ago, in 1498, a Portuguese fleet under the command of Vasco da Gama anchored off the coast of Mozambique during its search for a sea route to India. Portuguese occupation was initiated in the year 1505 when Captain Pedro de Anaia landed on the island of Mozambique [a small island off the northeastern coast of the mainland of Mozambique]. Mozambique was then known as the Captaincy of Sofala. The Captaincy was not politically autonomous however. It
was a dependency of the State of India [Portuguese India] and therefore fell under the governorship of Francisco de Almeida. In 1507, Governor de Almeida sent his men to the island of Mopambique to build a fortress. The first years of occupation were dedicated solely to commercial exploitation, Christianization, and improvement of the political conditions in India. Later followed the construction of more fortresses in big commercial centers such as Sofala, Tete, and Sena, where the Portuguese concentrated troops. The African people did not fear these troop concentrations and they invaded the fortresses in Mopambique.

Later, as the Portuguese began to explore the country's hinterland, they went up the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers. The land north of the Zambezi was inhabited by the Macalangas, a tribe of Mashonas who had come to the southern border of the Zambezi in the twelfth century to occupy what today is known as Southern Rhodesia. They established their capital in the area of the great Zimbabwe. They entered into a confederation presided over by King Monomotapa, who was considered a great king even though he had far less power as head of the confederation than was later granted him by the Portuguese. The chiefs of the various regional tribes gave limited recognition to Monomotapa as their sovereign, but were far from being his vassals.

In 1531, the captain of Mogambique founded a market at Sena with the intention of increasing the exportation of gold. A number of Arabs had already established themselves there, and the city of Sena grew so prosperous that two hundred years later it became the trade center. A few years later the city of Tete was constructed. The two cities prospered from trading as a result of the proximity between the lands of Monomotapa and the gold mines of Manica and Mashona. In 1550, the Portuguese adventurers established a trading post southwest of Tete, in the region of Mussapa near the river Mazo6. Here they operated independent of Monomotapa, who had given them various concessions previously. The Portuguese maintained this commercial relationship for a period of about sixty-five years, respecting and paying tribute to the sovereignty of the Africans. The instructions of the King of Portugal were: "Trade and live in peace with the Africans."

With the coronation of Don Sebastilo as king of Portugal, the Portuguese changed their policies. They began to dream of capturing the gold mines and dominating the African peoples. It was because of this dream that an expedition of one thousand men under the command of Don Francisco Barreto, then Governor General of India, landed on the island of Mogambique in 1569. Governor Barreto sent one regiment to Sofala. The invasion had unfortunate consequences; the Africans attacked the Portuguese immediately upon their arrival and severely punished their officers. After some time, Barreto and a number of his men made their way to Zambeze, in the region of Sena, where many of them lost their lives also (1571). After several fights and leaving uncompleted negotiations with King Monomotapa, Barreto evacuated the two hundred men fortunate enough to remain
alive (1573). Barreto later died and was replaced by his aide-de-camp, Vasco Fernandes Homen, who returned to Sena with four hundred men in an attempt to find the gold mines. After several clashes with the African people, the group journeyed into the region of Manica, where the city of Umtali is situated today. There they found gold but did not have men competent to exploit it. From Sofala, Fernandes Homen led his remaining two hundred men north of the Zambezi into Sena, where he tried to investigate the famous silver mines of Chicoa, but the Africans, the owners of the land, attacked and killed the entire group. As a result of this disaster, the Portuguese crown temporarily abandoned its ambitions for armed conquest. Even after their military defeat, however, the Portuguese maintained high interest in the area and thus attempted to continue the fight by other methods. In this new phase of war, they sent Catholic missionaries to Christianize and bribe the African chiefs. In Sena, there were four churches and some fifty Portuguese.

There were approximately twenty Portuguese in the fortress at Tete and many scattered in the surrounding regions. The missionaries worked—as they do even today—in cooperation with the Portuguese politicians. While the missionaries attempted to dominate the Africans through the Gospel of Christ, the feudalistic Portuguese were freely exploiting the African at every opportunity. The missionaries, then as today, were important masters who accumulated properties and many slaves, whom they sold to the feudal lords and masters. They maintained a system of exploitation based on the same type of plantations as those in existence today. Everywhere in the Monomotapa Kingdom, soldiers, missionaries, and traders could be seen actively planning and plotting against the Africans' land, resources, and peoples. The Portuguese population rose to one thousand men, a number that was not surpassed until the twentieth century. The kings of Portugal easily forgot the lesson [learned from military defeat]. The men of Vasco Fernandes Homen had wanted to control every facet of trade as well as to control the African people. In the seventeenth century a great number of Portuguese missionaries and feudal lords wanted to impose their laws upon the African leaders [to obtain] slaves for plantations. Conflicts increased considerably in the region of the Zambezi. By then King Monomotapa had been converted to Christianity and was, therefore, easily exploited. Through the king, the Vandals scattered the seeds of misunderstanding among neighboring chiefs and thus, because of tribal disputes, they managed to dominate the whole Zambezi region. The principal factor underlying these disputes was the refusal of the other chiefs to be baptized. It was a great struggle, known historically as the dispute of 1628. With the death of King Monomotapa, lackey of the Portuguese, his son Manuza succeeded to the throne in 1628. Because of his hostility toward the Portuguese colonists, he immediately declared war against the Portuguese [on the grounds of their] ostentation and interference in the affairs of state. After suffering various attacks, the Portuguese garrison surrendered and retreated to the island of Mogambique, leaving the new king in peace. The colonists' retreat was temporary, however, for, through some Christian members of the royal family, the Portuguese finally succeeded in convincing the new king to become a Christian
also. The king was baptized Felipe, after having solemnly promised vassalage to the King of Portugal, to the Dominican missionaries, and to the settlers and traders of Zambeze; he gave the Portuguese everything they wanted. For the first time in the history of Mogambique the Portuguese succeeded in maintaining a brief domination over a great part of the Macalanga peoples.

In reality, King Felipe's first defeat came when he gave consent for the slave traffic on the plantations owned by the missionaries and feudalistic lords. However, this government of lackeys did not last long. In 1688, the Macalangas declared war on the Portuguese and began a conflict that lasted many years. Nevertheless the Africans, their peoples scattered and demoralized by the long wars, lost and once more fell prey to the colonialists.

In 1752, the colonial administration became independent of Goa. Thus the first Governor General of Mogambique, Francisco de Melo Castro, was appointed. This colonial government accentuated the slave trade. It is calculated that from 1780 to 1800, slaves were exported to America at the rate of more than fifteen thousand a year, a number that rose to twenty-five thousand a year between 1800 and 1850. The law abolishing slavery put into effect by Minister Sade Bandeira in 1836 found no support in Mogambique. On the contrary, the slave traffic accelerated until 1840, when the British intervened and forcefully pressured the Portuguese government. The typically stubborn Portuguese, nevertheless, did not respect the law for long, as is shown by the fact that they have remained involved with dealing in human flesh, forced labor, and other forms of bondage up to the present day.

It is known that until 1890 the Portuguese sphere of influence south of the Save River was represented by only a few scattered traders and missionaries whose principal purpose in being there was to prepare the road for exploitation and domination by the Portuguese army. Only after the British ultimatum in 1890 did the occupation become a reality. From then on the Portuguese imposed their authority on the African. They refused to pay tributes to African princes. Some chiefs were not in agreement with the Portuguese policy, and a series of assaults took place. The Portuguese managed to defend themselves and then succeeded in gaining the support of certain chiefs through bribery. These chiefs then fought against the chiefs who would not accept the foreign domination. For instance, in 1894 Chief Marracuene fought the Portuguese in the battle of Marracuene. Although the Portuguese were decisively beaten, they later obtained help from the subordinate princes and lackeys of the Lourenço Marques district and from a few Angolans (according to Portuguese history). Thus, in February 1895, the army of Chief Marracuene, commanded by General Magata, gave way upon being faced with such overwhelming enemy forces, calculated at about six thousand well-equipped men. However, this Portuguese victory did not end the expedition. The Portuguese marched north into Gaza, which was dominated by the King Ngunguyana. In a fierce battle which took place at Magul in the Incomati River valley, King Ngunguyana's forces were defeated by the Portuguese.
In the same year, Portuguese forces under the command of Captain Mouzinho de Albuquerque landed at Inhambane. As usual, the Portuguese followed their motto "divide and rule." With false promises they succeeded in bribing the chiefs of Inhambane and of Muchopes to permit their passage toward Mandlacaze, where King Ngungunyana lived. King Ngungunyana was then at war with King Xipenanyane of Muchopes. The latter's desire to free himself from his neighboring enemy led him to take the opportunity of uniting his forces with those of the Portuguese Captain Mouzinho de Albuquerque, who he felt was a friend. Together they went in search of King Ngungunyana, whom they found in his palace in the company of the Queen and Prince Godide. After this betrayal, General Magigwana vainly attempted to revenge his king in the battles of Chaimite and Coolela, in which the general lost his life. Thus the campaigns south of the Save River were ended.

The news that the famous King Ngungunyana had been arrested reached King Macombe I, of Baru6, Niassa district, the following year. King Macombe I swore allegiance against the Portuguese. He proceeded to declare war and invaded the colonial fortresses. A number of battles occurred. It was only in 1917 that peace was restored and Macombe III fled to Rhodesia, where he spent his last days, while the Portuguese were engaged with the Germans in the great First World War.

The end of the war of the Macombes, which had lasted about twenty years, terminated the armed conflicts between the colonial invaders and the Africans of Mogambique, who had been defeated but did not lose hope. Logically, the end of war should mean the beginning of a new era, an era of peace, tranquility, understanding, and progress in relations between the conquered and the conquerors. However, the end of this war did not mean that, for the general disarmament of the African population was followed by reprisals and annihilation. Let us briefly examine the true state of affairs confronting our generation.

Portugal claims her presence in Africa is a "civilizing mission" to uplift the Africans and to convert them into Portuguese citizens. The Portuguese have argued that they do not practice the system of "apartheid" and that there are no color barriers. Based on those statements, one would picture present-day Portugal as being matured by the wisdom of trial and error, enlightened by the ages, and therefore being progressive and following a policy based on high and noble principles. But the declarations of interracial harmony are utterly unfounded. What is happening in Mogambique, where a campaign of extermination is being waged by the Portuguese colonialists against the African population, provides a clear and vivid example of the policies and principles of the Portuguese colonial regime.

Portugal's policy of "apartheid" is based on the premise that the mass of Africans are culturally, morally, and educationally unprepared to exercise Portuguese citizenship. Therefore the law establishes two classes of inhabitants: the nao-indígenas (non-natives) --whites, mulattoes, and assimilados (assimilated
Africans)—who enjoy full citizenship rights under the Portuguese common law; and the indenas (natives), who are governed by an intricate system known as the regime de indígenato (translation). Since establishing these classes, the Portuguese have taken systematic steps to oppress and exploit the indigenous African, effectively barring him from every avenue of improvement. Here, Your Excellencies, we wish to call your esteemed attention to the fact that discrimination is largely shown through practices involving color, race, and class prejudices. It has been correctly recognized that these feelings are not only of social and psychological origin but also constitute an inhumane evil. Yet even though the government of Portugal practices every form of inhumane injustice against humanity, it retains its membership in the world organization through the full support of nations that profess to be Christian and democratic. Portugal has also practiced forcible miscegenation, mixing of races, slavery, and both forced and contract slave labor, all of which have been designed to produce a deterioration of the African people in terms of their population, their rates of birth and death. The four-hundred-year-old system of establishing local government control for the specific benefit of Portugal must be ended in the cause of human justice, peace, and human dignity. On the other hand, even the assimilados do not enjoy the advantages of Portuguese citizenship, for they do not have the means to acquire them. The process of assimilation, implemented in 1917, requires the African to prove that he can read and write Portuguese fluently and correctly, that he has severed all tribal connections, that he has adopted the habits and customs necessary for the application of the Portuguese Common Law, and that he has an occupation suitable for providing a stable livelihood. It should be noted, however, Your Excellencies, that an individual of the African race only may be classed as an indígena but a Portuguese white settler may not be, no matter how illiterate he may be. The whole police force has been oriented toward maintaining a docile, cheap labor force. In 1945, Professor Marcello Caetano, then Minister of Colonies, made an official visit to Mogambique. As an improvement for the colony, he decreed an increase in the hut tax. Unmarried women (from the age of 18) and widows below the age of 55 years were forced to register in the tax records. The law provided that women should pay half as much as a man.... Much worse, they were forced to carry with them the famous twenty-five-page booklet, the caderneta indígena, for their identification when required by the colonial authorities. In 1948 the people, who were suffering from hunger and had been provoked by the despotic behavior of the supervisors of cotton fields, by the hut tax, and by the increasing seizure of labor for the plantations of São Tomé, revolted against these barbaric atrocities committed by the Portuguese tyrants. Needless to say, the result of the rebellion was afflicting and horrible. A large number of men and women—more than five hundred from the rebellious district of Lourenço Marques—were exiled to São Tomé; others were sentenced to prison terms ranging from ten to sixteen years, others were killed without pity.
In 1953, a group of forced laborers in Sgo Tomé revolted, demanding liberty, better conditions, and recognition of their rights as human beings. The claimants were severely punished; more than one hundred people were killed and many others were wounded.

In the same year another popular revolt took place at Mambone, district of Inhambane, caused by the poisoning of foodstuff destined for distribution to the people, who were starving because of a bad harvest that year. Part of the population received the food and later discovered that it was poisoned. The president of the Ndcleo Negrófico de Manica e Sofala, Sixpence Simango, alerted the population and presented a protest to the criminal authorities. The results were saddening. Hundreds of people were arrested and others were shot to death. Among the prisoners still serving indefinite prison terms are Chief Matique, Gabriel Macanga, Reverend Machava, S. Simango, Jjthio Batara, Gil Mendonga and other members of the Ndcleo Negrófico, Fernando Manjena and son, Tomé Mutuaro Mandivanje, Brito Simango, and Chimirombiro Simango. Macanguisse Timo and Albano Mundeco died in prison.

The wave of terrorism did not even begin to end there. In 1956, the chief of police of the port of Lourenço Marques called upon the Malanga police squadron for help in suppressing a revolt organized by the shibalos (forced laborers) and other dock workers who demanded better wages, good food, better working conditions, and reasonable working hours. (It is known that forced laborers in the ports and harbor areas of Mogambique work fourteen hours a day, including Sunday.) The cavalry arrived and suppressed the revolution wounding many and causing the loss of forty-nine lives of people whose sole crime was to call for their fundamental human rights. The Mogambican population protested, but the leaders were sent to concentration camps in the north of the colony.

Most remarkable was the recent revolt at Mueda in the Cabo Delgado district in 1960, during the suppression of which the colonialists massacred six hundred nationalists protesting the cruel foreign domination. It was truly a horrible and lamentable event in the history of a nation that has fought and suffered for its independence, freedom, and liberty for the past four hundred and sixty-five years. In 1962, in Mossurize, Mrs. Sevente Maveneka, Faduka Mwandida, and Muti Mumbuka were shot by the Portuguese light brigade as they tried to cross the border into the Rhodesias. No one is ignorant of what happens in the concentration camps of Marupa, Macangalane, Manhica, Ibo Island, Nhangu, and the Island of Inhaca, where hundreds of prisoners are forced to dig graves on their arrival so "no one will have to dig the grave for you when you are dead," as the camp supervisors say. Above the graves of the unfortunate Africans, a banana tree is usually planted. These camps are truly hells on earth, for seldom do the prisoners leave them. The concentration camps are [basically] huge rice fields, which the prisoners cultivate from sunrise to sunset without rest. There is no mealtime hour. The meals are served at the work locations by people especially employed for food distribution. These conditions are sad, but they do exist. And we only wish Your Excellencies would be persistent enough to see for yourselves what our people endure under the oppressive heels of the brutal Portuguese.
The 1962 speech by the then Minister of Colonies, Dr. Adriano Moreira, in which he proclaimed the end of the system of indigenato in the colonies, was made only to avoid attacks from within the United Nations, but the system remained intact. Indeed, the law of September 6, 1961, was a bluff and never a reality. It was not enacted for the benefit of either the natives or the non-natives. On the contrary, it prejudiced both groups. Instead of all natives’ enjoying the rights prescribed by this law, more classes than those already existing were established. Thus we have: natives, whose document of identification is the caderneta indigena; civilized natives (a new class), who carry a special identification card; and assimilados, whose identification card is similar to that of Portuguese citizens. The difference between civilized natives and assimilados is that the former need only to be able to speak Portuguese and do not earn a salary equal to that of the assimilados. Under this law, there exists equality only in a head tax of three hundred and sixty escudos per individual. With respect to assimilados, a further 10 percent tax on the salary is collected as Professional Tax, plus one hundred and fifty escudos per individual for Military Tax. Immediately after the implementation of this law, various difficulties arose concerning its enforcement. Therefore, it was never put into force. The first reaction came from the owners of private companies who did not want to increase the salaries of the "new Portuguese citizens of black color." Most of the latter lost the little they had only to be replaced in their work by the settlers daily arriving from Portugal and the Madeira Islands.

Here, Your Excellencies, we point out the brutal treatment perpetrated by the Portuguese in their policy of taxation without representation, taxation without the right to vote—flagrant violations of the United Nations Charter. In the operations of the CFM (Mogambique Railways) and other government offices, forced laborers are counted in the thousands. In compliance with the same law, the supply of forced laborers was interrupted with the idea of replacing them with voluntary workers earning a maximum daily salary of twenty escudos, to be paid weekly. For two months, a great loss showed in the government accounts. Then, the aforementioned law was secretly revoked by the colonial governor general, who ordered all local administrations to resume sending the shibalos. In the port of Lourenço Marques in March 1962, for example, the first group of shibalos received consisted of one hundred and forty men from the local administration of Massinga. They came trained so that in case of being asked whether they were shibalos or volunteers, they would answer, "we are shibalo volunteers." From the six escudos daily they were previously earning, their salary was raised to eight escudos; that is, from one hundred and eighty escudos to two hundred and forty escudos monthly.

It would be dreaming to think that the shibalo system will end in Portuguese colonies while British colonialism and American neocolonialism still exist in Africa. It is a fact that the British and Americans are the perpetuators of the forced labor system in Africa, even though they blame Portugal for being the executor of the system—Portugal, a small underdeveloped European country, a mere pawn in
the hands of the larger powers supporting a white brother nation in the family of colonialistic exploiters.

With and because of the larger powers, Portuguese colonialism thrives on the sacrifices and misery of the Mogambican people. Through unscrupulous investment maneuvers, which feed the colonialists, sustaining their economy in Mogambique and elsewhere in the world, these nations thrive.

* * * *

The Development of Nationalism in Mogambique
by
Eduardo Mondlane

[Eduardo Mondlane, leader of the Frente de Libertagio de Mogambique (FRELIMO) until his assassination in 1969, was perhaps the first black Mogambican to study at a university in Portugal. Eventually he earned his doctorate at Northwestern University and worked with the United Nations as a research officer until 1961, when he joined the faculty at Syracuse University. With the unification of the nationalist groups, however, he returned to Dar es Salaam. The following essay, entitled "The Development of Nationalism in Mogambique," was released in mimeographed form in Dar es Salaam on December 3, 1964.]

Mogambican nationalism, like practically all African nationalism, was born of direct European colonialism. Mogambique's most specific source of national unity is the common experience (in suffering) of the people during the last one hundred years of Portuguese colonial control. In order to understand the development of Mogambican nationalism, we must study the main stages of the development of Portuguese colonialism in our country and note the resulting reaction of the people.

Before I outline these stages of the development of Portuguese colonialism and their relationship to the rise of nationalism, I wish to present a definition of nationalism. By nationalism I mean "a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership in a nation or of a desire to develop the strength, liberty, or prosperity of that nation." The above definition applies to nationalism in all circumstances or stages of development of any people. For instance, it might apply to European nationalism as a continental phenomenon, or French, American, Russian, Chinese, Brazilian, etc. nationalisms as expressions of the aspirations of given ethnic or national entities. The African context in which Mogambican nationalism finds expression might require further refinement of the definition offered above. In view of the recent historical circumstances that have affected the lives of the various peoples within the continent of Africa, it is necessary to add that African nationalism is also characterized by the development of attitudes, activities, and more or less structured programs aimed at the mobilization of forces for the attainment of self-government and independence. In the specific case of Mogambique, these attitudes, activities, and structured programs, shared by all Portuguese colonies in Africa and possibly by all other remaining peoples not yet free, must include the establishment of
military or paramilitary schemes for the final showdown before the actual attainment of independence can be ensured.

If you could bear with me for a few more seconds in connection with these preliminary remarks, I should like to sum up the definition of nationalism offered above in the following manner:
a) a consciousness on the part of individuals or groups of membership in a nation—in our case, Mozambique;
b) a desire to develop the strength, liberty, or prosperity of that nation—the concept of the FRELIMO (as we are popularly known) pertaining to the future socio-economic structure of the country and how to go about implementing it;
c) the specific goal of attaining self-government and independence—FRELIMO's political and military program;
d) a concept of the people's unity—the Mozambican people's desire to rid themselves of Portuguese imperialism and colonialism so as to be completely free to develop their socio-economic structures as they wish; and,
e) the establishment of more or less permanent political structures for the pursuit of national objectives in cooperation with other African nations.

In reference to African nationalism in general, it is necessary to stress four more points:
i) that it is a reaction against political controls imposed by Europeans upon the African peoples; and
ii) that it is a reaction against foreign, especially Western economic exploitation of the African natural and human resources.
iii) In those areas of Africa where a combination of European and Asian populations have come to settle alongside the African peoples, African nationalism has also had to include a reaction against local cultural and socio-economic barriers created by members of these non-African communities.
iv) Concurrent with the rise of African nationalism, there developed another kind of nationalism—cultural nationalism—epitomized by the mushrooming of all sorts of theories concerning the African man, labelled "African personality" by Anglophiles and "Ndgritude" or "Africanité" by Francophiles.

Mozambique is one of the remnants of an old Portuguese colonial empire that was established during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries in Asia, South America, and Africa. In Africa the remnants of this empire still include Angola, Mozambique, Guiné (called Portuguese), the Cape Verde Islands, and São Tomé Island. The largest of these colonies is Angola, although Mozambique has the largest population of them all.

Contacts between Portugal and parts of what is now known as Mozambique began at the end of the fifteenth century, when Vasco da Gama, a well-known Portuguese navigator, reached the island of Mozambique in early March 1498. Since the main interest of the Portuguese kings who had sponsored these trips was to open a route to India that would be safer than the then dangerous Near East
land route, for many years the Portuguese satisfied themselves with establishing filling stations along the

East African coast, thus leaving the interior untouched. The Portuguese claim that they have been in Mogambique for over four hundred and fifty years, implying that for all that time they have been controlling our country politically. If there is any truth in this Portuguese claim, it has to do with the fact that soon after the first contact with the people of the coastal region of East Africa, the Portuguese, envying the wealth and power possessed by the Arab rulers of the time, plotted, connived, organized whatever forces they could muster, and fought their way into a position of control. This enabled the Portuguese to monopolize the then very rich East African trade in ivory, gold, and precious stones. To accomplish this, the Portuguese took advantage of the rivalries then existant among the sherifs and sheiks of such city states as Pate, Malindi, Kilwa, Zanzibar, Mogambique, Sofala, etc., which were famous for their "prosperity and elegance."

At that time, their wealth and cultural refinement were comparable to the best in Europe and Asia. From the reaction of the Portuguese sailors of that time, gleaned from their diaries, it is possible to suggest that East Africa as a whole "was a world comparable, if not superior, in material culture to Portugal in 1500."

However, political unity among these city states was no easier to achieve at that time than it is now in present-day East Africa. Let me quote Professor James Duffy: "Political unity among these city states was a transitory burden. Each local prince defended his city's political and commercial independence, and at no time was there an East African nation, although the stronger towns at one time or another dominated their weaker neighbors."

Even though the Portuguese took advantage of this unfortunate situation, they were never able to impose a lasting political control, except over a very thin coastal strip running from Cape Delgado to the city state of Sofala. By 1700 a resurgence of Islamic influence in this part of Africa had been able to effectively eliminate Portuguese traders and soldiers, as well as scores of towns that they had held from time to time.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese concentrated on conniving and cajoling their way into control of the rich commerce of the area between Cape Delgado and the Zambezi basin, in an attempt to capture the flow of gold from the famous gold mines of Monomotapa, which the Portuguese had believed to be the proverbial "King Solomon's Mines." Again, in this instance, the imperialistic activities of the Portuguese affected an area that included what is today known as Zambia and Zimbabwe or Southern Rhodesia. The capital of Monomotapa's empire was located in Mashonaland and was part of the Makalanga confederacy of that time.

During a period of two hundred years, the Portuguese were able to obtain a great deal of wealth because of the simple fact that they had been able to control the flow of commerce from the interior of the country to the coastal city states and abroad. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Portuguese authority was firmly enough established in the northern and central parts of Mogambique so that it was possible to introduce Catholic missionaries—first the Dominicans, then
the Jesuits, who were the first to introduce Christianity in East Africa. However, whatever success

crowned this first missionary effort was almost completely destroyed in the eighteenth century by the corrupting effect of the marriage that had naturally resulted from the association of commercial, religious, and political activities of the Church and the State. It was during this time that the prazo system was introduced in Mogambique. Prazeiros were Portuguese white and mulatto settlers and landowners who, not unlike European feudal lords, ruled those Africans who had the misfortune to fall under their authority and control. These Africans' lot was worse than that of slaves. The praizeiros often controlled whole districts as personal properties and recognized no law but their own—and only occasionally paid their vassalage to the king of Portugal. Jesuit and Dominican missionaries of the time also came to own vast tracts of land, administering it like any praizeiro, collecting head taxes and, when slavery became more profitable, dealing in slaves. It was out of the prazo system that the great land companies, such as Nyasa and Manica e Sofala companies, developed. It can also be presumed that the heartless and peculiarly Portuguese concessionary company system, which typifies the major economic enterprises of Portuguese colonialism, derived its refinements from the prazo system of this period. Corruption in the prazo system was so rampant that by the third decade of the nineteenth century even the Portuguese government felt compelled to outlaw it. Among other reasons for its abolition by the Portuguese colonial government, the prazo system was notorious for fostering insecurity for person and property, and for the excessive number of Africans who were compelled to leave the area altogether due to the slaving practices of the manor lords. All of this resulted in the almost complete collapse of the Portuguese administration. However, in order to reimpose Portuguese authority, it was necessary to seek the cooperation of some of the praizeiros, which meant their reinstatement; therefore, the vicious circle!

All along, however, the financial benefits that accrued from the slave trade were so great that the praizeiros of central Mogambique had become the reservoirs for slaving. It must be noted here, even in passing, that although the slave trade was one of the most characteristic Portuguese economic activities, slavery per se in East Africa was practiced long before Vasco da Gama touched this coast of Africa. Most of the slaves from East Africa were sold in the Middle East and in South East Asia, including India.

Most of the above colonialistic-imperialistic activities in East Africa took place primarily on the thin coastal strip, involving mostly contacts with the Arabs and the Swahilis, and only very superficial contacts with the bulk of the Bantu-speaking people of present-day East Africa and Mogambique. The Portuguese conquest of what is now Mogambique originated with the proverbial scramble for Africa, which began in the second half of the nineteenth century. After the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Portugal was impelled to capture and solidify what had been dished out to her. To accomplish this, the Portuguese used every technique known in the history of
colonial conquests. Where it was possible, she used infiltration by Portuguese traders, who disguised

themselves as simple businessmen interested in the exchange of goods between equals; but later on, after having thoroughly spied upon and mapped out a whole region, they invited in their military forces, which subsequently wiped out whatever resistance might have been put up by the local rulers. At times, the Portuguese used white settlers, who pretended that they needed land to farm, but who, after having been kindly accommodated by the naive traditional rulers, claimed possession of communal lands and forcibly enslaved the African peoples who were originally their hosts. Sometimes even Portuguese missionaries were used as pacifiers of the natives, using the Christian faith as a lullaby, while the Portuguese military forces occupied the land and controlled the people.

Where the traditional political authority was strong and the military machinery was adequate to offer serious resistance to European conquest, the Portuguese were more subtle in their techniques of initial contact. For instance, under these circumstances, the Portuguese were prepared to begin their contacts with strong African states by establishing diplomatic relations, sending Portuguese "ambassadors" to the courts of the most important traditional rulers. Then, after having sufficiently spied out the internal strengths and weaknesses of the government, they proceeded to attack, using the traditional excuses of "provocation" or "protection of the security of the white settlers or missionaries," etc.

This is the way in which the war against the last of the Mogambican traditional empires, the Gaza Empire under Gungunyana, was justified. The war against Emperor Gungunyana began in 1895 and ended in 1898 with the death in battle of General Magigwane and the capture and deportation of the Emperor to Portugal, where he died several years later.

With regard to the kind of government that the Portuguese established after they had subjugated all parts of the country, we have already presented descriptions, which have been published elsewhere.

As is clear from the foregoing, the success of the Portuguese in controlling the whole of Mogambique was due mainly to the lack of a cohesive political force to oppose them. Right from the first days of contact with the East African coastal city states in the fifteenth century, when the Portuguese were able, albeit temporarily, to defeat and control many of them, through the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, when they captured the main commercial wealth of northern and central Mogambique, up to the nineteenth century, when they proceeded to conquer and keep the present territory of our country, the reaction of our people was fragmentary. It was a piecemeal reaction that encouraged a piecemeal conquest of our people. Even as late as the second decade of this century, in 1917 and 1918 to be exact, when the Makombe of the Barwe--in an attempt to reestablish some of the power of his legendary predecessor King Monomotapa--staged a successful revolt, his success did not last long, for it was not a national Mogambican uprising: it was confined to one or two tribal kingdoms.
Mogambicans had to wait for more than forty-five years before they could seriously challenge Portuguese authority. I am referring to the national liberation war, launched on the 25th of September 1964 by the people of Mogambique under the leadership of the Mogambique Liberation Front.

Between 1918 and 1964, a number of minor, local tribal uprisings took place in various parts of Mogambique, but they were easily crushed by the Portuguese, and the tribal leaders were massacred or deported to the islands or to Portugal. As the colonial system became steadily and firmly established in the whole country, a small class of educated African people slowly emerged, in spite of the meager educational facilities available to Africans as a whole. To these Africans, who were sometimes called assimilados or 4volue, the Portuguese offered limited opportunities for social and economic advancement under the colonial system, but only sufficient to make them useful as instruments of contact between the European administrative and economic interests and the masses of the black people. Among these assimilated Africans, some mulattos, and most Europeanized Asians such as Goans, there are those who believe that their socio-economic and cultural future, or even that of the whole country, is linked to a perpetual attachment to Portugal. But most of the educated Africans have no such illusion. They have seen over the years how their own people have gradually become poorer as the white man became wealthier. The more the black people pressured the white man by reaching for privileged European positions in the socio-economic structure, the more stringent the Portuguese colonial laws became. This, of course, brought about more frustration among the African people, especially among those who had an education comparable to that of the Europeans.

Some of this frustration was expressed in plaintive poetry, such as the following lines by Noemia de Sousa:

Oh Africa, my motherland, answer me:
What has happened to my bush sister,
that she comes no more to the city
with her eternal little ones
(one on her back, one in her womb),
with her eternal charcoal-vendor's cry?
Oh Africa, my motherland,
you at least will not forsake my heroic sister.
She shall live in the proud memorial of your arms.

Whenever the political climate in Portugal permitted it, the frustration was expressed in direct political journalism, openly voicing and defending the rights of the black masses, as illustrated by the success of the Albasinis in establishing O Brado Africano in the early 1920's, one of the first African weeklies in the whole continent. Although this paper is still in circulation today and is still the only Mogambican African paper, it has been thoroughly emasculated by the fascist government of Salazar

so that it no longer says anything meaningful.
Other forms of protest against the excesses of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism took the form of political or semi-political associations. In the beginning of this century, when the Portuguese themselves were groping about for a more democratic system of government, several African political groups arose, which later became political parties. But when Salazar finally established the present fascist system of government, these parties were wiped out and were replaced by the present more racial and communal associations. I am referring here to the rise and fall of such African organizations as the Grão-mio Africano, which later became Associagão -. Africana. For quite some time this African organization was the only Mogambican political group that served as the focal point of most African aspirations. When it became clear to the settlers that the African people were rallying around one body against the settlers' interests, they connived with some of the African leaders and helped to split them into two groups. This split resulted in the formation of another African organization in the early 1930's, the Instituto Negrófilo (The Negrophile Institute), which, when the fascists took over the government in Portugal, was forced to change its name to Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique. The membership of these two organizations seems to reflect a division of the African people into two groups: the mulattoes, who tend to predominate in the Associagão Africana, and the black Africans, who dominate the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique. However, since these two organizations are no longer what one might call popular movements, they no longer serve any visible social or political purpose for the masses of the oppressed African population. They are at best bourgeois social clubs, often called upon by the government to shout their part in the martial chorus of allegiance to Salazar and his fascist regime.

Another kind of semi-social, semi-political organization that left some marks on the Mogambican political scene is the Associagão dos Naturais de Mogambique (Association of Native-Born Mogambicans). This organization was originally meant for European-born white settlers. Consequently, for quite a long time it openly discriminated in its membership against the so-called non-Europeans. But about fifteen years ago, it began to allow some members of other racial groups to join the association. In fact, during the mid-fifties the Associação dos Naturais de Mogambique developed a policy favoring social integration between the two major racial groups, with a view to preparing the people for a future autonomous Mogambique under Portuguese leadership. At one point during the last ten years, the organization launched a scholarship campaign to subsidize the education of some promising Africans in secondary and commercial schools. At first the government encouraged the efforts of this group, perhaps believing that its leaders were interested in only the social and cultural advancement of the African people; but when the government began to note that there were some tendencies toward a more genuine Mogambican nationalism among the members, it took drastic steps to stop them. The government arrested all the top leaders of the association, replaced them with fascist leaders, and placed the whole organization under direct government control.

Lately we have received information indicating that Sr. Filipe Tembe, President
of the Executive Committee of the Centro Associativo, has been arrested and is now in prison, apparently for deviating from the official fascist line set by the Salazar government.

The Rise of Political Parties

It was only after the Second World War that political parties began to emerge on the Mogambican horizon. Since this was the case in practically all of Africa, I need not try to explain why it was so. Most of these parties, however, developed outside of Mogambique because of the fascist nature of Portuguese colonialism. About the only exception to this rule is the development of the Mogambican student movement, J Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes de Mogambique (UNEMO), which right from its inception had a definite political concern. This movement began in Lourenço Marques in 1949, when a group of university students who were attending school in South Africa got together all the African students who were in secondary schools in that city and organized a group called Nicleo dos Estudantes de Mogambique (Nucleus of Mocambican Students). Even though this group had been established within one of the African associations referred to above, when the government began to sense its political inclinations, it pounced on its leaders, put them in prison, and proceeded to try to purge it of all political connotations. I had just been thrown out of South Africa by the Malan government at that time, and, having been one of the founders of Nicleo, I was also put in prison and thoroughly investigated by the State Police (PIDE).

The present FRELIMO was the result of the merger of the three major political parties of Mogambique, which, in June 1962, decided to unite in one movement. The three parties were: Uniao Democritica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), which was first organized in Southern Rhodesia by Mogambicans working in that country; Mogambique African National Union (MANU), organized by those Mogambicans who had been working in East Africa; and Uniao Nacional Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI), first organized in Malawi. Since both the history and program of the movement have been dealt with by me in other publications, I need not repeat them here, except to underline the following facts:

1. FRELIMO is the only popular nationalist movement for the liberation of Mogambique.
2. FRELIMO has one definite goal—the complete and unconditional liberation of our country with a view to developing it politically, socially, and economically for the benefit of all the people of Mogambique, as part of the total liberation of all the peoples of Africa.
3. FRELIMO is a part and parcel of Africa; therefore, it adheres to all the programs and policies of the Organization of African Unity; therefore, being the only Mogambican nationalist movement supported by the OAU through the
African Liberation Committee, it cooperates with this body and all other African nationalist movements for the liberation of all of Africa.

4. FRELIMO is part of all the progressive forces now guiding the revolutionary programs of southern Africa. In this connection, it must be pointed out that FRELIMO is in the vanguard of all the southern African revolutionary forces now engaged in actually driving out the last vestiges of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.

At this stage one might ask: What is the reason for the present unity among the Mogambican people? Is this unity a durable one? In order to answer these questions we have to return to the definitions presented earlier in this paper and affirm that there is a Mogambican nationalism that unites all the various peoples of the vast territory from north to south, regardless of their languages, religions, races, and cultures. In other words, there is now a consciousness on the part of the people of our country of belonging to a nation--Mogambique--and a desire to develop the strength, liberty, and prosperity of that nation. The Mogambican peoples, after many years of facing a common enemy, have coalesced into one solid people, ready to free themselves from bondage. The Mogambican people have come to consider themselves a nation in the same way that the peoples of India, China, the Soviet Union, and other multilingualistic and multireligious societies now consider themselves one nation.

It was mainly in the last seventy-five years that the Mogambican peoples learned their lesson in unity. Immediately after destroying our traditional rulers, the Portuguese confiscated our land and natural resources, putting them under the control and direct use of large European economic interests, and harnessed our manpower for the benefit of these interests and the European settlers. The Mogambican national unity was born out of common experience in suffering together while working as forced labor on the large sisal plantations; while clearing thick forests for planting cotton; while picking cotton together, baling it, carrying heavy loads of it for hundreds of miles to the market centers monopolized by Portuguese and foreign concessionary companies; while sweating together, sometimes with blood, cultivating peanuts, sugar cane, and tea, or loading and unloading cargoes of these products and of heavy machinery from transoceanic liners to trains, or vice versa--all for the benefit of Portuguese, South African, Rhodesian, European, and American white interests. Mogambican unity was born out of toiling together in the deep, hot, narrow, and dustridden shafts of the gold, diamond, and coal mines of the Transvaal and Orange Free State to help enrich the South African and British Harry Oppenheims and their American Engelhardts as they cooperate with the Portuguese to maintain a southern African economic empire for the white man stretching from Katanga to the Cape. Our national unity was born out of the common experience of trying to escape together from Portuguese prisons, forced labor, palmatoria (a beating with a rod), and political persecutions.

After finding ourselves in all of these places and circumstances together for so
many years and, in some parts of Mogambique, for so many centuries, we had no alternative but to unite into one solid people and organize a counterforce, the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique.

Early Manifestations of Discontent

[The following letter was sent anonymously from Mogambique via Johannesburg to the United Nations on July 7, 1957.]1

Mogambique protests against the declarations made by the delegate of Portugal at the session of the commission of the United Nations and against those made by Senator Georgino A. Avelino, delegate of Brazil at the United Nations, who defended Portugal with regard to her overseas possessions and with regard to the proposal for forming an ad hoc committee to study the replies made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by countries recently admitted to the organization concerning whether or not they possess Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Mogambique expresses its disapproval of the above mentioned declarations and makes clear the following: that Mogambique cannot be called a province because its statute does not grant it rights equal to those of the provinces of Minho, Alentejo, Estremadura, etc. With regard to human and civil rights--the native here is a slave; both sexes are sold, as they were in the era of slavery, from the age of thirteen to old age. We do not have official schools for natives, where they may be educated and civilized. There are only religious schools for them, where they are taught to pray. This does not happen with white people born here, since they have primary, intermediate, and secondary schools. Although it is kept secret, there is worse race discrimination here than in neighboring countries. A native cannot travel from one town to another without carrying an administrative authorization. He has no rights; he may be expelled from his small agricultural holdings by colonists who come from Portugal.

Those incapable of undertaking slave work are made to grow cotton, rice, wheat, etc. These products sell for very little; they are sold at the buyer's price, not at the producer's. Are conditions the same in the above-mentioned provinces? These facts do not agree with what they (the Portuguese representatives) declared politically when they were questioned by other countries.

The photographs are included to prove that the sale of blacks still exists in Mogambique, and we have no hope that this inhumanity will cease in this Christian world!

We never protested against anybody. During the demonstration that took place here last February, it was the whites who protested against the action of the United Nations, and the protest was not the idea of any inhabitant of Mogambique.

The black African needs help since he is very poor and has no education. Those who can do some types of work are so badly paid for their great sacrifices that they are obliged to live in foreign countries,
In order that the United Nations cannot claim any ignorance due to Portuguese propaganda at the United Nations, we are writing this clarification, which is signed by
Mogambique P.E. Africa

[The following excerpt, dated October 5, 1960, is from "Manifesto dos democratas de Mogambique dirigido a populago," in Portugal Democrático (São Paulo), IV (November 1960), p. 8. Signed by "Democrats of Mogambique," the statement is representative of European discontent with Portugal's centralized control over the territory's affairs.]

In the name of liberty and human dignity, we vigorously repudiate the current regime and declare that it is an illegal and discretionary power of oppression and force, applying not its own constitution but police force and arbitrary press censorship!

Consequently, Mogambique democrats again demand:
1. Abolition of direct and open government intervention in matters concerning the private and political lives of the citizens and an end to the police practice of violation of homes and correspondence;
2. Abolition of the secret and "domestic" political police (PIDE), for they are illegal and contrary to the peaceful, orderly nature of the Portuguese people, whether European or native;
3. Abolition of illegal and arbitrary censorship of the press and of any Portuguese intellectual activity. Press censorship has only helped to maintain the local populations in blind, superstitious backwardness, in ignorance, confusion, and unawareness of present problems;
4. Immediate release of, or granting of amnesty to, all political prisoners, without distinction as to race, political conviction, or religious creed;
5. Prohibition and declaration as null and void of imprisonment without proven guilt and of summary and administrative expulsion of citizens of any race merely for political beliefs;

6. Abolition and declaration as null and void of legislative process detached from executive and administrative powers, for it is contrary to the constitutional provisions of the current regime;
7. Abolition of government political, administrative, or police intervention in the life and economic initiatives of the European minority and the native society, to facilitate the effective creation and organization of a new, multiracial society in Mogambique;
8. Immediate termination of the mobilization of the political secret police in Mogambique; their replacement with large-scale shipments, from the metropolis and from abroad, of capital and machinery, as well as with protection and public service aid to all whites or blacks living and working here;
9. Revocation, for the same reasons and goals, of all legislation regulating commerce, agriculture, or industry, which, being dependent upon authorization, results in only the most insignificant economic and professional initiative and impedes creation and development of a national social and economic life;
10. Consequently, and for the effective, integral development of Mogambique, the
extensive return to all individuals—of whatever race, born or residing in
Mogambique—of equality, protection, recognition, and unconditional enjoyment
of all human, civil, and political rights as foreseen even in the constitution of
the current regime; thus, the abolition of distinctions resulting from special
statuses and rulings contrary to those principles and to the general and universal
rights of man and of citizens, as expressed in the United Nations Charter—which
Portugal signed!
Mogambican democrats issue this protest and these ten articles of reclamation that
express the only, clear truth in opposition to the political, official façade presented
by the government this year in "commemoration" of October 5, hoping that the
people of Mogambique see in this patriotic, democratic proclamation the just,
effective, and noble way of commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the
establishment of a democratic republic in Portugal.

THE GOOD OF THE NATION, OF THE FATHERLAND, OF LIBERTY, AND
OF HUMAN DIGNITY.

[The manifesto below was published by the Unito Progressiva de Mogambique
(Manica e Sofala) in Portugal Democrdtico (Slo Paulo), IV (June 1961), p. 6.]
The Unigo Progressiva de Mogambique (Manica e Sofala) (UPM), feeling
obliged to not remain indifferent to the turbulent African and international
political situation and trying to aid the present Portuguese government in partially
resolving the political crisis in its most profitable colonies—Angola and
Mogambique—is making public in Portuguese territories and also abroad, the
rights that it urgently claims for the

African peoples of Mogambique:
1. Equality for the African before the law.
2. The right to life and physical integrity.
3. The right to individual liberty, with the reservation that organized judicial
power may intervene when necessary.
5. Freedom of expression, assembly, and association; the right to work and to
an education.
6. The right to secrecy in correspondence and in telephonic and telegraphic
communications.
7. Respect for private investments and for acquired or inherited possessions.
8. Inviolability of the home.
9. Elimination of all traces of racial discrimination in legal texts and in practice.
The UPM, as spokesman for all other African movements in this colony, follows
the example of the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA)—with
which it has made contact. Both would consider effective and rapid realization by
the Portuguese government of the following fundamental measures as the first
sign of Portugal's rejection of the armed way:
1. Immediate and solemn recognition of the right of the people of Mogambique to
self-determination.
2. Total, unconditional amnesty and liberty for all political prisoners.
3. Establishment of public liberties—especially with regard to legalizing the different existing political movements—and of concrete guarantees for the effective exercise of the liberties demanded.

4. Immediate withdrawal of Portuguese Armed Forces (land and sea) and liquidation of existing military bases throughout Mozambique.

5. Annulment of any agreements or military compromises made with South Africa or any other country, such as Spain or France.

6. Convocation, by the end of 1961, of a round table composed of representatives from all African political parties in Mozambique, from the government and from all sectors of Portuguese opposition to the regime, within the country or abroad, with the aim of arriving at a peaceful solution to the colonial problem in Mozambique in the interests of the parties present.

The UPM, whose organizers and followers are all Africans, is fighting for the freedom, dignity, and progress of all peoples of Mozambique (who are of different racial origins), counts on the moral support of the entire population, without racial, religious, or political discrimination, and subscribes to the following statement:

A radical change of attitude is seen among European extremists who find themselves aided by the government itself. Throughout the colony, in the Sul do Save as well as in Nyassa and Cabo Delgado, they are receiving machine guns and other weapons from the hands of these same authorities to defend themselves against possible attacks by Africans.

May the colonial government order the immediate collection of these arms, which are a flagrant proof of the atmosphere of distrust and tension created by the authorities, to avert the outbreak of a wave of hostilities, (an outbreak which would be) contrary to the plans that African parties have in mind.

The Mogambique Refugee Situation

by Janet Rae Mondlane

[Janet Rae Mondlane, wife of Eduardo, is director of the Instituto Mogambicano in Dar es Salaam—which serves the educational needs of several hundred Mozambican refugees and exiles in Tanzania. The following unpublished report was written during 1963.]

The story of refugees is always an unhappy one. For a refugee's life means leaving one's family behind, often not having enough to eat—certainly not having enough to clothe oneself—and sometimes wondering where the next place for sleep will be. For most of us, the refugee problem is an old one. There probably have always been refugees of one sort or another; but today politics are like a pendulum swinging back and forth, affecting the lives of thousands upon thousands of people. Therefore appeals on behalf of refugees have become commonplace.

Since my husband and I visited Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, this summer, from the first part of June until the middle of July, we have found ourselves in the midst of another refugee problem. A new group of refugees has come to join the ranks of the many other refugees that populate our modern world. They are young
men and women from Mogambique, the country that lies just south of Tanganyika. Africans from the Portuguese colony of Mogambique have been leaving their homeland for many, many years, in search of fortune. It has been estimated that five hundred thousand Mogambican Africans leave Mogambique each year, traveling back and forth across the borders to work in the neighboring countries of the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika. In these neighboring countries they find work and a certain amount of freedom that they fail to find in their own home country. This is not to say that most of the neighboring countries are free, for many of us who are familiar with colonial Africa know that this is not the case. However, it is certainly true that compared with most other parts of Africa, the colony of Mogambique and its sister colony across the southern part of the African continent, Angola, are perhaps the most tragic among the cases of European colonialism in Africa. In Mogambique, which I know best, the people are persecuted on the streets, they are persecuted in their churches, they are persecuted in their homes. They have freedom in no place--wherever they go. It is sad to have to say that, although the winds of change blow across other parts of Africa, there is a cold, cold wind that blows through Angola and Mogambique. The nationalism that has affected the other parts of Africa has also been felt in Mogambique as well as in Angola. The Portuguese have certainly not looked upon this nationalism with any benevolence or cooperation. In fact, among the European colonial powers, Portugal has treated her colonial possessions more cruelly than any other European power. This may be due to a number of reasons or rationalizations; but whatever the reasons may be, the Portuguese dictator Salazar has been cruel and unjust in his handling of Mogambicans and Angolans. He has murdered and napalmbombed in Angola; he has imprisoned and tortured; and he has taken away to unknown destinations thousands of Africans. The Portuguese handling of the Angolan revolt has been swift and cruel. They permit no opposition, either in their colonies or at home. The small [military] actions that have taken place in Mogambique tell no different story. To date there are approximately forty thousand Portuguese soldiers stationed in Mogambique. These soldiers are supposed to keep Mogambique calm and see that no nationalistic feeling gains a hold among the African majority. In 1961, a Mogambican in Dar es Salaam, a leader of one of the two former Mogambique African nationalist parties, announced that there were seventy thousand African soldiers prepared and ready to invade Mogambique from Tanganyika. As a result of this announcement the Portuguese began a campaign of persecution and murder that is hard to describe and almost unbelievable. During this particular campaign, many people left Mogambique, fleeing across the borders into the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika. Due to the pressures put on Africans in Southern Rhodesia, many of these Mogambicans left that country and made their way to the free country of Tanganyika, where they were given asylum. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Tanganyika government there are approximately fifty thousand Mogambican refugees in
Tanganyika. Many of these African people have been crossing the Rovuma River (separating Tanganyika from Mozambique) for many years, going to work on the plantations in the ports of Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya. When the Portuguese closed the border early this year, these people were not allowed to return to their homes. They were forced into being refugees. This situation has made these African people very conscious of their political plight. Had the Portuguese been more sensitive in their dealings with their African subjects, they would have realized that an action such as closing the borders between one country and another would only serve to awaken the African consciousness to its state of subservience. Nevertheless, this is the action that the Portuguese took. The

Mozambicans who are presently working on the plantations of Tanganyika are very eager to return home to their families, but they have no contact whatsoever with their home country except for what little news they can get from clandestine travelers.

While we were in Dar es Salaam there was one small group of refugees that claimed our immediate and whole attention. These were the young men and women who recently had to flee Mozambique in order to escape imprisonment or persecution of one kind or another. Almost all of these young people are, or were, students. Unfortunately, in Mozambique the African people are given very little opportunity to study. The educational system for Africans is extremely poor. Most young Mozambican men and women receive no schooling. (Of those who have been to school, only a few are ready for high school. Many have not completed their grade school education.) This small group that I am referring to consisted of about thirty-six young men who came from various parts of Mozambique and who had varied achievements or attainments in their education. Some had been partially through grade school; some had finished grade school. Some had managed to get a little high school education and three or four were almost ready for their college education. These students were behind in their educational attainment because they had been terribly deprived.

During the past six months, since our departure from Dar es Salaam, there has been an increase in the number of student refugees. There is no doubt that the urgent need for education and the heightening of political tension has contributed greatly to the flow of students. At present there are approximately fifty student refugees in Dar es Salaam alone. Of this number, those ready to begin university studies can almost be counted on one hand. The crying need is for high school education. Sometimes there is a tendency to despair, for the young people see their goal so clearly and yet it seems as if the doors remain shut no matter how heavily they knock.

It might be more meaningful to you if I told you the story of one boy, a seventeen-year-old boy named Zeca who wants to become a doctor. Zeca was born in Southern Mozambique, where he was able to complete his elementary substandard. Then he left for Southern Rhodesia in 1959 to complete his elementary education. He did this at the request of his father who, like many of his fellow countrymen, was working in Southern Rhodesia at that time. He did
very well in school and, after having spent some time in Southern Rhodesia, he traveled to his home to visit his family for the holidays. At the end of the holiday period, he was ready to return to school—but the Portuguese would not allow him to return. They gave him no reason but merely refused to issue him a permit to leave the country. This, unhappily, is not unusual, for the Portuguese are always ready to assure themselves that the best thing they can possibly do for the African people is to block any educational opportunity that might be available to them. However, Zeca was very eager to continue his education. So, on the advice of an uncle, and with his help, Zeca left Mogambique illegally, returning to Southern Rhodesia. However, since he did not have the money to pay the school fees, he began working, taking a correspondence course for his junior certificate. With a great deal of hardship and through very hard work, he managed to complete two years of junior certificate by correspondence course.

But at the end of two years, the Portuguese caught up with him again. Discovering that he had left the country illegally, they were ready to take him back to Mogambique to the inevitable imprisonment. Zeca was informed of the Portuguese plan and managed to flee—but before he could complete his exams for the junior certificate. The destination of his flight was Dar es Salaam. Zeca, being a very determined young man, decided that he absolutely must begin school: Form I or high school. He began his round of schools, of embassies, of the Tanganyikan government offices. Confronted by one failure after another, he became a very discouraged person, but he continued his search. Finally, a Catholic school in Dar es Salaam allowed him to enroll with a permit from the Tanganyikan government offices to begin classes in Form I without having to pay tuition. How long this situation would last for Zeca was questionable. Tanganyika is very much in need of schools for its own young people. Although asylum can be given to the young refugees, the country certainly is not able to provide them with education.

The story of Zeca's search for education can be heard again in the experiences of Angonio, and in the story of Lopes, in that of Eli, in the experiences of Isaac and Jo.o. The same experiences apply to Felipe, Daniel, Pedro, Gabriel, José, Patrick, and any of the young men that we found in the refugee camps outside Dar es Salaam. The refugee camp is a long cement-block house. The refugees are given a bed and a mosquito netting. Their food is paid for by refugee organizations working through the Tanganyikan government. At the time of our arrival there had been some difficulty concerning the amount of money being distributed to these refugees. In fact, the situation had become so bad that the refugees had been living on barely one meal a day. This they managed by pooling their individual allowance of $1.75 a week for all foods and necessities and by cooking their meals together. In this way they were able to fill their stomachs just day by day. This, of course, made their mental situation a most unhappy and dissatisfied one. Being cut off from their families, not knowing what had become of their relatives since their escape, and then not having enough to eat worked upon their mental and emotional capacities to such an extent that they were ready to get up and fight whoever seemed to stand in their way, the way between their hunger and food.
Sadly enough, even greater than their need for food was their need for education. Each day during the first two weeks in Dar es Salaam these boys would come to us in groups of two, three, or four, asking us what could be done to get scholarships for them so they could continue their studies. They walked five miles to the city on an empty stomach, sat and waited for us in the very early hours of the morning, sat and waited until they could have a chance to speak with us, sat and waited until they could have some kind of reply, then trudged back to their refugee camps at the end of the day. When I saw that the greatest hunger of the refugees was the hunger for education, I began thinking about what could be done in the interim--between now and the time when they could move out of Dar es Salaam into a country where they could continue their formal education. My only conclusion was that I must find one or two teachers who could tutor them in English, in French, in mathematics, in some of the basic sciences, and in a bit of history. Now this is a lot to ask of one person or two people: to conduct a classroom for boys ranging in age from seventeen to twenty-eight, for boys whose educational attainment varies from middle grade school to middle high school. It is even more to ask a teacher to teach without books, without a blackboard, without papers and pencils, without all the things that we who have been to school are used to. But I was determined that I was going to find someone who could. My first success was in finding a French teacher. Through the French Embassy, the French-speaking League of Dar es Salaam was offering French lessons to Africans at a very minimum fee. Some of these students were enrolled in this course and, since we were able to afford the minimum dues, we saw that their fees were paid .... Yet the most pressing problem on which we worked and continue to work is the academic future of these young men and women. We have succeeded in obtaining U. S. government scholarships for twelve students to study in this country and some additional scholarships from other countries .... The solution must be found where the most students are living--in Tanganyika. The material and educational provisions we were able to work out in Dar es Salaam are only temporary measures. How long will the Tanganyikan government be able to help support these young people? Where will needed clothing come from? Where will they go to school? And how long will there be just fifty people waiting and waiting and waiting? There will be more coming. Yet they cannot be employed if they are not Tanganyikan citizens. The jobs available must be for the Tanganyikans themselves. These are young men who have a purpose in life. They are young men on whom the future of Mogambique depends. While there are fifty in Dar es Salaam today, there may be one hundred in six months and two hundred next year. For the Portuguese do not stop in their persecution. They find it necessary to continue stringent measures in their colonies. No matter how unjust their practices may seem to the rest of the world, they see only one way to deal with those who oppose them: put them out of the way. This has been the experience of the refugees in Mogambique, and it has been the bitter experience of those who did not even have the time to become refugees, who are now at the bottom of some
ocean or in some unknown place that only the Portuguese colonialists know. These young people, and those men and women who follow them, must have some organization or agency through which they can appeal for aid, for food, and for clothing. The Salvation Army, which has provided the building and the beds for the refugees, has done what it can to help these people with its small resources. But the need is much greater than a bed and a mosquito netting and one meal a day. These young men need scholarships and a school to help them continue on the path they have selected. Mogambique is a country with a desperate need for doctors, economists, for people who are trained in agriculture, for all the professions that a modern society requires: teachers, engineers, mechanics. These are the roles that these young refugees must finally fill. Let us hope that what they experience now will not leave them bitter but, with help from people who wish them only the best, will instead allow them to succeed in their desire to build a nation for themselves and their children. They need schools, they need clothing, they need food. They need sympathy. We will never forget one of our many visits to the refugee camp when, after being with the refugees for perhaps three and one-half weeks, we went out to talk with them and particularly to see if we couldn't raise their spirits a little bit. They didn't know we were coming that evening. Their one small candle had just about burned down. The kerosene lamp that we had brought for their house had run out of fuel, and I felt most ashamed that I had not thought to bring a gallon of kerosene along with me. Nevertheless we arranged all the beds along the walls in an egg-shaped enclosure and sat there chatting around the little candle stub. Although these young fellows came from different ethnic groups of Mogambique, we thought it might be nice if we could strike up a song that we all knew. For after all, these boys had been living together for four months, six months, or eight months, and some a year, and surely they had taught each other some of the songs of their people. We tried one song after another. One or two would join in here, one or two on another song. Finally we stopped and said, "Say there, what's the matter? Don't you fellows ever teach each other your songs?" One of the boys spoke up, "Here we have never before had a reason to sing." This struck us as being particularly sad, for we have hardly ever known a Mogambican who could not sing some song to help him through a difficult time. Yet the spirit and determination of these young men is high. They know what they are after. They believe in their future, and they are asking only for the help to send them along their way. It is going to be a long, long way from that airless, mosquito-ridden, lightless, cement-block house where they have little to eat, to the leadership of a large African country dominating one thousand and five hundred miles of the East African coast. But that is where these boys are headed. It is on them that the leadership of Mogambique will depend. It will come from them and from those that follow them. This is one reason why something should be done on their behalf to see that they get to their schools as quickly as possible. The time is very short. This help will be important for building a nation--a nation that is coming so soon and for which so much is needed.

II
LEADERSHIP
The statements below reflect the views of three nationalist leaders of Mogambique. It is particularly interesting to note the contrast between Mondlane's two statements (one in 1955 and one in 1962) as well as the similarity in demands and views of Mondlane, Gwanbe, and Mallinga.

* * * *

The Portuguese Overseas Provinces
by
Eduardo Mondlane
[The excerpts below, reprinted with permission of the University of Chicago Press, are from Mondlane's essay, "Mozambique," in Calvin W. Stillman, Africa in the Modern World, Chicago, 1955, pp. 233-44. At the time Mondlane was studying in the United States.]

Before the constitutional amendment of 1950, the whole of the empire outside the mother-country and India was known as the "Portuguese Colonial Empire." With the amendment, the designation of "Colonial Empire" became "Overseas Provinces." This move to change the legal status of the overseas territories from colonies to provinces took place at its appropriate historical time. As everyone knows, the problems that colonial powers face today in relation to their colonies are not to be minimized. Portugal, like all other colonial powers, having to answer questions raised by such organizations as the United Nations. By this I do not mean that, when the new amendment to the constitution was made, its authors deliberately wanted to avoid embarrassing questions. It means, rather, that the point is pertinent when viewed against the perspective of world politics .... The aim of the Portuguese government is to have Portugal one and indivisible, united in culture, language, and spirit. In order to achieve this general aim, the Portuguese government has recruited the contribution of two important institutions within the nation: the Roman Catholic church, with its missionary organization and machinery, and the Nationalist party, with its devotion to the glories of the Portuguese past and the revolution that has been going on for the last twenty-five years, at the head of which is Dr. Salazar, the present prime minister. . . . Before closing I would like to point out three of the most important problems that Mogambique is facing. One concerns the education of Africans. It is known that the educational standards in the schools for native Africans in Mogambique are far below those of neighboring countries. The reasons are many, but the most important is a material one: not enough money .... The second problem is that of health. The Portuguese government has done everything within its power to eliminate disease in Mogambique. The health department of our government in Mogambique is one of the most forward-looking and most successful in Africa. These last ten years have seen a tremendous expansion of the health services to reach most parts of Mogambique .... The third problem is that of the migration of labor, especially to the Union of South Africa. Besides the fact that our young men provide the cheapest labor force that the Union can get in the whole of South Africa, the migration creates a number of other
problems of a social and emotional kind. It is easy for anyone who has an inkling of the social organization of any nonindustrial people to see that the migration of men from their homes to other regions for more than two years at a time causes all kinds of family and social maladjustments. The moral consequences of separation from one's family are known to all of us here.... In conclusion I would like to mention that while Mogambique, as a Portuguese territory, presents problems that are unique, it is necessary to keep in mind that the problems of Africa as a whole, and especially those of South Africa as a region, have a great deal in common.... We come, then, to a statement of fundamental questions confronting us in Portuguese Africa: Will the Portuguese be able to resist the influences of the Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa in forming their attitude toward Africans, in view of the close economic relationship with these territories? Will pressures in this direction increase as more Portuguese settlers are brought to the country as it develops economically, as occurred elsewhere in Africa? Will Portuguese Africans who work in the Union of South Africa--in a segregated society that tends to breed hatred of white people--be able to identify with the Portuguese as co-citizens of the same country? Will Africans throughout the continent tomorrow have an attitude of appreciation for what Portugal is doing, and may do in the future, for the development of opportunities for Africans? Will these Africans feel resentful toward Portugal? Dissent on Mogambique
by
Eduardo Mondlane

[The following statement by Mondlane was presented to the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration at its eighth meeting on April 9, 1962.1 Early in my life I took advantage of whatever educational facilities were available to the people of my race and culture. However, on finishing the first four years of school it was not possible for me to enter high school because at that time practically no black Africans could go on. Either they could not afford to or they were deemed too old to attend the only official high school then operating in Mogambique. Consequently, in 1944, I had to go to the Transvaal, South Africa, to continue my studies. On finishing high school, by passing the South African Joint Matriculation Board Examinations in 1947 I entered the Jan H. Hofmeyr School of Social Work in Johannesburg, and a year later entered Witwatersrand University, in the Faculty of Social Sciences. However, after the South African nationalist party was voted into power, it refused to renew my visa. This resulted in my returning to Mogambique in September 1949, before finishing my studies toward the B. A. degree. At that time the Portuguese government was engaged in a crackdown on all liberal groups in Mogambique, i. e., groups that were in one way or another against Prime Minister Salazar's regime. As I had just returned to Mogambique...
from South Africa under rather unusual conditions, I became an easy subject for the activities of the state police. I was, therefore, soon arrested and kept incommunicado in prison for investigation for three days. Finally, when they were satisfied that I was not in any way implicated with any of the white Portuguese whom they had already arrested, they released me. One of the main reasons for detaining me was that I had helped to organize an African students association in the capital city of Lourenço Marques a year before. Although the purpose of this organization had been cultural and social, its popularity amongst our young African students had aroused the curiosity and fears of the Portuguese political police.

I feel that a few illustrative examples of the kind of questions that the police asked me and other members of the executive committee of the student organization would be appropriate here, in order to show the basis of the fears felt by the Portuguese government. Even though our organization was attached to an officially sponsored African organization, the police kept asking us who was the source of our financial support, with prodding questions leading to an outside group or nation. Also, even though my studies at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg had been mainly supported by bona fide religious groups, the police tried to insist that my funds might instead be emanating from some overseas country. By this time, i.e. in 1949, rumblings of nationalism were being reported in connection with West African British colonies, especially Nigeria and Ghana, where Namdi Azikiwe and Kwame Nkrumah were already pressing for the independence of their countries. Therefore, the Portuguese police insisted on finding out if there was any relationship between our student association and those West African nationalist leaders. One of the last questions I was asked before I was released concerned my own conception of the moral, intellectual, and cultural capabilities of people of my own race. The question was phrased generally this way, "Do you think that the black man has evolved morally, intellectually, and culturally enough to be able to govern himself?" Since my answer was obviously a strong "Yes," while I was shivering in my boots, the gentleman who had been investigating me, after recovering from the unexpected answer, asked further why then only purely African independent states were in his view so backward and primitive. Then he gave me a stern lecture concerning what I had said. After they were satisfied that we had no direct relationship with the white Portuguese political group they were after, they released us from prison.

A few weeks later I received a copy of a summary of the remarks of the Attorney General of Portugal on the investigations. One of the major conclusions arrived at by the Attorney General concerning me and the student organization I had formed was that we were an embryo African nationalist organization, and that as such we should be closely watched. In order to do this, the Attorney General counselled the Mogambique government to give us every facility possible, while encouraging trusted African students to join the group and report on its activities. I was judged to have a "nationalist virus," which might grow to dangerous proportions unless it was quickly encysted and rendered harmless to the rest of the African population.
He then suggested that I be closely watched and, if possible, encouraged to go overseas, preferably to metropolitan Portugal, to continue my studies. A few days later the Director of Civil Administration of Mozambique asked me to see him in his office. He suggested first that I seek a government scholarship to study in Portugal, and secondly that my student organization should work more closely with other government-sponsored youth organizations. The first suggestion I declined, in view of the fact that I had already been promised a scholarship by a humanitarian organization in New York City to study at Lisbon University. With regard to the second suggestion, I told him that I had no power as an individual member to decide what the group should do. Obviously we could not accept subjecting ourselves to government guidance, especially when we knew the intention of the interest it had in our organization.

While I was in prison, I received several messages from Africans of all persuasions encouraging me to stand for the rights of the African peoples. They took my imprisonment as a token of the determination of the African people to free themselves from colonial control. In June 1950, I left for Lisbon to continue my studies. Here, for the first time, I met the first group of really educated Africans from Africa under Portuguese colonial control. All my life in Mozambique I had never met a single black man who had ever finished high school in any Portuguese colony. At Lisbon University in mid-1950, there were fewer than ten black African students who were attending university or equivalent institutions; all of them were from the West African Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea, Cabo Verde, and the little island of São Tomé. Even if one counted those who were attending the other two Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Oporto, one could not arrive at a total of more than twenty black African students. While I was understandably pleased to meet people of my own race attending a Portuguese university, I was disappointed to find such a small number of them, when even South Africa had at that time more than fifty black African students at the Witwatersrand University alone. When counting those who were attending Fort Hare University College, Cape Town and Natal, the number of black African university students [in South Africa] at that time must have been more than five hundred.

I had also read reports of African students from countries that were under British and French colonial control who were studying in the so-called metropole universities. The British universities boasted more than ten thousand African students, while France had more than twenty thousand African students. I shall return to this point when dealing with actual statistical information on education in Mozambique. During my one year of studies at the Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, I was harassed by the political police. Twice they came to search my room, probably hoping to find some documents (which they thought I had) that would enable them to arrest me. Nor was this harassment confined to me alone. Practically all of the other African students lived in fear of being picked up by the political police for one reason or another, but most of all because the Portuguese
government, feeling guilty in its relationship with its colonial wards, wished to make sure that those of us who were studying in their midst did not plot to change our people's status.

By the end of my first year, the tension was so great that I could not study. I was afraid that if that situation continued, I might not be able to finish my education. I had already noted that most of the other African students had been dragging in their studies for the same reasons. So I applied for scholarships and admission to American colleges.

In the fall of 1951 I entered Oberlin College, Ohio, where I continued my studies in sociology and anthropology. I obtained the B. A. degree in June 1953 and, in the fall of the same year, registered at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, where I obtained the M. A. and Ph. D. degrees in 1956 and 1960, respectively. Before completing my dissertation for the Ph. D. degree, I spent one year at Harvard University as a visiting scholar, studying and preparing the theoretical materials for my research. It was from Harvard that I was invited by the United Nations to join the Trusteeship staff. This was in May 1957. For the following four and one-half years I worked at United Nations Headquarters.

In the fall of 1960, I was sent to the British Cameroons as a member of a United Nations team to observe the preparations for, and the carrying out, of the 1961 plebiscite of that territory. In February of that same year, I flew back to Mogambique on home leave. On returning from Mogambique I tendered my resignation to the United Nations in order to devote my attention to writing and speaking on behalf of my people. At the present time I am teaching anthropology at the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University.

I should like to give a brief outline of the situation in Mogambique as I understand it. In so doing I shall take into account the fact that a previous committee of the United Nations recently presented a report on conditions in the Portuguese colonies of Africa in which it provided this organization with a great deal of factual information that I would not wish to duplicate. Therefore, I wish to stress two areas of life about which I believe this Committee would be interested to hear: namely, the economic situation, especially as it affects the freedom of the people of Mogambique in their quest for a decent standard of living; and the educational policies of Portugal as they affect the African peoples of Mogambique.

We Mogambicans are, like all other Bantu southeast Africans, an agricultural people. For centuries our economic activities have centered around the tilling of the land, around raising mainly those crops that are directly related to our staple foods, such as peanuts, African corn, manioc, yams, sorghum, beans, peas, and a large variety of tropical and subtropical fruits. In addition, we are also well-known for our cattle culture. Our whole social structure is organized around an agriculture in which the rearing of cattle, goats, and occasionally sheep, plays an important role. Our family life, for example, is to a large degree based on the land. Land, however, is owned communally, with individual claims to any piece of it as property made on the basis of use only. Livestock is owned by individual families, but the grazing land for livestock belongs to the whole community.
Traditionally, the division of labor was based on sex, with women specializing in the lighter chores of cultivating the fields and preparation of foods while men felled the trees, took care of the livestock, hunted, and defended the community against both wild animals and any human invaders. When our country was finally conquered and controlled by the Portuguese about the middle of the last century, many of our younger men were released from their traditional military chores and began to seek new areas of adventure elsewhere. The most important of these were the newly discovered diamond and gold mines of South Africa. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese had actively participated in the capturing of many of our people to be sold overseas as slaves. When this was finally stopped, either because there were no markets for selling slaves or because the slaves were more economically useful in Mogambique itself, the Portuguese encouraged private companies to use more and more local African slave labor. As the practice of forcing African men to work for local Portuguese planters for unreasonably low wages was intensified, more and more of our young men left the country to work in the neighboring territories of the Transvaal (in mines), Natal (on sugar cane plantations), and Southern Rhodesia (on white farms). Most of the publicity that resulted from this kind of slavery hit the world press with reference to Angolan labor only, in connection with the Slo Tomé cocoa plantations. But, in fact, the excesses that aroused the ire of several European cocausing industrial groups were relevant to Mogambique also, in that several thousand laborers from the East Coast had been sent to Slo Tomé. The Portuguese have always argued that Africans are lazy and won't work unless they are forced to do so. Therefore, Portugal, in order to fulfill her so-called "civilizing mission," decided to establish laws aimed at compelling Africans to work in European institutions. The belief that the African must be forced to work is part of a Portuguese philosophy in which she regards herself as a civilizing force in a continent she considers primitive and inhabited by "children." This Portuguese attitude toward Africa and the African peoples is typified by the following statement made by Professor Marcello Caetano, who was for a long time Prime Minister Salazar's theoretician and, until last week, the Chancellor of the University of Lisbon. Professor Caetano once wrote: "The blacks in Africa have to be directed and indoctrinated by Europeans... The Africans have not learned how to develop alone the territories that they have inhabited for thousands of years; they have not produced one useful invention, made no valuable technical discovery... and have done nothing that can be compared to the accomplishments in the land of Culture and Technics, which is Europe... A former Portuguese minister of colonial affairs phrased the same idea thus, "It is necessary to inspire in the black the idea of work and of abandoning his laziness..." Although it is not my intention to refute these obviously ignorant and prejudiced statements about the African peoples, I should like to mention, albeit in passing, that our willingness to work, in whatever we wish to engage in, has been demonstrated beyond doubt by various groups with which we have been in
contact over the years. For example, the tendency of many thousands of Mogambicans to emigrate to neighboring countries to seek work was initiated by our own desire to improve our own standard of living, rather than by what they, the Portuguese, try to claim. Long before our traditional governments were destroyed, we were actively engaged in the development of our own economies and, where these did not suffice to provide outlets or remunerative work for our able-bodied men, we sought alternative areas of work, sometimes even trekking hundreds of miles on foot to get employment. There was no need for the Portuguese to use the various legal and extra-legal devices they now use to push Africans from their own traditional means of making a livelihood into serving European economic interests.

As the situation stands today, we are probably the most exploited nation in the whole of Africa, in that we have one of the highest proportions of our able-bodied population working hundreds of miles away from our own homes. While the Portuguese government is presenting to the outside world the false picture of a people who it alleges need to be civilized by forcing them to work, the truth is otherwise.

The annual emigration of Mogambicans to South Africa is estimated at five hundred thousand able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five and is governed by a series of agreements between South Africa and Portugal, beginning in the year 1897. In that year an agreement was made between Portugal and what was then the Republic of the Transvaal; it was followed by the Modus Vivendi of 1901, the Transvaal-Mogambique Convention of 1909, and the Portuguese-South African Convention of 1928, revised in 1934, 1936, and 1940. All of these agreements between Portugal and South Africa arranged for the gold and diamond mine interests of the Transvaal to be granted large-scale labor-recruiting privileges in at least the southern province of Mogambique in return for guaranteeing that a certain proportion of the sea-borne traffic of the industrial center of South Africa, which includes Pretoria and Johannesburg, must pass through the Port of Lourenço Marques rather than through the South African ports of Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. Other benefits accruing to Portugal are direct monetary payments per African recruited, guaranteed repatriation of all clandestine emigrants, maximum contract time, and permission to establish Portuguese Native Affairs inspection and taxcollecting facilities (Curadorias) on South African territory.

At the turn of the last century about three-quarters of the total African labor force at the mines of the Transvaal was from Mogambique. According to a Transvaal Labor Commission report, for the first twenty years of the industry's development, the gold mines were almost entirely dependent upon the East Coast for their labor. As another reporter puts it, "The Mozambique boy [sic.] may, therefore, be described as the pioneer colored laborer of the Witwatersrand." Since then the African people of Mogambique have spent the most productive years of their lives helping to develop an economy—a labor for which they themselves received almost nothing—that has, as it is well-known, enriched and continues to enrich the
white people of South Africa and, to a certain extent, has profited and continues to profit the Portuguese government.
Without going into the details of hazards that generations of Mogambicans have undergone and in which thousands of our people have lost their lives, we would like to underline a few points. In the twelve years between 1902 and 1914, over forty-three thousand Mogambicans died as a result of mining accidents and disease while employed by the Chamber of Mines of the Rand. It is quite likely that a greater number of our people died at home from diseases and accidents that resulted from labor at the mines. Remembering my experience in Mogambique, I cannot recall a single family that does not count the loss of at least one man who either died in the mines of South Africa or came home with an illness contracted in the mines and died a few years [later]. [The death toll] between 1902 and 1940 stands at 81,166. Even if this great loss of our people were related to the economic development of our own country and for the benefit of our own people, it would be greatly deplored. However, the situation is worse. These thousands of Mogambicans have died to satisfy the economic greed of both the South African whites and the Portuguese.
Having grown up in the area from which most of the people composing this labor force come, I should like to indicate in a few words some of the consequences this migratory system of labor has for the workers' families in Mogambique. Most of the laborers stay an average of fifteen months in the mining areas, even though the contract allows for a maximum sojourn of eighteen months. During those fifteen months their services are lost to their wives and children. Not only do the men normally help to build the huts and granaries of the family, in addition to clearing the forests and thickets to enable the women to cultivate the land and sow the seeds, but they also provide an important element in the total life of a family. The many emotional problems the wives of these men have to face as a result of their husbands' prolonged absence from home cannot be described in a statement of a few minutes' duration.
Nor is this all. In order to make certain that sufficient men leave their homes to work either in South Africa or in Mogambique--on plantations, in industries, or on government projects--the Portuguese government has, from time to time, passed laws that force Africans to leave. These are the so-called contract labor laws. In order to justify this, of course, the same kind of arguments and rationalizations that we have already pointed out are brought forth. Even as late as the 1940's, a Portuguese governor stated the following: "The problem of native manpower... is probably the most important preoccupation of European agriculture. Generally speaking, throughout the various seasons of the year there is an insufficient number of workers for the accomplishment of the undertakings that have been planned. The recruiters struggle with great difficulties to engage the needed number of workers. . . The rendering of work in Africa cannot continue to depend upon the whim of the black man, who is, by temperament and natural circumstances, inclined to expend only that minimum of effort which corresponds to his minimum necessities. . ."
When I returned to Mogambique last year, I had great hopes of seeing some improvements, which I thought might have resulted from the present political situation in Africa. But, alas, I was disappointed. If anything, the situation is in many ways worse. In the first place, the South African mining interests boast the highest number of Mogambican workers ever. Secondly, the southern district adjoining Zululand and Swaziland is now so thinly populated that many people fear that unless things change drastically it will be completely emptied of its erstwhile teeming population. Thirdly, the African traditional rulers have become virtual policemen for the local administrators rather than a link between the people and their conquerors. So that even where one might once have expected some rapport between the people and the government, none now exists.

With regard to wages, African workers earn more monthly salaries lower in value than those earned by European workers. As I travelled all over the southern province, I heard complaints of inadequate wages, illegal extensions of contracts with the conniving of some of the local government officers, the use of women and minors on government road projects, and many other charges.

One of the most common irregularities in the administration of the labor codes occurs in the actual recruitment of the workers. As happens with most legal provisions of the Portuguese government, there is no concern for impartiality in their application. For example, the local administrative officer is also the highest judicial authority as he is the highest executive authority for any given group of Africans. Except for the very small number of "assimilated" persons, the vast majority of the African people must depend on the local administrative officer for the interpretation of the law as well as for the adjudication of differences among the people. Therefore, if an employer wished to have a given number of workers on a given date, the administrative officer often breaks his own governmental regulation and orders the local chiefs to bring in the needed people or else. Even though a chief understands the law and disagrees with the officer, he dares not oppose him, for there is no independent authority to which he may appeal.

One of my major disappointments in Mogambique during last year's visit was to discover that the educational policies and practices of the last twenty years have not changed.....

The gap between the Portuguese theory of education in its overseas territories and its actual practice has been a very wide one. Some five hundred years of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mogambique have resulted, not in the creation of millions of full-fledged black Portuguese citizens, but in the evolution of barely thirty-six thousand assimilados out of a total population in the two territories of over ten million. Universal education, even at the beginning adaptaglo level, is still a long way off. Schooling beyond the fourth grade is reserved for a few hundred Africans a year. Moreover, the continuing encouragement of large-scale migration of Portuguese settlers to Angola and Mogambique raises new questions regarding the ultimate intent of Portuguese policy.

Despite the oft-repeated official claim that there is no discrimination along racial lines in the Portuguese territories, the fact is that most African education is both
separate from and decidedly inferior to that available to non-Africans in Angola and Mozambique. The official rationalization for the maintenance of a completely separate system of schools for Africans is that the purpose of these schools is to introduce African children to Portuguese culture and language and that the approach required would be too elementary for children born into that culture. This argument would have more validity if the same measuring stick were applied to children of other non-European cultures as well; but the Asians in Mozambique, most of whom share the Africans' unfamiliarity with the Portuguese language and culture and usually are not Christians, are eligible for entry into government and private schools catering to Europeans. On the other hand, it is quite true that fully assimilated Africans who have already become citizens of Portugal by official act have been accepted with a minimum of color bias in Portuguese schools, although their role in Portuguese society has remained ambiguous.

However sincere the original intent of Portuguese educational policy may have been, educational practice in recent years has clearly been directed toward keeping the lid on African education. This is accomplished by isolating the Africans under Portuguese jurisdiction from the mainstream of African thought and education, discouraging the use of indigenous languages by prohibiting them even at the primary level of education, and educating Africans to a minimal level in a highly controlled, Portuguese-oriented educational environment.

While I was in Mozambique last year, I had the opportunity of discussing educational problems with two of the highest officials of the Board of Education of the country. One of these was the Director of Education for the whole country and the other was the principal of Salazar High School, the largest government high school. In talking to these two gentlemen, I was interested in finding out, first, the government's plans for expanding African education so that it may take more students and, second, whether the government intends to correct the anomaly existing in high schools, where there is such a paucity of African children in a country in which more than 95 percent of the people are Africans. With regard to the first question, the Director of Education told me that nothing can be done to increase the number of African grade school children until more money is available to expand the whole system. I told him that in talking to Roman Catholic priests, whose church monopolized African education, I was told that the government does not give enough financial support to their work and that, therefore, they are not able to either improve the quality of education given or increase the number of students that they can take. Out of an annual revenue estimated at over $6 million from the total of individual African head tax collected, only some $1,050,000 is given to the Roman Catholic missions, which monopolize African education in Mozambique. With a per capita expenditure of less than $3.00 a year per African child of school age, it is not surprising that the rate of illiteracy in Mozambique should remain at over 99 percent.

The priests gave me some pamphlets written by the late Clemente Cardinal Gouveia in which he mildly questioned the government's not giving enough financial support to the Roman Catholic church to run the African schools. One of
the paradoxes here is that he is the Cardinal mainly responsible for the closing of many non-Catholic schools during his twenty years as Archbishop of Lourenço Marques.

During my conversation with the principal of Salazar High School, I had sought to discover how many African students they had in Lourenço Marques government high schools and how they compared with white students in academic performance. The principal of Salazar High School evaded my first question by saying that, although there were not as many as he personally would wish for, there were more than when he began teaching at the same school some years back. As to how these students stood academically in comparison with the whites, he said that in the physical sciences and mathematics they compared quite favorably with all other students, but that in the Portuguese language and literature, they did not do so well. The reason for this poor performance in Portuguese, he continued, is that Portuguese is a second language to the African students. They need to be given a special preparatory course that will enable them to meet the standards of their white fellow students. He also suggested that their poor Portuguese affected their performance in other subjects, in that even though the examiners do not know the races of the candidates, they can tell by the poor Portuguese grammar that they are Africans. He would not give me any figures on the number of African students in his school, with the excuse that the government does not allow student registration to mention race. He took me to the school dining hall to show me how the government was making it possible for the less privileged students to have a meal at noon. In spite of the fact that there were no more than twenty Africans in a high school that has more than a thousand pupils, practically all of those who needed a school lunch were Africans. There were also a few mulattoes and Asians. Of the twenty-odd students who were eating in the dining room, there were about three who looked white. On leaving the school grounds I met a couple of African girls who were students at the high school. They told me that there were six African girls at the Salazar High School during the 1960-61 school year. As for African boys, they estimated their number at twelve.

I later met one of the Roman Catholic priests who was acquainted with the school system and asked him if he could estimate the number of African students at the Salazar High School. After noting proudly that students in Portuguese Africa are not identified by their race, he went on to make an estimate of twenty. When he noticed disappointment in my face, he quickly added that there were more African students at the uptown government high school. However, when I later visited that school I found that the proportion was also heavily in favor of whites. On talking to some of the African students, I gathered that there must have been no more than forty African students out of an estimated total of eight hundred at that school.

In Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique, the educational situation is even worse. Even though no statistical information on racial distribution in the schools there was available, I was recently able to gather some facts from talking to white and Goan students who came from that city and who are now studying in
European universities. They told me that out of an estimated total of five hundred
high school students in the official high school at Beira, there cannot be more than
five black African students.
In order to understand the educational situation in Mogambique, one must see it
as linked to all other aspects of life in that Portuguese colony. But the most central
of these is the economic situation. Now let us turn to the economic picture in
order to shed more light on why the Portuguese are refusing to develop the
peoples of Mogambique toward self-determination.
The economy of Mogambique can be divided into two main parts. The first of
these is the export trade, which currently earns an average of $75 million per year.
But since the value of imports is about twice as high as that of exports, the above
figure can pay for only 50 percent of the imports. Remittances from the four
hundred thousand Africans working in South African and Rhodesian mines
compensate for a large portion of the difference. The rest is taken care of by
proceeds from the annual influx of sixty thousand white South African tourists.
As the whole economy is completely controlled by Lisbon, the largest portion of
Mogambican trade is with Portugal in order to help meet her pressing need for
foreign currency resulting from her own annual trade deficit, which runs at about
$150 million. While prices for raw materials and foodstuffs are officially kept
below world levels and some commodities, such as cotton and sugar, are sold
exclusively to Portugal, imports into Mogambique are subject to protective
policies with the purpose of maintaining the market for continental Portuguese
manufacturers by eliminating the necessity for them to compete with foreign
manufacturers. Thus, Mogambique uses practically all the foreign exchange left
after covering its own trade gap to meet its large deficit in payments to Portugal.
It is obvious that this constant need for foreign exchange must leave the
Portuguese colonial policies open to diplomatic pressure from South Africa and
the Rhodesias, and, furthermore, it creates a situation whereby the burden of
economic development, which is subject to exploitation by Lisbon, falls on the
substructure of the African workers.

It must be kept in mind that African labor is the main factor behind the production
of raw materials and foodstuffs for both the Portuguese industries in Europe and
the export trade. The extraordinarily low wages paid to African workers cannot be
justified by any arguments based on the capital expenditures and know-how that
the Portuguese provide. A brief analysis of economic policies in Mogambique, as
they relate to the production of cotton, will illustrate at least in part what we
mean. Most of the cotton is produced in the northern areas. These areas are
divided into concessions given to white-owned companies, in most cases
companies closely associated with textile companies operating in Portugal. Each
African adult is assigned 1.2 acres of land on which to plant cotton, using
whatever means of cultivation are available to him. The local government
officers, in cooperation with the concessionary companies, provide police to
supervise the cultivation, planting, weeding, and harvesting of the cotton. It often
happens that all members of a family are driven out of their homes to work in the
cotton fields, which are supposed to be their own, even if such labor acts to the
detriment of all other traditional economic activities. From what I have witnessed in the areas in which I have lived, this is the worst of the three methods of human exploitation. In classical slavery, the exploiter owns his slave and, therefore, must invest a certain amount of money to keep him well, physically strong, and happy; with absentee landlords, the squatters farm the land, producing anything they wish as long as they ultimately pay a certain proportion of their produce to the landlord; but in the Portuguese cotton concessions of Mogambique, the concessionary companies assume no economic or moral responsibilities except, probably, for what they spend in lining the pockets of some of the government officers who have direct control of the African cotton farmer.

Facts About Mogambique

by
Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe

[Gwambe, head of the União Democritica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), presented his views before the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration at its twenty-second and twenty-third meetings on May 14, 1962.]

On January 10, 1498, Vasco da Gama, the navigator and so-called discoverer, landed at Inhambane, south of Mogambique, on his way to India; he is the man responsible for all colonial domination in our country. Da Gama, himself, led the Portuguese stranglers who tortured and killed thousands of innocent indigenous people in northern Mogambique. Upon realizing that Mogambique was especially rich in mineral resources, da Gama reported back to Portugal. His king gave him a military expedition charged with seizing the wealth of the Africans by force, and in 1502, da Gama returned to Mogambique on a mission of strangulation. In 1505, the Portuguese officially started the colonization. The Africans later realized that the aim of the Portuguese was to exploit them and occupy their country by force. Thereupon, campaigns of emancipation started.

In 1561, a Portuguese settler named António Caido was living in the court of [Chief] Monomotapa. Gonçalo da Silveira, a Catholic priest, arrived there with an expedition led by Francisco Barreto from Sofala to Inhanga Penhalonga. When Barreto died at Sena, he was succeeded by Vasco Fernandes Homen who led the diabolical mission to the burning of wood and straw [native huts] at (Simbae). In April 1569, three vessels left Lisbon with one thousand bandits armed for the purpose of seizing the mines of Monomotapa. The Africans, seeing that the Portuguese were provoking a war, began replying in the same warlike manner. Campaigns of emancipation were launched, and the most historically relevant ones are as follows:

1) The campaign of Tete and Sena in 1628-1629, in which two armies of Monomotapa, comprising thirty thousand men, were destroyed by two hundred and fifty armed Portuguese thugs. Prominent Chiefs were also killed, and here is where the struggle for the liberation of our country was born. Many minor campaigns followed, and in 1630 the governor, Dom Nuno Alves Pereira, imposed Portuguese domination upon what had been the Monomotapa Empire,
which was then divided into two provinces - Butonga or East and Mucarangua or West. From 1630 on, after overthrowing the Monomotapa Empire, the Portuguese began to feel that they had enough power to exploit the territories of Zamb~zia, and they started to send out miners and engineers, etc., men like Andr6 Alvorado, who was sent in 1633. In 1677 four vessels left Lisbon with six hundred aboard destined for a garrison. They included officials, engineers, miners, goldsmiths, women, and missionaries, who scattered all over the territory. The women were converted and orphans were specially ordered by the government to marry Portuguese along the Sena rivers.

2) The other great campaign was that for the Vatua Empire, founded by Manucusse. Manucusse was a Commander during the Chaka War. He came to Mogambique with his troops in 1810, and when Chaka sent his troops to fight him, Manucusse sought refuge in Massapa, which was under Zapa's control. He invaded Zambeze, where Zapa had founded the Angonis Empire in Niaasa and the Mepessene Empire at Aruangua. When Chaka withdrew his troops, Manucusse returned and established control over the Cossa and Bila tribes. After his death, the empire that he had established from Incomati to Luabo was fought over by his two sons, Mauela and Muzila.

Muzila was assisted by the Lourengo Marques colonial government, and between the 17th and 20th of August 1862, Muzila won the battle. After Muzila's death in 1885,

the Vatua Empire, founded by his father, Manucusse, passed to the hands of his son Mudungazi, who became a powerful king widely known as Ngungunyani. Portuguese stranglers attempted to destroy his empire several times and on September 8, 1895, a band of Portuguese armed thugs, two hundred and seventy-five bandits, destroyed Ngungunyani's army of six thousand men led by Matibejani. The most disgraceful attack occurred November 7, 1895, at Khuulela, where nine hundred Portuguese thugs clashed with more than twelve thousand Ngungunyani troops. On December 28, 1895, at Chaimite, Ngungunyani was arrested by the extremist savage Mouzinho de Albuquerque and deported. From 1895 to 1897 the campaign was controlled by Maguigwani, then Chief-Commander of Ngungunyani's national liberation armed forces. The same Mouzinho de Albuquerque shot Maguigwani as he resisted at the Nuanetsi River on October 8, 1897. Three years later, in 1900, the Portuguese completed the occupation of Mogambique, set up their rule at gun point throughout the country, and declared: "WE WILL NEVER SURRENDER THIS COUNTRY, NOT UNTIL THE DEATH OF THE LAST PORTUGUESE."

3) In the last campaign, the one history recorded as Africa's most powerful, a large number of Portuguese bandits lost their lives. It took place at Barue over a period of ten months, ending in 1918. From then on, the Portuguese rode roughshod over the Africans and rejoiced by saying: "PEACE AND WORK ARE THE THEME IN THE COLONY OF MOCAMBIQUE...."

Since 1498, when the first Portuguese navigators arrived in Mogambique, the country has been exploited by these Portuguese invaders. Our emperors and kings have been reduced to chiefs. The colonial government of Portugal has divided
their kingdoms into portions. Their courts' traditional powers have been reduced and they are no longer allowed to try criminal cases. The African authorities are divided into four sections: Rgulo (Paramount Chief), Chefe (Chief), Induna (Headman), and Bandhla (Counsel). The highest authority in the krall is Rdgulo. These ranks were created by the Portuguese after the emperors and the kings had been stripped of their stature and power. Although the present African authorities are respected by their own people, the Portuguese have cheated them to the extent that the people see the chiefs as insignificant. The cause is the fact that not a single important case can go before the chiefs, for the Portuguese authorities make profit on each case that is heard. Profit is derived, for example, from any case heard, since it provides forced labor for the state; both the offender and the offended are forced to work on the roads while they wait for their case to be heard; thereupon, one of the two, or both, can be sent to forced labor if he did not pay his poll tax, and no doubt the same applies to the offender. Most of the kralls are actually deserted. The inhabitants have run away to neighboring territories in fear of arrest, murder, or torture. Some of the chiefs run away from their chieftainship because they cannot produce enough people for poll taxes. African authorities are subjected to all kinds of inhumane treatment from government officials—no matter what their rank. Even the child of the Post Chief can have the Paramount Chief thrashed. We know of a certain Post Chief's wife who used to inspect the plantations around the administrative area riding on a hand barrow carried by the people. One of the chiefs looked at her, she reported to her husband that a man had looked at her, and the chief was brought to be thrashed. The Post Chief was Levy Francisco Aguilar da Silva, at present in civil administration, Lourenço Marques. This incident took place in Chidenguele between 1942 and 1944. This Post Chief had as his last word "palmatoria [a beating with a rod] and prison." African authorities live in fear of the tortures they may suffer from Portuguese officials. In Chibuto, some of the chiefs hung themselves because they feared what was to happen the following day when they were to present the people for their poll taxes. In 1940, in Chidenguele, Paramount Chief Munguambe was ordered to gather all his people for census. One of the refugees says he remembers that two government officials went there to take the census. At the krall of Chief Chithombe the people gathered. This was a critical time for the chiefs and the people. For three weeks, chiefs and headmen were ordered about by the police, who came with the official teams, and were told to collect goats, fowls, eggs, and some vegetables so that the officials would be polite to the chiefs and the people. This produce was brought in large amounts. The refugee remembers when Chief Chithombe was forced to give up his virgin daughter Fanyekani, and everyone knew that Fanyekani was aspiring to be a wife. The other official, Alfonso from the Veterinary Department, took Fanyekani's cousin as his temporary wife. Fanyekani was left with no hope of being married until a rich white businessman,
named Antonio Varrella Montenegro, took her. She later became pregnant and was abandoned along with her colored son. In Mogambique, chiefs are not paid any fixed salary. The only pay is a lump sum given at the end of every year, when all their people have paid their poll taxes. It happens that some people in certain chieftainships do not pay their poll taxes and manual contribution. The chief will be arrested and punished only because some of the people failed to pay their poll taxes or manual contribution. In 1950, the Portuguese government imposed provincial status upon Mogambique. The change in status was made without consulting the chiefs and the Africans themselves, who are the majority. It was made by government officials and the white settlers in Mogambique only.

Most of our chiefs in Mogambique are uneducated, and the Portuguese government does not encourage chiefs to be educated. They say education among the chiefs in Mogambique is poison. As a result, very few chiefs in Mogambique know how to read and write. Those who happen to have a bit of education are given fat salaries and many other privileges and possessions such as houses, cars, etc. This part of the Portuguese indoctrination and brain washing of the chiefs and the vast majority of the African population in Mogambique is aimed at dividing the African peoples and suppressing the national liberation forces.

The late Zimtambira Chicusse, the former Paramount Chief of Angonia, had started organizing his people to overthrow the Portuguese colonial government but, when the Portuguese discovered his plans in 1955, he was arrested, tortured, and detained in Lourenço Marques along with his followers. Chief Zimtambira was later released and given unpaid clerical work at Negocios Indigenas (Native Affairs Department) in Lourenço Marques. He once said, "These criminals are refusing to let me go, and they rule my people at Milange, a small portion of land, but they must not forget that my son will rule all this country." A member of PIDE informed the authorities of the statement, and the next day Chief Zimtambira was back in detention. After the formation of UDENAMO, Chief Zimtambira rejoiced and said, "This is my prophecy," and started to organize even behind the walls of the prison. In May 1961, PIDE agents informed the authorities; Chief Zimtambira and his followers were shot in the presence of the other prisoners. Chief Sengeledo and eight of his lieutenants were supporters and organizers of UDENAMO; the Portuguese authorities arrested them all and dropped them alive in the Zambezi River on November 14, last year. Other chiefs detained are Sipanela, S. Maipe, and Augusto Chaleka, all from Niassa province. It is quite clear that African chiefs have no more authority in Mogambique, and that these posts of chieftainship are a sort of bribe to help the Portuguese exploit the African population.

* * * *

The Barbaric Colonial and Imperial Rule
by
Mathew Michinji Mmole and Lawrence Mallinga Mallinga
Mmole and Mallinga, head of the Mogambique African National Union (MANU), submitted their statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration at its twenty-sixth meeting on May 16, 1962. The MANU, a political party operating in exile with its national headquarters in Dar es Salaam (Tanganyika), on behalf of its eleven thousand paid-up members and its thousands of supporters in Tanganyika, Kenya, Zanzibar, Uganda, and Nyasaland as well as in Mogambique itself, do hereby present this memorandum to the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration established under General Assembly resolution 1699 (XVI).

MANU was formed to enhance the human dignity of a nation or community, raise its status in every walk of life, and cultivate a sense of self-respect and responsibility in the Mogambican Africans; it was formed for the liberation of our country, with the goal of achieving complete independence and elimination of Portuguese colonial and imperial rule before the end of the year 1963.

It is well known to the Mogambican Africans that the Portuguese entered Mogambique for the first time on March 2, 1486. They settled in Mogambique (formerly known by the name of Msumbiji) as businessmen up to 1505, the year they colonized the country. During their stay in Mogambique, there has been intermarriage between Portuguese men and African women, and the outcome of these intermarriages has been 25,149 mulattoes (half-castes). It has now been four hundred and fifty-six years since we Mogambicans fell under the barbaric colonial and imperial rule of Portugal.

All schools in Mogambique are run by Roman Catholics. Catholic missions hold a monopoly on education of the so-called "uncivilized Africans." According to the agreement between the Portuguese government and the Catholic church (here the Catholic church known as "Holy See"), arrived at and signed at the Vatican city on May 7, 1940, the education must "CONFORM" to the doctrinal dictates of the Portuguese Constitution and must take its directions from plans and programs issued by the local governments. This means that 99.7 percent of the African population is prohibited access to lay schools.

Africans are deliberately kept in a state of ignorance, and the missions provide only limited and rudimentary education for a small number of individuals. Lack of education, poor medical care, complete absence of the rights of political and trade union organizations—all these are based on forced labor, which is also used as a weapon to delay the liberation of the Africans and frustrate their aspirations to achieve independence. African geography, history, and culture are either ignored or distorted, and African children are forced to study Portuguese geography and history.

No doubt the United Nations is aware of the fact that Political and Labor Movements are classified as offensive in all the colonies—or the so-called overseas provinces—under the rule of Portugal. Mogambique is one of the colonies. Under these circumstances and others, we Mogambican Africans emphatically deplore the fact that we are totally deprived of freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of the press. In addition to that, we have no hesitation in stating that we Mogambican Africans, today, in this atomic age, are the most oppressed people in the world as we are not allowed to:

a) form and run political parties, trade unions, cooperative societies, or other societies within the country,
b) own a business or shop,
c) tune a radio to any station outside Mogambique,
d) read newspapers and magazines other than the Brado Africano—a Portuguese government controlled newspaper,
e) gather three Africans or more without committing an offense, and
f) Africans are deliberately hindered from participating in commercial and industrial activities.

There has been established a department known as Administrago Concelho, which is responsible for a trade in labor. The Portuguese government has contracted to supply labor for the mines of the neighboring territories such as South Africa and the Rhodesias, as well as for the sisal and sugar-cane farms in Mogambique.

The system works more or less as follows. An up-country planter informs the government that he will be needing so many men, and these are provided for him by the local Chefe do Posto (district officer). Native recruiters go out into the villages and collect the necessary number of men, who are then turned over to the planter. But the planter, to be sure of getting the recruits he needs, usually has to pay off a corrupt Chefe do Posto.

For the four hundred and fifty-six years that Mogambique has been under Portuguese administration nothing of importance has been done in regard to the health of the people, with the exception of a few hospitals having been built in the big towns.

To support its case in the question of medical care, MANU does not hesitate to state that, owing to the lack of hospitals and medical facilities in Mogambique, many patients from various districts in the northern part of Mogambique walk from their homes to the southern province of Tanganyika in search of medical care...

The Portuguese government has done practically nothing with respect to the water supply for the villages inhabited by Africans. In many cases, Africans have to go long distances (ten to fifteen miles) in search of water. Pipe lines for water are constructed only in towns and other places inhabited by white men.

The condition of the roads in Mogambique is very poor, and the provisions for improving the general conditions of roads in various districts are poor. In many cases, the Portuguese government depends on free service from the poor Africans, and the work Africans do free on road construction is termed national service. The bad condition of the roads causes tremendous difficulties of transportation and greatly hinders the transaction of various businesses from one district to another. Tremendous difficulties also arise in the question of telecommunications in various parts or districts of the country.
In order to implement its policy and objective of hindering the progress of the Africans in civic awakening, on several occasions the Portuguese government has adopted the most oppressive measures aimed at the poor, defenseless Africans, threatening them in every walk of life. The Portuguese think that by so doing, the Africans could be forced to abandon their plan to demand the independence of their own country--their own birthright.

* * * *

III

ORGANIZATION


The FRELIMO Constitution

Name and Headquarters:

I Name: The name of this organization shall be FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DE MOCAMBIQUE (FRELIMO).

II Headquarters: The headquarters of FRELIMO shall be in Lourenco Marques.

III Definition: FRELIMO is a political organization consisting of Mogambicans with no discrimination as to sex, ethnic origin, religious creed, or locality of domicile.

IV Aims and Objectives

The aims and objectives of FRELIMO are:

--A total liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination and of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism.

--The achievement of immediate and complete independence in Mogambique.

--To defend and realize the aspirations of the Mogambican people, who have been exploited and oppressed by the Portuguese regime.

V In order to achieve these objectives, FRELIMO will:

--Proclaim the necessity for unity to all Mogambican people.

--Organize, mobilize, and unite all Mogambicans.

VI The Front reserves the right to unite with other organizations taking part in the anti-colonialist struggle of all countries under Portuguese domination, to form a united FRONT for fighting against Portuguese colonialism, in order to bring about its total liquidation; it reserves the right to adhere to a Regional African organization, a Pan-African organization, Afro-Asian and other organizations, that have as their aims an anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism working for the emancipation of the people.
VII Membership: All Mogambicans who agree with the program of FRELIMO, and pledge themselves to support its policies, may become members of FRELIMO.

VIII Each member must pay his dues regularly.

IX Each member shall belong directly to a cell.

Organization and Structure:

X The structure of FRELIMO is [organized on the following levels]: NATION, PROVINCE, DISTRICT, AREA, CELL.

XI On a national level there shall be a National Council and a Central Committee.

Each Province, District, and Area shall have one Committee.

XII A cell is the basis of the organization of FRELIMO and shall be established on working premises and in residential areas, and each shall have a Secretariat.

XIII The Province, District, and Area Committees shall be elected by Delegates at Assemblies of the Province, District, and Area, respectively.

XIV The CONGRESS is the supreme organ of FRELIMO.

XV The National Council shall be elected by Congress, and the Central Committee by the National Council.

XVI The National Council, the Central Committee, the Provincial, District, and Area Committees, and the Cell Secretariats are responsible to their respective superior organs for the execution of resolutions and political directives of FRELIMO.

XVII FRELIMO will mobilize and organize Mogambicans who have emigrated to other African countries and elsewhere into groups that shall act as sections in the foreign division of FRELIMO.

XVIII The structure of FRELIMO is based on Democratic Centralism. Its organs shall work and be oriented on the following basis:

a) Democratic spirit.
b) Collective spirit.
c) Unity in action.
d) Criticism and self-criticism.
e) Mutual help.

Modification and Dissolution:

XIX The Congress of FRELIMO shall have the power to amend the constitution.

XX The Congress shall have the exclusive power to dissolve itself. A two-thirds majority of delegates to the Congress shall be required for such dissolution. In no case will FRELIMO be dissolved before the achievement of the National Independence of Mogambique.

Temporary Arrangements:

XXI The Provisional Headquarters of FRELIMO will be in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, while operating from exile.

Finance:
XXII The funds of FRELIMO will be derived from registration fees, members' subscriptions, donations, and funds raised by any other means.

Omissions:

XXIII Omissions in the present statutes will be rectified by the following organs in order of authority:

a) By the General Internal Regulations of FRELIMO.
b) By the National Council.
c) By the Central Committee.

XXIV The General Internal Regulations will be drafted by the Central Committee, submitted for approval by the National Council, and submitted for ratification to the Congress.

* * * *

The UDENAMO Constitution

Name
Article 1--The name shall be the UNIAO DEMOCRATICA NACIONAL DE MOCAMBIQUE (UDENAMO).

Headquarters
Article 2--The headquarters of the UDENAMO shall be at Lourenço Marques, or any place approved by the NATIONAL CONVENTION.

Definition
Article 3--The UDENAMO is a political organization composed of Mogambicans, without any discrimination as to sex, ethnic origin, religious belief, or place of residence.

Aims and Objectives
Article 4--The aims and objectives of the UDENAMO are:
--To serve as a vanguard in the relentless struggle for the freedom of the African people and the independence of Mogambique.
--To foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism in order to rid Mogambique of imperialistic economic exploitation, social degradation, and all traces of colonialism and imperialism.
--Total liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination in Mogambique.
--To defend and realize claims made by all the people of Mogambique, coming from any social strata enduring oppressions and exploitation, particularly the claims made by peasant and worker masses.

Article 5--In order to achieve these aims, the UDENAMO
--Organizes, mobilizes, and unites all the patriots of Mogambique.
--Proclaims the necessity for unity to all patriotic forces of Mogambique.

Article 6--The UDENAMO reserves the right to
--Constitute with other organizations engaged in an anti-colonialist struggle in southern Africa, enduring white supremacy, economic exploitation, social degradation, and colonial domination, a UNITED FRONT to coordinate
programs, projects, tactics, and efforts for the speedy and complete suppression of colonialism and imperialism.

--Adhere to regional African, Pan-African, Afro-Asian, Latin-American and other organizations whose aims consist of fighting against colonialism and imperialism with a view to the social emancipation of the people.

Membership
Article 7--All Mogambicans who approve the constitution and program of the UDENAMO and who pledge themselves to daily execute the policy of the UDENAMO can be members of the UDENAMO.
Article 8--Each member of the UDENAMO must pay his dues regularly.
Article 9--Each member of the UDENAMO must belong to a cell.

Organization and Structure
Article 10--The structure of the UDENAMO is as follows: NATION, PROVINCE, DISTRICT, LOCALITY, CELL.
Article 11--The supreme organ of the UDENAMO is the NATIONAL CONVENTION.
Article 12--There shall be a NATIONAL COUNCIL and CENTRAL COMMITTEE at the level of the NATION. Each Province, District, and Locality will have a committee.
Article 13--The CELL is the basis of organization of the UDENAMO and shall be established in places of work and residence. The Cell shall have a committee.
Article 14--The National Council shall be elected by the National Convention and the Central Committee by the National Council.
Article 15--The Province, District, and Locality Committees are elected, respectively, by the assembly of delegates of the Province, District, and Locality. The committee of the Cell is elected by the assembly of the Cell.
Article 16--The National Council, Central, Province, District, Locality, and Cell Committees shall be responsible to their respective superior organs for the translation into action of resolutions and directives of the UDENAMO.
Article 17--The UDENAMO also organizes and mobilizes all Mogambicans who have emigrated to other countries into groups functioning as branches of the UDENAMO abroad.

Article 18--The structure of the UDENAMO is strictly based on the principle of democratic centralism, and the method of work of its organs is based on the following principles:
a) Democratic spirit.
b) Unity of action.
c) Sense of responsibility.
d) Criticism and self-criticism.
e) Mutual assistance.
The Term of the Mandates
Article 19--The National Convention of the UDENAMO fixes the term of the mandates of the National Council, Central, Province, District, Locality, and Cell Committees.

Finance

Article 20--The funds of the UDENAMO are derived from registration fees, members' subscriptions, donations, and any profits made by UDENAMO.

Omissions

Article 21--Cases of omission in the present constitution will be solved by the following in order:

a) By the GENERAL INTERNAL REGULATION of the UDENAMO.
b) By the National Council.
c) By the Central Committee.

Article 22--The General Internal Regulation elaborates, in detail upon the functioning of the UDENAMO.

Article 23--The General Internal Regulation shall be drafted by the Central Committee for approval by the National Council and submitted for ratification to the National Convention.

Amendments and Dissolution

Article 24--The present constitution shall not be altered, modified, amended, or otherwise changed except by the National Convention and with the approval of at least two-thirds of the member delegates present.

The dissolution of the UDENAMO can be accomplished only by two-thirds of the delegate members of the National Convention.

Transitional Measures

Article 25--Until the First National Convention, the UDENAMO will be directed by a Central Committee composed of ten members.

Article 26--The provisional headquarters of the UDENAMO shall be where the secretariat is to be maintained or at any other place approved by the National Council.

The FUNIPAMO Constitution and Rules

Name

1. The name of the United Front shall be FRENTE UNIDA ANTI-IMPERIALISTA POPULAR AFRICANA DE MOCAMBIQUE (FUNIPAMO) (Mogambique African Peoples' Anti-imperialist United Front), thereafter referred to as the FRONT.

Introduction

2. FUNIPAMO is a peoples' Front and semi-political organization composed of all patriotic forces of Mogambique in order to struggle united against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

Office
3. The National Headquarters of the Front shall be in the legal capital of Mogambique, but while it operates in exile, the provisional headquarters shall be in any capital of East or Central Africa, or in any other place that may be deemed suitable by the National Council.

Membership
4. Membership to the Front is open only to all African political parties, peasants', workers', youth, students', and women's organizations, cultural organizations, tribal and worship associations, clan chiefs, etc., and their organs of power that have been originated and still are under the leadership of indigenous Mogambican Africans.

Aims and Objectives
5. The aims and objectives of the Front are:
   a) To unite all patriotic forces into a single militant force for liberating Mogambique from foreign domination and colonial rule as soon as possible, using any means.
   b) To constitute an African Peoples' democratic and republican government.
   c) To provide a medium through which the people of Mogambique can promote their political, economic, educational, cultural, and social development.
   d) To enlighten world opinion on the conditions present in Mogambique and bring to the notice of the entire civilized world the true nature of the Portuguese oppression in Mogambique.
   e) To establish workers' organizations, such as trade unions, social groups, and welfare groups, in and outside Mogambique in the interest of the people of Mogambique.
   f) To seek moral and material assistance from independent African states in the struggle for the liberation of our motherland, MOCAMBIQUE.
   g) To accelerate military and political training for our cadres.
   h) To accept aid of any kind from freedom-loving countries, provided there are no strings attached to such aid.

Leadership
6. The leadership of the Front shall be exercised jointly; the affiliated organizations shall send their representatives to take posts in the United Front; and these representatives shall be under full control of their own organ.

Office Bearers
7. a) The Office Bearers of the Front shall be:
   Joint Presidents.
   Joint Secretaries General and Financial Controllers.
   Directors of Information and the Cultural Bureau.
   Joint Directors of Allied Forces and Deputy Financial Controllers.
   b) Duties assigned to Office Bearers shall be:
   One joint President shall manage the Ministry of Security and Defense, and
one joint President shall manage the Ministry of Public Relations and Administrations. One of the joint Presidents shall be elected as Chairman of each of the Executive Committee and National Executive Council meetings. One joint Secretary General and Financial Controller shall manage Internal Security and Defense, External Public Relations and Administration and Financial Affairs, and shall sign all checks in conjunction with the other joint Secretary General. One joint Secretary General and Financial Controller shall manage External Security and Defense, Internal Public Relations and Administration and Financial Affairs, and shall also sign checks in conjunction with

the other joint Secretary General.

Joint Directors of Information and Cultural Bureau, as a daily routine, shall be responsible for all publications, propaganda, and cultural affairs as well as for scholarships. Directors of Allied Forces and Deputy Financial Controllers shall manage the functions of all allied forces and deputize any of the Financial Controllers and shall, in conjunction with the two Financial Controllers, sign all checks.

8. The Executive Committee of the Front shall be composed of the officials listed above.

National Executive Council
9. The National Executive Council of the Front shall be composed of all National Office Bearers, Executive Committee Members, and ten members from each of the affiliates.

The Working of the Committee and the Council
10. a) The Executive Committee's powers shall be based on the parties' lines and shall formulate the policy of each affiliate to the Front. The Committee shall be a liaison between the affiliates and the Front and shall be responsible for maintaining and strengthening the relations among all organizations affiliated with the Front and among all organizations and the Front. The working reports and decisions of the Executive Committee shall be referred to the National Council for perusal and action. It shall meet as often as necessary.

b) The National Council shall try within its power to formulate and guide the policy of the Front, pass and review resolutions of high policy, and review and modify the functions of the Executive Committee. The results of the National Council's work shall be referred to the National Executive Council for implementation and action. The Council will work more or less like a National Assembly as it will be concerned with making and amending rules and standing orders. It shall meet once a year and an emergency Council can be called up at any time when necessary.

c) The National Executive Council shall examine the working of the Executive Committee and accept and implement the resolutions passed by the National Council. It shall deal with national issues and matters of high policy. It shall be responsible for the overall operations of the Front. It shall lay down procedures for all functions of the Front, internal and external. It shall
meet as often as possible.
d) The Front, in addition to the affiliates, shall employ or appoint clerical staff.
e) QUORUM: Two-thirds of the members present at any meeting of the Executive Committee or National Executive Council may form a quorum.

Funds of the Front
11. a) The affiliated organizations shall pay a membership fee decided upon by the National Council, shall meet the annual expenditures of the Front, and shall contribute labor, etc., to the Front.
b) No money shall be withdrawn from the bank account without resolution of the Executive Committee of the Front. All checks shall be signed by the two joint Secretaries General and Financial Controllers, and the Deputy Financial Controllers.
c) Only the affiliated organizations shall have power to collect funds from any source.

Discipline
12. The joint Presidents have no power to expel an Officer, but they can suspend the Officer and immediately submit reports in writing to his or her organization, which will investigate the case and try to intervene. Upon failure to reach agreement, the organization involved will be given written notice to appeal before the Front's National Executive Council. A copy of the notice given to that organization by the Executive Committee shall be sent to the Front's National Executive Council together with a copy of the proceedings of the particular case. The decision made by the Front's National Executive Council shall be taken as final.

Amendments
13. The constitution can be amended and rescinded by resolution passed by the annual National Council or by an emergency National Council.

Dissolution
14. Dissolution of the Front may be carried out by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the delegates present at the annual or emergency National Council.

The COREMO Constitution
I. Whereas a true democracy must be established immediately in Mogambique;

II. Whereas Africans must find concrete bases for effectively changing the colonialist situation in order to assure a true democracy;

III. Whereas the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is being mocked in Mogambique, and Africans are deprived of the Fundamental Rights of Man;

IV. Whereas Portuguese authorities have shown complete indifference before the United Nations, with their declarations and resolutions adopted to assure the establishment of their constitutional laws in all the Portuguese colonies;

V. Whereas the fertile region of Mogambique has been monopolized by white colonists;
VI. Whereas the African people of Mogambique have expressed opposition to the Portuguese authorities for their declaration that Mogambique is one of the "OVERSEAS PROVINCES OF PORTUGAL";

VII. Whereas the problem of social classes in Mogambique seems to us to be a very ugly form of colonial law that should be abolished immediately;

VIII. Whereas the political destiny and advancement of Mogambique must be encouraged and developed by its own people;

IX. Whereas recognition and respect for human dignity are the bases for a decent society;

X. Whereas the situation in Mogambique provokes the cry: "FATHERLAND OR DEATH";

The Comité Revolucionario de Mogambique (COREMO) announces that, through a firm unity of the people, a true movement for freedom has been formed, which, with the help of the sons and daughters of Mogambique, who freely follow COREMO, will undertake a political and military struggle against colonialism in order to abolish the Portuguese authority to redeem Mogambique from the colonial yoke, to save our fatherland, and to attain complete conquest of our beloved country.

Article 1: Name
The name of the party will be: COMITE REVOLUCIONARIO DE MOCAMBIQUE (COREMO).

Article 2: Headquarters
The headquarters of COREMO will be in Mogambique, in the place approved by the government of the people.

Article 3: Definition
COREMO will be a politico-military organization, composed of all African peoples of Mogambique without discrimination as to sex, ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, and it will be prepared to fight inflexibly, very vigorously, and implacably against foreign domination with all its vestiges of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.

Article 4: Aims and Objectives
The aims and objectives of COREMO are:
1. To fight incessantly and inexorably for the establishment of a true, independent, and democratic government for the African peoples of Mogambique.
2. To take possession of political power through the Exército da Libertaglo do Povo and other progressive groups composed of peoples of Mogambique and through other patriotic forces opposed to foreign domination.
3. To promote and support African customs, manners, and culture, and to suppress certain foreign customs and cultural traits that are prejudicial to African customs and culture.
4. To hasten the total liquidation of imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism perpetuated by the Portuguese government in Mogambique.
5. To maintain, protect, and understand unity among all peoples of Mogambique, eliminating individualism, tribalism, regionalism, and discrimination.
6. To mobilize world opinion against the usurpation of the political and fundamental rights of the African peoples of Mozambique by the Portuguese government; to cooperate with all similar organizations throughout the world; to assure the observance of human rights in conformity with the United Nations; and to defend itself from oppression.

Article 5: To achieve these aims, COREMO:
1. Will mobilize, organize, unite, train, and educate—politically and militarily—all peoples of Mozambique, stimulating them to take up arms in defense of the land given them by God;
2. Will appeal for, proclaim, and accept the necessity of forming the Alianga Compacta ou Unidade with all genuinely revolutionary forces of Mozambique and of leading all forces and energies in an effective fight against the common enemy, on the condition that such a unified alliance will be formed in the true and just interests of the people of Mozambique;
3. Will establish and hasten the progress of newsletters, newspapers, or magazines in order to further the aims and objectives of COREMO.

Article 6: COREMO Members
All people of Mozambique may become members of COREMO, wherever they may be, provided that they accept the constitution, the policies, and the program of COREMO and that they promise to daily carry out the activities of COREMO.

1. A person who wishes to become a member of COREMO will pay, in Portuguese currency, the sum of:
a. Men—ten escudos (two and one-half xelims) as a registration fee, and four escudos (one xelim) each month as monthly dues;
b. Women—eight escudos (two xelims) as a membership fee, and two escudos (sixpence) as monthly dues;
c. Young people—four escudos (one xelim) as a membership fee, and one escudo (threepence) as monthly dues.

Article 7: Associate Members
COREMO can accept associate members from any section, body, or organization originating in Mozambique provided that:
1. The society, body, or organization believes in assuring the national political independence of Mozambique.
2. The organization commits itself to affiliation by uniting its constitution with that of COREMO, provided that the Central Committee accepts such a condition.
3. The organization will be required to pay an entrance fee of not less than four hundred escudos and yearly dues to be calculated in accordance with the total membership of the organization, at the rate of one escudo (threepence) per month per member.

Article 8: Structure
The structure of COREMO will be organized on the following levels: NATION, PROVINCE, DISTRICT, LOCALITY, VILLAGE, SECTION

Article 9: Organization
1. The organizational bodies of COREMO will be as follows: SECTIONS, VILLAGES, LOCALITIES, DISTRICTS, PROVINCES, NATION
2. The activities of COREMO will be coordinated by custom and by the administration at the national headquarters of COREMO for the provincial headquarters and for the officials of the districts; at the district headquarters for the local officials; at the local headquarters for the village officials, and at the village headquarters for the sections.
a. The Section will be a part of the Village and will have a Section Chief.
b. The Village will be a part of the Locality and will have a Committee with a Local President (Chairman) and other officers in conformity with the GENERAL BY-LAWS.
c. The Locality will be a part of the District and will have a Committee with a District President and other officers in accordance with the GENERAL BY-LAWS.
d. The District will be a part of the Province and will have a Committee with a Provincial President and other officers in accordance with the GENERAL BY-LAWS.
e. The Province will be a part of the Nation and will have a Committee with a National President in accordance with the GENERAL BY-LAWS.

3. There will be a General Congress of the people, a Popular Committee, and a Central Committee at the national level.

Article 10: Official Headquarters
The officers of the national headquarters will be:
1. National President and National Vice-President.
2. National Secretary General and National Assistant Secretary General.
3. National Secretary of the Treasury.
5. National Secretary for Information and Assistant National Secretary for Information.
6. National Secretary for Organization and Assistant National Secretary for Organization.
7. National Administrative Secretary.
8. National Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
9. National Secretary for Public Works and Social Affairs.
10. National Secretary for Education and Culture.
All of these will be elected in the General Congress of the People, and they will be members of the Central Committee of COREMO.
In addition, further officers will be decided upon and appointed to the national headquarters by the National President in consultation with the Central Committee.

Article 11: Rights of the Members of the Central Committee
1. The National President has the following rights:
a. To be the principal officer of COREMO and to preside over all the meetings held in the offices of the headquarters.
b. To have the power to give directions, opinions, and advice to all his subordinate officers in accordance with the constitution of COREMO.
c. To have the power to exercise his discretion in certain matters that arise in certain meetings and to halt discussion in the Central Committee.
d. To be the national spokesman for COREMO.
e. To have the power to convene meetings himself in cases of emergency.
f. With the consultation of the national and provincial officials, to have the power to nominate or appoint any member of COREMO to the offices in any section coordinated to the national headquarters with the approval of the Central Committee.
g. With the approval of the Central Committee, to take charge of overseeing the localities and the foreign offices with one or two members of the Central Committee in order to promote the principles and the policy of COREMO.
h. In consultation with the members of the Central Committee, to have the power to receive or do business with the authorities, based upon the principles and objectives of COREMO.
i. To exercise collective powers and responsibilities in all actions of COREMO.
j. To have the deciding vote in any meetings presided over by himself.

2. The rights of the other members of the Central Committee will be defined in the GENERAL BY-LAWS.

Article 12: Central Committee
1. The Central Committee will be composed of fifteen officers elected by the people in their General Congress.
2. The National President will preside over the meetings of the Central Committee.
3. The quorum (the number of voters needed to resolve a problem) of the Central Committee will be two-thirds of its members, but the National President or his Vice-President, or the Secretary General will be present at all meetings of the Central Committee.
4. In case of the absence of the National President and of the Vice-President, the Secretary General may preside—in emergency cases only.

Article 13: People's Committee
1. The People's Committee will be the administrative and directing committee, responsible for all the functions of COREMO.
2. In special cases, it will have the power to bring before the Central Committee any irregularities considered prejudicial to the party.
3. The People's Committee will consider the recommendations and resolutions approved by the Central Committee.
4. It will have the power to dismiss, suspend, or expel any member of the Central Committee or other nominated officers after the Disciplinary Committee has satisfied itself that such a member of the Central Committee or other officer has been shown to have a character undesirable and unfitting for the activities of COREMO.
5. The People's Committee may require that any report, documents, materials, or money be produced for its inspection when requested by any member of the Central Committee of COREMO, on the condition that such an order or orders be written by the National President or Secretary of the People's Committee.

6. It will govern the Provincial, District, Local, and Village meetings, reinforcing the statutes of COREMO, the by-laws, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

7. The People's Committee will meet at least once every six months, and oftener in case of emergency.

8. The People's Committee will be composed of: all members of the Central Committee, members of the Provincial Committees, and heads of the principal foreign missions. But the representatives of the groups gathered together can be invited to attend, with complete participation, at the discretion of the Central Committee.

Article 14: General Congress of the People

1. Except in emergency cases, the Annual General Conference called by the General Congress of the People will be held once a year; the date and place will be determined by the Central Committee.

2. The delegates to the General Congress will be elected from all the provinces.

3. The General Congress will take into consideration the reports and any other matters presented by the Central Committee and by the members of COREMO.

4. The Constitution of COREMO can be amended only by the General Congress of the People.

5. The elections for all the Central Committee will be conducted in the General Congress every two years, but in emergency cases a vote of lack of confidence in any member of the Central Committee will be conducted by the Central Committee itself.

Article 15: Terms of Office

All officers of COREMO will be appointed or reappointed (in the same electoral year as members of the Central Committee) every two years. The elections will begin in the villages for the members of the Central Committee.

Article 16: Guiding Principles

The structure of COREMO will be strictly and rigorously based on the principle of democratic centralism, and the work methods of its organs will be guided by the following principles:

1. Unity of action
2. Democratic spirit
3. Sense of responsibility
4. Collective spirit
5. Extreme vigilance
6. Mutual assistance
7. Keeping the secrets of the party with good faith, equity, criticism, and self-criticism.

Article 17: Finances
1. The funds of COREMO will come from:
   a. Individual registration fees and dues from the people, appeals, donations, and profits from investments.
   b. Associated groups.
   c. Donations or loans from interested groups or individuals from Mozambique or abroad.
   d. Other sources, means, and resources approved by the Central Committee.
2. All the funds received from any member of COREMO will be reported to the respective meetings and the sections during their meetings and the report will be inscribed in the minutes.

3. There will be a Finance Committee composed of five members, elected in a special meeting of the Central Committee, which will have the power to control the expenditures and to assist in increasing the funds.
4. The funds of COREMO will be deposited in a bank or banks determined by the Central Committee.
5. The five members of the Finance Committee elected by the Central Committee will be signatories for the accounts of COREMO but only three of them need sign checks for deposit or withdrawal of money.
6. All the Committees or Sections of COREMO will have sums of money approved by the Central Committee for the use of their various departments.
7. The accounts of COREMO will be officially examined by an independent and qualified auditor appointed by the Central Committee.

Article 18: Omissions
1. Omissions from this Constitution will be resolved by the following authorities in order:
   a. By the General By-laws of COREMO.
   b. By the Plenary Session of the Central Committee.
   c. By the People's Committee.
2. The General By-laws will elaborate in detail the functions of COREMO.
3. The General By-laws will be outlined by the Central Committee and submitted to the People's Committee for ratification.

Article 19: Amendments
1. The Constitution of COREMO may be amended only by the General Congress of the People.
2. Any proposed amendments will be submitted two months before the date of Annual General Congress to the members of the Central Committee.
3. The People's Committee may make recommendations to the General Congress for amending the Constitution.

Article 20: Dissolution
1. A vote of a two-thirds majority of the Annual or Emergency General Congress will be required to dissolve COREMO.
2. In the event of complete dissolution, funds and goods will be distributed to villagers and to employees, or to charity, in accordance with an urgent necessity.

Article 21: Transitional Measures
1. COREMO will be directed by the Central Committee composed of fifteen members elected by no less than fifty people from Mogambique.
2. The Central Committee will be authorized to lead the fight for the liberation of Mogambique in accordance with the prevailing domestic and foreign situation.
3. The headquarters of COREMO will be in Mogambique, in whatever location is approved by the Central Committee.

4. COREMO will be represented abroad by Foreign Missions based on friendship with other countries.

Article 22: Slogans
The official slogan of COREMO will be:
FATHERLAND OR DEATH.

IV
IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Apparent unity among nationalist movements of Mogambique was achieved at the Frente de Libertagao de Mogambique (FRELIMO) first congress in September 1962. From its inception, however, FRELIMO was plagued by internal dissension. The founder of Unifto Democrtica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, excluded from the FRELIMO central committee, formed the Comit6 Secreto da Restauragao da UDENAMO in Kampala and later re-established UDENAMO with a modified name, the Uniao Democrtica Nacional de Monomotapa (UDENAMO-Monomotapa). In December and in mid-1963, several former leaders of UDENAMO, Mogambique African National Union (MANU), and Unilo Nacional Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI) were expelled from FRELIMO. Thus Paulo Jos6 Gumane and David J. M. Mbunda established in Cairo a new UDENAMO, the Uniao Democrtica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO-Mogambique). Likewise Mathew Mmole reorganized the MANU. On May 20, 1963, the Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Mogambique (FUNIPAMO) was constituted in Kampala under the leadership of Mmole, Gwambe, and Sabastene Sigauki, the provisional representative of the Mogambique African National Congress (MANCO). With the expulsion of six members of the FRELIMO central committee a year later, the Mogambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO) was created. In early 1965, MORECO joined UDENAMO and in mid-June 1965 the Comit6 Revoluciondrio de Mogambique (COREMO) officially proclaimed itself a coalition of five movements: MANU, MANCO, UNAMI, UDENAMOMonomotapa, and UDENAMO-Mogambique. The documents that follow form a record of these developments and of the ideological direction of Mogambique nationalism.

* * *

Mogambique and Salazar's Government: Communiqu6
by
Jaime Rivaz Sigauke
The UDENAMO communiqué was published in Portugal Democrático, IV (October 1961), p. 4. Sigauke later became a high official in the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO).

The União Democrática Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO) challenges Salazar's declarations to the entire world on the cooperation between his government and the people of Mogambique. The UDENAMO, founded by people from Mogambique who are aware of the fascist character of the Portuguese government, totally rejects such declarations and denounces the backwardness, slavery, and massacres for which the Portuguese government is responsible. Two examples are:

Education: For a population of eight million, Mogambique has three secondary schools, run by Catholic clergy.

Slavery: From Mogambique, blacks are still sold to the mines in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where thousands of them die each year. Others are sold within Mogambique to Portuguese firms and to companies in other countries using forced, unrenumerated labor. These companies include: Incomate Sugar State; Sena Sugar State; Companhia Colonial Buzi; Companhia do Boror; Boror Comercial; and sisaland cotton-growing companies. Thousands of people leave Mogambique monthly to escape a form of torture invented by the Portuguese. Called shibalo, it is the system of forced labor in Mogambique, in which the government uses people for the construction of streets, bridges, and railroads and for work at the dockyards, in public works, plantations, and other state services. They are on a twelve-month contract with a miserable salary and a right to badly prepared food served only at noon. The so-called "natives" do not have the right to a court trial. Sentences are simply pronounced by administrators and chiefs of the administrative posts.

Portugal sent twenty thousand soldiers to Mogambique before the UDENAMO went into action. The UDENAMO supports the fight of the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) and the União das Populações de Angola (UPA) in Angola, since the Angolans have no other way of gaining their independence. Through its Vice-President, F. G. Mahluza, the UDENAMO declares that it will not rest until Salazar and his fascist government are overthrown and the people of Mogambique, oppressed and massacred for four hundred and fifty-six years, are freed.

Resolutions of the First FRELIMO Congress

[These resolutions are included in Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO) First Congress: Documents, Dar es Salaam, September 23-28, 1962, pp. 7-16. They set forth a program of principles and action.]

The First Congress of FRELIMO, which met in Dar es Salaam from September 23 to 28, 1962, and gathered together delegates from Mogambique, undertook a profound examination of the present situation in Mogambique. The Congress noted that the people of Mogambique are still subjected to Portuguese colonial oppression in all its forms: political, economic, social, and cultural.
CONSIDERING that the policy of the Portuguese government in Mozambique is characterized by the suppression of the basic freedoms;
CONSIDERING that the Portuguese government fails to recognize the primacy of the interests of the Mozambican peoples and, on the contrary, opposes the right of the peoples to determine their own destinies and obstinately continues with the myth that Mozambique is an "Overseas Province";
CONSIDERING that the Portuguese government, instead of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict between the people of Mozambique and the Portuguese colonial administration, is intensifying fascist methods of repression against patriots; reinforcing the military and police apparatus by the despatch of military contingents and the development of PIDE; committing massacres of innocent populations; imprisoning and torturing nationalists; and utilizing intimidation, blackmail, and corruption;

CONSIDERING that this anachronistic attitude, which is contrary to history and to common sense, is leading the masses of the people to seek effective methods of self-defense;
CONSIDERING that the Mozambican people ardently aspire to self-determination and independence;
CONSIDERING that the recent reforms promulgated by the Portuguese government are measures adopted in the same framework of colonialist spirit that has previously governed Portuguese action in Mozambique; that they have been adopted unilaterally without prior consultation with the Mozambican people and are thus inadmissible; that these measures are intended to convince the Portuguese population resident in Mozambique that the Portuguese government is willing to apply liberal measures, thus inciting them to oppose the nationalist demands of the Mozambican people; that in these circumstances such measures are racialistic because they contribute to a widening of the chasm that separates the African population from the European population; and that, moreover, these measures merely constitute new premises for the political propaganda of Portuguese colonialist circles; that they are intended to discourage the Mozambican people from pursuing the struggle for independence and to deceive the United Nations and world opinion;

THE CONGRESS:
Vehemently condemns Portuguese colonialism; greets all patriots who are fighting for the triumph of the cause of independence, justice, and freedom in Mozambique;
PROCLAIMS the union of all Mozambicans regardless of ethnic origin, financial means, religious and philosophical beliefs, or sex, in the struggle using every available means for the immediate and complete liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and for the winning of national independence;
APPEALS to all Mozambicans to intensify daily action in favor of independence by continual improvement and strengthening of their organization inside FRELIMO, in order to greatly develop the struggle against the enemy, Portuguese colonialism;
DEMANDS that the Portuguese government solemnly and formally recognize the right of the Mogambican people to self-determination and national independence, the essential condition for the establishment of negotiations between the Portuguese government and the nationalist forces of Mogambique for the purpose of defining the means of access to the independence of Mogambique; THE CONGRESS:
Noting the identity in form of the political, economic, social, and cultural oppression in Mogambique and in the other Portuguese colonies;

CONSIDERING that Portuguese colonialism is the common and direct enemy of the peoples of Mogambique, Angola, Guin, Cabo Verde, SMo Tomd and Principe, and Timor;
DECLARERES that the unity of action between the nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies constitutes an inestimable contribution to the struggle for the general liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and for national independence. THE CONGRESS:
Noting that the survival of Portuguese colonialism is a permanent source of conflicts;
Noting that only national independence will permit the Mogambican people to contribute fully to the development of international cooperation and the consolidation of peace between the peoples;
PROCLAIMS its complete agreement with the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and with the principles of coexistence proclaimed by the Bandung Conference;
CONFIRMS the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Conference of African Peoples and by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference;
DECLARERES its active solidarity with all anti-colonialist forces in the world;
EXPRESSES its gratitude to all those countries that have shown solidarity with the struggles of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies by taking measures of economic and diplomatic boycott against Portugal, and appeals to all the other independent African states as well as to all peace- and freedom-loving countries to reconsider their relations with Portugal.
THE CONGRESS:
Having in mind the declaration on the concession of independence to colonial peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1960;
INVITES all peace- and freedom-loving countries and men to support the just cause of independence for the people of Mogambique, by opposing, in an effective way, the continued utilization of methods of fascist repression.
THE CONGRESS OF FRELIMO:
Noting that the struggle against the general system of colonialism is today in its decisive and ultimate phase;

Noting that the colonialist powers, in a final effort, have created a veritable front for maintaining the essentials of their economic and military power in Africa;
Noting that these same powers are using every means, including the cowardly assassination of leaders, as was the case with the African hero, PATRICE LUMUMBA;
AFFIRMS its solidarity with the peoples who are waging the struggle against all forms of colonialism and imperialism;
DENOUNCES and condemns the criminal alliance of SALAZAR-VERWOERDWELLENSKY;
CONDEMNS the policy of "apartheid" existing in South Africa, demands the immediate ending of white supremacy, and demands that the right to freedom and self-determination of the people of South Africa should be respected;
CONDEMNS the policy of the South African government in Southwest Africa;
CONDEMNS the retrograde policy of the Southern Rhodesian authorities, protests against the banning of ZAPU, demands the lifting of this ban, and assures the people of Southern Rhodesia of its total solidarity with their struggle for national independence;
DENOUNCES, condemns, and demands the destruction of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, imposed against the people's will;
DEMands immediate independence for all territories still under the yoke of colonialism;

THE CONGRESS OF FRELIMO:
After having examined the present needs of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, declares its firm determination to promote the efficient organization of the struggle of the Mozambican people for national liberation and adopts the following measures to be put into immediate effect by the Central Committee of FRELIMO:
1. Development and consolidation of the organizational structure of FRELIMO;
2. Development of unity among Mozambicans;
3. Maximum utilization of the energies and capacities of each and every member of FRELIMO;
4. Promotion of the accelerated training of cadres;
5. Employment of every effort to promote the rapid access of Mozambique to independence;
6. Promotion, by every possible method, of the social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman;
7. Immediate promotion of literacy for the Mozambican people, creating schools wherever possible;
8. Initiation of means for supplying the needs of the organs at different levels of FRELIMO;
9. Encouragement and support of the formation and consolidation of trade union, student, youth, and women's organizations;
10. Cooperation with the nationalist organizations of the other Portuguese colonies;
11. Cooperation with African nationalist organizations;
12. Cooperation with the nationalist movements of all countries;
13. The obtaining of funds from organizations that sympathize with the cause of the people of Mogambique; the making of public appeals;
14. The procurement of all that is required for self-defense and for the maintenance and development of resistance on the part of the Mogambican people;
15. The use of permanent propaganda of all types in order to mobilize world public opinion in favor of the cause of the Mogambican people;
16. The establishment of delegations to all countries in order to undertake campaigns and public demonstrations of protest against the atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonial administration as well as for the immediate liberation of all nationalists who are inside the Portuguese colonialist prisons;
17. The procurement of diplomatic, moral, and material help for the cause of the Mogambican people from the African states and from all peace- and freedom-loving countries.

Proclamation to the Mogambican People
MEN AND WOMEN OF MOCAMBIQUE!
FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN!
Our country is suffering the martyrdom of economic, political, social, and cultural domination by Portugal.
Our people have benefited in practically no way from the riches of our soil and subsoil.
Racial discrimination still reigns and maintains Africans on subordinate levels of national activity.
Illiteracy affects almost the entire African population and freedom continues to be denied us.
Hundreds of Mogambican patriots in prisons and forced labor camps are paying the price for love of liberty.
PEOPLE OF MOCAMBIQUE!
The winning of national independence is the path indicated to us by history. Independence is the essential condition for the realization of our legitimate aspirations to-
ward freedom, justice, and well-being.
It is our duty to pursue unalteringly the fight for liberty. But this struggle must be undertaken in the most perfect unity, for such a condition is the guarantee of a future of peace and harmony among Mogambicans.
We are not alone in the struggle in which we are now engaged for our independence.
In fact, our brothers of Angola, "Portuguese" Guind, Cabo Verde, Sao Tomd and Principe, and Timor are also engaging in the struggle for the general liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.
In addition, world opinion has already condemned the policy of the colonial fascist government of Portugal, and at the international level Portugal is completely isolated. In the United Nations, the only complete support for Portugal comes from the fascist governments of South Africa and Spain.
This situation is conclusive proof that our cause is a just one.

FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN!

The First CONGRESS OF FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, from September 23 to 28, 1962, appeals to all Mogambicans to organize themselves, ever better and more strongly, inside FRELIMO, in order to pursue the struggle against the oppressors of our country and to continue united in the struggle for national independence.

FRELIMO pays homage to all Mogambicans who have fallen in the sacred combat for the freedom of our people and to all patriots who are imprisoned in the colonialist jails.

FOR A WORLD OF PEACE!

FOR A FREE AND PROSPEROUS MOCAMBIQUE!

DOWN WITH PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM!

LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF MOCAMBIQUE!

Resolution on the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônicas Portuguesas (CONCP)

The FIRST CONGRESS of the FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam from September 23 to 28, 1962:

CONSIDERING that the form of political, economic, social, and cultural oppression by Portugal is identical in all its colonies;

CONSIDERING that the Portuguese government does not recognize the principle of primacy of the interests of the inhabitants of these countries, and that, opposing the right of the peoples to determine their own destinies, it stubbornly upholds the myth of "Overseas Provinces";

CONSIDERING that, instead of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflicts between the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and the Portuguese colonial administration, the Portuguese government intensifies its fascist methods of repression against the nationalists by despatching military reinforcements, engaging in genocide, and creating hot-beds of war;

CONSIDERING that the peoples of the Portuguese colonies ardently aspire to selfdetermination and independence;

GREETS all patriots who are fighting for the triumph of the cause of independence, justice, and freedom in Cabo Verde, Guiné, Só Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, and Mozambique;

GREETS the CONCP, the Front uniting all the peoples of the Portuguese colonies who are engaged in the struggle for the general liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and for national independence;

APPROVES the principles and decisions adopted by the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), which took place in Casablanca from April 18 to 20, 1961;

ENCOURAGES the peoples of the countries still under the Portuguese colonial yoke to pursue a unified fight for freedom; and

REQUESTS the immediate admission of FRELIMO to the CONCP.

Message to His Excellency the Prime Minister of the Government of Tanganyika

YOUR EXCELLENCY,
We have completed our work.
The First Congress of FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam, wishes to convey its homage, respect, and high consideration for you and expresses gratitude for the evidence of solidarity that Your Excellency and all the people of Tanganyika wished to show for the cause of the people of Mozambique who are engaged in a struggle for the

noble ideals of independence, national liberation, justice, and progress.
At this moment in which we are preparing to apply the decisions we have made, permit us to request your support for the appeal we have made to the heads of African states requesting the mobilization of all the forces at their disposal for the defeat of Portuguese colonialism.
Please accept the warm greetings of the delegates present at our First Congress.
THE CONGRESS.

Message to the Heads of State of the Independent African Countries
The Congress of the FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam, from September 23 to 28, 1962, calls the attention of African heads of state to the perils facing the people of Mozambique and the other Portuguese colonies as a result of the measures lately taken by the Portuguese government, which tend to incite the white population to an inhumane repression of the just demands of the Africans. The Congress appeals earnestly to all heads of state in Africa to act within the spirit of African solidarity by contributing, in every way possible and with the greatest interest, to the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in Mozambique, a step which will constitute an important contribution to the complete liberation of Africa and the realization of African unity.
The Congress considers that the Welensky-Verwoerd-Salazar alliance is a criminal alliance that aims at the extermination of the African peoples, and it therefore considers that any and all cooperation with these governments will retard the progress of the national liberation movements.

Message to PAFMECSA
The Congress of the FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam, from September 23 to 28, 1962:
CONSIDERING that the colonialist powers have created a veritable front against the African peoples in order to maintain their colonialistic privileges;
CONSIDERING especially the criminal character of the Welensky-Verwoerd-Salazar alliance;
CONSIDERING the need for cooperation among the nationalist forces in action against colonialism and imperialism;

GUIDED by the principles of African unity;
GREETS the nationalists who are fighting colonialism and imperialism;
GREETS PAFMECSA and acknowledges its struggle against the oppressors of Africa.
REQUESTS admission to PAFMECSA.

Resolution on the United Nations THE FIRST CONGRESS OF FRELIMO,
CONSIDERING that Portugal refuses to carry out resolutions taken by the United Nations;
ATTENTIVE to the fact that no concrete measures have been taken against Portugal for failure to comply with United Nations' resolutions;
CONVINCED that this lack of action, which undermines the prestige of the United Nations, is the consequence of other states' support for Portuguese colonialism;
REQUESTS the United Nations to take concrete and immediate steps to prevent the genocidal war that Portugal is preparing and to press Portugal to put into effect the Declaration of December 14, 1960, which permits the Mogambican people to decide their own destiny.
PROPOSES that the following sanctions be applied to Portugal:
--Economic boycott by all members of the United Nations;
--Expulsion of Portugal from that international organization.
EXPresses the deepest indignation of the Mogambican peoples against all peoples who furnish assistance to Portugal for the support of its regime.
Message to the Portuguese People
PEOPLE OF PORTUGAL!
At this crucial moment in the history of Mogambique, the FRELIMO addresses you.
The Mogambican people, inspired by the profoundly human feelings for freedom, dignity, and justice are firmly determined to fight, to their death, if necessary, for the conquest of national independence.

With tentacles extended, the Portuguese government maintains its ferocious oppression of our people and our country.
Our people continue to live in subjugation to forced labor. The fascist colonial government of Portugal pursues its policy of exploiting the labor of our people. However, this exploitation benefits only the Portuguese colonialist circles.
In attempting to destroy our love of freedom, your government unhesitatingly massacres Mogambican people. Mueda in June 1960; Xinavane in February 1961; these are examples of the barbarous reaction of the colonial fascist government to the legitimate aspirations of our people. Nevertheless, Mogambique, as well as Angola, Guind, Cabo Verde, Sao Tomé and Principe, wishes to be free and independent.
It was to try to break the Angolan people's desire for independence that Salazar's government unleashed the war in Angola. But the Angolan people have not surrendered and will not surrender, neither will the people of Guiné. On the contrary, the colonialist repression produces only a stronger and stronger reaction from all the peoples of Mogambique, Angola, "Portuguese" Guiné, Cabo Verde, and Sao Tomé and Principe.
Moreover, the situation of the Portuguese government at the international level is one of almost complete isolation. The only total support it enjoys is that given by the fascist governments of South Africa and Spain, for the horrified conscience of the world is revolted by the barbarities perpetrated by the Portuguese army in Angola and, more recently in "Portuguese" Guiné.
Today the FRELIMO declares that it will not accept the responsibility for any loss of life or property that the Portuguese may suffer as a result of a possible generalized conflict, which the Portuguese government is in the process of preparing in Mozambique and which will cause a confrontation between the African and European populations. The Mozambican people hope that, with regard to the present conflict between themselves and the fascist Portuguese colonial administration, the Portuguese people will take a position worthy of their noble democratic traditions, one which will help to avoid the unleashing of war in Mozambique.

* * * *

The FRELIMO Program

[This statement, entitled "Programme," was released by the Frente de Libertaglo de Mozambique (FRELIMO), possibly in Cairo, about 1962. The one-page Portuguese version, called "Programa" was published in Dar es Salaam by FRELIMO's Department of Information.]

1. To work for the general liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
2. To unite and mobilize Mozambicans of all social classes, residing in Mozambique and outside, without discrimination of tribe, religion, ideology, or sex.
3. To fight, using any means necessary, for the liquidation of Portuguese colonial domination in Mozambique and of all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism.
4. To fight in cooperation with all other Mozambican patriotic forces.
5. To collaborate with all African peoples who are struggling for their complete independence, particularly with the peoples and organizations of Portuguese colonies.
6. To collaborate with all progressive forces and peace-loving countries in the whole world; to obtain the sympathy and support of all peoples for the cause of the liberation of the Mozambican people.
7. To achieve immediate and complete national independence for Mozambique.
8. To establish a democratic government based on total independence, in which all Mozambicans will be equal before the law and have the same rights and duties.
9. To form a government of the people, by the people, and for the people in which the sovereignty of the nation will reside in the will of the people.
10. To promote peace, order, and prosperity in Mozambique.
11. To affirm the inalienable right of the Mozambican nation to act for itself on the political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, or any other level.
12. To maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Mozambique.

13. To liquidate all traces of a colonialistic or imperialistic economy.
14. To reconstruct the economy and develop production in order to transform Mozambique from a colonial and underdeveloped country to an independent, industrial, developed, modern, prosperous, and strong country.
15. To defend the interests of all Mozambican people through:
   --The abolition of the forced labor system.
   --The abolition of agreements that govern the emigration of Mozambican workers to South Africa and other colonized countries.
   --The abolition of the practice of transporting prisoners to the plantations of São Tomé and other countries.
   --The abolition of the use of Mozambican soldiers in colonial wars against peoples of other Portuguese colonies as well as in wars against the people of other countries.
   --The establishment of equal pay for equal work, without discrimination by race or sex.
   --The raising of the standard of living of the people.
16. To honor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
17. To end colonialist and imperialist education and culture; to reform the educational system now in force; and to energetically and rapidly combat illiteracy.
18. To develop education and culture in order to serve the free and peaceful progress of the Mozambican people.
19. To create forces for national defense: an army, navy, and air force composed of indigenous people.
20. To eliminate foreign military bases in the national territory.
21. To refrain from adhering to military blocs.
22. To collaborate in the building of a unity among all the peoples on the African continent, based on respect for liberty, dignity, and the peoples' right to political, economic, and social progress.
23. To collaborate with all the people of the world on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and reciprocity of advantages, and peaceful coexistence.

* * * *

Proclamation to the Mozambican People
[On September 25, 1964, the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO) announced that it was initiating its war against the Portuguese in Mozambique. The text of the communiqué issued by the Central Committee was published in Mozambican Revolution, II (October 1964), 1-4.]
Our armed struggle has begun.
It began as FRELIMO had planned—organized and determined.
At precisely the correct moment, after FRELIMO had prepared the minimum military and political conditions within Mogambique, the people, under FRELIMO's leadership, took up arms and attacked. Until then, our struggle was on the plane of negotiation, that is, attempted negotiation. It was only after exhausting all possibilities for a peaceful solution that we decided to take up arms. We are now sure that this is the only means by which we may convince the Portuguese people in Mogambique to get out, to give back what belongs to us, to restore to us our land.

We are aware of the difficulties we shall have to face: thirty-five thousand Portuguese soldiers equipped with the most modern arms; cannons and tanks; jet planes; napalm bombs; police instructed in the Nazi techniques of repression and control; militias of colonists specially trained in the caga ao negro (hunt for the black man). This entire apparatus has already begun to work against us, with its greatest strength.

However, when we decided to confront Portuguese colonialism—when we consciously and thoughtfully resolved to build a world of justice and equality by destroying the world of oppression and misery that strangers had established in our country, we had already weighed the forces of repression. We knew that for many of us death would be the price of that ideal. We are ready to pay any price for it.

To support us, we have the strength that comes from holding fast to our ideals of liberty. We have aid that other peace-loving peoples of the world give to us. We have the history and the example of other peoples: our Algerian brothers also decided one day to be free—and they attained their goal by fighting one of the most powerful colonialist armies of the world.

We have nothing to lose. Existence itself has no meaning in a regime of servitude. We have nothing to lose but the chains that destroy our dignity. We shall never turn back. Nothing can stop our revolution. The Mogambican revolution is an immense movement—irreversible as a force of nature—with its roots in the will and in the aspirations of each Mogambican. Our armed struggle has begun. It will not cease until Mogambique is independent.

With quiet confidence, with no fanfare but with a certainty and a determination that transcend the words and the gestures, we proclaim: The Mogambican people will win. Mogambique will be free.

Proclamation to the Mogambican People

MOCAMBICAN PEOPLE,

In September 1962, the Congress of the FRELIMO unanimously affirmed the will and determination of the Mogambican people to fight by any and all means for the achievement of their national independence.

DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, FRELIMO never ceased to work for the attainment of that goal. FRELIMO tried, through peaceful means, to convince the colonial-fascist government of Portugal to satisfy the fundamental political demands of the Mogambican people.

FRELIMO constantly made known to Pan-African, Afro-Asian, and world organizations the situation in which the Mogambican people live and denounced
the crimes of colonialism in Mozambique. As a result, not only the Mozambican people, but also the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and world public opinion in general condemned the criminal policy followed by the Portuguese government.

In spite of this, Portuguese colonialism continues to dominate our country. The richness of our country and the work of the Mozambican people continue to be exploited by the Portuguese colonialists and their imperialistic allies. Daily our brothers are murdered for actively participating in the struggle for the liberation of our country. The prisons are full of patriots, and those who are still free live in uncertainty as to what the next day will bring. The PIDE increases the number of its agents and perfects its methods of torture; the Portuguese army is being reinforced and constantly increases its potential in men and war material; and the "psycho-social" section continues its campaign of deceiving the Mozambican people.

MOCAMBICAN PEOPLE,

FRELIMO has always carried on its work with the intention of assuming completely its responsibilities as the leader of the revolution of the Mozambican people. Therefore, concurrent with its peaceful efforts, FRELIMO prepared itself to face the eventuality of an armed struggle. Today, faced with the constant refusal of the Portuguese government to recognize our right to independence, FRELIMO again declares that armed struggle is the only way for the Mozambican people to achieve their aspirations of liberty, justice, and social well-being.

MOCAMBICAN PEOPLE,

Workers and peasants, workers on the plantations, in the timber mills, and in the concessions, workers in the mines, on the railways, in the harbors, and in the factories, intellectuals, civil servants, Mozambican soldiers in the Portuguese army, students, men, women, and young people, patriots,

IN THE NAME OF ALL OF YOU

FRELIMO TODAY SOLEMNLY PROclaims THE GENERAL ARMED INSURRECTION OF THE MOCAMBICAN PEOPLE AGAINST PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE.

Our fight must not cease until Portuguese colonialism is totally liquidated.

MOCAMBICAN PEOPLE,

In this decisive hour in the history of our country, in which we have unanimously decided to take up arms to confront Portuguese colonialism, FRELIMO is sure that each Mozambican will fulfill his duty. We must continually reinforce our unity, the union of all Mozambicans without distinctions, from Rovuma to Maputo.

We must consolidate more and more our organization; we must always act in an organized way.

Everywhere FRELIMO will always be present and ready to direct the struggle. We must be firm, decisive, and implacable with the Portuguese colonialists.
We must be firm, decisive, and implacable with those who collaborate with Portuguese colonialism, with the agents of the PIDE, and with all traitors to our people and our country.
UNITED, WE SHALL WIN!
INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH!

MOCAMBIQUE WILL WIN!
LONG LIVE FRELIMO!
LONG LIVE MOCAMBIQUE!
LONG LIVE AFRICA!
The UDENAMO Program

[This document is included in Unilo Democrdtica Nacional de Mogambique, Constitution and Programme, Cairo, 196?, pp. 16-22.1
1. To unite and mobilize Mogambicans of all social classes residing in Mogambique and abroad, without discrimination by sex, ethnic origin, religious belief, and ideology, to fight together for the immediate and total liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and manifestations, and to achieve the total national independence of Mogambique.
2. To fight by all means for the general liquidation in Mogambique of imperialist economic exploitation, social degradation, colonial domination, and all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism.
3. To collaborate with all African peoples engaged in the struggle for their total independence, particularly with the organizations and peoples of Portuguese colonies and southern Africa.
4. To collaborate with all progressive forces and peace-loving countries in the whole world, to obtain the sympathy and support of all peoples for the cause of the liberation of the Mogambican people.
5. To establish a republican and democratic government based on total independence and under which all Mogambicans will be equal before the law and have the same rights and duties.
6. To form a national assembly and a government of the people, by the people, and for the people in which the sovereignty of the nation will reside in the will of the people.

7. To affirm the inalienable right of the Mogambican nation to act for itself with regard to political, economic, social, or any other problems.
8. To maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Mogambique.
9. To liquidate all colonialistic or imperialistic aspects of the economy.
10. To reconstruct the economy and develop production in order to transform Mogambique from a colonial and underdeveloped country to an independent, industrial, developed, modern, prosperous, and strong country.
11. To defend the interests of all Mogambican people through:
   --The abolition of the forced labor system.
   --The abolition of agreements that govern the emigration of Mogambican workers to South Africa and other colonized countries.
   --The abolition of the use of Mogambican soldiers in colonial wars against peoples of other Portuguese colonies as well as in wars against the peoples of other countries.
   --The establishment of equal pay for equal work without discrimination by race or sex.
   --The raising of the standard of living of the people.
   --The equal distribution of land to the peoples of Mogambique.
   --The granting of land to the people who work on it.
12. To develop education and culture in order to serve the free and peaceful progress of the Mogambican people and rapidly combat illiteracy.
13. To create national armed forces composed of indigenous people for the defense of the independence and freedom of Mogambique.
14. To eliminate foreign military bases in the national territory and refrain from adhering to military blocs.
15. To collaborate in the construction of a unity among all the peoples on the African continent, based on the respect for liberty, dignity, and these peoples' right to political, economic, and social progress.
16. To collaborate with all the people of the world on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, equality and reciprocity of advantages, and peaceful coexistence.

Declaration of Dissolution of FRELIMO
by
Mathew Michinji Mmole, Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, and Sabastene Sigauke
[This document was released in Kampala on May 21, 1963. It represents early dissent and withdrawal by two factions of the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO).]
As a result of ten months of investigating the working ability and leadership of the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO), the Vigilance and Security Council, composed of the Executive Committee Members of the two parties that
make up FRELIMO—the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) and the
Uniao Democrática Nacional de Monomotapa (UDENAMO)—secretly met from
the 19th to the 21st of May 1963. The Council was directed and empowered to
make the following public declaration with the condition that copies of the
declaration be sent to all heads of African states, nationalist leaders, progressive
forces of the world, and the press.
After long and careful discussions concerning people's just demands, the
Vigilance and Security Council have arrived at a decision of immediate
WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERSHIPS OF BOTH PARTIES, UDENAMO AND
MANU, from FRELIMO, which is controlled and manipulated by United States
imperialists. Full reasons for taking such drastic steps will be issued in the form of
memoranda within a few weeks and copies will be sent to you and all those
concerned as specified in the first part of this Declaration.
The Vigilance and Security Council is pleased to announce to the public that,
because of a strong desire to unify the Mozambican Africans, combined with the
peoples' great need to build a unified, militant, and revolutionary nationalist
liberation force to combat the enemies of Mozambique and Africa as a whole, a
new peoples' militant and revolutionary front has been established and named
FRENTE UNIDA ANTI-IMPERIALISTA POPULAR AFRicana DE
MOCAMBIQUE (FUNIPAMO) or MOCAMBIQUE AFRICAN PEOPLES'
ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNITED FRONT. At the aforementioned meeting of the
Council, an application from another party, the Mozambique African National
Congress (MANCO), with headquarters in central Africa, was considered, and
MANCO was admitted to the newly formed Front.

For the public's information we list below the names of the interim joint office
bearers:
Mathew M. Mmole Hlomulo C. Gwambe L. M. Millinga
Calvino Z. Mahlayeye
Stella Moyana M. Ngome T. M. Marapene E. Kalime
Joint President—Security and Defense. Joint President—Public Relations and
Administration. Joint Secretary General—Internal Security and Defense,
External Public Relations, Administration, and Financial Controller.
Joint Secretary General—External Security and Defense,
Internal Public Relations, Administration, and Financial
Controller.
Directress of Information and Cultural Bureau. Deputy Director of Information
and Cultural Bureau. Director of Allied Forces and Deputy Financial Controller.
Deputy Director of Allied Forces.
COSERU Press Communiqué
Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe

[This three-page document was distributed by the Comité Secreto da Restauração
da UDENAMO in Kampala on May 14, 1963.]
The Comité Secreto da Restauração da UDENAMO (COSERU) or the Secret
Committee for the Restoration of UDENAMO has been in existence for about
five months.
This committee was formed last year, in accordance with our opposition and
denunciation of the Frente de Libertag{o de Mogambique (FRELIMO), which
serves as a tool of imperialists, and also in accordance with the JOINT
STATEMENT signed by Mathew Mmole and me on July 27, 1962, in Cairo, as
the National Presidents of Mogambique African National Union (MANU) and
Uniao Democrdtica Nacional de Moambique (UDENAMO), respectively. Thirdly,
our committee was formed in accordance with the peoples' response to our
activities, which helped the people to understand all the imperialistic maneuvers
employed by the FRELIMO; as a result, the majority of Mogambican nationalists
are supporters of UDENAMO and MANU and demand the immediate restoration
of both unions.

For the sake of uninterrupted progress and success, the existence of this
committee was kept secret until now.
The aims of the (COSERU) at the time of its formation were to:
I. Campaign against the FRELIMO whose leadership was revealed, after long
and careful analysis, to be composed mainly of a clique of U. S. -hired stooges and
traitors whose activities are in the interest of imperialists and colonialists, both
modern and classical, and are directed toward the further enslavement of toiling
Mogambican people.
II. Enlighten Mogambicans, both at home and in exile, as to the dangers
threatening our struggle produced by U. S. infiltration of and direct interference in
Mogambique's internal affairs, a process that clearly indicates either a U. S.
conspiracy with Portugal or a U. S. plot to replace Portugal through the back door.
III. Sum up all the successes and failures experienced by UDENAMO since its
formation on October 2, 1960, in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, and work out
ways, and means to avoid the repetition of past errors that enabled opportunists
and American stooges to infiltrate the rank and file of the party and weaken the
dynamism and the true ideals of the party, which are freedom and independence
for Mogambique and complete eradication of imperialism and both modern and
classical colonialism.
IV. Reflect critically on our past experiences and successes and then utilize and
develop them into a powerful weapon in our renewed struggle.
V. Study and analyze carefully the Mogambican people's enemy, his peculiarities
at home and his foreign alliances with reference to the nature of this alliance as
well as the structure of its maintenance.
VI. Study and analyze thoroughly our friends at home and abroad, their role in
and attitudes toward our struggle, the type of support they can give us, the limits of
such support, and the cause of such limits.
VII. Thoroughly know ourselves as well as our enemy, and plan from those
conclusions; in other words, we mean we should know:
a) What advantages we have, how long we can develop such advantages for our just cause, and with what type of people at home and abroad we should have an alliance.
b) How powerful Portugal is militarily, politically, economically, etc., and how she can be defeated.
c) How many enemies she has, how many countries she is compelled to support, how many troops she can afford to maintain in waging unjust and unholy wars of aggression in Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor, and how the peoples of the above-mentioned countries react against Portugal; to what extent the revolution can be prolonged, and what methods should be used to increase the strength and determination of those peoples in their struggles.
d) Who finances Portugal, who supplies weapons to wage unjust wars in these countries; the fighting morale of the Portuguese soldiers, their nature and peculiarities, including their reaction and that of their families and relatives at home against Portugal.
e) What is the reaction of the forced laborers, workers, students, youth, women, clan chiefs, bourgeoisie, gentry, and assimilados against the Portuguese domination and to what extent these groups can unite to form a main force against our enemy.

VIII. Reinstate UDENAMO with the original revolutionary spirit that inspired the people of Mozambique to support it; but also work out effective progressive policies, programs, political philosophy, and slogans to accelerate the achievement of legitimate demands of the people of Mozambique.

Briefly, these are the main aims with which COSERU was formed and, after the thorough studies and analyses described above, the committee has concluded its work and is now moving toward the implementation of the following recommendations, which are subject to further study and the approval of other members of UDENAMO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The failures of UDENAMO resulted from a lack of intimate knowledge of ourselves and of the enemy; therefore, there were no effective policies, political lines, programs, and suitable slogans being used to achieve the just demands of the people. Unless immediate measures are taken to correct this situation, the dangers that still exist within the ranks of Mozambican organizations such as FRELIMO will remain, to the detriment of the struggle.

2) In FRELIMO there are two types of traitors:
a. Those who serve directly and consciously as the stooges of imperialists acting for the United States, and
b. Those who fail to understand the situation and are unconsciously pushed onto the traitors’ band-wagon by these traitors through many types of bribes as well as by political and physical intimidation. The former, who are in the minority, have the illusion that money is their main weapon for winning the revolution, and they forget the people; the latter, who are in the majority, can be won
over to the genuine revolutionary party through political education.
3) Portugal is isolated in Mogambique and almost 100 percent of the population is reacting to Dictator Salazar's government; therefore, there exists a possibility of mobilizing all the reacting elements into a united force against the common enemy.
4) Superficially, Portugal is our enemy, but essentially the NATO bloc headed by the United States, and in particular the United States itself, are our major enemies, for they supply the weapons with which our people are suppressed and stand with Portugal in the United Nations. The United States itself is plotting to replace Portugal through the back door; therefore our target is not Portugal alone, but both countries--while the hyena is about to leave the front door, we should, at the same time, avoid the leopard, which is just about to enter through the back door and take the place of the defeated hyena.
5) The fighting morale of the Portuguese soldiers is weak because the war is being waged by Portuguese reactionaries, not by the Portuguese people, and contradictions are widespread; secondly, the soldiers are recruited by force to serve the interests of the reactionary capitalists, so the victory lies with the peoples of Mogambique, Angola, Portuguese Guind, etc. and the Portuguese people themselves in Portugal must achieve victory and overthrow the Portuguese dictatorial regime.
6) At home, as well as abroad, the people of Mogambique should rely primarily on themselves--their own strength, energy, resources, and past experiences--in their struggle against the Portuguese; this should also apply to the political party, which should rely on the people inside the country and on those in exile to unite and defend the fatherland.
7) Pan-African and international support must be second and third in importance. We cannot depend upon help filtering from the top down to us or upon help coming from the side; our struggle should start at home and progress upward--by this we mean Pan-African and international support is meaningless unless we have the support of the broad masses of the people at home.
8) The Pan-African and international situation is most favorable for obtaining help in the struggle against imperialism and modern and classical colonialism; therefore, UDENAMO should form a united front with all progressive elements at home and abroad and integrate its struggle with the struggle for the complete emancipation of the oppressed peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and with the struggle to support the progressive forces in imperialist countries who are being suppressed by the reactionaries.
9) UDENAMO and MANU should formally withdraw from the FRELIMO without further delay and take over the leadership of the struggle for the people’s salvation from imperialism and modern and classical colonialism.

OURS IS THE PEOPLE’S JUST AND DEFENSIVE WAR FOR LIBERATION VERSUS THE IMPERIALISTS’ UNJUST AND OFFENSIVE WAR OF EXTERMINATION.

* * * *

FUNIPAMO Memorandum Supporting the Dissolution of FRELIMO
by
Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, Mathew Michinji Mmole, and Sabastene Sigauke

[This five-page mimeographed document was released by the Frente Unida Antimperialista Popular Africana de Mogambique (FUNIPAMO) in Kampala on May 27, 1963.]

1. Introduction:
In connection with paragraph two of the declaration made and signed by leaders of Mogambique African National Union (MANU), União Democrática Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), and Mogambique African National Congress (MANCO), released in Kampala, Uganda, on May 21, 1963, we wish to remind you of the facts surrounding the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO)’s establishment in the middle of 1962 and its failure to function in the interest of the people.

FRELIMO was formed after several months of communication between the two major political parties of Mogambique, MANU and UDENAMO, which were operating in exile with their provisional headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika. Its formation coincided with the aspirations of Hon. Mr. Oscar Kambona, Secretary General of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Minister of External [Affairs] and Defense, of Hon. Mr. Mbiyu Koinange, Secretary General of Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) and of the President of the Republic of Ghana, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.

FRELIMO was formed with one major aim—to unite all Mogambican political parties, sports associations, tribes, chiefs, and power elements in a single solid spearhead for liberating and completely freeing our motherland, Mogambique, from foreign domination and the colonial yoke before the end of 1963. Thus FRELIMO hoped to achieve the aims and objectives established by the front’s program as desired by the Africans of Mogambique.

It was extremely disappointing for Mogambican Africans to learn that the elected president of FRELIMO, Dr. Mondlane, has neither the guts nor the ability to command the nationalists’ forces and expand them into a militant and aggressive state, as was planned by the front at its formation. He failed for the following reasons:

2. Disunity and Abuse:
a. Instead of uniting the forces and creating the best possible relations among them, just a month after the formation of FRELIMO, Dr. Mondlane expelled all the elected front officials without consulting with the Supreme Council and without giving specific reasons to the members and the public for such expulsions. That meant that FRELIMO positions remained vacant and the front was under the control of illegal and inexperienced officials who were not entirely aware of its aims and objectives and the legal procedure the front had agreed to follow while in operation. Dr. Mondlane appointed the new officials without the consent of the Executive Committee or the Supreme Council. Embittered by being asked by the Executive Committee to state why he had appointed people to run the office without the knowledge of the Executive Committee, he thereafter expelled many elected Executive Committee members and replaced them with those appointed by himself.

b. He created animosity between himself and the leaders of UDENAMO and MANU, including their Executive Committee members, by calling them Communists and Nkrumah henchmen.

c. Under these illegal officials, FRELIMO recommended that the government of Tanganyika expel all the genuine leaders of MANU and UDENAMO, including a number of supporters to whom he objected merely because they had different ideas about running the front and because they were frank in pointing out the mistakes made by these illegal officials. As a result, the following events occurred:

i. Mr. Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, president of UDENAMO, was arrested two days after elections and a few weeks later was re-expelled from Tanganyika during his absence.

ii. Messrs. David M. Mabunda and Paulo Gumane, Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General of FRELIMO, executives of UDENAMO, and six other members were expelled from Tanganyika in one day.

iii. Mr. Alli Makaba, Youth movement organizer and MANU Administrative Secretary, was expelled from Tanganyika. Lacking funds to go elsewhere, he returned to Mogambique, where he may now either be in an unknown Portuguese concentration camp or be dead. It is feared he has been shot by PIDE.

iv. Frequently, police stations in southern Tanganyika received telegrammed instructions, signed by the FRELIMO Publicity Secretary, Leo Millas, to the effect that the president of MANU, Mr. Mmole, and his vice-president, Mr. S. A. Kalomba, be arrested and kept under police custody. Because the police authorities were not satisfied by FRELIMO’s reasons, Messrs. Mmole and Kalomba were released.

v. On April 15, 1963, FRELIMO repeated the same charges to Dar es Salaam police, and Mr. Mmole, along with twelve other members, was arrested and taken to Buguruni police station. Again, they were released after police authorities decided they were not satisfied with FRELIMO’s reasons for wanting them arrested.
3. Misuse of Funds:
a. It is a 100 percent undeniable fact that FRELIMO has spent the front's funds unprofitably; the front received the money from various sources as aid to the liberation of Mogambique. Most of the FRELIMO leaders--the president and his lieutenants--live permanently in the highest class hotels in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika.
b. Much money was used in buying members' support for the president and his lieutenants when they faced strong opposition from the genuine Executive Committee members, who were later expelled as stated in Item 2a of this memorandum.

4. Spy Link With Portuguese Authorities:
Most Mogambican Africans, both in and outside Mogambique, are suspicious of the activities of the present illegal FRELIMO officials for the following reasons:
a. It has been discovered that some of those so-called officials are engaged in writing letters to Mogambique extending invitations to people well-known by Mogambican Africans to be important members of PIDE. For example, it is common knowledge that Mr. António Hassani Said, who arrived in Dar es Salaam March 15, 1963, commanded one of the squadrons of colonial troops that carried out the mass killings at Mueda, Mogambique, in June 1960. The two Portuguese military fliers who landed at Dar es Salaam airport on March 12, 1963, are another example. According to an as-yet-unconfirmed report that reached us from Mogambique, the fliers were allegedly engaged in spying along the Mogambique, Nyasaland, and Tanganyika boundaries to see whether nationalist forces (as per information that had reached the Portuguese government) trained in Cairo, Ghana, and Algeria had established front target camps along the boundaries. Their trip of March 12, 1963, which landed them in Dar es Salaam, was not the first, as on about March 1 and 2, 1963, a similar plane had flown across the Rovuma river over the Newala District Office in Tanganyika and returned to Mogambique.
b. During a certain period, the FRELIMO office maintained a "camera" for photographing members of the front and, according to the report that reached us, the photos of those members are now on display at government offices for identification, and should any of those members try to return to Mogambique, they are subject to immediate arrest.
c. From first-hand information we have learned that from time to time the daily activities of all genuine nationalist leaders and supporters in Dar es Salaam are recorded and reported to the Portuguese government in Mogambique. Because of this spy link, the party now operates with three postal addresses (No. 15274 for general use and Nos. 15293 and 14689 for private use). The latter two addresses are known only to the so-called top leaders.

5. Delay of Struggle:
We have noted with dismay the deterrence of progress under FRELIMO, and in addition we deeply regret having supported the so-called leaders, who have now
caused unnecessary delay in our national struggle because of the following:

a. As a result of his inefficient leadership, Mondlane has completely disrupted the excellent relations among Mogambican Africans, which had been established by the leaders of the two major political parties, MANU and UDENAMO.
b. Dr. Mondlane has promoted tribalism among the members by abusing some Mogambican tribes. Some UDENAMO and MANU committee members reported that, at a certain meeting, during which Mondlane was asked many questions, he became annoyed and said that the people of northern Mogambique were born with inferior intelligence and thus were unable to understand things easily. This insult opened a very wide gap between the people from northern and southern Mogambique.
c. His lieutenants have repeated the same mistake from time to time by telling members that the people from northern Mogambique were not fit to be sent to take up studies in either technical or academic education but were fit to be trained only as ordinary gunmen.
d. Dr. Mondlane has wronged the members by never telling them the truth; thus, the members were unable to judge the stand of their leader; for example, on March 27, 1963, as Dr. Mondlane and his lieutenants were leaving Dar es Salaam for America, he told some members of his Executive Committee that his group was going to visit a FRELIMO branch office in Moshi, Tanganyika, but a few days later, these members learned from certain intelligence sources that, instead of going to Moshi, Dr. Mondlane's group had flown to Cairo and thence to America, where they met with the American Committee on Africa. The topic of these meetings was not known by even a single Executive Committee member.
e. As a leader Dr. Mondlane has failed to end fights between officials and between officials and ordinary members. Two fights concerning which Dr. Mondlane failed to prevent or to seek the causes are: Leo Millas versus a group of members who were later expelled from Tanganyika, and Silvério Nungu, Administrative Secretary, versus James Msadala, Vice-Treasurer.
f. There is a wide gap between the president and his lieutenants and the ordinary members and supporters, as no contact has been established between the two groups since the elected officials and committee members were expelled from FRELIMO.
g. The president, Dr. Mondlane, has publicly made clear his support of several points that are contrary to the FRELIMO "program and standing orders" as well as to the desire of the Mogambican Africans:
i. that education should come first before self-determination and total independence.
ii. that without the support of the United States, Britain, and France, Mogambique will never be freed despite the African peoples' struggle.
iii. that Africans of Mogambique had not yet determined to free themselves from the colonial yoke, but that they will do so after he educates them for twelve months from March 1963 to March 1964.
iv. that he had now changed his mind and decided against maintaining fulltime activities in politics because political parties are often poor; that
poverty could cause the standard of living of his white American wife and

her children to be lowered. Proof of this is that Dr. Mondlane has applied for a
post of lecture at the University College of Dar es Salaam,
where he expects to start to work by June or July 1963. Furthermore,
he has failed to step down from the American way of living and cooperate
with the African masses as do other African leaders such as the fathers of
Africa--Jomo Kenyatta, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah Ngwazi, Dr. Kamuzu
Banda--and many others.

6. FRELIMO Is a United States of America Imperialist-Controlled and -Manipulated
Front.
The reasons for calling FRELIMO a U. S. imperialist-controlled and -manipulated
front are as follows:
a. During the Moshi Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in February 1963,
it was proved by many nationalists present that FRELIMO presented two similar
speeches--one drafted by the American Embassy and the other by the
FRELIMO delegation. First, Leo Millas read the American drafted speech,
and later vice-president Uria Simango read the other. Messrs. Batson Manyara, L. M. Millinga, Lucas Fundi (of Mombasa), a gentleman employed by a
certain embassy in Dar es Salaam, and a UNIP delegate, while standing at short
distance away, saw Mr. A. Andregg of the Dar es Salaam American Embassy
hand the speech to Leo Millas as they stood near one of the rest
rooms. For security purposes we are withholding the names of the UNIP official
and the employee of the embassy, but if nationalist leaders and heads of
African states need proof of this allegation, we are prepared to produce the
names.
b. That only American whites are allowed to join the front. This membership is
contrary to front policy, which does not allow membership for non-Mogambicans.
We have seen a number of young Americans in Tanganyika
working under the cloak of the Peace Corps.
c. The vice-president, Uria Simango, has on many occasions told members that
the president does not want to see any Mogambican visit or study in any country
other than the United States.
d. Dr. Mondlane strongly warned Mr. L. M. Millinga after the latter had written
an open letter to Mr. Menon Williams in connection with a vote cast by the U. S.
's chief delegate to the United Nations against a resolution that called
upon Portugal to free Mogambique. In his warning Dr. Mondlane stated that he
will never agree with anyone who attacks Americans or their government
because they will assist the front in everything.
e. Almost all whites, besides journalists, welcomed to FRELIMO headquarters
are Americans.
f. In any case, a representative from the American Embassy had been invited to
be present at most of the FRELIMO public and Executive Committee meetings.
On one occasion a representative of the American Consulate in Mogambique came to Dar es Salaam and participated in one of the Executive Committee meetings of FRELIMO.

As a matter of fact, we know of so many American activities functioning within the inner circle of FRELIMO that we are unable to list them all in this memorandum, as it would take hundreds of pages.

7. Summation:
   a. Since copies of this memorandum are to be sent to Dr. Mondlane and his lieutenants, we must issue the challenge that they have failed to fulfil the requirements contained in a declaration drafted by Dr. Mondlane himself and signed June 25, 1962, in Dar es Salaam by MANU and UDENAMO presidents and secretaries general.
   b. Dr. Mondlane must confess the defeat inherent in his not uniting all the small parties of Mogambican origin, as outlined in the FRELIMO Program and Standing Orders, Subsection a of Section 4, approved by ad-hoc committee on June 25, 1962.
   c. Dr. Mondlane must accept as a mistake his acting contrary to Subsection d of Section 4 of the FRELIMO Program and Standing Orders.
   d. By allowing Americans to become members of the front, Dr. Mondlane has committed a crime under Subsection e of Section 4 of the front Program and Standing Orders.
   e. Since he has disturbed the best possible relations (among the tribal groups), we have no hesitation in accusing Dr. Mondlane of having committed treason, offense under Subsection b of Section 7 of the Program and Standing Orders.

We call upon Dr. Mondlane to accept the decision made by us as having the authority delegated by the majority of the members and supporters of the two parties that formed FRELIMO. We call upon him to hand over the office and properties of the front to Mr. Mathew Mmole, joint president responsible for security and defense, and Mr. Hlomulo Gwambe, joint president for public relations and administration, of the newly formed FRONT--FRENTE UNIDA ANTI-IMPERIALISTA POPULAR AFRICANA DE MOCAMBIQUE (FUNIPAMO)--as soon as possible.

In conclusion, we wish to make clear to the public that our forming a new front should not be taken to mean that we would have failed to out-vote Dr. Mondlane and his lieutenants had elections been called; we formed a new front in order to do away with the name FRELIMO, which many nations in Africa and abroad have completely identified with negative American propaganda and other offensive implications.

* * * *

The Mogambican Student and the Revolution
[The following two statements were issued by the Unifo Nacional dos Estudantes]
Mogambicanos (UNEMO). The first is a resolution and declaration distributed in English about 1963. The second, signed by Jolo Nhambiu, was published in UNEMO's "The Mozambican," in June 1964, p. 2.1

Mogambique has been a Portuguese colony since 1498, and still remains one today. This long Portuguese reign has always been characterized by terror and suppression of civil rights of Mogambicans.

The military campaigns, starting in 1670 and reaching a relative climax in 1890, never ceased to harass Africans (in Mogambique), who could not accept the brutal Portuguese rule.

Forced labor is still prevalent in Mogambique. A minimum of one hundred thousand men are bound to go to the mines of Wittwatersrand (South Africa) and an equal number must work in Southern Rhodesia under conditions established by the agreement (Convention of Mogambique) between South Africa and Portugal.

Under 0 Contrato Indígena Shibalo, each African has a maximum of six months to do the kind of work he wishes, followed by a period of eleven to twelve months of forced labor (shibalo) during which he is to work where the colonial government wants him to.

Segregation is defacto and legal, for only some five thousand African assimilados presumably have the rights of a Portuguese citizen. This, therefore, leaves the whole African population of more than six million in a humiliating status of indigenato.

Schools are of two kinds: government elementary schools for Portuguese, mulattoes, assimilados; and rudimentary Catholic schools, sponsored by the government, for African indigenas. The latter schools are of inferior quality and are supposed to teach Africans up to the third grade only in order to keep them in obedient servitude. Illiteracy is above 90 percent. No college or similar institution exists in Mogambique, in spite of claims made by the Portuguese government that it has such institutions.

Political activities are completely banned, and no African union organizations are permitted by the Portuguese government and its fascist police (PIDE). Taxes (mpostos pessoais and impostos bracais) total over 30 percent, which is equivalent to more than two months wages for a worker. In addition, the government requires most persons to work for some period without any remuneration.

The Salazar government refuses to consider demands made by the African nationalist movement Frente de Libertaggo de Mogambique (FRELIMO); on the contrary, it has unleashed a wide-spread campaign of repression and intimidation against that organization. Now, there are more than six hundred political prisoners in Mogambique.

Refugees are escaping in an increasing number as a consequence of the repressive measures taken by the PIDE.

Students are not allowed to leave the country to pursue their studies abroad, being subject to punishment and jail if they ask for passports.

Bearing in mind all the criminal plans the Portuguese government is determined to carry out in Mogambique; considering the stubborn policy of Portugal toward her colonies in Africa, which she insistently calls "overseas provinces"; and
noting that conditions in Mogambique are so critical that at any time people will decide to reestablish peace by defending themselves against the Portuguese military yoke;
UNEMO demands the immediate and complete granting of independence from Portuguese colonialism for Mogambique.
UNEMO calls upon all national student unions to take every measure that would prevent the slaughtering of our people, by:
a) Sending cables and letters of protest to the Portuguese government.
b) Publicizing the situation in Mogambique to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
c) Aiding Mogambican students in their efforts to organize themselves.
d) Assisting those Mogambicans who are in need of scholarships for secondary and university education.
UNEMO fully supports FRELIMO, which represents the legitimate and just aspirations of the people of Mogambique in their desire for independence and freedom.
UNEMO regrets the military assistance being given to Portugal by her so-called "NATO Allies," assistance that is used to suppress the people of Mogambique. UNEMO demands the immediate and complete cessation of all such assistance in compliance with the resolution of the United Nations.
UNEMO is now in its third year of existence. We have gone through several internal and external problems of an organizational and functional nature. We have improved in many areas, though much still remains to be done.

One of the most acute problems that confronted us as we came into existence in 1961 was the existence of more than one political party, all of which were determined to fight for the liberation of our fatherland.
As could be expected, even though all the parties had similar objectives, the differences in socio-political doctrine or means of action made it difficult for UNEMO to deal simultaneously with every one of them. And, since we believe that effective action can only be attained if there is a concerted effort against the enemy, UNEMO urged unity for the then-existing political parties, both for the preservation of national unity, which was often threatened by inopportune regional "climpings," and also for a better coordination of every effort against Portuguese colonialism in Mogambique. Fortunately, within the first year of our existence, we had the chance to participate in the Congress that brought about the unification of the political parties into one movement of all forces against the colonial system that oppresses our people.
Thus, FRELIMO came into existence in response to needs stemming from the nature of our struggle—a struggle that demands unified and concerted efforts from all whose sole aspiration is to free Mogambique from Portuguese domination and establish a new and better value system (political, economic, and social).
It is evident that the perspectives of those who formed the front were quite diverse and conditioned by several environmental factors; however, there was enough room for the accommodation of at least the principal interests of each group, which are of prime importance to the country as a whole. And we also want to
believe that there was only one consequential principle of expediency or action, for the Portuguese fascist regime offers but one way--armed struggle. Therefore, unity among the then-existing political parties was necessary and urgent. Unity came about, but obviously without serious commitment on the part of some political leaders. In this way, solidarity within the front's executive branch was lacking, and cooperation was almost impossible. Everyone saw what followed thereafter.

Now, UNEMO is facing a more serious problem, the problem of those whose personal pride is paramount in their decision-making process. It is the problem of personalities, the problem of those who want a Congress for unity every year, for every time they are presidents of a new political club.

The Mogambican students should consider seriously the question of those who gamble on the plight of a suffering nation.

* * * *

479

Failure of Unity Talks

by

Paulo Gumane

[The following press release of February 15, 1965, appeared in the organ of Uniao Democrdtica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO-Mogambique), Combate, 8 (?) (1965 ?), pp. 1-4. It blames the Frente de Libertaglo de Mogambique (FRELIMO) for a breakdown in negotiations aimed at establishing unity among divided nationalists. ]

There shall be no unity between UDENAMO and FRELIMO. The prospects of African unity in Mogambique have been frustrated. Talks have failed and negotiations broken down. This can only be a victory for Salazar.

Only equals can deliberate, only equals can negotiate, and unity can be achieved only in a spirit of equality. Unity, therefore, is possible only between equals. Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President of FRELIMO, must bear the responsibility for the breakdown. His unbending character has destroyed the last hopes for African unity in the struggle of Mogambique.

The negotiations for unity between UDENAMO and FRELIMO were dominated, from the beginning, by the high-handed attitude of Dr. Mondlane, shown by his refusal to accept Mr. Gumane as an equal in the negotiations. Personal ambitions for power are fundamental in the breakdown.

The Central Committee of FRELIMO consists of fifteen positions and responsibilities, thirteen of which are unconstitutional according to the FRELIMO Constitution, Article XIV, "The National Council and the Central Committee are elected by CONGRESS." Expulsions and resignations reduced the constitutional number of Central Committee members from fifteen to two. Dr. Mondlane has since then unconstitutionally nominated thirteen members, three of whom had been first rejected at Arnataglo Community Center, Dar es Salaam, by Mogambicans attending the Congress of September 1962.

Of the fifteen positions in Dr. Mondlane's hand-picked Central Committee, we, the [UDENAMO] representatives to FRELIMO, as a term of unity, asked for
eight of the total number of fifteen. In an effort to return the control of organization to the people of Mogambique, whose wishes we are bound to uphold, we suggested that the act of union, itself, and the UDENAMO members in the eight positions requested should be ratified by the constitutional congress. The positions on the FRELIMO Central Committee that we requested were denied us by Dr. Mondlane. The emphatic reminder that only Congress is empowered to ratify acts of union was, in the same spirit, rejected by Dr. Mondlane. Our second request was that the position of VicePresident be given to Mr. Paulo Gumane, together with the secretariat in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Departments. It was at this point that the chicanery of Dr. Mondlane was at its American best. He conceded to the request by offering to Mr. Gumane a Vice-Presidency and the responsibility of supervising the work of five departments in FRELIMO: Foreign Affairs, Publicity and Information, Education, Health and Social Welfare. This looks very magnanimous on paper, except that the positions are RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPERVISING THE WORK, which is not what we had requested. What Dr. Mondlane offered has neither authority nor power. Dr. Mondlane rejected our request and we rejected his offer. But since African unity must at all times prevail, we, the representatives of UDENAMO, modified our stand in genuine compromise and agreed to reduce our number of positions on the Central Committee to five. This was done with the full realization that this would give the FRELIMO members a two-thirds majority over us. This was accepted by FRELIMO in outline, but not in detail. We, the representatives of UDENAMO, were offered a Vice-Presidency for our President, Mr. Paulo Gumane, as well as four positions for our members: Finance, associate secretary; Publicity and Information, secretary; and two other positions to be filled in the Cairo offices of FRELIMO. This again might look magnanimous, but in effect it meant that only three members of UDENAMO would be in Dar es Salaam, which is the operational center of FRELIMO. That would have given us three members on a Central Committee of fifteen. This was unacceptable. By this means Dr. Mondlane was insisting on centralizing all power in the members of FRELIMO, the implication being that he wanted a total takeover, a complete surrender of UDENAMO, almost unconditionally. UDENAMO wanted to unite, but not to be gobbled up.

But African unity is paramount and must at all times predominate over personal ambition. UDENAMO desires the liberation of Mogambique, not the glories of power. In this spirit, we surrendered all claims and demands, stating that we would join FRELIMO without any guarantees of positions and representatives. But we made one demand on which we will not compromise: that the act of unity must be submitted to Congress for ratification and that the Central Committee must submit to elections by Congress. Mr. Mondlane became incoherent in his rejection of this demand. Questions must, therefore, arise, and they demand answers. Why is Dr. Mondlane afraid to face the people? All men in public politics must derive their power from the people. We
throw out this challenge to Dr. Mondlane: Face the people.

All this was before 1963. But the need for African unity is strong. So on November 20, 1964, Mr. Gumane, President of UDENAMO, and Dr. Mondlane, of FRELIMO, were joint signatories to an agreement providing for the unity of UDENAMO and FRELIMO, under five headings.

But when details came to negotiation, the same problems prevailed. Dr. Mondlane wants absolute power for FRELIMO, but will not face the people, in whom the mandate for this power exists; even a simple request, such as for codification of the ways and means by which members can be expelled, was rejected.

Constitutionality is our only ultimate protection. We, the representatives of UDENAMO, point out here that: a) we desire this unity as an essential; b) that our quarrel is not with FRELIMO but with the high-handed impulses of Dr. Mondlane; and c) that mandates can come only from the people.

The Mogambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO), which broke away from FRELIMO on September 25, 1964, has concluded arrangements and negotiations to form, on a basis of equality and without condition, an alliance with UDENAMO. This declaration announces that MORECO has become one with UDENAMO and shall henceforth be known as UDENAMO. To formalize the union, UDENAMO has drafted an amendment to its constitution providing for an increase in the number of Central Committee members to fifteen. The draft is to be placed before the UDENAMO Congress for ratification.

Establishment of COREMO

[The following is extracted from Comité Revolucionario de Mogambique (COREMO), Memorandum Submitted to the 3rd Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, Lusaka, 1965 (?), pp. 2-3. This document traces the evolution of COREMO and outlines its political program.]

After a series of fruitful discussions among Mogambique national liberation movements, held in a cordial and patriotic atmosphere, an agreement was reached by the Unión Democrática Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), União Democrática Nacional de Monomotapa (UDENAMO-Monomotapa), and the Mogambique African National Congress (MANC) to sincerely join their respective organizations into a new united body, namely the Comité Revolucionario de Mogambique (COREMO), which shall be the only and sole body to guide the armed struggle in Mogambique and ask for moral, diplomatic, financial, and material support from friendly peoples and nations of the world in order to annihilate, once and forever, the tyrannical Portuguese colonial regime in our country.

The beginning of the consolidation of national unity became a reality with the formation of the Provisional Action Council of the new body.

COREMO is not a united front, but an absolute organization with the direct adhesion of all Mogambicans ready to fight and sacrifice for our freedom.
COREMO shall consciously pursue a policy of Positive Neutrality and Nonalignment in international conflicts and Cold War, but shall always stand for the Truth and for the peoples' just cause. COREMO's internal policy shall be to carry on a "fierce fight against the Portuguese oppressors and exploiters" and to align itself with all the progressive and popular forces against diverse reactionaries and their colonialist and imperialist masters. COREMO shall seek freedom--total and unconditional national independence from the Portuguese colonial regime--by all possible means at our disposal and shall meet peace with peace. If this is not permitted, then we shall do what our enemies compel us to do. COREMO is a Pan-African movement and shall respect the principles set forth in the charter of the Organization of African Unity. COREMO shall work in cooperation and collaboration with all freedom movements in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the rest of the world, and shall always regard Asian and Latin American peoples and nations as part and parcel of the struggle for peoples' emancipation and for world peace, justice, prosperity, and happiness. At the extraordinary session of the Preparatory Committee of the COREMO, held at COREMO's headquarters in Lusaka, Republic of Zambia, from June 15 to 17, 1965 and attended by all six members of the Preparatory Committee, by the National Presidents of UDENAMO-Monomotapa and UDENAMO, by the acting President of MANC, and by other accredited representatives of the above-mentioned organizations, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted:

a) After carefully analyzing the serious situation in our national liberation struggle and after hearing the reports from the Preparatory Committee, which was set up by three of the five uniting organizations to smoothen the preparations for the first elections of COREMO, it was unanimously agreed that the delay in holding these elections, due mainly to the lack of funds and difficulties beyond our control, was delaying our people's just cause, and therefore, the following alternatives should be taken in order to accelerate the armed struggle in Mogambique:
1) Dissolution of the Preparatory Committee effective immediately.
2) Formation of a Provisional Action Council.
3) Suspension of all diplomatic activities and contacts by all component organizations.
4) Formulation of a fighting program in Mogambique, and
5) Establishment of a period for the total transference of all party properties to COREMO's Provisional Action Council, without COREMO's being responsible for the debts of any component organization.

b) It was furthermore unanimously resolved that the Provisional Action Council shall implement points 3, 4, and 5 prescribed above and shall work in accordance with Article 21, Clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the Constitution of the COREMO.

c) The three organizations, i. e., MANC, UDENAMO-Monomotapa, and UDENAMO,
shall each nominate six (6) representatives to take up duties in the Provisional Action Council and the eighteen (18) shall be appointed from within the respective organizations.

d) The Provisional Action Council shall be reshuffled unconditionally upon genuine and revolutionary request by the MANU and the Unilo Nacional Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI) in order to allow the smooth redistribution of portfolios by the five (5) organizations once MANU and UNAMI have sent their six representatives each.

e) The duration of the Provisional Action Council shall be determined by the prevailing situation in our national liberation struggle, internally and externally. Drafted and accepted unanimously by all three organizations, i.e., UDENAMOMogambique, MANC, and UDENAMO-Monomotapa, on June 17, 1965.

The COREMO Program

I. To unite and mobilize the people of all social classes who are living in Mogambique and abroad without discrimination as to sex, ethnic background, origin, religious beliefs, or ideology; to fight together for the total and immediate liquidation of all forms and manifestations of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism, and to achieve the national independence of Mogambique.

II. To fight primarily by means of armed conflict but to be willing to accept other progressive methods for hastening the extirpation of the imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism perpetuated by the Portuguese government of Mogambique.

III. To stimulate all patriotic forces as well as political and cultural unions, organizations of heads of families, and other associations to form a tight alliance in order to struggle against the enemy of the people of Mogambique for the immediate, political independence of our country.

IV. To fight, together with all the revolutionary forces of South Africa dedicated to the anti-imperialist fight, in order to uproot the enemy in small portions from that area of white supremacy in this part of Africa and to move on to the complete liberation and unification of Africa.

V. To fight, together with all Africans, for the eradication of all foreign domination established in Africa politically, economically, socially, and culturally, and for the realization of complete political independence and the unification of Africa into a powerful nation.

VI. To collaborate with all progressive forces and to maintain peace with friendly nations throughout the world; to obtain the sympathy and support of the entire population for the cause of liberation of all peoples of Mogambique.
VII. To collaborate and coordinate efforts with the peoples of Asia and Latin America and with all progressive forces in the world dedicated to the inexorable fight against imperialism in order to crush the imperialists and their lackeys and attain the immediate realization of the legitimate requests of the people.

VIII. To establish genuine and absolute national independence in our country.

IX. To establish a democratic republic based on total independence under which all people of Mogambique will be equal before the law and will have the same rights and duties.

X. To constitute a popular government with the complete participation of all the people of Mogambique and with majority representation.

XI. To affirm the inalienable rights (which cannot be abrogated or transferred) of the nation of Mogambique to direct its own political, economic, and social role and any other role useful to the people.

XII. To establish the national unity and the national integrity of Mogambique.

XIII. To construct and promote the economic development of the nation in order to transform Mogambique from a colonial and backward country into an independent, economic, prosperous, powerful, and cultured nation.

XIV. To defend the interests and legitimate and just claims of all the people of Mogambique through:
   a. Equal distribution of land.
   b. Intensification of the agricultural industry to make the country self-sufficient and to develop exports.
   c. The establishment of markets controlled by the state in all aspects in order to avoid corruption and robbery of the workers by foreign exploiters and investors.
   d. The imposition of a truly equal system of punishment for whoever robs or deceives a laborer, worker, or any other person.
   e. The creation of the establishments and undertakings of a recognized state; the stimulation of cooperative societies under the management of the people; and the reasonable distribution of the products of the people.
   f. The protection of the interests of the workers against the abuses of the patrons.
   g. The abolition of all forms of forced labor systems.
   h. The establishment of the principle of equal pay for equal service, taking into particular consideration the ability and experience in the service.
   i. The protection of the workers by legislation promoting pensions for skilled and unskilled laborers, humanizing the conditions of labor, and guaranteeing social security for the people of Mogambique, and
   j. Raising the standard of living of the people.

XV. To liquidate the imperialist officials and the colonialist culture, by expulsion or by their reduction to a normal level, which will not discredit or destroy the customs and the culture of Mogambique.

XVI. To regain our lost heritage, the respect for and dignity of our chiefs, which
the imperialists, the colonialists, and the Portuguese oppressors have debased for many years.

XVII. To train a force for the defense of the people: army, marine, air force, militia, etc.

XVIII. To abolish all foreign military bases and to refuse landing permits to military airplanes of the enemy and to their ships at sea and within national waters, unless it be for a truly emergency landing in accordance with the law of the government of the people.

XIX. To join the Organization of African Unity and to respect the African declaration of Addis Ababa.

XX. To join the African High Command to fight collectively against foreign aggressors on the continent of Africa.

XXI° To abrogate any military negotiation with any other country outside Africa.

XXII. To collaborate with the peoples of the world through the deepest mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and mutual policies against the direct intervention in domestic matters.

XXIII. To support the policy of positive neutrality and nonalignment.

XXIV. To respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

XXV. To respect the PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

* * * *

CHAPTER VII
UNITY EFFORTS AND RELATIONS AMONG GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

In the 1950’s, African intellectuals studying at Portuguese universities established the Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC) as an outgrowth of the controversial Casa dos Estudantes do Império, the semiofficial center for Africans in Lisbon that was condemned as subversive and closed by the government in 1965. In 1960 at the second All-African Peoples Congress in Tunis, the MAC was superseded by the Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independência das Colônias Portuguesas (FRAIN). In April 1961, FRAIN was dissolved and replaced by the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP).

Message to the Portuguese People
[The following statement, entitled "Message au peuple Portugaise" was distributed in Lisbon during November 1960 by students from the Portuguese African colonies.]

The university students from the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the future leaders of their respective countries, feel that it is their duty to reveal to the Portuguese people their point of view on the accusations made at the United Nations against the Portuguese government.

Having followed the development of the events in the highest international body very attentively--thanks to the world radio and press rather than the Portuguese radio and press, which continually lie--we understand that problems of vital
concern to our peoples were discussed there sensibly and with a constructive spirit. We entirely uphold the accusations made against Portugal, and we present some others to support them:

1. The practice of forced labor in "Portuguese" Guind, Slo Tomé, Angola (especially in Porto Alexandre, Baia dos Tigres, Foz do Cunene), and in Mogambique (particularly in Foz do Limpopo);
2. The exportation of "native" workers from Angola and Mogambique to mines in South Africa in exchange for certain compensations for the Portuguese government, which receives an annual tax for "rented" workers;
3. The famines that, because of the improvidence and incompetence of the representatives of the Portuguese government, periodically claim thousands of victims in Cabo Verde (the last crisis caused seventeen thousand deaths);
4. The concentration of military forces of repression in our countries;
5. The massacre of São Tomé in 1953, during which nine hundred peaceful inhabitants of the islands were assassinated by European civilians armed by Governor Gorgulho;
6. The lack of universities and the insufficient number of secondary and primary schools.

In the demonstrations organized by Salazar's government, half a dozen "sold" students disgustedly pretend to represent the opinion of the Portuguese colonies. We energetically denounce this betrayal of truth and of the interests of our peoples, for which they are responsible. The best proof that the truth is entirely different from what the Salazar-controlled press and radio claim lies in the fact that no one from the "Associations of Overseas Students" has joined these demonstrations in support of the present Portuguese colonial policy.

Our greatest wish is to establish bonds of friendship with all peoples who show the desire to collaborate with us in the democratic building of our countries. We feel a special inclination for the people of Portugal, whose qualities of comprehension and tolerance we have had the opportunity to appreciate throughout our centuries-old contact.

So that our hope for a future of close collaboration with Portugal may not be disappointed, let us set a date for the end of the present preparations for a new colonial war during which our blood and that of your young people will run—sacrificed in vain.

Let us rally around the steadfast claims of the Movimento Popular de Libertagão de Angola, and let us consider as a sign of the good faith of the Portuguese government the execution of the following measures:
--Solemn and immediate recognition of the right to self-determination of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in Africa;
--Total, unconditional amnesty and immediate liberation of all political prisoners;
--Establishment of civil liberties, notably that of legally constituting political parties, and concrete guarantees for the effective exercise of these liberties;
--Immediate withdrawal of the armed forces and immediate liquidation of the military bases existing in the Portuguese colonies in Africa;
Convocation of round tables attended by the representatives of all political parties in the colonies and the representatives of the Portuguese government, with the aim of finding a peaceful solution to the Portuguese colonial problem in the framework of the mutual interests of the parties present.

We come to reveal the point of view of the university students from the Portuguese colonies in Africa, for the purpose of contributing to a peaceful solution of our conflict, not with the Portuguese people, but with the dictatorship of Salazar, which defends the interests of the monopolists who steal our natural resources and impoverish our peoples by slave labor. These exploiting monopolies in our countries endanger the prosperity and peace of our peoples and lead the Portuguese people toward a useless, self-destructive war.

LONG LIVE PEACE AND FRATERNITY AMONG THE PEOPLES!

down with colonialism!

A Report on Portuguese Colonialism

[The following are excerpts from a report presented by the Movimento AntiColonista (MAC) to the second All-African Peoples Congress in Tunis in 1960. The report appeared in Marcel Levaux et al, Le procbs des cinquante (Ceratte, Belgium, 1960) and also in Tam Tam, 3-4 (April-May 1961), 93-97.]

As everyone knows, Portugal inaugurated modern European imperialist expansion into Africa and first practiced systematic slave trading. After having occupied, by its actions in Africa, a place of prime importance in the execution of the greatest crime of genocide ever practiced in history, Portugal was able, by means of the imperialist world's agreement against our peoples and of the interested support of certain imperialist powers, to pledge itself to the military conquest of the present colonies in continental Africa. Nevertheless, military occupation of these territories, thanks to the heroic resistance of our peoples, was completed only around 1920.

Once most traditional leadership bodies had been liquidated in African societies, Portugal chose the method of classic colonialism--direct domination. Indeed, the fundamental theses of Portuguese colonialism have always been formulated in these terms: The African territory should be considered as res nullius; Western civilization and culture have a unique and absolute value in the world; the mental and moral development of colonial peoples is at the level of animals. By virtue of these theses, Portuguese leaders were guided toward a policy of forced annexation of the colonies, of spiritual assimilation of the peoples, and of police repression. Still, it is evident that a country like Portugal--underdeveloped, agricultural, and backward, where the annual income per capita is about $150, with 49 percent illiteracy--is far from able to contribute to the progress of the civilization and culture of African peoples. It is not by chance that the most important and decisive labors of improving the African territories under Portuguese domination have been realized with the cooperation of non-Portuguese capital: the railroad between Beira and Benguela, the Trans-Zambezan Railway, the port of Beira. Likewise, it was with the cooperation of non-Portuguese capital that sugar cane, sisal, and the Quelimane palms were planted; that water and light were installed in
Lourengo Marques; that diamonds were mined and petroleum was prospected for in Angola; that the most important hydroelectric works and agricultural projects in progress were financed.

Since Portugal does not recognize the "right of African peoples to decide their own future," it has necessarily imposed Portuguese nationality upon us. But the fact of being a "Portuguese" African black--or, let us say, a native--does not necessarily mean being a Portuguese citizen. By a racist law, it was established that individuals of the black race and their descendants might not have the rights of citizenship that the Portuguese normally have. Even theoretically, the native does not have even the slightest chance of participating in the public life and the direction of the affairs of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Black citizens, who constitute a minority (not over 0.3 percent) of the population of the Portuguese colonies of continental Africa, can no longer intervene in the public life and the direction of the affairs of their countries, because Portugal has foundered for thirty years in the regime of a fascist dictator. Furthermore, no political party exists in Portugal besides the Unilo Nacional, Salazar's party. Practical measures have been taken to prohibit African ownership of rural or urban land. It can be stated that almost all African peasants work on lands to which their right of possession is not officially recognized. On one hand, the law does not permit natives living in tribal organizations to use and benefit from the lands necessary for their settlement and for their crops; and on the other, it forbids them all rights of possession of rural property .... Although more than 70 percent of agricul-

tural production in Angola comes directly from native agriculture--where female labor has a predominant place--by virtue of the general practice of forced labor, the income of the black peasant of Angola is very low.

The colonial administration contributes knowingly to making life more miserable for the peasant through a number of measures, notably by official fixation of low prices for native agricultural products by the authorities along the border of Angola and Mogambique under the pretext of nonpayment of the sovereignty tax. The Portuguese colonial administration likewise utilizes a series of practical measures to maintain tight control over the peasant economy. The exploited labor of the African peasant takes on aspects of servitude with the practice of legally imposed cultivation of just one crop. In 1953, more than five hundred and seventy thousand natives of Angola and Mogambique were forced to produce cotton on more than three hundred and twenty thousand hectares. This obligatory cultivation not only exhausts the African soil, but reduces even more the cultivation of foodstuffs in our country, already plagued by chronic food shortage; it greatly raises the cost of living in these regions and creates terrible famine among the laboring masses.

Forced labor is still practiced in the Portuguese colonies. Its causes are multiple: the demographic reduction of the populations, a consequence of the trade practiced for centuries by the Portuguese; the quest for cheap African manpower; the Portuguese policy of genocide; economic retardation and the deficits in the
The system of forced labor is accompanied by methods inherited from slavery. In fact, the natives are sold by the administrative authorities to the farmers and the European companies, which are becoming eager to cooperate in the search for manpower. Some years ago, the Archepiscopal Diocese of Luanda, in a confidential memorandum sent to the governor of Angola, said that the official practice of forced labor was responsible for the slow progress of Christianity among the Angolan masses. The Archepiscopal Diocese revealed in that document that the administrative authorities were selling each forced laborer at a price varying between one thousand and one thousand two hundred escudos. And they defended themselves from the accusation of selling the blacks by stating that they were only renting them. Such corruption was practiced not only by the Portuguese authorities but also by their intermediaries, the African village chiefs imposed on the natives by the colonial administration.

The practice of forced labor leads in a permanent manner to the destruction of the economic life of Africa; the disintegration of millions of African families; the prostitution of a considerable number of women; the propagation of venereal diseases, a decrease in the birth rate, and an increase of infant mortality; the shortening of the useful life of the laborer; the liquidation of relatively "independent" agricultural activity of millions of African peasants; the practice by the colonists of appropriating the lands and other goods abandoned by Africans subjected to forced labor, etc.

In Mogambique, more than four hundred thousand Africans are officially sent each year to the mines of Rhodesia and South Africa. Portugal is vitally interested in maintaining this traffic, since it constitutes one of the sole guaranteed methods for accelerating the mass installation of Portuguese colonists, and since it can permit equilibrium in the balance of payments of that colony. One must see in the practice of forced labor the fundamental reason for a barbaric massacre of more than one thousand Blacks on the island of Sao Tomé in February 1953. In fact, the reduction of the exportation of forced laborers from Angola to that archipelago and the high price of coffee at that time led the government of Sao Tomé to impose by arms the regime of forced labor on the natives of the island. This same type of colonialism practiced by a backward country appears incapable of dealing with the grave problem of cyclic famines in the archipelago of Cabo Verde. These crises cause the death of thousands of inhabitants; others are forced to emigrate to other colonies, where they are severely exploited.

As for health problems, in Portuguese colonies the majority of hospitals and other sanitary establishments are primarily for the European population. During 1956 in Angola, for example, 84 percent of the deaths among the "natives" were attributed to "senility and to little known or unknown causes," according to the World Health Organization. We note in passing that the infant mortality rate among Angolans is more than 40 percent. The highest mortality rate in the world is found on the island of Sao Tomé: forty-two per one thousand inhabitants during a
normal period. Finally, in 1956, there was one midwife in Cabo Verde for the entire population of one hundred and forty-seven thousand, which is scattered among twelve islands. In reality, the Portuguese plan relies upon promoting both the traditional policy of genocide (by the indirect methods of forced labor, insufficient sanitary assistance, maintenance of the very high infant mortality rates, alcoholism among the masses, very low salaries) and the settlement of a white population, to maintain the definitive domination of the whites over the Africans. It is a diabolical plan. As a result of these realities, it must be admitted that the colonial war prepared by Portugal will permit it to fulfill its plans for domination and extermination of the African populations. It is not by chance that the Portuguese government does not show the least tendency to adapt its colonial policy to the realities of our times. ... Our peoples are aware of all the Portuguese maneuvers to divide the Africans for the sole purpose of prolonging Portugal's domination in Africa. Our peoples know of the shameful offers made by the Portuguese Prime Minister to Brazil and other western European nations. with a view to the common pillage of their colonies in exchange for support for the maintenance of their empire. Our struggle, waged under exceptionally difficult conditions, has already been successful in breaking the wall of silence that fascist Portuguese colonialism placed around the peoples under its domination.

The Colonial Struggle

[About 1960 the Executive Committee of the Frente Revoluciondrio Africana para a Independ~ncia Nacional das Colônicas Portuguesas (FRAIN) called for unity among nationalist movements. Their statement appeared in Marcel Levaux et al, Le procbs des cinquante (Ceratte, Belgium, 1960).]

The extremely difficult conditions imposed by fascist Portuguese colonialism have demonstrated that it was necessary to reinforce the action within our countries by supportive action abroad. It was urgent to denounce Portuguese colonialism, so that at least the sanction of world public opinion would fall on every one of their crimes. Thus, motivated by the Partido Africano da Independ~ncia (PAI) and the Movimento Popular de Libertagfo de Angola (MPLA), a large number of Africans residing abroad created the Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC), whose principal objectives were the following: to study the problems caused by the struggle being waged by patriotic organizations in our countries; to contribute to the most lucid guidance of this struggle, by keeping in mind the concrete evolution of international policy; to work for united action by liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies; to constitute, through their forces acting within our countries, inexhaustible revolutionary reserves to deprive Portuguese colonialism of any opportunity to subdue the emancipating struggle of our peoples. During its two years of existence, the MAC made the voices of our peoples heard at several African and Afro-Asian meetings and contributed to destroying the lies of Portuguese colonialism. The MAC participated in the second All-African Peoples Conference, its active members representing the PAI and the MPLA. This participation was a successful
contribution to the struggle of the African peoples under Portuguese domination. The revolutionary forces of all Africa and a great part of international opinion were sufficiently informed of the crimes of Portuguese colonialism and of the struggle that was taking place behind the curtain of silence. The isolation to which Portugal had long condemned our peoples was finally broken. In the presence of concerned leaders, the conference defined African solidarity with regard to our liberating battle. For the first time it adopted a special, clear resolution on Portuguese colonies.

Another important event was the constitution of FRAIN, formed by PAI and MPLA, and within which MAC was dissolved. FRAIN is open to all organizations, in Portuguese colonies, that are actively fighting for the liquidation of colonialism. For the good of our peoples and the Portuguese people themselves, and for the cause of world peace, our organizations attach great importance to the peaceful liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. It is certain that the Portuguese colonialists are determined to march against the sense of history and are preparing to start colonial wars. But it is even more certain that our peoples will achieve total victory over Portuguese colonialism. Our peoples and their political organizations are not rising up against the Portuguese people. They are rising up against Portuguese colonial domination. Our people and their patriotic organizations are fighting for the conquest of the right to self-determination and the effective and urgent exercise of this right. The peoples of Angola, Cabo Verde, "Portuguese" Guinea, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe must decide, themselves, on their destiny and choose the direction of their development in complete liberty and without the interference of Portugal or any other country. It is correct that we have also drawn the attention of public opinion to the underdevelopment of Portugal, which leads that country to prostitute its colonies for the profit of interests that are helping it maintain its empire. This stresses the immoral character of the domination of Portugal over rich territories more vast than the half of Europe to the east of Poland. But in mentioning the flagrant underdevelopment of that country, which dares to justify the possession of an empire as a pretended "civilizing mission," we do not mean to say that our peoples would accept replacement of Portuguese colonialism with that of another country, be it through direct intervention or by intermediary action through Africans or African organizations.

We categorically proclaim again that we are fighting for the inalienable sovereignty of our peoples over their own nations and for their complete control of their riches, in the framework of general and democratic progress toward African unity. Our peoples are fighting for real independence. Faithful to the spirit of the United Nations Charter and to the resolution of the conferences of Bandoeng, Cairo, Accra, and Tunis, our peoples and their patriotic organizations will continue and intensify their struggle for the complete disappearance of Portuguese colonialism, for the effective and urgent exercise of the right to self-determination, and for immediate and unconditional independence.

* * * *
Resistance and the Struggle for Independence
by
Marcelino dos Santos
[Marcelino dos Santos, as secretary general of the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), made the following statement on June 15, 1962, before the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration in Rabat. In the 1950's Santos studied sociology in Paris, where he also was associated with the journal, Présence Africaine. One of the most articulate of Mozambican nationalists, he is also a leader of Frente de Libertagfto de Mogambique (FRELIMO) in Dar es Salaam. The statement below, entitled "Déclaration au Comité Special de l'ONU..." was released by the CONCP in June 1962.1]

The situation in Angola, in the archipelago of Cabo Verde, in "Portuguese" Guinea, in Mozambique, and in São Tomé and Príncipe is a colonial situation. Indeed, the present relations between Portugal and those countries present a picture of a characteristically colonial relationship—economic exploitation of the riches of the country and social domination of the native populations. The essential characteristics of Portuguese colonialism arise from the backward state of the economic structure of Portugal as well as from the colonial-fascist character of the Portuguese government.

It might be useful to recall here that Portugal is a backward, agriculturally retarded nation, which today is 42 percent illiterate and which has not been able to keep up with the rhythm of industrial development in all the other European nations. Furthermore, Portugal has not experienced a "classical" democracy of the parliamentary type, and democratic traditions have remained weak. The combination of these different factors has given the Portuguese colonial system its own physiognomy, namely, the maintenance of all forms of classical colonial exploitation: forced labor; subjection of the population of our countries to special laws like the "native" statutes; cultural obscurantism; imposition of famine cycles; and all forms of misery and humiliation of the populations.

The peoples of our countries have never accepted such a situation, and our history is marked by innumerable events attesting to the constant resistance to foreign domination. The vast movement of emancipation that, through new international cooperation, has shaken Africa since the last world war cannot avoid having its expression in our own countries.

During the years following the last world war, organization of resistance to the oppressor has led to the formation in our countries of nationalist organizations whose major objective was attainment of our national independence. Indeed, experience shows that in a colonial situation, national independence constitutes the sole historical issue. That is, the conflict between the peoples of our countries and the Portuguese colonial administration can be resolved only by our achieving independence.

The conquest of political power appears to be the first necessary step in the economic development of our countries and the social and cultural progress of our
people. Aware of this fact, the peoples of our countries, mobilized in their nationalist organizations, have moved to active resistance, the new phase of their struggle against the oppressor. Thus the process of general liquidation of Portuguese colonialism began; it must end in national independence, that is, in the political, economic, social, and cultural liberation of our peoples.

The birth of national liberation movements radically changed life in our countries. Based on the noble and profoundly humane feelings of liberty, justice, and dignity, born of the popular masses, the liberation movements from their birth appeared as the new repositories of power, a power that gradually enlarged the development of our liberation movements themselves. Through the movements' internal dynamism, the number of men capable of leading the liberation movements increased progressively. Because of this phenomenon, the liberation movements have two aspects intimately connected with and complementing each other:

--one, the negative, destructive aspect, aims at the liquidation of colonial structures and colonial power;

--the other, the positive aspect, aims at the progressive formation and development of the country's new machinery of leadership adapted to the interests of the peoples and the needs of the fight.

These objectives, which we try to realize through our daily activity, are the concern of our nationalist organizations. These also constitute proof of the sense of responsibility and of the political maturity of the nationalist organizations of our countries.

We have always considered unity as one of the guiding principles of our struggle. Indeed, we are trying to combine the efforts of all patriots, excluding no one for religious, ethnic, or other reasons. By doing this, we are preserving the unity of the people and the integrity of the territory, both of which are fundamental to the success of our fight. We have always fought for the realization of united, fighting coalitions at the national level, that is, within each of our countries.

Guided by these unifying principles, and the desire to fight more effectively and rapidly for the liberation of our countries, the nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies met in Casablanca in April 1961 and decided to create the CONCP.

As we have repeatedly stressed, we solemnly reaffirm today before this United Nations Special Committee the resolute will of our people to be free. We accuse the Portuguese government of developing the machinery for military and police repression in our countries in order to maintain its domination over our peoples. The policy followed by the Portuguese colonial-fascist government has engendered a trench between Africans and Europeans in our countries and has created an atmosphere of hatred and fear. The CONCP follows a policy that desires to be anti-racial and to free man. For us, it is not a question of fighting against the Portuguese people, but of destroying the structures of colonial power among us. We feel no hatred toward the Portuguese people. Quite the contrary, we are trying to conduct a policy of friendship with the peoples of the entire
world and, of course, with the Portuguese people. It is evident that these reports must be based on respect for our own personality and our free determination. We are deploying our activity within the framework of this political harmony. The CONCP constitutes a symbol of the unity of our peoples. Its goal is to coordinate the struggle for liberation of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, and it appears to be an inestimable contribution to the construction of the foundations of our independence. The CONCP is trying to bring about cooperation and solidarity among the peoples of our countries in the general struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Our joint action can weaken the ranks of the colonialist forces. The CONCP acts in the sense of preparing our countries to assume fully the tasks of independence. That is why we make daily efforts toward the elevation of the political level of the masses.

We are trying to face the enormous needs of our fight through efforts to train staffs, both political and technical, and we consider the development of our own training centers, with our own professors, very important. We are trying, furthermore, to face the problems posed by the flood of refugees. For us it is a question not only of the alimentary and medico-sanitary needs of the refugees but also of providing for the development of their education and their political training. Thus, the CONCP is trying to assume its responsibilities for the different aspects of the life of our peoples. Furthermore, the CONCP is pledged to a campaign of informing world opinion, especially the African nations. Our appeal was heard throughout the world, and we declare with pride that we are constantly receiving testimonies of solidarity from everywhere, not only from Africa but also from the peoples of Europe, Asia, and America.

Therefore, the CONCP:

Considering the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960;

Considering the different resolutions made concerning various cases brought before the United Nations that brought condemnation to the political pursuits of the Portuguese government in our countries;

Considering that the persistence of the bastions of colonialism is a threat of war;
Considering that colonialism is a crime;
Considering the justice of the claim of our peoples to self-determination and to independence;

Asks that the United Nations take adequate measures and utilize the effective means that are needed for aiding our peoples to realize their aspirations to self-determination and to independence.

We are firmly convinced that negotiation—whether or not it is the result of a peaceful struggle—between the qualified representatives of our peoples and those of the Portuguese government is the necessary way to independence. But before there is negotiation, the Portuguese government must solemnly and formally recognize the historic right of the peoples of our countries to self-determination and national independence.

The First Conference of the CONCP

Preamble

The first CONCP Conference organized by the Movimento Popular de Libertagão de Angola (MPLA), the Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), and the Liga de Goa (Goa League) took place April 18-20, 1961, in Casablanca. Thirteen delegates attended the conference, representing ten organizations in six countries: Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné, Goa, Mogambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. This meeting grouped together the nationalist organizations of various countries still under Portuguese domination, a prime necessity in the present critical phase of the Portuguese colonial regime. Indeed, the development of the patriotic struggle of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies and the necessity for effectively combatting colonialism and hastening its complete elimination have led nationalist organizations to coordinate their efforts. In turn, the necessity for defining the principles of united action and for deciding on the means of waging the battle against Portuguese colonialism, became the prime motive for introducing a new scope into this liberating struggle. Thus the historic importance of the first CONCP conference emerges clearly: Through the voices of their representatives, fourteen million human beings have stated their inalienable right to liberty and their firm determination to assume the full responsibility for their destiny.

Opening Speech by Mirio de Andrade, President of the Conference

During the years following the last world war, we witnessed great changes in Africa and Asia. Pressured by the irreversible will of the people, imperialist governments have had to adapt themselves to the increase in national awareness of colonized peoples. Quite clearly, there appeared a mutation of classic colonial exploitation by imperialists who worked out new forms of oppression, which we call neocolonialism. But the march of universal progress has happily permitted the emergence of independent nations in Africa and Asia and the appearance of leaders who are determined to lead the peoples along the road to complete liberation from all after-effects of imperialism.

It appears that the Portuguese government is not concerned by any of this. That government, blinded by a supposed historical mission, enchained by a centuries-old colonial ideology, has always refused to progress in the historical sense. It is characterized by support for all forms of classical colonial exploitation: forced labor, submission of populations to particular statuses (such as the status of the native), obscurantism, the imposition of cycles of famine, and all forms of misery and annihilation of populations. Moreover, to each demand, to each peaceful demonstration of the people, the Portuguese government has reacted in only one way--with bloody repression.
In Goa, where, since 1946, nationalists have directed the struggle by nonviolent methods inspired by the principles of Gandhi, the Portuguese colonialists have given free reign to their barbaric methods of torture, deportation of nationalists to Angola, and mass imprisonments. The São Tomé massacres of February 1953, arranged by a vile Portuguese army captain, claimed more than a thousand victims from a population of only sixty thousand; the massacres of Pijiguiti in "Portuguese" Guinea were unleashed by a simple petition for salaries. These are two of the numerous examples of the inhumane character of Portuguese colonialism in the middle twentieth century. There are so many examples of the anachronism of the methods used by Salazar's government to maintain its exploitation of the wealth of our countries. In a few minutes, the delegates present here will describe the precise state of each country's situation, and you will have the opportunity to understand the justice and legitimacy of the combat in which we are presently engaged against Portuguese colonialism. Generally, the nationalist movements in Portuguese colonies were born as a result of the establishment of a fascist regime in Portugal more than thirty years ago. Imagine all the difficulties the patriots in Portuguese colonies must have endured in secrecy in order to escape the police vigilance, in order to fulfill their desire to carry the flag of national awakening to the masses. In our countries, to the oppression that characterizes any colonial situation there is added the results of fascist Portugal's isolation. Thus we have all lived in the context of a double oppression and a double isolation. Yet nationalist movements in Portuguese colonies, all victims of the violence created by Portuguese colonialism and of police terror, have had the good sense to propose a solution to the colonial question through peaceful means. We have always shown proof of our lucidity on this subject, convinced that the rational road to our era--the solution of the conflict between our peoples and the Portuguese colonial administration--lies in dialogue and negotiation. Our labors were in vain. Salazar's government, which draws its financial equilibrium from the exploitation of the riches of our countries and whose survival is, therefore, intimately bound up with the existence of colonies, has categorically rejected negotiation. During our speech in the London House of Commons (December 6, 1960), we reaffirmed our desire to plan, along with the Portuguese government, a peaceful solution to the colonial problem. We foresaw that the obstinacy of the Portuguese government would daily push the popular masses to clamor for effective means of progressing to direct action. This direct action, which today exists in Angola, provoked a crisis in Salazar's government. Thus we have made the Portuguese colonialist government feel the pangs of its death. We now have the historic role of dealing the final blow. The Portuguese government is engaged in a colonial war in Angola, for which it is entirely responsible, and is preparing to extend the war to other countries. Such, ladies and gentlemen, is the context of this first conference of the CONCP. During this conference we will study the united action of our respective
organizations, as well as the establishment of means for coordinating our combative action against Portuguese colonialism. We do not lack profound reasons for arriving at complete agreement on these two specific points, since we are trying to express the aspirations of our peoples to liberate themselves completely from Portuguese colonial domination and from any other form of foreign oppression. On the basis of common experiences and the solidarity uniting us, we shall try to coordinate our efforts to eliminate this shameful and barbaric colonialism immediately ....

Speech by Viriato da Cruz, Spokesman for the Angolan Delegation, Secretary General of the MPLA

The blame rests on the Portuguese colonial administration, which has always denied, and still denies, the Angolan people their right to enjoy fundamental liberties and reduces the material possibilities for an Angolan livelihood through a policy of plundering lands, low salaries, imposed systems of agricultural production, and ludicrous prices. The Portuguese colonial administration has systematically scoffed at African dignity through degrading and even bloody measures, in order to further their goal of imposing Portuguese sovereignty and realize the colonies' so-called political assimilation. Thus the slightest, most peaceful claim made by the Angolan peoples is answered with terror and barbaric massacres that, according to the colonial administrators, serve as a "lesson" for the rebellious people who oppose "civilization." To the appearance in Angola of the first nationalist pamphlets denouncing the grave injustices and asking for important changes in administrative methods in the colony, Governor General Viana Rebelo replied by publicly declaring war on Angolan nationalists as well as by opening training camps for colonist militias and by public demonstrations of napalm bomb explosions. These steps were taken to spread terror among the Africans and to foment the aggressive fear and hostility against the African people that the colonial press had aroused among the European population. For three years, arrests of African nationalists (or even suspected nationalists) have been constant in Angolan life, and they increase every day. Thousands and thousands of peaceful African men have suffered humiliations and tortures in prison or have been victims of deportation or assassination. Repression has reached all classes of the African population. When the Portuguese go so far as to arrest Monseigneur Manual das Neves, the second man in the hierarchy of the Catholic church in Angola, it strengthens our conviction that no African considered, by the colonial administration, capable of defending the just aspirations of the Angolan people remains free... Thus the Portuguese government has clearly posed the alternatives: Either we support the colonial regime or we face war. As the Angolan people cannot and will never be able to accept the colonial regime, the Portuguese government has declared war on the Angolan people. Yes, there is now war in Angola. We declare to the world that one concern, one conviction, fills the hearts of Angolan patriots. Our conviction is that war can end only with the conquest of the chief aspiration of the Angolan people--the exercise of their right to self-determination and to independence in a united, indivisible Angola.
Our greatest concern is that this war, which has been imposed upon us, end as quickly as possible; we emphasize that we infinitely prefer a peaceful, negotiated solution by arms ....

Speech by Aristides Pereira, Spokesman for Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands: Member of the Political Department of the PAIGC
To this day, no Portuguese colony has become independent. We continue, therefore, under the odious colonial-fascist domination of Portugal. Yet the character of the struggle for liberation of our countries has evolved during these recent times; great progress has been made by our peoples in their march toward dignity, liberty, and national independence. This situation can be characterized, at present, in the following manner:

a. Reinforcement of colonial Portuguese repression in all areas, a symptom of despair and confusion on the part of Portuguese colonial authorities.
b. Development and consolidation of patriotic forces, which daily become more organized and determined to conquer their independence under the direction of our party.
c. Isolation of the Portuguese colonial-fascist government. Fruitful international political activity by our party.
d. Concrete results in the organization of existing patriotic forces abroad. Training of staffs for the struggle for liberation and for the future.
e. Vigilance over those who would divide us, over opportunists, tribalists, and saboteurs of our struggle.

Yet, instead of taking a courageous attitude in fulfilling its obligations to our peoples, the Portuguese government has resorted to the means within its reach to reinforce and to try to maintain its domination over our peoples.

Speech by Adelino Gwambe, President of the UDENAMO
The first meeting of patriots of the Portuguese colonies, to study together the problems posed by the persistence of the Portuguese colonial regime and to seek the means to bring quick victory to the national emancipation movement, is extremely important for all of us. Thus, this conference will be a historic turning point in the fight of our peoples. We, the representatives of Mogambique, will work hard to increase our efforts each day. Mogambique, as everyone knows, lives in a colonial situation. Experience has made us understand that our liberation can be accomplished only by winning political power and national independence. We know that fighting is not easy. It is hard, and it demands great efforts and perseverance. But it is necessary. The people of Mogambique do not want to be born and die without having been able to live.

For some years the people of Mogambique have been organized and have been fighting in secret. Workers' strikes and revolts in several regions of the country are the expression of this liberating combat. Quite recently, in the northern village of Mueda, the regime of Salazar drowned the villagers' petitions in blood.
In the Mogambique of today, six and one-half million Africans are represented in the Legislative Council by two village chiefs, named by the governor, while seventy thousand Europeans have twenty-two representatives. In our country, the percentage of illiteracy is more than 99 percent. And a racist law divides the population into citizens which represent 1.5 percent of the population, and natives, which make up the rest.

There, quite briefly, are some of the facts of a situation characterized by economic exploitation of Africans; police, military, and political oppression; and scorn for human dignity. It is against this situation that the patriotic organizations of Mogambique are fighting. Our organization, the Unifto Democr-Itica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), has undertaken the struggle within the country. But it is trying also to assemble all those who are forced into exile in Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Rhodesia, or Kenya. Now the time has come to unite concretely our efforts with those of all our brothers in other Portuguese colonies.

Speech of Miguel Trovoada, President of the CLSTP

Portuguese colonialism, the lust and avarice of which are well enough known, has not spared the smallest portion of land from pillage and rapacity wherever it has established itself, either in Africa or in Asia. Consequently, the islands of Sto Tomé and Príncipe have been and are still a theatre of intense agricultural exploitation characterized by successive periods of monoculture. Plantation masters, in their blind anxiety over maximum, immediate profits, demand excessive efforts from the soil and the arms that cultivate it, without considering the replenishment of the respective energies, thus reaching the inevitable impoverishment of the soil and of the men and the progressive weakening of their productive potential. In this process of maintaining the greatest production, it is evident that the working people progressively decline, oppressed in the valley of famine and misery caused by the colonial administration--they become slaves serving agricultural companies.

That is why our people, aware of their situation and having been shown the ineffectiveness of passive resistance, have definitely decided to move to the offensive against foreign domination by any means at all. For this goal the Comitê de Libertaglo de Stô Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP) was born. This means that "the winds of change which are blowing in Africa," to use the expression of the English leader MacMillan, have also touched the islands of Stô Tomé and Príncipe, despite the obstinacy of Salazar in ignoring them. They are blowing like sudden trade winds ready to reverse completely the principles of exploitation and unhappiness. They are blowing to end the infectious illnesses and one of the highest mortality rates in the world (about 85 percent among infants under five years); to lighten the long night of ignorance where the people lie overwhelmed by illiteracy; to put an end to the refusal to permit them to enjoy the benefits of progress...; to put an end to the systematic importation of their brothers for forced labor on the plantations, that new form of slave trade; to end discrimination both in public and in private sectors, which

deprees and demeans well-known and competent Africans, for the benefit of the few, almost illiterate, peasants who have come from Portugal.
General Declaration
Unity--Solidarity--Cooperation

Unity

CONCP, meeting in Casablanca, April 18-20, 1961, having brought together representatives of the national liberation movements of Cabo Verde, Guiné, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, and Goa, has deeply examined the situation that prevails in the countries still subjected to the colonial domination of Portugal. The conference has shown the identity of the forms of political, economic, social, and cultural oppression that is rampant in these countries. WHEREAS the policy of the Portuguese government is characterized by the suppression of fundamental liberties in the colonies; WHEREAS the Portuguese government refuses to recognize the principle of the priority of the interests of these countries' inhabitants and, contrary to the right of the peoples to decide their own future, persists in maintaining the myth of "overseas provinces"; WHEREAS the Portuguese government, instead of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict between the peoples of these countries and the colonial administration, intensifies its fascist methods of repression against the nationalists by sending military reinforcements, by practicing genocide, and by creating theaters of war; WHEREAS this anachronistic attitude against the march of history and common sense has pushed the popular masses to use effective means for active self-defense; WHEREAS the peoples of the Portuguese colonies ardently aspire to self-determination and independence;

The CONCP:

SALUTES all the patriots who are fighting for the triumph of the cause of independence, justice, and liberty in Cabo Verde, Guiné, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Goa, and in all the other territories subjected to Portuguese colonial domination.

The CONCP:

CONVINCED of the urgent need to liberate the peoples colonized by Portugal:

PROCLAIMS UNITED ACTION OF THE NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT USING ANY MEANS NECESSARY FOR THE IMMEDIATE ELIMINATION OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND FOR LIBERATION FROM ALL FORMS OF OPPRESSION:

PLEDGES all patriots in the Portuguese colonies to mobilize themselves within their national organizations and to speed up the process of eliminating Portuguese colonialism; INVITES the various nationalist movements to group their forces in united battlefronts around an immediate objective: the elimination of Portuguese colonialism.

The CONCP:

AFFIRMING that only national independence can aid world peace and international cooperation between peoples,
AFFIRMING that the survival of Portuguese colonialism is a permanent motivation of conflicts,
MANIFESTS its support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the principles of coexistence proclaimed by the Conference of Bandung;
CONFIRMS the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Conference of African People and the Conférence de la Solidarité Afro-Asiatique;
PROCLAIMS its active solidarity with all anti-colonialist forces in the world;
APPEALS to the workers of Africa, Asia, and the entire world to refuse to unload ships going to and coming from Portugal.
In accordance with the declaration of December 14, 1960, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the CONCP:
INVITES all countries and all men who love peace and liberty to support the just cause of peoples still subjected to Portuguese colonial domination, by effectively opposing the continuation of fascist methods of repression in these countries.
The CONCP has noted with satisfaction the declaration of the Conference of African Chiefs of State, held in Casablanca, January 4-7, 1961, which proclaimed in its charter the "will to free African territories still under foreign domination, to give them aid and assistance, to eliminate all forms of colonialism and neocolonialism, to discourage foreign troops and bases, which endanger the liberation of Africa, and to act alike in exerting themselves to rid the African continent of political interventions and economic pressures."

Solidarity
The CONCP,
AFFIRMING that the fight against colonialism today is entering the final, decisive phase,
AFFIRMING that colonialisit powers, in a last attempt, have created a real front for the essential maintenance of their military and economic power in Africa and Asia,
AFFIRMING that these same powers have often resorted to such base means as assassinating leaders such as Patrice Lumumba, the hero of Africa,
REAFFIRMS its solidarity with the peoples who are waging the battle against all forms of colonialism and imperialism;
AFFIRMS, concerning Africa, its total approval of the resolution on liberating dependent peoples decreed at the Third Conference of African Peoples, held in Cairo, March 25-31, 1961;
SALUTES the heroic fight of the Algerian people for their national liberation;
RECOGNIZES the legitimate rights of Morocco to Ifni, Ceuta, and Melilla;
APPROVES the resolution on Mauritania adopted by the African Conference of Casablanca;
CONDEMNS the colonial occupation of Saharan Africa;
CONDEMNS the imperialist maneuvers in the Congo;
CONDEMNS the policy of apartheid in South Africa;
CONDEMNS the South African policy in Southwest Africa;
DEMANDS the granting of independence to the territories of Central Africa, Nyasaland, and Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Cooperation
The CONCP, after examining the present necessities of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism and with firm determination to coordinate effectively the activities of the nationalist movements in the Portuguese colonies, adopts the following measures, with a view to their immediate execution:
1. Obtaining funds, through public appeals, from organizations sympathetic to the cause of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies;
2. Mutual aid to nationalist organizations in the Portuguese colonies for rapid development of their methods of work and their means of action;
3. Consolidation of the union among nationalist organizations of each colony;
4. Appeals to nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies that have not participated in this conference to give immediate support to its principles;
5. Obtaining the means for self-defense, in order to maintain the resistance of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies;
6. Obtaining medical assistance and the necessary means of subsistence for the victims of Portuguese colonial aggression;
7. Action to inform the Portuguese people of the justice of the colonial peoples' struggle;
8. Concrete support of the Portuguese democratic movement and establishment of useful relations with Portuguese democratic organizations;
9. Permanent publicity of all kinds to mobilize world public opinion;
10. Cooperation with democratic and anti-colonialist movements in all countries;
11. Measures in each country for campaigns and public manifestations of protest against the violation of the rights of man and the atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese colonial administration, as well as demand for the immediate liberation of all political prisoners;
12. Execution of all measures concerning the international economic and diplomatic boycott of Portugal.
Resolution on Angola
The CONCP, after having studied the recent developments in Angola,
WHEREAS the Portuguese government, by its well-known policy of total suppression of fundamental liberties, has not permitted the Angolan peoples free expression of their just aspirations to independence;
WHEREAS the Portuguese government has refused to consider the proposals for peaceful solution of the colonial problem in Angola, contained in the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) Declaration of June 13, 1960;
WHEREAS, since 1959, high-ranking officials of the Portuguese government have issued, in both Portugal and Angola, public declarations of war against Angolan nationalists, and Portuguese colonialism has reinforced these declarations with a buildup of its military apparatus and propaganda in an attempt to aggravate the tension and hostility felt by the Portuguese population in Angola toward the Angolan people, with an accompanying recrudescence of a terror campaign directed against the Angolan people and consisting of persecutions, imprisonments, trials, and arbitrary deportations of Angolan patriots and some
foreigners sympathizing with the cause of the liberation of Angola, and, finally, massacres of peaceful and unarmed people;

SALUTES the general insurrection of the valiant people of Angola since the events of Luanda last February;

APPEALS to all parties and political movements as well as to all popular organizations in Angola to rapidly show their united action in the common struggle against Portuguese colonialism and to guarantee the unity of the Angolan people through a united, solid coalition;

RECOMMENDS that the people and all Angolan patriots maintain the greatest vigilance over the neocolonialist maneuvers intended to sidetrack the struggle of the Angolan people from the true objective of independence, to provoke divisions among the people, and to dismember the country or to install puppet governments;

APPEALS to all colonial army soldiers in Portuguese colonies of Africa and Asia to unite their weapons with those of their Angolan brothers, who will, without restriction, give them a brotherly welcome;

APPEALS to all natives of Portuguese colonies of Africa and Asia living or working in Angola to support the just struggle of the people or, at least, to observe a neutral position favoring this struggle;

APPEALS to all anticolonialist organizations and personages to arouse world opinion to demand the liberation of all political prisoners in Angola, in particular Dr. Agostinho Neto and Ilidio Machado, leaders of the MPLA;

IS INDIGNANT at the outrages committed by the Portuguese colonial police, who have victimized the Angolan clergy, as shown by the recent arrest of Mgr. das Neves, former Vicar General of the Archepiscopal Diocese of Luanda, and the deportation without trial of the former Chancellor, Rev. P. Pinto de Andrade, to the island of Príncipe;

SUPPORTS fully the resolution on Angola approved by the Third Conference of African Peoples, held in Cairo on March 25-31, and confirmed by the fourth session of the Afro-Asian Council held in Bandoeng, April 10-14, 1961;

APPEALS urgently to the peoples of bordering nations to actively support the struggle of the Angolan people, and also to paralyze all the maneuvers that could act to the detriment of the struggle of the Angolan people in their respective countries;

SUPPORTS the measures of the United Nations members, especially the speeches in which countries of the Afro-Asian bloc demand that the international organization take immediate and effective steps to make Portugal apply the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries" in Angola and that an immediate end be put to the genocide toward which Portuguese colonialism is now proceeding in Angola;

ASKS urgently that the Afro-Asian nations remain vigilant in case of eventual intervention by the United Nations in Angola and that they guard against presently taking a position that might later oblige them to sanction imperialist maneuvers.
and thus endanger the unity of the people, the integrity of the territory, and the exercise of democracy within the framework of authentic independence for which the Angolan people are fighting;

RECOMMENDS that the executive bodies of the organization born of this conference mobilize world opinion in favor of the liberation of Angola and arouse active solidarity with the Angolan people on the part of all peoples.

Resolution on Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands

The CONCP, after analyzing the present situation of the peoples of Portuguese Guinea and Cabo Verde, according to the report presented by the Partido Africano da Independência (PAIGC),

DENOUNCES once more the massacres, assassinations, and tortures in Portuguese Guinea and the starvation of tens of thousands of persons in Cabo Verde;

DENOUNCES the secret attempts now made by the Portuguese government to establish new forms of colonialism in these countries, aided by the treason of certain Africans;

DENOUNCES the imperialist plots against the struggle and freedom of the peoples of Guinea and Cabo Verde;

DENOUNCES the favorable concessions made by the Portuguese government to foreign capital as well as the creation of NATO military bases in these countries;

APPEALS to these peoples to establish a solid union among themselves and with the peoples of other Portuguese colonies to achieve the rapid, total liquidation of colonial domination;

APPEALS to all independent African and Asian nations to give immediate, concrete support to the peoples of Guinea and Cabo Verde in their struggle for liberation, for the rapid liquidation, by any means necessary, of Portuguese colonialism, and for the prevention of any attempt to establish neocolonialism in these territories.

Resolution on Mozambique

The CONCP, meeting in Casablanca, April 18-20, 1961, after having proceeded to a concrete and profound study of the situation in Mozambique, and with the agreement of the União Democrática Nacional de Mozambique (UDENAMO),

CONDEMNS colonial oppression under which the African population of Mozambique is living, an oppression characterized especially by:

--the systematic practice of forced labor;
--the shameful exploitation of African labor; --the total absence of civil and human rights;
--the cultural obscurantism in which the African population is held;

DENOUNCES the economic agreements between Portugal and the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the results of which constitute a human and economic loss for Mozambique;

AFFIRMS the inalienable right of the people of Mozambique to self-determination d to national independence;

REBELS against the repression of which the patriots of Mozambique are the victims;
REBELS against the barbaric methods of repression used by the Portuguese authorities, a recent example of which is the massacre of Mueda;
REBELS against the military preparations that the Portuguese government is currently making to strangle the popular patriotic movement;
REBELS against the maneuvers of the Portuguese government to install a racial dictatorship like that of South Africa;
REBELS against the pacts and alliances between Portugal and the Union of South Africa and the Rhodesias, make a commitment for Mogambique without the free consent of the people of Mogambique;
REBELS against the use of soldiers of Mogambique in the wars against our brothers in other countries under Portuguese colonial domination;
SUPPORTS the people of Mogambique in their fight for emancipation and encourages them to continue the struggle, united, for the liquidation of colonialism and the conquest of national independence;
APPEALS to the United Nations to condemn vigorously and through concrete measures the Portuguese government's colonial policy concerning the principle of the rights of peoples to decide their own future, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration of December 14, 1960, in order to prevent Mogambique's becoming a theater of war and thus constituting a threat to international peace and security.

Resolution on São Tomé and Príncipe
The CONCP, meeting for the first time in Casablanca, April 18-20, 1961, after having analyzed the situation of São Tomé and Príncipe, which is characterized by the maintenance of forced labor in the agricultural lands, by aggravation of the already miserable living conditions of the African population, rendering its existence more and more difficult, and by the intensification of repression against the patriots of these countries,
ASKS for the exclusion of Portugal from the International Labor Organization;
DENOUNCES the maneuvers to create a climate of hostility between the African inhabitants and their brothers of Angola, Mogambique, and Cabo Verde for the sole purpose of dividing the forces of the people and hindering unity of action against the common enemy;
ENCOURAGES the nationalist struggle of the people of São Tomé and Principe;
DECLARRES its total support of the Comité de Libertagão de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), the organization of active forces in this colony, whose struggle is a positive contribution to the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.

Resolution on Portuguese Opposition
The CONCP, meeting in Casablanca, April 18-20, 1961,
RECOGNIZING that the Portuguese people find themselves under the oppression of a fascist government;
RECOGNIZING that such a situation is unnatural and does not permit the dissemination of free information concerning the problems of the Portuguese colonies;
ASSURES the Portuguese people of its total support in the struggle they are waging to free themselves from the fascist regime and to install a democratic regime in Portugal;
ENCOURAGES the Portuguese democratic movement to reinforce its unity in order to achieve the rapid victory of the cause of democracy;
DECLARES that the fight of the peoples still under Portuguese domination is directed, not against the Portuguese people, but toward the total liquidation of the colonial system;
DECLARES that the organizations participating in the conference are open to constructive dialogue and are ready to cooperate effectively with the true representatives of the Portuguese democratic movement on the basis of solemn recognition of the rights of the people of the Portuguese colonies to self-determination and to national independence.
Resolution on the United Nations
The CONCP,
POINTING OUT that the systematic refusal of the Portuguese government to carry out the United Nations' resolutions on the Portuguese colonies is an attempt to undermine the prestige of this organization and has no plausible justification;
CONVINCED that this persistent scandal within the United Nations is due to other nations' support of Portuguese colonialism as well as to a frequent failure to understand the consequences of the lack of application of the United Nations' resolutions on Portuguese colonialism;
ASKS urgently that the United Nations take immediate, concrete measures to oblige Portugal to comply with the declaration of December 14, 1960, concerning the granting of independence to colonial peoples;
EXPRESSES the great indignation of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies at the behavior of the United Nations members, who have not yet shown effective proof of their desire for the immediate application of this declaration concerning the Portuguese colonies;
DEMANDS that the planned subcommission, which would conduct an inquiry into the Angolan situation, according to the proposal of the Afro-Asian nations, be created and invested with full powers to permit it to freely collect proof of the barbaric actions perpetrated by the Portuguese colonial administration.
Joint Declaration of the MPLA and the PAIGC
The Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA) and the Partido Africano da IndependIncia da Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), meeting in Casablanca, April 21, 1961, declare:
1. That the creation of the Frente Revolucion--ria Africana para a Independencia Nacional das Colônias Portuguesas (FRAIN) has had positive results and has made a great contribution to the common struggle against Portuguese colonialism;
2. That, by virtue of the creation of the CONCP, whose program supersedes that of the FRAIN, the latter hereby ceases to exist.
Resolutions of the Second Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas,
Dar es Salaam, October 3-8, 1965

President of the Second Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas:
Agostinho Neto

II. Secretariat:
Mário de Andrade
Marcelino dos Santos
Amalia Fonseca Aquino Braganga

III. Delegations:
CLSTP (Comitê de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe)
Tomds Medeiros--Chief of the Delegation
Guadalupe Ceita
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
Eduardo Mondlane--Chief of the Delegation
Uria T. Simango
Filipe Magaia
Lourenço Mutaca Uzaro Kavandane
Mateus Mutemba Pascial Mocumbi
Mahomed Khan
Ana Raposo
Jorge Rebelo
Anunciago Simlo Matola
Francisco Sumbane
Samora Machel
MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
Agostinho Neto--Chief of the Delegation
Daniet Chipenda Luís de Azevedo
Anibal de Melo Nicolau Spencer Luís de Almeida
Edmundo Rocha
PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
Amilcar Cabral--Chief of the Delegation
Vasco Cabral Victor Maria Abflio Duarte
José Aradijo
UDEMU (União Democrática das Mulheres da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
Lucette Andrade
UNTG (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné)
Jolo Tomás Cabral

IV. Fraternal Delegation:
UNEMO (União Nacional dos Estudantes Mogambicanos)
Jolo Nhambiu--Chief of the Delegation
Joaquim Chissano

V. Guest of Honor:
FNL (South Vietnam)
Nguyen Van Tien
VI. Observers:
USSR (Comitê de Solidariedade Afro-Asiatica)
Nicolai Bazanov Peter Ivfioukov
German Democratic Republic (Comitê de Solidariedade Afro-Asiatica)
Heinrich Eggbrecht
Peoples' Republic of China (Comitê de Solidariedade Afro-Asiatica)
Liao Keng
Chou Lou-Ming
Republic of Guinde
His Excellency Ambassador Bocar Biro Barry
Portugal (FPLN -- Frente Patriótica de Libertaglo Nacional)
Ramos de Almeida
Rui Cabegadas
Yugoslavia (Alianga Socialista do Povo Trabalhador da Yugoslavia)
Rabic Dimitrite
Algeria (FLN -- Frente de Libertagao Nacional)
S. E. Moghraoui
Italy (Comitê Anti-colonialista Italiana)
Giovani Sembardini Bini, M. P.
World Peace Council
Jersiv Savcik

General Declaration
The Second Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP) met in Dar es Salaam, capital of the United Republic of Tanzania, October 3-8, 1965, in the presence of thirty-four delegates representing the following political and popular organizations:
-- CLSTP (Comité de Libertaglo de Só Tomé e Príncipe)
-- FRELIMO (Frente de Libertaglo de Moçambique)
-- MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola)
-- PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
-- UNTG (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné)
-- UDEMU (União Democrática das Mulheres da Guiné e Cabo Verde)

At this historic and crucial moment in the struggle for total liquidation of Portuguese colonialism, the Second Conference solemnly salutes the heroic fighters of Angola, Guiné, Cabo Verde, Moçambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. After thorough analysis of the present status and the internal dynamics of our peoples' struggle, the Second Conference has established more effective forms of cooperation, particularly in the politico-military sphere and in national reconstruction, and has decided upon concerted action at the African, Afro-Asian, and international levels. Furthermore, taking into consideration the present demands of the movement for liberation in our countries, the Second Conference has decided to reorganize its unique structuring.
Since the Constitutive Conference, held in Casablanca, Morocco, in April 1961, news of the victories over Portuguese colonialism, under the enlightened leadership of the CONCP member organizations, has been received abroad with the active sympathy that the peoples of Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe deserve. The emergence of armed fighting, which is now being waged along three fronts and is based on mobilization of the popular masses, postulates the attainment of our peoples' aspirations to real and complete independence.

The Second Conference, after examining the international situation, which is basically characterized by increasing imperialist aggression, and in view of the support for the fight of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, believes that the movement toward national liberation in the Portuguese colonies is an integral part of the general struggle of all these peoples for their emancipation from colonialis, imperialist, and neocolonialist domination.

As a result, the Second Conference expresses its active solidarity with all peoples fighting against classic or neocolonialism and against imperialism, especially with the people of Vietnam, the Congo, and Arabic Palestine. The Conference salutes the heroic people of Cuba and encourages them in their defense of the conquests attained through their revolution.

The Second Conference declares that the natural alliance of movements for national liberation with the forces of the socialist world or with other progressive forces will hasten the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism.

The Conference has analyzed the actions of the United Nations regarding the execution of Resolution 1514-XV, of December 14, 1960, on the concession of independence to colonial nations and peoples. It has confirmed that, in spite of the isolation in which Portugal finds itself within this world organization, the United Nations has not yet shown that it is able to command respect for its resolutions from the Portuguese government and its allies, which continue to lend aid and assistance to the colonial war.

The Conference congratulates the United Nations Special Committee of Twenty-four, for its resolution of June 11, 1965, which recognizes the legitimacy of the armed fight of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies.

In the event that the Portuguese government should continue the colonial war in Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique, the Second Conference hereby places on the Portuguese government all responsibility for any and all forms that war may take regarding the destruction of bases and Portuguese supply lines to them.

The Second Conference congratulates its delegates for the spirit of solidarity and open collaboration that characterized their work and that produced tangible results through the unanimous acceptance of their resolutions.

First Commission
Politico-Military Questions
Declaration on Unity

Unity of objectives and action among the various nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies within the CONCP has been revealed as an essential factor in the acceleration of the fight for national liberation.
At the National Level:

a. Unity is being attained through the mobilization of victims of colonial exploitation and domination from all social strata in a single battlefront against the common enemy.

b. Unity among the political and popular organizations--labor unions, women's organizations, youth organizations, and student organizations--led by the political movements of the respective countries, stimulates the creative initiative of workers, women, and young people and is contributing to the integration of the various areas of activity in national life into that single battlefront. Unity among the fighting fronts in the various countries at the level of the shared struggle against Portuguese colonialism is based on an internal union around the organizations that are leading the fight in each country, a union that is materialized by

the existence of the CONCP. In reality, the CONCP functions as a catalytic and dynamic agent for uniting the forces of our peoples in the fight against Portuguese colonialism, and it reinforces unity at the internal level.

Consolidation of the unity of objectives demands action, in the sense of constant reinforcement of the unitary spirit and in the sense of revolutionary vigilance, in order to destroy all the enemy's attempts at divisive maneuvers aimed at opening rifts in our single battlefront through antagonisms of a tribal or social nature.

Resolution on General Coordination at the Politico-Military Level

Considering the identical political positions of the member organizations of the CONCP,

Considering the similarity of armed action being undertaken on the three fighting fronts,

Considering the constant need to intensify and accelerate the process leading to total liquidation of the Portuguese colonial system,

The Second Conference has decided:

a. To coordinate the political actions of its member organizations;

b. To coordinate military actions in the sense of intensifying the rhythm of armed combat;

c. To establish a common military strategy through specialized agencies;

d. To tighten cooperation among the member organizations in all ways, particularly with respect to the initiatives already carried out and in the sphere of activities complementary to the armed fight--education and culture, training of leaders, and sanitation assistance;

e. To study the possibility of new initiatives of common military action against the bases and supply lines of the colonial war, should it be prolonged.

Resolution on National Reconstruction

Considering the determination of the nationalist organizations to translate the aspirations of the popular masses into a life of progress and social well-being,

Considering that the attainment of those aspirations requires the consolidation of political independence and the conquest of economic independence,
Considering the prime and immediate necessity of bringing about radical changes that, in addition to leading to the breakdown of the colonialist structures within the areas already liberated from colonial domination, simultaneously intensify the development of the armed fight,

Considering the necessity for building our countries into modern nations, The Second Conference has decided:

a. To exchange leaders among the various organizations;
b. To encourage the creation of specialized agencies to plan the necessary tasks in the different spheres of national reconstruction;
c. To study the means by which cooperation among our countries will be assured after the conquest of national independence.

Guind and Cabo Verde

The popular masses and all the social classes of Guind and Cabo Verde, united under the leadership of their national organization—the PAIGC—have made considerable progress in their fight for liberation against Portuguese colonialism. In Guind, during about two years of general armed fighting, almost half of the national territory was liberated from the Portuguese yoke, and the action of the Forgas Armadas Revolucionarias do Povo is becoming more vigorous every day. The colonialist forces are on the defensive, and Portuguese occupation is limited almost exclusively to urban areas. In the zones not yet liberated, the armed action of the PAIGC fighters is being intensified and extended to new areas of the country. A new life is being constructed in the liberated regions with a view to rapid and solid betterment of economic, social, and cultural conditions among the people of Guiné. In its present situation, Guiné, where the PAIGC is developing new structures for the administration of the liberated regions, can, in effect, be considered a state, part of whose national territory (namely, the principal urban centers) is occupied by foreign military forces. This situation is special, and its favorable evolution can hasten the process of liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

In Cabo Verde, where difficulties, especially of a geographical nature, have not permitted so rapid an evolution of the fight for liberation as has taken place in Guiné, important progress has been made in the last two years with regard to the mobilization and political organization of the popular masses. The present situation shows that political conditions must mature before the fight can enter the next phase. Under the leadership of the PAIGC, the people of Cabo Verde are actively preparing themselves to unleash armed action against the occupational forces, the only recourse remaining within their reach to achieve the liberation of the archipelago from the colonial yoke.

The Second Conference:

Having analyzed objectively the conditions that characterize the true status of the fight for liberation in Guiné and Cabo Verde:

a. Congratulates the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde and their national fighting organization, the PAIGC, for the important victories attained in their fight for national liberation, which represent a singular contribution to the hastening of
the liberation of the peoples in countries still subjected to the Portuguese colonial yoke;
b. Encourages the PAIGC to intensify in Guinea both the armed fight being waged to complete the liberation of the country and the economic, social, and cultural reconstruction of liberated regions, and to unleash direct action against the colonialismand forces in the Cape Verde Islands at the opportune moment;
c. Makes an urgent appeal to the independent nations of Africa and to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to give special attention to the case of Guinea and to give the PAIGC all the political, moral, and material aid necessary to hasten the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in that country;
d. Proclaims its unconditional support for any measures that the PAIGC may deem necessary at the political level in order to consolidate the conquests of the struggle in Guinea and to bring the international legal situation of the people of Guinea into harmony with the real situation of these people within their own country.

São Tomé e Príncipe

Considering the policy of obscurantism and exploitation carried out by the Portuguese government in São Tomé and Príncipe, as seen especially in the maintenance of forced labor in the country.
Considering the policy of repression and the growing intensification of the Portuguese government’s execution of that policy, through the PIDE and the colonial army, with the objective of crushing the just aspirations of the peoples of São Tomé and Príncipe to self-determination and independence,
Considering the tradition of battle and the effective contribution now being made by the people of São Tomé and Príncipe in their struggle against Portuguese colonialist occupation,
The CONCP has decided:
a. To salute and to support, by every means, the fight of the people of São Tomé and Príncipe for their liberation and total independence;
b. To appeal to all African nations and to all anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist organizations in the world for concrete aid in the fight for national liberation being waged by the people of São Tomé and Príncipe.

Angola

Considering that the MPLA is the only Angolan nationalist force effectively waging armed combat against retrogressive Portuguese colonialism,
Considering that it is becoming necessary to break the shackles that impede the harmonious and rapid development of the fight of the Angolan people,

Considering that the MPLA is incontestably the political organization that represents Angolan society in its entirety,
The Second Conference:
a. Supports totally the fight for liberation of the heroic people of Angola under the leadership of the Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola (MPLA);
b. Appeals to the Comitê de Libertação da África to give material aid for Angola exclusively to the MPLA, the nationalist organization actively fighting to defend the true interests of the Angolan people;
c. Appeals to the nations bordering Angola to lend all their support and facilities to the MPLA for the development of armed fighting for national liberation, especially with regard to allowing the free circulation of goods and material, a step necessary to the progress of the fight;
d. Exhorts the heads of African nations and the OAU to make, in the interest of the peoples of Angola and Africa, a courageous review of their recognition of the legality of the so-called Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio (GRAE), an agency in a state of complete disintegration, which, through its anti-nationalistic acts, constitutes the greatest obstacle to the development of the armed fight and to unify within the Angolan movement for national liberation;
e. Calls to the attention of African leaders the attitude of the present government of the Congo (L`opoldville), which forbids all MPLA activities within its territory—an action contrary to the resolutions adopted by the OAU concerning free action by nationalist movements recognized by the Comité dos 9.

Mogambique

The Second Conference:
a. Reiterates its condemnation of the retrograde and criminal policy of the fascist colonial government of Portugal, which is imposing war upon the people of Mogambique;
b. Salutes the armed fight of the heroic people of Mogambique against Portuguese colonialism and for the conquest of national independence;
c. Reaffirms its total support for the people of Mogambique and for the organization leading them: Frente de Libertacao de Mogambique (FRELIMO);
d. Appeals urgently to the independent nations of Africa, to all nations that cherish peace and freedom, and to all the forces of progress to give unconditional support to FRELIMO, with the aim of solving the urgent problems created by armed fighting and the imperative needs of national reconstruction;
e. Denounces the coalition of the governments of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal, which aims at imposing white supremacy in southern Africa;
f. Denounces the cooperation between the Portuguese police in Mogambique and the English police in Swaziland and Rhodesia that has already permitted the kidnapping of several Mogambican nationalists living in either Swaziland or Rhodesia;
g. Appeals to world groups to demand the liberation of all Mogambican patriots unjustly detained in colonialist prisons.

Second Commission
Foreign Affairs

On Portugal and the Portuguese Democratic Opposition

Considering that the Portuguese government, scorning international legalities, continues its refusal to recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples of Angola, Guiné, Cabo Verde, Mogambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe,
Considering that the development of the anti-fascist fight in Portugal constitutes appreciable support for the national liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies,
The Second Conference:
a. Reiterates that armed combat is the only means of fulfilling the just aspirations of peoples under Portuguese colonial domination;
b. Salutes and encourages the Portuguese democratic opposition in its fight against the fascist regime;
c. Declares that the CONCP is ready to strengthen its relations with the Portuguese democratic opposition on the basis of mutual benefits.

On African Unity
Having made a detailed analysis of the African state of affairs,
The Second Conference:
a. Reaffirms the dedication of our peoples to the cause of African unity, which is considered a means of accelerating the achievement of total liberty and of implementing progress for the peoples of Africa;
b. Proclaims its enthusiastic support for the OAU;
c. Condemns all attempts to create political pressure groups, within the OAU or outside it, whose negative actions aim at impeding the march of the African people toward an indispensable unity, a resistance to foreign domination, and a victory over backwardness;
d. Denounces and condemns imperialist maneuvers to foment division among African nations, to sabotage the concrete prospects for realization of African unity that sprang from the historic Conference of Addis Ababa and are clearly expressed in the OAU Charter;
e. Assures the African nations sincerely and objectively dedicated to the cause of African unity of its active solidarity.

On African Aid to Movements for National Liberation
Having examined the procedures followed by the Committee of Liberation of the OAU in fulfilling the mission with which it was charged by the historic Conference of Addis Ababa,
The Second Conference:
a. Congratulates the Committee of African Liberation for the steps it has already taken, in less than two years of existence, to assist (financially and materially) the movements for national liberation;
b. Appeals urgently to the African nations to faithfully observe all the decisions made at Addis Ababa regarding concrete aid to movements for national liberation;
c. Denounces and condemns all maneuvers tending to exert pressure within the Committee of Liberation or within the OAU that would hinder the recognition of nationalist organizations, which are proven leaders of the struggles of our respective peoples;
d. Considers urgent the necessity to reorganize the Committee of Liberation so as to give it greater efficacy in attaining the objectives consecrated in the OAU Charter;
e. Demands reconsideration of the decision made by the OAU regarding Angolan
nationalism by which the so-called Gov-erno Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exflio was precipitously and prejudicially recognized;
f. Demands that the Committee of Liberation definitely resolve within the OAU the question of the solemn recognition of the PAIGC as the fighting organization of the people of Guiné and Cabo Verde. The PAIGC, exclusively, must be granted the necessary means for reinforcing its actions.

On Bordering Nations
Considering the importance of the attitude of the bordering nations with respect to the armed fight for national liberation in the Portuguese colonies,
The Second Conference:
a. Extends a brotherly salute to those nations bordering the countries fighting against Portuguese colonialism that have proved their concrete solidarity with that fight;
b. Encourages those nations to develop their solidarity and action in accordance with the growing needs of the fight against the Portuguese colonialists;
c. Sends an urgent appeal to the bordering nations that hesitate to support the armed fight for national liberation to revise their positions and to give the fighting organizations of the Portuguese colonies all the facilities necessary for reinforcing their action against the Portuguese colonialist forces;
d. Proclaims the great respect held by the member organizations of the CONCP for the sovereignty of the bordering states and for the principle of noninter-
vention in the internal problems of those nations;
e. Denounces and condemns the attitude of each and every bordering nation that, aware of the especially difficult battle conditions under which the peoples of the Portuguese colonies fight, impedes the actions and movements of the organizations in combat in their national territory, practices repressive acts against them, confiscates their weapons, or, as is the case with regard to the Congo (Léopoldville) and Angola, actually connives with Portuguese colonialists.

On South Africa
Taking into consideration the urgent nature of the problems facing the peoples of South Africa, which are closely connected with the fight for liberation of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies,
The Second Conference:
a. Reaffirms its unconditional support for the peoples and the true nationalistic organizations in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Southwest Africa, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, in their struggle against imperialism and domination;
b. Appeals urgently to the African nations, and to all progressive forces in the world, to proceed actively to an economic and diplomatic boycott of the abominable regime of "apartheid" that dominates the African peoples of South Africa;
c. Denounces anti-African alliances that aim at perpetuating white domination in South Africa and the subversive maneuvers made to undermine the conscience and economy of the African nations through financial investment in the Union of South Africa;
d. Appeals to the United Nations and to the OAU to take all the measures within their power to destroy the threat to peace and security in Africa, and in the world, that is represented by imperialist actions and by racism in South Africa;
e. Declares that the CONCP, both as a whole and through its member organizations, is ready to cooperate with South African nationalist and anti-imperialist organizations in studying methods for establishing solid coordination of efforts in the common fight for liberation.

On Other Dependent Countries

Considering the liberation of African peoples who, like those of the Portuguese colonies, are still under foreign yoke to be an indispensable condition for the security, liberty, and progress of all African nations,
The Second Conference:

a. Reaffirms its fighting solidarity with the peoples of African countries still subjected to the colonial yoke, regardless of the dimensions and geographic conditions of those countries;
b. Encourages nationalist movements in those countries to reinforce their actions and to use all means necessary to free their people from the colonialist yoke;
c. Appeals to African nations and to the OAU to assist the peoples of those countries in every way possible, with a view to accelerating the process of their decolonization;
d. Condemns neocolonialist maneuvers that use false concessions, as in the case of Equatorial Guinea, in an attempt to paralyze the fight for the national liberation of the African peoples.

On the Congo

Considering that the struggle of the Congolese peoples for their independence and progress is of prime importance for Africa in general and is contributing greatly to the rapid liquidation of Portuguese colonialism, the Second Conference:

a. Pays deep homage to the memory of Patrice Lumumba, patriot and martyr of an Africa fighting for its national liberation;
b. Salutes the Congolese patriots who took up arms to free their fatherland from the imperialist and neocolonialist yoke and encourages them to redouble their efforts to develop an armed fight for national liberation;
c. Proclaims its disgust for the traitor Tshombe and all African agents of imperialism that are operating in the Congo against the interests of their own people and against Africa.

Motions

On the Republic of Guinea

From the information furnished to the Conference by the PAIGC, in which reference is made to the evolution and present situation of the armed fight for national liberation in Guinea, the Second Conference declares, regarding foreign aid for that fight, that:
The people of the Republic of Guinea, their government, and their national party, the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), have given their fullest attention to the armed fight of the people of Guinea and have reinforced their solidarity with that
fight. In showing their active solidarity, the people of the Republic of Guinea spared no effort or even sacrifice, which proves their awareness of their responsibilities with regard to the fight of their neighbors and brothers, the people of Guinea.

Keeping in mind this declaration, the Second Conference:

a. Salutes the people, the government, and the PDG, especially its president, Sekou Touré, and gives them warm recognition for their concrete aid to the people of Guinea through their fighting organization, the PAIGC;

b. Expresses the wishes of our peoples regarding the attainment, by the people of the Republic of Guinea, of continual success in constructing a life of peace, of work, and of social justice under the leadership of the PDG and against all the enemies of Africa.

On the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)

The social revolution in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), begun during the glorious days of August 13, 14, and 15, 1963, is a historic fact that is recognized not only within the country itself. The lesson it teaches should be remembered by the entire African continent, for it shows the heights that a people can reach when they are ready to die for the triumph of the cause of justice and dignity.

The Second Conference:

a. Salutes warmly the people, the government, and the Movimento Nacional da Revolução (MNR), led by President Alphonse Massamba-Debat;

b. Expresses its deepest acknowledgment of the brotherly solidarity they have extended to the Angolan people and their vanguard movement—the MPLA—in their fight against colonialism and imperialism;

c. Manifests its sympathy, solidarity, and unconditional support for the fight being waged for the progress and well-being of their brothers in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), despite the constant provocations of international imperialism.

On the Republic of Zambia

The unique circumstances under which the people of the Republic of Zambia rose to independence allows appreciation for the political phenomena that ordinarily are not present in our territories; one phenomenon to which reference should be made is the tension arising from the political situation in the colonialist and racist nations that surround it.

It is, therefore, only just to recognize:

a. The patriotic dedication of their leaders in creating conditions indispensable for the consolidation of national independence;

b. The awareness, shown by the same leaders, of their responsibilities in supporting the struggle for liberation of their brothers still under colonial domination.

Considering these factors, the Second Conference:

a. Salutes the people, the government, and the United National Independence Party, especially its president, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda;

b. Expresses its acknowledgment of the aid given to the struggle of the peoples of
the Portuguese colonies through the vanguard organization, the MPLA;
c. Assures active solidarity of its member organizations with the struggle for the
well-being of their brothers in Zambia.

Resolutions
On the Allies of Portugal
Considering that the Portuguese colonialist government could not face a colonial
war on three fronts against the peoples of the Portuguese colonies unless it had the
moral, political, economic, financial, technical, and material support of its allies,
namely, the United States of America, the West German Federal Republic, Great
Britain, France, and Japan,
Considering that that aid constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations
resolution on colonialism in general and on the Portuguese colonies in particular,
since it is contrary to the inalienable right of the peoples to self-determination and
to independence,
Considering that since furnishing Portugal with supplies continues the colonial
war, it is defined as complicity in that war,
The Second Conference:
a. Denounces and condemns the allies of Portugal who are giving aid to the
Portuguese colonialists in Guiné, Angola, and Mogambique;
b. Proclaims that no circumstance can justify or extenuate the responsibility of
Portugal's allies for their complicity in the crimes committed by the Portuguese
colonialists against the colonial peoples;
c. Declares that no attempt by Portugal's allies to establish themselves in countries
still under Portuguese colonial domination can overcome the determination and
the vigilance of the peoples fighting for their real and complete independence;
d. Declares that the participation of the allies of Portugal in the colonial war,
through the criminal supplying of material utilized against the colonial peoples,
will inevitably be reflected in future relations between the peoples of the present
Portuguese colonies and the countries allied with Portugal;
e. Reaffirms the determination of the peoples in the Portuguese colonies to
proceed with their just fight for national liberation until total liquidation of
Portuguese colonialism has been achieved, no matter what aid Portugal may
receive
from its allies.

On Vietnam
Verifying that the heroic people of Vietnam are the victims of a cowardly war of
aggression being forced upon them by North American imperialists,

Verifying the criminal methods used in that war by the aggressive forces of the
United States of America, namely, systematic bombardment of the towns and the
use of weapons condemned by international conventions, such as germ warfare
and the use of poisonous gases,
Verifying and considering the violation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by the
United States government, its agents, and the reactionary forces within it,
Considering the inalienable right of all peoples to liberty, to national independence, and to the free choice of their institutions,
Considering the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as victims of the war of aggression through systematic and massive bombing of civilian populations, schools, hospitals, etc.,
Considering that the struggle of the heroic people of Vietnam is a positive contribution to the fight for liberation of all peoples, especially those of the Portuguese colonies,
Considering that so-called "proposals for negotiation" made by the United States are nothing more than a maneuver designed to camouflage and to justify the nature of the aggression and the continuation of the warlike acts of the American imperialists against all the people of Vietnam,
The Second Conference:
a. Greets with enthusiasm the heroic fight of the people of South Vietnam under the enlightened leadership of the FLN, their only guide and legitimate representative;
b. Supports unconditionally the FLN declaration of March 22, 1965, which it considers the only valid basis for solving the problem of South Vietnam;
c. Reiterates the appeal of the popular assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (RDV) and approves the ten points contained in it;
d. Condemns vigorously the barbaric war of aggression of the American imperialists and of their agents, both at home and abroad, against the people of North and South Vietnam;
e. Demands immediate and fullest respect on the part of the United States for the Geneva Agreement of 1954;
f. Demands the immediate cessation of the criminal "escalation" against the RDV, the rapid withdrawal of all American and other troops and of all civilian and military personnel from the country, and the dismantling of all bases used for military aggression;
g. Considers that the solution of the problem of Vietnam is entirely up to the people of that country, who must sovereignly and without foreign intervention decide upon their own destinies;
h. Honors the victims of the imperialist aggression and repression practiced by reactionary forces at home;

i. Appeals to all the peoples, to all the progressive organizations, to all the governments desiring peace and liberty, and to American public opinion to condemn unequivocably the unjustified war of aggression and repression being waged by the American government against the peaceful and heroic people of all Vietnam, and to give all their material and moral support to the FLN and [sic.] South Vietnam;
j. Assures the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the support of the CONCP and its member organizations in the sacred fight of the RDV to defend the sovereignty, national independence, and integrity of Vietnam.

On the Tri-Continental Conference
Considering the historic importance of solidarity among the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which is based on similar social conditions as well as on the common determination to liquidate colonialism and imperialism, The Second Conference:

a. Salutes the Fourth Conference of the Organization of Solidarity with Afro-Asian Peoples, held in Winneba, for its decision to convocate the Tri-Continental Conference;

b. Expresses its confidence in the success of the first assembly of the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America;

c. Ardently hopes that this Conference will promote closer cooperation among the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and will permit the development of combined action in the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.

Third Commission
Resolution on the Reports of Activities and of the Permanent Secretariat
The Second CONCP (held in Dar es Salaam on October 3-8, 1965), after examining and discussing the reports of activities and of the administration for the period between the first and second conferences, has decided:

a. To manifest its satisfaction with the technical presentation;

b. To approve these documents without reserve.

Resolution on Reorganization
Considering the changes resulting from developments in the struggle for liberation in our countries—Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique—that are engaged in armed fighting against Portuguese colonialism,
Considering what is needed to develop the struggle for liberation in Cabo Verde and in São Tomé and Príncipe,
Considering the similarity in the objectives and action of our organizations and the necessity for close coordination in the politico-military sphere and in national reconstruction as factors decisive in hastening the final downfall of the Portuguese colonial system, in consolidating political independence, and in creating conditions for real economic independence,
Considering the imperative need to adapt the structures that have existed until now to the new circumstances determined by the present situation in our countries in Africa and in the world,

The Second Conference has decided:

—To reorganize itself radically, a decision implemented by the adoption of new statutes.

Special Motions
Motion on Morocco
Considering that the Kingdom of Morocco has warmly welcomed the headquarters of the CONCP since its Constitutive Conference,
Considering the concrete aid that the Kingdom of Morocco has always given to the movements for national liberation in the Portuguese colonies,

The Second Conference:
a. Salutes the people of Morocco for the solidarity they have always shown in the fight for national liberation of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies;
b. Expresses deepest gratitude to His Majesty Hassan II and his government.

Motion on the United Republic of Tanzania
The Second Conference:
Considering the determination of the government and the people of the United Republic of Tanzania to help the movements for liberation in the Portuguese colonies and to help all peoples still under colonial domination,
Considering that the government of Tanzania, under President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, has always worked to develop the country and promote its economic and social progress, as may be seen in the five-year development plan,
Considering that Tanzania has always shown itself to be in favor of immediate African unity as a means of reinforcing the independence of Africa and assuring rapid economic and social reconstruction,
The Second Conference:
a. Warmly greets the people and the government of Tanzania;
b. Thanks the government of Tanzania for inviting the CONCP to hold this Second Conference in Dar es Salaam;
c. Acknowledges the hospitality and all the facilities given to the participants in the Conference.

Motion on the FRELIMO
Considering the ability of the FRELIMO to shoulder the responsibilities entrusted to it with regard to welcoming the Second Conference to Dar es Salaam,
Considering that the FRELIMO thus made an important contribution to the success of the work and to the atmosphere of comradeship that existed among all the participants,
The Second Conference:
a. Salutes all the leaders and workers of the FRELIMO;
b. Expresses the gratitude of the participants for the work carried out and for the brotherly and warm welcome that was given them by the FRELIMO workers.

Decision on the Third CONCP Conference
THE THIRD CONFERENCIA DAS ORGANIZACOES NACIONALISTAS DAS COLONIAS PORTUGUESAS, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE NEW STATUTES, WILL BE HELD DURING 1967, IN A COUNTRY OR A ZONE FREED FROM PORTUGUESE DOMINATION.

* * *

CHAPTER VIII
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEST AGAINST PORTUGUESE RULE IN AFRICA
This chapter is divided into two parts, the first being a summary of United Nations activity on the Portuguese African issue. Comments and excerpts from documents are arranged by organization: the General Assembly, Security Council, special committees, the ECOSOC, the ECA, the UNESCO's International
The Portuguese Colonies and the United Nations

For the first time, the question of non-self-governing territories became the subject of a serious debate at the United Nations, during the Eleventh General Assembly in 1956. The debate centered around the admission into the United Nations of Spain and Portugal, countries that possessed colonies in Africa, but that refused to provide the information required by Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. Until then the General Assembly had always admitted without discussion the list of non-self-governing territories supplied by the powers administering such territories. Now, however, the right to decide when a territory stopped being non-self-governing was jealously being reserved by the U. N. At first the Spanish government declared that, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, it would give the necessary information on whether or not it had territories that fell within the jurisdiction of Article 73—to the Secretary General whenever he wanted it ... The Portuguese government responded categorically that it did not possess any non-self-governing territories and insisted that the African territories under its authority constituted an integral part of the Unified State of Portugal. This strategy was immediately denounced by many delegations to the General Assembly, who tried to form a commission to study the application of the articles in Chapter XI relating to new members. ...

The following year, seventeen delegations presented a resolution inviting the Secretary General to prepare a resumé of opinions on the question, and they suggested the formation of a ten-member commission to study this problem and present its report to the Twelfth General Assembly. This resolution was adopted by the Fourth Committee but failed in the plenary session because of a procedural maneuver that demanded a two-thirds majority (United Nations Document A-3733 of November 14, 1957, p. 15). Thus the resolution was not passed, even though the vote was forty-one for and thirty against, with ten abstentions.

On this occasion the Portuguese delegate declared that admission of nations into the United Nations should not be discussed and that the international organization
was obligated to recognize Portugal's constitution and structural basis without demanding any changes (see summary provisional documents--Twelfth United Nations General Assembly, Fourth Committee, 650th Session, September 17, 1957--A-C-4--SR--650; Official Documents of the Assembly--Session 691, November 4, 1957, paragraphs 7, 32, 46).

Definition of a Non-Self-Governing Territory: One of the principal questions in the evaluation of the status of Portuguese colonies in Africa is the definition of a nonself-governing territory. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter defines nonselfgoverning territories as those whose inhabitants do not yet administer their own affairs. Such a definition, however, leaves unanswered the question of knowing when a territory reaches the level of self-government.

After repeated efforts to clear up this point, the 1952 General Assembly published a provisional list of factors to consider in determining whether or not a territory is self-governing and constituted an ad hoc committee that was to continue studying the question. The motion was finally approved, and it defined the forms of selfdetermination thus:

1. Independence
2. Free association, on an equal basis (resolution 742-VII of the General Assembly of November 27, 1953).

On approving the list of factors proposed by the ad hoc committee, the General Assembly provisionally recommended that the above considerations be kept in mind whenever the question of "non-self-governing" territories should arise. The same Assembly also declared that the criteria, which serve as indicators for determining whether the obligations imposed by Article 73 are being fulfilled, should by no means be an obstacle to a territory that has not achieved complete self-government. It declared, furthermore, that in order for a territory to be considered socially and economically self-governing, it was essential that its people administer themselves entirely, as is stated in Chapter XI of the Charter. The Assembly established a competent ten-nation committee to study the problem more deeply. It asked this committee to keep in mind the list of criteria provisionally accepted by the Assembly in conformity with the desires of the member states, and to consider also:

1. The possibility of defining the concept of autonomy as seen in Chapter XI of the Charter;
2. The guarantees of the principle that the people regulate themselves, in conformity with this Chapter;
3. The manifestation of the freely expressed will of the people regarding the determination of their national and international status--Chapter XI.

This second ad hoc committee unanimously agreed on the impossibility of a satisfactory definition of the concept of complete self-administration in conformity with Chapter XI of the Charter. But it did admit that there are certain characteristics that help to determine whether or not complete self-government exists in a particular case, namely:

1. Sufficient political advancement of the people to entrust them with the power to
decide, by democratic means, the future of their territory;
2. The functioning of a system of representative government with periodic elections in which the people can participate fully or with other democratic processes through which the people can freely express their will;
3. The enjoyment of individual rights, including:
   a. Personal freedom and the opportunity to participate and have a representative voice in the government;
   b. The guarantee of fundamental rights; that is, freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, and the right to a fair trial;
   c. Universal adult suffrage;
   d. The freedom of an individual to join political parties, and the right of all political parties to participate freely in the political life of the nation.
4. The absence of pressure or coercion upon the people, enabling them to express freely their points of view regarding the national and international status they might want (access to independence and to other forms of autonomy or free association as an integral part of the metropolis or of another country);
5. The guarantee that the objectives of the people will be respected.

Conditions in the Portuguese Colonies: The second question essential to the evaluation of the status of Portuguese colonies is whether the above conditions actually exist in them. During the discussions of the Fourth Committee the Portuguese representatives declared, as mentioned above, that Portugal did not administer any nonself-governing territories (as defined in Article 73 of the Charter), since it was a Unified State with extensions in Africa. It must be noted that Portugal always insisted that the discussion be limited to legal relations between the metropole and the African territories. Such a limitation was adhered to for a time, and any discussion on present conditions in the Portuguese colonies was avoided, as well as any examination of constitutional or other legal provisions that affect individuals within such territories. Still, the members of the Fourth Committee tried to determine whether the political and social status of the natives of these territories is the same as that of the Portuguese; whether the governors of such territories are elected or appointed; whether the natives participate in the administration of their own affairs; what the possibilities are for education for all their inhabitants; and whether the natives can exercise their professions under the same conditions as the Portuguese. The Portuguese delegates only responded that Africans enjoy exactly the same constitutional rights as the Portuguese; that throughout Portugal governors are appointed by the administration; that there are Legislative Councils.

It so happens, however, that in the two largest territories--Angola and Mogambique--not one native is a member of such a Legislative Council, educational facilities are not provided for all inhabitants of these territories, and, finally, the exercise of a profession is not free. The data on conditions existing in the Portuguese colonies that we shall next present completely belie the myth of "departmentalization" that the Portuguese try to sustain.

Resolutions of the General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960.

Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples:

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,

Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of, or impediments in the way of, the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural, and economic development of dependent peoples, and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends toward freedom in such territories that have not yet attained independence,

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national territory,
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;
And to this end
Declares that:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories that have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

Resolution 1541 (XV), December 15, 1960.
Principles that should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter.
Resolution 1542 (XV), December 15, 1960.
Transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter:
The General Assembly,
Recalling that, by resolution 742 (VIII) of November 27, 1953, the General Assembly approved a list of factors to be used as a guide in determining whether a Territory is or is no longer within the scope of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling also that differences of views arose among Member States concerning the status of certain territories under the administrations of Portugal and Spain and described by these two States as "overseas provinces" of the metropolitan State concerned, and that with a view to resolving those differences the General
Assembly, by resolution 1467 (XIV) of December 12, 1959, appointed the Special Committee of Six to the Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter to study the principles that should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73e,
Recognizing that the desire for independence is the rightful aspiration of peoples under colonial subjugation and that the denial of their right to self-determination constitutes a threat to the well-being of humanity and to international peace,
Recalling with satisfaction the statement of the representative of Spain at the 1048th meeting of the Fourth Committee that this government agrees to transmit information to the Secretary General in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter,
Mindful of its responsibilities under Article 14 of the Charter,
Being aware that the government of Portugal has not transmitted information on the territories under its administration, which are enumerated in operative paragraph 1 below, and has not expressed any intention of doing so, and because such information as is otherwise available in regard to the conditions in these territories gives cause for concern,
1. Considers that, in the light of the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, General Assembly resolution 742 (VIII) and the principles approved by the Assembly in resolution 1541 (XV) of December 15, 1960, the territories under the administration of Portugal listed hereunder are Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter:
   a. The Cape Verde Archipelago;
   b. Guiné, called Portuguese Guiné;
   c. São Tomé and Príncipe, and their dependencies;
   d. Sio Jolo Batista de Ajud;
   e. Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda;
   f. Moçambique;
   g. Goa and dependencies, called the State of India;
   h. Macau and dependencies; i. Timor and dependencies;
2. Declares that an obligation exists on the part of the government of Portugal to transmit information under Chapter XI of the Charter concerning these territories and that it should be discharged without further delay;
3. Requests the government of Portugal to transmit to the Secretary General information in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter on the conditions prevailing in the territories under administration, enumerated in paragraph 1 above;
4. Requests the Secretary General to take the necessary steps in pursuance of the declaration of the government of Spain that it is ready to act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter;
5. Invites the governments of Portugal and Spain to participate in the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories in accordance with the terms of paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1332 (XIII) of December 12, 1958.
Resolution 1603 (XV), April 20, 1961.
The situation in Angola. In a 73 to 2 vote, the General Assembly called upon the government of Portugal "to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)"; and to appoint a subcommittee of five members to conduct such inquiries concerning Angola as it deemed necessary.

Resolution 1671 (XVI), December 18, 1961.
Problem raised by the situation of Angolan refugees in the Congo:
The General Assembly,
Having been apprised of the situation of the refugees from Angola in the Republic of the Congo (I.Aopoldville),
Noting with satisfaction the efforts made by the government of the Republic of the Congo (I.Aopoldville), in cooperation with the United Nations in the Congo, the League of Red Cross Societies, and other voluntary organizations, to provide those refugees with immediate assistance and to help them to become self-supporting until they can return to their own homes,
Recognizing that it is desirable to maintain unity of action in the further provision of assistance in an area where the needs of the refugees cannot, in practice, be separated from those of the local population,
1. Recommends that the United Nations in the Congo, in close liaison with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the organizations mentioned above, should continue to provide emergency assistance for as long as is necessary and enable the refugees to become self-supporting as soon as possible;
2. Requests the High Commissioner to continue to lend his good offices in seeking appropriate solutions to the problem arising from the presence of Angolan refugees in the Republic of the Congo (I.Aopoldville), inter alia, by facilitating, in close collaboration with the authorities and organizations directly concerned, the voluntary repatriation of those refugees;
3. Urges Member States of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to make available to the competent organs of the United Nations the means required for the measures of assistance mentioned above.

Resolution 1699 (XVI), December 19, 1961.
Adoption by a vote of 90 to 3, with 2 abstentions. Noncompliance of the government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV):
The General Assembly,
Recalling that by resolution 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, it declared that an obligation exists on the part of the government of Portugal to transmit information under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories under its administration, and that this obligation should be discharged without further delay,
Noting with deep regret that the government of Portugal has refused and still continues to refuse to submit information on its Non-Self-Governing Territories or to participate in the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-
Governing Territories, as called for by General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) and Chapter XI of the Charter,

Recalling further the principles set forth in its resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, entitled "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,"

Considering that the provisions of the said Declaration and any decision of the General Assembly concerning its implementation are fully applicable to the Territories under Portuguese administration equally with other Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Noting the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration,

1. Condemns the continuing non-compliance of the government of Portugal with its obligations under Chapter X of the Charter of the United Nations and with the terms of General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), and its refusal to cooperate in the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories;

2. Considers it necessary that, pending the fulfillment of these obligations by the government of Portugal, the General Assembly must, for its part, continue to discharge its own obligations and responsibilities toward the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories under Portuguese administration;

3. Decides to establish a Special Committee of seven members to be elected by the General Assembly to examine as a matter of urgency, within the context of Chapter XI of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the Assembly, such information as is available concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, and to formulate its observations, conclusions, and recommendations for the consideration of the Assembly and any other body that the Assembly may appoint to assist it in the implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV);

4. Requests the Secretary General, pending the compliance by Portugal with its obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter to transmit information on conditions in the Territories under its administration, to prepare for the use of the Special Committee, on the basis of available information, background papers containing information on conditions prevailing in the Territories under the administration of Portugal;

5. Authorizes the Special Committee, in order that information available to it may be as up to date and authentic as possible, to receive petitions and hear petitioners concerning conditions prevailing in Portuguese Non-Self-Governing Territories;

6. Requests the Secretary General to furnish the Special Committee with such necessary secretarial and other assistance as it may require in the performance of its tasks;

7. Requests Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with its Obligations under the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
8. Further requests Member States to deny Portugal any support and assistance that it may use for the suppression of the peoples of its Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Resolution 1742 (XVI), January 30, 1962.

The situation in Angola:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the situation in Angola,

Recalling its resolution 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961, and the Security Council resolution of June 9, 1961,

Having examined the report of the Subcommittee on the situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV),

Deploring the lack of cooperation and assistance by Portugal in the full and effective discharge of the Subcommittee's task as called for in the aforementioned resolutions,

Noting with deep regret Portugal's refusal to recognize Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and its failure to take measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, entitled "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples."

Convinced that the continued refusal of Portugal to recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence constitutes a permanent source of international friction and threatens international peace and security,

1. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the Subcommittee on the situation in Angola and commends to the Portuguese government, for urgent consideration and effective implementation, the observations, findings, and conclusions set out in the Subcommittee's report;

2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence;

3. Deeply deprecates the repressive measures and armed action against the people of Angola and the denial to them of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures against the people of Angola;

4. Appeals to the government of Portugal to release immediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they may be held;

5. Urges the government of Portugal to undertake, without further delay, extensive political, economic, and social reforms and measures, and in particular to set up freely elected and representative political institutions with a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola;

6. Decides to continue the Subcommittee on the situation in Angola appointed under General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV);

   a. To continue the performance of its tasks;

   b. To study ways and means to secure the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly;
7. Requests Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolution;
8. Requests all Member States of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies to deny Portugal any support and assistance that may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola;
9. Requests the government of Portugal to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on the measures it has undertaken in the implementation of the present resolution;
10. Recommends that the Security Council, in the light of the Council's resolution of June 9, 1961, and of the present resolution, keep the matter under constant review.

Resolution 1807 (XVII), December 14, 1962.

Territories under Portuguese administration:
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, set out in its resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960,
Recalling further its resolutions 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, and 1699 (XVI) of December 19, 1961, and all its other resolutions relating to Territories under Portuguese administration,

Having examined the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration and chapters VIII and XI of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Noting the statements of the petitioners,
Greatly deploring the continued disregard by the Portuguese government of the legitimate aspirations for immediate self-determination and independence expressed by the peoples of the Territories under its administration,
Greatly concerned at the intensified measures of oppression being carried out by the Portuguese government against the indigenous peoples of Territories under its administration,
Noting that the Portuguese military and other forces of repression have used extensively and continue to use, for the repression of the nationalist movements, military and other equipment supplied to Portugal by some of its allies for other purposes and also equipment obtained from other sources,
Noting the opinion of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, expressed in paragraph 439 of its report, concerning the implications of the supply of military equipment to the Portuguese government,
Noting with deep concern that the policy and acts of the Portuguese government with regard to the Territories under its administration have created a situation that constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,
1. Approves the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration;
2. Condemns the attitude of Portugal, which is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations;
3. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese administration to self-determination and independence and upholds without any reservations the claims of those peoples for their immediate accession to independence;

4. Urges the Portuguese government to give effect to the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, in particular those set out in paragraphs 442 to 445 of that report, by taking the following measures:
   a. The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;
   b. The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;
   c. The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;
   d. Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);
   e. The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;

5. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to give high priority to an examination of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration, bearing in mind the present resolution and the other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

6. Calls upon Member States to use all their influence to induce the Portuguese government to carry out the obligations incumbent upon it under Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the Territories under its administration;

7. Earnestly requests all States to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese government any assistance that would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration and, for this purpose, to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese government;

8. Requests the Security Council, in case the Portuguese government should refuse to comply with the present resolution and previous General Assembly resolutions on this question, to take all appropriate measures to secure the compliance of Portugal with its obligations as a Member State.

Resolution 1808 (XVII), December 14, 1962.

Special training program for Territories under Portuguese administration:
The General Assembly,
Having examined the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, in particular chapters IV to VII of part two and chapter II of part three thereof,
Having heard the petitions,
Considering the inadequacy of social and educational facilities in the Territories under Portuguese administration,
Bearing in mind that the process of education in these Territories must be designed to familiarize the inhabitants with, and train them in, the use of the tools of economic, social, and political progress,
Considering that it is one of the sacred duties of the United Nations to promote:
  a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development,
  b. Solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems, and international cultural and educational cooperation,
Considering that the United Nations, in carrying out its duty under Article 55 of the Charter, has created machinery for economic, social, and technical assistance, and that substantial assistance has been rendered to peoples of the less developed countries, including peoples in colonial territories,
Considering the necessity of extending such assistance to the Non-Self-Governing Territories under Portuguese administration with a view to forming in these Territories indigenous cadres for the future administration of their independent countries,
Recognizing that the indigenous inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese administration, whose countries can appropriately be designated as being economically underdeveloped, have a legitimate right to receive benefits from the United Nations programs of technical cooperation,
Recognizing further that the United Nations has a responsibility toward the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories,
Recognizing that:
  a. A special intensive type of fellowship program should immediately be organized to train the largest possible number of indigenous inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese administration in the functions and techniques of administration and in the fields of economics, law, health and sanitation, and in such other fields as may be necessary,
  b. In addition, Member States should be invited to make available scholarships for study abroad by students from Territories under Portuguese administration,
1. Decides to establish such a special training program for Territories under Portuguese administration, including technical education, education for leadership and teacher training;
2. Requests the Secretary General, in establishing such a special training program for the indigenous people of these Territories, to make use as fully as possible of the existing United Nations programs of technical cooperation--notably the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund so as to minimize the charge on the regular budget--and particularly to make available to
those indigenous inhabitants of the Territories who are or who may be temporarily residing in various countries and territories outside the Territories under Portuguese administration the benefits of such programs, with the consent and cooperation of the host governments;
3. Invites the specialized agencies to cooperate in the establishment and implementation of the special training program mentioned above, by offering every possible assistance and such facilities and resources as they may be able to provide;
4. Invites Member States to make available, directly or through voluntary agencies, for the use of students from Territories under Portuguese administration, all expense scholarships both for the completion of secondary education and for various forms of higher education;
5. Invites Member States whose universities enjoy administrative autonomy to permit direct communication between the Secretary General and the heads of those universities with a view to the granting of scholarships envisaged in the present resolution;
6. Requests Member States to inform the Secretary General of any scholarships offered and of awards made and utilized;
7. Requests the Secretary General to establish appropriate machinery for dealing with applications from Territories under Portuguese administration for education and training outside the Territories;
8. Requests Member States to facilitate the travel of students from Territories under Portuguese administration seeking to avail themselves of such educational opportunities;
9. Requests the Secretary General to report on this question to the General Assembly at its eighteenth session;
10. Requests the government of Portugal to cooperate in the implementation of the present resolution.
Resolution 1809 (XVII), December 14, 1962.
Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration:
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1699 (XVI) of December 19, 1961, by which it decided to establish a Special Committee to examine as a matter of urgency, within the context of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, such information as was available concerning Territories under Portuguese administration, and to formulate its observations, conclusions, and recommendations for the consideration of the Assembly and any other body that the Assembly might appoint to assist it in the implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,
Considering that in its resolution 1807 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, it requested the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to give high priority to the examination of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration,
1. Decides to dissolve the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration;
2. Expresses its gratitude to the Special Committee for its efforts and for its valuable contribution to the accomplishment of the purposes of the United Nations under Chapter XI of the Charter and resolution 1514 (XV);
3. Requests the Secretary General to forward the report of the Special Committee, together with the summary records of the Fourth Committee on the question, to the government of Portugal, the Economic and Social Council, the Economic Commission for Africa, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the specialized agencies concerned, including the International Labour Organisation.

Resolution 1819 (XVII), December 18, 1962.

The situation in Angola:
The General Assembly,

Having considered the critical situation in Angola,
Having considered the report of the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, established under General Assembly resolution 1699 (XVI) of December 19, 1961,
Having considered the report of the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola, established under General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961,
Resolutely condemning the mass extermination of the indigenous population of Angola and other severe repressive measures being used by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola,

Deploring the armed action being taken by Portugal for the suppression of the people of Angola and the use in this process of arms supplied to Portugal by certain Member States,
Noting that in the Territory of Angola, as in other Portuguese colonies, the indigenous population is denied all fundamental rights and freedoms, that racial discrimination is in fact widely practiced and that the economic life of Angola is to a large extent based on forced labor,
Convinced that the colonial war being carried on by the government of Portugal in Angola, the violation by that government of the Security Council resolution of June 9, 1961, its refusal to implement the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, and its refusal to implement resolutions 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961, 1654 (XVI) of November 27, 1961, and 1742 (XVI) of January 30, 1962, constitute a source of international conflict and tension as well as a serious threat to world peace and security,
Bearing in mind the principles embodied in resolution 1514 (XV),
1. Expresses its satisfaction to the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola for the work it has accomplished;
2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence, and supports their demand for immediate independence;
3. Condemns the colonial war being carried on by Portugal against the people of Angola and demands that the government of Portugal put an end to it immediately;
4. Again calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from armed action and repressive measures against the people of Angola;
5. Urges the government of Portugal, without any further delay:
   a. To release all political prisoners;
   b. To lift the ban on political parties;
   c. To undertake extensive political, economic, and social measures that would ensure the creation of freely elected and representative political institutions and transfer of power to the people of Angola in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
6. Requests Member States to use their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolution;
7. Requests all Member States to deny Portugal any support or assistance that may be used by it for the suppression of the people of Angola, and in particular to terminate the supply of arms to Portugal;
8. Reminds the government of Portugal that its continued nonimplementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council is inconsistent with its membership in the United Nations;
9. Requests the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to secure Portugal’s compliance with the present resolution and with the previous resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

Resolution 1913 (XVIII), December 3, 1963.

Territories under Portuguese administration:
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration,
Having considered the report on this question submitted by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Having heard the petitioners,
Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960.
Recalling in particular that the Security Council, by its resolution of July 31, 1963, urgently called upon Portugal to implement the following:
   a. The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence,
b. The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose,
c. The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties,
d. Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to selfdetermination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV),
e. The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples,

Noting with deep regret and great concern the continued refusal of the government of Portugal to take any steps to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council,

Convinced that the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions will provide the only means of obtaining a peaceful solution of the question of Territories under Portuguese administration,

1. Requests the Security Council to consider immediately the question of Territories under Portuguese administration and to adopt necessary measures to give effect to its own decisions, particularly those contained in the resolution of July 31, 1963;

2. Decides to maintain the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on the agenda of its eighteenth session.


Special training program for Territories under Portuguese administration:

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1808 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, by which it established a special training program for the indigenous people of Territories under Portuguese administration,
Having considered the report of the Secretary General submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 of the aforesaid resolution,
Noting with regret that, notwithstanding paragraph 10 of that resolution, the government of Portugal has not cooperated in the implementation of the resolution,
Noting with satisfaction that several Member States have extended offers of scholarships to students from Territories under Portuguese administration,
Noting that only a few applicants from Territories under Portuguese administration have the necessary qualifications to enable them to enter institutions of higher education,
Noting further that most of the scholarships offered by Member States are for higher education only and consequently are not accessible to inhabitants of Territories under Portuguese administration whose qualifications cannot meet the requirements set for the use of such scholarships,
1. Requests the Secretary General to continue his efforts to use as fully as possible the existing United Nations programs of technical cooperation and, particularly, to make available to those indigenous inhabitants of the Territories under Portuguese administration who are or who may be temporarily residing in various countries or territories outside the Territories administered by Portugal the benefits of such programs, with the consent and cooperation of the host governments;
2. Draws the attention of Member States within whose boundaries great numbers of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration reside to the possibilities available to them of obtaining assistance from the United Nations programs of technical cooperation, for the purpose of providing these refugees with more facilities for secondary, vocational, and technical education;
3. Invites the specialized agencies to cooperate in the establishment and implementation of the special training program mentioned above by offering every possible assistance and such facilities and resources as they may be able to provide;
4. Expresses its appreciation to Member States that have extended offers of scholarships to students from Territories under Portuguese administration;
5. Invites Member States that have offered scholarships, and those that plan to do so, to consider in the first place offers of scholarships for secondary education and for vocational, technical training;
6. Requests Member States to inform the Secretary General of any scholarships offered and of awards made and utilized;
7. Further requests Member States to facilitate the travel of students from Territories under Portuguese administration seeking to avail themselves of the educational opportunities offered;
8. Reiterates its request to the government of Portugal to cooperate in the implementation of the special training program for inhabitants of Territories under Portuguese administration;
9. Requests the Secretary General to report on this question to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.

Resolution 2107 (XX), December 21, 1965.

Question of Territories under Portuguese administration:

The General Assembly,
Having examined the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories under Portuguese administration,
Having heard the statements of the petitioners,
well as the relevant resolutions of the Special Committee, adopted on July 3, 1964, and June 10, 1965.
Noting with deep concern that, in spite of the measures laid down by the Security Council in the aforementioned resolutions, the government of Portugal is intensifying the measures of repression and military operations against the African people of these Territories with a view to defeating their legitimate aspirations to self-determination, freedom, and independence,
Further noting with deep concern that the activities of the foreign financial interests in these Territories are an impediment to the African people in the realization of their aspirations to freedom and independence,
Considering that the evidence submitted by the petitioners confirmed that the government of Portugal has continued to use the aid and weapons that it receives from its military allies against the populations of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, and other Territories under its administration,
Convinced that the attitude of Portugal toward the African population of its colonies and of the neighboring States constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
1. Reaffirms the right of the peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese administration to freedom and independence and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the rights laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
2. Approves the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories under Portuguese administration and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;
3. Appeals to all States, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, to render the people of the Territories under Portuguese administration the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights;
4. Condemns the colonial policy of Portugal and its persistent refusal to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council;
5. Condemns the policy of the government of Portugal which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the establishment, on a large scale, of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of workers to South Africa;
6. Requests all States to prevent such activities on the part of their nationals involved in foreign financial interests, which are an impediment to the attainment by the people of their legitimate rights of freedom and independence;
7. Urges Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:
a. To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;
b. To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;
c. To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial Territories;
d. To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;
e. To boycott all trade with Portugal;

8. Requests all States, and in particular the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps:
a. To refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese government any assistance that would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its administration;
b. To take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the government of Portugal;
c. To stop the sale or shipment to the government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition;

9. Appeals to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic, or technical assistance so long as the government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

10. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned, and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration and to the people who have suffered from military operations;
11. Requests the Security Council to consider putting into effect against Portugal the appropriate measures laid down in the Charter, for the purpose of carrying out its resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination;
12. Decides to include the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration in the provisional agenda of its twenty-first session.

Resolutions of the Security Council
Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 956th meeting on June 9, 1961, concerning the situation in Angola:
The Security Council,
Having considered the situation in Angola,
Deeply deploring the large-scale killings and the severely repressive measures in Angola,
Taking note of the grave concern and strong reactions to such occurrences throughout the continent of Africa and in other parts of the world,
Convinced that the continuance of the situation in Angola is an actual and potential cause of international friction and is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, declaring Angola, among others, a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, by which the General Assembly declared without dissent that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation, and asked for immediate steps to be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of these Territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom,

1. Reaffirms General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) of April 20, 1961, and calls upon Portugal to act in accordance with the terms of that resolution;
2. Requests the Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola, appointed under the terms of the aforesaid General Assembly resolution, to implement its mandate without delay;
3. Calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures and, further, to extend every facility to the Subcommittee to enable it to perform its task expeditiously;
4. Expresses the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Requests the Subcommittee to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as possible.

Resolution S/5293, April 24, 1963.
Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1033rd meeting, on April 24, 1963, concerning a complaint by Senegal:
The Security Council,
Having heard the statements of the representatives of Senegal and Portugal concerning violations of Senegalese territory by the Portuguese military forces, Deploring the incidents that have occurred near the frontier between Senegal and Portuguese Guind, Noting with concern that the state of relations in this area between the two parties concerned may lead to tension on the occasion of any incident, and expressing the hope that such tension will be eliminated in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, Taking note of the declared intention of the Portuguese government scrupulously to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Senegal,

1. Deplores any incursion by Portuguese military forces into Senegalese territory as well as the incident which occurred at Bouniak on April 8, 1963;
2. Requests the government of Portugal, in accordance with its declared intentions, to take whatever action may be necessary to prevent any violation of Senegal’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3. Requests the Secretary General to keep the development of the situation under review.
Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1049th meeting on July 31, 1963:
The Security Council,
Having examined the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration as submitted by the thirty-two African Member States,
Recalling Security Council resolution S/4835 of June 9, 1961, and General Assembly resolutions 1807 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, and 1819 (XVII) of December 18, 1962,
Recalling General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) of December 15, 1960, which declares the Territories under Portuguese administration to be Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960, by which the General Assembly declared inter alia that immediate steps be taken to transfer all powers to the people of these Territories without any conditions or reservations in accordance with their freely expressed wishes, without distinction as to race, creed, or color in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence,
1. Confirms resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of December 14, 1960;
2. Affirms that the policies of Portugal in claiming the Territories under its administration as "overseas" territories and as integral parts of metropolitan Portugal are contrary to the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council;
3. Deprecates the attitude of the Portuguese government, its repeated violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter, and its continued refusal to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council;
4. Determines that the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration is seriously disturbing peace and security in Africa;
5. Urgently calls upon Portugal to implement the following:
a. The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;
b. The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;
c. The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;
d. Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representatives of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);
e. The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;
6. Requests that all States should refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese government any assistance that would enable it to continue its repression of the peoples of the Territories under its administration, and take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment for this purpose to the Portuguese government;

7. Requests the Secretary General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this resolution, to furnish such assistance as he may deem necessary, and to report to the Security Council by October 31, 1963.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 1083rd meeting:

The Security Council,

Having considered the Secretary General's report as contained in Document S/5448;
Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December 15, 1960;
Recalling further its resolution contained in Document S/5380 of July 31, 1963;
Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Secretary General in establishing contact between representatives of Portugal and representatives of African states;

1. Regrets that this contact has not achieved the desired results because of failure to reach agreement on the United Nations interpretation of self-determination;
2. Calls upon all states to comply with paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution S/5380 of July 31, 1963;
3. Deprecates the noncompliance of the government of Portugal with Security Council resolution S/5380;
4. Reaffirms the interpretation of self-determination as laid down in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as follows: All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development;
5. Notes General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV) that enumerated, inter alia, Territories under Portuguese administration as falling under the category of Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter;
6. Believes that action by the government of Portugal to grant an amnesty to all persons imprisoned or exiled for advocating self-determination in these territories will be an evidence of its good faith;
7. Requests the Secretary General to continue with his efforts and report to the Council not later than June 1, 1964.


Adopted by a vote of 7 to 0, with 4 abstentions, a compromise resolution calling on Portugal to grant self-determination to its African Territories and requesting all Member States to withhold from Portugal "any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the territories."

Report of the United Nations Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola
[Established by resolution 1603 (XV), the Subcommittee prepared its report, which was issued in February 1962 by the General Assembly, sixteenth session, supplement no. 16 (A/4978). The following excerpts are from Part IV, pages 46-49 of that report.]
The Subcommittee, in reviewing the situation in Angola, would like to emphasize once more its inability to obtain complete information because of the failure of the
government of Portugal "to extend every facility to the Subcommittee to enable it to perform its task expeditiously" as called for by the Security Council. However, the information available to the Subcommittee leaves little doubt that the disturbances and conflicts in Angola are mainly consequences of genuine grievances of the indigenous population against the administration of the territory, including dissatisfaction with economic conditions, the impact of African nationalism, the rise of political groups seeking redress of grievances and the right of self-determination, and the severe repression to which these groups had been subjected. The disturbances and conflicts have resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, the flight of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand refugees from the territory, and the creation of "a veritable atmosphere of war." They have involved much brutality against both the Portuguese and the Angolans, accompanied by fears and charges of attempts toward the "extermination" or "annihilation" of racial groups, that is, of a racial conflict of a genocidal nature. Severe economic effects have been caused by the destruction of property, the abandonment of villages, the loss of part of the coffee crop, and the military expenditures. The events have created bitterness, which will make the restoration of calm and the achievement of cooperation among the racial groups for the progress of the territory and its population ever more difficult. During the past few months the situation in Angola has not improved, but deteriorated. The conflict has increased the problems and heightened passions. In emphasizing the urgent need for a cessation of armed conflict, the Subcommittee has in view not only the heavy toll of lives in the past few months but also the apprehensions concerning the future. While the government of Portugal continues to depend on the suppression of the conflict by military means, it would seem that the rebel side is equally determined to continue guerrilla warfare as the means for the achievement of the recognition of its rights and aspirations. Not only are military measures contrary to the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but also they can neither resolve the basic problems in Angola nor lead to peace and stability. The rapid spread of the conflict shows that the rebellion has as its main cause genuine and widespread discontent and a growing spirit of nationalism. The existence of fluid frontiers, the strength of feeling among the refugees and their fellow tribesmen in the vicinity of the northern border, and the feelings aroused by Portuguese actions of the past few months would appear to lead to the conclusion that, through the area of military activity may be reduced or strategic points recovered, the end of the conflict cannot be ensured by military measures alone. The Subcommittee would draw attention to the considered judgment of the General Assembly in resolution 1514 (XV) that "the process of liberation is
irresistible." It is too much to hope that the nationalist sentiments aroused in the Angolan population and the desire for change will subside and that the status quo can be re-established. The choice between voluntary surrender or annihilation offered to those now in revolt leaves no room for the adjustments that political and military realities would appear to impose upon Portugal regardless of its own position and policy aims.

Despite the apparent calm that still prevails in the part of the territory not affected by recent conflicts and disturbances, the information available to the Subcommittee indicates the existence of discontent in those areas and a strong desire for a rapid improvement of the status and conditions of the Angolan people. The General Assembly, aware that failure to act speedily, effectively, and in time for ameliorating the disabilities of the African peoples of Angola was likely to endanger "international peace and security," established the Subcommittee to inquire into the situation; it also called on the government of Portugal "to consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

The Security Council reaffirmed the General Assembly's resolution, called upon Portugal to act in accordance with the terms of that resolution, and "to desist forthwith from repressive measures."

In the light of the gravity of the situation described in this report and its varied repercussions, the Subcommittee notes with regret that the government of Portugal has not up to now seen its way to cooperating with the General Assembly and the Security Council to fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Angola, and has thereby failed to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Subcommittee regrets that the government of Portugal adopted and has maintained a negative attitude toward the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, with the result that urgent measures to alleviate the situation in Angola have not been taken.... The representative of Portugal stated in the Security Council on June 9, 1961, that his government considered the Council's resolution of that date "as entirely illegal and unjust" and made "the strongest possible reservations to the resolution."

The position of Portugal regarding the resolutions of the United Nations organs remained virtually unchanged, and the government of Portugal did not consider it possible to accede to the request of the Subcommittee for a visit to Angola, though, as noted earlier, it indicated willingness to supply "information of a factual character" (see part one, section III, above). The Subcommittee once more expresses its regret that the government of Portugal was unwilling to give its full cooperation to the Subcommittee despite the United Nations' decisions and the appeals of a very large number of Member States. It expresses its disappointment that Portugal did not avail itself of the opportunity pre-
sented by the establishment of the Subcommittee to allay the serious concern caused by the events. The presence of the Subcommittee in the territory might well have helped to reassure the population, to end the bloodshed, and to demonstrate the desire of the government of Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations in the search for a peaceful solution.

Despite the attitude of the government of Portugal, the Subcommittee would like to view the invitation extended to its Chairman in July 1961 and the transmittal of some information to the Subcommittee (including legislation promulgated on September 8, 1961, introducing some reforms in Portugal's overseas policy) as a limited, though hardly satisfactory, response to the Subcommittee's approaches for Portugal's cooperation with the United Nations.

Though the reforms are rather limited in scope and it is difficult to know their full impact until more information is available and experience in their implementation is gained, they would seem to reflect some awareness by the government of Portugal of the need to adjust its policies to the realities of the situation and the opinion of the international community.

Of the legislative measures promulgated on September 8, 1961, the most important was the repeal of the Statute of 1954. With this act, the legal [definition of] persons of indigenous status [who] were granted no political rights "with respect to nonindigenous institutions" no longer applies. However, the practical consequences of this change must be measured against the fact that to qualify either as a candidate for political office or as an elector, it remains necessary to meet the educational, financial, and other requirements established by law.

It would not seem possible at this stage to indicate the full legal and practical consequences of the repeal of the Statute of 1954 in other fields. The distinction between persons of indigenous status and others has not been abolished in all its forms. The Portuguese Constitution contains special provisions concerning indigenous persons, and many of the general provisions of the Statute of 1954 are embodied in more detailed decrees and regulations, including the new legislation promulgated on September 8, 1961. Though the repeal of the Statute of 1954 would have been indispensable for the introduction of any far-reaching reforms, the effective elimination of indigenous status and its varied consequences depends on a revision or repeal of relevant legislation and particularly the reform of administrative practices.

The other main changes effected by the new legislation are briefly indicated below.

While providing for the continued application of native customary law in tribal societies, the new legislation lays, however, some new emphasis on the codification of customary law and appears to render it easier and simpler to opt for Portuguese civil law.

With reference to rights over land, the new legislation largely reproduces the corresponding provisions of the Statute of 1954, and its purposes would seem mainly to rationalize and simplify the procedures for acquiring or registering rights in immovable property (see part three, section V, above).
Under the new legislation, the area of land surrounding a regedoria, which is reserved for the eventual use of the inhabitants thereof, has been increased from four to five times the area of land actually under occupation or use by those inhabitants. Penalties are to be imposed on persons who are responsible for displacing the inhabitants of a regedoria from the land to which they are entitled. The new legislation seeks to give better protection through registration to those members of tribal societies who have acquired individual rights of possession and use of immovable property. The rights are also stated to be transferable. Finally, procedures have been introduced to ensure that State land granted by way of concessions is limited to a reasonable amount and is put to the best use.

Evaluation of changes in penal laws would require more information than is available at present as well as confirmation in practice. The Subcommittee notes that the Minister for Overseas Portugal has referred to a reorganization of the courts of first instance, but the Subcommittee has not received specific information on the subject.

The recent legislation does not seem to affect substantially the laws applicable to the indigenous inhabitants with respect to labor, as the repealed provisions are largely covered by the Constitution and Native Labor Code.

One of the new decrees establishes Provincial Settlement Boards. They will be responsible for all matters relating to the settlement of the territory by "aborigines, natives, or immigrants" and for expediting such settlement. The Minister for Overseas Portugal has emphasized as one of the justifications for the measure the necessity of increasing the settlement of Portuguese Africa by "European Portuguese." High priority is to be given to such settlement.

The Subcommittee considers that a review of the policy with regard to land use, including the question of immigration, in relation to the economic development and political future of Angola is of great importance.

On the other hand, despite assurances that the interests of the indigenous inhabitants will be protected, the Subcommittee is apprehensive about the implications of statements made by Portuguese officials to the effect that new settlement is intended "to perpetuate Portuguese sovereignty" and that "soldier settlers" would be established in Angola.

The Subcommittee also expresses deep concern over the psychological implications of plans for settlement at this time, particularly if they were to cover lands from which indigenous inhabitants may have fled as a result of the conflict. It feels that a restoration of normalcy in Angola requires priority for the creation of conditions and the taking of measures that will facilitate the return of refugees and that will in no way undermine the hopes of the population for the full enjoyment of their resources and the unfettered determination of their destiny.

In a recent speech in Oporto, the Minister for Overseas Portugal referred to the decree reorganizing the regedorias as inspired by the desire of ensuring the participation of the inhabitants in the administration of local affairs. A further reason for reorganizing the regedorias may have derived from the repeal of the Statute of 1954, which had contained some of the basic provisions of these
institutions. The new decree in its application may permit improvements, but its provisions appear to follow in almost every substantial respect the corresponding provisions of the Statute of 1954. It also lays upon the regedores the obligation to observe and inculcate respect for the provisions of "military discipline."
The decree on the conditions for establishing local autonomous bodies has been referred to by the government of Portugal as providing for "the reestablishment of the normal functions of administrative bodies." The decree revokes a decree of 1940, which had postponed elections to such bodies in overseas provinces, and appears designed to give renewed effect to parts of the Organic Law without major change. It deals with local self-government in the provinces in areas containing persons eligible to vote under Portuguese Law. The Subcommittee notes that tribal populations remain outside these local forms of self-government. In short, the recent reforms would seem to have been designed mainly, as indicated by Portuguese officials, to offset alleged misunderstandings abroad and to rationalize procedures. Their immediate effect on ameliorating the conditions in the territory as recommended by United Nations organs appears to be limited. The position of the United Nations organs as to the nature and direction of the necessary measures and reforms is clearly indicated in the Charter, in General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1542 (XV), and 1603 (XV), and in the Security Council resolution of June 9, 1961. These texts provide the guidelines for consideration by the government of Portugal in connection with its future policy toward Angola. Progress along the lines relevant to General Assembly and Security Council resolutions would require further revisions in the laws and reforms in their application.

While recognizing difficulties of readjustment on certain aspects of policy and of the prompt introduction and implementation of reforms, the Subcommittee feels that there should not be any insurmountable barriers to the introduction of such measures. The Subcommittee believes that the recognition of the personality of Angola, the primacy of the interests of the inhabitants of the territory, the acceptance of the principle of self-determination for Angola, and the need for immediate steps to prepare Angola for self-government are not antithetical to the vital interests or the historic mission of the Portuguese people. Such steps are, on the other hand, fully consistent with the recognition of racial equality and the proclaimed philosophy of Portugal.

In its resolution of June 9, 1961 (S/4835), the Security Council expressed the hope that a peaceful solution would be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Subcommittee is convinced that such a peaceful solution requires efforts both toward the immediate ending of bloodshed and toward the coordinated political, economic, and social development of the territory. It feels, in particular, that measures to remove the legitimate grievances of the population and the establishment of contacts with representatives of Angolan political groups are essential to ensure a cessation of the conflict and to achieve a peaceful solution. The Subcommittee is convinced that it is in the genuine interest of the government of Portugal to heed the opinions expressed by the United Nations
organs and to take the necessary measures with the cooperation of the Organization. It is further convinced that constructive cooperation between the government of Portugal and the United Nations is the best means of bringing about a prompt end to the conflict and a peaceful evolution toward the objectives stated in the United Nations resolutions. It feels that rapid measures by the government of Portugal can still preserve the positive elements of past policies and achievements.

The government of Portugal may well consider the example of other metropolitan powers that have granted or recognized the right of self-determination and independence to territories which had been administered as overseas territories or provinces, and the numerous examples of fruitful relationships that resulted therefrom.

The Subcommittee would express its view that the United Nations cannot but continue its concern with the developments in Angola in view of the provisions of the Charter, the international aspects and repercussions of the situation, and its vital interest with regard to peace in Africa and in the world. The Subcommittee would hope that the United Nations and its Member States would take further action as appropriate to persuade and assist the government of Portugal and the Angolan people to embark on a policy of peaceful settlement in conformity with the Charter.

The Subcommittee notes that the representatives of the Angolan groups heard by it, including those accused by the government of Portugal of responsibility for the recent disturbances, stressed their desire for a peaceful solution of the problem and for cooperation among racial groups within Angola on the basis of equality. This publicly expressed position would seem to provide an opportunity and hope for the achievement of the ends laid down by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Subcommittee has been told by some of these groups that they had found no channel for discussion with the government of Portugal and that the latter had eliminated any basis for discussion by its firmly negative attitude on the question of selfdetermination. The Subcommittee would express the hope that the government of Portugal would see fit to accept the path of negotiation for a solution of the Angolan problem.

The Subcommittee would hope that the facilities of the United Nations would be available to those concerned in their search for a peaceful solution. The Subcommittee feels that a peaceful solution of the Angolan problem requires not only a drastic reform of legislation and administration but also the formulation of plans to prepare the territory for self-government and the exercise of selfdetermination. It would emphasize, in particular, the need for a rapid and massive expansion of educational facilities in order to enhance the economic, social, and political advancement of the territory.

The Subcommittee would point out that the expenditure of resources on military and security measures, especially when the requirements for development of the territory are so great, does not serve the interests of either Portugal or the Angolan people. Attention should rather be focused on the fulfilment of the basic needs of
the people, taking into account the expectations aroused in the population by developments in other territories.

The Portuguese authorities face a historic choice: whether to continue to rely on the use of force, with the inevitable miseries, economic losses, and uncertainties; or to respond to world opinion and take measures to reassure the population, ensure the return of the refugees, and build a new relationship with the people of Angola. What is needed is readiness to understand the new forces in the world, courage to accept change, and wisdom to formulate and pursue viable means toward an enduring peaceful solution.

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
Resolution 42 (IV), February 24, 1962, recommending that the ECOSOC deprive Portugal of membership in the Commission.
Resolution 68 (V), February 23, 1963, expressing regret that the ECOSOC did not comply with resolution 42 (IV) and recommending that ECOSOC reconsider its decision.
Resolution 69 (V), February 23, 1963, reaffirming the ECA's position as expressed in resolution 42 (IV).
Resolution 94 (IV), February 28, 1964, recalling the decision of the ECOSOC to expel Portugal from membership and requesting that representatives of the non-self-

governing territories of Angola, Mogambique, and South-West Africa be invited to attend future sessions of the Commission as associate members.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
Resolution 974 D III (XXXVI), July 24, 1963, decision to reconsider the question of Portugal's membership in ECA, resulting in Portugal's expulsion.
Resolution 974 D II (XXXVI), July 30, 1963, reconsidering a decision on the recommendation of the ECA concerning the membership of Portugal in the Commission.

International Conference on Education (XXVI)
July 4, 1963, resolution demanding Portugal's expulsion "in the name of humanity" and accusing Portugal of holding its African territories "in bondage."

International Labour Organisation, Report, Geneva, February 21, 1962:
[The ILO's report consisted of proceedings and conclusions relating to a request from Ghana to examine labor conditions in the Portuguese territories. The concluding observations of the ILO commission appointed to study the problem are extracted from the ILO's Official Bulletin, XLV (April 1962), 245-47.]

There are certain further aspects of the whole problem that involve such farreaching considerations of general policy that the Commission does not think it appropriate to express its views concerning them as formal recommendations, but as regards which it thinks it desirable to bring certain general observations to the attention of the Portuguese government.
The first such observation is that the policy of abolishing forced labor— to which the government is so completely committed and in the implementation of which it has already made such substantial progress— cannot be made fully effective in a context of social and cultural backwardness in which for many people freedom and compulsion are equally impalpable, and it is very difficult for the government to know much of what happens in the minds of those most directly affected by the measures that it takes.

Freedom is not a purely negative concept; it does not consist only of, and does not necessarily exist by reason of, the absence of compulsion and constraint; it includes an element of choice that represents its positive aspect. It is no accident that the Declaration of Philadelphia links together freedom and dignity, and seeks the fulfilment of both in economic security and equality of opportunity. This fundamental consideration has a direct bearing on the question as to whether labor performed in certain circumstances should be regarded as forced labor or free labor.

In mentioning this matter the Commission is not thinking of the pressure of economic need in response to which most labor is performed throughout the world, but of a complex of economic, social, and cultural pressures that result in people's doing what they are told to do simply because they are told to do so. Their lives are a series of conditioned reflexes that are less than human. It becomes at times impossible to say whether or not their labor is the result of an inner compulsion, which makes it technically forced labor because they are so incapable of any choice or of the exercise of any independent judgment that outside force is unnecessary. An order is an order, a suggestion is indistinguishable from an order; and the inertia of ages maintains a social pattern in which people do what they are told to do because they have always done so.

In certain places, and particularly at the Cassequel Sugar Plantations, the Commission is satisfied that this is the real position and the bulk of the working force is at so backward a stage of development that freedom and economic opportunity belong to a world so wholly beyond their grasp that the question of whether or not the labor exacted from them is forced labor becomes virtually meaningless. This is not a problem that admits of any simple or immediate solution; it involves the whole question of the stage of social and cultural development of a people, but it is an essential feature of the background of the problem that the Commission was appointed to examine and has been one of the major difficulties confronted by it in the many signs of constructive economic and social development in both Angola and Mozambique. A great intensification of measures of economic and social advancement is necessary to eliminate this element in the problem of the effective abolition of forced labor.

The problems arising from social and cultural backwardness are aggravated by language problems. Where the government and its administrative staffs and the management and senior supervisory staffs of industry and plantation agriculture do not speak the same language as do a large proportion, amounting in some areas to the great bulk, of the population, it is difficult for either the government or the leadership of industry to have any real knowledge of what is being done in their
name and on their behalf by those on whom they rely in their dealings with the African population. It is equally difficult for them to have any means of appraising the extent to which their policies and measures give reasonable satisfaction or are acquiesced in only because there is no immediate opportunity of expressing criticism. In the Commission's view, it is a major weakness in the practical implementation of the abolition of forced labor, as of other social measures, that there is a linguistic gap between governments and governed. It is not for the Commission to say what measures should be taken with respect to the study of languages; this is a matter of long-term educational policy. The Commission therefore confines itself to drawing the attention of the government to the matter.

The linguistic problem is the more important for the effective administration of labor legislation in that it tends to reflect racial differences. Portugal, which was one of the first countries to ratify the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention in 1958, is rightly proud of the absence of any racial discrimination in her territories. But, while there is no discrimination on grounds of race, there are, in fact, as yet few Africans in positions of responsibility in either government or economic life. The effect of the lack of an adequate cadre of trained Africans on the rate of development of the territories concerned lies outside the competence of the Commission, which is concerned only with the bearing of the lack of such a cadre on the effectiveness of the abolition of forced labor. The Commission has no doubt that there is, in fact, a direct relationship between the two questions. Where workers are recruited for employment at some distance from their homes, the structure of African society makes some consultation of and cooperation with the local chiefs indispensable. In the absence of trained African elements in the administration in sufficient numbers and at a sufficient level of responsibility, it is difficult for the administration to know what really takes place between the chief and his villagers. A substantial and rapid advance in the training of African cadres in both government and economic life would appear to be entirely consistent with Portuguese policy as it has been explained to the Commission and, while involving matters of general policy going far beyond the competence of the Commission, would afford the best possible guarantee that the policy of the government to make the abolition of forced labor fully effective is not frustrated by a cultural and social background that excludes either real knowledge or proper control.

* * * *

II

RESOLUTIONS AND ACTIONS OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL AND AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

Third Pan-African Congress, Lisbon, 1923, attended by representatives of the government-sponsored Liga Africana, which was described by one delegate as a "great association of Portuguese Negroes, with headquarters at Lisbon... a federation of all indigenous associations scattered throughout the five provinces of Portuguese Africa... the head of the Portuguese African movement... without appealing to violence and departing constitutional limits." The Congress
demanded that Africans have a voice in governmental affairs, the right to land and its resources, free elementary education for all, and an abolition of slave trade.


Second Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Conakry, April 11-15, 1960, approved a resolution on Angola:

The Second Conference, having been made aware of the present political situation in Angola:

Pledges its solidarity with the Angolan people who are fighting for their independence;

Is indignant at the atrocities inflicted upon the Angolan people by Portuguese colonialism;

Demands the annulment of the trial for high treason brought against the Angolan patriots and calls it to the attention of the International Commission on the Rights of Man;

Demands the immediate liberation of the Angolan leader, Ilidio Machado, and of all political prisoners;

Expresses its confidence in the United Nations Special Committee charged with conducting an inquiry into the territories relevant to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and asks that the problem of the Portuguese colonies be placed on the agenda for the next General Assembly;

Appeals to the Afro-Asian peoples to urge their respective governments to plan diplomatic measures against Portugal;

Adopts the institution of a day of Afro-Asian solidarity with the peoples of the Portuguese colonies.

Second All-African Peoples' Conference, Tunis, January 25-30, 1960, approved a resolution on the Portuguese colonies:

The Second All-African Peoples' Conference, meeting in Tunis, January 25-30, 1960, confirming the declarations and resolutions adopted at the first Conference in Accra in December 1958,

After examining the situation created in the African countries under Portuguese domination, where the regime of forced labor is still rigorously applied and where the native populations are subjected to unrestrained exploitation,

Condemns Portuguese colonialist policy, denouncing the systematic repression of nationalist movements and the preparations for war by the Portuguese government in Angola;

Reaffirms the right of these populations to national independence and pledges the independent nations of Africa and all the African people to give them unconditional support;

Demands the immediate liberation of all political prisoners in Angola, Mozambique, "Portuguese" Guinea, So Tomé, and Cabo Verde;

Appeals to the organizations belonging to the conference to organize a day of solidarity for the territories under Portuguese domination during 1960;
Appeals to the United Nations special committee charged with studying the question of the non-self-governing territories to consider the problem of decolonization and independence of the territories;
Is concerned that Portugal is intensifying its repression.
Third All-African Peoples' Conference, Cairo, March 25-31, 1961, adopted resolutions on Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands and Angola:
The Third All-African Peoples' Conference,

Having closely studied the report presented by the Partido Africano da Independência concerning the condition of the people of "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands,
Strongly proclaims the inalienable right of the people of (Portuguese) Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands to national independence and the attainment of their freedom by all possible means.
Denounces the conspiracies of Portuguese colonialism for the purpose of establishing a new form of colonial domination in these countries in collaboration with some African traitors and with the support of American imperialists and West Germans.
Condemns the relations between France and the government of Senegal, on one side, and with the Portuguese government on the other, which have been denounced for being contrary to the interests and the cause of freedom of the people of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands.
Appeals to these two African peoples to attain, either between them or with the peoples of other Portuguese colonies, the speedy and total liquidation of colonial domination.
Urges the African independent states to offer concrete and immediate support to the struggle of the people of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands for the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism and in order to avoid all possibility of establishing neocolonialism in these countries.
The Third All-African Peoples' Conference, having examined the present situation in Angola, a situation characterized essentially by popular rebellion, on the one hand, and by the intensification of barbarous Portuguese repression, on the other,
Salutes the Angolan patriots who, after the events of last February, fought courageously against Portuguese colonialism.
The Third All-African Peoples' Conference, convinced that the Angolan people are about to achieve their national sovereignty,
Condemns all attempts to allow imperialist and neocolonialist intervention in Angola, in particular the provocation of divisions among the people, the dismemberment of territory, or the installation of a puppet government;
Recommends:
1. That all Afro-Asian members of the United Nations pressure Portugal to adhere to the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1960, on the liquidation of colonialism.
2. That the independent African states reconsider their position concerning diplomatic and commercial relations with Portugal.

3. That the African states maintain vigilance until an eventual intervention of the United Nations in Angola, guarding against taking a position that would place them in a situation where they would have to sanction imperialistic maneuvers.

Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization, Monrovia, May 8-12, 1961, approved a resolution on Angola:
The Conference, concerned about Angola, asks all African and Malagasy states to furnish unreservedly their material and moral support to Africans in Angola in their struggle for autonomy; calls attention to the atrocities and bloody repression of which the Angolan people are victims.

Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization, Lagos, January 25-30, 1962, approved an anti-colonialist resolution (aimed at Portugal and South Africa) declaring an immediate economic and diplomatic boycott of all colonial powers that do not accept the right of indigenous majorities to self-determination and independence.


International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, November 1961. The ICFTU executive board expressed the wholehearted solidarity of the free workers of the world with "the freedom movement which has been cruelly suppressed in Angola," insisting that the only acceptable first step toward solution of the colonies' problems would be acceptance by Portugal of the principle of self-determination.

American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, Harriman, New York, November 23-25, 1962, approved the following resolutions on Angola and Mozambique:

We urge the United States government to support the recommendations of the U. N. subcommittee on Angola calling upon the Portuguese government to enter into negotiations with African nationalists for the purpose of implementing self-government for the Angolese. We also call upon the U. S. government to support similar negotiations between the Portuguese government and African nationalists in Mozambique and Portuguese Guind.

We urge the U. S. government and private sources within the U. S. to make a humane response to the medical, educational, and material needs of Angola and Mozambique and of the refugees from those territories.

We support the nationalists of Angola and Mozambique in their struggle for freedom and independence.

We deplore Portugal's expenditure of large sums of money on public relations designed to misinform and mislead the American public, and call upon all media of communication in the U. S. to counter these activities by the Portuguese government by making special efforts to communicate the true facts about Angola and Mozambique to the American public.
We urge the American government not to participate directly or indirectly in supplying arms to Portugal to be used against the peoples of Portuguese territories in Africa.

We call upon the U. S. government to use its influence to persuade other Western powers to urge Portugal to grant Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guiné their independence.

We urge the United States government to support a United Nations resolution permitting the Commission of the United Nations to make an on-the-spot inspection in the Portuguese territories.

Third Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Moshi, February 4-11, 1963, approved the following resolutions on the Portuguese colonies:

The Third Conference, after having undertaken a profound analysis of the situation prevailing in the countries under Portuguese colonial domination,

Reaffirms its formal condemnation of Portuguese colonialism;

Salutes the struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for their national independence;

Supports the action of nationalist organizations of the Portuguese colonies, members of this Conference, in their pursuit of the national liberation struggle, and encourages them to continue their efforts with fervor and determination;

Condemns member nations of NATO who continue to furnish Portugal with military and financial aid;

Condemns the maintenance of foreign military bases in the Portuguese colonies and demands that they be withdrawn immediately;

Condemns the criminal alliance of Salazar, Vervoerd, and Wellensky and affirms its determination to struggle with all means against that alliance, whose aim is the maintenance of European supremacy in Africa against the interests of the African masses;

Demands that each independent country of Asia and Africa:

a. Effect an economic and diplomatic boycott against Portugal,

b. Deny the participation of Portuguese representatives in inter-African, interAsian, or Afro-Asian meetings,

c. Prevent the entry and passage of Portuguese boats and planes in their ports and airports,

d. Prevent Portugal from using their air space,

e. Render all material aid necessary to the development of direct action of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies in order to hasten an end to Portuguese colonialism,

f. Render all material assistance necessary for the accelerated formation of cadres for these countries,

g. Render all aid necessary for the opening in their countries of bureaus of information on the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, and

h. Direct the attention of the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations in order to induce the Security Council to condemn Portugal;
Supports the PAFMECSA decisions on the Portuguese colonies, resolved in its Lopoldville meeting of December 1962.

In particular, the Third Conference,

I. As to Angola:

Considers that the continuation of the war in Angola threatens international peace and security and that the struggle of the Angolan people constitutes an important contribution to the liberation of the African continent;

--Salutes the armed struggle of the Angolan people for national liberation;

--Calls for the freedom of Father Pinto de Andrade, honorary president of the Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA) detained in Lisbon, and of all such Angolan political leaders;

--Urgently appeals to all popular governments and organizations of Africa and Asia to furnish all appropriate aid to the popular liberation army of Angola;

--Reaffirms its certitude that the unity of nationalist forces in Angola is the best means of hastening the triumph of national independence;

--Recommends that February 4 be observed as Angolan Day.

II. As to Mogambique:

--Salutes the union of nationalist forces in the Frente de Libertagao de Mogambigue (FRELIMO);

--Encourages FRELIMO to pursue the fight against Portuguese colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism;

--Assures the Mogambican people and their organization, FRELIMO, of fullscale aid in their liberation struggle;

--Expresses its recognition to the people and government of Tanganyika for the assistance they have unceasingly rendered to the Mogambican people in their national liberation struggle....

III. As to "Portuguese" Guin6 and the Cape Verde Islands:

--Salutes the armed struggle of the Guin6 people against Portuguese colonialism;

--Assures the people of Portuguese Guin6 and the Partido Africano da Independ~ncia da Guind e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) of full-scale assistance and encourages them to continue their fight for national liberation....

--Demands the freedom of PAIGC president, Raphael Barbosa, as well as that of all imprisoned Guin6 and Cabo Verde patriots...

Union Africaine et Malgache, Ovagadougou, March 10-14, 1963, reaffirmed its militant stance toward colonialism adopted at Libreville on September 12-14, 1962, by stating in its final communiqud:

Lastly, the conference affirms its determination to liquidate the last colonial fortresses in Africa. To this end, it decided on concrete measures to help its friends in Angola, Mogambique, Portuguese Guin6, and the Cape Verde Islands, and so on. It thus considers liberty as an indivisible whole.

Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, May 22-26, 1963, adopted the following resolutions on decolonization:

The Summit Conference of Independent African States meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from May 22 to May 25, 1963; having considered all aspects of the
questions of decolonization; unanimously convinced of the imperious and urgent necessity of coordinating and intensifying their efforts to accelerate the unconditional attainment of national independence by all African territories still under foreign domination; reaffirming that it is the duty of all African independent states to support dependent people in Africa in their struggle for freedom and independence; noting with deep concern that most of the remaining dependent territories in Africa are dominated by foreign settlers; convinced that the colonial powers, by their forcibly placing settlers in control of the governments and administration of those territories, are establishing colonial bases in the heart of Africa; have agreed unanimously to concert and coordinate their efforts and action in this field, and to this end have decided on the following measures:

1. Declares that the colonial powers' forcible imposition of settlers in control of the governments and administration of the dependent territories is a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned;
2. Invites the colonial powers to take the necessary measures for the immediate application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by insisting on the fact that their determination to maintain colonies or semi-colonies in Africa constitutes a menace to the peace of the continent;
3. Invites further the colonial powers, particularly the United Kingdom with regard to Southern Rhodesia, not to transfer the powers and attributes of sovereignty to foreign minority governments imposed on African peoples by the use of force and under cover of racial legislation. A transfer of this kind would amount to a violation of the provisions of United Nations resolution 1514 on independence;
4. Reaffirms its support of African nationalists of Southern Rhodesia and solemnly declares that if power in Southern Rhodesia were to be usurped by a racial white minority government, the member states of the Conference would lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measures that the African nationalist leaders may devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority. The Conference undertakes henceforth to concert the efforts of its members to take such measures as the situation demands against any state according to such recognition;
5. Reaffirms that the territory of South-West Africa is an African territory under international mandate and that any attempt by the Republic of South Africa to annex it would be regarded as an act of aggression; reaffirms also its determination to render all necessary support to the second phase of the South-West Africa case before the International Court of Justice; reaffirms, further, the inalienable right of the people of South-West Africa to self-determination and independence;
6. Intervenes expressly with the great powers so that they cease without exception to lend directly or indirectly any support or assistance to all those colonialist
governments that might use such assistance to suppress African national liberation movements, particularly the Portuguese government, which is conducting a real war of genocide in Africa. Informs the allies of colonial powers that they must choose between their friendship for the African peoples and their support of powers that oppress African peoples;

7. Sends a delegation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to speak on behalf of all African states at the meeting of the Security Council that will be called to examine the report of the United Nations Committee of 26 on the situation in African territories under Portuguese domination;

8. Demands the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations between all African states and the governments of Portugal and South Africa so long as they persist in their present attitude toward decolonization;

9. Asks for an effective boycott of the foreign trade of Portugal and South Africa by (a) prohibiting the importation of goods from those two countries, (b) closing African ports and airports to their ships and planes, (c) forbidding the planes of those two countries to fly over the territories of all African states;

10. Earnestly invites all national liberation movements to coordinate their efforts by establishing common action fronts, when necessary, so as to strengthen the effectiveness of their struggle and the rational use of the concerted assistance given them;

11. Establishes a coordinating committee consisting of Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Tanganyika, Congo-Lgopoldville, Guinée, Senegal, and Nigeria, with headquarters in Dar es Salaam, responsible for coordinating the assistance from African states and for managing the special fund to be set up to provide assistance;

12. Establishes a special fund to be contributed by member states with the deadline of July 15 to supply the necessary practical and financial aid to the various African national liberation movements;

13. Appoints the day of May 25, 1963, as African Liberation Day and will organize popular demonstrations on that day to disseminate the recommendations of the Heads of State Conference and to collect sums, over and above the national contributions, for the special fund;

14. Receives, in the territories of independent African states, nationalists from liberation movements in order to give them training in all sectors of Africa, and affords young people all the assistance they need for their education and vocational training;

15. Promotes, in each state, the establishment of a body of volunteers in various fields, with a view to providing the various African national liberation movements with the assistance they need in the various sectors;

16. Fixes a deadline for the accession of all African territories to independence.

Pan-African Women's Conference, Abidjan, August 1963, approved the decolonization resolution voted at the May 22-26, 1963, Addis Ababa conference and called for the sending of medicines, clothing, and food to aid "all our brothers fighting for the liberation" of the Portuguese colonies.
World Council of Peace, Warsaw, November 28-December 2, 1963, approved resolutions on the Portuguese colonies:
The Council, whose presidential committee has followed with closest interest the
efforts made by the United Nations and by the independent African states to
secure a peaceful solution to the question of ending colonialism in the countries
dominated by Portugal, considers that:
1. The Portuguese government, disregarding present-day international law and
morality, continues to perpetuate the crimes of colonialism in Africa. It employs
every form of violence for the purpose, from police repression and the massacre
of people, in Mogambique, S5o Tom6, and the Cape Verde Islands, to colonial
war in Angola and Portuguese Guin6.
2. The great upsurge of national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies,
the particularly violent nature of Portuguese repression, and the outbreak of armed
struggle in Angola and Guin6 are eloquent proof of the consciousness and
determination of the peoples of those countries to free themselves from the
colonialist yoke and to win independence.
The colonial war in Angola and Guin6 and the definite prospects of fresh colonial
wars being started by Portugal in Mogambique, the Cape Verde Islands, and Slo
Tomd make for the insecurity of independent African states. The peoples of these
countries have a sacred right to free themselves from the universally condemned
colonialist yoke, and the Portuguese government's attitude in face of this right
constitutes an attack on peace in Africa and a threat to world peace.
If the peoples of the Portuguese colonies are to have the peace that is
indispensable for their progress, if the security of African states is to be
guaranteed and the threat to peace emanating from Portuguese colonialism
removed, the peoples of these countries must achieve national independence
without delay.
The Council must also note that the government of Portugal--an underdeveloped
country--could not carry out its colonial oppression if it did not have the military
and financial aid of its NATO allies, and particularly of the United States, Britain,
West Germany, and France, as well as South Africa.
In view of this situation the World Council of Peace:
--Reaffirms its unconditional support to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies-
Angola, "Portuguese" Guin6, the Cape Verde Islands, Mogambique, Sao Tom6
and Principe--in their struggle for national independence, and proclaims the right
of these peoples to free themselves by every necessary means from the yoke of
imperialism and colonialism. It calls for an immediate end to the war being waged
against the people of Angola and Portuguese Guin6.
--Denounces and condemns the retrograde and criminal attitude of the Portuguese
government and brands as accomplices all Portugal's allies who in one way or
another are helping Portuguese colonialism.

--Assures the Conferencia das Organizagbes Nacionalistas das Colônias
Portuguesas (CONCP), the common front of struggle of the peoples of these
colonies against Portuguese domination, of its active support.
--Calls on all national peace committees and peace forces all over the world to organize a wide international campaign with a view to informing public opinion about the just nature of the liberation struggle conducted by the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. This movement should also seek material support for this struggle and should vigorously oppose the giving of aid to Portugal by the NATO countries.

Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, Dar es Salaam, November 24, 1964, revised an earlier resolution that recognized the GRAE:

Having studied the report of the Committee of Three (Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, and United Arab Republic) on the reconciliation between the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA),

Recalling that the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa has the imperative mandate to assist the movements in the struggle for the unconditional liberation of all African territories still under foreign domination,

Adopts the conclusions of the report of the Committee of Three and decides to submit them for approval in the next session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity in Nairobi;

Decides, with a view to reinforcing the liberation struggle in Angola, in addition to the assistance already given to the Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (GRAE), to bring, in the meantime, both technical and material assistance to the fighting front opened by the MPLA in the enclave of Cabinda and in Angola.

Fourth Conference of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Winneba, Ghana, May 9-16, 1965, passed the following resolution on Portuguese colonial domination:

The Fourth Conference, having analyzed the situation in the Portuguese colonies:
--Salutes the heroic struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for their national independence;
--Reaffirms its formal condemnation of Portuguese colonialism;
--Recognizes, in the face of the intransigence of the Portuguese fascist-colonial government, that armed struggle is the only effective means for eliminating Portuguese colonialism and for the realization of the just aspirations of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies for their freedom and national independence;
-- Warns member organizations and independent African nations of Africa and Asia against the maneuvers of Portuguese colonialism and its imperialist allies that have as an aim the perpetuation of Portuguese colonialism or the introduction of neocolonialism in the Portuguese colonies in an attempt to create puppet organizations;
-- Denounces and condemns the aggressive plots of Portugal...
--Appeals for ... aid necessary to the development of their liberation struggle, in particular:
   a. aid in weapons and military equipment, necessary for the armed struggle;
   b. facilities for the transit of military material;
   c. financial aid;
d. health assistance...;

e. facilities for documentation...;

I. As to Angola:
-- Salutes the armed struggle of the Angolan people for national liberation, under
the direction of the Movimento Popular de Libertaigo de Angola (MPLA);
-- Requests neighboring countries to facilitate the transit of military materials
necessary for the development of the armed struggle of the Angolan people;
-- Expresses gratitude to the brother people of the Congo (Brazzaville), to their
party and government for never ceasing to aid the Angolan people and their
organization, the MPLA;
-- Assures the Angolan people and their organization, the MPLA, of total
assistance in the fight against Portuguese colonialism and for total and complete
independence.

II. As to "Portuguese" Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands:
-- Salutes the victorious development of the armed struggle by the people of
Portuguese Guinea and the people's revolutionary armed forces, under the direction
of the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC);
-- Encourages the Cape Verden people and their organization, the PAIGC, to
pursue their efforts to extend the armed struggle to the Cape Verde Islands;
-- Assures the people of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands of total
assistance in their heroic struggle against Portuguese colonialism and for total and
complete independence;

-- Expresses its gratitude to all African peoples and, in particular, to the people of
the Republic of Guinea, to their government and to the Parti Démocratique de
Guine for the assistance that they have unceasingly rendered to the people of
Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands and to the PAIGC.

III. As to Mozambique:
-- Salutes the armed struggle of the heroic people of Mozambique, under the
direction of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO);
-- Assures the Mozambican people and their organization, the FRELIMO, of total
assistance in the struggle that they wage against Portuguese colonialism and for
total and complete independence;
-- Expresses gratitude to the people and government of Tanzania for the
unconditional and solid assistance they have unceasingly rendered to the
Mozambican people;
-- Declares September 25 as a day of solidarity with the Mozambican people.
Organization of African Unity, Conference in Accra, October 22-26, 1965,
approved the addition of three more members to the nine-member Liberation
Committee charged with helping nationalist groups in the Portuguese territories
and in South Africa and, in addition, adopted a series of resolutions urging greater
worldwide efforts to eliminate Portuguese rule.
Fourth Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization or the
Tricontinental Conference, Havana, January 1966, endorsed the FRELIMO in
Mozambique, the MPLA in Angola, and the PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea and
approved anticolonialist motions, including one demanding liberation for the inhabitants of Sao Tomé and Príncipe.

* * * *

APPENDIX
NOTES ON OPPOSITION, PRE-NATIONALIST AND NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS WITH INTERESTS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA
The following party and movement descriptions are based on careful readings of available documents issued by the nationalist groups themselves as well as on interviews with many of the leaders. Some secondary source material, although contradictory and frequently erroneous, has also been consulted. It is most difficult to reconstruct the splintering and proliferation of these movements in the early 1960's, and the Africans who participated in these developments have difficulty in keeping the relationships in order. It is hoped the following descriptions may be helpful to the researcher, who is urged to use discretion in including this information in his own analysis. The following breakdown serves as a guide to clarification of complex and seemingly insignificant political developments. It is possible, however, that some statements may confuse and obscure rather than clarify.


General Portuguese Africa
Comitê de Libertaglo dos Territórios Africanos sob o Domínio Português.
Integrated with the MAC and led by Hugo de Meneses, with headquarters in Conakry, according to Portuguese sources.
Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP).
Based in Rabat, Morocco, and successor to the FRAIN, the CONCP is led by its president, Magro de Andrade, and its secretary general, Marcelino dos Santos. It includes in its organization the PAIGC, the MPLA, and the FRELIMO and the CLSTP. Conferences were held in 1961 and 1965.
Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies. Formed about 1961 in England by a group of liberals and intellectuals headed by Sir Leslie Plummer, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, Basil Davidson, and others in collaboration with representatives of the Portuguese opposition and the MPLA.
Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Português (FACCP). Founded in 1962 as the UPA's answer to the CONCP. Included the MLGCV of Guiné. Based on a joint agreement signed in Dakar on January 17, 1962, which included as objectives the intensification of armed combat in Angola; extension of the war to southern Angola; commencement of hostilities in Guiné; establishment of provisional republics in Angola and Guiné. A two-party front never implemented.
Frente Revolucionária Africana para a Independência Nacional das Colônias Portuguesas (FRAIN). Formed in Tunis in 1960 at the second All-African Peoples' Congress, with headquarters in Conakry. Comprised the MPLA, PAIGC, MINA, and the MAC. Superseded the MAC and replaced by the CONCP.
Liga Africana (LA). Headquartered in Lisbon, an early political organization in which Angolans participated. In 1923 the third Pan-African Congress was held in Lisbon under the auspices of the Liga. The Liga, according to the Congress's report was "a federation of all the indigenous associations scattered throughout the five provinces of Portuguese Africa and representing several million individuals. . . ." Government control of the Liga limits its activities to social welfare.
Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC). Organization of Portuguese African nationalist movements founded in 1957 in Paris and replaced by the FRAIN at the second All-African Peoples' Congress in Tunis in 1960. The Paris meeting was known as the Reunion de Consultation et d'Etude pour le Développement de la Lutte des Peuples des Colonies Portugaises.
Partido Nacional Africano (PNA). Conservative interterritorial group of educated Africans and mulattoes established in Lisbon in 1921. Called for autonomy in the
colonies.
Unigo Geral dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Dominação Colonial Portuguesa or
Union Generale des Etudiants d’Afrique Noire sous Domination Coloniale Portugaise (UGEAN). Founded in Rabat in 1961 as a student organization with representative membership from all Portuguese territories in Africa.
Portuguese Opposition
Comité Marxista Leninista (CML). The "fechado" faction of pro-Chinese Communist elements that defected from the PCP about February 1964. Led by Campos, a former member of the PCP central committee. The other "abierto"-faction, called FAP, had links with the student movement in Portugal.
Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal. Portuguese American committee led by Abffio de Oliveira Aguas and formed to support the activities of Henrique Galvão.
Active in the early sixties, it favored self-determination for the African colonies.
Direcção Democrata Social. Semi-legal opposition in Portugal during late fifties and sixties; comprised of old republicans, liberals, socialists, and other moderates opposed to the Salazar regime.
Direcção Revolucionária Ibérica de Libertação (DRIL). Portuguese revolutionary group of Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvão which supported Galvão’s seizure of the luxury liner Santa Maria in 1961. Allegedly, Galvão’s plot was linked with a scheduled uprising in Angola.
Frente Anti-Totalitário dos Portugueses Livres Exilados (FAPLE). Movement in São Paulo, Brazil, formed by Henrique Galvão and other Portuguese exiles. advocating policy changes in the African colonies. Published Boletim and Tribuna de Portugal during the early sixties.
Frente de Ação Popular (FAP). With headquarters in Paris, this pro-Chinese "abierto" faction of the Partido Comunista de Portugal was comprised of younger members of the PCP who defected or were expelled from the party. Led by Carlos Langa, it published the mimeographed Revolução Popular from March to September 1964.
Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN). An exile Portuguese coalition established in 1962 at Algiers. Its second congress elected Humberto Delgado as president. Delgado, because he was not reelected at the third congress, formed his own Frente Portuguesa de Libertação Nacional, which favored militant policies of the pro-Peking FAP. FPLN consists of three organizations: the Partido Comunista; the non-Communist left Movimento de Ação Revolucionária (MAR), which was led by Rui Cabegades in Algiers and was an outgrowth of student disorders in 1962 (comprised of two factions, the Catholic youth and the socialist
youth); and the Movimento de Resistência Republicana (MRR), represented in Algiers by Tito de Morais and a loose coalition of republicans, liberals, etc., such as Cunha Leal and Azevedo Gomes in Portugal. There were also three independents on the executive committee of the FPLN: Manuel Sertório, Piteiro Santos, and J osé Maria Ervedosa. Ramos de Almeida represented the Communist Party.

Frente Portuguesa de Libertagão Nacional (FPLN). Led and formed by Humberto Delgado after he failed to be reelected president of the original FPLN. Claimed to be militant and favored revolutionary tactics. Established in mid-1964; ceased with Delgado's murder in Spain in early 1965.

Grupo Revolucionário Português de Libertagão (GRPL). Pro-Peking movement of Portuguese exiles. Established in the early sixties, it published Revolução Portuguesa.

Junta de Acção Patriótica dos Portugueses da Argelia. Published JAPPA, a bulletin issued from January to about August 1964.

Junta Central de Acção Patriótica (JCAP). The executive committee of the FPLN in Algiers.

Juventude da Frente Patriótica de Libertagão Nacional (JFPLN). Youth movement of FPLN.

Liga Monárquica Independente (LMI). Led by Princess Maria Pia de Saxe-Cobourg, Duchess of Braganga, daughter of King Carlos and Manuelista claimant to the throne. Upon return from exile in early 1965 she was accused of complicity with the exiled opposition and immediately expelled by the Portuguese police. She was associated with the "constitutional" and "independent" monarchists who backed the opposition's Diretório Democrata Social in Portugal in Portugal and the Frente Patriótica de Libertagão Nacional (FPLN).

Movimento de Acção Revolucionária (MAR). Led by Rui Cabegades in Algiers. A non-Communist left movement established in mid-1962 as an outgrowth of student unrest at that time. Two currents within the MAR: Catholic youth and socialist youth. Published Boletim do MAR and Boletim Informativo. Affiliated with the coalition FPLN.

Movimento de Resistência Republicana (MRR). Affiliated with the FPLN. Tito de Morais was its Algiers representative. A loose coalition of republicans and liberals that functioned in Portugal as the Diretório Democrata Social and was led by Azevedo Gomes and Cunha Leal. Had semi-official status and was allowed from time to time to publish manifestos of protest.
Movimento de Unidade Democratica (MUD). Opposition movement active in Portugal and to a lesser extent in the colonies during the late forties.

Movimento de Unidade Democratica-Juvenis (MUDJ). Portuguese opposition movement in the late 1940s which included Agostinho Neto in its central committee.

Movimento Democratico de Libertag9o de Portugal e Col6nias (MDLPC). Exile movement in Caracas that published a newspaper called Oposiglo Portuguesa.

Movimento Nacional Independente (MNI). Precursor movement to the FPLN; led by Humberto Delgado about 1961.

Portuguese Democratic Association (PDA). Exile group in London led by Sacuntala de Miranda and a committee of political refugees.

Seara Nova. Socialist movement active since the early twenties; publishes a literary journal with the same title.

Section des Rencontres des Etudiants Portugais b l'Etranger (SEEPE). Student opposition group in Brussels that published the French-language quarterly SEEPE Information during the mid-sixties.

Uni§o de Mulheres Portuguesas (UMP). Exile organization in Montevideo, Uruguay, led by Maria Luisa Silva Neves.

Unidade Democratica Portuguesa (UDP). Group associated with Portugal Democratico in Brazil. Seeks Portuguese support in Brazil and has diverse branches in other parts of Latin America in its fight to overthrow Salazar.

Union des Etudiants Portugais en France (UEPF). Opposition student group in Paris that publishes the Portuguese-language monthly Boletim.

Angola and Cabinda

Afrika-Vanguarda (AV). Name for the Juventude do Conselho do Povo Angolano (CPA); headquartered in L~opoldville.

Alianga dos Bakongos or Association pour le Maintien, l'Unitd et l'Expansion de la Langue Kikongo (ABAKO). Established about 1950 with headquarters in L6opoldville. Led by Joseph Kasavubu, who desired to reestablish the old Congo monarchy and a province of the lower Congo which would include both Portuguese and French territory. An ABAKO branch apparently was established in Angola. The ties between the UPA and Patrice Lumumba prompted ABAKO leaders to sponsor the NGWIZAKO, which in October 1960 published in Ldopoldville a manifesto demanding that Cabinda be joined with the Congo. Clandestine offshoots of ABAKO
included the Mouvement de Regroupement des Populations Congolaise (MRPC), established about 1959, and the Mouvement de Resistance Bakongo, formed in the same year. An Angolan auxiliary, the Nto-Bako Angola, was formed on December 8, 1960.

Alianga dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo or Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo (ALIAZO). Led by its president, Andr- Massaki, until its reconstitution as the PDA under the leadership of Emmanuel Kounzika. Kounzika was first vice-president and Ferdinand Dombele was secretary general of ALIAZO. Founded in 1960, ALIAZO advocated independence for Angola and the unity of the Bazombo people. ALIAZO superseded the ASSOMIZO.

Alianga dos Naturais do Enclave de Cabinda. See Associacao dos Indigenas de Enclave de Cabinda and AREC. Later known as the MLEC.

Alliance de Mayombe (ALLIAMA). In August 1963 this Cabinda movement joined the FLEC coalition. At the time its president was Ant6nio Eduardo Sozinho.

Alliance des Jeunes Angolais pour la Liberte ou Alianga da Juventude Angolana para a Libertade (AJEUNAL). An obscure Bakongo organization whose president, Alphonse Matondo, and secretary general, Edouard Makoumbi, proclaimed in 1962 their movement's objective of uniting the UPA and MPLA "for the struggle and liberation of Angolan territory." Makoumbi petitioned the U. N. Special Committee on Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1963.

Alliance of Portuguese-Speaking Congolese. Active in the early 1960s, the Alliance was led by its president, Jos6 dos Santos Kasakanga, and vice-president, Antoine Menga. Its aim was to obtain cooperation between the Portuguese government and Angolan nationalists in the Congo.

Amicale des Originaires et Ressortissants du Cabinda. Anti-Portuguese movement in Brazzaville led by Paulino Posty and Alfredo Nascimento.

Amicalismo. Movement and philosophy brought to the former French Congo by Andr Matiswa, who declared himself a disciple of Kimbangu. Although not influential in Angola, it is viewed suspiciously by Portuguese authorities.

Amigos do Manifesto Angolano (AMANGOLA). Angolans who in Brazzaville during 1965 supported Jonas Savimbi prior to his forming the UNITA.

Angola Negra. Group established about 1948 and absorbed into the Conselho de Libertagio de Angola in 1952.

Anticomit6 Angola. Committee of Angolan students and sympathizers in Amsterdam, active during the sixties.
Associaglo Africana do Sul de Angola (AASA). A legal organization founded about 1954 by railway workers of Nova Lisboa. Led by an African deputy in the Portuguese National Assembly, Anttnio Burity da Silva, the organization later was viewed suspiciously by governmental authorities.
Associag~o Cambande or Cassango. Pre-nationalist religious movement founded in 1943.
Associagfo Chipambule or T’yipambule. Founded in 1956; an extension of the prenationalist religious movement, Associag~o Cambande or Cassango.
Associaglo das Mulheres de Angola (AMA). Established as the women’s branch of the FNLA; led by Maria da Conceigo Rosgrio Neto, president of AMA.
Associaglo dos Indfgenas do Enclave de Cabinda. Founded perhaps as early as 1956 with the objectives of separating Cabinda from Angola and achieving a union with the ex-Belgian Congo and ex-French Congo. Its leadership included Lufs Frank Ranque (president), Jolo Pukuka, Anastgsio Semba, and Santos Puaty. Possibly same as (or renamed) AREC.
Associaggo dos Mussorongos. Mutual-aid Sorongo society formed about 1942 with headquarters at Boma in the Congo. Seems to have evolved into the MNA about 1960. Its president was Antdnio Monteiro.
Associagio dos Quiocos do Congo [Ex- Belga, Angola e Rod–sia or the Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l’Angola et de la Rhod6sie (ATCAR). Viewed by Portuguese authorities as a potential threat to Angola. Established in Elizabethville in 1956. The tribally oriented ATCAR was founded by a Katanga businessman, Ambroise Muhunga, who apparently had ambitions of becoming paramount chief of all Chokwe, including those in Angola.
Associagfo Maiange. Religious movement influential in Cabinda; viewed with suspicion by Portuguese authorities.
Associagto Regional dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA). Evolved from the Gr–mio Africano founded in 1929. Similar in orientation to the Associaglo dos Naturais de Mogambique; advocated mass mobilization of Africans to achieve reform and change. Composed of African intellectuals from Luanda including Viriato da
Cruz, whose struggle against "repressive colonialism" was carried out by clandestine and semi-clandestine means. Mensagem, a literary journal, was published under its auspices.


Association Mutuelle des Ressortissants de Zombo (ASSOMIZO). Legal association and mutual-aid society established December 23, 1956, by Bazombo followers of Sim~o Toko in Iopoldville. Superseded by ALIAZO. One of its founders was Emmanuel Kounzika; its first president was Andrg Massaki, editor of a Protestant journal, Sikama (Wake Up).

Baha. Protest movement built on a system of small cells. Organized by Joaquim Filipe Cardoso and others during the 1950s.


Campanha Nativista. A small group of politically conscious persons in Malange whose efforts to seek intervention by the League of Nations against unjust colonial practices were thwarted by police. Leaders Manuel da Silva Lameira and Pais Brandlo were arrested in 1927.

Centro de Estudos Angolanos. Established in Algiers by Angolan students generally sympathetic to the MPLA. Publishes a magazine and occasional monographs.

Centro de Instruglo Revoluciondrio (CIR). MPLA revolutionary training center at Dolisie in the Congo-Brazzaville.

Chijilochalimbo. Self-help association of the Lwena or Luvale peoples established in 1958 under its president, Dickson Mukuma.

Comisslo da Revoluglo Nacional. Formed by Jolo Batista Traves Pereira and other Africans who defected from the Portuguese army to join with the UPA in early 1962.

Comisslo de Luta das Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola. About
1952 this clandestine group was amalgamated into the PCA. Comité da Revolução Nacional de Angola (CRNA). Obscure dissident UPA group which supported Jolo Batista in February 1962.

Comité d’Action d’Union Nationale des Cabindais (CAUNC). After being expelled from the central committee of the MLEC in November 1961, Nzita Henrique Tiago formed the CAUNC. In August 1963 this grouping joined the FLEC coalition; its president at the time was Henrique Tiago.

Comité de Soutien a l’Angola (CSA). Group led by Jean Mettas and others sympathetic to the MPLA and the PAIGC. Established in Paris.

Comité des Bons Offices Angolais. Led by a Bakongo businessman, Emmanuel Lamvu, who proposed to unite all Angolan nationalists active in the mid-sixties. Comité Diretor Provisório do MPLA. Established on July 5, 1963, by Viriato da Cruz as a splinter faction of Neto’s MPLA; later affiliated with the FNLA.

Comité Federal Angolano do POP. The PCP affiliate in Angola established about 1948. A precursor to the short-lived PCA.

Comité Secreto Revolucionário do Sul de Angola (CSRSA). Formed in May 1961 from remnants of the Cacunda Group. Built an underground leadership led by three Lobito residents: Osseia Oliveira Chinyama as president; Adlo José Domingos Kapilango, vice-president; and Luciano Kassoma, secretary.

Comité Unidade Nacional Angolana or Comité de l’Unité National Angolaise (CUNA). Its representatives, Alphonse Kita, José Manuel, and Henriquê Pierre, respectively secretary general, political director, and president, presented a petition concerning Angola to the U. N. Special Committee on Colonial Countries and Peoples on June 26, 1964.

Comunidade Cabindense (COMCABI). Cited by Portuguese sources as having had an ephemeral existence in Angola.

Confédération des Syndicats Libres de l’Angola (CSLA). Established in Léopoldville on September 1, 1962, and supported by the Confederation des Syndicats Libres du Congo. Led by Gracia Kiala, president, and André Kiazindika, secretary general. Unsuccessfully sought membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de l’Angola (CGTA). Labor organization formed in Léopoldville on August 18, 1962. Predominantly Bakongo-Bazombo constituency. President was Antoine Luzemo; secretary general was Pedro Makumbi-Marques. A supporter of ”Christian social doctrine,” the CGTA was
admitted to the African regional division of the international Christian labor movement, the Union Panafricaine et Malgache des Travailleurs Croyants (UPMTC).

Conselho de Libertago de Angola (CLA). Established in early 1952 as a coalition of three movements formed in 1948, the Comitê Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Português, the Comissão de Luta das Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola, and Angola Negra.

Conselho do Povo Angolano (CPA). Established in 1965 and led by André Cassinda (Kassinda). Coalesced the UNA, PNA, CUNA, MNA, and the UGTA.

Conselho Nacional de Libertaggo (CNL). Highly critical of the GRAE, the CNL published several manifestos during 1965.

Corpo Voluntário Angolano de Assistência aos Refugiados (CVAAR). Organized by the MPLA in Léopoldville during June 1961 to give medical assistance to war wounded and to refugees.

Exército de Libertaggo de Angola (ELA). Little-known clandestine group active in Luanda about 1960-61.

Exército de Libertaggo Nacional de Angola (ELNA). Guerrilla organization of the UPA established March 28, 1962. Same as the ANLA.

Exército Popular de Libertaggo de Angola (EPLA). Guerrilla army of the MPLA.

Frente Africana contra o Colonialismo Português (FACCP). Founded in 1962 as the UPA equivalent to the CONCP. Included UPA and the MLGV of Guiné, but lacked a Mogambican representative. Its joint agreement signed in Dakar, Senegal, on January 17, 1962, included as objectives: (1) intensification of armed combat in Angola, extension of war to southern Angola; (2) opening of hostilities against Portuguese in Guiné with UPA support (military material and technical assistance); (3) establishment of a Republic of Angola and Republic of Guiné under provisional governments. Agreement was signed by André Cassinda-Martins for UPA and Henri Labery for MLGC.

Frente Angolana de Libertaggo Nacional (FALN). Headquartered in Léopoldville, led by Marcos Cassanga, military leader of UPA who split from Holden Roberto's group. Four UPA rebels training in Tunisia joined Cassanga's movement. A faction of the LGTA also was believed to have split from the UPA and joined with Cassanga.

Frente de Libertaggo de Angola or Front de Liberation de l'Angola (FLA). Proposed...
coalition of ALIAZO and MLEC, submitted in April 1961 to the UPA and rejected by Holden Roberto. The FLA name also was proposed by the MPLA for a front organization during 1961-62. Frente de Unidade Angolana (FUA). Founded in January 1961 as a passive resistance movement of Europeans in Angola; led by Alexandre S6crates Diskalos (president) and Fernando Falcao. Advocated cooperation with the MPLA if MPLA would drop its demands for immediate independence. FUA clandestine activities were centered in Benguela and Lobito. Some of its activists apparently had attempted to form an opposition movement of young whites and mulattoes in Nova Lisboa about 1940. FUA exiles in Paris established a new committee in September 1962. Frente Democrita para a Libertago de Angola (FDLA), Front formed on July 7, 1963, by MPLA, Movimento Nacional Angolano, UNTA, and NGWIZAKO after expulsion of Cruz and Matias Migueis from the MPLA. A few days later the MDIA also joined the FDLA. The FDLA offer to join the GRAE was rejected by Holden Roberto. Frente Nacional de Libertaglo de Angola (FNLA). Established in Ldopoldville on March 29, 1962, as a coalition of the UPA and PDA. One week later the FNLA under Holden Roberto's leadership announced the formation of the GRAE. Frente Unida de Juventude de Angola (FUJA). Established about 1961 by Luanda students as the successor to the MAJE. Frente Unida para a Libertaglo de Angola (FULA). Created May 1960 and believed by Portuguese officials to be linked with the MPLA. Front Commun de la Jeunesse Nacionaliste de l'Angola (FCJNA). Bazombo youth group which in 1962 was converted into AJEUNAL. Front Commun des Parties Politiques de l'Angola (FCPPA). Established in Leopoldville in November 1960 as a coalition of ALIAZO, MPLA, and UPA. Although the AREC participated in discussions, it did not join. The UPA withdrew in January 1961; the coalition disbanded in February 1961. Front de Lib6ration National de l'Angola (FLNA). Short-lived movement established by Marcos Kassanga after his withdrawing from the UPA in 1962 following the death of military commander Jolo Batista. Front National Angolais (FNA). Participant in coalition meeting (with FNLA, MDIA, MLEC, UNTA, and other groupings) on May 10, 1962, with Congolese Prime Minister Kamitatu. Front pour la Lib6ration de l'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC). Established August 4,
1963, as a coalition of MLEC, CAUNC, and ALLIAMA.
Gov~rno Revoluciondrio de Angola no Exflio or Gouvernement Rdvolutionnaire de
l'Angola en Exil (GRAE). The government in exile established in 1962 in
Ldopoldville by FNLA leader Holden Roberto. Recognized by fifteen nations as
of June
1965.
Grande Vanguardo-Commando. Clandestine group of African soldiers, including
Marcos Kassanga and Jofo Batista. which they formed while attending the
military school Escola de Aplicaglo Militar at Nova Lisboa in 1959.
Gr~mio Africano. Founded in 1929; later became the Associaglo Regional dos
Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA).
Groupe Angolais URSS. Presented petition to the U. N. Special Committee on
Colonial
Countries and Peoples on April 28, 1964.
Grupo Avante. A local youth group at Silva P8rto in the district of Bid. Censured
by
Portuguese authorities in the 1950s.
Grupo de Defesa da Regiffo Costeira (DIRECO). Cited by Portuguese sources as
having had an ephemeral existence in Angola.
Grupo de Nova Lisboa. Obscure opposition movement formed about 1940 by a
group
of young whites and mulattoes in Nova Lisboa who were opposed to the
deportation
of laborers to Sfo Tomd. Elements in this group later formed the FUA.
Grupo Ohio. Lobito social-cultural club which was harassed by police during the
fifties.
Grupo Saint Esprit or Dibundo Mpeve ia Londo. Pre-nationalist religious
movement,
a derivation of Kimbanguism; influential in the Noqui region of Angola. Founded
in 1957.
Igreja dos Negros. Founded by Simlo Mp~fdi, a native of the former Belgian
Congo
who later resided in northern Angola where he was accused of being a German
agent, imprisoned, and deported. The movement is viewed with much suspicion
by Portuguese authorities.
Juventude CrisW de Angola (JCA). Secret society formed in the mid-fifties by
dissidents who had withdrawn from the AASA and the Christ the King Seminary
at Nova Lisboa. Functioned only eight months, although its vice-president, Joqo
da Cruz Chisseva Kalutheho, organized a JCA section in Dundo. Remnants of
the organization later joined the UPA.
Junta Militar Angolano no Exflio (JMAE). Splinter group of the GRAE
established in
1966 as an outgrowth of an abortive raid on GRAE headquarters in Kinshasa in
mid-1965. Led by Alexandre Taty, the JMAE supported the Portuguese army
forces in Cabinda.
Juventude da Unífto das Populações de Angola (JUPA). Youth group of the UPA. Published Juventude Revolucionária.
Juventude de Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (JMPLA). Youth branch of the MPLA.
Juventude Democrática de Angola (JDA). Youth branch of the PDA.
Kasonzola. Syncretic movement influential in the region of Baixa de Cassange during the 1930s. Although banned by authorities, the movement remained influential and later was converted into a protest movement known as Maria, led by António Mariano.
Kimbanguism or Movimento do Quimbanguismo. Religious movement begun in the early 1920s by a Protestant, Simon Kimbangu. Called a "prophet movement" and restricted by Belgian authorities in the Congo. Later, just before Congo independence, the movement was revived on the lower Congo and apparently used by the Abako political party to stir up Bakongo solidarity. According to the American missionary David Grenfell, there were some thirty-seven splinter groups of the movement, all vying for power. Former Congolese Finance Minister Emmanuel Bamba, who was hanged in Léopoldville in mid-1966, was a member.
Liga Angolana. Organization founded by Angolans in 1913; succeeded by the LNA.
Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA). Established in Léopoldville on June 13, 1961, and originally led by André Cassinda, a young trade unionist from northern Angola. The LGTA, the labor wing of the UPA and later of the FNLA, affiliated with both the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the African Trade Union Confederation as well as with the Federagão Geral dos Trabalhadores do Congo.
Liga Nacional Africana (LNA). One of earliest African organizations, established in 1929 by white Angolans from several illegal and semi-legal organizations; later admitted mulattoes and Negroes. Until the 1940s LNA ranks divided over the question of utilizing radical techniques to right grievances through a direct participation of the African masses involving "native" as well as "assimilated" Africans. The Salazar regime intervened and replaced the elected leadership with administrative committees appointed by the governor general of the colony. The intervention occurred after the Liga in 1956 issued a manifesto deploring the plight of Africans in Angola and then, in 1957, declined a Portuguese request to send a delegation to the United Nations.
Lundas. Important ethnic group of exiles desiring reconstitution of the old Lunda Kingdom. Led by European-educated tribal chief Mwanta Yanvu, with headquarters in Sandoa, Katanga.
Maria. Messianic protest movement influenced by Kasonzola, Maria was the syncretic movement of the 1930s in the region of Baixa de Cassange. Founded by António Mariano, who preached an evangelism influenced by the UPA and Lumumba.

Movimento Popular de Libertaglo de Angola-Agostinho Neto (MPLA-AN). Identification by the GRAE and FNLA of Neto's MPLA after the split of July 5, 1963, when Viriato da Cruz established the Comitê Diretor Províssorio do MPLA and later affiliated with the FNLA.

Movimento Separatist Angolano (MSA). Founded in June 1960 and led by a European, José António Cabral, who maintained contacts with Portuguese refugees in Brazil. The movement advocated independence.


Movimento Tokoismo. Messianic movement led by Simão Gongalves Toko, who was born in Angola in the village of Sadi Kiloango near Maquela do Zombo. Comprised of followers of the Bakongo subgroup, the Bazombos. Adopted some traits attributed to Kimbanguism. Formalized into the Nkutu 5. Nsimbani and ASSOMIZO.

Movimento Tonche or N-Tonche. Pre-nationalist religious movement founded in the former Belgian Congo in 1941; influential in the region of Maquela do Zombo. Also known as the Kidista movement.

NGWIZANI h Kongo (NGWIZAKO). An ethnic mutual-aid society which became a political party in February 1960, having evolved from the Portuguese-supported Catholic Bakongos (including the deposed Kivuzi clan) whose candidate for the Congo Kingdom, António III, was named king in 1955. Known also as the Associaglo dos Congugnses de Expressão Portuguesa. In October 1960 it published, in a Léopoldville newspaper, a manifesto demanding that Cabinda be detached from Angola and joined with the Congo. In July 1963 NGWIZAKO joined the FDLA.

Its leadership included Emmanuel Loureiro, who served as first vice-president of the FDLA coalition. In 1965 the movement joined the FPIKP.


Olongende. Bailundu social-cultural club harassed by the police in the fifties.
Organizago Cultural dos Angolanos (OCA). Lobito association led by Protestants Julio Alonso and Jos4 Belo Chipenda. Officially apolitical, the OCA was banned about 1957, and its president, Afonso, was arrested by the police.
Organizag.o das Mulheres de Angola (OMA). The women's branch of the MPLA, represented by Guilhermina de Assis.

Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO). Southwest African organization identified by Portuguese authorities as a potential threat to southern Angola, especially in the area of Baixo Cunene and Cuamato. Established in 1959. Later became SWAPO.

Parti d'Action Rdvolutionnaire Angolaise (PARA). Party temporarily established by Jonas Savimbi after his defection in 1964 from the GRAE.

Parti Progressiste Africain (PPA). Ex-Ajeunal, Bazombo youth group that in 1965 joined the FPIKP.

Partido Comunista Angolano (PCA). Active by October 1955 in Luanda, Catete, and Malange. Possibly replaced the Conselho de Libertaggo de Angola, which was established in early 1952 as a coalition of the Comit6 Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Portugis, the Comisslo de Luta das Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola, and Angola Negra. The PCA joined the MPLA in December 1956, and apparently dissolved thereafter.

Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA). Angola's first revolutionary party to function illegally as a representative of the African masses. Early in its formation it issued a manifesto calling on Africans to join underground groups and unite in a broad movement for the liberation of the colony. Organized by Viriato da Cruz, editor of the clandestine journal A Mensagem. Founded in 1953 or perhaps 1956. Later, in December 1956, merged with the MPLA of which Cruz became the first secretary general.

Partido Democratico de Angola (PDA). Evolved from ALIAZO and associated with UPA in the FNLA and GRAE. Leaders include Andr6 Massaki and Emmanuel Kounzika. Headquarters are in Kinshasa.

Partido Nacional Africano (PNA). Small Chokwe party based at Tshikapa, Kasai, and headed by Jos6 Paulo Chiringueno, a former vice-president of Cassinda's CNE. Desired an independent Chokwe Republic of Mexico. Affiliated with the CPA in 1965.

Partido Nto-Bako or Nto-Bako Angola (NTOBAKO). Founded in Ldopoldville on December 8, 1960, as an Angolan auxiliary of ABAKO. Its first president was Angelino Alberto, who later collaborated with the Portuguese police in Angola. In 1965 it joined the FPIKP. See Origine du Peuple Bakongo d'Angola.
Partido Pro-Angola. Formed in early 1920s by Europeans desiring autonomy. Demanded the establishment of administrative and financial autonomy based on the British system of government. Portugal would continue to have sovereignty over Angola, but Angolans would have the right to choose their own governor.

Partido Solitgrio Africano (PSA). Congolese movement established in 1959 with headquarters in L~opoldville. Active in Malange and Lunda during the early 1960s. Believed by the Portuguese to have been active in Baixa do Cassange.

Rassemblement Ddmocratique de la Jeunesse Angolaise (RDJA). Established October 1961 by factions of ALIAZO, UPA, and MPLA.

Rassemblement des Chefs Coutumiers du Kongo Portugais (RCCKP). A participant along with the FNLA, MDIA, MPLA, MLEC, UNTA, and other groups in a May 10, 1962, meeting with Congolese Prime Minister Kamitatu. Joined the FPIKP in 1965.

Servigo de Assistgncia ass Refugiados de Angola (SARA). GRAE refugee service in L~opoldville.

Sociedade Cultural de Angola (SCA). Cultural organization of European liberals and Marxists founded in 1943.

Solidariedade Africana para a IndependAncia de Angola (SAIA). Obscure nationalist movement mentioned in official Portuguese sources as once having an ephemeral existence in Angola.

South-West Africa National Union (SWANU). Its representative, Mbaeva, petitioned the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on August 21, 1962, and explained how Portuguese police had persecuted tribal elements overlapping southern Angola and northern South-West Africa.

South-West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO). Formerly known as OPO (see above) and apparently influential with the Cuanhama peoples of southern Angola. Announced an alliance with the FNLA in 1963 and later cooperated with the UNITA of Jonas Savimbi.

Tawa or Tonsi. Nineteenth-century religious movement still active in Portuguese Congo in early 1920s.

Ukwashi Wa Chokwe (UWC). Self-help association formed about October 1956 by John Kajila and some fifty Chokwe representatives at Mufulira. Kajila was its first
president. Split by an internal crisis in 1958, the movement was reorganized under a new president, Smart Chata, in October 1959. Under his leadership the movement became progressively Angolan.

Unifto Congolese para a Libertaigo de Angola or Union Congolaisse pour la Liberation de l'Angola (UCLA). Ldopoldville-based nationalist movement mentioned in Portuguese sources as no longer in existence. A Congolese Bakongo group linked to ABAKO and hostile to UPA, PDA, and MPLA.

Unilo das Mulheres da Angola (UMA). Its representative, Serafina de Assis, petitioned the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration on June 1, 1962. The UMA is affiliated with the MPLA.

Unifo das PopulagSes de Angola (UPA). Established by Holden Roberto in 1958 as the successor to UPNA with headquarters in L~opoldville, it published A Voz da Nago Angolana. On March 29, 1962, it joined the PDA in the formation of FNLA and on April 5, 1962, announced the establishment of GRAE. A movement of Bakongo Angolans living in the Congo but claiming ties to the old Congo monarchy.

Many in its ranks had been influenced by Protestant missionaries.

Uniao das PopulagSes do Norte de Angola (UPNA). A movement, according to official statements, established in IAopoldville in 1954 among Angolan emigrants in the Congo, but according to verbal statements by its founders not organized until mid1957. A coalition of the Lopoldville and Matadi Bakongo groups which named Barros Necaca as president and Borralho Lulendo as secretary.

Unifo dos Naturais de Angola (UNATA). Movement established about 1956 and led by Eduardo Vitdrio Pereira. The movement, which was suppressed about 1958, influenced Marcos Kassanga and Jolo Batista Traves Pereira, both of whom were later associated with the UPA.

Unifo dos Trabalhadores e Operdrios Negros de Angola (UTONA). Illegal trade union with underground headquarters in Angola.

Uniao Nacional de Angola or Union Nationale Angolaise (UNA). Short-lived organization led by former UPA militants Marcos Kassanga and Andr6 Cassinda, who desired to establish a nationalist movement among Angolan refugees in Katanga.

Later Cassinda included the UNA in his CPA alliance.

Unio Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA). Established in March 1962 in Switzerland, where it held its first congress. A second congress also was held in Switzerland a year later. At its third congress, a report of the proceedings stated: "We want the movement to be integrated within the entire Angolan nation,
free of ethnic, political or religious discrimination. The movement must not side with any political organization ... 2 The UNEA is pro-UPA, whereas UGEAN is pro-MPLA.

Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA). According to nationalist sources, the UNTA was formed in 1954 with headquarters in Leopoldville. Founded by French-speaking Bakongo migrants, it established relations with the World Federation of Trade Unions and political ties with the MPLA and the CONCP. Its secretary general during the early sixties was Pascal Luvuala, and its deputy secretary general was Bernard Dombele.

Uniao Nacional para a Independncia Total de Angola (UNITA). Organizational effort began in 1965, but the union was formally founded in March 1966 by former GRAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Savimbi. Headquarters are in Zambia whence it launched attacks across the Angolan border. It claims to be active in the areas of Moçico, Lunda, Bié, and Cuando-Cubango.

Uniao Progressista de Nso em Angola (UPRONA). New party formed in August 1965 by Carlos Pinto and Muanza David. Represents the Nsoso tribe of the 31 de Janeiro region of northern Angola. Its statement of objectives concerned the cultural, social, educational and economic problems of the Nsoso tribe. Also issued a constitution of twenty-five articles. Members believed formerly associated with the MPLA. See Grenfell lett. Notes No. 30/65. Affiliated also with FPIKP.

Uniao Social dos Maimbos de Luali (Seggio Local da ABAKO). Anti-Portuguese movement in Cabinda.

Union Générale des Travailleurs Angolais (UGTA). Split off from the LGTA to join in 1965 with the CPA.

Vamos Descobrir Angola. Literary movement founded about 1950 by Viriato da Cruz, Agostinho Neto, Mirio de Andrade, and white Angolans including Mario Antônio, Leston Martins, Antônio Jacinto, Antônio Cardoso. The name also was the slogan for the literary journal Mensagem. The movement was known also as the Movimento dos Novos Intellectuais de Angola.

Vilinga Va Kambungo. Self-help association of the Luchazi peoples; established in 1958 under its president James Muwema.

Wene wa Kongo. A faction of NGWIZAKO led by Manuel Ndamba and José Milton Putuulu; favored maintenance of the NGWIZAKO in Angola.

Pre-Nationalist Religious Movements
Associagfto Cambande or Cassango, Associaglo Chipambule or T'yipambule, Grupo
Saint Esprit or Dibundo Mpeve ia Londo, Movimento Mayange or Nlenvo, Movimento Tokoismo, Movimento Tonche or N-Tonche, Tawa or Tonsi: See entries above for description.

Other Religious Movements Viewed With Suspicion by the Portuguese
Amicalismo, Associaqfo Maiange, Igreja dos Negros, Movimento do Quimbanguismo,
Movimento Lassismo: See entries above for description.

Portuguese Guin6, Cape Verde, Sio Tomd and Prfncipe


Forgas Armadas Revoluciongrias do Povo or Forces Armdes Rvolutionaires du Peuple (FARP). Established at PAIGC conference February 13-17, 1964, inside Portuguese Guin6. This marked a second main phase in the liberation struggle.
Frente de Libertaglo da Guin6 (FLG). Short-lived front formed by coalition between
MLG-Mendy (after his expulsion) and the RDAG (there were earlier ties between the two groups). Both MLG and RDAG joined the FLING in 1962.
Frente de Libertaglo da Guin6 Portuguesa e Cabo Verde or Front de Libdration de la Guin6e Portugaise et du Cap-Vert (FLGC). Established in 1960, probably by both Labgry and Cabral. A coalition front claimed to have been established within Guin6 but actually functioned outside (Cabral in Conakry and Labgry in Dakar).
Labgry announced the FLGC's formation in an article in Afrique Nouvelle (March 30, 1960); also in a communiqu6 of March 21. In that communiqu6 Labgry indicated that the FLGC program was similar to the Federation of Mali, then in existence. The FLGC incorporated the MLICV and later the MLGCV-Conakry of Cabral. Labgry emphasized in his communiqu6 the importance of Cabo Verde as an African land, called upon the Portuguese to negotiate independence. The FLGC, directed by Labgry and founded by ten men including Francisco Jos6, Jolo Gomes,
Frente de Luta pela Independ~ncia Nacional da Guin6 Bissau (FLING). Established in Dakar during July 5-August 2, 1962. A coalition of groups representing Fulas, headed by Ibrahim Diallo; Manjacas, led by Frangois Meny; and Mandingas, headed by Doudou Seydi and his RDAG followers. There also was some Balanta and Papel representation and following. Includes the following: MLG (FLG) of Mendy; MLG, Conakry; MLG, Bissau; UPG, Labgry, once with Cabral in FUL
until FLING formation; RDAG; URGP (Pinto Bull in 1963); and UPLG (believed ceased or expelled with Diallo's death). The 1962 amalgam of small groups led to the following coordinating committee: Diallo, President (UPLG); Sekau Mane, Secretary for International Affairs (RDAG); F. Mendy, Secretary General; Daniel Bary, Secretary for Information (UPLG); Henry Mendy, Treasurer (MLG); Boubacar Mane, Secretary for Organization and Propaganda (RDAG); Gumar Gano, Secretary for African Affairs (UPLG); Emanuel Perreira, Secretary for Education (MLG); Fily Mane, Secretary for Women's Affairs (RDAG). See the hearing of petition by Ibrahim Diallo in Dakar, June 12, 1962, before U. N. Special Committee: A/AC 108/SR 50. There called Front National de Liberation de la Guinde dite Portugaise (FNLG).

Front Uni de Liberation de la Guinde du Cap Vert (FUL); also called Front Uni de Libération. Established in July 1961 as a coalition and successor of the FLGC. Established on the initiative of Amilcar Cabral and his PAIGC, but also incorporated the UPG of Labory until the front split over differences in policy. The MLGC of Senegal (Cabral established main organization, the MLGC or MLGCV of Conakry) split into its original groups, the MLICV and the UPG, which stemmed from the UDCV and MLICV and the FLGC. The July 26, 1961, issue of Afrique Nouvelle includes a FUL resolution. Immediately after the FUL's formation, its rival, the MLG of Francois Mendy, attacked three towns across the Senegal border into Guine.


Mouvement de Liberation des Iles du Cap Vert (Senegal Section-MLICV). Leader in 1963 was Mendes Diaz. Affiliated indirectly with Labo-ry-led groups since 1960. Possibly originally called the União Democrática de Cabo Verde. Apparently through Labo-ry link and the tie to UPG, the MLICV united into the MLGC or MLGCV (Dakar section), then split when FLING was established in 1962.

FLING oriented toward Guiné, and therefore the MLICV maintains only an indirect tie, probably through Labo-ry, who is of Cape Verdean descent.


Movimento de Libertaglo da Guiné (MLG). Established in 1960 or earlier and led in 1961 by Manuel Pereira (president) and Saidou Kalle (vice-president); the MLG was founded by Francois Mendy, Dacosta Balbino and Pereira Victor (Manuel?). A militant group that led raids across Senegalese border in 1961 and that may
have carried out extensive military operations in 1962. At its annual meeting in Dakar in April 10, 1962, F. Mendy (secretary general), Henry Mendy (political director), and Joaquim Gomes (treasurer) were expelled. On April 16 the three met and expelled Dacosta Balbino, who was ostracized by all nationalists. The Mendy faction re-established earlier ties with the RDAG (in mid-1961 founded the FLG) and joined the FLING. Members of FLING coordinating committee in 1962 were F. Mendy (secretary general), H. Mendy (treasurer), and E. Pereira (secretary for education). Factions or branches are: MLG-Dakar, led by F. Mendy and associated with FLING; MLG-Conakry, led by Ernestina and Luís da Silva; and MLG-Bissau, the interior organization. For further information, see Afrique Nouvelle, October 6, 1961, and U. N. document A/AC 108/SR 48. Also SR 40-41 and 46.

Movimento de Libertaplo da Guiné e Cabo Verde or Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinde "portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert (MLGC or MLGCV with sections in Conakry and Dakar). First created in 1960 in Conakry by Amílcar Cabral and others (Cape Verdeans and Guineans exiled in Republic of Guinea who, in a document of November 1960, claimed that the MLGC was a branch of the FLGC, which in turn was directed by the PAIGC. The PAIGC officially seems to have been maintained as the interior movement, with the related MLGC the exile movement. The FLGC was considered an interior movement also, but in reality existed entirely in exile, with the PAIGC and FLGC having an internal organization.

The Senegal branch was founded in 1960 or 1961 by Labdry, who fused the UDG (?) of Portuguese Guinea and the UDCV (later respectively called UPG and MLICV). According to Bustin, the MLGC or MLGCV of Senegal was led by Ibrahim Diallo, who was secretary general. The Senegal and Guinean branches attempted to coalesce but failed, with the Senegal branch going its separate way, turning to the UPA of Angola to form the FACCP. Later they reunited into the FUL.

Movimento de Libertaplo da Guiné Portuguesa or Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée Portugaise (MLGP). Probably the predecessor to or part of the FLGC, the popular front movement claimed to have been established in Guinea by nationalists and which had as a branch the MLGCV. MLGP established probably in late 1950s or in 1960.

Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). Founded in 1956 as the successor to the unsuccessful MING, which grouped civil service employees, the PAIGC, established by Amílcar Cabral, Rafael Barbosa and others, attempted to aggregate urban and rural workers. Secretary general and military chief in the 1960s was Amílcar Cabral. Established within Guinea, Cabral attempted to establish related exile organizations and this resulted in the
formation of the MLGCV and later the FUL. A turning point was the
dockworkers' strike of Pijiguiti in August 1959, after which the PAIGC decided to
avoid demonstration in
urban areas and to concentrate on mobilization in rural areas. After failure to
unite with other nationalist movements, mainly in Dakar and led by Labry, Caba-
ral decided to pursue his own course. He established headquarters in Conakry,
where PAIGC became the principal movement. In about 1959, the PAIGC
established its labor affiliate, the UNTG, and later formed the women's branch,
the UDEMU. A third phase was the launching of guerrilla warfare in 1962 and in
1964 the establishment of a revolutionary army. The PAIGC maintains contact
with the PAI of Senegal, the MPLA, the UDENAMO, and CONCP as well as
FRELIMO.
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain de la Guinée dit Portuguese (RDAG).
Essentially a Mandinga-oriented group that joined the MLG in 1961 to form the
FLG and in 1962 the FLNG. Leaders in 1963 were Doudou Seydi and Cheik
Mane, although Doudou Seydi had been sentenced to ten years in a Senegalese
prison in May 1962.
He had been arrested earlier in Conakry in April 1962. Allegedly he was framed
by Cabral. Among RDAG members serving on the FLNG executive committee
in 1962 were Sekou Mane (secretary for international affairs), Fily Mane
(secretary for women's affairs), and Boubacar Mane. See U.N. document A/AC
108/SR/49,
statement of June 11, 1962, for further information.
Unifto das PopulagSes da Guind (UPG) or Union des Populations de la Guinée
Dite Portuguese (sometimes called UPG-ex MLGC and UPG-Bissau). Formerly
associated with Labry's MLGC or MLGCV and later with the FUL. Probably
stemmed from the UDG. Later, in 1962, joined the FLNG. Called a purely
Guinean movement
although Labry, one of its main leaders, is of Cape Verdean descent. After
MLGCV and FUL split, the UPG and the MLICV worked separately but in close
cooperation. At time of U. N. petition hearings in 1962 Lopez da Silva was
secretary general; José Mendy was vice-president; and Jonas Fernandez, Faria,
and Labry presented views in which they claimed 2,500 to 3,000 members.
Unio Democrdtica da Guin6 or Union Démocratique de la Guinée (UDG). Like
the
UDCV and the MLICV, the UDG later became the MLGCV. Led by Labdry, the
two main groupings, Cape Verdean and Guindan, formed the coalition of FLICV.
Unifto Democr-tica das Mulheres da Guin6 e Cabo Verde (UDEMU). Women's
branch
of the PAIGC, with headquarters in Conakry.
Unilo Democrdtica de Cabo Verde (UDCV). Apparent predecessor to MLICV,
which
was aligned with Labdry's FLGC (later called the UPG within the MLGC or
MLGCV
coalition). Also aligned with the FLICV before becoming the MLICV.
Unifo dos Povos da Guiné (UPG). Originally known as the Mouvement de Libération de la Guiné "portugaise" and later incorporated into the MLGC.
Unifo dos Povos das Ilhas de Cabo Verde or Union des Peuples des Iles du Cap Vert (UPICV). Extreme left group led by Jost Lait-o da Graca. No affiliation.
Unilo Geral dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UGTG). Small Portuguese Guiné trade union established in Dakar in 1962; organized among Guineans resident in Senegal and allied with FLING. Secretary general was Bartolomeu de Carvalho, but union later was led by Estevo António Tavares. Maintained contacts with LGTA of Angola and received assistance from the Tunisian trade union federation, the Union Gdnérale Tunisienne du Travail.
Unilo Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UNTG). The labor affiliate of the PAIGC claimed to have been established and still functioning within Guiné itself.
Union des Ressortissants de la Guiné Portugaise or Unio dos Cidadbes da Guiné Portuguesa (URGP). Established in 1963 and led by Benjamin Pinto Bull, who in the same year visited Portugal and conversed with Salazar during a three-day visit. Advocates peaceful negotiations with Portuguese. Pinto Bull's brother Jaime was named a high official in Guiné itself and had long served as a deputy in the National Assembly; also in Portugal's U. N. delegation. The Pinto Bull name stems from their father, who came to Guiné from Freetown, Sierra Leone for employment and married a Portuguese woman. B. Pinto Bull is a school teacher in Dakar.
Union Populaire de Libération de la Guiné–e Portugaise (UPLG). Became part of FLING in 1962 with Ibrahim Diallo as president. A Fula-oriented movement. Other members included Daniel Bary, who was secretary of information of FLING in 1962, and Gumar Gano, who was secretary for African affairs in 1962. At the U. N. committee hearings in 1962 (see A/AC. 108/SR. 50, Dakar, June 12, 1962), the secretary general was Barry Mamadou, a student at the University of Dakar, who left Guiné "seven years ago." Leader in 1963 was Ibrahim Diallo (who later died?).
Mogambique
Associaglo Africana. Originally called the Gr–mio Africano. Composed of mulattoes or mixed peoples of Mogambique.
Associaglo dos Naturais de Mogambique. Established, controlled, and supported by white Mogambicans. An organization for the Europeans born in Mogambique, not for Africans or Asians which at first openly discriminated against non-Europeans in its membership and services. In the 1950s began to encourage the membership of other racial groups. Eventually adopted a policy supporting social integration between whites and Negroes as well as favoring eventual independence from
Portugal. Launched a scholarship program to subsidize or support Africans in schooling. Eventually government intervened and replaced the leadership, ending the organization's effectiveness and, according to Eduardo Mondlane, "with its demise as a multi-racial nucleus may have gone all the hopes for a racially tolerant Mozambique."

Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mozambique. Originally called the Instituto Negrofilo, which split off from the Gr–mio Africano. Composed of black Africans whose leaders have been intimidated and imprisoned from time to time.

Comité Revolucionario de Mozambique (COREMO). Formed in June 1965 after initiation of unity talks in March. Announced on June 17-18 that COREMO comprised a coalition of five movements: UDENAMO-Mozambique, UDENAMO-Monomotapa, MANU, MANC or MANCO, and UNAMI (which apparently did not actually join).

Most of these organizations announced their dissolution upon joining COREMO. H. J. C. Gwambe was named first president. From headquarters in Lusaka, COREMO announced that it launched its revolution for Mozambican independence on October 24, 1965.

Comité Secreto da Restauração da UDENAMO (COSERU). Formed by Gwambe after he failed to be elected to executive committee of FRELIMO and after his expulsion from Tanganyika.

Frente de Libertação de Mozambique (FRELIMO). Established June 25, 1962, as a coalition of UDENAMO, UNAMI, and MANU under the direction of Eduardo Mondlane. A party congress was held in September to outline its program of action and principles. In December 1962 and in mid-1963 several leaders were purged (by Leo Millas, Mondlane's personal representative) while Mondlane was at Syracuse University. After further organization and preparation, FRELIMO launched its war against the Portuguese in Mozambique on September 25, 1964. Mondlane later was assassinated, and Moises Machel assumed the leadership.

Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Mozambique (FUNIPAMO). Established May 20, 1963, with headquarters in Kampala, Uganda. Comprised UDENAMO-Monomotapa, MANU, and MANC or MANCO. Succeeded by a broader coalition front, COREMO.

Gr–mio Africano. The predecessor to the Associaggo Africana, composed of mulattoes or mixed peoples. Important as a beginning of African nationalism in
Mogambique. A faction of black Africans split from the Gr~mio to form the Instituto Negrófilo, later called the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique. Instituto Negrófilo. Formed after a division in the Gramio Africano in the 1930s. Comprised indigenous black Africans. Represents the beginnings of overt African nationalism, although its leaders and organization are controlled by the Salazar government. Under Salazar regime, name changed to Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique.

League of Revolutionary Mozambican Students and Youth (LEJUREMO). Student group under dominance of the MANU leaders. Recruited by Leo Millas in Khartoum, Sudan.

Liga Feminina de Mogambique (LIFEMO). The women's organization of FRELIMO which held its first congress in Mbeya from May 31 to June 4, 1966. Its first president was Selina Simango.

Mogambique African National Congress or Congreso Nacional Africano de Mogambique (MANC or MANCO). Represented by Sabastene Sigauke and part of the front organization, FUNIPAMO. Headquarters in "Central Africa." Also joined in COREMO.

Mogambique African National Union (MANU). Stems from a social organization established by the Makonde tribe in northern Mogambique and in Tanganyika, called the Mogambique Makonde Union, which joined with other small groups to establish MANU in Mombasa, Kenya, in February 1961. It was supported by the Kenya African National Union and the Tanganyika African National Union. Moved its headquarters to Dar es Salaam in late 1961 after joining with several groups in Tanganyika. Many of its members had been active in KANU and TANU until the independence of Tanganyika, when there was an opportunity to establish a similar movement of Mogambicans. Mathew Mmole was its secretary general and M. Mallinga its president, the latter having been a labor union leader who worked in labor movements of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, and was an organizing officer of dockworkers in Mombasa and cotton workers in Uganda. Joined with FRELIMO in June 1962 but reformed when its leaders were expelled in December 1962. MANU joined with FUNIPAMO in May 1963 and with COREMO, officially, in June 1965.

Mogambique African National Union (MANU--Khartoum). In 1965 and 1966 maintained headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan. Dominated a youth group, LEJUREMO, and claimed to have initiated the military struggle in Mogambique on August 28, 1964.
Mogambique Makonde Union. Principal group of several small movements established about 1954 that fused to form the MANU. Had ties with TANU of Tanganyika. Mogambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO). Established on September 25, 1964, by six expelled members of the FRELIMO central committee. Joined UDENAMO in early 1965. Succeeded by COREMO after UDENAMO joined with four other organizations.


Movimento Democratico de Mogambique. An organization of white Mogambicans that in April 1961 demanded civic rights for all Africans and an end to forced labor. An organization of leading lawyers, doctors, and businessmen that sent a petition to Salazar in April 1961. Later it called for a boycott of the 1961 elections.

Nucleo dos Estudantes de Mogambique. Founded in 1949 by Eduardo Mondlane and other Mogambicans who had been attending school in South Africa. Represented all Africans attending secondary school in Lourenço Marques. Mondlane and others interrogated because of this activity. Later (1961) succeeded by the UNEMO.

Nucleo Negro de Manica e Sofala. Its president, S. Simango, was arrested by Portuguese police in 1956.

Partido de Libertaglo de Mogambique. Opposition party organized by two black Africans, Diniz Mengame and Tomaz Betulane Nhantumbo, who were sentenced to prison by a Lisbon court in 1962, allegedly for plotting against the security of the state. Their party, also known as the Convenglo do Povo de Mogambique, was formed during 1956-57 in Johannesburg.


Uniao Democrática Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO). First established in Southern Rhodesia by Mogambicans working in Salisbury. Founded on October 2, 1960, and later established headquarters in Dar es Salaam in April 1961. Its leader, Gwambe, deported from Tanganyika after his announcement of impending attack by nationalists on Mogambique. Gwambe's expulsion of Marcelino dos Santos from UDENAMO may have been the reason for his not being named to the executive committee of FRELIMO when it was formed as a coalition in June 1962 (coalition of UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI). In late 1962 Mabunda and other MANU leaders were expelled by FRELIMO (Leo Millas apparently behind the ousters); Mabunda and others reformed an UDENAMO in Cairo which became known as UDENAMOMogambique, while Gwambe announced reestablishment of
UDENAMO-Monomotapa or the União Democrática Nacional de Monomotapa, with headquarters in Kampala, Uganda. The UDENAMO-Monomotapa, MANU, and MANC or MANCO came together in May 1963 to establish in Kampala a front called the FUNIPAMO. Later they joined with the UDENAMO-Mogambique to form the coalition called COREMO in 1964 and 1965. In June 1965 both UDENAMO groups and MANU announced the dissolution of their groups and declared allegiance to COREMO. COREMO established in Lusaka with foreign office in Cairo. Gwambe had early ties with MPLA and PAIGC before the creation of FRELIMO and also with Ghana, which refused to recognize Mondlane's movement for some time. Gwambe, after expulsion from Tanganyika, established the COSERU and then later reformed the UDENAMO. Uniao Democrática Nacional de Monomotapa (UDENAMO-Monomotapa). Established about late 1962 by Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe. See under Uniao Democrttica Nacional de Mogambique, above.


União Nacional Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI). Established about 1961 by leaders from the Tete region who were exiled in Nyasaland. Moved headquarters to Dar es Salaam in about 1961; in 1962 joined with FRELIMO and later withdrew. Leader in early 1960s was José Baltazar Chagong'a, who petitioned the United Nations.

Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes de Mozambique or Union Nationale des Etudiants du Mozambique (UNEMO). Student movement begun in Lourenço Marques in 1949 when a group of university students who had been attending school in South Africa grouped all secondary school students in Lourenço Marques into an organization called the Núcleo dos Estudantes de Mozambique. Eduardo Mondlane was a founder of the Núcleo. This led to the establishment of UNEMO in 1961.

Uniao Progressiva de Mozambique (UPM). A party in Manica and Sofala that in a statement issued in 1961 favored self-determination for Mozambique and demanded equality for the African.

INDEX
Abako (Bakongo affiliation), 206 Accra. See All African Peoples Conference, First; and Conference of Independent African States, First; and Organization of African Unity, Accra Conference
(CPA)
Aid to Portugal, 154; financial, 212, 578; from NATO, 40, 88, 90, 578; German troops, 294. See also Arms to Portugal
Albuquerque, Captain Mouzinho (Mousinho) de, 386, 424 Alianpa Compacto ou Unidade, 440 Alianpa da Juventude Angolana para a Liberdade (AJEUNAL), 588, 593, 599 Alianpa dos Bakongos or Association pour le Maintien, l'Unité et Expansion de la Langue Kikongo (ABAKO), 206, 587, 596, 599, 600, 602 Alianpa dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo (ALIAZO), 43, 93, 103, 188, 241-42, 253, 588, 590, 592, 593, 600 Alianpa dos Naturais do Enclave de Cabinda (AREC), 188, 588, 590
All African People's Conference; First (Accra 1958), xv, 206, 494; Second (Tunis 1960), xv, 57, 63, 65, 157, 190, 253, 470, 487, 493, 494, 570, 584; Third (Cairo 1961), 494, 570-72
Alliance (South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal), 91, 286, 294, 451, 455, 574. See also Afro-Asian solidarity
Alliance de Mayombe (ALLIAMA), 128, 588, 593 Alliance des Jeunes Angolais pour la Liberté, 588, 593, 599 Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo (ALIAZO), 179, 588. See also Alianva dos Naturais de Maquela do Zombo
607 Association des Tshokwe [Tchokwe du Congo, de l'Angola et de la Rhodésie (ATCAR), 589
 Association Maiange, 589, 602 Associagão Regional dos Naturais de Angola (ANANGOLA), 187, 194, 589, 594 Association des Ressortissants de l'Enclave de Cabinda (AREC), 588, 589, 590, 593,
 596
 Association Mutuelle des Ressortissants de Zombo (ASSOMIZO), 588, 590, 598
 Association pour le Maintien, l'Unité et l'Expansion de la Langue Kikongo (ABAKO),
 587
 Azevedo Júnior, Luiz de (of the MPLA), 277, 513
 Bahá (protest movement), 590 Baía dos Tigres, 188, 488
 Baixa de Cassange, 181, 191, 216, 595, 600 Bakongo tribe; religiously inspired nationalist group, xii, xiii; favoratism Roberto, xvii, 150, 159, 206, 587, 588, 591, 595, 596, 598, 600, 601 Bala, Jean Pierre (President of MDIA), 244 Balanta, 305
 Balbino, Dacosta (of MLG), 604 Balthazar de Castro, Ambassador, 50

Bandeira, Sade, 386 Bandung, Conference, 450; Congress of, 61 Baptista, Jolo
(Sec. Gen. GRAE), 158 Barbosa, Rafael (co-founder of PAIGC), xix, 575, 605
 Barreto, Francisco, 384 Barros, Jean (of PDA), 121 Barroso, Reverend Father, 48
 Baru, 424
 Bary, Daniel (of UPLG and FLING), 603, 607 Batista, Jogo, 590, 593 Battle of
 Como, 377-78 Bazomboks, xiii, 43, 593 Bechuanaland, 523 Beira, 421, 490
 Belgian Congo, 318 Belgium: as colonial power, 70, 144, 185; colonization of
 Congo, 50 Belgrade. See Conference of Heads of State of Non-aligned Nations
 Bembe (Angola), 46 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 41, 159 Benga, Alfredo, 55 Benn, Anthony Wedgewood, 584 Berlin. See Pact of Berlin Berlin Conference of 1885, 50, 127, 184, 186, 394 Bijagós Islands, 322 Bissau, Guiné (PAIGC and FLING
headquarters), xi, 297, 308, 316; Pijiguiti massacre, 304, 321, 356, 369 Bloc. See
 Alliance Boal, Manuel, 265 Boavista, laborers, 45 Bo (Guiné), 380 Boletim
 (Paris), 587 Boletim (São Paulo), 585 Boletim de Informação (UNEA
publication), 136 Boletim do MAR, 586 Boletim Informativo, 586 Bomboko,
 Justin, 80, 148 Border. See Frontier Boror Comercial, 447 Bouniaki (incident),
 556 Boycott of Portugal, 91, 256, 278, 553, 574 o Brado Africano (weekly), 382,
 396, 427 Bragança, Aquino Rey (Goan), 171, 513 Bragança, Duchess of, 586
 Brandão, Pais, 590
 Brazil, ix, x, 20, 21, 22, 34, 207, 318, 400, 492, 585, 596

Brazzaville, Congo, xvii, 64, 184; MPLA Conference, 279 Buta, Alvaro Tulante,
 xi, xii; Angola 1914 revolt, 54, 177
 CFM (Mogambique Railways), 390 Cabegadas, Rui, 40, 514, 586 Cabinda, xxii,
 96, 97, 98, 127-30, 168, 190, 272, 275, 291, 295, 587-602; nationalist movements
 (see listings in Appendix, pp. 587-602)
 Cabo Verde, ix, 68, 74, 303-05, 313, 350-52, 492, 518, 575, 580-81; CONCP
 resolution, 509; nationalist movements (see listings in Appendix, pp. 603-07)
Cabral, Amficar, xiv, xix, xxii, 39, 171, 172, 297, 301, 305, 306, 350, 352, 355, 358, 367, 369, 372, 374, 377, 514, 603, 605 Cabral, Jolo Tom.s, 514 Cabral, José Antônio (of the MSA), 598 Cabral, Vasco, 514 Cacheu (Guiné: scene of several important early rebellions against Portuguese), xi Cacunda, 1718 attack on Portuguese at, xi Cacunda, Júlio Chinovola, 590 Cacunda group, 590, 591 Caderneta Indígena, 47, 388, 389 Caetano, Marcello, vii, 2, 388, 416 Cairo, 89, 466; Congress of, 61; New UDENAMO, 446; Second Conference of Nonaligned Nations, 286. See also Conference of Heads of State and Government and All African People's Conference Campanha Nativista, 590 Clo, Diogo, 50, 182 Cape Verde. See Cabo Verde Cardoso, Joaquim Filipe, 590 Carlos, King, 586 Carmona, 249

Casa dos Estudantes do Império, xiv, 180, 470, 487 Casablanca Conference (April 1961), 192, 198, 254, 454, 496, 498-500, 504-12, 515. See also CONCP

Casablanca group, 198 Casamance, 311, 569 Cassanga, Marcos, 592 Cassinda, André, 95, 96, 199, 592, 595, 599, 601 Cassinda-Martins, André, 592 Castro, Francisco de Melo (Governor General of Mozambique), 385 Castro Fernandes, Antônio Júlio de, 5-10 Catholics and Catholicism, 47, 50, 52, 410, 420, 427, 501 Catholic missionaries. See Missionaries, Catholic Catholic monarchist movement, 43, 204 Census (1940), 425; (1956), 47 Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mozambique, 382, 397, 607, 608 Centro de Estudos Angolanos (Algiers), 177

Centro de Instrução Revolucionário (CIR), 590 Chagong’a, José Baltazar (UNAMI leader), 610 Changamire (of Batua Kingdom), xii Chata, Smart (president UWC), 600 Chiefs (Portuguese influence upon), 59, 315-16, 424-26, 491, 568 Chijichalimbo, 590 Chipenda, Daniel, 225, 226, 277, 513 Chipenda, José Belo, 598 Chiringueno, José Paulo (PNA leader), 599 Chiriyama, Ossea Oliveira (CSRSA leader), 591 Chissano, Joaquim, 514 Chokwe resistance, xii, 589, 599, 600 Chombe (of Sena region), xii Christians and Christianization, 60, 76, 82, 143, 383, 385 Citizenship of Africans, 323-24, 388, 490 Civilizers and civilizing mission, 49, 68, 237, 301, 313, 387, 415, 494 Coffee, 46, 47, 51, 52 Cold War, 36, 199, 482 Colonial Act of 1930, 18 "Colonial Pact", 51 Colonialism (Portuguese), as viewed in, Angola, 49-56, 56-62, 65, 66-70, 70-73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 85, 86, 89, 91, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 111, 13940, 142-44, 174, 196, 197, 212, 213, 223, 229, 273, 302-03; Cabinda, 128; Cabo Verde, 313-15; Cabo Verde and Portuguese Guiné, 348, 356-57, 358, 370; Mopambique, 391, 410, 430, 449, 460, 477, 490, 495, 500 Colonialism (not Portuguese), 66, 69, 70, 81, 82, 90, 91, 102, 110, 114, 127, 129, 144, 185, 212, 301, 302-03, 313, 403 Combat. See Armed combat Comissão da Revolução Nacional, 590 Comissão de Luta das Juventudes contra o Imperialismo Colonial em Angola, 590, 592, 599
Comité d'Action d'Union Nationale des Cabindais (CAUNC), 128, 591, 593
Comité de Libertação da África, 520 Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP), xv, xix, 306, 323, 325, 503, 511, 513, 515, 584, 603
Comité de Libertação dos Territórios Africanos sob o Domínio Português, 584
Comité de Soutien à l’Angola (CSA), 591 Comité des Bons Offices Angolais, 591
Comité Diretor Provisório do MPLA, 591 Comité dos Sete. See Committee of Nine
Comité Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Português, 599 Comité Marxista
Leninista (CML), 585 Comité Revolucão Nacional de Angola (CRNA), 590
Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), African nationalist
movement, xix, 172, 446, 481-83, 483-86, 607; Constitution, 438-46

Comité Secreto da Restauração da UDENAMO (COSERU), 446, 466-69 Comité
Secreto Revolucionário do Sul de Angola (CSRSA), 591 Comité Unidade Nacional Angolana or Comité de l’Unité National Angolaise (CUNA), 591, 592
Committee of Nine of OAU or Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of
Africa or OAU Freedom Committee, 165, 167-68, 211, 289, 291, 292, 293-94, 520, 522, 579; report, 167-68
Committee of Three (Ghana, Congo-Brazzaville, UAR), 158, 289, 293, 579; report
of subcommission, 167
Committee Pro-Democracy in Portugal, 585 Communism and Africa, 144-45, 193, 585-86 Communists, 6, 9, 28, 35-39, 42, 144, 151, 208, 471, 585-86 Como,
Battle of, 377-78
Companhia Uníqua Fabril (CUF), 305, 380 Comunidade Cabindense (COMCABI), 591 Conacry (Republic of Guinea), xvii, xix, 61, 93, 94, 176, 297, 311, 316, 381. See
also Conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
Concentration camps, Portuguese, 54, 55, 90, 188, 287, 369, 389, 488
Conciliation Committee, Angola, 98 Conde, António, 277
Confédération des Syndicats Libres de l'Angola (CSLA), 591 Confédération
Générale des Travailleurs de l'Angola (CGTA), 591 Conference de la Solidarité
Afro-asiatique. See Conference of the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization
Heads of State, 87 Conference of African People. See Conference of the Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity
Organization
Conference of Heads of State and Government (Cairo, June 1964), 166, 280-83, 290, 292, 293, 311
Conference of Heads of State of Independent Africa. See Addis-Ababa
Conference Conference of Heads of State of Non-aligned Nations (Belgrade,
Coxi, Manuel (UPA leader), 80 Cruz, Joaquim Josê da, xii
Cruz, Viriato da, xiv, xvii, 35-39, 141, 151, 176, 199, 204, 236, 265, 501, 589, 591, 593, 597, 598, 599, 602; speech to Second Conference of Solidarity with Afro-Asian Peoples, 202
Cuba, 156, 311, 515. See also Tricontinental Conference Cultura (magazine) 1957, 179
Cunha Leal, Francisco Pinto da, vii, 29, 55
Dahomey, 85
Dakar, Senegal, xix, 84, 85, 290, 297; Conference (July 5-August 3, 1962), 347;
Dakar recommendations (of Goodwill Mission), 278
Dar es Salaam, xix, 84, 294, 404, 406, 426, 448, 454; Second Conference of CONCP (October 3-8, 1965), 513-530
Discalos, Alexandre Socrates (FUA president), 37, 39, 592
David, Muanza (UPRONA), 602
Davidson, Basil, 584
December Manifesto (1956), 251
Declaration of Human Rights. See Universal Declaration of Rights of Man, Declaration of Philadelphia, 567
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, 319
Declaration on the Concession of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 195
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (United Nations), 548, 551, 552, 576
De Gaulle, Charles (General), 29
Delgado, Humberto (General), 28, 41-42, 585, 586, 587
Dembros region (Angola), xi, 177, 186, 213, 271; MPLA stronghold, 275
Democratic centralism: FRELIMO, 430; COREMO, 440; PAIGC, 328; UDEMU, 342;
UDENAMO, 434
Deportations, 46, 47, 54, 55, 57, 67, 71, 72, 76, 78, 96, 128, 129, 186, 508
Deslandes, A. V. (Governor-General of Angola), viii
Diallo, Ibrahim (FLING president), 603, 605, 607
Diamonds. See Mines
Dirio das Sessbes (of Portuguese National Assembly), 23, 25
Difrio de Mocambique, viii
Dias de Novais, Paulo, 50, 183
Directório Democratã Socid, 28, 585, 586
Directório Revolucionfrio Ibérico de Libertap (DRIL), 585
Discrimination, 17, 56, 99, 101, 107, 130, 143, 200, 324, 399-400; Discrimination Convention, 568
Djabali, Suzanne (Delgado interview), 41
Dombele, Bernard (of UNTA), 226, 601
Dombele, Ferdinand (of the GRAE), 112, 588
Dombele, Maurice (of the GRAE), 112, 158
Duffy, James, 393
Economy of colonies, 30, 31, 44, 46, 49, 57, 73, 75, 104, 119, 120, 128, 130, 252, 255, 284, 304-05, 324, 353-55, 380-81, 421-22, 491
Economy of Portugal, 57, 194, 212, 319, 375-76, 495
Eduardo, Johnny, 105, 112, 172
Eduardo, P. John, 112
Education, programs of: FRELIMO, 451; LGTA, 106, 107; MDIA, 248-49; MPLA,
Elections, 68, 69, 76, 85, 86, 115, 117, 128, 130, 149, 255, 363, 368; in Portugal (1948), 185
Ferdinand, Dombele, 105 Ferro, Ranca (exiled Angolan), 46 Figueira, Lello (Angolan nationalist), 55 Figueirido, Fidelino de, v Financial aid to Portugal. See Aid to Portugal

601; ideology, 146-49; Memorandum to Conference of Heads of State 1963, 152-53; MPLA-FNLA relationship, 210, 266-71; recommendations of 'Committee of Nine', 165-70

624
Frente Patriótica de IUbertago Nacional (FPLN), vii, viii, 28, 40-41, 208, 514, 585, 586
Frente Portuguesa de IUbertaplo Nacional, 585, 586 Frente Revolucion–ria Africana para a Independência das Colônicas Portuguesas (FRAIN), xv, 190, 254, 310, 470, 487, 493, 512, 584, 597
Frente Unida Anti–Imperialista Popular Africana de Mogambique or Movambique African People’S Anti–Imperialist Front (FUNIPAMO), 446, 465, 475, 608; constitution and rules, 435-38; membership, 435; objectives, 436 Frente Unida de Juventude de Angola (FUJA), 593, 596 Frente Unida para a Libertaplo de Angola (FULA), 593 Freyre, Gilberto, ix, x, 19-22, 186 Front Commun de la Jeunesse Nationaliste de l’Angola (FCJNA), 593 Front Commun des Parties Politiques de l’Angola (FCPPA), 593 Front de Libreration National de l’Angola (FNA), 593 Front National Angolais (FNA), 593 Front National de Librération de la Guinée dit Portugaise (FNLG), 603-04 Front Patriotique pour l’Indépendence du Kongo dit Portugais (FPIKP), xvii, xix, 598, 599, 600, 602
Front pour la Librération de l’Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), 588, 591, 593, 596; resolutions, 127-30
Front Uni de Liberation de Guinée du Cap Vert (FUL), 604 Front Uni de Libreration de la Guinée du Cap Vert or Front Uni de Libération (FUL), 603, 604, 605, 606
Frontiers, xix, 67, 80, 81, 82, 88, 111, 150, 159, 260, 281, 291, 405
Gabu, 380
Galvão, Henrique, viii, 34-39, 42, 183, 585 Gama, Vasco da, 383, 392, 422
Garrison, Lloyd (American journalist), 157, 159 Gaza (empire), 386, 395
Germany (West), 120; agent, 594; colonial power, 301, 302; supports Portugal, 212, 294, 526, 578
Ghana, independence, 49, 55, 58, 63, 165-66, 207 Gilmore, José. See Holden Roberto (pseudonym José Gilmore) Goa, 68, 171, 373, 385, 499, 538
Goan Political Convention, 190, 215 Gold. See Mines, gold
Gomes, Alberto (of the MNA), 597 Gomes, Azevedo, 586
Gomes, Jogo (a founder of FLGC), 603 Gonçalves, Tiago, 158
Goodwill Mission (Lhópoldville 1963), 275-79, 280-81 Gourgel, Fernando Pio Amaral (of the UPA), 105
130, 182 Instituto Mofambico, 404 Instituto Negrolfilo, 382, 397, 607, 608. See also Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique
Jagas, 177
Jesuits. See Society of Jesus João II, 182
Johannesburg, 417
João, Francisco (a founder of FLGC), 603 Josias, Antção J. (MPLA leader), 93 Jfinior, Azevedo (Angolan nationalist), 93 Junta Central de Ação Patriótica (JCAP), 40, 586 Junta de Ação Patriótica dos Portugueses da Argélia, 586; JAPPA bulletin, 586 Junta Militar Angolana no Exílio (JMAE), 594 Juventude Cristã de Angola (JCA), 594 Juventude da Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (JFPLN), 586 Juventude da União das Populações de Angola (JUPA), 594 Juventude de Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (JMLPA), 217, 262, 283, 594 Juventude Democrática da Angola (JDA), 116, 125, 126, 595 Juventude Revolucionária (organ JUPA), 594
Kajila, John, 600
Kalime, E., 466
Kalle, Saidou (MLG Vice President), 604 Kalomba, S. A., 471
Kalundungo, Joao, 161-63
Kampala, 446
Kanini, Ngola, 177 Kapilango, Adão João Domingos (CSRSA vice president), 591 Kasavubu, Joseph, 43, 144, 159, 587 Kasonzola (Angolan protest movement), 595 Kassanga, Marcos (UPA leader), 94, 593, 601 Kassanje. See Baixa de Cassange Kassel, Carlos (anti-Castro militant), 156 Kassinda, Marcos (Angolan nationalist), xvii Kassoma, Luciano, 590, 591 Katanga question, 81, 82-83, 163 Kavandane, Iázaro, 513 Kayaya, Abreu Moises, 590 Kaziluki, Augustin, 119, 244 Kennedy, John (President), 36 Kevela, Mutyia, 177 Kiako, Philippe, 158 Kiaku, Andrés (PDA leader), 120 Kiala, Gracia (of the CSLA), 591 Kiata Lua, Norbert (of the PDA), 105 Kiazindika, André (CSLA Secretary General), 591 Kidimbu, Antoine (of the PDA), 122 Kiditu, Manuel (Angolan Protestant leader), xii Kiditu, Martins (arrested Angolan), 46 Kikongo language, 64, 120, 275 Kiliajane, Ngola, 177 Kilwa, 393
Kimbangu, Simon, 588, 595, 596 Kimbanguism or Movimento do Quibanguismo, 594, 595, 596, 598 Kimpese, Congo, 79 Kimpwanza, 63
Kinkouzu (UPA and FNLA training base), 162, 163, 275 Kinshasa. See Lopoldville Kissama, 177
Kita, Alphonse (representative of CUNA), 591 Kivusi (clan), 179 Kounzika, Emmanuel or Manuel (Founder of ASSOMIZO and of PDA), xiii, xvii, 43,
62, 92-100, 105, 112, 165, 171, 588, 590, 599 Kumpesa, Simon (of PDA), 121
Kwango River (battle), 272 Kwilu-Futa (Angola), 46
Lab~ry, Henri (FLGC leader), 297, 305, 313, 592, 603, 605, 606 Labor (child),
45, 52, 304, 333-40, 418; migration to South Africa, 410, 416. See
Forced labor

Labor Code. See Native Labor Code Labor Unions: Angola, 100, 105-08; Guin6,
320, 327, 333-40; Mogambique, 427.
See also African Trade Union Confederation; Confédération des Syndicats Libres
de
l'Angola; Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de l'Angola; Federação Geral
dos Trabalhadores do Congo; International Confederation Free Trade Unions;
Liga Geral do Trabalhadores de Angola; União dos Trabalhadores e Operários
Negros de Angola; União Geral dos Trabalhadores da Guiné; União Nacional dos
Trabalhadores
da Guiné; Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola; Union Générale des
Travailleurs Angolais; World Federation of Trade Unions Lagos (OAU
Conference February 1964), 280 Lameira, Manuel da Silva, 590 Lanpa, Carlos,
585
Lara, Lício, 265, 277 Latin America, 40, 63, 69, 484 League of Nations, 24, 590
Leal, Cunha, 586
Lebanese in Portuguese Guiné, 320 Lello, Figueira (exiled Angolana), 46 Lenge,
Jolo (of MNA), 597 Lengo (Lenço), Jogo (also known as Dom Pedro VII), xii
Léopoldville (now Kinshasa), xiii, xvii, 43, 48, 62, 64, 73, 77, 79, 84, 87, 93, 94,
95, 105, 108, 109, 113, 129, 176, 277; Goodwill Mission June 1963, 280; Meeting
FNLA and MPLA August 1962, 266
Le Travailleur Angolais (LGTA newspaper), 107 Liachuca, José, 105, 112, 158,
161, 163-65 Liberated regions: Angola, 295; Guiné and Cabo Verde, 377, 378,
380 Libreville. See Conference of the Chiefs of States and Chiefs of Governments
of the
Union Africaine at Malgache Liga Africana (LA), 569, 584 Liga Angolana, 595
Liga da Guiné, 322, 604 Liga de Goa, 498
Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGTA), 80, 150, 156, 592, 595, 602,
606;
Principle of LGTA, 105-08
Liga Monárquica Independente (LMI), 586 Liga Nacional Africana (LNA), 53-54,
178, 187, 194, 595 Liga Ultramarina (LU), 584 Lisbon, Portugal, xiii, 12, 41, 81,
88, 93, 94, 95, 99, 179, 316, 320, 350, 413, 421, 423, 470, 487; Third Pan-African
Conference, 569, 584 Lisbon University, 391, 413, 414, 416 Living conditions,
41, 46, 62, 69, 79, 80, 110, 319-20 Livromentos, David (PDA nationalist), 105
Loanda Kingdom, 50
Lobato, Alexandre (colonial nationalist), ix, 22, 24-27 Lobito (Angola, scene of
battles), 272 Lopes, Duarte (Ambassador to Vatican), 50
Lopes da Silva, Manuel (of UPG), 305, 317 Loureiro, Emmanuel (Angolan nationalist), 55, 226, 598 Lourengo Marques, 389, 390, 398, 412, 417, 432 Luanda, 150, 187, 244, 275, 508; Easter terror 1959, 189; I. L. 0. Conference, 71; Trial 1956, 46; uprising 1926, 46, 55; uprising 1961 on prisons, 176, 181, 191, 206, 215


Malinga (or Millinga). Lawrence, 409, 426, 466, 474, 609 Maluvunu, Ernest (of PDA), 121 Mambone revolt (Mogambique), 388 Mane, Cheik (RDAG leader), 605 Mane, Fily (Secretary for Women "s Affairs FING), 603, 605 Mane, Sekou (Secretary International Affairs FING), 603, 605

Manhertz, Bernhardt, 157, 159, 162 Manicongo empire, 50 Manucusse (Commander), 423, 424 Manuel, Jos6 (representative of CUNA), 591 Manuelista, 586

Manuza, 385

Maquis and maquisards, 156, 159, 163, 272, 284, 287, 288, 291, 295 Marapene, T.M., 466 Maria (Angolan protest movement), 595 Maria, Victor, 514 Marianos, Ant6nio, 595 Martin, Sanda (of the PDA), 105, 165 Martins, CesArio (MPLA leader), 93 Martins, Inocencio (MPLA leader), 93 Marxism, 151, 159, 195, 585 Massacres, 47, 70, 80, 90, 128, 191, 202, 298-300, 304, 321, 325, 369, 388, 423, 488, 499, 507, 509, 510. See also Piiguiti, Mambone, Mueda, and Sgo Tome Massaki, Andr6 (PDA leader), 92, 119, 588, 590, 599 Massamba-Debat, Alphonse, 525 Massangano (1578 expedition), xi Masseko, Alfonso, 158 Matamba Kingdom, xi, 50 Matola, Anunciao Sim-o, 513 Matondo, Alphonse, 588 Matsa, Norton de, 54 Matswa, Andr6 (PDA leader), 588 Matumona (PDA and FNLA leader), 92, 267-70 Maueua (son of Manucusse), 423 Mayembe, Francisco (MNA leader), 597 M'Bala, Jean Pierre (MDIA leader), 596 Mbando, Queen Nzinga or Junga (Anna de Sousa Nzinga), xi. See also Queen Jinga Mbamba-Cuimba, Angola, 45 Mbanza Kongo (now called Slo Salvador), 182 Mbemba a Nzinga (Alfonso I) (African king), xi Mbunda, David J. M. (a founder of UDENAMO), 446 Medeiros, Tombs (CLSTP delegate), 513 Medical aid and facilities, 52, 79, 81, 130, 428. See also Corpo Voluntario Angolano
de Assistência aos Refugiados Melo, Aníbal de, 158, 513 Mendy, Françoise Kankoila (founder of MLG and leader of FUNG), 297, 305, 315, 603 Mendy, Henry (member of MLG and treasurer of FLING), 603 Mendy, José (UPG vice president), 606 Menezes, Hugo de (MPLA leader), 93, 584 Menga, Antoine, 588 Mengane, Diniz (organizer of Partido de Libertagio de Mogambique), 609

A Mensagem, xiv 179, 180, 589, 596, 599, 602 Mercenaries, 83, 90, 159, 286 Messianic mass movements, xii-xiii, 179, 188, 192, 602 Miguel, Matias (FDLA leader), 593 Militant struggle. See Armed conflict Military bloc, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, 286. See also Alliance Military training (of Africans), 80, 121, 148, 159, 167, 211 Military Tribunal of Luanda, 189 Millas, Leo (of FRELIMO), 471, 473, 474, 608, 610 Miners, African, 45, 106, 415, 417, 428 Mines, general, 249, 284, 416, 423, 447, 476, 488, 492; coal, 399; copper, 45, 51; diamond, 51, 399, 415-16; gold, xii, 51, 384, 393, 399, 415, 416; silver, 183, 384, 399 Mingiedi, Maurice (of FRELIMO), 119 Miranda, Sacuntala de, 587 Missionaries: Catholic, 50, 52, 179, 191, 237, 384, 393, 395, 420, 427; Protestant, 43, 64, 601

Missionary Agreement (1940), 237 Mmole, Mathew Michinji (Secretary General of MANU), 426, 446, 465, 466, 471, 475, 609

Mogambican African National Congress (MANC or MANCO), 172, 446, 465, 481, 482, 483

Mogambican Cultural and Socio-Political Associations-resistant to Portugal, 382, 388, 396-97, 412, 607, 608, 609

Mogambique (general), 51, 68, 74, 95, 302, 383-91, 509-10, 520, 572-73, 574; nationalist movements, 607-11

Mogambique African National Union (MANU), xix, 382, 398, 426-28, 446, 465, 466, 469, 471


Mopambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO), 446, 481, 609 Moerbeke Sugar Company, 79 Moise Noir, 596

Molt6, MussA (resistance in Guiné), xii Mombasa, Kenya: birthplace of MANU nationalist movement, xix, 382 Mombasa (Zanzabar, scene of Arab uprisings), xii Monarchists, 43, 204, 208, 586 Mondlane, Eduardo (FRELIMO leader), xix, 37, 39, 173, 382, 391, 404, 410, 471, 474, 475, 479, 480, 481, 513, 607, 608, 609, 610 Mondlane, Janet Rae, 404 Mondo (PDA bulletin), 119

Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinée "portugaise", 606 Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinée "portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert. See Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné e Cabo Verde

Mouvement de Libération des Iles du Cap Vert (Senegal Sector MUCV), 604, 605, 606 Mouvement de Regroupement des Populations Congolaise (MRPC), 588 Mouvement de Resistance Bakongo (MRB), 588, 596 Mouvement pour la Liberation de l'Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC), 93, 128, 188, 241-42, 253, 588, 590, 591, 592, 593, 596, 600 Movement for Colonial Freedom, 274 Movimento Afro-Brasileiro para a Libertaggo de Angola (MABLA), 596 Movimento Angolano de Juventude Estudante (MAJE), 593, 596 Movimento Anti-Colonialista (MAC), xiv, xv, 190, 197, 254, 310, 470, 487, 489, 493, 584

Movimento das Mulheres, 116 Movimento de Acção Revolucionaria, 28, 586 Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola or Mouvement de Defense des Interêts de l'Angola (MDIA), xvii, 93, 173, 244-50, 596, 600; program, 246-50

Movimento de Independência Nacional da Guiné Portuguesa (MING), 604, 605 Movimento de Independência Nacional de Angola (MINA), 179, 189 Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné (MLG), xix, 297, 305, 347, 603, 604, 605; MLG, Bissau, 347, 603; MLG, Conakry, 347, 603; MLG, Mendy, 603 Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné e Cabo Verde or Mouvement de Libération de la Guinée "portugaise" et des Iles du Cap Vert (MLGC or MLGCV), xv, 322, 323, 358, 592, 604-05, 606

Movimento de Libertaggo da Guiné Portuguesa or Mouvement de Liberation de la Guinée "portugaise" (MLGP), 605 Movimento de Libertaggo da Angola (MLA), 596 Movimento de Libertaggo de Enclave de Cabinda. See Mouvement pour l'Abração de l'Enclave de Cabinda

Movimento de Libertaggo Nacional (MLN), 596 Movimento de Resistência Republicana (MRR), 28, 586 Movimento de Solidariedade Africana (MOSA), 596 Movimento de Unidade Democrática (MUD), 587 Movimento de Unidade Democrática-Juvenil (MUDJ), 587 Movimento Democratizadora Africana, 609

Movimento Democrático de Libertaggo de Portugal e Colônias (MDLPC), 587 Movimento Democrático de Mogambique, ix, 609 Movimento do
Quimbanguismo, 595, 596, 602 Movimento dos Novos Intellectuais de Angola, literary movement also known as Vamos
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Agostinho Neto (MPLA-AN), 172, 173, 174, 598
Movimento Separatista Angolana (MSA), 598 Movimento Separatista Lusitano (MSL), 598 Movimento Tawa or Tonsi, 598 Movimento Tokoismo, 598, 602. See also Toko, Simão Movimento Tonche, 598, 602 Moyana, Stella, 466
Mpadi (ar M’Padi), Simão, 504 Mpanzu a Nzinga, xi
Msadala, James, 473
Muandazi, Antoine, 159
Mueda (revolt and massacre-June 1960), 389, 457, 472, 502, 510 Muhungu, Ambrose, 589
Mukuma, Dickson, 590
Mulattoes, 51, 53, 54, 92, 93, 176, 382, 397, 427, 476, 593, 594, 595, 597, 608
Mutaca, Lourengo (FRELIMO delegate), 513 Mutemba, Mateus (FRELIMO delegate), 513 Mutual assistance (and non-aggression pact), Congo Empire-Portugal 1659, 50 Muwema, James (Vilinga Va Kambungo president), 602 Muxuebata, Jorge (led revolt against Affonso I), xi Muzila (son of Manucusse), 423
M’Vila, André (of PDA), 105 Mwanza, Daniel (of PDA), 120
Na Kongo, Antoine (of PDA), 122 Nambuangono (MPLA stronghold), 271, 275
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 91 Nationalism (African), i, ii-v, xv-xxii, 34-39, 40-42, 48-56, 78, 82, 97, 102, 144,
Pacifism and passive resistance: 1914 deportation of men to Sao Tomé, Angola, 61, 99, 146, 303, 315, 499, 503, 592; UPA, 72 Pact of Berlin, 245
Paka, Francisco, 105
Palmatoria, 399, 425
Pan-African Conference, Third (Lisbon, 1923), 569, 584 Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), 572, 574
Pan-African Women's Conference (1963), 577 Panda, Antoine (of PDA), 122
Papeis Wars (eighteenth century), xi
Paris Peace Conference (1919), 184 Parti d'Action Révolutionnaire Angolaise (PARA), 599 Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), 524, 581 Parti Progressiste Africain (PPA), 599 Partido Africano de Independência (PAI), 493, 571 Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), xv, xix, 37, 170, 190, 215, 301-81 passim; defense, 366; first party congress, 377, 378-81, history, 306-07; international policy, 366; major program, 361-66; minor program, 360-61;
Partido Comunista Portugues (PCP), 207, 591, 592. See also Partido Comunista de Portugal
Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUA), xvii, 176, 179, 187, 202, 214, 597, 599; Marxist ties, 195
Partido de Libertação de Moçambique, also known as Convenção do Povo de Moçambique, 609
Partido Democrático de Angola (PDA), nationalist movement organized by Kounzika, xiii, xvii, 43, 77, 92-94, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 111, 113-27, 147, 150, 162, 171, 179, 219, 243, 253, 588, 593, 595, 599, 601; embezzlement, 126; resolutions, 116, 118
Partido Nacional Africano (PNA), 585, 592, 599 Partido Nto-Bako or Nto Bako Angola (NTOBAKO), 599 Partido Pro-Angola, 599 Partido Socialista Católico (Moçambique native political movement), 610 Partido Solidarí­o Africano (PSA), 600 Passive resistance. See Pacifism Pate, 393
Patriote Angolais (MDIA publication), 596 Peaceful settlement of Colonial War, 148, 325, 367, 376, 461, 565 Peaceful coexistence, 89, 464 Peasants, African, 58, 102, 150-51, 169, 178, 252 Peasants (Portuguese, as settlers), 56, 65, 209, 504, 575. See also Portuguese settlement and settlers
Pedro VI (Congo king), 48 Pembele, Ferdinand (of PDA), 121 Pereira, Aristides (PAIGC member), speech, 502 Pereira, Eduardo Vitório (UNATA leader), 601
Pereira, João Batista Traves (of UPA), 590, 601 Pereira, Nuno Alves (seventeenth century Governor of Mozambique), 423 Perreira, Manuel (of MLG and Secretary for Education, FUNG), 603-04 Pessoa, Fernando (author), 22 Peterson, Josê M. (brother-in-law to Holden Roberto), 158 Pierre, Henrique (CUNA representative), 591 Pijiguiti docks (massacre), 304, 316, 321, 356, 369 Pinck, Eduardo, xii, 105 Pinck, John Edouard (cousin of Holden Roberto), 158 Pinock Ed, Johny (son of John Pinock), 156, 158 Pinto, Carlos (UPRONA), 602 Pinto Bull, Benjamin (of URGP), 603 Pinto Bull, Jaime (deputy in National Assembly), 606

Plummer, (Sir) Leslie, 584 Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 93, 127, 128, 597 Poisoning of Africans, 202, 388 Police (Portuguese), 43, 87, 187; kidnapping of Mozambique nationalists, 520. See Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), 180, 188, 189, 195, 214, 304, 307, 314, 367, 371, 398, 401, 448, 461, 462, 472, 476, 519 Political Convention of Goa. See Goa Political Convention Political parties. See listings in Appendix, pp. 587-611. Pêrto Alexandre (Angola), 272, 488 Portugal, passim; Chamber of Deputies, 302; Constitution, 18, 67, 68, 236, 561; corporate state, v; Decree of June 12, 1961, 14; elections, 28; of 1948, 185; of 1958, 41; Lusotanian community, ii, v, vii, 1, 2, 5, 6, 19-22, 22-27, 34; mission, sense of, ii, iii, v, 8, 16, 17, 18, 68; mystique, 238; National Assembly, 196; new state, iv; opposition to colonial policies, viii-ix, 12, 23, 24, 48-56, 74, 84; pacification campaigns, x-xii, 25, 81, 86, 87, 321; Statute of 1954: see Estatuto dos Índígenas; Unigão Nacional, 5, 294, 490 Portugal Democréticos (SMo Paulo), 401, 402, 447, 587 Portuguese Africa, nationalist and pre-nationalist movements, 55, 77, 206; cooperation with Portuguese opposition, 40-42; evolution, xv, xxii; history of struggle, 82, 177 passim; leadership arrested, 189; nationalist magazine, 179-80; see Appendix for listing-Angola, 587-602; Cabinda, 587-602; Cape Verde, 603-07; Mozambique, 607-11; Portuguese, 585-87; Portuguese Africa in general, 584-85; Portuguese Guiné, 603-07; Príncipe, 603-07; São Tomé, 603-07 Portuguese army in Portuguese Africa, 49, 60, 72, 79, 90, 92, 149, 202, 281, 286, 304, 386, 405, 460, 499, 508: defeats, 186, 295; defection, 590; desertions, 376 Portuguese businessmen and businesses, 46, 62, 76, 173 Portuguese citizenship, 14, 30, 143 Portuguese colonialism. See Colonialism Portuguese Communist Party, 207. See Partido Comunista de Portugal or Partido Comunista Portugues Portuguese Democratic Association (PDA), 587 Portuguese democratic front, 88 Portuguese Guiné, nationalist movements. See listings in Appendix, pp. 603-07 Portuguese Guiné. See Guiné (Bissau) Portuguese language, 64, 120, 200 Portuguese National Assembly, viii, ix, 22-27, 31 Portuguese nationalist movements. See listings in Appendix, pp. 585-87 Portuguese navy, 90 Portuguese opposition, viii-viii, chapter 2, 28, 34-39, 40-41, 41-42, 88, 255, 319,

Poste de Cuimba, 45
Posty, Paulino, 588
Prazo system, 394
Presence Africaine (Paris journal), 184, 495 Pretoria, 416
Principe (island), 68; deportation to, 300; nationalist movements: see listing in Appendix, pp. 603-07
Prisoners, political, 40, 46-47, 54, 78, 86, 90, 140, 190, 197, 214, 215, 255, 274, 287, 299-300, 367, 369, 388, 399, 459, 471, 488-89, 501, 508, 521, 548, 569, 570, 575; Agostinho Neto, 173, 213; Angolan national leaders, 251; GRAE prisoners, 293; 600 Mogambican prisoners, 477; U. N. demands release of Angolans, 542 Program s. See individual parties Protectorate. See Cabinda Protest organizations, city origin: LNA, ANANGOLA, AASA, 194 Protestant ethic, 21 Protestant missionaries. See Missionaries, Protestant Puaty, Santos, 589 Public health. See Health Services Pukuka, Jollo, 589 Pukuta, Jos6 (MLEC advisor), 596 Punishments. See Tortures Queen Jinga, 213. See also Mbandi, Queen Nzinga Quicongo-speaking peoples of Northern Angola, 43 Quiosa, Jos6 Bernardo Domingos (MPLA leader), 93, 94 Rabat, Angolan coalition of national parties, 176 Racism, 3, 32-33, 65, 72, 76, 88, 91, 99, 103, 400 Radio, 67, 93, 312, 322, 487, 488 Railways, 159, 390, 490 Ramos, Jos6 C~ndido (MLEC leader), 596 Ranque, Lufz Frank, 589 Raposo, Ana (FRE LIMO delegate), 513 Rassemblement IMmocratique Africain de la Guin6e dite Portugaise (RDAG), 347, 600, 603, 605 Rassemblement des Chefs Coutumiers du Kongo Portugais (RCCKP), 600 Rebellion of March 1961 (Angola), xvii Rebelo, Jorge (FRE LIMO delegate), 513 Rebelo, Viana (Governor General of Angola), 501 Red Cross Societies, League of, 539 Reforms, by Portuguese, 149 Refugees, Portuguese African, 43, 74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 90, 95, 96, 97, 99, 106, 121, 128, 140, 153, 497, 551, 559; refugees: in Brazil, 587, 598; in Congo, 140, 164, 174, 220, 257, 260, 277, 281, 538, 539; in Senegal, 322; in Tanzania and Tanganika, 404-09. See also Corpo Voluntfrio Angolano de Assistgncia aos Refugiados; Exiles; Servigo de Assist-ncia aos Refugiados de Angola Regeadores and regedorias, 14, 15, 16, 52, 71, 562, 563 Religious movements, 179, 188, 192, 588, 589, 598. See also Appendix, 602; Associag-o Cambande or Cassango; Associag-o Chipambule or Tyipambule; Associag-o Maiange; Tokoism Repression, by Portuguese: in Angola, 47, 54, 61, 65, 67, 70, 77, 82, 86, 87, 90, 106, 139, 140, 143, 146, 149, 179, 197, 214, 287; 310, 313, 501; in Guin6 and
Cabo Verde, 304, 310, 313, 315, 316, 322, 372; in Mogambique, 405, 424-26, 457, 460; general repression, 505, 544; history of, 499
Repression (not Portuguese): French, 70; South African, 91 Resende, Sebastito Soares de (Bishop of Beira), viii Resignations: Savimbi (GRAE), 154-61
Resistance, African. See Revolts Resolutions. See under specific party or organization Runion de Consultation et d'Etude pour le D6veloppement de la Lutte des Peuples des
Colonies Portuigaises, 584
Revolts, xxii, 4, 43, 53, 54, 55, 70, 75, 96, 160, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 186, 191, 202, 206, 208, 215, 216, 298, 303, 304, 316, 321, 322, 383, 388, 395. See also Baixa de Cassange; Luanda; Nhacra; Pijiguiti; Suzana RevoluO o Popular, 585
Revoluao Portuguesa, 586 Rhodesia, 64, 74, 86, 91, 92, 286, 406, 447, 476, 576; kidnapping Mogambican nationalists, 520
Rodrigues, Marciano (a founder of FLGC), 603 Rodrigues, Sarmento, Admiral (Colonial Portuguese nationalist), viii Roseira Lopes, 22-24
Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Rfigel (Switzerland), Second
General Assembly of the UNEA, 140
Sakupwanya, John, 382
Salazar regime, vii, 2-4, 12, 18, 29, 34-37. 40, 41, 42, 68, 72, 73, 81, 85, 88, 90, 91, 95, 97, 99, 103, 187, 190, 193, 213, 286, 294, 314, 396, 405, 412, 447, 448, 451, 455, 468, 479, 488, 490, 500, 574, 585, 587, 609 Salisbury (Rhodesia), xix, 382 Salvation Army, xii, 408
Sanda, Martin (of PDA), 121 Sansao, Alphonse, 119
Santa Maria (Cabo Verde), 305 Santa Maria incident 1961, 34, 193, 585 Santo, Espirito (Angolan nationalist), 55 Santos, Domingo dos, 265
Santos, Eduardo dos (MPLA leader), 93, 158, 265 Santos, Marcelino dos, iv, xiv, 41-42, 495, 513, 584, 610 Santos, Piteiro (FPLN leader), 28, 40, 586 Santos Costa, Fernando, 12 Slo Antgo, 303
Sto Domingos, 380
Saxe-Cobourg, Princess Maria Pia de, 586 Schools. See Education Scorched Earth policy, in Angola, 53 Seara Nova (journal and socialist movement), 28, 587
Second Conference of Non-aligned Nations (Cairo, October 1964), 286 Second General Assembly of UNEA (Rigil), 139-40 Second World War, 63, 81, 127, 187, 302, 398, 496 Section des Rencontres des Etudiants Portugais a l'Etranger (SEEPE) and quarterly
SEEPE Information, 587
Semba, Anastasio, 589 Sena, 383, 384, 423
Sena Sugar State, 447
Senegal, xix, 50, 95, 305, 316, 322, 555-56 Senghor (President of Senegal), 314
Sequeira, João (Angolan nationalist), 55 Sertório, Manuel (of FPLN), 28, 586
Servigo de Assistência aos Refugiados de Angola (SARA), 81, 161, 163-64, 600
Settlement and settlers. See Portuguese settlement and settlers Sex, non-discrimination: COREMO, 446, 483; FRELIMO, 458; PAIGC, 367; UDENAMO, 432, 463
Seydi, Doudou (RDAG leader), 605 Shibalos (forced laborers), 389, 390, 447, 476 Sigauke, Jaime Rivas, 447 Sigauki, Sabastene (MANC leader), 446, 465, 608
Sikama, 590
Silva, António Burity da, 589 Silva, Lopes da (UPG Secretary General), 606
Silva, Samuel (of PDA and GRAE), 112, 119 Silva Neves, Maria Luisa, 587 Silva Porto (Angola), 54, 55 Silver. See Mines
Simango, Selina (president LIFEMO), 608 Simango, Sixpence, 388, 609
Simango, Uria, 474, 513 Slavery and enslavement, 40, 44, 45, 54-55, 57, 61, 64, 67, 71, 72, 74-75, 76, 79, 105-08, 110, 111, 129, 182, 183, 355, 385-86, 387, 394, 400, 415, 447 Sleeping sickness (in Angola), 52 Smith, Ian, 286
Sobas (tribal chiefs), 30 Socialists (in Portugal), 28 Sociedade Cultural de Angola (SCA), 180, 600 Sociedade de Plantapbes Agrícolas do Rio M'Bridge-Explorago Cuimba (CUFA), 45 Societé Commerciale d'Outre Mer, 380 Society of Jesus (Jesuits), 183, 393 Sofala (Mogambique), xii, 383, 393 Soldiers. See Portuguese army Solidariedade Africana para a Independência de Angola (SAIA), 600
Solidarity, Afro-Asian. See Afro-Asian solidarity Sonc6, Infali (hero of Guinean resistance), xii Songo (Angola), 46
South-West Africa National Union (SWANU), 600 South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), 599, 600 Soviet Union. See Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Sozinho, Antônio Eduardo, 588 Spain, 19, 37, 41, 50, 69, 313, 403, 453, 457, 532, 537, 538 Spencer, Nicolau, 513 Stanleyville (Congo), 62 Statute of Portuguese Natives of the Provinces of Guiné, Angola, and Mozambique, 237 Student organization: Anticomitê Angola, 588; Associations of Overseas Students (Lisbon), 488; Casa dos Estudantes do Império, 470; Frente Unida de Juventude de Angola (FUJA), 593, 596; League of Revolutionary Mozambican Students and Youth (LEJUREMO), 608. See also Movimento Anti-Colonista (MAC); União Geral dos Estudantes da África Negra Sob Dominação Portuguesa (UGEAN); União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA); and União Nacional dos Estudantes de Mozambique (UNEMO) Students, 100, 131-42, 150, 164, 180, 209, 270, 304, 350, 379, 398, 406, 413, 470, 476-78, 488, 495, 546, 586, 587 Sugar industry, 51, 79, 182, 447, 567 Sumbane, Francisco, 513 Suzana (revolts), 1934, 36, 41, 45-52, 321, 322 Swahili, 120, 394 Swaziland, 523; kidnapping of Mozambican nationalists, 520 Sweden (speech given by Galvão in), 42 Switzerland, 63 Takasala, Pedro (exiled Angolan), 46 Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), 608, 609 Tanzania, 95, 529 Tariffs (between Portugal and colonies), 51 Taty, Alexandre (Angolan nationalist), xvii, 95, 97, 105, 158, 594 Taxes: Angola, 46, 49, 52, 59, 71, 76, 110, 488, 491; colonies, 194; Guiné, 319; Mozambique, 388-89, 390, 395, 424, 476, 488, 491; Sgo Tomé and Príncipe, 323 Taxes, types: native, 319; poll., 323, 424; sovereignty, 491 Tawà or Tonsi (religious movement), 600, 602 Tchyoka (king of BiM), xi Teka, Samuel (of PDA), 121 Tembe, Filipe, 398 Tenreiro, Admiral Henrique, 196 Terror and terrorism, 49, 60, 76, 109, 187, 189, 194, 195, 214, 298-300, 304, 389, 500. See also Repression; Revolts; Torture Tete (Mozambique), 382, 383, 384, 423, 610 Third World, i, 170, 185 Tiago, Henrique, 591 Timor, 68, 302, 450, 538 Tito, José (MNA), 225, 226, 597 Togo, 58, 63 Toko, Simão (leader of messianic movement), xiii, 179, 188, 192, 598 Tokoism or Tocoism, xiii, 188, 598 Tomas, Americo (President of Portugal), 95 Tonche, 598. See Movimento Tonche Torture, 46-47, 61, 67; 69, 90, 110, 128, 143, 196, 197, 275, 425, 428, 423, 461, 501, 509 Toto, José (of PDA), 120 Tour de force, 97 Traitors, 59, 203, 304, 467, 475, 571. See also Chiefs, Portuguese influence upon Trans-Zambezan Railway, 490 Transvaal, 75, 399, 412, 415, 416 Transvaal Labor Commission report, 417 Transvaal-Mozambique Convention 1919, 416 Treason, 97, 114, 125, 187. See Traitors Treaty of Methuen (1703), 302 Trial of the Fifty, 189-90, 214 Tribalism. See Ethnic groups Tribuna de Portugal (São Paulo), 585 Tricontinental Conference (Havana, January 1966), also called Fourth Conference of
Ukwashi Wa Chokwe (UWC, a self-help association), 600 Uige, Angola, 46, 65
Underdevelopment, 2, 38, 32, 40, 50, 80; Cabinda, 130; Cape Verde, 304 Unigio Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI), 382 Unito Congolesa para a iUbertaq~o de Angola or Union Congolaise pour la Libération de l'Angola (UCLA), 600
Uni qo das Mulheres da Angola (UMA), 601 Unigio das Popula95es da Guin6 or Union des Populations de la Guin-e Dites Portugaise, 305, 317, 318, 321, 323, 606
Unio das Popula,9es de Angola (UPA), xv, xvii, 35-39, 43, 48-56, 54, 55, 56, 5662, 63, 64, 65, 70, 72, 73, 77, 92-95, 98, 102, 103, 105, 111, 143, 144, 145-46, 150, 156, 171, 179, 188, 206, 219, 253, 271, 448, 584, 587, 588, 590, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 599, 600, 601, 605; ‘Angolan Drama’, 48-56; composition of executive committee, 158; denouncement by MPLA, 275; formation of FLA, 241-43; ideology and divisions, 142-46; leaders, 80; organization of, 101
Uni qo das Popula,9es do Norte de Angola (UPNA), xii, xvii, 43, 54, 150, 179, 188, 206, 601
Uniao de Mulheres Portuguesas (UMP), 587 Unigio Democrqtica da Guin6 or Union Immocratique de la Guin6 (UDG), 606 Uni–o Democrqtica das Mulheres (UDEMU), 342; statutes, 341-46 Unigio Democrg.tica das Mulheres da Guin6 e Cabo Verde (UDEMU), 312, 327, 514, 515, 605, 606
Unigio Democrqtica de Cabo Verde (UDCV), 323, 604, 605, 606 Unigio Democrqtica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO), xv, xix, 172, 382, 383-90, 398, 422, 426, 446, 447, 466, 468, 469, 471, 479, 481, 482, 483, 502, 503, 509, 605, 607, 608, 610; constitution, 432-35; membership, 432-34; objectives, 432-33; organization and structure, 433-34; program, 463-65
Unilo Democrftica Nacional de Mogambique (UDENAMO-Morambique), 446, 479, 607, 610
Unigio Democrftica Nacional de Monmotapeta (UDENAMO-Monmotapeta), 446, 465, 481, 482, 483, 607, 608, 610
Unigio dos Naturais de Angola (UNATA), 601 Unito dos Povos da Guin6 (UPG), 322, 604, 605, 606 Unigio dos Povos das Ilhas de Cabo Verde or Union des Peuples des I les du Cap Vert (UPIVC), 606
Unigio dos Trabalhadores e Oper~rios Negros de Angola (UTONA), 601 Uni–o Geral dos Estudantes da Africa Negra sob Dominao Portuguesa or Union G6n6rale des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire sous Domination Coloniale Portugaise (UGEAN),
312, 585, 601
Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UGTG), 606 Unigo Mukana de Mogambique, 610
Uniao Nacional (Portuguese party), 5, 294, 490 Uniao Nacional Africana de Mopambique Independente (UNAM), xix, 398, 446, 483, 610 Uniao Nacional de Angola or Union Nationale Angolaise (UNA), 592, 601 Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA), 131-42; composition, 132-33; constitution, 131-39; consultative body, 137; functions, 134; goals, 132; resolutions, 139-41; rights and duties, 137; structure, 133-34
Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes de Mogambique or Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes MoVambicanos or Union Nationale des Etudiants du Mozambique (UNEMO), 398, 476-78, 514.
610
Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos (UNTA), xvii, 218, 226, 277, 592, 593, 600, 601, 602
Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Guiné (UNTG), 312, 327, 514, 515, 605, 606; duties, 335; statutes, 333-40; worker rights, 335
Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), xvii, 588, 602 Uniao Progressiva de Mogambique (Manica e Sofala) (UPM), 402, 611 Uniao Social dos Mainbos de Luali (secção local da ABAKO), 602 Unidade Democrática Portuguesa (UDP), 587 Union Africaine et Malgache, 146, 575 Union des Etudiants Portugais en France (UEPF), 587 Union des Ressortissants de la Guinée Portugaise or Union dos Cidadãos da Guinée Portuguesa (URGP), 603, 606
Union Populaire de Liberation de la Guinée Portugaise (UPLG), 603, 607 United Front, 176, 214, 435-38
69, 88, 111, 127, 128, 139, 215, 236, 237, 238, 239, 245, 326, 366, 376, 390, 402, 459, 464, 494, 532-34, 535, 536, 539, 554, 555, 556, 563, 564, 569; Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, 538; Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 548, 551, 552, 576; Documents on Portuguese Africa, 531-69; Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 531, 547; resolutions, 565-66; Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 531; Economic and Social Council resolutions, 565-66; First Committee, 70; Fourth Committee, 63, 64, 69, 79, 321, 322, 534; General Assembly, 63, 65, 66, 85, 275, 278, 370; General Assembly resolutions, 86, 91, 103, 287, 370, 497, 505, 510, 512, 516, 533, 534-54, 555, 556, 557, 558, 560, 563, 572; High
World Federation of Trade Unions, 601 World Health Organization, 492 World War II. See Second World War
Xinavane (February 1961, massacre), 457 Xipenanyane (king), 386
Yanvu, Mwanta, 595 Youlou, Father (of Congo), 165, 166-67 Youth, 43, 59, 100, 114, 116, 119, 187, 194, 207, 215-16, 312, 314, 471, 516. See also organizations listed under Juventude
Zaire (river and Manicongo empire), 50, 182-83 Zamba (Angola), 45 Zambeze river, 50, 383; valley of, 49 Zambia (UNITA headquarters), xvii Zambia, Republic of, 525 Zanzibar, 393

ongo
LUNDA