Revolution
and
Counterrevolution

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Revolution
and
Counterrevolution
Mozambique’s War
of Independence,
1964-1974
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Preface
Mozambique, economically underdeveloped and a cockpit of political turmoil for centuries, underwent a ten-year war of independence and varying amounts of social restructuring in parts of its countryside. It is hoped that this volume will contribute to a useful overview of the Mozambican revolution and the Portuguese counterrevolution in the southeast African country from 1964 to 1974 for students of Africa, of revolution and of guerrilla warfare. The format is topical rather than chronological. The military aspects of the war saw no great set-piece battles. Instead the fighting consisted of countless small-unit actions and counter actions, although encounters were lumped together by each side for operational purposes. A detailed retelling of ambushes, raids and sweeps would numb even an ardent specialist of insurgent campaigns. Besides such a narrow focus would obscure the well-established fact that rural revolutions are much wider in scope than troops marching to and fro for tests of strength. The endeavor in these pages is to give weight to such themes as the contestants' attempts to mobilize or terrorize the population and the impact of foreign intervention into the struggle. The thematic approach, nevertheless, requires some unavoidable repetition; the author trusts that the reader will understand this necessity.

In writing this book, the author faced a few nettlesome obstacles. Research demanded a visit to revolutionary Mozambique and post-coup Portugal along with investigative trips to libraries and archives in Mozambique, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although much material, some useful and other propaganda, resulted from these ventures, candid statements or secret documentation were hard to come by. Some materials were destroyed. Other data were lost or withheld. Yet courageous participants on both sides shared some documentation. And more granted interviews in return for anonymity. I have respected their wishes and kept their names out of this work. In some cases, their careers or personal safety warrant such treatment. Their trust is greatly appreciated and their knowledge was of a great help.

Another obstacle also stems from the nature of the war itself. An effort has been made in these pages to get to the down-to-earth fighting, mobilizing and terror tactics in a revolutionary war. It is my hope that the chapters also reflect the
ironies, ambiguities and tragedies of a society in the throes of a violent transition in which nearly every action has good and bad consequences and every hero is also a traitor.

Yet another obstacle, but of less trouble for the writer than the reader, centers on the usage of place names. In short, preindependence Mozambican names have been kept. For example, Mozambique's capital is presently called Maputo. This fact and others like it are noted in parentheses alongside the old designations. The colonial names have been retained because both sides generally used them prior to the end of the war. One major exception, which is also noted in the text, revolves around the Portuguese decision in July 1970 to divide and rename the District of Manica e Sofala into Vila Pery and Beira. The guerrillas did not make this distinction. Similar reasoning applies to the use of Rhodesia. Since Mozambican insurgents fought against Rhodesian troops, whether black or white, and not Zimbabweans who also fought the Rhodesian soldiers, the settlers' name for the country lying to Mozambique's west has been used.

Much of the final stages of research and writing of this volume was undertaken while the author was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. As such, I am profoundly grateful for the resources placed at my disposal while a recipient of a National Fellowship. This program, which is under the direction of its Executive Secretary, Dr. Dennis L. Bark, not only allowed a year free from teaching and committee responsibilities but also permitted contact with resident and visiting scholars at the Hoover Institution. In this regard, I would like to repeat the fact that books are often the efforts of individuals who have benefited from the conversations, insights and previous scholarship of others. Chief among those whose dialogue helped sharpen my knowledge of armed revolutions in the Institution's Senior Commons Room are Senior Fellows Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan. Dr. Gann read the manuscript and furnished much useful criticism. In the earlier stages of the project, two other scholars of Africa and politics provided years of intellectual sustenance and support; they are Professors Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Douglas L. Wheeler. None, of course, should have to bear any criticism for this effort, for the errors and interpretations are my own. Library and archival staffs at the Arquivo Histórico de Mocambique, Boston University and the Hoover Institution deserve more than a note of thanks; Karen Fung at the latter institution was most helpful. Two typists—Janet Dutra and Polly Tooker—will always have my gratitude for this project as well as others. Finally, my family who should receive not just a "thank you" but also a note of deep appreciation for their understanding.

T. H. H.
Palo Alto, California

Revolution
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Background to Revolution:
Pacification and Resistance

By and large, it would seem that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.

--E. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space, and Will"

There were black men in those forests, men with weapons and leadership and a purpose. They were as cruel as the Portuguese and he did not know what kind of future there would be when they reclaimed their country. Perhaps it would be worse than the Portuguese and there would be no work in the factory or cooked meat in the shops or soccer on a Sunday afternoon. But only they would cleanse the country of men like Saturnino.

--Ronald Hardy, Rivers of Darkness

\Mozambique is a strange country for a People's Republic established on Marxist-Leninist foundations. Since classical Marxism envisaged socialist revolutions occurring in industrially advanced nations, why did Mozambique, a backward land, undergo violent internal conflict ending in a Marxist government? By African standards, it had made a certain amount of economic progress before its Revolution. Yet Mozambique was much less developed than Cuba, China, North Korea or even Vietnam--all regarded by Mozambican guerrillas as allies on the road to world revolution.

To this day, the vast majority of Mozambique's people continue to till the land with simple tools. By 1964, when the war against Portuguese colonial rule began, economic development had begun to accelerate in a modest fashion. Portuguese and other foreigners had set up a number of light industries and cash-crop farms. There were rudiments of modern transport and modern social services.

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Cement and steel cities were expanding. But taken as a whole, Mozambique remained an underdeveloped country, much more so than Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), its western neighbor, not to speak of South Africa, which continues to this day to dominate the economy of southern Mozambique.

According to the orthodoxy of Marx and Engels, circumstances in colonial Mozambique seemed most unpropitious for a revolution. Mozambique is ethnically divided; a united Mozambican nation is still to be built. Its varied peoples had been brought within artificial boundaries drawn by European statesmen in the late nineteenth century. At the end of the Portuguese era, the industrial proletariat--supposedly the source of Marxian consciousness--as yet remained in its infancy. The country's economic retardation was reflected in its educational system. By the time the Portuguese departed, there was hardly a revolutionary intelligentsia in the Western sense. The bulk of Mozambique's academicians, businessmen, technicians, professionals, managers--the kind of people who normally form the national bourgeoisie in developing countries--consisted of expatriates loyal to the Lisbon government, or at least indifferent to
the revolutionaries' cause. A considerable part of the labor aristocracy--the skilled workers and supervisors--were also Europeans. The big towns in fact persisted as strongholds of the colonial government until the last.
The chances for victory through rural guerrilla warfare seemed equally slight. Mozambique is an immensely elongated country. Stretching seventeen hundred miles on the Indian Ocean coastline, its length is the same distance as from Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida. Nearly twice the land area of California, its demographic density remains low; nothing moves the traveler from Europe more than the immensity of the bush. Cultivators have to struggle with a great array of afflictions, scarcity of communications, scarcity of capital, scarcity of markets, deficient or irregular rainfall, the presence of tropical diseases that strike down men and beasts. Yet Mozambique had not been troubled widely by land shortages; plantations were few and far between; there was no widespread violent strife between plantation owners and rural proletarians, or between rich peasants and poor. Mozambique's rural economy continued to be dominated during the colonial era by the so-called traditional sector, comprising the vast majority of the population, who tilled the village lands.

Under such conditions, no less an expert than "Che" Guevara had scoffed that "guerrilla warfare in Africa is impossible."11 Guevara had himself been disillusioned by his experience with "tribalism" and witchcraft in the unsuccessful rural rebellions that struck the Congo (Zaire) in 1964-1965. Earlier, the Mau Mau rising against the British in Kenya had ended in disaster for the rebels; rural insurrections in Cameroon, Chad and Madagascar had all been smashed. But events in Mozambique belied all predictions. The rebels won. Their protracted campaign made up a new chapter in the

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history of guerrilla warfare. This victory indicates once again that a Marxist-inspired upheaval need not necessarily depend on a predetermined level of social or industrial development. Xenophobic opposition to Portuguese colonialismo, the yeast of this revolution, sprang from individuals and small groups in a country lacking linguistic, cultural or ethnic unity. Arising not from an international conflict of the kind that produced communist regimes in Russia, China, Yugoslavia or Vietnam but from a "war of national liberation," Mozambique's Revolution casts into different perspective the intriguing relationship between major wars and revolution. As such, it advances something of a revolutionary paradigm of its own.

THE PORTUGUESE CONNECTION

Despite Mozambique's connection with Portugal since 1498, when Vasco da Gama touched the Mozambican coastline on his way to India, it was little more than peripherally subjected to Lisbon's imperium before the mid-nineteenth century. Until then the Lusitanian association rested on a tenuous presence in the tiny islands of Ibo and Mozambique off the northern coast, a few under-strength and feverwracked garrisons on the Zambezi River and flag-showing trading posts in the coastal towns of Quelimane, Sofala (near present-day Beira) and Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). These toeholds on its Indian Ocean territory served
Lisbon's trading ventures well enough in the East prior to the European conquest phase of overseas expansion. Then its weakness whetted the ambitions of other European states during the "Scramble for Africa." Widespread slave trading from Mozambique's ports and independent African polities in the sertao (hinterland) belied Lisbon's claims to sovereignty or "effective occupation" after the Berlin Congress in 1884-85.

British, French and German designs on Lisbon's claims galvanized Portugal's imperial spirit in a manner unparalleled since the golden epoch of its sixteenth-century seaborne empire. Portugal began tardily to dispatch explorers, missionaries, merchants and soldiers to lend substance to its territorial contentions. Its efforts in many respects matched or surpassed those of European rivals, but its lack of power in the chancelleries of Europe, where African boundary disputes were ultimately settled, cost Lisbon territory in Africa. Of concern here, however, is not the wide range of Portugal's exertions, except as an understanding of how they steeled Portuguese resolve and Mozambican resistance. Rather it is with the methods of conquest and opposition as they relate to the liberation war that require retelling. An overview of those events, therefore, becomes necessary after a word about Mozambique's terrain, climate and people, for the Revolution bore the imprint of its environment.

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LAND AND PEOPLES
Located in the southeastern corner of the continent, Mozambique shares borders with the Republic of South Africa and Swaziland to the south, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Zambia to the west and Malawi and Tanzania to the north. Except for the Rovuma River demarcating the northern boundary with Tanzania, the long and porous frontiers with Malawi, Zambia and even Rhodesia were important factors in guerrilla infiltration. About eight times the size of Portugal, its 297,846 square miles are divided almost equally into moderate highlands and coastal lowlands. The continental plateau extends slightly into the country at three points: on the western edge of the northern district of Niassa (Vila Cabral Plateau), along the Malawi border of the northwestern district of Tete (Angónia Plateau) and on the Rhodesian frontier of the west central district of Manica (Chimoio Plateau). The coastal zone accounts for two-fifths of the area and is a narrow strip of about fifty miles in the north which widens in the south to almost the South African and Rhodesian boundaries. A transitional hilly segment separates high and low altitudes in the upper two-thirds of the country. Until the discovery of modern medicines, the low-lying land was regarded as unhealthy for Europeans. Mozambique, unlike the colony of Angola on the west coast, lacked broad plateaus close to the coast where large numbers of farmer-settlers could escape the ravages of malaria, sleeping sickness and African heat. The few widely separated areas of over three thousand feet in elevation with favorable conditions for agriculture and animal husbandry were far from the sea and attracted only a handful of European settlers. Unlike much of the African coast, Mozambique is graced with several large bays creating superb natural harbors. These have enhanced its gateway location, and
the principal ports of Nacala, Beira and Lourenio Marques have actively engaged in the transit traffic to landlocked states. Several rivers flowing across Mozambique into the Indian Ocean facilitated the linkage with the interior in the past. The Zambezi, which bisects the "Y"-shaped country into two nearly equal parts, was the greatest bearer of exchange. In modern times, railways and roads sustained the hinterland trade. This east-west traffic has contributed to the country's isolation between north and south in the interior which was not adequately offset by coastwise communication or hastily built roads in the course of the independence war.

Vegetation varies with water and elevation. Spear grass twice the height of a man covers some savanna, and bamboo forests flourish on river banks or wet ground. On the drier and higher savanna, baobab trees and patches of forest with ironwood and ebony also offer good ground cover in the rainy summer. Narrow ravines are densely set with fine timber trees. The thick bush and higher elevations of the Makonde Plateau, Niassa highlands and Angonia Plateau, all in the north, lend themselves to guerrilla warfare.

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Mozambique's tropical climate is moderated by altitude. Cooler winter months and chillier nights are noted in the high veld near the Zambian and Rhodesian borders whereas the Zambezi Valley is widely known for its oppressive heat. The climate is characterized by alternating seasons of heavy precipitation and dry, cooler periods. The amount and location of rainfall are regulated by Mozambique's topography and the annual monsoon that blows moisture across the Indian Ocean from the northeast. Its rainy season corresponds to the warm months from November to March—the southern hemisphere's summer. As elsewhere the seasonal swings of wet and dry have long influenced war and peace activities in Mozambique. During the dry months Europeans have embarked on journeys or military operations; the Africans have often chosen the moist periods as best for war against the Portuguese. Rainy months favor the guerrilla, for the low clouds hamper air strikes and the spotty, heavy downpours quickly wash away tracks. When winter arrives the foliage withers and browns, thinning out natural concealment and aiding aerial surveillance. Ground mobility improves for roadbound vehicles in the times of aridity, albeit dirt roads turn to red clay or white dust which erodes engines in a season. Heat, wet or dry, takes a considerable toll, as it did on Portuguese machines and morale.

The 1970 census estimated the African population at slightly over eight million. It was densest in the northern coastal regions. Mozambicans and non-Africans made the population density heaviest in the southernmost district of Loureno Marques (now Maputo province) with 111.6 persons per square mile in 1960. The Mozambican population is ethnically diverse.5 Merely 15-20 percent spoke Portuguese at the time of the Revolution, necessitating the use of local languages by mobilizers or their translators. Historically, the effects of economic and political separation, however, sometimes outweighed commonalities of culture. Within the major ethnic clusters (see Table 1), there has been an incomplete social structure or even cultural unity since the collapse of indigenous imperial
confederations preceding the colonial presence. The characteristic pattern of social organization, even among former political entities, has been autonomous assemblages, sometimes comprising a knot of villages or just one village. An absence of political organizations for ethnic identity and loyalty precluded monolithic ethnic reaction to Lisbon's pacification campaigns and later to the advance of rural revolution.

Up in the northeast district of Cabo Delgado, the Makonde inhabit the plateau of the same name. Across the Rovuma River in southern Tanzania live a sizeable number of related Makonde. From their high ground stronghold in Mozambique, the Makonde ably defended themselves from slavers, some of whom were Makua peoples to the south. The Makonde's long-held defense posture has been considered the main explanation for their bellicosity, cultural homogeneity and resistance to Islam. West of the Makonde live the Yao (Ajaua) in the Niassa district, mostly in the area between the Lugenda and Rovuma rivers. As middlemen for Muslim coastal merchants, the Yao adopted aspects of Islam and Muslim social customs and dress. Further west on the shore of Lake Malawi a group of Nyasa dwell encircled on three sides by Yagos. Since the late nineteenth century, these Nyasas came under the instruction of two Anglican missions located at Massumba in Niassa district and on Malawi's Licoma Island, off the Mozambican shoreline. That many

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Table 1
Mozambique's Largest Ethnolinguistic Groups in 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makonde</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makua-Lomwe</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngoni</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maravi</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Zembezi peoples</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shona-related peoples</td>
<td>765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thonga</td>
<td>1,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chopa and Tsonga</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Since the Portuguese colonial government considered all inhabitants as Portuguese citizens after 1961, the 1970 census made no distinction between ethnic groups. These estimates are adopted from a manuscript prepared by Antônio Rita-Ferreira, former head of the Department of Information and Tourism in Lourenço Marques. It was published as "The Ethno-History and Ethnic Grouping of the Peoples of Mozambique," in South African Journal of African Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1973), pp. 5676, but with many errors. Rita-Ferreira listed only twenty-five thousand Makonde, which excluded thousands in exile and within the country itself.
of the Nyasa were fluent and some literate in English instead of Portuguese pointed up the absence of Portugal's influence in the distant north. South of the Yao and Makonde and extending inland from the seacoast across the country are the related Makua and Lomwe peoples, the largest ethnolinguistic community in Mozambique. Some coastal Makua converse in a Swahili dialect and live a Muslim-affected existence similar to that of the east African littoral to the north. Their Islamic affinity and past slaving pursuits abetted the enmity with the Makonde that was so much a part of the Revolution. The Makua are one of the few ethnic groups not to have

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large numbers in neighboring countries. After 1900 many Lowme, who occupied lands to the south of the Makua, moved to Malawi where they now constitute the second largest people. Another major northern people are the Maravi. They inhabit the Tete district north of the Zambezi. Maravi is actually a blanket description since there are no people referring to themselves by it. The principal subgroups are the Nyanja, Chews and Nsenga. Nyanja are found mainly in Malawi. Along the lower Zambezi Valley, the varied peoples have been subjected to the rich cultural diffusion of African and non-African immigrants, traders and conquerors who moved up and down the river. Yet intermarriage and acculturation have not removed distinct dialects or separate identities. Moving up the river from the coast are the Podzo and Manganja on the northern bank. Located further up the Zambezi and on the southern side are the Shona-related peoples of the Sena, Tonga, Barue, Tawara and Korekore, all of whom were involved in the liberation war to some extent. Below the Zambezi and to the south of the Save River, the country is occupied by Shona-related peoples. Among the most important subgroups are the Karanga, Ndau, Manyka and Teve. Southern Mozambique is inhabited by three distinct communities: the Ngoni, Chopi and Thonga who in turn include subdivisions of Rhonga, Shangana, Hlengwe and Tsowa. The Thonga, the second biggest community in the country, furnished much of the labor to South African mines. Under Portuguese rule about 40 percent of the males legally and illegally traveled to work in the gold mines. Although the labor exodus was held responsible for agricultural underdevelopment Sul do Save (south of the Save), it was encouraged by Lisbon for the remunerations paid to it by South Africa. The other two main ethnolinguistic clusters are the Chopi and Tsonga. Inhabiting the southern districts of Inhambane and Gaza, they and other southern peoples had more exposure to education and modernization than isolated peoples. Likewise, the capital area contained about 30 percent of the officially estimated twenty-five thousand Mozambicans of mixed parentage of whom most sprang from Euro-African origins. These factors explain why many leaders of nationalist movements came from the south and had petit bourgeois, urban backgrounds. One last African people warrant mention. These are the Ngoni whose invading ancestors from South Africa displaced most Nyanja off the Angonia Plateau in the
last century. Some also exist in small pockets in Maputo province (formerly Lourenco Marques district) and Niassa province.

Mozambique's non-African population was also varied; it was comprised of Indians, Chinese and Europeans. The 1960 census reported 17,243 persons of Indian background. Their economic competitiveness and penchant for sending profits to India evoked resentment among Europeans and Africans. Census statistics listed only 2,098 Chinese in the country. They were usually self-employed in commerce, fishing and agriculture. The Portuguese made up the

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greatest non-African section of the population. Germans and Britons amounted to only three thousand and were engaged in business, sugar and sisal production. Estimates of the Portuguese placed their number at some two hundred thirty thousand in 1973, the year before the Lisbon coup which signaled an end to colonialism. More than two-thirds had been born in Portugal and most resided in the south or coastal urban centers where they dominated commerce, industry and sections of the civil service. They enjoyed the fruits and privileges of colonial life as well as contributed in no small way to the beginnings of the economic development in Mozambique. Their numbers and status suffered drastic reductions in the decolonization process.

A salient fact for insurgency or counterinsurgency that emerges centers on the difficulties of welding the multiplicity of societies into a common force. Such divisions were more beneficial to Portugal than to nationalists. For centuries the Portuguese pitted one African against another in a conscious pursuit of a divide-and-rule policy. It was a policy necessitated by numerical inferiority and facilitated by existing hostility or separation among Mozambicans. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see Portuguese colonialism as solely a divisive force. On the one hand, Portuguese penetration into Mozambique tended to exacerbate century-long antagonisms as the European intruders played off group against group. On the other hand, it reduced ethnic distinctiveness in the face of a common enemy, fostering a sense of Africanness and a xenophobia which promoted nationalism. Only the main currents in the long winding river of Mozambican resistance require our attention.

CONQUEST AND RESISTANCE
Mozambican resistance to Portuguese pacification campaigns began in the mid-nineteenth century and can be arbitrarily put into three geographic zones: south, central and north. Fighting in each was fierce, and a Portuguese victory was not a foregone conclusion. Indeed Portugal's forces encountered setbacks at the hands of separate polities acting alone or operating in temporary pan-ethnic federations. The colonial campaigners confronted logistical and security difficulties familiar to guerrilla forces a century later; both had to rely on ill-trained auxiliaries, to requisition food from locals, to depend on porters for transport (many of them conscripted) and to cope with defection and treachery in their ranks.

In the southern third of the country from about one hundred miles north of the Save River, the main resistance to colonization came first in the person of
Gungunyane, ruler of the Gaza Ngoni kingdom, and then his war minister, Maguiguana. The Gaza kingdom was a legacy of the Ngoni military raids into southern Mozambique in the 1820s from what is today the Republic of South Africa; its very existence thwarted Lisbon's designs on the hinterland behind the strategic gateway of Delagoa Bay. Motivated by fears of British expansion from Rhodesia, Lisbon's decision to move against Gungunyane was precipitated in 1895 when he refused to hand over two rebellious Rhonga chiefs to Portuguese authorities.

The lopsided Portuguese victories at Marracuene, Manjacaze and Lake Coolela set disciplined firepower and lethal machine guns of a modern army in positional battles against massed chargers armed mainly with spears. Following the capture and parade of Gungunyane through Lisbon streets in Roman fashion, his followers rebelled under the aging leadership of Maguiguana in 1897. Deemed more arduous than the first Gaza campaign, it finished with the destruction of the old general's army at Maconte village close by the Limpopo River. Again it was a pitched battle where artillery and concentrated rifle fire proved decisive against spears and inaccurate musket shots. Small troops of cavalry in both campaigns placed speed, surprise and initiative on the European side. Hut burning, cattle roundups and death or exile of African leaders secured the peace.

More dogged opposition greeted efforts to subdue the central zone along the axis of the Zambezi Valley. A flimsy Portuguese presence had existed on the lower Zambezi since the early sixteenth century. Sertanejos (backwoodsmen) had staked out prazos (estates) from African chieftainships. Over time, the prazo owners became so completely Africanized as to call into question Lisbon's sovereignty. To establish control in the face of anticipated British encroachments, Lisbon initiated a policy of military pacification.

As in the Gaza operations, the Portuguese recruited large drafts of African auxiliaries, oftentimes Ngoni, to serve with regular metropolitan troops or simply under Portuguese officers. They also encouraged the conquest of independent chiefs or prazo barons by other prazo senhores in their pay. Supplied by Portuguese arsenals and granted army commissions, these African allies defeated their brothers to substantiate Portugal's territorial claims. But resistance by the powerful Zambezi families was longer-running and more determined than in the southern region.

From behind the stockade walls of aringas (wood fortresses, some with several thousands of inhabitants), the defenders put up stiff opposition to Portuguese advances. Against the formidable aringa of Massangano, the Lisbon government sent four disastrous expeditions sometimes numbering four hundred/six hundred regular soldiers along with several hundred auxiliaries in the late 1860s. Not since Franciscisco Barreto led nearly seven hundred armored nobility to their feverish death in the pestiferous Zambezi Valley in the 1570s had so many metropolitan troops been so recklessly deployed. The stockade forts were eventually breached by the use of modern artillery. Defense of the aringas, however, was not static; it
involved harassing Portuguese columns, following up European defeats and
ambushing relief forces. By adorning the aringa walls with the skulls of previous
attackers so as to discourage fresh onslaughts, the resisters also practiced a form
of psychological warfare. The era of the Zambezi Wars finally closed

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in 1902. But hardly had the bloody arena experienced the beginnings of colonial
rule than it bristled into the Barue rebellion of 1917 before settling into sullen
passivity.12
The importance of the Zambezi Wars and Barue revolt lies in the evolution of
pan-ethnic unity transcending the atomized ethnolinguistic societies. The revolt
also furnished a tradition of resistance that moved some groups or individuals to
join the nationalist insurgents half a century afterwards. The name Massangano
(along with Gungunyane) reappeared in the insurgents’ military communiques,
and the Shona-related people, recalling their past stands, generally rallied to the
nationalist cause.
Along the northern coast opposition came from sultans of
Muslim communities and Makua chiefs. Not unlike the Zambezi triangle, the
emptiness of Lisbon's claims, which was apparent in the rampant slave trading
from northern ports and coves, beckoned to British intervention. This prospect
aroused deep concern in the Portuguese capital. The leaders of these African and
Swahili polities strove as an elite to preserve the commerce in slaves from which
they benefited until 1913 when Lisbon at last prevailed.
Preceding the pax lusitania, Portugal's rule remained checked as their
outnumbered columns encountered ambush and defeat at the hands of wily
resisters armed by Portuguese negociantes. These businessmen not only depended
on African sufferance for survival but also resented Lisbon's taxes and antislavery
regulations. On occasion they supplied money and military intelligence to the
resisters. Defection from Portugal's ranks also came in the form of Portuguese and
African desertions. Moreover, Mozambican guides maneuvered metropolitan
forces into deadly traps.13
To neutralize the advantages of modern weapons, Mozambicans killed or
undermined the power of Lisbon's political puppets, cut telegraph lines, poisoned
water sources and demoralized the attackers with blood-curdling slogans. What
often saved Portuguese fortunes was the timely appearance of a gunboat. To
offset their local vulnerability, outnumbered Portuguese forces also resorted to
tactics that resembled those utilized during the Revolution-concentrated volleys
and hut-burning followed by hasty retreats and claims of victory over Africans
fleeing into the bush, abduction of the defenders' relatives and reliance on
disaffectted elements for military information.
The northern interior was the last to be pacified militarily and the first to blaze in
the nationalist insurgency. Here, as in other parts of Mozambique, the Lisbon
government relied on the assistance of a chartered company. In this instance the
Niassa Company (one of the three principal foreign-financed concession
companies formed in the 1890s to exploit the province's resources) mounted
expeditions starting in 1899 against the Yao in what is today Niassa province. The
Africans' access to arms, munitions and manpower across the Rovuma River in German East Africa (now Tanzania), however, hampered pacification. Sixty years later the

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Portuguese army faced a similar problem of sealing off the frontier as an infiltration route from an across-the-border sanctuary. Dense bush and surprise counterattacks likewise handicapped the occupation. A final campaign on the Mataka's (chief) kraal near the modern-day city of Vila Cabral (now Lichinga) in 1912 put an end to the Yaos' last-ditch military resistance.14 A final occupation operation, although of comparatively minor scale, ensued against the Makonde in Cabo Delgado in 1922.15 The inaccessibility of the Makonde Plateau kept colonial influence to a minimum even after military opposition ceased. It was among the Makonde that the insurgents found deep support and many recruits.

Following close on the heels of military occupation and as a consequence of World War I, Mozambique sustained an invasion from a German-officered column of some two thousand askaris fleeing British and South African pursuit from German East Africa. Because of Portuguese, British and Rhodesian inaptness, the column moved almost at will in northern sections from November 1917 to September 1918. Portugal's defense efforts suffered from a want of control in the north and from the hostility of the locals, some of whom welcomed the invading force.16 As the undefeated German-led band departed for attacks on British posts in Zambia and Malawi (then Nyasaland), the European war ended and peace slowly settled on the northern tier until broken by the Revolution.

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON RESISTANCE

Resistance and revolts were significant in the historical context of opposition to colonialism although not as dress rehearsals for a rural-based insurgency after 1964.17 Some nationalists were raised where and when the memory of military opposition was still green. For example, Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of the Frente de Libertacao de Mogambique (FRELIMO), as a youth heard stories from elders of Gungunyane's combat.18 Tales of bygone battles passed from grandfathers to grandsons in fireside accounts. Nationalist leaders during the Revolution recounted with pride the conflicts of traditional warfare and posited the existence of a continuum between the colonial wars and the liberation struggle.19 Certain ethnic communities, among them the Makonde, Ngoni and Shona peoples, nurtured military traditions and truculent dispositions. In these groups as well as others, the African cultivator, far from being the docile child of a hapless continent, had a strong affinity for arms and battle. Historical martial deeds helped stiffen modern-day opponents who felt most keenly the bite of exploitive labor practices and subordinate racial status. But more often than not, immediate grievances amplified by guerrilla mobilizers rather than past showdowns induced young Mozambicans to take up arms in a revolutionary war. There were some related organizational and ideological themes linking resistance and revolution. Organizationally, the insurgent cadres strove to mobilize grass-roots support behind the guerrillas.
and changed the function of guerrilla warfare techniques initiated by their predecessors. Ideologically, the resisters and revolutionaries shared a fundamental antiforeign reaction to Portuguese rule and customs. But they shared little else. In the resistance phase of Mozambique's history, chieftains owed their authority to conventional folkways and to their standing in precolonial communities; this was not the case in the guerrilla war where cadres stepped from an altered society without traditional lineage. The traditional resisters' objective looked to expulsion of Europeans, not to a doctrine of societal reordering of economic development.

If Mozambican warfare during the conquest period suggests rough parallels to the revolutionary conflict, then, too, Portuguese counterinsurgency in some general respects resembles an earlier stage of colonial warfare. Conventional attacks against African strongholds from islands of Portuguese dominance and the application of heavy weapons against lighter-armed opponents reflect similarities in both eras, as did Portugal's dependence on Mozambican manpower, pliant chiefs, waterborne military craft and the seizure or destruction of opposition villages as evidence of victory or sovereignty. During both the pacification and counterinsurgency phases, inhabitants of independent areas were subjected to propaganda about a better life under Portuguese rule and guaranteed peace and safety through colonialism. In the earlier period, colonial forces accomplished subjugation with the capture or execution of authority figures, the use of abundant powder and a superior volume of fire. But in the revolutionary insurgency, previous methods were neutralized by an underground organization, fainthearted operations against the guerrillas, burgeoning nationalism and the blunders of an occupation army dealing with the civilian population. Geostrategic considerations were present among Portuguese officers during the pacification campaigns as well as the counterinsurgency. One student of the northern slave trading polities speculated about province-wide coordination among Mozambican resisters.20 While the proof of this hypothesis has not been produced, Portuguese officers certainly had to take into account the interconnectedness of the different theaters. They could not, for example, mount large operations in northern Mozambique until after the completion of the second Gaza campaign.

The earlier generation of Portuguese soldiers learned that genuine pacification lay in meshing military tactics with reorganization of the basic features of Mozambique's economic, social and political existence. Responsibility for the colonial campaigns rested with a clique of soldier-administrators called the "generation of 1895."21 Their political philosophy, an admixture of romanticism and tough-minded self-interest, shaped Portuguese colonial thought for decades. The architect of Lisbon's programs was António Enes who held that political measures must accompany or closely follow military occupation. Pacifying Mozambique dictated more than military columns; it demanded administrative reorganization. The patchwork of prazos, concessions, missions and military commands were to be swept away.
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As the army quelled defiance. They were replaced by civil circumscriqoes (circumscriptions)—a rural administrative division below the territory's major unit of districts and above the smallest subdivision of postos. The administradores of these circumscriptions, at first soldiers and gradually civilians, consolidated authority over the indigenous people in judicial, military and administrative matters. On a lower level, the chefe de posto (later called administrador de posto) fulfilled a similar role. As authorities invested with police and civil powers to ensure unity of command, they intervened in local disputes with the goal of maintaining good relations, obedience and order. Tax collection, which symbolized one traditional method of rendering homage as well as providing revenue, played an integral part in solidifying Portuguese rule.

Under the influence of the “generation of 1895” pacification was transformed from simply stamping out Mozambican military resistance to disarming and destroying independent polities in the southeast African colony. Portugal’s much-touted missao civilizadora (civilizing mission) must be viewed as an essential component of pacification rather than as a means of African uplifting—a pacification imposing a new kind of order, law, religion and nationality with the goal of diminishing an African identity and defusing a challenge. With the crushing of traditional resistance, a small number of Mozambicans switched to less violent forms of protest.

PROTEST AND ACCOMMODATION

It would, of course, be a falsehood to depict the Mozambican reception as totally unrestrained defiance to colonial domination in its seventy or eighty years of application. Individuals, village headmen or chiefs among them, cooperated with the European government for small salaries, exemption from manual labor, uniforms or enhanced prestige and authority. Rural dwellers found the allure of colonial urban life and cash-paying jobs more exciting and remunerative than subsistence cultivation up country. They served as laborers, servants, waiters, messengers, cooks and prostitutes. If Mozambicans as a rule experienced racial discrimination and forced labor, certain ethnic groups found colonial life more peaceful. Others found unexpected advantages. A nest of Chopi chiefs in Inhambane, for example, initially welcomed Portuguese collaboration against their powerful enemy the Gaza Ngoni. After the fall of Gungunyane, the Chopi exacted retribution under Portuguese license against their former foes.

Those Mozambicans who met Portuguese language standards and other assimilation qualifications could seek assimilado status for which they gained a quasi citizenship. Assimilados were usually the products of mixed parentage and self-education beyond primary schooling. Mozambique’s assimilado population of less than 1 percent never resulted in the same disastrous divisions between Africans and mestigos as in Angolan nationalism but it was a factor in Mozambican politics. A tiny and subservient protobourgeoisie of low-level African civil servants, businessmen, teachers, nurses.
and students emerged and held a marginal existence in the colonial society that
for all its racial knocks was materially better off than life in the bush. This stratum
bred both collaborators and protesters.

Random acts of violence persisted, sometimes bordering on
social banditry. If an isolated killing of a patrao (boss or landlord) took place,
fears of "native risings" became prevalent. One case of widespread European
appréhension occurred during the capital's four-day carnival in late February 1939
when rumors of impending trouble resulted in the placement throughout the city
of contingents of police armed with rifles.23 But the festivities passed without
incident.

Nonviolent forms of protest assumed various forms. The Chopi, for instance, sang
songs of ridicule. Makonde wood carvers crafted statues perverting traditional
Catholic representations to express their contempt.24 Sullen behavior and the
sabotage of cotton plants or tools, akin to slave responses in the antebellum
American South, characterized other types of reactions.

Organized opposition to colonialism shifted from what T. O.
Ranger in his study of east Africa has termed "primary resistance," or traditional
warfare, to more peaceful forms of challenge.25 These did not evolve into
eventual territorial parties as in the more liberally governed former British
colonies. Yet the opposition of journalists and associations contributed to the
transition from traditional military challenges in the hinterland to inchoate
organizational protest in towns and cities operating within the norms of Western
political movements. Important as urban education and organizing skills were,
success would ultimately lie back in the countryside with a rural revolution.

Prior to the final pacification wars literate Africans and mestis--os began a
journalistic protest of Portuguese colonialism. Among the first was a mestigo
intellectual, Alfredo de Aguiar, who arrived in Lourenço Marques as an officer in a
battalion of Angolas (Angolans) in 1879. His polemical style of assailing the
Portuguese for forced labor, lack of education and failure of equal opportunities
for Mozambicans set the tone for subsequent journalists. The last of his three
newspapers ran afoul of "the generation of 1895's" hard-nosed administration.2
Opposition papers got a temporary reprieve after the collapse of the Portuguese
monarchy and establishment of the Republic in 1910. Two brothers, Joio and
Jos & Albasini carried on the denunciatory tradition first in 0 Africano and then
the better known 0 Brado Africano (The African Cry). Disillusionment with the
Republic's liberal reformism led to biting criticism by Mozambican journalists.
Local authorities responded once again by suppressing the impassioned
broadsheets.

Early Mozambican nationalism also expressed itself through microassociations
formed in urban areas. A principal association of this period, Gr--mio Africano
(African guild), hoped to advance

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the status of its assimilado membership within the colonial system, not reject it.
Even before the overthrow of the Republic in 1926 by an army coup in Lisbon,
Mozambique's colonial authorities had begun a crackdown on dissent. The
increasing authoritarianism of António de Oliveira Salazar's Estado Novo (New State) brought evertighter controls and censorship in the colonies. As a consequence, the Associação Africana, a more militant outgrowth of the Grêmio Africano, made demands for guarantees of African land rights vis-à-vis concession companies and for the cessation of forced labor. Alarmed by its tenor, the colonial government purged or intimidated the native leadership, making them subservient to its will. As a reaction to this conformism, yet another militant faction broke away and established the Instituto Negritéfilo, which attracted African members while the parent association appealed to mestizos. In time the Instituto Negritéfilo also underwent government pressure to toe the line. Finally, it changed its name to the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique.

Reduced to little more than regime-sponsored organizations, these groups limited their activities to social events, sporting pursuits, receptions for colonial officials and impotent prods for Mozambican advancement within the colonial environment. Nevertheless, by their very existence they were able to sustain a framework for self-definition and political consciousness, if not open challenge. As such, the colonial authorities held them suspect. Soon after the revolutionary war broke out, the Portuguese banned the Centro Associativo and arrested its top officeholders.

Part of Portugal's effectiveness in checking the development of nationalism is explained by the general quiescence of anticolonialism on the continent before World War II. After the war, Lisbon's efforts to insulate Mozambican society from the rising tide of decolonization proved inadequate. One sign of a reawakening protest appeared in a rebirth of interest in African culture by youthful intellectuals alienated from the Portuguese milieu. José Craveirinha and Noémia de Sousa were in the forefront of the poetic upsurge of Mozambican discontent. Another poet significant for his turn to revolution was Marcelino dos Santos, a mestigo from the coastal town of Lumbo opposite Mozambique Island. Short-story writer Luis Bernardo Honwana and painters Vicente Gowena Malangatana and José Craveirinha, the nephew of the poet, subtly condemned Portugal's rule or cleverly depicted traditional myths or precolonial scenes so as to ignore Portuguese themes.

Beginning later than its companion movement in Angola, Mozambique's artistic revolt was cut short by Portugal's response to the revolutionary war. The authorities imprisoned the writers Honwana and Craveirinha and placed Malangatana under surveillance, after 1965. Noémia de Sousa moved to Paris where she gave up writing poetry. Traveling in Europe, dos Santos, who lived among leftist intellectuals in Paris and discovered Marxism, joined the revolutionary nationalist ranks.

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Later, nationalists held ambivalent views of the cultural movement. Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first president, considered its poetry to be "a style of eloquent self-pity . . . alien to the African reaction." Yet he recognized the poets' ability "to analyze a political situation and express it in clear and vivid language." The revolutionaries went on to pronounce the cultural
movement a necessary phase in the development of a national conscious. And the
previous vacillation gave way to the use of poetry as an instrument of the
Revolution. FRELIMO's periodical, 25 de Setembro, published militant poems
exalting the struggle against Portuguese forces. What these poems may have lost
in the way of artistic merit they made up in revolutionary fervor.31
Another form of protest involved labor turmoil in the country's dockyards known
by sailors for their grueling working conditions for the black stevedores. Labor
unrest struck the capital's wharfs in 1947 and reportedly spilled over to
agricultural workers just outside of the city.32 The following year somewhat
planned disturbances with political overtones again broke out. An estimated two
hundred arrests were made, and some detainees were later imprisoned or
transported to the west coast island of Sao Tomé. Still another strike erupted on
Lourenço Marques's docks in 1956, which purportedly claimed the lives of forty-nine
workers. Labor strife engulfed the dockyards of Beira and Nacala as well as
the capital in 1963.33 Despite these flare-ups, which FRELIMO maintained
played an inspirational role in later resistance, the docks and urban centers
themselves stayed generally quiet during the course of the war until the Lisbon
coup.
Disaffection also manifested itself among some Mozambican secondary school
students in Lourenço Marques who founded the N~cleo dos Estudantes Africanos
Secundarios de Moçambique (NESAM) in 1948. They expounded nationalist
ideas in the few issues of their own magazine, Alvor (Dawn). Mondlane, one of
the founders, ran into trouble with colonial officials, however. Either because the
authorities were not alarmed by NESAM in the late 1940s or because Mondlane
appeared redeemable to the assimilado process, they sent him to Lisbon to
continue his studies. If this was intended as a cure, then it backfired. While in
Lisbon, Mondlane met Agostinho Neto, subsequent president of the Movimento
Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and president of independent Angola,
and Amilcar Cabral, who was later assassinated while secretary-general of the
Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)--the
movement which succeeded in Guinea-Bissau. The Mozambican students
participated in discussion sessions and some encountered Marxism in the
universities and with the Portuguese Communist Party. Official harassment for
these clandestine talks on nationalism was the reason that Mondlane gave for later
continuing his studies in the United States. A few NESAM members, together
with other Mozambican students in Africa, Europe and the United States,
organized the Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes de Moçambique (UNEMO) in
1963. Their mission while abroad entailed publicizing the nationalist struggle. But
participation in UNEMO accounted for little more than a psychological escape
and physical
dodge to avoid fighting in Mozambique. The American branch was sometimes
critical of Mondlane's policies and ambivalent in its support for FRELIMO over
its weak rival Comit Revolucionario de Morambique (COREMO).34 UNEMO
reflected some of the same schisms as FRELIMO under Mondlane's leadership. After Mondlane's death, it became an instrument of FRELIMO. No survey of Mozambican anticolonial agitation, however brief, can neglect mention of the countryside. One nationalist document avowed that "between 1918 and 1964, a number of minor local tribal uprisings took place in various parts of Mozambique." Another held that rebellions broke out in 1942 and 1944 in the southern part of the country. Confirmation of these uprisings is buried in Portugal's sealed archives or in the ashes of the secret police's burned records. Protonationalist formations in rural areas materialized in cooperative markets. In order to raise profits and bypass Asian and Portuguese traders, some Africans attempted to set up cooperative schemes; these fell short of anticipated success but they did bring the founders into conflict with the colonial authorities. Lazaro Kavandame, a Makonde elder who subsequently served on FRELIMO's Central Committee before defecting, founded in 1957 and managed one of the cooperatives in his region before its suppression in mid-1959. Another indication of incipient ethnonationalism manifested itself in a Makonde party, the Uniao Makonde de Mocambique. Members of this movement went on in 1961 to establish the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) in Mombasa, Kenya. It was one of the three principal movements that merged to form FRELIMO. In nationalist literature, the most celebrated anticolonial event happened in the Makonde town of Mueda. After a period of antigovernment agitation, demonstrators gathered on June 16, 1960, in the plateau town to air their grievances. When the crowd reacted to the arrest of its spokesmen by attacking the district governor, a platoon of Portuguese troops opened fire. FRELIMO placed the casualty figure at five hundred. A Portuguese eyewitness held more plausibly that the troops, untrained in proper crowd control techniques, panicked and fired into the mob, killing between sixty and eighty. Whatever the exact figure, the Mueda incident became a symbol, a catalyst, for armed struggle. What mattered most in the insurgency was the widespread and effective use the Mueda affair found in FRELIMO propaganda. The confrontation was no less a discernible sign, although others probably exist hidden from view, that the military had begun to strengthen the police forces in Mozambique against nationalist activity.

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FORMATION OF A NATIONAL FRONT
The story of FRELIMO's formation from three exile movements has become an oft-told tale. It needs merely the concisest retelling here. Rising African nationalism stirred over a score of individuals to form embryonic, locally based parties within Mozambique in the 1950s. Given Portuguese surveillance, antigovernment cells sought safety in neighboring states where they coalesced. Migrant workers and discontented high school students mostly from south and central Mozambique gathered in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, to form the Uniao Nacional Democratica de Mogambique (UDENAMO) on October 2, 1960. One of the founders was Uria Simango, a Protestant pastor from the Beira area, who became for a time vice president of FRELIMO. The second exile movement, MANU,
whose formation was discussed above, owed its existence to a Makonde self-help and cultural association among plantation and dock workers in east Africa. Organized in Malawi by Mozambicans from Tete district, Únigo Africana de Mogambique Independente (UNAMI) constituted the third and smallest organization. Tanzanian independence in December 1961 convinced the three organizations to move to Dar es Salaam. There, they received pressure to merge into one front from fellow Mozambicans and such African heads of state as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. A step of sorts towards unity among nationalists of all Portugal's African colonies had been taken with the setting up of the Conferancia das OrganizagSes Nacionalistas das Col6nias Portugu~sas (CONCP). Under its secretary-general, Marcelino dos Santos, soon to figure in FRELIMO's hierarchy, CONCP urged UDENAMO and MANU to "come together."

A conference of all three movements convened during June 20-25, 1962, culminating in the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique or FRELIMO. Members of the former organizations assumed most of the key posts. But the presidency went to Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane who had been remote from the premerger wranglings. Mondlane, a onetime UN research officer, was at the time a professor of anthropology at Syracuse University in New York. FRELIMO held its First Congress in September 1962, three months after the founding meeting. In spite of feelers to Lisbon for a handover of Mozambican independence, the new front declared its aim of promoting an "efficient organization of the struggle of the Mozambican people for national liberation."42

From then on preparations were underway for an insurgency. Not long after its formation FRELIMO suffered from the emergence of factions, some of which led to rival splinter groups and others to infighting within the front. It serves no useful function here to detail the plethora of miniparties.43 For purposes of this work, it need only be emphasized that two central truths attended the divisions within Mozambican nationalism. In the first place, fractures have afflicted virtually all movements engaged in anticolonial war or revolutionary struggle. Secondly, such internal conflicts have benefited the incumbent forces. An unmistakable indication of internecine feuding surfaced to the outside world in the bomb assassination of Mondlane on February 3, 1969, although other intraparty murders occurred earlier. Temporary instability followed. After the breakdown in November 1969 of a Council of the Presidency comprised of Samora Machel, Marcelino dos Santos and Uria Simango, the presidency fell to Machel, a military man and secretary of defense.

Unlike the Angolan insurgency where three anticolonial movements of nearly equal strength contended for predominance while fighting Portugal, FRELIMO held the field almost alone. It gained recognition as the sole representative of Mozambican nationalism by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), foreign states and international organizations. Its rivals received no such recognition.
Despite the welter of acronymic movements bidding for attention, only very limited competition came from COREMO, ultimately under the command of Paulo Gumane. COREMO spokesmen tended to be more modest in their battle communiques than did FRELIMO bulletins. By the same token, its success in gaining international recognition and assistance was much more modest than its Tanzanian-based rival. COREMO failed to win anything but de facto recognition of its activities at the Tenth Session of the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC) in spite of a determined bid in 1967. Little overt financial or material aid flowed to it, and the Zambia-based faction was denied even permission to establish a branch in Dar es Salaam where the ALC maintained its headquarters. The absence of an OAU endorsement or widely touted battlefield victories did not prevent COREMO from getting an occasional favorable comment from a foreign journalist. Nor did its relative obscurity dim its hopes for coming to power in the topsy-turvy politics of southern Africa. In reality, it ceased to be a serious contender for power in Mozambique long before the end of the war. FRELIMO's claims in the international arena and on the battleground stood stronger than COREMO's or those of other movements.

THE PORTUGUESE PREPARATION

The Portuguese reacted to the signs of unrest and agitation. Mozambique's colonial government eased permits for wholesale purchase of arms by settlers and issued antisabotage instructions to property owners. Three months after the Mueda incident it also published a decree making all Portuguese citizens (assimilados included) liable for compulsory service in the civil defense force. But the establishment of the Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defense (Organizarao Provincial de Voluntirios e Defesa Civil--OPVDC) was delayed until 1962 and the actual formation took place only in 1964. Lethargy and red tape, so commonly ascribed to Portuguese inefficiency, account for merely a partial explanation of this procrastination. The rest of the answer lies in Portugal's fears of constituting an organized settler force of uncertain loyalties (and uncertain discipline) to the distant Lisbon before positioning a metropolitan army in its east African colony. Besides, the Angolan settlers' retaliatory bloodletting following the 1961 African insurrection cautioned officials about the wisdom of arming vigilantes on a large scale. Angola's rebellion with its savage reprisals and counterreprisals further unnerved whites in Mozambique and added additional impetus to police and military preparations. Present in Mozambique since the mid-1950s, the secret police were alerted and expanded. Commonly referred to as PIDE (Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado) even after its slight reorganization and relabelling to the Direccao Geral de Seguranga (DGS) in 1969, the secret police, or PIDE/DGS, became a key component of Portugal's counterrevolution. The build-up of the Forcas Armadas (Armed Forces) likewise preceded the formation of FRELIMO. By mid-1960 a paratrooper unit had arrived and troops began patrolling the borders with Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. Following the Angolan revolt the
next year, troop strength increased from three thousand to thirteen thousand men. Also in mid-1961, the Salazar government replaced Governor General Correia de Barros with Rear Admiral Manuel Maria Sarmento Rodrigues, whose loyalty, military background and reputation for toughness determined his selection. Lisbon granted him military and civilian authority so as to be able to deal firmly with unrest. By the outbreak of fighting in 1964, army manpower had jumped to thirty-five thousand troops.48 Tanzania's independence in 1961 and Zambia and Malawi's in 1964 caused concern in Lisbon. Mozambique's borderlands afford ideal conditions for infiltration and exfiltration. In the north and northwest, Portuguese authority was tenuous, communications were feeble and the terrain is irregular and densely foliaged. Expecting the brunt of the fighting to come against Cabo Delgado, Portuguese planners placed most of their installations in the northeastern district. The Forras Armadas deployed troops along the Rovuma and evacuated communities close to its banks in anticipation of harassing raids from across the river. Troops further cleared away the sparse brush on the Mozambican side of the river. Mozambique's Second Development Plan (1959-1964) allowed for the expansion of communication and transportation systems in the north. Airfields were constructed at Mueda, Palma, Umtamba, Midumba and Ngamba for reconnaissance, fighter and transport aircraft. For surer ground transit the engineers paved a road linking Mueda with Palma on the Indian Ocean. Coastal surveillance was enhanced by the construction of a naval base at Porto Amelia (now Pemba), about 150 miles south of the Rovuma's mouth. The northern district of Niassa drew less attention at this stage. A naval commando post was constructed at Porto Arroio and another lakeside operations base was refurbished at Metangula (formerly Augusto Cardoso). A year after the insurgency began, however, the Portuguese had only one gunboat, Castor, 28 tons and equipped with a 20 mm Oerlikon. It was reported at the same time that the air force numbered only five planes and no helicopters at the district capital city of Vila Cabral.49 The Forgas Armadas

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also lacked armored vehicles for patrol and convoy duty on roads and railways. Despite these equipment shortages, some counterinsurgency techniques reportedly formed a part of combat training among front-line forces.50 Civic action programs played a role in Portugal's preinsurgency preparations. It introduced itinerant medical units from the Servigo de Aecao Psicossocial. Comprised of seven members, the mobile teams had specialists in medicine, agriculture and home crafts. Some members inoculated the villagers, passed out salves and performed minor operations while others gave preventive medicine tips, taught rudimentary domestic crafts or instructed basic farming skills before moving to the next village.51 One of the crew monitored for signs of discontent and disseminated progovernment propaganda. Twenty units were said to be operating by late 1963 concentrating on the remote northern areas but also working in the central districts.52
Nor did Lisbon neglect statutory and symbolic factors in its early antinationalist campaign. Angola's rebellion triggered a change in the status of Africans from indigena (native) to Portuguese citizens. Repealing the 1954 Estatuto dos Indígenas (Native Statute) was intended to soften racial antagonisms; it also served the tightening of security by requiring Africans to register for a new identity card, the cartão de identidade. A year later in 1962, Portugal introduced the Rural Labor Code, which among other things outlawed forced labor, a primary cause of rural discontent. Too little and too late, such legalistic modifications were viewed by nationalists as tardy concessions granted under pressure. To the rural population for whom Portugal and FRELIMO competed, the laws passed in faraway Lisbon failed to ameliorate their living conditions or to involve them meaningfully in the political life of Mozambique.

To strengthen sentimental ties with Portugal, President Amílcar R. Tomás made a two-week, confetti-and-bunting visit to Mozambique. Large and officially encouraged crowds of Africans and Europeans welcomed the retired admiral. At points on his tour, Mozambicans surged through police cordons to kiss the hand of the white uniformed figure. In spite of a chilly reception in the northern belt, particularly around Vila Cabral, an official spokesman commented that the visit "showed the world that peace, progress and racial harmony exist in Mozambique."\(^53\) Less than two months later the start of the war for national liberation cast doubt on Portuguese assertions of "peace and racial harmony," but campaigns to reinforce identification with Portugal met with a measure of headway.

That an insurgency was first permitted to break out and then allowed to score local gains remains the weightiest indictment of Portuguese preparations. Prevention by uprooting the insurgent underground during its cultivation of the prerevolutionary soil is considered the best counterinsurgent defense.\(^54\) The inevitability of nationalism was long accepted. As far back as 1953, a young

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official told John Gunther: "Of course nationalism will come in time. . . . People grow, even here. And they will sooner or later demand change."\(^5\)

Not only did Portugal's counterinsurgency preparations fall well short in checking the spread of guerrilla war; worse still it braced for raids coming across the Rovuma. One month before FRELIMO launched assaults within Mozambique, the Portuguese commander of the Northern Territorial Command (from the Zambezi to the Rovuma), Lt. Col. Francisco Eduardo Nazareth insisted that "trouble here can come only from the outside as it happened in Angola."\(^56\) This inability to detect the extent of FRELIMO's mobilization of the rural population became a recurring Portuguese shortcoming increasingly costly to their counterrevolution.

FRELIMO'S PREPARATION

FRELIMO's preparations began from scratch. Its commentators claimed that clandestine mobilization within Mozambique preceded the fighting by a year and a half.\(^57\) Political cadres went to the villages to store arms, to explain the struggle and to enlist followers. Recruitment of unskilled and semiskilled refugees in
Tanzania and Mozambican villages furnished the type of recruits who formed the backbone of the guerrilla army for the duration of the Revolution. They lacked not only a knowledge of insurgent warfare but also a basic technical preparation to drive vehicles, operate field radios or read maps, let alone to handle modern weapons to achieve coordinated fire. Martial instruction came at first from foreign cadres. It dated from the dispatch of fifty Mozambicans to Algeria's Tlemcem base in January 1963. Two more groups of about seventy recruits total arrived four months later.

FRELIMO began the guerrilla warfare with a force of 250 trained and equipped men.58 Arms consisted of a potpourri of World War II vintage Thompson submachine guns and British or French rifles in varying condition. As time passed, many insurgents were armed with up-to-date Russian and Chinese weapons.

Several factors suggest that FRELIMO hurried to start fighting before the call of its own timetable.59 Since revolutionaries in Angola and Guinea-Bissau had already engaged the Portuguese, their Mozambican counterparts lagged behind and felt pressure through CONCP to stretch Lisbon's reserves further by a war in its east African colony. Another explanation lies in the Algerian connection. FRELIMO's strategy at first reflected Algerian precepts of people's war. In training young Mozambicans, the Algerians placed a premium on initiating an insurgency over building networks, holding that the former would lead to popular support.60 Yet there also was pressure within the leadership itself to spark an Angolantype insurrection, revealing divisions in the Central Committee.61 This was brought on because of Portuguese countermeasures, which were causing concern about the mounting difficulties of launching an insurgency. Finally, and most important, violent incidents in

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northern Mozambique may well have pushed FRELIMO into declaring an official start of its war for national liberation.62 Portuguese authorities had already announced a state of emergency in early 1964 as a consequence of a March 21 attack on an administrative post at Chare in Tete district near the southernmost tip of Malawi in which two sentries were killed and four were wounded. More deaths and sabotage took place in April and May. As a result, Portugal posted an additional twenty-five hundred troops in the border zones. It is unclear whether the attacks came from roving nationalist splinter groups or were a result of the general insurrectionary atmosphere prevalent in northern Mozambique.63 FRELIMO claimed no responsibility for this prewar violence, but its cadres assassinated intransigent intrasient local Makonde leaders.64 The proverbial last straw and most documented preinsurgency incident came with the death of a Dutch missionary in August 1964, a month before FRELIMO's war announcement. A small band of marauders led by onetime MANU leader Lucas Fernandes killed Father Daniel Boorman from the Catholic mission at Nangolo in Cabo Delgado. Soon afterwards, the police captured Fernandes and held him in Machava prison near Lourengo Marques. His motives included a racial hatred of the popular old Jesuit priest and a bid to be taken seriously since he had been
squeezed from a high position in FRELIMO. News of the priest's murder hastened the start of the insurgency, for FRELIMO feared that heightened colonial alertness would jeopardize its results and that another movement would take credit for triggering a general rising. For political and military reasons, FRELIMO's Central Committee quickly dispatched twenty-four guerrillas across the Rovuma on August 15 and on September 20 they got orders to attack five days later.

Before midnight on the moonless night of September 25, 1964, three squads of insurgents were to strike at separate targets in Cabo Delgado. Small postos administrativos and lightly armed military outposts were the targets of the first probing raids so characteristic of the early stages of guerrilla warfare. One group led by Alberto Joaquim Chipande (former schoolteacher and future defense minister in an independent Mozambique) fired on a post at Chai near Macomia when Portuguese air and ground surveillance blocked its passage to Porto Amelia; another guerrilla band under Lourengo Raimundo reached its objective and sprayed with fire a military post outside of Mueda; the third, commanded by António Saido, was stopped short of its destination of Montepuez by army patrols. These pinprick forays constituted a modest preview of more violent but similarly fleeting assaults to come.

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of the Revolution

The terrorist is not a soldier. The terrorist is afraid.
--General Kaulza de Arriaga
He who fights and runs away
May live to fight another day.
--Demosthenes
Revolutions belong to a tradition of historical action in the strong sense that virtually all revolutions in the present century have imitated--or at least set out to imitate as best they could--other revolutions of an earlier date.
--John Dunn, Modern Revolutions

After the first raids FRELIMO issued a proclamation announcing the commencement of "armed struggle." No guerrilla offensive ensued. Aside from small-scale and infrequent strikes, a lull developed in the conflict until the early months of 1965. This gave rise to a description of the insurgency as a "phony war." In reality this seemingly quiescent interval served as an intense period of politicization among the Makonde on their plateau and the Nyanja on the highlands along Lake Malawi. When FRELIMO later pressed ahead in Niassa, its guerrilla bands surprised the colonial army which expected the brunt of the fighting to be in Cabo Delgado. The insurgents crossed the Lugenda River and reached as far south as the railhead at Nova Freixo by autumn 1965. By so doing
the maquisards interrupted communication on the road connecting Vila Cabral, the district's capital, and Nampula, the capital of Mozambique district. Lord Kilbracken of London's conservative Evening Standard wrote of Portugal's deteriorating situation in northern Mozambique in the fall of 1965:

Today the battle zone stretches some 20 to 40 miles inland along almost all Mozambique's lake shore from the Tanzanian to the Malawi border. In 3,000 terrorised square miles the Portuguese, both civil and military, are now confined to five small isolated garrisons: Metangula, Maniamaba, Cobue, Olivenca, and Nova Coimbra. Not one white settler dares stay in all the area. Their once-neat holdings are today silent and abandoned. And most of the Africans--they belong to the Nyanja tribe--have fled to the mountains and islands or to Tanzania or Malawi.

These early inroads marked the highpoint of FRELIMO's penetration in Niassa. But it rendered itself unpopular among villagers by commandeering food, supplies and carriers; this is an inevitable feature of guerrilla forces, who lack a modern army's commissariat when they operate without broad-based support. By advancing off the tablelands without proper political groundwork among the Yao, the guerrillas overextended themselves. When they tried to hold ground, instead of tactically withdrawing, the FRELIMO forces suffered one of their worst setbacks. A Portuguese counteroffensive in 1966 pushed the guerrillas back northward. It and subsequent operations, however, could not dislodge an entrenched FRELIMO presence in a rectangular zone running from the Tanzanian boundary along Lake Malawi to just north of Vila Cabral and then inland for about 100 miles. The insurgent stronghold lay between the villages of Maniambo and Metamira. Bordering this highland block, the Forcas Armadas patrolled the reed-grown shoreline from a naval base at Metangula (Augusto Cardoso), which had come under early attack, and within it they held isolated garrisons at Olivenga, C6buA and Maniambo.

Over in Cabo Delgado, FRELIMO operations succeeded first in reaching as far south as the Montepuez River and then beyond it to the plain just north of the Lério River by the end of 1965. There, they ran into one of the ethnic hostilities that had historically divided Mozambican unity--conflict with the Makua. When rolled back by an effective counterinsurgency campaign, later guerrilla probes below the Messalo River encountered resettlement of the populace in aldeamentos (fortified villages).

Meanwhile in the summer of 1965, two guerrilla units moved from Malawi into the Zambizia district to strike at the tea plantations between Milange and Tacuane. But until after the Portuguese army coup, FRELIMO kept a low operational profile in the rich and populous Zambizia. Its commitments to other fronts, the unreceptiveness of the Makua (and related Lomwe) and the lack of cooperation of the Malawi government account in part for FRELIMO's absence of
headway in Zamb~zia. Lisbon's defensive measures account for another part of
FRELIMO's inaction. In October 1966, the Central Committee analyzed the
situation in Niassa as well as Zamb~zia and noted "deficiencies in the
coordination of general action."6 Little changed until after the Lisbon coup. Not
until July 1974, when the colonial army's morale had disintegrated, did

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FRELIMO open a "front" from Malawi. Then it scored a propaganda victory by
forcing the evacuation of the border town of Morrumbala, its first captured town.
This in turn led to a white flight as settlers hurried to the coastal town of
Quelimane.

Long before the Lisbon coup, however, FRELIMO faced formidable political and
military obstacles. Incidents within the two northern combat zones intensified but
remained localized. A command reorganization within the insurgent army in 1966
and broadening support among the Nyanja and Makonde provide explanations for
FRELIMO's ability to mount more intensive assaults than previously. For all its
intensified raiding and mine laying, FRELIMO strong points were confined to the
two tablelands in Cabo Delgado and Niassa until 1968: the north-central country
between them, largely uninhabited due to tsetse fly, saw little action and only
infrequent Portuguese patrols.

By that date, FRELIMO asserted the liberation of one-fifth of Mozambique and
one million people from Portuguese control. Not surprisingly, Lisbon's
counterassertion put the figures at considerably less, about 8 percent of the land
and two hundred thousand inhabitants.8 Military and economic damage was
slight. The guerrillas closed down the sisal and fruit plantations near Molimboa da
Praia, which the Forgas Armadas found too vulnerable and unprofitable to defend.
But the insurgent-dominated sectors were underdeveloped before the fighting.
The exodus of white and black farmers, however, resulted in food shortages in the
north. More serious concerns stemmed from the symbolic and psychological
impact of lost territory and population to a permanent insurgent presence.

Throughout the war the incidence of guerrilla activity stayed high in Cabo
Delgado while both FRELIMO and Portuguese communiqu6s noted a steady
decline in Niassa.9

Confronted by a slowdown in the two northern districts,
FRELIMO opened another front in the northwestern district of Tete during March
1968, where COREMO had carried out minor activities.10 Here FRELIMO
guerrilla incidents were initially well to the north of the Cabora Bassa dam site on
the Zambezi. Originally, FRELIMO units operated along the Capoche River near
the Zambian frontier and to the east on the Ang6nia Plateau close by the Malawi
border, thus depriving Lourenco Marques of the plateau's famed potatoes. Once
lodged in these distant and inaccessible lands, the guerrillas strove fruitlessly to
"Bust Cabora Bassa." Then in late 1971, they turned with some results to
intensifying their ambushing and mining of the work site's approaches. Causing
more concern were guerrilla actions south of the Zambezi which had commenced
the previous year. Partly out of fear for its lifeline to the Indian Ocean port of
Beira, Rhodesia launched "hot pursuit" strikes into Mozambican territory to arrest
insurgent progress. Belatedly, the Forgas Armadas shifted troops and resettled villagers in Tete to check guerrilla-infiltration. FRELIMO bulletins touted as victories these evacuations of posts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa and the reassignment of troops to the northwest. 11

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The arrival of Brigadier-General Kaélza de Arriaga in 1970 witnessed a stepped-up counterinsurgency offensive. Several largescale search-and-destroy operations were set in motion. The largest conventional sweep, Operation Gordian Knot, attained local success on the Makonde Plateau. Related missions destroyed guerrilla bases near Olivenga in Niassa. For all Arriaga's statements of impending victory, the insurgents, who were allowed time to regroup with an unusually long rainy season, showed little sign of lasting defeat. Meanwhile in the northwestern part of the country, FRELIMO continued apace its mining of the road connecting Rhodesia and Malawi across Tete. Guerrilla operations as well advanced into the northern sections of the central district of Manica and Sofala* by June 1972. At the end of 1973, FRELIMO directed raids against road and rail links between Umtali, Rhodesia and Beira. Caught napping in Tete, the Portuguese command scrambled to repeat the defensive methods already implemented in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. FRELIMO's spreading incursions into Mozambique's "waist" achieved a breakthrough appearance, the political and psychological ramifications of which will be considered below. Suffice it to say here that FRELIMO's filterings deep into the country's mid-section had profound implications for Portugal's rule in Africa in a way not present in either Guinea-Bissau or Angola. For the first time since the war's beginning, Mozambican revolutionaries were making a substantial impact on the settler population, who expressed alarm at the guerrillas' seemingly uncontainable advances.

When the army overthrew Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano's government on April 25, 1974, the political and military balance appeared to have shifted toward FRELIMO, at least in the central zone of Mozambique. Yet the next six months turned out to be just as pivotal as any in the war. Shortly after the coup, it looked as if Lisbon would neither end the fighting nor surrender total independence to Mozambique. The new government initially played for time, maneuvered and sought a settlement without FRELIMO's exclusive participation. FRELIMO's actions, therefore, assumed critical proportions. It is for these reasons that this study properly extends to the Cease-fire Agreement and the Lusaka Accord of September 7, 1974, which established a FRELIMO-dominated Transition Government until independence on June 25, 1975. The interval between the army takeover and the accord constituted a gauge on which to judge FRELIMO's application of war admixed with politics—an acid test for revolutionaries.

What this overview and others like it leave unanswered is a profusion of pressing questions germane to the principles and

*In July 1970, the colonial government subdivided and renamed the district of Manica e Sofala to Vila Pery and Beira. FRELIMO did not make this distinction.
After independence, the new government left the district divided but restored the two names Manica and Sofala.

The Military Insurgency of the Revolution in Mozambique's war of national liberation. For example, what basic strategies underlay insurgent and counterinsurgent goals? What methods were used for mobilization and politicization of European settlers and African peoples? And what role was played by terror tactics in motivation and participation? Which insurgent formulas proved most successful? Did any counterinsurgent programs bear fruit? When did Mozambican terrain, climate and social conditions affect or change accepted revolutionary and counterrevolutionary practices? How did each side encourage desertions and how efficacious were rehabilitation programs? Finally and importantly, in what ways did Mozambique's war of liberation compare and differ from other modern rural revolutions? The dearth of hard facts and the abundance of conflicting information call for circumspection in offering answers. Yet the problems are outweighed by the prospect of shedding light on the nature of a Marxist-inspired rural revolution and colonial war in an African environment.

INSURGENT STRATEGY

Strategic considerations played an important part in Mozambique's revolutionary war. They determined the nature of guerrilla tactics, targets and, especially, theaters of operation. The insurgent and the counterinsurgent alike tended to articulate political objectives as winning sections of the black and white population to their cause. But FRELIMO made decisions at times for goals other than gaining popular support. One of the points of debate within the FRELIMO Executive Committee in 1968-1969, for example, centered on the degree of emphasis to be placed on population-related programs versus all-out prosecution of the fighting. The military thrust prevailed. Under Mondlane's presidency, efforts to divert refugee relief services to military efforts encountered criticism, particularly from students. When Samora Machel assumed the presidency in November 1969, he added impetus to the combat school of thought and decreased the type of civilian-military controversy which bedeviled its Angolan sister movement, the MPLA. Late in the war Machel disclosed that welfare programs, such as nurses' training, had been downgraded so as to concentrate on guerrilla actions.

Attrition was the strategy of FRELIMO. From the start of the Revolution, insurgents acknowledged the difficulty of militarily defeating Portugal on the battlefield. Ever-spiraling costs in blood and treasure, so the argument ran, would force Lisbon from the mato (bush) to the negotiating table and to granting FRELIMO a political victory. Despite the familiarity of this guerrilla pattern, FRELIMO's implementation possessed its own variations. The Chinese Communists, for instance, strove to control the maximum amount of territory and to annihilate enemy forces. North Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap saw the destruction of French manpower as his major objective. Unlike the North Vietnamese, the Mozambican revolutionaries strove to stretch Portugal's resources thin by engulfing the countryside in insurgency, not control it.
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Employment of fleeting hit-and-run raids and freely sown landmines served this strategy. These tactics also kept the guerrillas' morale high and their casualties low.

Set piece battles using conventional forces were not envisioned in FRELIMO pronouncements. By precluding positional warfare, FRELIMO strategically ruled out the transition to Mao Tse-tung's third and final phase of guerrilla warfare. In theorizing about people's war, Mao had posited three phases leading to victory over the Japanese: "mobile war," "guerrilla war" and "regular war."

Parenthetically it should be noted that in the Chinese war against Japan, the struggle never progressed through the third level. General Giap labeled the same stages as "defensive," "equilibrium" and "offensive."19 The North Vietnamese commander held that in the first phase, "political activities were more important than military activities and fighting less important than propaganda."20 Here again, FRELIMO did not adhere exactly to the prescribed format of Asian revolutionaries. Both in the early and latter stages of the war, FRELIMO's stress on spreading guerrilla incidents overrode prolonged preparations for an insurgent infrastructure.

To be sure, FRELIMO undertook some of the all-important political and propaganda groundwork in the highlands of the northern districts before and immediately after the September raids. Successes there precipitated a too-rapid move into the lower elevations south of Vila Cabral and probing attacks in Zambzia and Tete districts. Under the illusion of a quick victory, guerrilla cadres thus gave promises of a "war over by Christmas" to the Nyasas along the Malawi coast.21 This offensive spirit militates against any simplistic assessment of slow-building progression from the first to the second stages of Mao's guerrilla warfare.

Again in the last months of the war, FRELIMO shifted suddenly from self-defensive actions to harassment operations. Below the Zambezi River and into the central zone, the maquisards not only advanced rapidly but also telescoped the first two phases of irregular warfare. This was accomplished, despite the risky gamble in Africa, by the use of veteran fighters from one ethnic group in the bailiwick of another community. Experienced guerrillas from the Makonde, Nyanja and northern Ngoni spearheaded the initiative among peoples to the south. Varying amounts of local popularity and support for the guerrillas, however, meant that they never operated in the isolation of the Debrayian foco.22 But aside from local logistics--food, information and porters--sometimes furnished under duress, assaults and sabotage often remained in the hands of seasoned guerrillas, not the locals until after the coup.

Notwithstanding the fact that the intensity of incidents accelerated as the insurgency spread over more and more countryside, the type of warfare stayed firmly rooted in stage two. Attacks on troops, installations or local authorities escalated from 8 to 10 a month to some 200 to 250 a month during the last two years.23 Insurgent firepower intensified with the addition of automatic weapons, 122 mm rockets and mortars to the FRELIMO
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inventory. Still, the level of warfare never reached the third and final phase of Maoist insurgency--conventional combat. It was neither in the revolutionaries' capacity nor in their strategy to engage in the mode of warfare characterized by the Viet Minh siege of Dien Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon or the Khmer Rouge encirclement of Phnom Penh. Mozambican revolutionaries displayed little of the exultation of military power as a means to victory until after independence. Mao's widely disseminated maxims, some of which were found on FRELIMO dead, venerated armed strength. The dictum that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was often quoted; but other oft-repeated statements included: "having guns, we can create party organizations" and "the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and highest form of revolution."'24 FRELIMO slogans and literature, by contrast, hailed the invincibility of a mobilized people against their oppressors. Typical slogans of this genre included: "united we shall win," "our objective, to make each Mozambican a militant," "the decisive force, the people of Mozambique," "people's unity, the main weapon."'25 Yet FRELIMO's wartime organization very definitely had a military orientation. When its literature analyzed guerilla methods, it usually did so in the form of traditional folklore. This was illustrative of African views about military tactics but not of the primacy of armed force in achieving political ends. One maneuver, for example, was spelled out as the following:

Our people characterize our military situation . . . by referring to the African saying: "To kill a snake in a hole, don't put your hand inside it; pour in hot water and the snake will come out--then kill it." The Portuguese are isolated in their posts, their "holes." We create conditions that force them out--by cutting their communications and hence supplies and by constant harassment. Once they are out, more vulnerable, then we attack.26

FRELIMO military thought also differed from that of revolutionaries in North Vietnam and Algeria where a "decisive battle' mentality sometimes prevailed. In North Vietnam, General Giap planned and executed the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 contrary to the advice of Mao. In On Protracted War the "Great Helmsman" warned against "decisive battles on which are staked the destiny of the nation."27 Although Dien Bien Phu was a violation of Mao's theory, it proved to be psychologically a decisive battle for the Viet Minh. Much less so was the Battle of Algiers. When the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1956-1957 set in motion its campaign against the French in the city of Algiers, it sought an "Algerian Dien Bien Phu." But French numerical superiority and harsh urban counterinsurgency practices dealt a hard knock to the FLN. The Battle of Algiers demonstrated that shortcuts in the protracted nature of insurgency can be perilous. Neither was the
lesson lost on FRELIMO nor was it ever learned to the point of the guerrillas avoiding all risks.28

FRELIMO did not subscribe to a "decisive battle" scenario; it did, however, pursue at least one major objective--attacks on the Cabora Bassa dam project--resulting in local reverses. Partly as a consequence of the military slowdown in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, FRELIMO recommenced military actions during 1968 in the northwestern district of Tete. It had abandoned guerrilla operations but not subversion at the beginning of 1965 after forays against administrative posts at Mutarara, Z6bua and Charre. Begun again in 1968 with adequate mobilization the insurgency advanced almost overnight in the hilly and forested terrain. The guerrilla cadres gained a sizable following among the Chewa people who span the Malawi and Zambian borders. The next year FRELIMO announced its intention of destroying the giant Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River.

BUST CABORA BASSA

Cabora Bassa took on prodigious political, military and symbolic value for Portugal and FRELIMO. Lisbon viewed it as an investment in the continuance of Portuguese rule. It was for this reason that Mozambican nationalists moved against the dam.29 Its wealth and electrical power would not only anchor Portugal in Mozambique but also solidify South Africa's and Rhodesia's interest in preserving Lisbon's faltering colonialismo by greater intervention into the country. FRELIMO was furthermore concerned with a breakaway settler regime a la Rhodesia in the country's bottom sections and with the stepped-up civic action programs winning away potential rebel backers. A concerted southward drive would upset both possibilities. Destroying or holding up progress on the dam had military as well as political significance. Cabora Bassa's plans entailed the filling of a man-made lake running 115 miles back from the dam wall along the path of the Zambezi. Its ten-twenty-mile width was intended as a formidable barrier to southward infiltration. Too much can be made of the dam's defensive capabilities since the guerrillas already had the capacity to traverse the river and slip around either end of the man-made lake. Before the coup FRELIMO had in fact spread from Malawi far downstream of the Cabora Bassa site. Still a radar-surveyed and intensely patrolled wide body of water would hinder free-flowing infiltration. As such, it was a powerful inducement for the infiltrators to move quickly through Tete into the central zone so as to grasp at a psychological victory over the Forgas Armadas.

Symbolically, Cabora Bassa's unimpeded construction belied FRELIMO assertions of expanding attacks and enlarging sovereignty. By the close of the 1960s, the dam's relentless construction dictated a reconsideration of FRELIMO's self-declared policy of sparing economic projects. Eduardo Mondlane stated in 1967: "We do not regard economic projects as primary targets because the natural resources of Mozambique are our own, even though they may be controlled by the Portuguese today."30 Shortly after becoming president, Machel articulated the changed realities about disrupting the construction of
Cabora Bassa: “If they [the Portuguese] achieve their objective, they will have a political triumph of international magnitude, it will mean that the Portuguese still control Mozambique, that armed struggle does not exist, that the guerrillas are still not consolidated, and that what we say is nothing but propaganda.”

The 1969 campaign to “Bust Cabora Bassa” approached a singleminded commitment in which FRELIMO invested much of its industry and prestige. The results were meager. Assaults on the dam's defense perimeter gradually gave way to somewhat more effective attacks on road and rail communication. Beginning in late 1971 and continuing until the end of the war, guerrillas damaged water pumps, raked moving railway wagons with gunfire or derailed trains on the Caminho de Trans-Zamb–zia, which connected Beira with Moatize in Tete. Attacks most frequently occurred on the track between the towns of Caldas Xavier and Doa, fifty-seven miles to the south, which parallels the Malawian frontier. In the first six months of 1972, for instance, FRELIMO guerrillas stopped traffic eleven times, once with a boulder on the tracks. The principal roadway to Cabora Bassa rolled along the tarred strip from Beira to Tete and then on a further eighty miles of dirt road to Songo, the base camp for the dam. Most insurgent strikes came against this final section of the trip, requiring well-armed escorts and mine probing crews to precede the convoys. Not until 1973 was the entire roadway tarred as a deterrent to landmines. Temporary interruptions did take place in the even flow of concrete and materials along the 275-mile passage from the seacoast. These delays, however, were never long enough to warrant the implementation of air transport plans. Indeed the work on the hydroelectric project, carried on day and night, proceeded ahead of the timetable. But the mineral extraction in Tete was impaired. Fearful for its employees' safety, the South African corporation COMOCIN withdrew from its Tete concession.

As FRELIMO’s military attention focused on the Battle for Central Mozambique, the guerrillas’ interest in halting Cabora Bassa's completion tapered off. But it persisted in the policy to drive up the cost of construction. A renewed concern for economic assets in an independent Mozambique has been seen as the reason why FRELIMO abstained from ambushing the trucks carrying the valuable generators and turbines to the dam; if damaged, the equipment would have had to be returned to Europe for repair. Besides when completed and operating, the giant scheme's 875-mile electrical transmission lines to South Africa, the largest consumer, stood vulnerable to sabotage. Yet the fact remains that the dam was built, and that the guerrillas failed to achieve their self-proclaimed objective. Portuguese success in protecting the dam and the flow of material proved both defensive and deceptive. By striking at

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Cabora Bassa, FRELIMO placed the Forgas Armadas on the strategic defensive. Thus the insurgents held the initiative. FRELIMO's attraction to Tete lay in the strategic objective of spreading the war, not solely in attacking Cabora Bassa. In this sense, its campaign against the dam served as a diversion around which guerrilla forces infiltrated into Manica and Sofala (Vila Pery and Beira).
STRATEGIC SURPRISES
FRELIMO executed three strategic surprises, all of which caught the Portuguese army unprepared: first, it drove deep into Niassa district in early 1965; second, it shifted its concentration from Cabo Delgado and Niassa to Tete in 1968; and finally, it went around Cabora Bassa to achieve a breakthrough into the midsection of the country in 1972. In the first two instances, the Forcas Armadas dwelled on specific districts to the detriment of counterinsurgency preparations in the west, and in the last they overemphasized the defense of Cabora Bassa for too long resulting in a loss of readiness in the central districts.35

The guerrillas, westward and southward advances kept the Portuguese more than strategically off balance, they kept them logistically overextended. The counterinsurgency measures in Cabo Delgado and Niassa were deemed a success by foreign analysts.36 They contained the main insurgent drive southward, and containment in guerrilla war, even if not airtight, is headway. Infiltration from Cabo Delgado was never completely stopped. Individual converts were won to the revolutionary cause among the reputedly hostile Makua people, especially in Nampula. But there was no wholesale conversion of the Makua to the Revolution. The guerrillas were not confined alone to the upland area of the northeastern district. Late in the struggle they stepped up raids on the defense points outside the coastal villages of Palma and Porto Amelia (Pemba).37 Yet they could not make substantial progress southward; and their increase in the pitch of military assaults in Cabo Delgado was not duplicated in Niassa district. Whereas the FRELIMO offensive reescalated in Cabo Delgado as witnessed in a mass attack on the Nazombe base twelve miles from the Tanzanian border, the fighting declined in Niassa. It was not the hospitable sea in which the guerrilla fish swims but a desert of scattered population inhabiting tiny villages two to three days apart. Regroupment and refugees further drained the population from FRELIMO access. But above all, pressure in Cabo Delgado and through Tete on into middle sections of the country compelled Portugal to fight a kind of two-front war.

Although FRELIMO's lunge southward beyond Cabora Bassa into Manica and Sofala was pushed by the immediacy of water filling the artificial lake, it opened political opportunities for the revolutionaries. Machel summed up the importance of Tete in 1972: "Tete is like the camel's hump--it is where their [Portuguese] The Military Insurgency of the Revolution
strengths and reserves are concentrated."38 Battling in central Mozambique offered FRELIMO railroad and roadway targets, halfreadied aldeamentos and white farmer settlements. There existed also the not unimportant possibility of threatening the town of Beira or depressing the Rhodesian tourist traffic of some seventy thousand holiday visitors a year to Mozambique's beaches. Bombardments of military targets such as Estima (Chitima) defense base near Cabora Bassa in June 1973 or of Inhampinga's fortified garrison in January 1974 added to concern among civilian workers in rural regions. Operating from bases as far south as the densely forested Gorongosa Game Park afforded the guerrilla units inaccessible preserves from which to strike.

The campaign in Manica and Sofala opened on July 25, 1972,
and was pressed after the Central Committee meeting in December. Despite the prospects and early guerrilla gains, the rapid move into the central zones was not without risks. Its eventual success makes it appear a stroke of military genius but in the circumstances of the time it was a gamble. Advancing beyond a properly politicized local population could place insurgents in jeopardy. Residents could refuse or resist guerrilla requests for food, recruits, porters and information. Or, they could cooperate with the incumbent. Pressed by the Cabora Bassa timetable, FRELIMO resorted to more and more civilian violence. To undermine the people's confidence in the Forgas Armadas, the insurgents rocketed the regroupment villages, sometimes four and five times a single night by 1974. So as to root out a growing guerrilla infrastructure, the Portuguese stepped up their violent tactics, trying to dry up the water of friendly people which sustained the guerrillas. Forced resettlement and reprisals became more frequent and on a larger scale after mid-1972. It was in this atmosphere of suspicion and frustration that elements of the Portuguese army massacred the inhabitants of Wiriyamu, and FRELIMO purportedly destroyed the village of Nhacambo, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

This deadly scramble took on another political twist late in the war. This occurred with a return to attacks on white settlers. During the early days of the war, Portuguese farmers in remote areas of the north had been killed or scattered. Then FRELIMO's policy switched toward coexistence with settlers and finally it returned briefly to intimidation.

In early 1974 reports of five Europeans killed in the central region were widely circulated. Their deaths produced profound effects on the military and political situation in Lusophone Africa and Portugal itself. Panic, demoralization, abandonment and a sense of futility—all were reactions among whites in Mozambique. Settlers demonstrated in the towns of Vila de Manica and Vila Pery. In Beira, they hurled stones at military installations and demanded the closure of the posh Santa Luzia military hotel. Unable either to contain the guerrillas or to stifle the news of white deaths, the army became the target of European fear and discontent. Using baton charges and cordons around besieged buildings, the army restored order in the seaside port. Worried farmers cabled

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Caetano, asking for reassurances. Lisbon dispatched General Francisco da Costa Gomes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, to pacify angry Europeans. He agreed to close the rest center in Beira, to hand out automatic rifles to some four hundred farmers on the Chimoio Plateau in Manica district and to give assurances of ultimate Portuguese supremacy as well as Lisbon's resolve.

The settlers' reactions undermined the army's morale. Both the Europeans and the military realized that the Forgas Armadas could no longer guarantee the safety of farmers in rural expanses. There existed as well the real possibility of urban terrorism. Guerrilla incidents proliferated with the start of 1974. The first five weeks witnessed nineteen assaults on the Beira-Umtali railway. As the Portuguese successfully stiffened defenses, the guerrilla strikes shifted. Mines, some even as far south as Inhaminga in Sofala district, derailed trains on the Beira-Blantyre
line, which interrupted transit to and from Malawi. The severing of Rhodesian and Malawian traffic to the Indian Ocean, if only temporarily, threatened a valuable source of Mozambique's revenue. Shellings of Inhaminga and sabotage at Muanza, sixty miles north of Beira, took place. All these acts eroded still further the army's credibility. It became more demoralized. The army's morale was hardly buttressed by the knowledge that the civilian authorities in Lourenço Marques enlarged their support for the military activities of the PIDE/DGS, including the expansion of its paramilitary flecha (arrow) operations.40

Back in Portugal the deteriorating Mozambican situation helped influence the course of events culminating in the golpe de estado.41 Members of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) kept abreast of the wars in Africa, of which the fighting in Mozambique during the weeks before the coup loomed most depressingly. The origins and motivations behind the army takeover were complex and deeply rooted in Portuguese society and history. The MFA's motives were inextricably bound up with professional grievances. As such they lie beyond the purview of this chapter. Yet there is little doubt that it was the unwinnable and worsening wars in Africa that furnished the backdrop and mainspring for the MFA's actions. And nowhere was the military equation seemingly more unsolvable than in Mozambique's collapsing central section. On closer examination, however, FRELIMO's destructive capability remained relatively low--lower than, say, the Viet Minh at an equivalent stage of historical development--although its freedom of maneuver broadened. Portuguese forces quickly repaired and restored damaged communication routes. More importantly, the Forzas Armadas persisted in their local military superiority. Strategically, by contrast, the guerrillas possessed the initiative and demonstrated the ability to determine theaters of combat along with the location of small-sized raids. It was in this ambience of mounting helplessness to affect the course of the war that the Lisbon coup took place.

The Military Insurgency of the Revolution
The apparent military reverse in Mozambique occupied a central position in creating a climate of pessimism. Angola's factionplagued nationalists offered no such revelation. In Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC's unilateral declaration of statehood on September 24, 1973, had gained international recognition from sympathetic countries but had not really tipped the military or political balance any further against the Portuguese than the movement's de facto control over wide areas had. Lisbon ignored it, just as it had ignored previous claims to liberated zones. Certainly, the Mozambican war was the most rapidly deteriorating after mid-1973, the time when the coup organizers began meeting. Official casualty figures from late 1973 to early 1974 indicate that the east coast colony cost almost more soldiers' lives than the combined losses in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. By modern war standards the mortality rate, however, was quite low. From November 1, 1973, to January 23, 1974, the Portuguese list of battle fatalities included 108 in Mozambique, 56 in Guinea-Bissau and 54 in Angola.42 Expenditures in Mozambique for the army, navy and air force surpassed outlays in Angola in the 1973 budget by almost 200 million escudos--the first year Mozambique had the
highest defense expenses. For the same year Guinea-Bissau's military budget was eleven times smaller than Mozambique's. More confirmation of the worsening Mozambican theater comes from the airlifting of ten thousand reinforcements from Angola in March 1974, only weeks before the coup. Portugal's counterinsurgency strategy had on one level been predicated on containment of the guerrillas to remote, underpopulated and economically expendable lands. Lisbon's human and material expenditures were to be kept within tolerable limits until the guerrillas either quit in frustration or, more likely, splintered into rivaling and ineffectual factions in the face of improved socioeconomic conditions in Portuguese-dominated zones. FRELIMO's move into the central zone and its political cohesion presented little prospect of reversal or disintegration to the MFA in Portugal. Nor did analysis of intelligence estimates afford solace. Visible guerrilla actions during the war usually lagged behind the actual front of insurgent political action by fifty to one hundred miles. Measured on this yardstick, FRELIMO's guerrilla cadres were crossing the Save River into the southern districts of Gaza and Inhambane at war's end. Unreported in the local press was a machine gun attack as far south as the road leading from Beira to Lourenço Marques in which three white truckdrivers lost their lives. An alleged PIDE/DGS map captured by FRELIMO in early 1973 marked a heavy concentration of insurgent suspects in Gaza district. FRELIMO had embryonic cells within the shantytowns surrounding the capital and known collectively as "canico" after the thin cane which constitutes the main housing material. Some of the cells emerged from the preinsurgency secondary school associations, NESAM. Others grew from FRELIMO sympathizers or organizers dispatched to the south. One of them, Matias Mboa, had been intercepted as early as 1965 and jailed in Machava prison.

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The revolutionaries' organizational structure in the major population centers, however, was rudimentary. They reasoned that urban activity would not have changed the balance and "the possibilities for corruption of cadres were much greater." Hence, pro-FRELIMO or anti-Portuguese feelings went unchannelled. Large ethnolinguistic communities, such as the Makua-Lomwe, were inadequately won over. Nor were there instances of FRELIMO penetration above the rank and file of the army or lower colonial bureaucracy as happened in Vietnam. In a sense, FRELIMO's insurgency drive outstripped deep political mobilization in large sections of the country. What contributed to a FRELIMO victory was first its strategic outflanking to the west of the two northern districts and then around the defenses of the Cabora Bassa dam into the European heartland. Militarily, the Forgas Armadas stood undefeated, intact and in possession of communication links, urban areas and consequential swaths of territory. But strategically, they had lost the initiative. Not only had the maquisards exercised tactical stealth--as is customary in insurgencies--but also they had demonstrated strategic surprise.

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
On the surface, FRELIMO's tactics and techniques resembled
those practiced in China, Southeast Asia and Algeria. The Mozambican revolutionaries carried out the classic principles of guerrilla warfare: constant harassment, selection of time and place for fighting, retreat from superior forces, assault on inferior units and exploitation of the enemy's political and moral weaknesses. Such tactics possibly caused Lisbon's military casualties to be about four thousand dead and FRELIMO's to be some twenty thousand killed, although only approximately a quarter of the latter figure may have been armed guerrillas according to one estimate. That incidents and casualties were lower than those in guerrilla actions elsewhere is attributable in part to fewer combatants and a smaller civilian population in Mozambique than in China, Vietnam or Algeria. The apparent similarities in rural revolutions should not blur the distinctions in Mozambique's Revolution. Further, a certain violence is done to the total picture of Mozambique's Revolution by delineating military aspects separately. Political, economic and psychological factors formed the context of the struggle. For organizational purposes, however, this section will focus on some of FRELIMO's tactics and techniques while taking up other dimensions in subsequent chapters. Mozambique's topography disposed it to clandestine combat. But its variety called for adaptability on the part of the guerrillas. Thick vegetation in the north allowed for insurgent units of 50-75 guerrillas, massing for assaults of 200-300 fighters, whereas the sparser savanna growth in mid-Tete dictated smaller groups of sometimes only 3 to 6 individuals. Mass wave onslaughts, although

The Military Insurgency of the Revolution 41 occasionally reported by frightened colonial troops in lonely outposts, were not regular partisan tactics. Dense bush permitted close-range ambushes of thirty yards or less; open spaces, on the other hand, required a switch to assaults of a hundred yards or more, necessitating more accuracy with bazookas, mortars and 122 mm rockets than rifles and handguns. Thinly covered grasslands caused greater concern for concealment than FRELIMO needed to observe in the forest areas. Bases and arms caches were also less complex and smaller outside them. Return fire against Portuguese aircraft was both more accurate and prevalent where trees gave camouflage and security. Elsewhere the emphasis was on movement. The adaptation from forest to savanna demonstrated a versatility not readily called for in southeast Asia and not expressly recognized by most observers. The lessons of Gordian Knot also dictated smaller more mobile units and moderate-sized operational bases for most engagements. Being short of radios, communication between units was maintained mostly by runners. Communication and control were enhanced by territorial subdivisions. Cabo Delgado, for instance, had by 1974 four sectors and fifteen districts. The assignment of big areas to squad-sized forces reduced combat collisions among units. Estimates of FRELIMO forces varied. Commencing raids in 1964 with 250 trained men, guerrilla army grew to between 9,000 and 11,000 full-time fighters by April 1974 inside Mozambique. An equivalent number have been placed in training, stand-by status or in the pipeline southward. In addition to the guerrilla
regular army there was more than two times as many youths, old men and women organized into regional and local militias who transported supplies, defended base camps and backed up local raids. That a relatively small group of insurgents caused considerable damage and, more important, Portuguese concern was confirmed by Forcas Armadas' reckonings which put the number of guerrillas operating below the Zambezi at five hundred in August 1973. The same source estimated fifty guerrillas around the town of Vila Pery and thirty in the Gorongosa Game Reserve.49 FRELIMO's military arm was comparatively slender. Even the Khmer Rouge's seventy-thousand-man army exceeded by almost sevenfold that of FRELIMO's force when the former came to power in Cambodia, a country of slightly smaller population than Mozambique.

Tactically, Mozambican guerrillas employed the age-old practices of irregular warfare; these were the devices that conventionally weaker forces use against their better armed opponents. Termed the flagela ao (flagellation) by Portuguese troops, it consisted of a whipping burst of gunfire against a stalled convoy or ambushed patrol followed by a quick getaway. As elsewhere, such tactics inflicted physical and psychological damage on the incumbent forces while minimizing the attackers' losses and swelling the confidence of the guerrillas and their civilian adherents. Mozambique Revolution, FRELIMO's main informational release, was replete with battle communiques and individual accounts of these methods so hyperbolic as to defy credence.

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Where Mozambican guerrillas differed from the pattern of others, say the Viet Cong, was in greater reluctance to stay put in an exchange of gunfire.50 By firing and running precipitately the damage, if any, was more often than not minimal. Toward the close of the war they displayed more aggressiveness and proficiency than in the initial years. But the liberation forces lacked the skills, discipline and resoluteness of the Vietnamese insurgents. None of the Chinese Communists' sophisticated tactics of encirclement, disconnection preceding an offensive, maneuvering units between separated Nationalist forces found their way into Mozambican practice.52 Right up to the Lisbon coup, FRELIMO employed hit-run tactics. This is not to say that it was without military development. Mozambican gunners were capable of laying at least hour-long sieges to towns such as Mueda in the Chinese sense of "surrounding the cities with the countryside." Nicknamed "Da Nang" by journalists because of the 122 mm rocket shellings, Mueda was occasionally put under fire before sunlight (the "hour of the Makonde") and then the besiegers escaped into the forest. The Forgas Armadas in fact launched Gordian Knot, in part to relieve Mueda. In spite of Gordian Knot's disruption to its bases, FRELIMO recovered and then persisted in rocketing Mueda or its water installation less than a mile from the town's fences.53 The insurgents' dominance around the northern town was strong enough not only to necessitate air resupply but also to compel Portuguese pilots to spiral down and up so as to skirt nearby antiaircraft sniping.
Overall FRELIMO's targets became progressively more military. Its first attacks came against outlying and lightly armed postos manned by an administrador de posto and a handful of sepais (African police). Or, it burned orchards and set fire to cotton trucks. The guerrillas’ growing technical expertise and mounting firepower capabilities were accompanied by larger scale assaults on armed convoys and military posts. According to FRELIMO bulletins these bombardments destroyed huge amounts of materiel. They reported that Mueda suffered a loss of damaging of nineteen aircraft in mid-September 1972, when scores of 122 mm rockets fell in a half hour. Similarly, Chingozi air base near Tete town had an alleged seventeen aircraft crippled by mortars and rockets.54 But Lisbon's air fleet in the entire country totaled only slightly more than the sum of reported destroyed craft in these two bombardments.

Most rockets and mortar rounds were fired from safe distances of at least a mile or two which gave the guerrillas some protection from immediate counterattack by patrols. Accuracy gradually sharpened but never to the inflated tolls proclaimed in communiques. One graphic illustration of FRELIMO's competency was in the use of patterned ground fire from different points to deal with incoming helicopters. General Arriaga's adoption of American gunship tactics was eventually countered to some extent by sweeping small arms fire through vertical, diagonal and horizontal arcs. Accounts of insurgent abilities differed. Most admired was guerrilla stamina; some FRELIMO fighters bearing arms could cover eighty miles in two days. Many officers and men in the Portuguese army told journalists that the guerrillas' soldiering skills and marksmanship steadily improved. Speaking with a barracks bravado, others commented pejoratively about African courage and bad aim. They were quick to point out that guerrillas still blew themselves up while setting their own demolitions.55 Outside observers, however, were likewise unimpressed with Portuguese riflemanship and soldierly qualities.56

One facet of Mozambican tactics which distinguished them from those employed in the guerrilla wars in Asia is the pervasive application of landmines. Throughout the war mines were often emplaced for psychological harassment and without covering fire. One Portuguese officer gave an account of an insurgent planting a mine each week for two months at the same point on a road linking Mago and Mucumbura in Tete.57 As guerrilla confidence and proficiency improved, mines were more frequently utilized in conjunction with ambushes of convoys and patrols. Accompanying fire became more sustained, accurate and destructive. A young Portuguese NCO, for example, recounted that his mined and ambushed patrol suffered ten deaths out of thirty men in Tete during late November 1970.58 More often than not, however, FRELIMO mined roads and pathways without covering fire. Even by themselves mine explosions achieved effective political and strategic impact as when they disrupted road and rail arteries connecting the Indian Ocean port of Beira with Rhodesia and Malawi. Dislocations in the carrying trade also adversely affected Mozambique's economy and colonial revenue. Safeguarding
trains and road traffic was thus reason enough to welcome Rhodesian patrols and air strikes against FRELIMO. Hence mines were a factor in internationalizing Mozambique's Revolution. Portuguese officials spoke disparagingly about the hit-and-run nature of mine warfare, but the inability to halt mine laying held grave implications for Portugal.

Mine detecting efforts brought about changes from metal- to plastic-housed devices (termites ate wood casings) of Russian and Chinese manufacture. The most widely used antivehicular mine was the TM-46 of Soviet origin. Mozambican insurgents attempted to overcome the defense of tarred roads by either tunneling in from the side or melting a hole in the surface. The drawback of the latter method was that five hours were needed to heat and then cool the tar to its original state and it left an identifying spot. Since the great bulk of Mozambican roads were untarred, mine laying was not precluded, only diminished on the asphalt ones. One informant contended that FRELIMO monitored the pay-off of its mines and ambushes through black and white sympathizers in Portuguese hospitals.59 A Portuguese military communiqu noted that "the enemy tried persistently to learn our movements before implanting mines and ambushes."60

More army casualties resulted from mines than from any other weapon. Likewise, landmines killed and maimed thousands of civilians. Colonial authorities contended that civilian deaths were calculated by FRELIMO to destabilize government rule. Insecurity and the turning away from colonial administration by some villagers was one consequence of mined kith and kin. In their propaganda, the guerrillas argued that the Forgas Armadas were responsible for the minings. The applications of terror and counterterror are analyzed in Chapter 6; suffice it to say here that with some exceptions, such as the Portuguese mining infiltration routes or approaches to their own forts, this was generally not the case. Portuguese figures (there are no compiled statistics from FRELIMO) from 1964 to 1973 conclude that 689 civilians were killed and 1,625 were seriously wounded by insurgent mines.61

According to FRELIMO, it used mines against the Forgas Armadas for military, political, economic and psychological goals. The mine is a weapon of the semiskilled and as such fitted into FRELIMO's reliance on village youth to conduct its campaign. Its effectiveness was great, however. Two out of every three troops or 70 percent, struck down by the guerrillas were mine victims.62 Yet the highest casualty was Portuguese morale. Understandably, troops feared treading on an antipersonnel device. This led to a mine psychosis and contributed to a static defense mentality in some colonial units. Riders in ambushed convoys in many instances stayed frozen in their vehicles or on the roadside to avoid stepping on antipersonnel mines which were often sown near the antivehicular variety of mines. Mined vehicles twisted like licorice and mine craters along roadways conjured up grim reflections of previous tragedies. Sometimes, the colonial forces towed away the derelicts not for spare parts but to remove telltale reminders. But many a convoy was spared heavy damage, aside
from the stricken vehicle and its crew, by the all-too-quick getaway of the guerrillas who fired and ran. Generally, FRELIMO abstained from prolonged assaults or well-escorted convoys.

Still another FRELIMO objective was attained by mine wounds. When two or three soldiers left the combat zone to carry a mined comrade, their leave-taking, however brief, diminished the size of the patrol. Helicopters, when used for evacuation, also reduced the forces flying combat missions which could have inflicted losses on the guerrilla army. Transportation and other facilities were more tied up for a wounded man than a dead one. Thus, the insurgents' goal took more into account than raising the casualty list when burying the lethal canisters in the ground.

In addition to its offensive aims, FRELIMO implanted mines in defense of its bases and hideouts. During the Gordian Knot offensive, delay was caused by the necessity of bulldozing safe paths to the guerrilla strongholds so as to bypass the mined routes. Otherwise, the Portuguese could not have advanced.63 Arriaga's accomplishments notwithstanding, mines gave the guerrillas, together with concealment and rear-guard tactics, more time to disperse than otherwise would have been the case. FRELIMO's infrastructure in Cabo Delgado escaped more severe injury because of the employment of mines. Defensive measures, then, played a role in FRELIMO military considerations; defense is not usually attributed to guerrillas by casual observers.

3
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Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution
The Armed Forces have reached the limits of neuro-psychological exhaustion.
--General Francisco da Costa Gomes, May 1974
The regular army must force its way into the enemy's country and seek him out. It must be ready to fight him wherever he may be found. It must play to win and not for safety.
--C. E. Calwell, Small Wars, 1906
The complexities of waging a rural revolution in an ethnically diverse and underdeveloped land were more than matched by the difficulties of conducting a counterinsurgency. Physical and climatic features alone presented formidable obstacles. Topographically, Mozambique is characterized by an extremely backward system of communications, conditions which foster regional isolationism and separatism. Few roads cut across this coastal land and fewer yet are passable during the rainy season. Furthermore, the rudimentary paths and two railways north of the Save River ran east to west; that is to say, they connected interior towns and villages with Indian Ocean ports. In turn the ports relied on coastwise steamships for communication. Since Mozambique is laid out on a north-south axis, like Vietnam whose configuration it resembles, this rail and road system neglected communications within the country itself. Aside from stretches of the Zambezi and Rovuma rivers, there were virtually no navigable waterways
in the northern half of the country affected by the insurgency. Much of upland Mozambique can be negotiated only by narrow trails unsuited to vehicular traffic. Transportation is particularly awkward in the mountainous zones in the north, northwest and bordering Rhodesia. In these areas, FRELIMO sank its roots spreading outward into flatter lands. Thick bush in the higher elevations enhanced these ideal conditions for groups of guerrillas to hide and survive.

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There is no need to linger over Mozambique's arduous physical features when here a central failing in Portugal's counterrevolution should be mentioned. As so often noted, an exclusive military orientation against an artful insurgent, the lever of whose tactics is geared on the fulcrum of the population, amounts to a misconceived response and leads to failure. Portugal's counterrevolutionary program steadily embraced nonmilitary schemes but armed operations still stood preeminent for too long among Lisbon planners. There was a steady preoccupation with outfighting rather than "outorganizing" the revolutionaries. This is not to say, nonetheless, that the Forgas Armadas mounted and sustained enough small, hard-hitting detachments applying constant patrols and surprise attacks. Hence even the military ideal went unfulfilled in the absence of aggressive, offensive operations on a wide scale. The Portuguese fashioned but introduced fitfully an elaborate antiguerrilla strategy to deal with the multifaceted nature of the Mozambican Revolution. Aspects of these counterrevolutionary institutions will form the basis of subsequent chapters along with treatment of FRELIMO's policies and actions. Here the focus will be directed in the main to Portugal's military counterinsurgency enterprises.

THE ARMED FORCES REACT
Briefly put, the Forgas Armadas adhered in general spirit, if not to the letter, to what have become the standard military responses to rural insurgency. Its preinsurgency preparations, as outlined in Chapter 1, accorded with many of the prescribed rules of counterguerrilla warfare. Roads and airstrips were bulldozed. Likely infiltration routes were cleared and watched. Even limited forced resettlement of Makonde villages near the Rovuma took place. Mobile health units from the Service of Psycho-Social Action moved among the Makonde dispensing innoculations and preventive medicine tips a full year before the outbreak of the insurgency. But despite centuries of self-professed understanding of the African nature, Portuguese officials at times evinced a woeful ignorance of the political climate in Mozambique and of the aspirations of exiled Mozambicans. Four months before the war, an administrator in Mueda remarked: "The Makonde are too deeply rooted in tribal consciousness, too primitive, to be susceptible to political propaganda." A foreigner after interviewing Portuguese officials argued that the Makonde were too independent to participate in an insurgent movement and showed a "general apathy toward politics." Even though warned of impending trouble from an organized nationalist front, officials declined to believe an insurgency simmered beneath their noses. Violence within northern parts in fact had markedly accelerated in the year before
FRELIMO's first announced operations in late September 1964. This accounts for one explanation why the Portuguese refused to acknowledge the FRELIMO declaration announcing the start of the liberation struggle. In short, the colonial government had become accustomed to expect limited, sporadic violence in the northern tier. Security and

The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution propaganda considerations obviously made Lisbon reluctant to accept FRELIMO's announcement. Instead they predicted raids coming from Tanzania. Portugal's countermeasures were inadequate and misapplied as result. In a word, they tended toward military preparations.

A moderate Mozambican constituency to undercut a nationalist appeal went virtually unformed and Lisbon dug in the heels of its military boots. When the Forgas Armadas carried out preinsurgency and early insurgency resettlement of villagers near the Rovuma, it did so in a spirit of vengeance and not with a concern for long-term loyalty. Streams of refugees poured across the border in surprise and confusion. Some five thousand Makonde refugees fled to Tanzania by 1965. This figure eventually jumped to fifty-five thousand, and an additional five thousand Nyanja-s eaking refugees crossed into Malawi, while others fled to Zambia. Rather than denying recruits and adherents to the guerrillas, these preliminary moves accomplished the reverse.

Taken by surprise from attacks within Mozambique, the colonial forces expanded resettlement of the Makonde on the Rovuma and redoubled their antiinfiltration exercises. Eventually, six fiftyton patrol boats reconnoitered the river's reedy shore and landed Fuzileiros Navais (marines) for search missions. On the Rovuma frontier, the Portuguese army widened surveillance, cleared brush from the banks, mined likely infiltration paths and patrolled the river by air and foot. Although the Forgas Armadas made passage difficult and dangerous, they never came near to sealing off the river—a major shortcoming.

A combination of ethnic animosities and counterinsurgency measures, as mentioned in Chapter 2, slowed FRELIMO advances in the two northern districts by late 1966. FRELIMO's slackened penetration southward was paralleled by diminished incidents in the north by the late 1960s. This loss of momentum exacerbated tensions within FRELIMO which surfaced with student criticism, riots at the Mozambique Institute and the political headquarters in Dar es Salaam, and a rash of assassination within the revolutionary hierarchy. The Portuguese saw this dissension as signs of deeper divisions within insurgent ranks. This opinion was confirmed when the Presidential Council charged with directing FRELIMO after Mondlane's death dissolved amid bitter accusations among the triumvirs—Machel, dos Santos and Simango. Machel's ascendancy to the presidency was accompanied by several political murders and purges which marked not so much an evolutionary radicalization of the hierarchy as the violent supremacy of the Marxist wing over reformist members. The latter were led by Lazaro Kavandame whom FRELIMO blamed for retarding the revolution in Cabo Delgado and for collaborating with the Portuguese.7 Several months after the 1970 Gordian Knot counteroffensive guerrilla incidents in Cabo Delgado picked
up substantially as the influence of Soviet and Chinese assistance began to bolster a Marxist FRELIMO.

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The Portuguese presence in the north came by 1972 to be characterized by island-like garrisons in a hostile sea with rutted dirt roads as communication lanes between them. A fair number of outposts, such as Olivença, Coimbra and Mueda, were mainly resupplied by air. Encircled with barbed wire, mines and trenches, the forts took on in the dry season a Beau Geste appearance with sandbagged walls and gun platforms at the outer perimeters. Just as FRELIMO activity declined in the late sixties, so, too, did the Portuguese military initiative. For the most part, it was helicopters versus landmines. Apart from air raids and heliborne assaults, army actions before 1970 assumed little more than convoy duty and short-distance patrols in daylight hours. Under this defensive posture, there developed a siege mentality.8 FRELIMO pronouncements confirmed the Forgas Armadas' tendency to avoid combat.9 In short, the conflict settled down to slow-moving shadowboxing with hardly any punches landing on the opponents.

With the blunting of FRELIMO's thrust and with the emerging telltales of internal squabbling, the late 1960s appeared a low point for the insurgency. But from the vantage point of hindsight the revolutionaries' position was not as desperate as it may have seemed in 1969. There is more than a modicum of truth to the assertion that the effectiveness of Portugal's counterrevolutionary program necessitated the opening of a new front in Tete. Insurgent setbacks in Zambazia and Tete during the opening months of conflict were further proof of the counterinsurgents' efficacy. The Porguguese position in retrospect, however, loomed more critical than imagined. While a professor at the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares in 1966, Arriaga warned that Portugal must develop its economy and it could not afford huge outlays on defense.10 Much more significant was General Costa Gomes's disclosure on Portuguese television after the Lisbon coup that the "military situation in Mozambique deteriorated for the Portuguese army in 1969."

STRAIGHTENING OUT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
Recognition of the worsening military equation in Africa prompted high level reshuffling. In January 1970, Lisbon merged the Ministry of the Army with the Ministry of Defense and gave it responsibility for the direction and conduct of military and civil defense. Whereas the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces-army, navy and air force--had exercised control over their respective services, afterwards the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (Costa Gomes) received overall command. Within each colony the commander-in-chief after July 1969 was granted a staff and complete responsibility for military operations, curbing some of the previous powers enjoyed by the territorial governorsgeneral. In Mozambique the governor-general was also commander-in-chief from June 1964 to July 1968, when the appointment of Balthazar Rebello de Sousa, the first civilian governor-general in thirty years, put a stop to the practice. A further step toward smooth relations between civilian and military chiefs occurred under the governor-generalship of Manuel Pimental dos Santos.
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Another civilian, Pimental dos Santos's conservative views and concentration on
civilian dimensions of the war dovetailed with Arriaga's conceptions. Writing
from exile in Brazil, former Prime Minister Caetano declared that Arriaga attained
the most "efficient performance" in the military reorganization.
Mozambique was divided in May 1970 into three territorial commands--north,
central, south--and a Tete Operational Zone. Nearly all senior military officers
were rotated. General Arriaga, who assumed command of the Portuguese forces
in March, oversaw the changes. His promotion after eight months as Commander
of Ground Forces in Mozambique signaled more than a routine rotation; it
brought a more aggressive prosecution of Lisbon's defense. He replaced the
cautious António dos Santos. Prior to field service, Arriaga had studied the
Mozambican theater from his position on the staff of the Institute of Higher
Military Studies in Lisbon. He therefore came to his post with definite plans.
The new commander-in-chief modified Portuguese strategic
assumptions. Previously, Portuguese policy focused on containment of the
insurrectionists to the poor, distant expanses allowing time in other areas for
development and reforms to meet the needs and aspirations of Mozambicans. This
strategy embodied realistic assumptions that the nationalists would splinter apart
with the slowing of their military headway or that a governmental turnover in a
neighboring state would compel FRELIMO to withdraw from its sanctuary bases
as happened to the MPLA in the Congo (Zaire) after November 1963.
Protracted warfare was not necessarily on the side of the nationalists in the
Portuguese view. Given the reluctance of the Lisbon government to hit back hard
at rebel camps in Zambia and Tanzania for fear of international furor, this view
offered an alternative to massive across-the-border raids. Likewise, it spared a
heavy strain on Portuguese blood and treasure. Nor was this vision out of tune
with historical precedent: Portugal had fought prolonged campaigns in Africa for
centuries and had always come out on top.
What went wrong with Portuguese convictions and calculations was that the
insurgent factionalism in Mozambique (and GuineaBissau) fell short of the
fragmentation among competing movements in Angola where Portugal's military
situation had improved by the early 1970s. In Mozambique thousands of troops
were tied down in defense and convoy duties while a new zone of subversion in
Tete threatened an additional drain, if not a total outflanking of Lisbon's position.
Containment no longer sufficed. Vigorous prosecution of the antiinsurgency
demanded a new commander and a redirection in strategy and tactics. Soon after
Arriaga's appointment, he visited the United States and consulted with General
William Westmoreland about American tactics in Vietnam. Obviously impressed,
Arriaga's tenure mirrored American practices within the context of Portugal's
much less abundant resources. The new commander's insistence on the
deployment of aircraft to support ground operations (particularly
with helicopter gunships), air-lifted assault forces and large "search-and-destroy" missions was accompanied by a buildup of troops and material. Bolstered by the arrival of an additional three thousand troops during January 1970, Arriaga mounted the biggest offensive of the war--Operation Gordian Knot. Its twin military objectives encompassed sealing off infiltration across the Tanzanian border and destroying permanent guerrilla bases. Launched in its first phase from June to August, the counteroffensive zeroed in on FRELIMO strongholds southwest of Mueda and inland from Mocimboa da Praia. Second and third phases extended the length to seven months and the scope to include actions in Tete and finally in Niassa. The main effort, however, was in Cabo Delgado. Approximately seventy suboperations were carried out with forty in Cabo Delgado, twenty in Tete and ten in Niassa. Begun with ten thousand troops, the countercampaign eventually brought thirty-five thousand men into action, although many were involved in the noncombat tasks of resettling the rural population.16

Tactically, the operations followed two forms. Small camps were struck by waves of heliborne commandos whose craft briefly hovered above the target area to avoid ground fire while the pilots directed the last artillery rounds onto FRELIMO positions. The assault forces usually disembarked near or on the fortified points so as to escape the encircling mines. Surprise, speed and lastminute coordination of supporting fire made this type of attack effective (if the insurgent location could be fixed) against the guerrilla tactic of melting into the mato to avoid a standing fight. Larger prepared positions of two hundred occupants or more and defended by heavy antiaircraft machine guns dictated a slower landbound approach. While subjecting them to artillery fire and air strikes, the army columns converged on the strongholds by bulldozers and mine-exploding vehicles to clear a path from three to six miles a day. The delay allowed the insurgents of a targeted camp to disperse even with their stores.17

To emphasize their mastery of the Mueda zone, the Portuguese temporarily occupied a few redoubts. General Arriaga and his wife in fact spent Christmas 1970 at Tartibo, a former insurgent camp (and later an aldeamento) on the Mozambique-Tanzania frontier, from which he broadcasted a radio message promising a sustained campaign until "the definitive elimination of the enemy in our national territory has been achieved."18 It was impossible to continue indefinitely the exertions of Gordian Knot. Captured redoubts relied on aircraft for resupply; the occupation of camps with ground access still spread thin the "forces of intervention," or mobile reserves (comprised mainly of commandos, paratroopers and detachments of the Special Groups). Besides, the logic of guerrilla warfare worked against wide troop dispersal into several fixed points. Like guerrilla movements elsewhere, FRELIMO simply relocated to other, albeit smaller and more concealed, camps.

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Characteristically optimistic, Arriaga's evaluation of the counteroffensive was sanguine. Known as the "rebel basher" by whites in Rhodesia, he argued that the campaign required only "psychological and social operations" to "achieve final
victory." He dismissed recurring guerrilla activity as "limited acts of banditry."19 Portuguese communiques announced high losses for the guerrillas. They reported 61 camps and 165 hideouts destroyed of which 3 were ranked as main bases near Mueda (code-named "Mozambique," "Gungunhana," and "Nampula") and 16 others in nearby areas large enough to have their own social service organizations. The military announcements held 651 guerrillas killed, 1,804 captured and 6,854 persons, presumably many women and children, surrendered. Despite assertions of progress, it was estimated that one thousand insurgents still roamed in Cabo Delgado.20

A Portuguese communiqué issued in late January 1971 acknowledged that, in spite of the massive operation, not all the military objectives had been realized.21 Principal FRELIMO camps were leveled, but even the Forgas Armadas admitted that many were reoccupied once they were evacuated by the colonial army. Insurgent attacks south of the Messalo River in Cabo Delgado and in the vicinity of MAgo on the south bank of the Zambezi in western Tete came nearly simultaneously with the January communiqué. These and subsequent incidents pointed up the resilience and strength of the guerrilla infrastructure.

On the other side of the balance sheet, FRELIMO was hurt by Gordian Knot, although its propaganda gave the opposite impression. It contended that its partisans had been tipped off by the appointment of a new commander and the troop buildup preceding the attack.22 But the years of sluggish warfare in the north afflicted challenger as well as incumbent. Following the counteroperation prisoners and talks with the guerrilla leaders after the April coup depicted a picture of a demoralized community of guerrilla fighters and followers and of disruption in their underground apparatus. One high-ranking insurgent commander divulged during the coup's aftermath that, had Gordian Knot lasted six months longer, FRELIMO "would have been throttled in Cabo Delgado."23 Defections of commanders and commissars along with rank and file multiplied in the wake of the campaign and persisted in steady numbers until the last days of the war. They constituted a primary, although not as it turned out conclusive, measure of Portugal's progress and sustaining hope of ultimately winning Mozambican loyalty.

Beneath the bravado of communiques listing destroyed bases and guerrilla casualties, deeper concerns about Gordian Knot held future implications for Lisbon's military policy. Prime Minister Marcello Caetano expressed concern about the number of casualties--132 dead and twice as many seriously wounded--incurred during the campaign.24 Arriaga's predecessor had conducted the war, however nonaggressively, with less than a hundred killed annually. The central fact that never again did the Forgas Armadas set in motion another offensive on the same scale in Mozambique points up the uneasiness with its mixed results. If Costa Gomes's assessment that 1969 saw a

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deterioration of the war for Portugal can be accepted as valid, then what could be said for Arriaga's ambitious counterassault was that it helped reverse the situation in the north inasmuch as any conventional military effort could. But all things
considered, Arriaga's drive fell short of "making Cabo Delgado impossible for FRELIMO."
So prevalent had guerrilla incidents become in the year following N6 G6rdio that subsequent medium-level operations were deemed necessary. A long wet season, as pointed out, enabled FRELIMO to undo some of the harm almost immediately. Small groups, for example, persistently moved southward across the Messalo River in Cabo Delgado trying unsuccessfully to cut the road connecting Montepuez and Porto Amélia after February 1971. Until the war's termination, Mueda came under regular, if not always accurate, rocketing. A second objective of Gordian Knot had been to seal off the porous Rovuma frontier. This proved an elusive goal since the 450-mile river served more as a highway than barrier to infiltration. Aside from regroupment and construction of an elaborate concrete town at Nangade, Arriaga stepped up patrols on the waterway by Fuzileiros Navais while acknowledging the near futility of shutting down the flow of guerrillas. A more effective military tactic was to mine and guard with small patrols the paths ascending the steep escarpments to the Makonde Plateau. Reportedly such practices, to cite one case, paid off in November 1971, when a 250-man guerrilla force suffered 160 casualties. Arriaga himself, whether out of disillusionment over the results of Gordian Know, change of heart or restraints imposed by Lisbon, shifted from extended conventional sweeps to small unit actions deploying black and white shock troops. Steadily, he became enamored with Africanized elite units trained in commando and airborne skills as the surest military means to outfight the guerrillas while regular soldiers expanded their participation in civic action programs.
Meanwhile the locus of antiinsurgent concern switched to Tete. Limited guerrilla actions on the Angónia Plateau in the vicinity of Vila Coutinho and to the west near Cago Coutinho were noted in March 1968. Initially, the Portuguese high command viewed FRELIMO's nibbling operations as nothing more than a calculated diversion to draw attention from the real theater of combat in Cabo Delgado. Next, the colonial army interpreted guerrilla penetration into Tete in terms of propaganda objectives. FRELIMO's declarations of having opened a "third front" seemingly corroborated this assessment of the attacks being stronger in word than deed. Finally, as the inroads deepened, it considered FRELIMO objectives a simple threat to the building of the Cabora Bassa project evoking a defensive posture. It even appeared to Pimental dos Santos that the guerrilla army was attempting to cut off Cabora Bassa from the east by infiltrating down from the tip of Malawi.

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Protection of the dam's construction was seen as the best means to defeat the insurgent advances, for its completion meant a long lake forming a barrier to southward movement. FRELIMO, on the other hand, believed that Arriaga wanted to lure it into attacks on the project so as to divert attention from infiltration. The tight perimeter defense secured a tactical victory but contributed to a serious miscalculation. Too late the realization dawned that
FRELIMO had for the most part bypassed the hydroelectric scheme and begun the Battle for Central Mozambique where its presence alone-without much real destruction—won a psychological triumph. The Portuguese High Command communiqué'd that "Frelimo's strategy was essentially a military one" in 1972.30 In reality FRELIMO sought to pepper the countryside with guerrilla incidents, not hold ground nor even liberate soil. These misconceptions help explain the slackness in Lisbon's counterinsurgency response. But there are additional explanations. Safeguarding the dam site inspired a defensive orientation and tied up troops in fixed positions and short-distance perimeter patrols. The result was a neglect of vigorous offensive campaigns. Guerrilla bulletins characterized the Forgas Armadas' counterinsurgency as governed by containment, stalemate and minimum physical contact. Western Tete from Chicoa to Zumbo was in fact written off except for air strikes. Rhodesian Security Forces assumed an active role to fill this vacuum. When FRELIMO soldiers generally refused the bait of making frontal charges on Cabora Bassa's encircling fortifications, Portuguese forces lost contact and inflicted minimal casualties. The upshot was an apparent slowdown in the national liberation struggle during the final years of the 1960s. Under Arriaga's command, the Forgas Armadas gradually introduced larger numbers of aggressively trained special units into Tete after 1972. By that time the insurgents had gained a foothold among some villages to the south of the Zambezi and had advanced preparations for incidents in Manica and Sofala. But as late as mid-1973, the army high command concluded that its counterinsurgency in Tete had gained the upper hand.32 The antiguerrilla campaign in Tete also suffered from a conflict of jurisdiction between civilian and military authorities. Until May 1971, when Brigadier-General Rocha Simoes was appointed governor of Tete, civilians had exercised control in the district. Less than a year later, Simoes was replaced by the hard-nosed Colonel Armando Videira. As in the course of the nineteenth-century pacification wars, military men gradually took over colonial positions; they held seven of the district governorships by 1974. This militarization of the top district offices failed to put to rest the controversy. Through its representative in Tete—the GPZ (Gabinete do Plano do Zambese)—the concern of the civilian-dominated Overseas Ministry for the completion of Cabora Bassa spilled over into military matters, inducing confusion and ill-will.33 The civilian-military tug-of-war hampered Portugal's war effort. Lisbon's overriding commitment to Cabora Bassa was resented.

54 Revolution and Counterrevolution by elements of the army as a tail wagging the dog when the dam's defense deflected so many troops from active combat missions. For their part, the civilian officials feared that a breach of the defense perimeter would prompt a withdrawal of international financial support for the construction as well as a hasty flight of the foreign technicians from the site. Its speedy completion was underlined by the 1970 appointment to the governor-generalship of Eduardo de Arantes e Oliveira, formerly Lisbon's chief negotiator with the international construction consortium,
ZAMCO. From his seat in the Mozambican capital, he eased the flow of assistance that ZAMCO needed for smooth building while exacerbating tension with the Forgas Armadas, particularly Arriaga who chafed at interference in his bailiwick. When Lisbon dispatched its last civilian governor-general, Pimentel dos Santos, relations between the top provincial official and Arriaga, as noted above, improved greatly. After the mid-1970 reorganization Arriaga also enjoyed a freer hand by owing responsibility directly to the General Staff in Lisbon. This revamped procedure lessened certain points of friction, but more importantly it represented another indication of Portugal's tougher military reflexes which coincided with Arriaga's generalship and Caetano's premiership. Initially, Salazar's successor pushed for a military solution as evinced by his promotion of Arriaga to the head of the armed forces in Mozambique and by his clearance for Gordian Knot. Later, too late, Caetano turned to political solutions. He first restructured the constitutional relations between Lisbon and its colonies and then nodded approval to the formation of a moderate indigenous party in Mozambique. Haltingly and unevenly, Caetano, who feared an ultraconservative backlash, and Arriaga, who wrestled with civilian interference in army-managed programs, placed greater emphasis on political methods. Yet one of the ironies of the Mozambican counterrevolution revolved around the fact that similar ends did not bring a convergence of approach between military and civilian authorities. Nor was the army's dominance over civilian meddling in military affairs permanent. Even Arriaga's departure from Mozambique failed to stop civilian meddling in military matters. General Tomas Basto Machado replaced Arriaga in August 1973. Trained as an artillery officer, he had served as a senior regional commander in Angola and as adjutant-general of the army immediately prior to his Mozambique command. A quieter personality, Basto Machado assumed command in the most trying period of the war.34 The army's prestige had been seriously eroded by the guerrillas' southward penetration and by the lingering international allegations of an army massacre at the village of Wiriyamu. Once again, civilians intervened in military affairs without coordinating their efforts with the army when they perceived the "forces of intervention" incapable of halting insurgent advances into the settler belt of central Mozambique. It was here that the PIDE/DGS-operated flechas intruded. Around the towns of Vila Pery and Vila de Manica, flechas searched the bush flushing out insurgents and dampening African adherence to the Revolution.35 Understandably, the Forgas Armadas recoiled at the growth of the

The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution secret police's paramilitary functions, whose tactics they viewed as brutal and counterproductive to good relations with the local people. At the bottom of the dispute stood the overlapping of intelligence gathering and the deficiency in proper dissemination of information. Army spokesmen held that the PIDE/DGS deliberately withheld information about impending attacks so as to embarrass the armed forces, such as occurred at Cago Couthinho in July 1973; the PIDE/ DGS countercharged that it communicated a warning but the army's ineptitude accounted for its poor showing. The bickering and bureaucratic rivalry
Within Portuguese ranks resembled a three-cornered fight. Manuel Viega, a journalist and twenty-four-year veteran of Mozambique said in 1973: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against FRELIMO, the war between the army and the DGS, and the war between the army and DGS, and the central government."36 This state of affairs violated the elementary military principles of defined responsibilities, a clear chain of command and the free flow of information among service branches. Their importance cannot be overemphasized.

Within the army itself divisions ran vertically and horizontally. Regular and miliciano (conscript) officers resented each other. Regimental-level officers were united in attributing corruption or incompetency, or both, to their senior commanders, staff corps and civilian officials. Against the inefficiency of the Lisbon bureaucracy, military figures, including Arriaga, spoke out to little avail. The metropolitan inertia in fulfilling shortages or meeting timetables contributed to the postwar feeling that the war was lost in Portugal and not Africa.37 This disunity stood out as a basic flaw in Portugal's counterresponse. It points to the fact that factionalism can plague not only revolutionary movements but counterrevolutionary forces as well.

To return to Portugal's counterinsurgency measures, the several weeks prior to the April 25 coup witnessed largely effective curbs to the sudden flurry of guerrilla assaults on railways, roadways, farms and military posts in Manica and Sofala (Vila Pery and Biera) districts. These incidents, as described in Chapter 2, took on the aspects of a breakthrough in Portuguese defenses. In reality, FRELIMO's onslaught repeated the pattern of spectacular operations opening each new combat sector and of preliminary Portuguese setbacks. Once mobilized the colonial army reduced the level of guerrilla activity. As customary, it responded belatedly. In this case it beefed up its forces, armed hundreds of farmer-settlers with G3 automatic rifles, guarded trains with commandos, patrolled railway beds for mines and dispatched elite troops to especially troubled pockets and to known infiltration routes in the central region. On the Chimoio Plateau, to reassure frightened rural residents, the colonial government installed a radio communication system, built airstrips, assigned helicopters and moved in flechas, which slowed the rate of local incidents until the coup.38 Judging by Portuguese figures on the decrease in railway minings and raids from totals of thirteen in January and ten in February to four in March and reportedly two in April along the Trans-Zambia Railway, the Foras Armadas's countermeasures had taken effect before the military overthrow in Lisbon.39

The psychological victory, if not the military, belonged to FRELIMO.4 Once again the extent of its infiltration had surprised the Portuguese. Although FRELIMO's actual harm to the economy and defense posture was minimal, its tenuous presence alone demonstrated anew that to the guerrilla belongs the initial element of surprise in a fresh operational theater. Yet partisan supply lines for weapons, mines and fighters were critically overstretched.
and vulnerable. This gave little comfort to panicked settlers and to drooping army morale. FRELIMO's deep advances confirmed the plans of the MFA plotters to overturn the Caetano government and to extricate Portugal from the African wars, as will be discussed in Chapter 9.

After independence FRELIMO officials maintained that their timetable called for engulfing the countryside around the capital in guerrilla incidents in 1976.41 Such predictions evince a certain Monday morning boasting, but they still cannot be ruled out as impossible. Reports of sabotage and attempted sabotage in the country's southernmost quarter had been published in South African newspapers since 1972.42 But what these types of depredations could not have done was to defeat militarily the Forcas Armadas any more than similar hit-run actions succeeded in bringing the army to its knees in Cabo Delgado or Tete. Which is to say that in no sense was Portugal defeated in conventional terms. At the time of the golpe the Forcas Armadas stood in control of all urban centers, major communication arteries (some roads in western Tete and Niassa had been abandoned) and army-garrisoned forts. Some outlying outposts in Tete and Niassa were evacuated; except for three or possibly four militia-protected villages, no army-defended position fell under assault before the MFA seized power. The commander of the 143-man fort Namatil (known as OMAR by the Portuguese) in Cabo Delgado did surrender without a shot to save lives on August 1, five weeks before the signing of the Lusaka Accord.43 But by that late date the army as a cohesive force had evaporated anyway. Before and immediately after the coup, the colonial army's mobile reserve could strike anywhere in the country. Once the troops left, however, the guerrillas returned as water might rush back into a hole made by one's fist.

Fatigued and dispirited as some of its officers and men were, the army, notably the elite units, was militarily capable of inflicting damage on its adversary. But by April 1974, it faced the prospect of conflict in much of Mozambique and of no real possibility of reversing FRELIMO advances. While confidently predicting an isolation of "subversive areas," the army command estimated a period of fifteen more years of war as late as September 1973.44 Spread-eagled across Mozambique, the Forcas Armadas could not prevent infiltration, pacify the countryside or injure fatally the guerrilla infrastructure.

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THE COUP AND MOZAMBIQUE

When the MFA grabbed the governmental reins from the ancien regime, the colonial army in Mozambique realized more clearly than General António de Spinola that Lisbon's bargaining position had collapsed. Spinola, whose relatively enlightened handling of Portugal's counterrevolution in Guinea-Bissau assured him the top office in the post-coup government, maneuvered to hold on to what Lisbon had been unable to win in ten years on the battlefield--Mozambique's destiny. From his position as head of the Junta of National Salvation, he pushed a program of self-determination for the colonies within the framework of a Lusitanian Federation as equal partners with Portugal.45 Military men and politicians, whose thinking Spinola echoed in his Portugal e o Futuro, realized
that the Ultras, ideal of clinging to African colonies, whatever their designation, was out of phase with the times and against the Europeanizing trend of a modern Portugal eager to participate in the Common Market and the West's good graces. All of this came to light in the widespread popularity for the coup makers. One keen authority of the MFA wrote that had the officers grasped the dearth of the Salazar-Caetano regime's support, they would have revolted sooner.46 Far out of step with reality in the southeast African colony, Spinola advocated a cease-fire and a general election under Portuguese auspices with FRELIMO as one of several parties. So as to maintain pressure on the Mozambican revolutionaries, he ordered the continuance of bombing raids and troop movements. Reality defied the general's political vision.

The FRELIMO information secretary in Lusaka, Rosaria Tembe, greeted Spinola's formula for a multicontinental Portuguese nation with an impassioned rejection which spoke for the mood of the moment on the eve of victory: "... we a not fighting in Mozambique to become Portuguese of black skin." What went unstated was that the FRELIMO leadership did not want to entertain the possibility of losing an election in a free or rigged contest. At the OAU conference in Mogadishu in June, Machel told the Portuguese that for preliminary talks to develop into negotiations Lisbon must recognize FRELIMO as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people and recognize the right of independence to all of Mozambique.

Meanwhile FRELIMO stepped up sabotage and raids throughout the spring and early summer. It poured guerrillas into the country's midsection in such numbers that one army officer described it "like fleas through a rug." South of Beira traffic was ambushed on the road to Lourenço Marques on May 9. Guerrillas and self-styled guerrillas murdered whites, pillaged European farms and extorted food from shopkeepers quickening the flight of settlers from the northern and central regions.48 The Dar es Salaam headquarters announced the opening of a new front in Zambezia on July 1 and the guerrilla army captured its first town at Morrumbala near the Malawian border on July 9. Not expecting the Lisbon coup and

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Breakdowns in discipline multiplied. Units refused their marching orders. Frontline troops played soccer and drank beer with their former adversaries. Leftwing manifestos endorsing FRELIMO circulated among colonial soldiers, some of which were signed by officers and NCOs. By midsummer an undeclared truce prevailed since the bulk of the Forgas Armadas' regular troops stayed in the barracks.

Anarchy swept the civilian "front." Rural unrest stirred African laborers against their former employers and landlords who fled to the main urban centers. Disbanded militia and mobs of hungry, tattered people roamed the countryside burning, looting and settling scores with Europeans. Farmers left off planting. The village of António Enes in Mozambique (Nampula) district burst into a semiinsurrection when thousands of Mozambicans sacked the town in search of food and in revenge for past injustices. Stevedores and miners struck for higher pay. Lawlessness stalked the African suburbs surrounding the cities. White railway workers protested the lack of army protection. In short, things fell apart.

Time ran out for the development of a viable challenger to FRELIMO, although immediate post-coup Mozambique burgeoned with political minigroups basking in the sunshine of civil liberties, the first since the fall of the monarchy in 1910. As in the early days of the Republic (1910-1926) Mozambique along with Portugal mushroomed with political activity. In short order, the moderate Grupo Unido de Mogambique (GUMO), which had surfaced before the army takeover with Caetano's blessing, was joined by over two hundred groups which served more as voicers of disparate opinion than as genuine political parties.

On the European political right, the Front for Independence and Continuity with the West (FICO, which in Portuguese means "I am staying") merged settler miniparties determined to perpetuate white supremacy. While attracting five thousand persons to its rally in May, FICO petered out as its constituents observed the better part of valor and left Mozambique or tried to pass as longterm adherents of FRELIMO. Merely superficially reminiscent of the settler-military OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète) in the

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Algerian liberation struggle, the settler right wing made but a death rattle in an abortive coup in Lourenço Marques on September 8, the day after the signing of the Lusaka Accord. The botched uprising was in reality a protest against the accord which granted Mozambique independence under FRELIMO following a nine-month transition period. Portuguese troops recovered the arsenal and radio station where the self-styled Dragons of Death broadcast an appeal for assistance from all who opposed the sellout to FRELIMO.50 As the Forgas Armadas bloodlessly regained control in the city's center, the African suburbs erupted into revolt protesting the white rebellion. The riot left scores of burned cars and an estimated eighty-seven dead.51 Attacks on whites accelerated the settlers' flight to South Africa, Rhodesia or Portugal. Independent white settlerdom A la Rhodesia was doomed, for European immigrants controlled neither the administration nor the colonial army. Besides Lisbon kept a wary eye on signs of separatismo among
settlers, placing some under surveillance and exiling or imprisoning those considered most dangerous.

On the Mozambican political right, the Partido de Coligação Nacional (PCN) developed from the merger of five groups opposed to FRELIMO during late August in Beira. Comprised of former FRELIMO and GUMO officeholders and prominent African moderates who feared for a loss of station or for their life in a Marxist Mozambique, the PCN gathered the few nationally known figures capable of offering a black opposition to the revolutionaries. Had there been more time, more security from attack and a Portuguese commitment, then a GUMO or a PCN could have afforded precoup Lisbon an acceptable alternative to a FRELIMO brand of politics. By rejecting any prescription to rural insurgency but a military victory or an inexpensive containment of the fighting while Portuguese nationalism grew in Mozambican hearts, Lisbon threw away its sole opportunity for a moderate political solution. If Caetano's nod of approval to GUMO's overt formation in January 1974 was too late for it to take root, then the coup made the PCN's chances next to impossible.

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Portugal introduced many of the accepted counterinsurgency tactics but neglected or inadequately applied others. The Forgas Armadas profited from knowledge gained in Asia and Algeria. When the army failed to implement properly standard techniques, it stemmed from either a deficiency in resources or a curious lackadaisical attitude toward prosecution of the war. This Latin casualness toward efficient procedure was noted by Portuguese officers as being particularly acute in Mozambique where perhaps the early gains in two northern districts gave rise to a false sense of well-being. Or, perhaps in the final couple of years a hopeless feeling permeated the officer corps with the realization of the protractedness of the war.

Usually, milicianos more than regular officers merely went through the motions in discharging their duties. Their hearts and minds were not in aggressive patrolling or offensive risk-taking. Colonial forces, for example, did not venture far from their defense perimeters even during the daylight hours. To take one instance: an infantry company given marching orders from a base near Tete town simply moved a short distance away and set up another camp for the duration of the assault. The undisciplined nature of more than one crack commando company verged on anarchy and diminished their effectiveness. Lacking training in night-warfare techniques, regular units limited most operations to the daytime. Moreover, there were cases among isolated garrisons of a local gentlemen's agreement of coexistence; in return for toothless colonial forays, the guerrillas refrained from bombardments. The number and size of FRELIMO bases in the vicinity of Mueda alone testify to the want of an offensive spirit by the late 1960s. This cautious or feckless application of counterinsurgency tactics bore less fruit than was the case in units of high esprit de corps. But they
kept casualty figures low among the officer corps and spared the Forgas Armadas the same serious hemorrhaging as the French army in Indochina. Possessed with a vaulting ambition to succeed, General Arriaga sought to set matters aright first with large-scale conventional sweeps and then small-unit actions with African elite troops. An augmentation of African manpower into Portuguese ranks, which had grown since the re-initiation of Mozambican recruitment in 1966, was viewed by Arriaga as the best means to put more troops on the ground and to form highly motivated pursuit units as part of the so-called "forces of intervention." The formation of special units was predicated on Sir Robert Thompson's conception that "tomcats" (guerrillas) must be "engaged in their own element." A "fierce dog" cannot win over a tomcat in an alley, because the feline creature will "climb up the tree and leave the dog to chase female cats." No, the proper response involves sending a fiercer tomcat, "the two cannot fail to meet because they are both in exactly the same element and have exactly the same purpose in life. The weaker will be eliminated."55 Militarily, there is much to recommend this practice, but in their objectives the colonial government and the insurgents had not "exactly the same purpose in life." The forces of intervention had essentially a military mission of eliminating the guerrillas whereas the insurgents had a political orientation to their assaults. Under Arriaga's direction, the Center of Instruction for Special Groups (CIGE) in Dondo (twenty miles north of Beira) began training in 1972 two types of forces. Wearing yellow berets, the Grupos Especiais (GEs), ethnically alike, were comprised of men from a specific locality who after training would return to act as a local force for offensive operations and to stiffen militia defenses. Estimates placed the number of these troops at about six thousand to eight thousand by 1974. Additional training and parachute instructions were given to the Grupos Especiais Paraquedistas (GEPs) who were ethnically mixed. The exact ethnolinguistic composition has not been revealed by official Portuguese commentators but interviewees reported a fair number of "southerners," high proportions of Makua and the Shona-related peoples who inhabit the region around Dondo.56 Once graduated from the CIGE the red-bereted GEPs engaged in pursuit operations and offensive missions in the north or in Tete. As part of the mobile reserves, squads of eighteen men were airlifted to the field for two-month combat tours; a third month was spent in Dondo. These special groups, along with Portuguese Commandos, conducted night operations, something most regular troops rarely undertook. Before sunset, regular soldiers normally returned to their fortifications and armed camps allowing the guerrillas to move virtually at will. By the end of the war, GEPs numbered nearly three thousand men. Distinctive training, marches, song and caps set the GEs and GEPs apart from European and African troops in regular units or from militias assigned to aldeamentos. In their thinking, Arriaga and Portuguese officers of the elite soldiers also set them apart from straight-line forces. They placed increasing faith in them as an answer to flagging Portuguese elan and to outfighting FRELIMO.57
The white officers as well as some African lieutenants, who commanded the gung ho teams, expressed enthusiasm for their military skills and martial vigor. These new formations achieved a certain battlefield notoriety as their displayed stacks of captured FRELIMO arms at-test. A backhanded compliment came also from FRELIMO which rarely mentioned the GEs or GEPs in its news releases. To have done otherwise would have acknowledged Lisbon’s progress in mobilizing Mozambicans in its behalf.58

Employment of African elite fighting men enabled the army to alter its priorities. Regular metropolitan troops were redeployed into socioeconomic programs in the aldeamentos. Reliance on elite formations for combat missions registered a change in Portuguese military orientation not only away from conventional tactics but also away from the notion that any army unit can fight as antiguerrilla infantry. In the African wars, the military establishment had harnessed all troops as infantry in tasks for which many cavalry, engineer and artillery contingents lacked proper training. Regular officers were appalled at the perversion of professional standards. Arriaga's realignment of forces recognized the inadequacies in preparations of noninfantry units and in the deficiencies in the drafts of half-trained conscripts who arrived from Portugal for duty in the north.59

The GEAs and GEPs represented simply one example of the search for military mechanisms to confront spreading guerrilla incidents. On the one hand, these redirections carried features of military gimmickry and on the other they conveyed flexibility and innovation. A fixation with combat devices to halt the insurgents had already spawned a fair number of special units: commandos, militia, Fuzileiros Navais and cagadores especiais (special hunters). Stepped-up attacks on the rail traffic prompted the formation of a Railway Police Corps in April 1972, and a month before riparian ambushes led to the appointment of a Zambezi River port captaincy under the}

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navy to safeguard passage. Even the Guarda Fiscal (Customs Police) performed military duties. An extravagant instance of this approach for new countermeasures involved the establishment in 1973 of an experimental cavalry squadron of three platoons with a total of 132 horses. Billeted in the town of Vila Pery (now Chimoio), the cavalry troop hoped to avoid mined footpaths and to sweep large areas rapidly and more effectively than four times as many infantrymen. Although used with some positive results in Angola after 1966, time ran out for the Mozambican counterparts just as it had for American horsemen in Vietnam. The panoply of specialized forces notwithstanding, Portuguese military thought in other respects remained wedded to conventional statistics. Communiques listed the number of guerrilla structures destroyed, for instance 715 in 1972.60 For the most part, they were merely flimsy grass huts or lean-tos and in no way indicative of the real revolutionary infrastructure.

In a bid to spread its power, the DGS/PIDE formed a paramilitary arm of its own. The flechas (arrows) comprised squad-sized, self-contained intelligence-gathering units of Africans officered by Portuguese. Trained in military skills and
parachuting as well as intelligence collection, the flechas assumed not only military intelligence missions but in addition acted occasionally as a commando force against insurgents. First utilized in Angola, the flechas began operations in Manica (Vila Pery) district at the beginning of 1973. Their ruthlessness and reputed success struck a responsive chord among those settlers who favored a get-tough policy toward FRELIMO and its village sympathizers. They enjoyed the public endorsement and financial support of Jorge Jardim, a prominent citizen in Mozambique's settler community. Jardim's daughter, Carmo, helped in the parachute training of flechas and GEPs.61 Professional soldiers on the other hand resented the intrusion into their operating zones. The army moreover believed that the flechas' brutal methods undermined their efforts to win over rural Africans to the Portuguese banner. For its part, the PIDE/DGS thought the army to be inefficient and lax. Made up of secret police agents, former guerrillas and disreputable types, the flechas gained an unsavory reputation for torture and summary executions.

That the PIDE/DGS was sanctioned to form a quasi-military wing indicates the power held by the secret police in the civilian government and points up once again the friction between civilian and military authorities. It points up as well the overriding military thrust of Lisbon's counterrevolution when a police intelligence agency is given the green light to constitute combat forces. Portugal developed a range of nonmilitary responses to FRELIMO, which will be surveyed below; but armed operations still stood preeminent among military and, curiously, even civilian officials prior to the MFA golpe.

Of all counterinsurgency techniques, the For as Armadas were compelled to perfect antimine defenses. This led to a deadly

The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution point-counterpoint game. When FRELIMO first planted metal mines in 1965, Portuguese magnetic detectors sounded an alert. To avoid detection the guerrillas boxed the mines in wood but termites ate the housings exposing the mechanisms to the ravages of the climate. Beginning in 1968, FRELIMO implanted heavy plastic coated devices which nearly defied discovery. In response the colonial army relied on a special demolition vehicle of French design about the size of a Jeep which triggered mines. Not only were these vehicles in short supply but also they were useless against a new mine requiring a heavier weight than the demolition Jeep, such as a Berliet troop carrier, to explode it. Finally, the new ratchet mine delayed its detonation so that a vehicle down the line caught the blast.62

The Portuguese were compelled to counter the sophisticated mines from communist countries. Dogs to smell out mines, as used in South Africa and Rhodesia, furnish another illustration of the hunt for a means to deal with the guerrillas' most pervasive weapon. Although dogs attained some success, they were neither suitable for all operations nor sufficient in number for wide application under combat conditions. One of the surest detections involved probing suspected patches with a pica--a steel-tipped wood shaft about a yard in length. The simplicity of the pica, named for the lance used to goad bulls in the
ring, ensured against the false signals sent by cartridges or tin cans to electronic
detectors. Portuguese briefing officers maintained that 70 percent of the
landmines laid by the guerrillas were discovered and disarmed—an
impossible to verify without knowing the number sown by FRELIMO.
Tarred roads were the most reliable defense against the destruction and death of a
mine, although the insurgents, as described earlier, on occasion tunneled under or
melted through the surface to conceal a mine. Despite the expense and difficulties
of terrain, Portugal built eight thousand miles of asphalt roads. Since great faith
was placed in asphalt highways as the prime landmine defense, FRELIMO
attributed part of the appointment of Governor-General Arantes e Oliveira, an
engineer, to his ability to oversee rapid road improvement. On railways the
Portuguese constructed armor-plated turrets on flatbed cars. Called Zorras, these
armored vehicles protected the seven men inside from insurgent fire while they
searched the tracks for mines. Zorras were tried on the Beira-Tete line and then on
the Beira-Umtali railway. They reduced the frequency of ambushes and derailed
trains but were not immune to attacks themselves. Convoys and air power are other orthodox weapons in the counterinsurgent's arsenal. And the Portuguese employed both. Such air force missions as
reconnaissance, resupply, fire support of ground forces, airlifting of troops to
combat zones and airdropped defoliants resembled the broadscoped application in
some other counterinsurgencies. Likewise, Lisbon unleashed air strikes on areas
abandoned by its ground forces; these proved no more a substitute for territorial
control than elsewhere, however. But

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given the paucity of Portugal's aircraft, air power never approached the intensity of the United States in Vietnam. Nothing similar to the American carpet bombings occurred, even though FRELIMO propaganda argued the contrary. During Arriaga's command, the Força Aérea Portuguesa (FAP) imitated tactics modeled after those of the Americans in Vietnam, such as gunships giving
support fire for disembarking heliborne troops. One slight variation in the use of aircraft took place in the evacuation of wounded insurgents, sometimes ahead of colonial casualties in the last two years of the war, as part of a "hearts and mind"
campaign.
Miniscule by modern standards, hindered by the shortage of spare parts and
roughed up by landing on grass airstrips, the FAP still represented one clear
advantage over FRELIMO. Outposts like Olivenga in northern Niassa, Cago Coutinho in upper Tete or even the town of Mueda in Cabo Delgado relied on air
resupply. Life was made precarious by dependence on a small air force,
nevertheless. Distant garrisons sometimes faced insurgents with little ammunition
and short rations. Yet without air taxies there would have been no Portuguese
presence in several outlying areas. These flights were deemed important enough
to the overall war effort to enlist commercial pilots and civilian aircraft to take up
the slack in transportation and resupply services to combat zones. Until exposed
in the press, South African civilian pilots in 1972 flew defoliation missions in
Tete to relieve insurgent pressure around Cabo Bassa.
Aircraft alone, however, could not suffice for the Forgas Armadas. The convoy system of logistics and communication figured predominately in Portugal's counterinsurgency in Mozambique. Vehicular caravans became a way of life above the Revu River in the central zone. Lines of Berliets, Unimogs and civilian trucks and cars traveling 50 to 100 yards apart wound their way over dirt and asphalt roads. Civilian motorists were issued army pamphlets, as in the case of Instructions for the drivers on the Zobue-Tete and Tete Zobue, with guidelines and emergency procedures. Military drivers filled the tires of their vehicles three-quarters full of water to absorb shock, placed sandbags on the floor and removed the hoods to prevent them from becoming guillotines on impact.

An inherent chink in most antiinsurgency campaigns stems from the incumbent's inability to cover all terrain. In northern and western Mozambique the territory between towns and army strongholds became a no-man's-land in which the guerrillas struck at the colonial military's land communication. Under these circumstances armed convoys fulfilled a psychological function as well as a logistical service. Convoys demonstrated both to army personnel and FRELIMO that the Forgas Armadas were able to control ground when and where it chose to exert enough force. But ambushes and mines blunted the edge of these assertions of control. In a sense, the resort to military escorted convoys, then, was an admission of eroded dominance. Even when damage was slight and casualties minimal, it consumed days of travel over distances that should have been covered in hours. For example, the road connecting Montepuez and Mueda is 132 miles long, and yet the convoy journey took anywhere from six days to two weeks.

The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution and Mueda is 132 miles long, and yet the convoy journey took anywhere from six days to two weeks.

Being neither safe nor expeditious, convoy corridors were shunned where possible for longer but securer routes. Lisbon, as one instance, persuaded Malawi's President Kamuzu Banda to grant it facilities at the Malawian lake port of Chipoka. From Beira, the Portuguese shipped fuel by rail to Chipoka and then transported it across Lake Malawi by boat to Meponda in Niassa district. By this indirect route, oil and gasoline shipments bypassed the mine and ambush hazards of northern Mozambique. In another instance, the army detoured traffic bound to and from Vila Coutinho through 120 miles of Malawi to skirt a perilous section of roadway in northeastern Tete. Down further in Tete, the colonial forces abandoned some roads and relied on the Zambezi to resupply Zumbo and Mago.

Armed convoys or circuitous routes spared the army equipment and personnel losses but diverted manpower from active combat missions. While the Portuguese spoke disparagingly about the absence of physical contact with the insurgents who either left only mines or fired and ran, they were compelled to tie up nearly five out of every seven of their line troops in convoy duty or in fixed positions. This left a mobile reserve for offensive operations of less than ten thousand men. Portuguese commitments reflected a higher percentage of fort- and convoy-designated troops than even the United States in Vietnam where, after General
Creighton Abrams took command, it deployed two-thirds of its combat forces in security positions and the remainder in small unit operations. Yet Portugal with 75 percent of its forces in Mozambican combat zones as distinct from support roles was well ahead of most conventional armies fighting insurgents. The United States in Vietnam had a gargantuan ratio of support per fighting man, i.e., three to one.70

COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASUREMENTS
One vital measure of counterinsurgency headway—the recovery of enemy arms—was given inadequate emphasis, among civilians in particular. GEPs and cacadores (hunters) proudly displayed captured arms upon returning to their camps. Individually or collectively, confiscators of insurgent weapons were rewarded in cash or kind on a fixed scale. By 1974, a Kalashnikov rifle (AK 47) brought a bounty of 1,000 escudos (about 35 U.S. dollars) and a mine netted 2,000 escudos (or about 70 U.S. dollars), illustrating the priority of concern for landmines. The colonial army captured most FRELIMO arms through raids on caches revealed to it by defectors or through surrender of insurgents. Sudden assaults on bases, as occurred in Gordian Knot, fetched sporadic but rich harvests. Day-to-day operations and routine patrols secured negligible amounts. Civilians were not brought into Portugal's arms recovery campaign as actively as in Malaya or even in Rhodesia. A reward system existed for years but it was not vigorously publicized in the

villages. Few posters advertised the idea of escudos for arms, although the authorities handed out leaflets from time to time. Still, the civilian contribution to Portugal's counterguerrilla struggle cannot be dismissed as meager since villagers willingly passed information to army intelligence and PIDE/DGS agents.7 This point requires consideration in light of the colonial government's results in obtaining FRELIMO weapons. One military communiqu& stated without a specific breakdown as to the types of arms that 964 weapons had been seized in 1972.72 This figure, if accurate, compares favorably with British statistics in Malaya, where 1,170 arms were taken in 1952, the highest year.73 The number or rate of lost Portuguese weapons is impossible to deduce with accuracy. No figures appear in the colonial army's communiques. Insurgent recountings of captured arms are unsystematic and so inflated (when reports were published) as to make them grossly suspect. The actual quantity of firearms captured in battle would seem small, if for no other reason than that FRELIMO tactics ruled out the overrunning of army positions or stoutly defended aldeamentos. Their brief encounters deprived them of military matériel. Since there were merely isolated instances of regular troops deserting, FRELIMO got but a trickle of up-to-date firearms in this way. Defectors from the militia took an unknown quantity of World War II arms, mostly Mausers, to the guerrillas. At the beginning of hostilities, a handful of weakly manned police posts lost handguns and antiquated rifles to insurgent raids. These sources, however, soon dried up. Seizing machine guns, rockets, mortars and sufficient ammunition from an alerted enemy became too difficult for an expanding
insurgent movement whose tactics militated against receiving heavy casualties. Besides the Forgas Armadas had scarcely any mines—a major FRELIMO weapon. The guerrilla ideal of fighting nearly entirely from captured arms thus was denied FRELIMO by Portuguese defenses and its own techniques. More to the point, however, it turned out to be unnecessary with ready supplies of Soviet and Chinese weapons.

Certainty about the exact amount is difficult to establish but the lost-recovered ratio of arms seems decidedly in favor of the colonial forces. Its value as a guide to the course of guerrilla resistance, as suggested by Sir Robert Thompson, proved unreliable in the Mozambican case. Two factors worked to offset its reliability. In the first place, FRELIMO methods placed more of a premium on psychological and economic factors rather than military contact as in Asia. Next, the available supply of modern arms from communist states made up the losses in FRELIMO ordnance.

Another counterinsurgent technique not fully or properly utilized by the colonial government pertained to population regulation. Regroupment of scattered villagers into aldeamentos will be elaborated on later. But suffice it to say here that resettlement alone was not enough to control contact between the peopleat-large and the guerrillas, let alone individuals sympathetic to FRELIMO. Mozambique's colonial government was deficient in an effective population control system. In Malaya the British, for example, implemented an identity-card check. Individuals had to produce their card upon demand. By this screening, the police could ascertain the identities and regulate the movement of people outside their normal work and living areas. British authorities extended their security framework to include the showing of cards for acquiring the necessities of life. By patient, careful police work, the British intelligence agents weakened the organization of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

The Portuguese never replicated the thoroughness of the British police apparatus. As mentioned earlier, Mozambique's colonial authorities issued the cartao de identidade with the 1961 repeal of the indigena status of Mozambicans; but as with so many of their programs the machinery never functioned properly. The 1970 reported figure of 665 Portuguese PIDE/DGS agents (or 2,000 in 1974) was too small to staff an intricate security system in a country as large and elongated as Mozambique. Their generalized use of torture and inefficient practices were also unsuited to the thorough and pedestrian side of straight-jacketing population movements. Throughout the conflict, recruits from the extreme south journeyed the length of the country to join the guerrillas in Tanzanian or Zambian bases. Owing to the infrequency of personnel checks and searches, FRELIMO sappers took buses from the port of Beira to rural stations of the Beira-Umtali railway to plant mines on the tracks. The British example in Kenya is also instructive. Aside from not having unrestricted access to a sanctuary in a neighboring state, the Land and Freedom Army ("Mau Mau") ran into insurmountable obstacles with the loss of free communication within Kenya itself. Skillfully, the British
froze movement between urban centers, Nairobi in particular, and the Aberdare Forest by means of regroupment, security checks and identity cards. It should not be concluded that the Portuguese were completely inept at intelligence gathering. The secret police had the decided edge over the army including matters of military counterintelligence. Their agents were notably effective beyond Mozambique's borders. Decisions and the contents of meetings within the OAU were sometimes known within forty-eight hours. When in 1972 the UN Committee on Decolonization (the Committee of Twenty Four) attempted to infiltrate a delegation through the open border of Tete from Zambia so as to substantiate FRELIMO claims to a provisional government, Portuguese intelligence ascertained its intended crossing points. In the course of a twelve-day period, Portuguese paratroopers repeatedly blocked the UN delegation from entry. In fact, Portuguese army and PIDE/DGS operatives achieved a high degree of accuracy. Across the boundary in Tanzania and Zambia, Portugal's intelligence was informed of the movements of recruits and FRELIMO leaders. It often knew the arrival of foreign ships in Tanzanian harbors with goods bound for the Mozambican revolutionaries.81 Hampered by fissures between the army and the secret police along with Lisbon's restraining hand, however, the colonial forces did not generally make the best use of their information.

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CONCLUSIONS

Portuguese military (along with nonmilitary) exertions attained some positive results. Because of the feelings of success among top soldiers, there has arisen, not unexpectedly, a "stab-in-the-back" view that the war was lost in Lisbon, not on African battlefields. The African colonies were surrendered, so the conservative generals' argument runs, because the Partido Comunista Português (PCP) and the Partido Socialista (PS) conspired in 1973 to "structure a military movement capable of overthrowing the Portuguese government." But on the point of possible collusion between the MFA and the left-wing parties, the authors of the argument have little more than circumstantial evidence. But this scenario appeared unlikely at the time of the golpe. By that time the MFA had concluded that the African wars were already unwinnable. One observer has drawn the conclusion that advanced nations lose wars in underdeveloped areas because of the political and psychological strains at home. In the Portuguese case, this begs an important question, however: why did not the Forgas Armadas defeat FRELIMO before the strains reached critical proportions?

Population regulation, as touched upon above, raises the issue of inadequate military manpower in Mozambique to come to grips with an elusive and spreading nationalist insurgency. The magical ratio of ten counterinsurgents for every guerrilla is open to serious doubt. But for certain, the colonial government's armed forces were numerically far too inferior to FRELIMO's liberation army. By war's termination Portugal had deployed some 65,000 to 70,000 men in Mozambique (about 35,000 in Guinea-Bissau and a further 50,000 in Angola). Over half (thirty-eight thousand to forty-three thousand) were from the metropole and the rest from Mozambique. Lisbon touted that its forces were 60 percent
Africanized. This figure represents many Mozambicans who served in the militia or autodefensa (self-defense) villages, where the colonial army simply handed out weapons and gave minimal combat instructions to villagers deemed loyal. These colonial forces opposed an insurgent army which had nearly free passage to foreign sanctuaries, access to sufficient modern firearms and numbered about nine thousand to eleven thousand fighters. Little wonder the Portuguese army could not contain insurgent incidents to remote backlands. By modern standards Libbon's Lilliputian army was much too small to control Mozambique effectively. This is not surprising since the United States army, which numbered over five hundred thousand troops in Vietnam, could not maintain effective control in an area one-fourth the size of Mozambique. The Forcas Armadas came to resemble a hard-pressed fire brigade with too many fires to tend; it ran from one to another without extinguishing any. The fact that it held on for so long is attributable to the generally poor quality of the firestarters.

The British campaign in Malaya, often cited as a model of counterinsurgency, exhibited considerable differences in government-insurgent ratios. Against an 8,000-man guerrilla force (mainly based on the Chinese community) at its peak in 1950, London The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution mustered 40,000 British and Commonwealth troops, 45,000 regular and special police and a quarter of a million part-time Home Guards. The enormous size of Mozambique likewise worked against the slender Portuguese force. Mozambique's land area (297,564 square miles) is almost six times that of Malaya (50,690 square miles). Its land and lake boundaries with the independent African states of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia zigzagged 1,800 miles, posing huge burdens on the Forgas Armadas' patrolling capability. Portugal's forces were stretched far too thin to have adequate mobile reserves to initiate attacks to keep FRELIMO off balance, let alone mount daily the hundreds of small patrols, security checks and constant surveillance required in successful counterinsurgency operations.

General Arriaga's formation of GEs and GEPs was partially a recognition of manpower shortages in colonial defenses. When his request for permission to form additional units of special forces was denied by the Lisbon government, Arriaga, according to his version, relinquished command in August 1973. Outsiders attributed his departure to a dismissal growing from the controversy surrounding the Wiriyamu massacre allegations which had exploded in international headlines the previous month. In reality, Arriaga's leave-taking may have had more to do with his well-known political ambitions in Lisbon and Mozambique. Back in Portugal the general's conservative views made him a likely candidate to succeed the aging Américo Tomás for the presidency. It was in Mozambique that his political interests caused concern to the metropolitan government. His friendship with Jardim occasioned speculation about a settler bid for white-dominated independence under the stewardship of these two influential figures. This is why Lisbon regarded with suspicion Arriaga's "mentalization" (heavy political indoctrination) of Mozambique's elite troops. Memories of the
OAS revolt in French Algeria were fresh in the Caetano government. Arriaga's preoccupation with politics similarly drew criticism from some soldiers in Mozambique who believed themselves short-changed in his military leadership. Arriaga's ambitions did not generate the problems that led to a deterioration in officer morale. Indeed, he geared his Africanization of the armed forces to the lessening quantity and zeal of Portuguese conscripts. The poor utilization of manpower and inferior training account in part for dwindling spirits among the regular officer corps and rising resentment against their conscripted companions. Troops arrived from Portugal half-trained by milicianos and conscript NCOs themselves arrived fresh from training and without their hearts in the war. Rather than receiving basic training with his overseas unit by its combat officers, as in the British regimental system, the Portuguese recruit got his military instruction from camp cadres who stayed behind in Portugal as in the American system. Unit morale suffered as a result. In his Brazilian exile memoir, Depoimento, Caetano acknowledged the mediocre military training and bad junior level leadership; he wrote about the fatigue of regular cadres being "our great problem." Because of these odds against the Forcas Armadas, Douglas Porch in his study of the MFA concluded that the fact "that the

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army took so long to crack was due largely to the poor quality of the guerrilla opposition." Certainly, the protractedness of the war imposed prodigious strains on the army. Tours of duty stretched from two and a half years to four and sometimes five years for conscripts. Regular officers served eight to ten years in African combat theaters. A seemingly endless guerrilla war fought with defensive tactics by poorly politicized forces five thousand miles from home engendered a cautious camp orientation among many units. Among regular company-grade and field-grade officers, some of whom plotted the MFA coup, a feeling of fatigue bit deeply into their spirit. After the April takeover, one highly decorated captain in command of a GEP squad recalled the utter weariness that gripped him with the realization that the war was at last coming to a conclusion. Looking at the raggedly dressed insurgents just out of the mato who cheered "Viva Mondlane" and "Viva FRELIMO" in his base at Dondo, the officer reflected that now he understood how the guerrillas had endured longer. Revolutionary wars, like conventional conflicts, are often won by the inspirational ideas conveyed to their combatants. In the prolonged struggle for Mozambique unit esprit de corps was a weak substitute for life-or-death nationalism and revolutionary elan. This relates to mobilization which is the topic of the next chapter.

4 Mobilization
There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental.
--Mao Tse-tung
The peasantry is not a revolutionary force.
--Amilcar Cabral
The thing history will remember us for is not defeating colonialism but learning how to use the armed struggle as a mechanism for changing the mentality of the people.

--Samora Machel
If Napoleon was right in arguing that modern war-making is based on the science of communication, then mobilization of the people (whether by pledges of a bright tomorrow or by use of terror) is the science of rural revolutions. Rural revolutionaries and their adversaries have widely acknowledged the primacy of political mobilization in a people's war. Mozambique's war of national liberation set down a familiar path. Once again, urban organizers went to the countryside to forge an alliance with the rural population. Here FRELIMO diverged from comparable movements was in the preHihm it set on building a sense of nationhood to accompany the war against colonialismo. Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries already worked from a strong temper of national identity. Again unlike the Chinese Revolution, the Mozambicans had to start from scratch in building a guerrilla army. Mao's cadres could draw upon sections of the population already possessing a measure of military experience and political motivation. No slavish adherence to Maoist revolutionary precepts laid down a sure guide, for China's minority peoples, located from from the centers of power, concerned the communist revolutionaries very little. The Bolshevik stratagem of promising autonomy to minority peoples

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during the grab for power only to repudiate the assurances was considered shortsighted by FRELIMO and was viewed as playing the Portuguee game of divide and rule.'
From necessity the Mozambican revolutionaries sought to bridge the gap separating disparate peoples, and Mondlane conceived of the rebel army "as a nation-making force." Total success eluded it. Large segments of the population stood with Portugal. Individuals and villages lumped in either camp obviously held varying degrees of commitment and would have preferred to remain neutral. But total success was unnecessary to win a political victory. Unlike the chiefs of interethnic risings of bygone days, the insurgent cadres filled enough of the inspirational and organizational vacuum with promises and coercion to sustain a guerrilla struggle.
FRELIMO's mobilization strategy took account of ethnicity. Makua opposition to the Makonde-based insurgent army, for instance, acted as one determinant in the guerrillas' shift in focus from the two northern districts to Tete.3 Just as important was the knowledge that ethnic communities along the Zambezi had more exposure to colonial injustices of forced labor on plantations or on construction projects, making them predisposed to revolt.4 This chapter will survey FRELIMO's political mobilization as brought about by special appeals, ethnic factors and the impact of Portuguese acts and policies. Intimidation and coercion, other components of forced persuasion, will be
explored in Chapter 6. Another ingredient of the mobilizing process—life in the guerrilla bases or "liberated areas"—will form a subject of Chapter 7.

The indispensable turntable of the Mozambican Revolution revolved on both the intensification of the horrendous burdens the war placed on the agrarian population and the impact of modernization imperfectly imposed on traditional rural society. Both loosened the bounds of old moorings and heightened the attractiveness of a revolutionary program for redress.5 Chronic poverty by itself as a "precondition" to the Revolution is not supported by the evidence. This socioeconomic condition had to be politicized into an explanation of Portuguese exploitation before participation of rural folk in the Revolution. Thus, chronic rural underdevelopment was a factor in Mozambique's Revolution as in others, but its role was passive. More massive poverty and deprivation were inflicted on the northern countryside as a consequence of revolution rather than as its precondition.6 If mobilization is at the heart of revolutionary warfare, then motivation is its lifeblood. To pulse its vital fluid requires a message. Without it there is only a rebellion or coup d'etat.

THE MESSAGE

FRELIMO's initial political platform called principally for national liberation. Other resolutions of the First Congress in September 1964 were directed to the achievement of independence by

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means of mobilization, preparation for war, education and diplomacy.7 Resolutions from the Second Congress in July 1968 signaled a Marxist inspiration by their idiom and by their aligning FRELIMO's cause on the side of a world class struggle. With no mention of communism, the programs for FRELIMO's liberated zones (base areas) called for the pursuit of collectivized agriculture, societal reordering, social betterment and "the construction of a new society free from exploitation of man by man."8 In keeping with the character of other revolutionary movements, FRELIMO's announced objectives and actual appeals for membership were based on differing considerations.9 But not in keeping with many revolutionary formations, FRELIMO did not have to ally itself with a merchant class or rural bourgeoisie since there were none to speak of. Because 96 percent of Mozambique's population was rural and preliterate, many abstractions of a revolutionary Marxist message could have been ill understood. The ignorance and isolation of humble villagers even in a country as underdeveloped as Mozambique can be overdrawn, however. Transistor radios and interurban buses allowed glimpses of the world outside huts and forests. FRELIMO recognized this fact in its broadcasts in Makua, Yao, Swahili and Rhonga along with Portuguese.

To channel individual and corporate discontent into a nationalistic response calls for knowledge of local conditions, patience, organization, selective violence and above all the simple words of a popular, concrete message. That a mere 15-20 percent of the population spoke Portuguese gave a decided advantage to those FRELIMO cadres conversant in local dialects and customs. Generally, the mobilizers appealed to shared colonial injustices,
black consciousness and previous resistance to pacification. The cadres strove to transform an elemental foreign aversion into a protonationalism. Their populist palaver with village listeners covered shared aspirations and anxieties about tax collection, exploitive labor methods, low agricultural prices for produce, lack of health care and educational opportunities, police harassment and troop transgressions including livestock thefts, rape, forced relocation and disrespect for customs. The mobilizers worked to get potential recruits to recall instances of personal suffering. This personalization of the issues enormously boosted their appeal. The guerrilla cadres also played upon the fears of villagers telling them that the colonial army had massacred neighboring villages and was intent on doing the same to their community. They associated the vagaries of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic on imperialism with well-understood local wrongs.

This difficult task of mass mobilization was far from completion even in areas of guerrilla dominance at the climax of the war. The very ethnic diversity which hampered Portuguese communication likewise hindered Mozambican unity as did Lisbon's countermobilization campaigns, for the southern cadres had to rely on translators in the north. To foster solidarity, FRELIMO issued membership cards but suspended the practice in some localities, because it eased the colonial government's identification of adherents.

Ordinary villagers related more to personal tragedies than to the abstract pulls of nationalism. Judging by FRELIMO's published testimonies of volunteers, in Mozambique Revolution and other sources, Portuguese mistreatment and local socioeconomic grievances rather than the political question of independence based on African majority rule played a part in a decision to side with the rebels. But self-advancement and improved status were certainly key factors of Mozambicans to journey long distances to join the maquisards and to endanger life and limb in a risky adventure. Men and women signed up for opportunities, advancement and rewards. Yet the fact that they stood to benefit from the Revolution must not obscure the sincerity of their convictions.

The absence of ethnic unity or still less ethnic nationalism meant that individual villages or settlements had to be approached. Much turned on the inclinations of the headman, chief or regedor (formerly régulo, a colonial appointee). Tradition dictated obedience by a village or cluster of villages although African villages are not as a rule as cohesive as Asian. When one of these figures went over to the rebels, he took blocs of his followers. While pre-Revolutionary Mozambique lacked the neat classes of Marxist symmetry, it had indigenous "haves," utilized by the colonial government but predating it, and plenty of "have-nots." Historian Jack Goody writes of precolonial Africa that "though there were no landlords, there were of course lords of the land--the local chiefs." In the long run FRELIMO regarded them as impediments to social revolution in the countryside but in the short run as possible agents of mobilization, if they endorsed the guerrilla cause. Since much of the village-level leadership depended on the colonial government for wages and security, it posed distinct problems for persuasion by a revolutionary message. An end to Portuguese rule and a new
social order struck many local officials as subversive to their position. Others might resist joining a fight when endorsed by an unfriendly neighboring community. So, embattled zones often briefly resembled checkerboards of pro- and anti-FRELIMO villages until intimidated over to the guerrilla side or dragooned into regroupment by the Portuguese army. Guerrilla policy pursued two courses of action. If the village authority could be talked into furnishing recruits, porters, food and information, then his position often remained secure even in some liberated zones. A broad appeal to anti-Portuguese resistance may have misled some elders, such as the Makonde L~zaro Kavandame, as to the radical nature of the FRELIMO program or to the incorrect assumption that they could guide the direction of the movement into moderate policies. The radicalization of FRELIMO is one reason why Kavandame and others were forced out. The other course was a violent one. When local officials stayed loyal to Lisbon, they became victims of assassination or abduction. Natural leaders, cultivated either before or after the liquidation, were enlisted to bring over the community. Political murder was most prevalent in contested areas where colonial rule appeared intact and circumstances called for rapid population conversion, as along sections of the lower Zambezi's south bank, or in areas where

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ethnic animosities confronted guerrilla infiltration, as with the Makua in southern Cabo Delgado. In regions where Portuguese authority was tenuous, such as in the remote north and northwest, chiefs and regedores saw little benefit or safety in Portuguese allegiance. Survival bent the posture of some to the wind of revolution; while others sided openly with the Portuguese and joined secretly with the rebels. Except where local officials were considered adamantly pro-Portuguese and assassinated out of hand, the politicization procedure conformed to a pattern in aspiring after a correct relationship with the population and in seeking ardent sympathizers. A cadre's ragged clothing and arms (some went unarmed) made these strangers look like bandits. So, if possible, FRELIMO dispatched a hometown boy to a village or locality. He took along cadres from other regions to acquaint his former neighbors with FRELIMO members of different ethnic communities. They paid the proper deference to local authorities and observed parochial customs. Each fresh collection of rural dwellers faced the perplexing choice of whether to inform the colonial authorities about strangers talking about revolt or to attend the secret meeting as potential converts. Occasionally, they did both thus enabling the Portuguese to arrest the mobilizing cadre. Bush rallies were held as well among the already committed to bolster spirits and to boost motivation. They offered a millennial vision of equality and prosperity. The cadres incorporated their message into the traditional African love of song, dance and the practice of call and response between speaker and his audience. The unedifying impulses it gave rise to were seen after colonial defenses broke down; few rushed to take over the land, but many rushed into the plantation homes and towns to take over European houses and possessions. The guerrillas'
ability to engage and inflict casualties on colonial authorities and their troops strengthened the cadres' appeal, but the pacification campaigns had imparted the myth of Portuguese invincibility. In bringing over the recalcitrant, personal weaknesses were played upon. Peer pressure was applied to ensure conformity and was labeled "selfdiscipline." One or two deaths also served as object lessons. Politicization, even among potentially receptive audiences, involved lengthy insurgent contact. Portuguese authorities put the time at one year and political cadres spoke in terms of several months. Noted above was the colonial army's estimate that the politicization front preceded guerrilla assaults by fifty to one hundred miles. This alarmed officials because it meant that mobilizers had crossed the Save River by early 1974. President Machel claimed in April 1972 to have political cadres over the whole country. In fact, FRELIMO suffered from shortages of trained political officers whose places were taken by Detachment Commanders. Their presence marked a militarization of the movement and partly explains the greater resort to coercion and violence in the Battle for Central Mozambique.

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A distinction should be made about the emphasis of FRELIMO organizing cadres. Military mobilization preoccupied the cadres and guerrillas in "advanced zones" or in areas of potential incidents. Here the political educators stressed support for the insurgent war effort. But in the northern forest bases, political activists, according to FRELIMO, promoted a commitment to Marxist goals of societal transformation. Politicization went beyond incipient nationalism to the more complex issues of social revolution and collectivized production. Organizing outside these isolated pockets in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete, however, primarily stressed the preliminary stage of armed mobilization. FRELIMO's mobilization acted as a modernizing force in organizing mass support rather than trading on neotraditional trappings which characterized the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya. In contrast to the Kikuyu-based Land and Freedom Army (Mau Mau), Mozambique's revolutionary leadership stopped well short of reactivating primeval symbolism or resurrecting salient features of traditional values as a basis for military solidarity. Still, cadres in the field winked at the practice of rituals and the wearing of amulets for safety. They had to coax partisans from superstitions protecting colonial representatives. They furthermore paid the brideprice for a guerrilla's wife rather than upset convention. Cult priests and spirit mediums fanned anti-Portuguese passions in their devotees and gave to guerrilla soldiers operating in western Mozambique among the Shona sanctified potions to turn Portuguese bullets to water. Detachment commanders were instructed not to rebuff these traditional blessings. The guerrillas from localities of pronounced Christian influence, as those in the northwest corner of Niassa where the Anglican missionaries had worked at Messumba and Licoma Island since the 1890s, turned to rosaries and Christian prayers for protection and comfort.

ETHNIC CONSIDERATIONS
Mozambican ethnic support for FRELIMO, as for Lisbon, was varied. To see ethnic groups as monolithic in their political affiliations is too simplistic. Even within ethnolinguistic communities considered committed to one side or the other, there were villages or individuals who openly or clandestinely joined the opposite camp. Along with the influence of village functionaries, referred to earlier, ambition, revenge and avarice motivated individuals to seek their own ends. Therefore, it was a mistake to characterize the war in strict ethnic exclusiveness. Portuguese spokesmen sometimes remarked that Lisbon simply faced three tribal uprisings—Makonde, Nyanja and Chewa. Alternatively, it would be equally incorrect not to acknowledge the predominance of one contender in a specific ethnic community.

The Makondes' antipathy to colonial administration predisposed them to revolt. Lisbon's ill-conceived relocation programs accentuated anti-Portuguese feelings. Makonde guerrillas formed the backbone of the FRELIMO army in the two northern districts and

**Mobilization 77** particularly in Cabo Delgado where their homeland is located. In other districts they acted as cadres and fighters together with locals. The revolution drew sizable segments among the Nyanja and Yao along the lacustrine edge of Niassa district, although fair numbers of Yao served as well in the colonial forces. In addition, FRELIMO found adherents within the smaller societies of Nyasa and Ngoni on the Vila Cabral Plateau. Over in the northwest district of Tete, the Revolution picked up an extensive following among the Chewa who span the border into Malawi and Zambia.

In Tete as elsewhere FRELIMO resorted to force, compelling locals to carry heavy loads of munitions and to feed the guerrillas. Logistics for an overreaching guerrilla thrust overrode long-term considerations. As FRELIMO's representative in Lusaka, Mariano Matsinha declared the war came first, political conversion second. Official FRELIMO publications, nevertheless, contended that the armed escorts accompanied the resupply columns just to protect the carriers. Nor did its coercion reach the point of divorcing guerrilla bands entirely from local support. Even before mobilizers moved into the Zambezi Valley region, these same sources argued with cogency, the Revolution attracted youths, frustrated and ambitious, who crossed the river and "joined our forces in the northern part."

The picture of conflicting loyalties that emerges from the proliferation of ethnic entities along the Zambezi is still unclear. They shared the common experience of alien rule but the diversity of people oriented within their own historical, cultural and geographic context bred a checkered pattern of loyalties. Political mobilizers faced the fact that more local leaders than in distant parts were either Portuguese appointees or dependent on colonial rule for their livelihood and status. That many did not opt for cooperation with the revolutionary cadres was borne out by the large number assassinated. The scale of violence and counterviolence illustrates once again the intensity of the Battle for Central Mozambique. Whatever the degree of destabilization through political murder needed in the
mobilization process, President Machel still maintained that the guerrillas got their staunchest backing from the Shona-related peoples. Of all these riverine communities, the Tawara were considered one of the most receptive to FRELIMO, for despite their close proximity to the Cabora Bassa project, the dam's recruiters from 1969 debarred them from working on the site. Instead Shangana from the Gaza district were brought northward because of their mining experience in South African gold shafts and their political reliability.

Below the Zambezi River the Revolution stirred memories of former resistance. One historian who gathered oral testimonies in the area before the fighting asserted that old men, some of whom remembered the pan-ethnic Barue Rebellion of 1917, transmitted past exploits and tales of heroism to youths in prepuberty schools and around evening campfires. FRELIMO spokesmen claimed in 1973 that in Manica and Sofala district the "response has been as fast as the five years since the offensive in Tete began." Even a

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Much of FRELIMO's top layer of leadership came from the south, and this multiplied their drawing power in the south from where young recruits moved north. A fair number of them were urban-oriented and literate and had become frustrated by racial and social obstacles to further economic and political advancement in colonial society. Although the revolutionaries had an underground network in the shantytowns on the outskirts of Lourenço Marques and other urban centers, they had not consolidated political organizations by the time of the MFA takeover. Despite its inchoate form, FRELIMO support provoked the colonial authorities to mass arrests of hundreds of reputed sympathizers and alleged saboteurs in June 1972.

Too often the Portuguese saw insurgent mobilization in
strictly ethnic terms and exaggerated ethnic distinctions as a divisive force in nationalist politics. An administrator in prewar Mueda posited: "The rebel leaders up here come from the south; they don't even speak the same language as the Maconde. The Maconde don't trust them." A preponderant Makonde participation in the Revolution was not without friction as witnessed in May 1968, when dissident Makondes, who bore a disproportionate share of the fighting, raided FRELIMO's main office in Dar es Salaam, killing one staff member. This was only one of several incidents of infighting within FRELIMO as the pressures of war and exiled politics intensified personal ambitions, ethnic hostilities and personality clashes. Like other revolutionary movements, FRELIMO was not free from graft, corruption, extortion, blackmai and inertia which the dedicated cadres were at pains to purge.

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Forgetting that factionalism has characterized most revolutionary movements in history, the Portuguese took solace in nationalist dissension, overstressed ethnic differences and downplayed signs of unity. Colonial officials considered that only ethnic communities which spanned borders into independent African states, like the Makonde, Chewa and Nyanja, were revolutionary prone because of non-Portuguese influences. Arrayed against this interpretation are the facts that political cadres made inroads into and guerrillas received succor from peoples not contiguous with sovereign African nations, that much of the revolutionary vanguard came from the south and that pockets of resentment against colonial rule existed countrywide.

One significant setback of rural mobilization ensued among the Makua peoples. Most but not all of the subgroupings of the three million Makua held aloof from FRELIMO. It picked up some Makua fighters and mobilizers from the worker and refugee communities in east Africa. Small numbers of Makua recruits came mainly from the cities of Nampula and Porto Amelia (Pemba). Joaquim Chissano, the movement's representative in Tanzania during the war, held that FRELIMO had resolved Makua-Makonde animosity within itself and predicated that it could do the same in an independent Mozambique. The Portuguese tried to fan mutual suspicions by portraying FRELIMO as exclusively backed by the Makonde. Lisbon touted the Makua as a "loyal tribe" to which it stood as friend and ally. The exuberance of these claims belied the complexity of Makua dialects and atomized political constituencies. After the coup, some Makua peoples cast their lot with the rebels while others preached regional autonomy which was encouraged by conservative settlers.

APPEALS TO SPECIAL GROUPS

FRELIMO proclaimed its appeal to all Mozambicans--plantation workers, students, women, peasants and soldiers in the colonial army. Persons of all walks of lower socioeconomic life responded but not in equal numbers. The call for rebellion struck especially responsive chords among the young and acutely frustrated. They became nationalists for reasons of conviction and the lure of opportunity for enhanced status. Others--Mozambican civil servants, politicians and much of the petite bourgeoisie--stayed loyal from satisfaction, fear,
persuasion, dependence or prospects of future gain until after the MFA's seizure of power in Lisbon. Then they abandoned the ancien régime. So far no information has surfaced that FRELIMO infiltrated cadres into the middle or higher range of the civil service as did the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.37 It did have informers in government hospitals and military installations. Local guerrilla knowledge of convoys and patrols was also considered accurate by high and low ranking colonial officers.38 Some African clergymen helped in recruitment and information gathering for the revolutionaries. Educated by non-Portuguese Europeans in many cases and detached from the colonial economy, they were receptive to nationalism. Their social standing placed

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them well to preach a nationalist sermon. The fact that several were arrested and a few died under suspicious circumstances while in prison attests to PIDE/DGS's recognition of their connection to the rebel cause. Assistance from African churchmen helped to fill a gap--the absence of front associations--in FRELIMO's mobilizing network. Unlike the Bolshevik revolutionary workers' soviets (councils) or the Viet Cong's diverse affiliates, the Mozambican movement had no front organizations. This is explainable in part by the speedy suppression of suspected auxiliary associations. In 1965, for example, the territorial government banned the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Mogambique and jailed its officeholders, the foremost of whom was President Domingos Arouca. Virtually any African-run club or organization was suspect in Portuguese eyes. Consequently, few were tolerated. There is no evidence to prove that these social and sport clubs were infiltrated by FRELIMO agents. Nor did FRELIMO have adequately trained cadres to create fronts. Another and most important glimpse at the picture of Mozambican milieu points up the almost total lack of sharp social cleavages and clashes typical of more developed countries. This absence of wide socioeconomic differences facilitated political mobilization. No special appeals were needed for poor, middle or rich peasants as in the strategies of the Chinese Communist Party. Most of Mozambique's countryside was characterized by primitive methods of subsistence agriculture, not peasant smallholdings in the European sense. Only 10 percent of the entire population worked on plantations and just a fraction of that in Cabo Delgado and hardly any in Niassa and Tete. A slogan of "land to the peasantry" therefore served no revolutionary purpose in a prefeudal society where grievances arose from contract labor or low prices paid for agricultural produce or high ones charged for consumer essentials as cloth, matches or soap by the cantineiro (canteen keeper). His transport costs and slow turnover of goods resulted in higher consumer prices in rural areas but slender profits and few competitors. Still, FRELIMO made much of Mozambique's poverty in its appeals, attributing underdevelopment to Portuguese colonialism and Western capitalism. Of the various segments in Mozambican society, it was the tiny assimilado or quasi-assimilado layer (those who met the requirements but for several reasons did not seek application) which constituted the revolutionary vanguard. Available
testimonies of FRELIMO recruits indicate that scarcely any abandoned the commercial sector--traders and small shopkeepers--of the urban Mozambican petite bourgeoisie, reckoned at thirty thousand (including Indians and Chinese) by FRELIMO before independence. Of professions within the assimilado caste (clerks, interpreters, traders, policemen, waiters, skilled artisans and nurses), young schoolteachers answered most enthusiastically to the nationalist call.39 FRELIMO's military commander after 1970, Alberto Joaquim Chipande, for instance, had been a village teacher at the time of the Mueda incident. With merely 5 percent of the population urbanized, many of

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the literate youths lived a semiurban existence. Accordingly, they keenly felt the traumas of socioeconomic transition. Political consciousness was raised in towns where the impact of Western civilization and Portuguese colonialism proved most unsettling. This pattern conforms to those in non-African environments. According to Miroslav Hroch in his study of early stages of nationalism in nineteenth-century northern and central Europe, the leaders came from "regions of intermediate social change."40 Likewise, China experienced its initial tremors of revolution, whether Communist or Nationalist (Kuomintang), in its treaty ports.41 It was in the towns that not only economic injustices were most keenly endured but also status resentment bit most deeply into the urbanized African young, who felt their economic and social mobility within colonial society impaired by color and cultural barriers. Slowly, too slowly, conditions were altering for African advancement. But they saw little change, and popular perceptions are often more important than reality. As Professor Lawrence Stone wrote: "Successful revolution is the work neither of the destitute nor of the well-satisfied, but of those whose actual situation is improving less rapidly than they expect."42

Without a recognition of status politics in the explanation of young Africans' participation in the Revolution it could become a distorted and simplistic class struggle interpretation, although admittedly it is a vexing problem to unravel economic motivation in revolution from racially based status resentment. The Mozambican revolt against Portugal's colonialismo, with its own racial and cultural biases, nevertheless had a racial dimension irreducible to socioeconomic factors.43 Thus as Leo Kuper observed of many Third World revolutions: "Status politics are a powerful instrument for mobilization to racial revolutionary struggle, and may overshadow economic grievances."44

"Womanpower" was a source taken more seriously by FRELIMO's political educators than by Portuguese authorities. Women in both Mozambican society and colonial communities held low prestige and subservient positions to men, which made them receptive to promises of a new social ordering and improved status. Portugal's counterpromises offered no such change in the traditional system. The colonial government founded the Movimento Nacional Feminimo to raise the morale of the Forgas Armadas but its members visited hospital wards instead of combat situations. Except for a handful of combat nurses who were all white, Lisbon left untapped a large section of the population.
By contrast, the nationalists spoke to an important constituency. FRELIMO's first congress advocated the "social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman." Soon after its own formation, FRELIMO established the League of Mozambican Women (LIFEMO). It mobilized women, provided food for guerrillas, made clothes and soap, superintended orphanages and collected wood for fortifications in the forest bases. LIFEMO held its first congress in Mbeya, Tanzania in mid-1966. Three years later it was openly discredited.

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as a tool of the reformist wing and purged. A Central Committee meeting in October 1966 called for the founding of a separate Women's Detachment with missions of transport, "mobilization of the masses" and "military protection of the population." This was accomplished in Niassa the next year, and Portuguese soldiers reported encounters with women guerrillas from time to time. Later, the Women's Detachment gave birth to the idea of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM), which the Central Committee founded in 1972. The OMM continues to exist in Mozambique today.

No figures were given as to the number of women in the fighting detachment, but they were put at two hundred in 1969 by one reporter. But many more women served as porters, informers in contested zones and auxiliaries in the forest-based militias. Women similarly played prominent roles in foreign delegations to solicit international aid and in convincing their men to rally to the Revolution. Their very presence in a village--armed and dressed like male guerrillas--was subversive to the traditional view of women working long hours in the fields and bearing children for their husbands, not as warriors or leading figures of community action. Their stance likewise convinced males, who dreaded a loss of prestige, to join the guerrillas. Before her death Josina Machel, FRELIMO militant and wife of Samora Machel, argued as much when in 1969 she insisted that "it has been proved that we women can perform this task of mobilization and education better than men." Colonial or conventional roles for women could not compete with the opportunities for advancement and adventure of the nationalists. Thus FRELIMO strengthened its guerrilla force with females.

Youth figured as the most vital section of the populace to be mobilized. With 58 percent of the country's population below the age of twenty in 1970, it could not have been otherwise. Free from the responsibilities of land-working cultivators with families, rural youths could more easily join the guerrillas than their older kinsmen. At night ordinary folk could collaborate in insurgent activities, but it was the young who yearned for excitement and opportunity. Teenagers and twenty-year-olds, semischooled and untrained for a profession, filled the fighting ranks of incumbent and challenger. No sector responded so eagerly to the calls of each camp to volunteer. From the rebels came appeals to past valor of traditional resistance and lures of rapid social mobility in an independent state. FRELIMO's program of mobilization permitted rapid recruitment of the young seeking a new identity and higher status in a decolonized society. It presented a bright alternative to the humdrum existence of village rural life.
Among the insurgents and their auxiliaries the conflict fostered a liberating atmosphere. Similar to the Chinese communist army during its revolutionary war, FRELIMO youths enjoyed freedom of speech and informality with the stripping away of cumbersome ceremonies and titles while undergoing political indoctrination in training camps or moving on the march. Like other successful rebel forces, FRELIMO imparted egalitarianism and rapid social

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mobility. But for all its personal liberation from historic customs and privileges, the army nurtured political activity. From the People's Forces, the first party committees were created in 1973, heralding the postwar formations in the civilian sector. That the guerrilla army fought for tangible rewards, too, can be ascertained by its postindependence revolt in the newly renamed capital of Maputo. In December 1975, about four hundred troops mutinied in part because the FRELIMO government had not compensated its fighting forces for their exertions.51 Their frustrations had been fueled by the awareness that during the war government troops had regular pay and better rations and medical care. These factors had caused the guerrilla army morale problems unalleviated by independence.

Defectors and Portuguese observers charged that FRELIMO seduced youths into joining by false promises of scholarships for education abroad. Educational promises especially attracted young Mozambicans aspiring to transcend their environment. Disillusioned by guerrilla training and arduous field conditions instead of academic schooling and professional careers, some would-be students defected. On the other side of the coin, the available evidence indicates that a disproportionate number of Mozambican students sent abroad for technical and professional degrees never returned. One defector, Alves Muganga, stated that until 1969 only 2 of the 154 scholarship students studying in the West returned for service in FRELIMO.52 An academic study posited that 85 percent, or fifty-one of sixty Mozambican students, stayed in the United States after completion of their schoolwork as of January 1972.53 These self-exiled students had realized their personal goals, and the revolutionary cause was no longer of interest. Their desertion of the Revolution continued to be a sore point with its advocates into the independence era.54

The technique of accomplice-making seemed utilized less often than in Asian revolutions, although there are no reliable figures for comparison.55 This practice entailed making villagers accessories to attacks on the Portuguese forces so that they would feel estranged from the colonial authorities and compelled to commit themselves to the guerrillas. Their initial transgressions amounted to minor offences, such as carrying ammunition or informing on an army convoy.56 Through them their families, clans and villages were no less compromised in army eyes. Once so committed, villagers displayed an unwillingness to betray local sons to the colonial apparatus viewed as alien and hostile to their community. Betrayal of village men meant their deaths or imprisonment; it could also lead to reprisals against the entire settlement.

It was, though, naive of colonial soldiers and officials to
conclude that a majority of FRELIMO's young recruits were deceived, press-ganged or terrorized into collaborating with their enemy. What the nationalist cadres offered above all else was the potential for change. One of the most lucid expositions of the possibilities awakened by revolution was set forth by Robert Taber in the War of the Flea:

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The will to revolt, so widespread as to be almost universal today, seems to be something more than a reaction to political circumstances or material conditions. What it seems to express is a newly awakened consciousness, not of "causes" but of potentiality.57 Promises of social and material improvement came easier for FRELIMO, which was not in power, than for Portugal whose shortcomings were apparent. Lisbon's programs, no matter how sincere a break with past neglect, looked inadequate and disingenuous. Above all, the revolutionary cadres could outbid the colonial regime, for they were free of present accountability. In short, they plausibly insisted that their promises could not be made good until colonialism had been swept away. Hopeful potentialities proved far more persuasive to FRELIMO volunteers than existing conditions.
Negative consequences, however, flowed from predictions of quick victory. One cause of FRELIMO's setbacks in Niassa arose from the population's expectations of a war over in six months. Father John Paul, an Anglican missionary stationed as Messumba who held pro-Mozambican sympathies, wrote that some Nyasa and Yao became disillusioned and disheartened as the war lengthened.58 An editorial in a 1972 issue of Mozambique Revolution admitted mobilization "deficiencies" and maintained the errors had been corrected, but as will be described in the next chapter the Portuguese recovered discouraged defectors right up to the coup.59 Despite problems, guerrilla manpower increased. Figures regarding military strength vary substantially, partly because of the difficulty in obtaining accurate information and partly because of FRELIMO's blurred distinctions between regular forces, regional guerrillas and village militia. FRELIMO declared that it had 250 trained guerrillas in 1964. Both its figures and those of the Portuguese put the number of insurgents at seventy-four hundred (with a further twenty-four hundred People's Militia) in 1967.60 When Miguel Murupa defected to the Portuguese in January 1971, he reckoned guerrilla strength at only three thousand to four thousand.61 This low estimate could have represented a downturn after Operation Gordian Knot or a mistake in counting only forces of one type. Otherwise, the small assessment showed Murupa's desire to tell his former enemies what they wanted to hear. If taken as fact that the guerrilla forces were so reduced by late 1970, then their build-up over the next four years was mounted especially rapidly, offering no consolation to Lisbon. By 1974, the regular guerrilla army, as noted above, had risen to between nine thousand and eleven thousand.

SETTLERS AND GUERRILLAS
It remains to investigate the revolutionaries' efforts to
mobilize support or undermine morale in the settler community and the Forcas Armadas. Mozambique's Portuguese population posed special problems and opportunities. Numbering about two hundred thousand, they concentrated themselves in the south and coastal lowlands, partaking of a privileged status in a white colonial society while working in every level of the economy. Over 80 percent were European-born immigrants to the east African colony in search of a higher living standard. Some worked as auto mechanics, taxi drivers or waiters which in developed societies rest on the lower rung of the socioeconomic ladder but in a tropical colony they lived better than their counterparts in the jobtight metropole. Their positions in the professions, skilled or semiskilled trades, industry or farming in itself made them apprehensive of FRELIMO's policies of socialism, multiracialism and African rule. This is not to suggest that European society was monolithic. Unlike Rhodesians, the Mozambican settlers had lived under half a century of dictatorship from Lisbon, leaving them devoid of political cohesion and of political institutions responsive to their interests. The Portuguese community was indeed deeply riven. Local businessmen and plantation owners chafed under Lisbon's red tape and economic favoritism toward metropolitan-based firms. Some harbored feelings of separatismo. Another segment favored an independent Mozambique under majority (African) rule. They listened to FRELIMO broadcasts from Dar es Salaam and, like the nationalists, believed their cause was against the "fascist regime of Salazar and Caetano." 62 Comprised mainly of university youths and some young professionals, they sympathized with African demands for independence. They constituted the so-called white FRELIMOs, the most outspoken of whom was the Portuguese Bishop of Nampula, Manuel Vierira Pinto. Angry settlers called him the "FRELIMO bishop," and the colonial government expelled him together with nine Italian missionaries in April 1974 for criticism of army atrocities. Since the early 1950s, liberal whites coalesced into the Movimento Democritico de Mogambique (MDM). Much of the MDM's opposition had more to do with anti-Salazarism and white separatism than with African rule. But soon after the Angolan revolt in 1961, it petitioned Lisbon to adopt policies so as to spare Mozambique a similar war and spare it from possible black revenge. Specifically, the Mozambican Democrats asked for an end to forced labor, education for all Africans, extension of civil liberties to Mozambicans and integration of the black majority into politics. 63 Circulating petitions and handing out pamphlets were their principal manifestations until after the coup when they resurfaced from clandestinity to spread FRELIMO's message among blacks and to work to allay fears among whites. Because of their antimetropolitan sentiments, the PIDE/DGS kept the Mozambican Democrats under close scrutiny. Occasionally, it arrested a European for "threats to the survival of the state." FRELIMO reported imprisoned whites and Asians as sympathizers so as to substantiate its multiracial program.
Other Portuguese suspects fled. António de Figueiredo, a journalist and author, became the most well known internationally. From exile in London, he upbraided repression in Portugal and colonialism in Africa. The

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MDM had some retribution after the military takeover when it led the round-up of secret police officers and their agents, detaining 120 in Machava prison. But prior to the coup, the PIDE/DGS net was tightly drawn. The exact membership of the MDM before the overthrow of the Caetano government is unknown; secrecy precluded open registration. It is doubtful if its number exceeded 200 located mainly in the capital and Beira.64

Students, the mainstay of the American antiwar protest, raised little opposition in Mozambique. During 1972 a handful of white pupils at the University of Lourenço Marques did form a small antiwar group, the Democratic Student Union. Beneath the slogans these students, however, belonged more to an anticonscription lobby than a pro-FRELIMO force. Seven were banned from the university 65 and restricted to an undisclosed place in the country for a year.

Together the MDM and the students represented a minority. A majority of settlers, for example, supported demonstrations in Mozambican cities against the American condemnation of Portugal in the United Nations at the beginning of the Angolan conflict. They followed the lead of Jorge Jardim's Notícias da Beira in calling for stiff punishment of missionaries exposing the massacres of Africans. They telegraphed Lisbon for tougher measures to counter FRELIMO advances. The coup's aftermath saw many of these die-hard elements coalesce into FICO. Its initial mass showing faded quickly as settlers realized that the army's resistance was crumbling and that the new Lisbon government was negotiating with the revolutionaries. Settlers had two options: accommodation or flight. Almost all fled.

In spite of calls for settlers to join the nationalists, hardly any responded before the Lisbon golpe. White fear of black retribution provides a partial explanation of settler aversion. Although FRELIMO's official wartime policy professed the contrary, the movement harbored antiwhite elements and undertook antiwhite acts. Aside from a handful of settler murders reported in the world press, there was a surprising absence of antiwhite racism attributed to FRELIMO by foreign reportage. Its own international literature was kept free of racist sentiments.66 Within the hierarchy, however, there existed members who were against whites and against mestiros; they assessed militancy and patriotism in accordance with the degree of blackness. They incited insurgents to attack whites.67 An anti-European message was instilled in guerrilla trainees and broadcast on the air.68 Guerrillas left notes threatening death to the diabo branco ("white devil") unless he left Mozambique.69 News of these incidents circulated and became magnified in the backwater areas. Some of the tales filtered into urban centers. As FRELIMO's hierarchy purged itself and revolutionized its ideology, racial enemies became class enemies; but the rank and file's views altered more slowly. There was, of course, much latent resentment stored up
against Europeans among Mozambican civilians, most of which broke out after the coup.70

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Therefore, the nationalists, appeals to settlers fell flat in budging them from their opposition to the Revolution prior to the fall of the Caetano government. A small number of Portuguese voluntarily gave clandestine assistance to FRELIMO in the form of subscriptions or information. Involuntary funds or food were, by contrast, handed over to guerrillas by settlers in remote areas anxious about their safety. Safe conduct and correct treatment of Portuguese and foreign missionaries paid off for FRELIMO since white churchmen sent young men to the guerrilla recruiters.71

Significant settler endorsement of FRELIMO came about only when a rebel victory and a sovereign Mozambique became a real possibility. Beforehand no clear sign showed unequivocally to the civilian population that Portugal was losing the war. Conversations in the capital’s sidewalk cafes had turned on football and affairs in Portugal. The war rarely intruded into daily life except when a large funeral for local sons briefly captured the media's attention. Settler self-confidence of its place in Mozambique and in the colonial army's ultimate supremacy continued unabated. FRELIMO naturally beamed radio broadcasts from Tanzania and Zambia (or the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe carried them) predicting inevitable triumph. Propaganda is most useful when it reinforces a recognizable trend. But it was only in the two or three months preceding the coup that the military balance visibly altered, manifesting to white civilians in the central districts the inability of the Forgas Armadas to contain the guerrillas. As there was little war reportage in Mozambican newspapers and no television coverage, the suddenness took European and African civilians by surprise. Moderates, civil servants, and the petite bourgeoisie usually defect to the rebels when the success of a revolution becomes imminent. This phenomenon occurred in Mozambique after the unseating of Caetano. Then tiny prorevolutionary groups proliferated and individuals took out newspaper advertisements, proclaiming their long-held sympathy for FRELIMO. Their declarations were taken as genuine rather than expedient by more than one observer.72

On the other hand, Mozambican settlers put up no determined armed resistance as had their Angolan compatriots. Several factors account for their disinclination. Mozambique's settlers comprised a much greater number of labor migrants than Angola's whites. Labor migration reflected the importance of the service sector within the east African colony's economy--railways, air terminals and ports--and the importance of large companies employing Portuguese on contract. Except for a scattering of farmers in the northern districts, most immigrants lived far from insurgent incidents until the breakthrough into the central districts. Thus, they were unthreatened before the last months. Conversely, the west African colony's plantation holders saw fighting at the start of their insurgency. The role of the army also was different in the two colonies. Unlike Angola where the scale of the uprising surprised the colonial authorities and the settlers' exertions saved the colony,
Mozambique underwent military preparations well in advance of the rebels' onslaught. Hence, the Forgas Armadas took charge of counterinsurgency without civilian participation, except as individuals in army-run units. Again unlike Angola where coffee planters fought a desperate holding action, confident of eventual army relief, the Mozambican smallholders felt no such certitude. Before they could put to use the hundreds of automatic rifles issued to them in February and March, events in Lisbon undermined their faith in the continuance of the new government's commitment. But even in the months preceding the army takeover, farmer morale around the towns of Vila Pery and Vila de Manica had slumped in view of the Forgas Armadas' seeming ineptness in halting the spread of insurgent incidents. Ironically, FRELIMO's guerrilla effectiveness, militarily slight as it was, did more to paralyze settler opposition than its assurances of white well-being in a black Mozambique.

SOLDIERS AND GUERRILLAS
The precise degree of FRELIMO's efficacy in swaying officer opinion with its Marxist creed, while demoralizing their resolution, is still a moot point. To be sure, the war loomed as the overarching backdrop for the MFA. Frustrations ran high at the interminableness of the African conflicts. This weariness extended to a loss of faith in the standards and performance of Portuguese society. Portugal's authoritarian regime, its economic backwardness and underdevelopment and its bureaucracy's venality and dry rot were all elements thrown into sharp relief by the revolutions in the ultramarino (overseas provinces).

Professional grievances and class antagonisms also were instrumental in sowing discontent in the officer corps. Staff officers formed a separate corps without field experience; the genuine bush fighters felt themselves isolated from the hierarchy. Dissatisfaction among officers below the lieutenant-colonel level loomed large, for they received poor pay, underwent slow and inequitable promotion and endured ineptitude or graft, or both, in high military and civilian places, while the burden of fighting fell on them. Regular officers at the front, for instance, detested the practice of military personnel in the rear and in Portugal holding second jobs to supplement their pay. The divisions within the officer corps encompassed not simply age and combat hardships but also class background. General officers came from the upper classes and held elitist attitudes; field-grade and regular junior officers, by and large, had middle class or lower origins.

A pivotal catalyst in the Armed Forces Movement's formation flowed from the publication of a governmental decree in July 1973 which granted regular commissions to the milicianos who previously had held separate militia commissions. Many conscript officers already had university degrees giving them a higher social standing than the academy graduates. But the regular combat officers, who had earned their seniority on Africa's tortuous terrain after
attendance at the military academy, resented the Rebelo decree for sacrificing their interests just to fill the ranks of the officer corps. These officers, who rose mainly from the middle class and below, perceived the new law as jeopardizing newly won social status and endangering further professional advancement.

Under politically motivated officers, the Melo Antunes and Vitor Alveses, their secret meetings on this issue soon broadened to other questions and led to the assault on the Caetano government.

To return to the degree of FRELIMO's ideological impact on the Forgas Armadas, important and difficult problems presented themselves, perhaps more for discussion than definitive answer. How much of the colonial army's loss of morale and desertion, for example, was induced by the nationalists' psychological and propaganda campaign? And how large a role was played by FRELIMO's revolutionary message in the motivations of the MFA?

FRELIMO invoked no large-scale desertions of white or black troops. Less than twenty Portuguese enlisted men deserted to the guerrillas and a similar number sought asylum in Sweden which FRELIMO helped arrange and then published their statements. Before the insurgency, one of the foremost deserters was Dr. Helder Martins who after the war assumed the post of Minister of Health in the FRELIMO government for a time. Almost without exception white enlisted deserters came from Portugal; men from the settler community displayed higher motivation.

Even the African defection rate, although greater than the Portuguese count, was modest until after the coup when a rash of civilians also scurried to align themselves with the revolutionaries. Before the coup nearly all desertions took place among nonelite troops and then mainly among the militia. From time to time, FRELIMO announced the surrender of entire African units. These units in reality amounted to little more than poorly trained, badly motivated and inadequately armed village militias of a dozen men or less who gave up without a fight for reasons of kinship or lack of Portuguese officers to stiffen their resolve.

An unknown number of Mozambicans in the colonial army, according to a secret Portuguese army report smuggled to and published by the pro-FRELIMO Angola Comit & in the Netherlands, passed information to the guerrillas which enabled them to mount actions against transports and patrols. This report noted that intelligence leaks were most prevalent in Cabo Delgado.

Recognizing the enlarging contingent of African troops in the Forgas Armadas, FRELIMO concentrated on its Mozambican "brothers" whom it later called "puppet soldiers." The guerrillas left handwritten notes on patrolled roads and near villages addressed to Mozambicans. They made a special appeal on the basis of shared colonial experiences, racial background and nationalism. Sensitive to psychological dimensions of guerrilla warfare, they catalogued their own sabotage successes while comparing their struggle with that of the Vietnamese over whom the United States could not prevail in a similar people's war.

90 Revolution and Counterrevolution

Good propaganda tends to reinforce an existing trend; and
FRELIMO's radio broadcasts and handwritten letters coincided with a lowering of the Forgas Armadas' morale by 1972. Wartime conditions in themselves by this time were conducive to demoralization. For Portuguese soldiers, particularly combat officers, sitting in a Mozambican tropical rain or baking under an African sun and wondering what they were doing thousands of miles from home provoked psychological factors of considerable importance often overlooked. In retrospect, the rebels' claims in 1964 that they already faced a totally demoralized Portuguese army after only a month of war seem from hindsight as utterly out of touch with reality. The root cause of flagging motivation resulted from the endless nature of the war, which was not present in the opening years. Declining spirit showed up in the growing reluctance of regular Portuguese soldiers to leave an ambushed convoy for pursuit in the bush or to patrol off the paths. Although Lisbon experienced few discipline problems (unlike the Americans in Vietnam) among its tough, peasant-stock soldiers, it faced a disillusioned and frustrated officer corps in the field—an assessment recorded by outside observers and officers themselves by 1973. So while hardly any deserted to the uncertainties of guerrilla treatment or no enlisted man "fragged" his company commander, the Portuguese rank and file reduced their risks by playing it safe. One of the ways Arriaga chose to cope with this lack of aggressiveness in his metropolitan troops was to turn to Mozambicans. An important historical question centers on the influence of FRELIMO's Marxist message on the junior and field-grade officers who formed the MFA. No final judgment can be flatly rendered about whether Marxist-flavored pronouncements on social ills were merely post hoc rationalizations to justify the seizure of power or simply an extension of the consciousness-raising experiences brought on by Portugal's counterrevolutionary apparatus itself. Any discussion of revolutionary inspiration in the officers' thought is inextricably bound up with the worsening malaise in the African wars, the civic action approach to win over African opinion especially in Guinea-Bissau and the deepening professional grievances alluded to above. Within the amorphous MFA, a spectrum of uncrystallized political sentiments characterized the thoughts of the coup-makers who found agreement in the goals of toppling the Caetano government and terminating the African conflicts. Their quest for a new order in Portugal and their solution to the question of African sovereignty were marked by much confusion, hesitation and contradiction which reflected the diversity of opinion within the MFA. Yet clearly discernible in a small number of officers' statements and actions were the traces of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. Some leading MFA organizers wrote that they had become familiar with Marxist doctrines while serving in Africa. Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, for example, held that he picked up revolutionary ideas while interrogating FRELIMO prisoners. Every Portuguese officer worth his commission read Marx and Mao for their counterinsurgency value. But a sheer minority of the MFA subscribed to the idea of a Marxist transformation of Portugal, and they did not prevail.
THE MOBILIZERS
Finally, the mobilizers themselves warrant brief description. Even more so than in the related revolutions in Algeria, China or Vietnam, the Mozambican field cadres had rural backgrounds. Except for the top layer of FRELIMO’s hierarchy, who gained education in Western universities, the political structure comprised at best mission-trained schoolteachers who were themselves little more than advanced students with four years of education instructing less knowledgeable pupils in rudimentary Portuguese and reading. Machel, who had attained training as a hospital orderly, was far from the bottom of the educational ladder in colonial Mozambique. The greater part of the mobilizers were semiliterate and FRELIMO suffered from self-admitted deficiencies in trained cadre. On the one hand, the absence of literate mobilizers could be said to have hampered organization and efficiency. But on the other, it narrowed the social and cultural gap between mobilizers and populace. Urbanized or slightly educated Mozambicans could still converse in local dialects which formed valuable links from FRELIMO to the rural population. Class origins as well as ethnic affiliations thus facilitated the process of mobilization and the flow of new leaders to the insurgent organization so crucial in revolutionary warfare.

There were drawbacks to this acute shortage of educated cadres, particularly in medicine and education—skills which could have won over villagers. But Western education did not stand in the way of a quick identification between revolutionaries and rural peoples in the way it had in China. The degree to which heavy doses of indoctrination administered by Chinese advisers in southern Tanzania or by instructors in other communist countries worked to compensate for the want of formal schooling is difficult to assess. At the very least the trained cadres had their mobilizing techniques sharpened.

By explaining that individual and village discontent had wider public and political connections, the cadres advanced a frame of reference, an explanation of affairs, through which villagers and young recruits could comprehend the bewildering experiences they were undergoing. While blaming Portuguese colonialism for all of the people’s ills, they helped fan local alienation into an abiding hatred of Portugal and into a spirit of revolutionary nationalism. These marginally educated cadres were able to observe the realities of rural economy and social life. They knew the meaning of life in the countryside and took advantage of the power and value of parochial myths, symbols and rituals. The Portuguese army and police played into their hands by being provoked into punitive assaults on Mozambicans by guerrillas’ landmines and ambushes. Even when accompanied by guerrilla violence and coercion, the ultimate goal of the cadres centered on the active engagement of the countryside in the cause against Portugal. Enlistment in the guerrillas represented one form of involvement; another flowed from reorganized village life in forest bases or areas bereft of colonial civil administration. By word or deed FRELIMO had to persuade the people to move into the forests away from roads and built-up areas. The mobilizers stressed their accountability to the people, egalitarianism and local autonomy. A village council, for instance, might
replace the authority of an assassinated chief, clearing the way for FRELIMO management, social mobility and irreversible commitment to the revolution. Much of this mirrored the individual responsibility and freedom of expression within the FRELIMO army and transborder sanctuary camps in contrast to hierarchical traditional society. Politicization through meetings, skits, dances, poems, songs, selfcriticism and study sessions reflected the facts of life in army and community, and so individual and collective accountability were conditioned by FRELIMO group expectations. Its promises of a brave new world fit in with what is known of peasant millenarianism. The Portuguese early on grasped the form, if not always the content, of people's war and introduced a countercampaign.

Counter mobilization
The military aspect is only one factor, since what counts is the conquest of the support and adhesion of the population.
--Manuel Pimental dos Santos
The side that wins the population will win the war.
--Colonel Augusto Seguro, Governor of Cabo Delgado, 1966
Counterrevolutionaries have steadily become committed to the imperatives of a counterideology and countermobilization to compete with rural insurgents. In South Vietnam, for example, Ngo Dinh Nhu tried in 1958 to popularize a rival philosophy to Communism which he called Personalism. French officers concocted an ideoloogy of super nationalism and patriotic duty in the Algerian war. When the African wars commenced, Portugal's colonial policy was imbued with an imperial creed--a blend of Catholicism, a soaring nationalism orchestrated by Salazar's Estado Novo, an Iberian brand of anti-Communism, a missao civilizadora and a resolution to keep Mozambique Portuguese. Colonial officials and teachers concentrated on Portugal and identification with its values and faith while professing a belief in cultural interpenetration. Youths sang Portuguese songs, and students learned Portugal's geography and history. Mozambique's Archbishop Teodosio Cardina de Gouveia preached to African troops that "may this and future communions produce in your souls the courage to fulfill your duties to God and to Portugal."
This doctrine may seem better suited to the nineteenth century and wars of pacification than a competing ideology to FRELIMO's vision of African nationalism and Marxist-inspired promises of a bright tomorrow. Yet as improbable as it may seem, Lisbon's campaign to forge "a new Portuguese man with a Christian mentality" attracted adherents, some of whom fought courageously and proudly under its flag. Large cheering African crowds turned out to greet President Tomas in 1964 and Prime Minister Caetano in 1969 providing another barometer of Lisbon's politicizing effectiveness. Hundreds of Mozambicans, of course, spurned the
official propaganda line and left to join the guerrillas in the forest; others embraced it. Although some Mozambicans passed the assimilado requirements with an eye to enhanced social and economic status alone, not a few accepted the colonial presence as black Portuguese. Given the shortage of schools and the capriciousness of testing officials, there were a mere 4,349 assimilated Africans in Mozambique's 1950 census. More often than not, racial prejudices and the influx of Portuguese immigrants who took the better jobs dashed the aspirations of assimilados, significant number of whom turned to rebellion. After the start of the Angolan conflict, Lisbon accelerated its campaign to foster solidarity with the colonial peoples. It scrapped the old assimilado status and the indigena (native) classification and announced all Mozambicans to be citizens of a greater Portuguese nation. Voting rights were still based on property rights and literacy, which is to say that only a tiny minority of Mozambicans exercised genuine citizenship. As late as the March 1973 election, 109,171 ballots were cast to elect twenty of the fifty representatives of the newly expanded territorial Legislative Assembly. Officially sanctioned associations of chiefs and businessmen selected the rest. These changes stopped well short of satisfying maximalist demands of the revolutionary leadership for political independence and personal power. For economic reasons and historical sentiment, Lisbon refused to cast its east coast colony free—the one sure way of unwinding the revolutionaries' mainspring. This is one dilemma of colonial counterinsurgency wars, that is, how to retain territorial possession and yet remove the impediment to power which revolutionaries seek. Within the context of Portugal's continued rule, Lisbon's mobilization was not without striking efficacy, although it did not resolve the dilemma.

AFRICANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

As noted above, the composition of the Forgas Armadas approached 60 percent African. If one accepts one of the largest estimates of Portugal's forces at seventy thousand in January 1974 then the absolute figure for Mozambican manpower was about 42,000. Since Lisbon extended this percentage to include scouts, various village militias and special detachments, many comprised mainly of Africans, the makeup of regular army units was probably nearer 35-40 percent African. The complement of black males virtually totalled the composition of many specialized forces. The militia or OPVDC, as a case in point, was formed along paramilitary lines from largely young Africans, some former guerrillas and a handful of local settlers and white soldiers discharged for bad conduct in other units. Employed mostly in defense of aldeamentos or settler localities, the milicia gained an unsavory reputation among village Africans for abuse and lack of discipline. Mozambicans comprised over 90 percent of the GEs and GEPs whom Arriaga dubbed the "Portuguese solution." The African composition of three other crack forces—the commandos, paratroops and marines—was reported to be 70 percent. Although the racial mixture of the PIDE/DGS's
flechas went officially unannounced, it was nearly completely Africanized, except for its officers. Mozambicans therefore formed the bulk of the colonial army's "forces of intervention"—the operational forces that spearheaded military actions. Portugal's effort compares favorably with France's in Algeria. About one hundred eighty thousand harkis (Moslem soldiers) fought for the French over the course of the war, but only around twenty to thirty thousand joined the colonial forces at any given time.

The Africanization program had forced itself on a chary Lisbon government. By 1966, the army's manpower requirements demanded vaster recruitment of Mozambicans beyond the previous limit of 15 percent at the beginning of the fighting, and the military's needs overcame initial fears of a black Trojan horse in the white citadel. With a population of 8.6 million in the 1970 census, Portugal had the highest proportion of military-aged men under arms (10.5 percent) of all Western countries save Israel. The same census called attention to the loss of nearly one million men (half between twenty and thirty years old) who fled the draft or left for better paid employment in France or West Germany.

Making virtue of necessity, Africanization of the army sought several advantages: it was intended to reduce European casualties, which steadily worried Lisbon; it vastly augmented the metropole's manpower pool; it scaled down transportation costs; it hoped to defuse international criticism of conducting a race war against Africans; it decreased the available manpower for FRELIMO by enlistment of youths into Portuguese ranks; and finally it aimed to give Mozambicans a stake in Portugal's cause.

One possible counterproductive aspect of African recruitment and resultant integration of black and white in the military has been suggested as the diminished European fears of Mozambicans in general and African rule in particular. A curious dilemma arises for countermobilizers when their recruitment of potential enemies serves to reduce the fighting will of the incumbent forces along with expanding its size. Yet the advantages plainly rested on large-scale Africanization of the Forgas Armadas. Besides their augmented numerical strength, Mozambican soldiers infused an aggressive spirit into the sagging metropolitan morale. Most significantly, the employment of large numbers of blacks in the army and the commissioning of Mozambicans as officers introduced far-reaching changes in the structure of colonial governance, the full impact of which was cut short by the military coup. Had Lisbon won the war, it would have been hard to turn back the clock to antebellum times. Colonial society could not have been the same once Africans in growing numbers were made officers and gentlemen.

Judging by FRELIMO's campaign to wean Mozambicans away from the Portuguese camp, Africanization presented a decided threat to the guerrillas. Not one incident of rebellion in Mozambican units or militia has come to light, even though the potential for mutiny was explosive in platoons comprised of a score of black soldiers and commanded by one white officer. Loyalty to Lisbon (not settlers) in regular and elite units (not the OPVDC militia) persisted into the
vacillating months following the army coup, when some metropolitan troops refused marching orders. Many of those six thousand black and white troops who deserted after the Lisbon golpe waited until the end of August, and then did so not from dread of going into action but because they realized that the MFA government had decided to surrender Mozambique to FRELIMO. Some feared for their lives from a retribution-minded FRELIMO government; others went to carry on the fight from Rhodesia or South Africa. They constituted the core of guerrilla forays into an independent Mozambique.13

Weighed against French experiences in the Algerian war where mass defections of Muslim bands were the rule, Portugal's mastery clearly stands out. There were only two confirmed small village militia units deserting to FRELIMO before the MFA came to power, although not a few poorly trained militiamen ran at the first sound of gunfire. Still, the issuance of only obsolete firearms to village defense units illustrated the ambivalence with which Lisbon regarded village militia formations.

Why did relatively large numbers of Africans serve in Portugal's forces? Conscription was one explanation. According to the testimonies of defectors who joined FRELIMO, most Mozambicans were forcibly recruited. Portuguese law stipulated two years of military service for all males between the ages of eighteen and fortyfive, and some young men fled to neighboring states to work and to escape the draft.14 So as not to endanger goodwill and in order to secure solely willing men, colonial officials claimed that most Mozambicans were volunteers, not conscripts. Just as there existed a long tradition of resistance to Portuguese penetration, so, too, there coexisted a well-established practice of enlistment in Portugal's wars. During the pacification campaigns volunteers usually consisted of assegai-wielding auxiliaries who served for booty and the duration of one expedition. At the start of this century, Mozambicans were uniformed, armed and drilled as European soldiers. Young men followed in the footsteps of their fathers or elders. Corporate identity was reinforced when recruitment came through family connections or localities. As in the case of the GE s who were marshalled from kindred constituencies, locally drawn contingents exhibited a strong sense of togetherness.

Youths also volunteered for money and status. The Portuguese, like the French in Algeria, recruited among the unemployed villagers who searched for employment and a future. Military service fetched higher pay than most civilian jobs open to Africans. A soldier got as much as a schoolteacher, and Mozambicans were promoted to the rank of captain. Unemployment was a definite factor in the decision to sign up. So was enlistment for training otherwise difficult to secure in the civilian sector, such as learning to drive vehicles or operate machinery. These skills secured jobs after soldiering. For thousands of young Mozambicans, Lisbon converted the army into the best avenue to upward socioeconomic mobility. Prestige motivated others to join the special forces-type
units with their more dangerous combat missions and training less adaptable to civilian life. Mozambican and Portuguese informants related that the camouflaged fatigue uniforms and colorful berets appealed to youths just as did the reputed tough training and parachute jumps, all of which supposedly enhanced their standing with the opposite sex.15 Many volunteers to the special units came from regular or militia ranks. Their pride as men found fulfillment in Portuguese-organized elite forces. Similarly, in trying to come to grips with why Indian men sided with the British Raj against their brothers, John Strachey offered an explanation which should be weighted carefully by students of African collaboration:

The immense power of the satisfaction which men get merely from belonging, without much personal advantage, to a successful "show" should never be forgotten by the student of history and politics who is searching for the reasons which have made things happen in the otherwise inexplicable way in which they have happened.16

Grudges against FRELIMO furnished still another reason. As some Mozambicans sided with the guerrillas because Of Portuguese atrocities, so, also, a few Mozambicans fell in with the colonial army to settle scores.17 This hostility sometimes carried ethnic overtones. Some toughs cast their lot with the Portuguese, particularly in the militias, for the authority it gave them over their compatriots. They alienated villages from the colonial government by appropriating chickens, livestock and furniture or violating women. The same sort of accomplice-making process used by the guerrillas to ensure the loyalty of halfhearted recruits was discernible on the counterinsurgent side, too. Once implicated in misdeeds to civilians or guerrillas, the Mozambican soldier or militiaman was unlikely to be forgiven by FRELIMO and thus became committed to the Portuguese.

AFRICANIZATION AND ETHNICITY

There is an absence of official data on the ethnic breakdown of the Forgas Armadas. Colonial statements deemphasized ethnic origin of soldiers so as to create an impression of unity and to downplay ethnicity in presenting an image of the new Portuguese citizen being white or black without distinction. Civilian and military officers held, not without justification, that all ethnic groups made up their forces. In practice, however, ethnicity got much consideration. Calls to join up were couched in appeals to specific ethnic clusters and based on past cooperation with the colonial forces, present-day aversion to another group and current fears about FRELIMO's violence toward loved ones. Wrongly, the Portuguese sometimes concluded that if one ethnic community (such as the Makua) were hostile to another which backed FRELIMO (as the Makonde), then the former was pro-Portuguese in its entirety. As if to contradict the prevailing assumption, General Arriaga stressed at a parade of paratroopers in Beira that the first GEs operating in the north were mostly Makonde.18 Heavy concentrations of
Mozambicans nevertheless did come from ethnolinguistic communities considered loyal; although each incoming recruit was screened to ascertain trustworthiness.

For regular army units, the Portuguese mustered recruits mainly from the south and central regions who had no ethnic affiliations in the northern war zones. Among these peoples, the Shangana from Inhambane and Gaza districts, formed a sizable component of the colonial army. Named from the Ngoni chief Soshangane who invaded from the south as a spin-off of the great Zulu upsurge, the Shangana initially put up stubborn resistance to Portugal’s encroachments. Later, from 1904, they served in northern pacification campaigns and peacetime regiments. Their white officers assessed them as ideal soldiers. Enlistment in the GEPs was relatively heterogeneous as recruitment took place army-wide. Its short-term missions to specific battlegrounds lent its composition to ethnic diversity. But since the GEs were recruited from one vicinity for service in it after training, they drew their men from the embattled northern sectors. Because the northeast constituted an active insurgent quarter, it was natural that the Makua would bulk large in defense, especially as the Portuguese played on their long-standing animosity with the Makonde who formed the backbone of FRELIMO in Cabo Delgado. Above any of Mozambique's peoples, the Portuguese stereotyped the Makua as a “loyal tribe.” Lisbon also attracted recruits from communities considered exclusively loyal to FRELIMO. Although an estimated 90 percent of the Makonde supported FRELIMO, some aided the Portuguese as militiamen and scouts. Other northern communities, such as the Yaos, Nyasas and Ngonis who had men bearing arms for the guerrillas, also provided troops and militia for the Forgas Armadas. Thus, like FRELIMO, Portugal had at least some participation from diverse ethnic groups but relied on specific peoples.

Neither side actively encouraged extreme ethnic feelings which would have led to separatist or regional “nationalism.” In Blantyre, Malawi, an exiled movement calling itself the Uniao Nacional Africana da Rombia (UNAR) laid claim to the land and loyalties of the peoples between the Rovuma and Zambezi rivers (and hence the name Rombia). To keep its territorial options open, the Malawian government gave it some clandestine encouragement. It is very likely that a settler faction led by Jorge Jardim toyed with the scheme of using the UNAR to head a docile state in the north, but it is doubtful if Lisbon ever seriously entertained any breakaway formulas. The UNAR attracted exile and local Nyasa backing before guerrilla advances doomed its separatist schemes. A number of submovements arose among the Makua in the Lisbon coup's aftermath, which had roots in earlier separatist initiatives. The settlers and local officials, without authorization from the new military government in Lisbon, fanned Makua separatist feelings so as to frustrate FRELIMO's control over all of Mozambique in the months of uncertainty following the MFA's takeover. These last-ditch schemes amounted to little, however.

Countermobilization 99
In contrast to France's active sponsorship of an autonomous Thai Federation northwest of Hanoi as a political and military weapon against the Viet Minh, Portugal before or after the coup never sanctioned the formation of separate autonomies in Mozambique. This approach differed from Spinola's policies in Guinea-Bissau.26 Lisbon's belief that Mozambique was an overseas province of Portugal worked against a narrower policy of territorial dismemberment. Portuguese citizens in the metropole argued that without overseas territories Portugal would be only a bathing beach for Western Europe. Propaganda posters superimposed the Portuguese empire on a map of Western Europe with a subtitle stating: "Portugal is not a small country."

COUNTERMOBILIZATION AND MOTIVATION

Countermobilization for the Portuguese went beyond drumming up recruits. Regular officers placed a premium on the motivation of their troops. Under Arriaga's generalship, they resorted to larger doses of propaganda to supplement unit esprit de corps. Propaganda for military personnel as well as for the civilian population embraced themes of a struggle against communism and a war for family and home, a brighter economic future and multiracial participation in a pluri-continental Portugal with a growing autonomy for Mozambique. Alternately labeled bandidos or tools of SinoSoviet expansion, FRELIMO was depicted in leaflets, posters and broadcasts as an enemy of the population. Portuguese officers and NCOs harangued village assemblies that cannibals made up the guerrilla forces.27

Beginning in 1972, General Arriaga instituted a controversial program of mentalizagao (mentalization) among special units so as to instill and maintain patriotism and loyalty. Adopted from the French 5es Bureaux in Algeria, it represented a Portuguese answer to what they believed was Chinese "brainwashing" of FRELIMO guerrillas in the training camps of southern Tanzania. Elite troops, black and white, got one hour of political drill each day; NCOs and officers received more. Mentalization began in boot camp where pamphlets and slogans were memorized and discussed. Double-timing soldiers often chanted marching songs about Mozambique being Portuguese or Africans being citizens of Portugal. In crack garrisons and units, mentalizagao formed a portion of the daily routine. Arriaga, unlike General de Spinola in Guinea-Bissau, never abandoned the assimilation policy of making Africans feel themselves to be Portuguese.29 At Nampula and other training centers, the Ministry of Education helped the army teach Portuguese while members of its Servigo de Ac ao Psicossocial aimed at "social integration."30

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The mentalization program achieved patchy results, although the blame cannot all be laid at the feet of Arriaga. Caetano's government was at odds with Arriaga. It feared a highly politicized army acting contrary to its orders as had happened at the end of the Algerian war when elements of the French army revolted against Paris. As a consequence, the politicization campaign fell short of systematic and widespread implementation. Indoctrination was not army-wide. Nor did other territorial commanders press it into general service. Its most notable success lay
with Mozambican elite troops who fought with conviction. Its gravest failure lay with the officer corps, from whose ranks sprang the coup-makers. Metropolitan conscripts held mixed sentiments. As early as 1969, one foreign observer close to Portuguese enlisted men and sergeants concluded that they were divided in their attitudes toward the war. "One section thought all this soldiering in Africa was an attempt to defend an unrealistic and therefore pointless situation; the other section held the official view, that Mozambique was Portugal."

A South African correspondent, commenting on the meagerness of the conscripts' zeal, wrote that they "are not aware of the reasons for the war in this steamy, overseas possession." Coming from hardy peasant stock, the Portuguese rank and file were accustomed to physical hardship, material deficiencies and less reliant on technology to solve problems than other Western soldiers. They gave their officers and NCOs minimal disciplinary problems. Indeed relations between ranks conveyed an air of informality but obedience, although certain commando units were unruly under a meek commander. Violent actions toward rural Mozambicans, as a control problem, figured as another matter and will be surveyed later. Unexposed to the dispiriting drug and disco culture of the West, the Portuguese draftee was considered by most observers to be a fine soldier. Some commentators, nevertheless, pointed out that he avoided dangerous assignments and lacked motivation. Morale and ran highest among troops from the settler community who called Mozambique their home, but FRELIMO insisted they were more racist than metropolitan soldiers.

While FRELIMO had to contend with and overcome ethnicity, the Forgas Armadas labored with its own brands of disunity. Divisions existed not only between African and European troops, who separated socially in spite of integration during duty hours, but also between Portuguese conscript officers and professional soldiers. Regular officers could not stomach the conscripts for their timeserving, civilian orientation and unprofessional military behavior. The drafted officers, on the other hand, saw their professional counterparts as out for advancement or private gain and thus interested in prolonging the war. Some professional soldiers, known as chicos, engaged in black-marketing and staff officers lived the good life well to the rear of shot and shell. In rear-line forces, sharp-dealing Portuguese officers and NCOs were said to have sprung versions of the shell game on unwary African recruits to swindle their pay. For reasons of personal safety, the Portuguese did not continue these "con games" in the front lines.

Countermobilization

The deepest cleavage separated the military authorities and the PIDE/DGS. Professional jealousy was brought about by the secret police's increasing military functions with the formation and deployment of the flechas. Officers and men disliked and feared the omnipotent powers of the PIDE/DGS. Over the long haul, suspicion and dread were bad motivators for army morale. Disunity within Portuguese forces served to explain not only poorly harmonized tactical coordination but also declining martial spirit. Worse, much worse for Portugal, was the waning political
motivation in the lower and middle grades of the officer corps in uma guerra esgotante (a war of exhaustion). An on-the-spot observer wrote that by mid-1973 the ideology of aggressive nationalism and the multicontinental conception of Portugal had worn thin among combat officers stationed in Mozambique.38 Dispirited by American and French setbacks in rural counterrevolution, Portuguese officers compared Portugal's slender resources with the wealth of France and the United States and drew pessimistic conclusions. Their loss of momentum showed up in other ways. Officers displayed a certain cavalier Latin attitude to their missions, slackness in briefing incoming replacements, inattention to detail and, most important, progressive psychological fatigue.39 Within and without the MFA, officers had come around to their own political solution embracing territorial autonomy for Mozambique (and the other colonies) within a commonwealth framework with Portugal.40 António de Spinola popularized their sentiments from his prestigious perch—a specially created post of Deputy Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. His book, Portugal e o Futuro, mirrored their thoughts, not introduced them. Once in power, the MFA, under the temporary inspiration of an extreme faction and caught up in the radicalism of the moment, opted for a total separation of the colonies from Lisbon by acknowledging the demands of the liberation movements for independence. As detailed in the previous chapter, several determinants contributed to the coup and then the MFA's initial radical stage during which its spokesmen made Marxist-spiced pronouncements and policies until overtaken by a Thermidorian phase. The trials of combat—death, maiming, separation from home, privation, tropical disease, boredom, fear and the necessity for inflicting suffering on others—were solvents that eroded morale. These catalysts bred receptive minds for revolt. In the absence of an efficacious countervailing ideology a regime cannot hope to keep its forces impervious to its adversaries' political winds. During his tour as commander in Guinea-Bissau, Spinola, the most sensitive of top Portuguese officers to the psychological and ideological dimensions of rural revolution, argued with the West in mind: "We must develop and propose an effective counterrevolution, thus combating ideas with ideas."41 In the final reckoning a powerlessness characterized Portugal's political ethos among its own centurions. The MFA's takeover substantiates the findings of D. E. H. Russell. Written before the Lisbon coup, Russell in a review of fifteen case studies concluded that "in no case of successful rebellion did the regime retain the loyalty of the armed forces."42

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The lessons arising from Caetano's downfall were not lost on Mozambique's neighbor, the Republic of South Africa. After Portugal turned belly up, Pretoria assigned to each battalion a psychological action officer to watch for "tell-tale signs of Communist influence. and low morale."43

COUNTERMOBILIZING THE MOZAMBIAN POPULATION
Portugal sought to mobilize African civilians behind its cause and to win over members of the revolutionary movement. Its broadcasts, newspapers, leaflets and street posters stressed multiracialism and unity with the metropole. Wall pictures associated soldiers with medicine, education and social welfare. School children sang the Portuguese national anthem and rendered the fascist salute before the latter was stopped as bad publicity for Lisbon. The regroupment of the rural population into aldeamentos eased the dissemination of propaganda, although the hardships and injustices attached to resettling deflected the positive impact. Inadequate numbers of trained specialists and ineptitude also account, by and large, for a lost opportunity to influence residents of the closed environments on the scale of the French in Algeria. Aware of the psychological terrain on which they fought, individual military commanders or teams from the Servio de Accao Psicossocial invoked local superstitions to countermobilize the populace or discourage guerrilla mobilization. Rarely was it done artfully, however. Unlike Rhodesia in the 1970s, there was no systematic employment of customs or witch doctors to turn villagers toward the government.

Portugal radiated a genuineness in mollifying racial antagonisms by giving effect to educational and health programs. It also struck down the legal obligation of Africans to work for the settlers or the colonial government by passing the 1962 Rural Labor Code, although infractions continued in rural or war area where African forced labor built fortifications or aldeamentos. In 1971 Lisbon changed the admission codes of hotels, restaurants and cafes to eliminate racial discrimination. Economic differences along racial lines sufficed to exclude all but a few Africans from patronage in even lower class white establishments, however. The Lisbon officials blamed the settlers' racism and ill-treatment for undercutting their efforts to win over the population. Metropolitan endeavors to upgrade the basic amenities of Mozambique's inhabitants will be touched on in Chapter 7. Suffice it to say that Lisbon's countermobilization might be listed as another explanation for FRELIMO's race into the central zone before the population below the Zambezi became acquiescent toward a refurbishing Portuguese colonialism or interpreted its own interests as hostile to the Revolution.

Portugal sought to transform the population into a demographic sea inhospitable to the guerrilla fish. Specifically, it strove to involve the populace - at large in its own defense. This took the form of the auto-defesa program in which the village or aldeamento militia were armed with cast-off weapons. The most viable autodefesa developed among the Makua but the program had participants on all fronts. An army communiqué declared that by "the end of 1973, about two hundred thirty thousand persons were covered by this system." Militia were also mixed with commandos and used for offensive operations and the protection of trains from Beira to Umtali.

The positive gains of this countermobilization were announced in army news releases after 1968. Military communiques became more infrequent after that date, about once a month, and they deemphasized coverage of guerrilla raids.
Instead they devoted detail to how villagers and militiamen repelled FRELIMO raids, which represented a departure from earlier reportage. The Portuguese did not suffer the rash of defections of entire self-defense villages taking with them hundreds of rifles as had happened to the French in Algeria. Nor did FRELIMO breach the defenses of more than a couple of weakly manned auto-defesa compounds in frontal onsloughts before the coup.

Countermobilization enjoyed other successes, too. The colonial authorities actively pursued a campaign to induce guerrillas and their hierarchy to defect. Before, during and after large military offensives, the Forgas Armadas publicized their message of safe conduct, amnesty and restoration to the Lusitanian fold. The government’s Voice of Mozambique broadcast messages over its regional transmitters in local dialects and attempted to jam FRELIMO airwaves. In the Gordian Knot operation, thousands of leaflets were air-dropped in what the Portuguese jokingly called the guerra do panfleto (war of the pamphlet). The year 1972 witnessed the air dispersal of 4,889,000 circulars, welcoming FRELIMO deserters and offering money for weapons.48 Another sort of leaflet bore the photograph and signature of a well-known nationalist deserter along with an invitation to follow in his footsteps. Like the French before them, Mozambique's colonial army turned to "sky shouting" techniques—aircraft fitted with loudspeakers to broadcast appeals to suspected concentrations of guerrillas or their supporters on the ground. Their airplanes flew, for example, 1,417 aerial broadcast sorties in 1971, a figure that moved upwards during the next two years.49 When the new Organic Law for the Overseas Provinces went into effect in 1972, the government welcomed back the rank-and-file "terrorists" to the Lusiad Community promising guarantees of no proceedings against them. In this way it sought to split leaders from followers.

Psychologically, it aimed at the anger and anxiety of guerrillas in the field by taking advantage of the disaffection felt by internal forces against their external administrating wing. Near the frontiers, the Psycho-Social Service Action teams hung posters portraying FRELIMO leaders "living it up" in luxury hotels at the expense of those supporting the revolutionary movement. Other posters contrasted the misery of those who followed the guerrillas with the bliss of those who stayed loyal to Portugal.50 Aware of these and other countersubversive methods to aggravate disunity, revolutionary cadres warned about "Portuguese agents" in their midst.51 The Servigo de Acção Psicossocial tried to get as much mileage out of a defector as possible. As in the case of Lazaro Kavandame, onetime Provincial Secretary of Cabo Delgado and Central Committee member, it traded on his position as an elder authority of the Makonde, endeavoring to weaken FRELIMO's standing with them. He made appeals to the Makonde to lay down their arms. Kavandame was also said to have brought over a suitcase of secret nationalist documents to sweeten his worth to his newfound allies. His appeals reportedly caused concern to FRELIMO, but in reality Kavandame's position had probably eroded prior to his defection.52
Weaning away the nationalist took the form of forgiveness and good treatment, especially for prominent turncoats. This was one of the twists of the countermobilization campaign. Oftentimes defecting guerrillas were treated well and given jobs while ordinary folk mildly suspected of involvement with FRELIMO got beatings and summary executions. A noteworthy defector who held the FRELIMO post of Deputy Foreign Secretary, Miguel Murupa, was first assigned to the army's Department of Psychological Action, then to Jorge Jardim's Notigias da Beira and finally became an associate editor of Voz Africana, which catered to Mozambican readers. Never a subservient personality, Murupa (and others) criticized the colonial government in the pages of Voz Africana for not delivering on promises of adequate health and education for Africans.53 For their part, the colonial authorities manifested more tolerance of Mozambican criticism than at any time since the early Republican era (1910-1926). This rehabilitative policy extended to lesser defectors who might find themselves in the coveted post of a clerk in an administrative center or in the commercial sector.

A formula which favors onetime enemies over minor infractors or even loyal subjects is one not calculated to mobilize widespread support in a populace. It would be historically inaccurate to maintain, however, that the Portuguese totally neglected or ravaged humble villagers. Soldiers handed out gifts of clothing and mobile health units from the Psycho-Social Service Action moved among clusters of huts. Yet the point was not overlooked by simple people or common soldiers in the colonial forces that FRELIMO traitors did well out of their change of heart.54 Under Arriaga, the Forgas Armadas were to fly out FRELIMO injured ahead of Portuguese wounded. This program called for medical preference for guerrillas and for their hospitalization in the same wards as colonial army casualties. How generalized were these practices cannot be determined; FRELIMO charged instead that the Portuguese rarely took prisoners. Evacuating guerrilla wounded first, nevertheless, was done enough to provoke resentment in the colonial army's ranks.55 Arriaga's policies regarding amnesty and the wounded also incurred settler criticism for a "kid-glove" approach.56 Offers of repatriation, however, combined with hard times in the mato won many of the foot soldiers and their village camp followers back into the Portuguese flock.

Eager to expand their campaign to attract nationalists, the army command publicized their successes in the recuperada (recovered) rate. It announced mass defections and reported a figure as high as 1,087 for the single month of August 1971.57 General Arriaga estimated that ten thousand surrendered in the first ten months of 1971.58 Obviously, the lion's share of the defectors were civilians who either placed themselves under Portuguese protection or went into aldeamentos under army pressure. Caught in the crossfire and bewildered by the crosspressures of contending forces, hapless village people could more easily be grouped by either side than in less tumultuous times. Under the guise of protection, the Portuguese moved villagers into aldeamentos and FRELIMO regrouped them in the mato.
A far more accurate gauge of desertion takes into account the side-changing of FRELIMO's leading figures of whom there were several. In distinct contrast to the lean record of the French and Americans in southeast Asia, Lisbon can justifiably contend that it helped induce the defection of a number of its top opponents. Table 2 lists the names, titles and defection dates of FRELIMO officeholders whose desertion from the revolution could be ascertained from published materials or informants. Most of this coatturning came about in the second half of the Revolution, in or after 1969, which indicated the seeming remoteness of victory in the deserters' minds and the worsening of internal squabbles. No picture of FRELIMO desertions would be complete without alluding to the reasons for such extensive disaffection. Guerrilla fighters and cadres in the bush were most apt to switch their allegiance because of military setbacks (such as Gordian Knot), knowledge of infighting within the hierarchy, hardships, desertion of colleagues, promises of amnesty, disbelief in the inflated revolutionary propaganda and disillusionment in the ultimate prospects of victory.9 When Central Committee members or middle-level military figures defected from the Revolution, their reasons owed less to ethnic or regional differences than to personal ambitions being thwarted.60 FRELIMO interpreted this phenomenon as a by-product of the radicalization process; in this view the betrayers were too bound by their bourgeois outlook to accept revolutionary ends.6 In these power struggles, the losers lost all, placing their positions and even their lives in jeopardy. Their options ranged from retiring from politics, going over to the Portuguese or setting up their own competing formations. The proliferation of acronymic, brief-lived movements attested to the popularity of this latter course.62 Eventually a good percentage following this option either crossed over to the Portuguese camp or dropped out of politics. A salient fact that is evident from FRELIMO's party history is that of the twenty-four original members of the first Central Committee formed in 1962 just one remains active in politics—Marcelino dos Santos. Of the forty-four members of the expanded Central Committee at the Second Congress in 1968, there were only half still in political life at the beginning of the independence.

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Table 2

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<th>List of High-ranking Defectors</th>
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<td>Caliante, Zeca Kadavela, Jos&amp; Katur, Manuel Mussa Kavandame, Lazaro Magno, Alexandre Muganga, Alves Murupa, Miguel Namiva, Veronica Napulula, Januario Ribeiro, Casal Simango, Uria Commander of Fourth Sector (south of Zembezi, around Cabora Bassa) Provincial Secretary of Niassa Central Committee member Central Committee member, Provincial Secretary in Cabo Delgado Central Committee member &amp; Provincial Secretary of Zamb~zia Central Committee member &amp; Responsible for recruitment in Tete</td>
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era. These facts present a classic illustration of a consuming its offspring.

Splits and desertions have typified southern African politics for decades and plagued revolutionary formations around the world for millennia. Where Mozambique's Revolution differed from analogous post-World War II liberation conflicts, even in southern Africa, is in the considerable number of apostate revolutionaries who returned to the incumbent's banner. What has been insufficiently appreciated was Lisbon's headway in attracting former rebels. Along with the problems which beset all exiled revolutionaries, Portugal's own Latin politico-cultural influence exercised a potent pull on contemporary Africans. Historically, this hunger for a foreign imprimatur had moved mestigo prazo barons of bygone times to speak Portuguese and to court alien rank, accolades and uniforms. The pulls of conflicting loyalties proved strong enough to divide families; the brother of Joaquim Chissano, independent Mozambique's Minister of Foreign Affairs, for example, served as a lieutenant in the Forgas Armadas. A cynic might be skeptical about the genuineness of identification with Portugal in a Mozambican heart but a glimpse at the black Frenchmg molded by Paris in Francophone Africa is proof of this belief. For those still doubting the sentimental bond between subject and colonizer the fact remains that a guerrilla's reunion with Lisbon afforded a tangible escape hatch and personal fulfillment in an Africanizing bureaucracy and economy to rebels doomed in FRELIMO purges or disillusioned by unremitting hardships and stale promises.

"Psychological recuperation" of revolutionaries meant a displacement of FRELIMO's nationalism cum Marxism and reindoctrination with Portuguese orthodoxy. Under the supervision of the PIDE/DGS, whose main rehabilitation center was housed at Machava prison on the outskirts of the capital, the program worked with both captured and penitent guerrillas. Top FRELIMO members were spared the process. The secret police debriefed prisoners for information and politicized them by "mentalization" techniques similar to those used in the army's elite forces. Discussion sessions, recitation of slogans and literacy instruction formed components of the rehabilitating procedure, which allegedly took two years for hardcore revolutionaries. Official organs purported that vocational training in carpentry, tailoring shoemaking and upholstering made up another phase of restoration.

If effectiveness was measured by restored revolutionaries' contributions, then Portugal scored high. Many former Central Committee members lent their names,
photographs and statements to countermobilizing propaganda. Kavandame, for instance, appeared before Makonde as well as Portuguese audiences. Marupa held news conferences testifying that FRELIMO had been taken over by Communists and that "there was no real nationalism in Mozambique but rather exasperation over racial inequalities." His interviews were published in a widely distributed book, Perspectivas da África Portuguesa, with a pro-Portuguese theme. FRELIMO charged that prisoners in Machava were compelled to write antinationalist articles for the magazine, Ressurgimento. Most certainly the PIDE/DGS incorporated torture into their repertoire in exacting information from prisoners and suspects but not usually, so the scanty evidence suggests, in the conversion of subordinate figures. Besides, not a few rehabilitated nationalists served in the Forgas Armadas. The notorious flechas were comprised of many erstwhile guerrillas. Those who joined the elite contingents were known to fight with a special ferocity against their former comrades and to treat with a savage ruthlessness the villagers among whom they operated as if to prove their new commitment.

As verification of its progress in reinstating adversaries and as part of its public campaign of benevolence, the government released rehabilitated men on national holidays. On July 9, 1972, it gave countrywide publicity to the freeing of some fifteen hundred political prisoners (skepticism lingered on the precise number 108 Revolution and Counterrevolution really set free) in celebration of Mozambique's redesignation from an "overseas province" to a "state of Portugal." Mozambique's most illustrious political detainee, Domingos Arouca, went from a metropolitan jail to a fixed residence in Inhambane district in June 1973. His release can be construed as one of several small telltales of the Caetano government's belated restoration of favorably disposed moderate nationalists.

Lest it be supposed that rehabilitation commanded universal approval within the Portuguese military, not to mention the settler community, the contrary view should be pointed out. Men in the field complained about "rehabilitated" guerrillas returning to FRELIMO. One lieutenant lamented that his platoon captured the same man four times; the last time the officer shot him. Understandably, this recidivism lowered army morale and convinced Portuguese civilians of the government's ineptness. Using this as a justification, certain colonial soldiers executed prisoners out of hand rather than deliver them over for rehabilitation.

A "NATIVE ELITE"

A grave void in Portugal's countermobilization turned out to be its miscalculation in not fashioning soon enough a credible and sizable "native elite" to replace or decrease its colonial presence. Lisbon did take timid steps to Africanize its bureaucracy. It appointed Pedro Baessa, a Mozambican, to be the President of the Nampula Municipal Council (mayor) in 1970 and expanded non-European participation in the fifty-seat Legislative Assembly. In the 1973 elections, the colonial government managed through elections and appointments to secure a narrow nonwhite majority (nineteen Africans, three mestigos, three Indians, one
Chinese and one Goan). Subject to Lisbon's veto, the Legislative Assembly's nominal authority covered legislation (but not enactment of laws) and the expenditure of certain provincial funds. After a centuries-long association with the Portuguese-dominated Catholic Church, Mozambique came by its first non-white bishop (colonial Mozambique had nine bishops) with the appointment of Mgr. Albino Ribeiro de Santana, a Goan from Angola, in February 1972. As so often happened, settlers resented Lisbon's "liberalism," and here and there whites hailed the new bishop with obscenities.

Designed for Mocambican and international approval, these substitutions at the top layer of colonial government and life were surpassed at the lower echelons of society. The colonial administration, banks and companies began recruitment of Mozambicans, raised their salaries and improved their living standards to foster loyalty. But the tardiness and inefficiency sometimes led to sham instead of substance. One deceptive technique begun on a limited basis in early 1972 involved the appearance of well-dressed Africans in aldeamentos posing as the governor of the population. He was introduced as their leader and thus the locality needed no longer to support the guerrillas because it had Mozambican representation in the government.74 Limited and tardy application, not

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to mention the dearth of reliable data, makes it difficult to evaluate this device. It probably sowed doubt and confusion among inhabitants, but where the insurgent infrastructure was entrenched, the pretender never established legitimacy. Nor could he build up an on-the-ground administration. As imperfectly executed as they were, the programs provoked FRELIMO concern.75 Unlike the British in Malaya, the Portuguese never instituted an ambitious training program nor provided proper leadership experiences for local officials to give their administration the necessary competence and human contact with the population. Most of the lowest-level European or Cape Verdean officials could not converse in Mozambican dialects. These administradores de posto (before 1967 called a chefe de posto), who governed in the rural administrative subdivisions, were unforgiving figures, collecting taxes, supervising forced labor, dispensing punishments, detecting disloyalty and often lining their pockets. Their legacy represented a bloody and dark chapter in Mozambique's colonial history. Little wonder they performed as bad instruments of countermobilization among a fearful rural populace. Custom and colonial practice dictated broad tax and administrative powers to regedores, the heavyhanded imposition of which deepened cleavages between ruled and rulers to the advantage of the revolutionary challengers. Traditional chiefs, regedores or village headmen got little competent instruction for a watertight administration, the crux of preventive counterinsurgency in the opinion of more than one expert.76 Unendowed with national resources or mass educational attainments itself, Portugal, moreover, shied away from education for all but a chosen minority. It feared an educated protest. Consequently, no adequate programs were set up to train rapidly significant numbers of local leaders and youths who afterwards could
return home as representatives of the colonial government in the functions of mayors, judges, village officials, policemen, teachers, doctors, nurses, agricultural specialists, youth organizers and labor leaders. Any isolated educational institutions that came into being during the war represented a tardy response and focused on primary schooling and skilled trades. The University of Lourenço Marques, which opened in 1963 with courses in agriculture, engineering, medicine, education and veterinary science, enrolled approximately twenty-five hundred students a decade later, a mere 2 percent of whom were Mozambicans. Prudence should have dictated the launching of elite-formation programs before or in the early stages of the insurgency. Without prepared Mozambican officials, Lisbon forfeited administration to an invisible insurgent structure with which it could not cope. But Lisbon and settlers alike viewed considerable numbers of educated officials or financially independent Mozambican businessmen as potential competitors or prospective rulers. History bore out this fear in one sense when national independence movements in Mozambique along with Angola and Guinea-Bissau began their struggles with leaders schooled in part by missionaries in the territories or by Portugal's universities. Damned if it did or damned if it did not, Portugal (and other colonial powers) endured international pillorying for not living up to "the white man's burden" when it neglected the improvement of its charges. But a colony's education, modernization and urbanization spells the end of the political relationship or at least its modification. Normally, indigenous elites become ambitious or inspired to cut the colonial ties unless held ruthlessly in check by a Soviet-type system. Even a client elite is no guarantee of suppressing or sidetracking an indigenous revolutionary movement judging by the American experience in Vietnam. A foreign-engineered "native elite" carries the stigma of being a traitor to the nation and to the aspirations of its population in the propaganda of the revolutionary party. Such was the fate of Lisbon's one very belated effort at granting legitimacy to a reliable faction. In February 1974, when FRELIMO's southward penetration appeared unstoppable, Caetano gave his blessing to the overt operation of the Grupo Unido de MoZambique (GUMO). A multiracial lobby, it advocated an autonomous Mozambique with economic and political connections to the metropole. Too late and far too minimalist a party platform, GUMO came off as colonialist. But, more important, it lacked time to organize a party structure to compete with FRELIMO. The revolutionary movement's ten-year struggle invested it with the mantle of legitimacy and military power to back up its claims to speak for the Mozambican people. Its exertions outstripped the last-minute preparations for a creature sympathetic to Lisbon.

THE SETTLERS AND THE WAR
Settler mobilization never figured high on Salazar-Caetano's priorities. Nor did settlers ever figure significantly in the defense of Lusitanian sovereignty in Mozambique during the liberation war. Clustered in coastal centers and below the Zambezi, Portuguese colonists in the main were not well placed for direct
confrontation. This stands in sharp contrast to the Angolan landholders who found their farms and plantations in the midst of the 1961 insurrection. Over in the east coast colony, white residents' commitment to the defense of the rural central zone, as described in the previous chapter, went largely untested. Lisbon did not arm them in mass until the beginning of 1974. Before they could prove or disprove their worth, the MFA usurped power, and the farmers' nerve crumbled. Still, from the start settler morale concerned Lisbon which dispatched high-level delegations to uplift spirits. Amidst defensive preparations for impending insurgency in the north, President Témas sailed to Mozambique to assure its inhabitants of Lisbon's determination to defend the colony. When Caetano assumed the reins of office from the stroke-stricken Salazar, he journeyed in 1969 to the ultramar to allay fears that a change in the prime ministership would mean a change in Lisbon's retention posture. Similarly, Costa Gomes early 1974 mission to central Mozambique was staged as a personal reassurance to worried smallholders.

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Again unlike Angolan settlers, the Portuguese of Mozambique never enrolled in great numbers into the OPVDC. Authorized in 1962, when some civilians were taught marksmanship but not organized for two years, the OPVDC stood under army tutelage; top slots were the preserve of Lisbon's officers. One active unit was formed in the capital in 1965 with the missions of preparing for civil emergency and serving as a militia. The 1967 colonial budget allocated barely 5 million escudos to the OPVDC from a total of 728 million escudos. Not much southern settler involvement in the self-defense militia developed from these initial efforts. Patriotically inclined young whites enlisted in the regular or elite formations of the For'as Armadas or the government drafted them for duty. It was generally regarded that settler youths displayed higher motivation than their conscripted counterparts from the homeland. Local settler participation in the OPVDC picked up when the insurgent incidents permeated the upper quadrant of the central districts. But here they behaved more like punitive vigilantes than a disciplined defense force. While most of the white civilians favored tough measures to resist African nationalism, they were not overly active in military resistance before the MFA golpe. One notable exception was the role of Jorge Jardim, who together with his daughters, assisted in parachute training of GEPs and flechas. Another lesser exception to the general settler aloofness arose from the service of a renowned professional hunter, Francisco Daniel Roxo. Formed under the aegis of the Servicos de Acção Psicossocial his autonomous commando unit ferreted out guerrillas in the north while its excesses vexed regular army officers. High colonist morale was one thing to Lisbon, their mobilization into homegrown regiments was quite another. Historically, separatist tendencies have sprung up in spite of the colonial communities' dependence on the metropole for defense against internal and external threats. More germane to modern-day European emancipation from Lisbon's inhibiting bureaucracy first was London's giving
Responsible Government to Rhodesia and then the Rhodesian settlers' abrogation of their colonial status in 1965. Since Rhodesia's grant of virtual dominion status in 1923, Mozambique's settlers have envied its freedom. Lisbon looked on it with suspicion. The Salazar-Caetano regime was determined to ward off a repetition and to retain mastery of Mozambique's destiny in light of rumors of a settlers' bid for sovereignty. That posture accounted in large measure for its lukewarm mobilization of the white community into militia organizations.

Concerns about the reliability of the European constituency were not without foundation. A Jardim-Arriaga separatist state based on a mentalized praetorian phalanx of elite troops conjured up a scenario plausible to FRELIMO even after the general's departure. Both Lisbon and FRELIMO miscalculated the real faults and flaws of the settler community, which was without its own institutions and under the metropole's thumb. Consequently, Lisbon's apprehension of separatismo prevented it from mixing a social cement to bind soldier and settler.

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The European denizens' distance from the shooting in the faraway north contributed to poor relations between them and the army. They did not see the hazards and hardships of the Forgas Armadas. Where the French and especially British expeditionary armies got on well with their colonists, the Portuguese forces drew scorn and scolding from their countrymen. Colonists deprecated their military protectors' martial vigor, courage and reliance on Mozambican manpower. They took a jaundiced view of army programs to improve the lot of Africans and to champion black rights against customary white privileges upsetting traditional race relations. Coddling the enemy, driving up prices in shops and, most of all, not forestalling the spillover of mines and train derailments into the settlers' areas stood high on their list of grievances. One settler after the coup complained: "The army sold us out to the Communists. But then the officers' heart wasn't in the fight for the last three or four years. Their troops repeated what they had said: 'This is not our country. We don't want this war," 82

Sensitive to the necessity of winning Africans to their cause, dedicated officers resented pillorying for their assistance to blacks. They became perplexed by settlerdom's inability to perceive its own best interest in uniting black and white against the nationalists. Small wonder regular officers felt isolated from the very people they had been sent to protect. The Beira residents' storming of the officers' mess right before the MFA coup added insult to injury. Strange as it may appear, those that had most to gain contributed least.

SETTLERS AND COLONATOS
Transporting metropolitan colonists to Mozambique formed a component of Lisbon's occupation schemes since the seventeenth century. It settled sons and daughters as a defense force as well as an instrument to exploit east African resources. Salazar widened the scope of immigrants to use them as agents for transmitting to Mozambicans the Lusitanian values of Catholicism, reverence for private land ownership and peasant industriousness. More than any other undertaking, the Limpopo Valley Immigration Project of the 1950s combined all
these goals. To induce settlers to cultivate the rich black silt, Lisbon paid their passage, offered free land and donated equipment and houses. By 1964, the government had moved 1,550 overseas families into the colonato (settlement) at Chamusca (formerly Guija).84 Eduardo Mondlane correctly assessed the aim of the colonial policy of resettling African farmers near the Limpopo colonato (ninety-seven were allowed in 1961); it strove to mold them in politically conservative ways to deflect the black peasants from nationalist movements bent on transforming the political and economic order.85

Despite historical precedent, Lisbon only gradually returned with renewed attention to the old practice of deploying settlers as a civilian occupation force. Its hesitation was based on the

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unsuccessful defense record of the smallholders in the northern tier who picked up and ran with the opening of the Revolution. Taken by surprise and surrounded, the Angolan plantation owners gave stubborn resistance whereas Mozambican farmers, who had advance warning and preparation, chose discretion over valor. The 1960 census revealed a total of 4,572 Europeans in the three main war-engulfed districts: 1,482 in Cabo Delgado, 922 in Niassa and 2,168 in Tete.86 Sabotage and terrorist incidents depleted these slender ranks to a handful soon after the war began.

Although Lisbon encouraged emigration to all of Mozambique, it concentrated on populating the northern regions but without appreciable results. The intent differed from the colonatos of the Limpopo type, for the newer variety established in war zones incorporated the paramilitary function of defense. Recognition of this counterinsurgency utility was given greater emphasis in Mozambique’s Third National Development Plan (1968-1973) which set aside special funds to enlarge existing colonatos and to install new ones abutting guerrilla-influenced sectors.

Coming from Madeira to find new homes and new lives in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, 178 youths arrived in 1968 to launch what one Lisbon newspaper touted as an extensive resettlement operation.87 Typically, the program soon slowed. General Arriaga called repeatedly for land-holding colonists to block infiltration. Focus and implementation centered on Cabo Delgado and Niassa with less attention on the districts of Zam~bia, Mozambique and Manica. The deteriorating military situation in Tete made it the least feasible for European settlement. For security reasons, Cabo Delgado colonatos were located south of the Messalo River and generally along the main roads.

Begun in 1968, the Montepuez settlement site in Cabo Delgado, as a keystone in the aldeamento network, was allotted top priority. Lisbon donated 250 hectares of land, a house, twenty-five cattle and agricultural advice to each immigrant family. By 1970, it had 150 resident families.88 Bad harvests, poor rainfall and guerrilla incursions in Cabo Delgado yielded less fruitful returns there than in Niassa. In that district, authorities contended that over a two-year period only 3 of the 223 families who had settled in 1970 left their farms.89 East of Vila Cabral, Azorean and Madeiran family groups started arriving in 1968 to take up cultivation of one-hundred-hectare plots at Nova Madeira together with African farmers. Sprawling
and decentralized though it was, Nova Madeira's location away from the Malawi border enabled it to escape with far fewer guerrilla incursions than those colonatos closer to the boundary line. Established in 1971, Mandimba colonato, as an illustration, suffered occasional kidnappings and killings because of its nearness to the insurgents' transfrontier sanctuaries. This proximity could not be offset by an active defensive posture or by tightly grouped houses and support buildings. Here as elsewhere the army distributed arms to settlers. Costs for transportation and installation ranged from eight thousand to twenty thousand US dollars per family depending on the elaborateness of the farmsite and the extent of assistance after

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settlement. By contrast, African resettlement in aldeamentos or even in European colonatos came to a fraction of these expenditures. The heavy outlays touched off a controversy within the government about the advantageousness of slighting Mozambican welfare by stout subsidization of Portuguese immigrants at a time when the colonial government was engaged in campaigns to win African loyalty. What gave poignancy to the debate was the paucity of tangible gains from white resettlement.

The actual number of farming settlers taking up residence in the war-affected north amounted to a trickle of the small stream of metropolitan expatriates arriving in the colony during the conflict. Mozambique's first year of war saw a European population of some one hundred sixty thousand. The next year another 11,276 disembarked. Thereafter the figures dropped off to seven thousand in 1969. As the war situation worsened, they plunged to less than one thousand a year. By late 1972, outflow surpassed inflow. Yet the colony's Junta Provincial de Povoamento (Provincial Council for Settlement) boasted in late 1973 that "about 800 European colonists arrive every month for settlement in colonatos." One South African newspaper at the same time printed a more realistic but still exaggerated estimate of one thousand settlers a year bound for the rural north. All inflated figures to the contrary, the Cabo Delgado goal of a total of eight hundred colonists was never met, and the colonato populace fell below the number of smallholders who lived in the district in 1960. Nor were any resettlement objectives reached anywhere in war-zoned Mozambique. Those who did take up cultivation were subsequently lured by the attractions of better living conditions, higher pay and greater safety to the province's cities or to South Africa and Rhodesia. Of the approximately two hundred settlers in Montepuez vicinity during 1970, fully fifty, or 25 percent, left. What remained cannot be considered of paramilitary worth. Often penned up within their colonatos by night, like the soldiers in their fortified garrisons, the residents' compounds became tiny islands in a stormy sea rather than aggressive bases of Portuguese strength and civilization. Most breached their isolation and allayed their insecurity by accommodation with the guerrillas, hardly a way of denying rural support for the insurgent.

The real competition for immigrants, however, came not from neighboring countries but from distant places. Angola attracted two to three times as many
settlers during the 1960s. Still more competition arose from European countries which beckoned to Portugal's poor in search of higher-paying jobs and to young men in flight from military conscription. Their remittances sent home to families from work in France and West Germany provided a source of much-needed foreign currency to help compensate for Portugal's chronic trade imbalance while they contributed to its inflation.

It is from this dismal demographic perspective that FRELIMO's widely propagandized contention of Portugal's intention to settle one million immigrants in the Cabora Bassa complex should be seen. The revolutionaries' charge grew from an exuberant overstatement by an official at Cabora Bassa into a propaganda sledgehammer in the

Countermobilization 115 skillful hands of FRELIMO.95 Realistically, the displacement of a million peasants to the Zambezi Valley stood well beyond the population and financial resources of a tiny impoverished land on the western rim of Europe. As a natural extension of civilian colonatos and a recognition of its military presence, Lisbon tried intermittently to install exservicemen in colonatos dos militares desmobilizadores. It tried to follow the precedent of the ancient Romans who settled retired legionaries as a reserve corps. Some of the selected sites—the Angonia and Makonde plateaus—were as strategic to guerrilla activity as they were unlikely to appeal to discharged soldiers. Although the program planted a small but undisclosed number of veterans around Porto Amelia (Pemba) and Mueda in Cabo Delgado and Ribau in Mozambique district, it never amounted to a viable counterinsurgency institution.96 Indeed, the enterprise never went much beyond a 1967 pious hope to urie soldiers to take up residency in guerrilla-influenced territory.9

The resettlement of immigrants and demobilized soldiers foundered not only on the African landscape but also in the dictatorial and backward European country from where its citizens voted with their feet to live in securer and richer France and West Germany. What is more, had the venture succeeded, the game may not have been worth tomorrow's candle. An alienation of African land by the white farmers portended a swelling liability to prospective race relations. A case in point involved the Montepuez colonato where homesteaders alienated land from the surrounding inhabitants, thus transforming them into landless labor on European farms.98 Backcountry immigrants adopted the same boss mentality toward Africans as their urban cousins—the very phenomenon Lisbon hoped to legislate away. Inconsistent with its logic of an intended multiracial society, Portugal, nevertheless, spent disproportionate sums on white agriculture but inadequate amounts on Mozambican farming. Explainable as the disparity may have been to the colonial government, which was encouraged by the raised crop output, it boded ill for the reduction of racial antagonisms.99 More basically, if the colonato prescription fell short of developing the countryside or restoring preinsurgency crop production, so it also proved ineffective in curbing guerrilla activity.

SUMMARY
In briefly summing up this array of observations an apparent paradox emerges: Portugal's countermobilization was less successful with its own officers and nationals than with a fair constituency of Mozambicans, at least in the short term. The settler community as an entity abstained from direct involvement and was fractured by a few genuine FRELIMO sympathizers, some advocates of a white-rulled republic and many silent exponents of the status quo as defended by Lisbon. In an additional twist, the insurgent triumph came not on the colony's battlefields but rather in the metropolitan capital's streets where Lisbon's citizens

116 Revolution and Counterrevolution enthusiastically welcomed the MFA takeover. Looking back, the seeming paradoxical outcome of Mozambique's Revolution fades in the realization that the officers' revolt conformed more to the rule of revolution than it set forth an exception to revolutionary tradition. As a foremost student of political upheaval so eloquently put it: no government has ever fallen before attackers until it has lost control over its armed forces or lost the ability to use them effectively . . . and conversely [that] no revolutionists have ever succeeded until they have got a predominance of effective armed force on their side. This holds true from spears and arrows to machine guns and gas, from Hippia to Castro.100

Looked at through a Portuguese lens, the FMA's overturning of the civilian government perpetuated the military's practice of intervention into politics begun in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Under a historiographical microscope the coup confirmed once more that a prolonged and inconclusive (or unsuccessful) war provides one of the likeliest combinations of circumstances for armed forces to take part in political interference or revolution.101

While on the subject of orchestrated motivation, it must be emphasized that Portugal's countermobilization invoked nothing like universal Mozambican allegiance. On the whole the Portuguese observed a news blackout on the war believing that the absence of reportage would promote a drop in guerrilla morale. Instead, Lisbon forfeited the propaganda field to FRELIMO whose version often went officially unchallenged in settler and Mozambican circles as well as in the international arena. General Arriaga's about-face on this policy was but partially effective against Lisbon's attitude. On the debit side and still to be analyzed were the adverse effects of counterterrorism and regroupment of villagers. Portugal's most spectacular (but not singular achievement among colonial powers) lay in indigenizing its armed forces, in particular the high-esprit special units. No shortages of Mozambican recruits hampered the running of Portugal's war machine. But neither the Africanization of its army nor the reliable loyalty of its Mozambican troops enabled it to stamp out or dry up FRELIMO's mobilization. Not unlike previous revolutions, the Mozambican variant approached a civil war pattern before the final curtain. There are lessons to be drawn from the failure of a few small successes to lead to an overall Portuguese victory.
Terror and Counterterror

The wars of people will be more terrible than those of kings.

--Winston Churchill

To put it bluntly, it was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area; otherwise one could never suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the country-side or overthrow the authority of the gentry.

--Mao Tse-tung

Counter-terrorism is, first, telling the truth to the population, and to the enemy, convincing the minds and conquering the hearts.

--Kaulza de Arriaga

Terror, intimidation and coercion were not unique to the Mozambican Revolution. They have occurred wherever men and women have fought. Neither side openly advocated nor publicized its application of civilian-directed violence, although both acknowledged some terrorist acts. Carefully calculated agitational terror has served as a military, political, economic and psychological instrument in the hands of the challengers in revolutions around the world. According to Thomas Perry Thornton, terror can accomplish five objectives: it eliminates opposing forces, builds a movement's morale, advertises a movement among the populace, destabilizes a community by destroying its authority structure and by psychologically isolating its members and provokes the incumbent into self-defeating reprisals or elaborate precautionary defenses which in themselves communicate insecurity to the population. As succinctly put by Trotsky: "the revolution . . . kills individuals and intimidates thousands."

Terror can become a double-edged sword and can cut at the insurgents, if massively or indiscriminately applied. It can turn the population away from the guerrillas' side. Too much insurgent violence could also provoke the incumbent forces to switch from enforcement terror to genocide among the populace friendly to the revolution. International awareness and censure, drummed up by the challenger, can act to restrain such a systematic liquidation if the counterrevolutionaries are sensitive to criticism. As in the case of other revolutions, Mozambique's rural population found themselves caught in the eye of a storm between White terror and Red terror.

Reliable evidence on atrocities is difficult to obtain. The accusations of the Portuguese and FRELIMO must be treated with suspicion, as should those of any interested party. Oftentimes, missionaries, a third source, got their information secondhand and were not disinterested parties but favorably disposed to the guerrillas. Appearances no less deceive, for FRELIMO and the Portuguese dressed their men in the uniforms of their adversary or as villagers with the aim of
performing acts to discredit each other. Lisbon's denial of atrocities rang hollow. And some FRELIMO charges were pure propaganda, expressing horror at Portuguese crimes while maintaining silence about insurgent terrorism against Mozambican and European civilians. As so often happens in guerrilla wars, truth was the first casualty and civilians the final losers.

On the evidence available, the colonial forces were more guilty of indiscriminate killings and mass murders. Selective violence and abduction with a defined set of aims belonged mostly but not exclusively to FRELIMO. Its indiscriminate seeding of landmines often had nonselective consequences. Viewed from this standpoint, there occurred little departure from the forms of violence and counterviolence in other rural revolutions. Viewed from another, the scale of civilian-oriented crimes by the guerrillas and by the counterinsurgents was comparably less than in Southeast Asia. This is partially explainable not only by a smaller and more scattered population in Mozambique but also by a more benign guerrilla policy than, say, that of the Viet Cong. Having less legitimacy and a weaker presence of the colonial government among rural Mozambicans, as opposed to the situation in Vietnam, also accounted for the considerably smaller application of terror in Mozambique. As it was, some FRELIMO defectors asserted that civilian-directed violence figured in their decision to leave the nationalist movement.

Another dissimilarity in FRELIMO's employment of terrorism showed itself in less ingenuity of the Asian sort. Booby traps were planted by guerrillas and Portuguese. The colonial army placed explosives under bridges where FRELIMO soldiers hid, and the guerrillas wired several mines together for series detonations. Additionally, the guerrillas riddled interurban buses with machinegun fire and derailed trains with satchel charges or sometimes by large stones on the tracks. But there were no bicycle frames packed with plastic explosives, no poison injected into wine bottles with hypodermic needles nor grenades lobbed into vehicles stopped for traffic lights as in Indochina. Nearly all revolutionary movements have a sadistic or "thug" element present which perpetrates excessive violence or criminal acts on noncombatants. FRELIMO proved to be no exception by its own admission.

Beyond these thugs, there appears to have been no identifiable, separate bandit faction operating more or less under FRELIMO's wing before the MFA takeover. Afterwards avengers and opportunists, masquerading as guerrillas, took advantage of the ensuing chaos. Real retribution boiled over after the signing of the Lusaka Accord establishing a nine-month Transition Government leading to independence in June 1975. Then, settlers, some deservedly, became fair game for disgruntled Mozambicans.

Although guerrilla killings were comparatively fewer than in the Asian brand of revolutionary warfare, they were more numerous than believed from nationalist statements. The international publicity given to missionary charges of Portuguese atrocities obscured the magnitude of the many mined villagers or individually executed village-level administrators.
GUERRILLA VIOLENCE AGAINST OFFICIALS
FRELIMO selectively assassinated and abducted to complement its mobilization. Often the sole link connecting the population and the colonial apparatus lay in the hands of a regedor or chief. Adopting the techniques of other rural revolutionaries, FRELIMO severed this link either by political conversion or by assassination of recalcitrant local authorities termed “enemies of the Mozambican people.” Won over or removed, the colonial government’s representatives were eliminated from sections of the countryside. The insurgents filled the resulting vacuum with their political arm.

Other targets were unpopular settlers and sometimes even a white administrador de posto. Their elimination promoted the popularity of the Revolution. For the most part, these liquidations were unaccompanied by torture or brutality. Grisly killings by dismemberment or burning gasoline were customarily reserved for informants—those arch foes of revolutionaries whose information can destroy a whole underground network.

Impartial statistics of the total number of murdered or abducted village-level officials are unavailable. FRELIMO literature lists only a handful of assassinations, and then for the express purpose of alleging the participation of villagers in the execution of a corrupt or harsh official. As expected, Portuguese figures, although compiled irregularly for propaganda reasons, registered a significant death rate for its officials. By mid-1973, one glossy Lisbon-based magazine printed that since the beginning of the war nine hundred traditional leaders had been murdered, including some one hundred fumos (chiefs).6 Portuguese allegations of a few guerrilla atrocities were occasionally substantiated by the same missionaries whose testimonies called attention to the crimes of the colonial forces.7

Officials as well as villagers found themselves in a deadly vise. If the army or secret police discovered their complicity with the guerrillas, then the colonial agents punished them. In spite of Lisbon’s psycho-social warfare, it could not match the diffused but continuous mental and physical pressures exerted by an indigenous revolutionary underground. Their hearts in survival rather than ideology, some chiefs kept a foot in each camp by rendering homage to the Portuguese while sustaining the guerrillas. Aware of the exposed position of not a few officials in contested zones, FRELIMO cadres accepted secret declarations and clandestine material aid.8 Conforming to Marxist revolutionary patterns, FRELIMO’s strategy called for using chiefs and members of the colonial economic and civil machinery during the war and then destroying them as classes afterwards. An aggressive social egalitarianism in a brave, new world of tomorrow thus justified their eradication in today’s.

For this reason, loyal chiefs and officials lived a parlous existence without adequate army protection in the course of the Revolution. Execution programs boomeranged in certain communities, notably among the Makua, where local leaders commanded legitimacy and loyalty through tradition and kinship. Additionally, the Corpo de Milicias das Regedorias (African units which
furnished protection to chiefs and other civilians) proved more effective than in other parts of the country. As the war heated up in the central districts, the guerrillas moved more from politicization to execution as the most expedient method of destabilizing the colonial administration. This accounts for the increase in local authorities’ deaths, and helps to explain the desperation of Portuguese reprisals. During the months before the Wiriyamu incident, Caetano later wrote that nearly one hundred Mozambican officials had been assassinated.9 

The Battle for Central Mozambique gave rise to the largest colonial massacre of the war. Missionaries charged Portuguese forces with the mass murder of some four hundred persons around the village of Wiriyamu nineteen miles south of Tete town. These accusations burst into the international media during mid-July 1973 and fixed world attention on Mozambique for nearly a month. On the morrow of the Wiriyamu crisis, there came to light other missionary charges of smaller-scale slaughters.10 Bearing the earmarks of a contrived counterpropaganda maneuver, Lisbon alleged a FRELIMO massacre in the village of Nhacambo in Tete. These controversies signaled that violence had long since spread to the population at large.

GUERRILLA VIOLENCE AND CIVILIANS
FRELIMO killed and maimed Mozambican civilians for political objectives, as have other revolutionaries. Like selective assassination or abduction of officials, violence can contribute to breaking the tie between the people and their government by sowing insecurity among the villagers who turn away from the incumbent regime because of its failure to protect them against an elusive but ubiquitous band of guerrillas. Terrorism (and counterterrorism) then shrinks the room available for corporate or individual neutrality. Too much political violence can backfire. Such was the case in the Greek Civil War where the Communist insurgents drove over half a million potential adherents into urban areas away from their reach, paving the way for defeat.11 

Portuguese spokesmen dwelled on what they perceived as the death-squad politics of their adversaries. They took the position that the guerrillas committed more atrocities among the populace than they launched raids on military targets and that for every soldier killed one hundred Mozambican civilians met death at the hands of the guerrillas.12 They spoke of villagers in Sofala district being “psychologically unbalanced by terror.”13 True enough, villagers, there and elsewhere, showed signs of disorientation, wandering aimlessly or fearfully from sites of alleged atrocities. Cases not only of kwashiorkor but also of actual starvation were noted by European doctors in Tete town and Songo from 1971. Families sold goats and cattle upon which they depended and then fled. One account related that by the end of 1971 at least three thousand Ngoni from the Angonia Plateau of northeast Tete and Nhungwe people from central Tete took flight northward and settled in Malawi.14 Lisbon's allegations notwithstanding, it would be false to ascribe all terror tactics to FRELIMO and it would be an oversimplification to assess the basis of all
FRELIMO's popular endorsement growing out of a gun barrel. From a complex combination of conviction and incentive as well as intimidation, Mozambicans, as ordinary folk in other rural rebellions, cooperated with the insurgents. FRELIMO did strike, nevertheless, at the rural population in colonially dominated zones not so much to gain their support as to shake their passivity or loyalty to Portugal. The most conclusive illustrations of civilian-directed violence occurred in the shellings of the scattered self-defense villages and aldeamentos. Labeled by FRELIMO as "concentration camps" because of the barbed wire encircling their defenses, aldeamentos came under mortar and rocket fire so as to discredit the Portuguese military for its inability to guarantee safety to the residents. These bombardments, ineffectual as they often were, diminished whatever amenities collectivized life and inadequate Portuguese resources could offer. Along with hectic and frequently inaccurate rocketings, the guerrillas planted mines on paths from aldeamentos to fields, firewood sites and watering places. FRELIMO countercharged that landmine casualties resulted from Portuguese tactics to discredit it. An acute shortage in mines for the Forgas Armadas makes this accusation doubtful. Besides, Lisbon's best interests, so its arguments ran, revolved around ensuring the population's safety, not endangering it. FRELIMO argued contrarily. It posited that colonial troops killed one person or massacred one village and then brought others to witness the site saying that the atrocity had been done by a group of guerrillas of hostile ethnic composition. It is impossible to decide the worth of all these allegations and counterallegations, but they hint at the deadly and suspicious atmosphere of rural life.

The Portuguese-operated Mozambique Services for the Centralization and Coordination of Information reported that from 1964 to 1973 the guerrillas killed 689 and seriously wounded 1,625 Mozambican civilians. It contended, moreover, that FRELIMO forces abducted a further sixty-five hundred villagers to haul supplies or to press gang into military training. Table 3 shows the Portuguese count of guerrilla assaults on Mozambicans by year. Given the possibility that the figures approximate civilian violence, they reflect the heavy insurgent activity in 1965-66, the slowdown in the late 1960s and the rising intensity of incidents in the early 1970s. Judging by guerrilla warfare standards in Asia, the casualties were not particularly high. Mozambique's scale of violence was patchy when compared with South Vietnam, for instance, where from 1957 to 1965 estimates placed the number of assassinations at 7,500 and abductions as 23,400 villagers, officials, schoolteachers and health administrators.

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Guerrilla defectors stated that their comrades accelerated civilian bloodshed with the deep thrust into the country. Colonial army communiques confirmed the murderous trend. From July 1973 onwards assaults on aldeamentos reached five or six in a single night. According to the Portuguese interpretation, the guerrillas resorted to more terrorism for three objectives: the imperative to beat the filling of the artificial lake behind Cabora Bassa, the necessity of destroying the aldeamentos that secluded the people from easy nationalist contact and the need to provoke colonial retaliation as a method of expanding grass-roots support in constituencies where they lacked the same solid base of loyalty as enjoyed among the Makonde or Chewa. The cycle of provocation followed by reprisal proved effective. FRELIMO tracts are replete with testimonies of guerrilla converts who allied themselves to the Revolution because of Portuguese mistreatment to kith or kin. As in the Communist tradition in China and Yugoslavia, FRELIMO engaged in operations calculated to incite the foreign occupiers into harsh retribution.

It was in this environment of bloody action and reaction that two of the major unsolved terroristic incidents of the war happened—the killings at Nhacambo and the destruction of the coastal munitions steamer Angoche. The Angoche was found burned out, abandoned and adrift off the northern Mozambican coast in late April 1971. Since FRELIMO spokesmen declined responsibility for the gutted ship and missing crew, suspicions fell on the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), a Lisbon-based revolutionary cell opposed to the colonial wars and skilled in sabotage. Authorities in Nacala arrested three men in connection with the high seas affair but without shedding much public light on the mystery. Soon after the puzzle attending the ship's fate was overshadowed by developments on the land itself.

Sharing a similar uncertainty as to the identity of the perpetrators was the reported massacre at Nhacambo (Nyakamba). In the world-publicized incident at Wiriyamu, Portuguese investigators near Wiriyamu in the village of Chawola admitted "unnecessary civilian deaths" in an army assault. The Portuguese army assumed responsibility for a fraction of the fifty-three dead at Chaowla by charging that the villagers had been used as protective shields by the guerrillas against advancing colonial troops. Neither side, however, accepted responsibility for the razing of Nhacambo village. Located in Tete, it suffered a purported FRELIMO raid on January 5, 1974, leaving seventeen dead and thirty wounded. The Portuguese accused the guerrillas of massacring the inhabitants for withholding support. FRELIMO denied the charge. One missionary advanced an explanation where the OPVDC committed the atrocities and blamed the revolutionary movement. It is difficult, as yet, to decide the worth of these allegations and counterallegations. In a war where each opponent impersonated the other in uniform and technique so as to discredit them, the truth may never be known to outsiders.
VIOLENCE TOWARD SETTLEMENTS

Any analysis, however brief, of FRELIMO's molesting settlers must take into account yet again not merely the absence of accurate data but also the abundant complexities facing a revolutionary movement engaged at once in a colonial war for independence, a racial confrontation and a social revolution for a new society. In short, the ordering of these priorities placed restraints on FRELIMO's actions. An all-out assault on European settlers, although popular with xenophobic Mozambicans, would have opened FRELIMO to international criticism for "black racism." Moreover, it would have undercut its claims to be fighting for freedom against a "fascist Salazarian colonialism," not the Portuguese people.2

A direct attack on foreigners, while contrary to FRELIMO's growing Marxist analysis which detected class enemies not racial ones, was in line with the xenophobia of Chinese Communists who slaughtered European and American traders and missionaries alike. Instead, Mozambican revolutionaries often went to great lengths to cultivate European missionaries by correct behavior toward them and their African devotees. One mission, Unango in Niassa, suffered a raid. As a Catholic mission station reputedly making profits among the Muslim Yao, the punitive visitation was viewed by an Anglican missionary as a popular act.5

Generally, FRELIMO abstained from terrorist forays in towns and cities, for fear of alienating potential white and black adherents. Without proper politicization from a secure underground, urban populations were ill-informed of the Revolution's goals.26 Violence under these circumstances may have worked against FRELIMO. Equally important in the decision against generalized urban terrorism was the belief that it would have placed in jeopardy its inchoate town infrastructure in the same way the Battle of Algiers damaged the FLN's recruitment and informational channels. Minor exceptions took place such as in the shellings of Porto Amelia (Pemba) and Palma or in the explosion of hand grenades in Tete town. No small part in the determination to forgo systematic sabotage and assassination derived from the incompleteness of a secret organization in urban centers. Within the FRELIMO hierarchy loomed a recognition of Portuguese strength in urban areas and in an aversion to the corrupting influences city life had on cadres.27 Therefore, Lisbon very definitely controlled the towns with armies of informers and agents ready to sell out the Revolution.

Against rural settlers, FRELIMO's approaches altered to adapt to political conditions. Sustained strikes on backcountry whites from the onset of the Revolution could have multiplied its foes, perhaps driving them into determined resistance like their Angolan counterparts during the 1961 revolt. Just as Portugal sought to divide African opposition and draw Mozambicans to its flag, so, too, revolutionaries strove to make the war nonracial in order to reduce their opponents. This objective dictated a normally benevolent posture toward homesteaders. Another priority demanded limited amounts of settler violence so as to "pursue correct relations with the peasantry." Firing on whites, especially
unpopular ones, impressed black opinion. Dutch missionaries around Inhaminga, for example, wrote that one victim of machine-gunning was known to have treated Africans harshly.28 Other white deaths resulted from randomly ambushed and mined roads.

White farmers, traders and plantation owners represented "class enemies" who exploited the rural masses. But they did not constitute a classic landlord class in the Asian or European sense, because their numbers were small and land ownership in much of northern Mozambique was commonplace. Nonetheless, their exactions in sharp practices, forced labor and restricting African cultivation to cash crops (mostly cotton), burdened the agrarian populace.29 Scattering the poor cultivators and plantation laborers from European production dislocated the economy and increased the number of available recruits for the guerrilla army. It also worsened the misery of the rural community. Scattering the farmers and plantation owners from their holdings allowed for less hindered mobilization of the population who became convinced of the guerrillas' efficacy in rooting out their oppressor. Briefly, it dramatically demonstrated FRELIMO's resolve to liberate them. The almost inevitable Portuguese reprisals further cemented the bond between people and revolutionaries. Aside from individual acts of revenge against Europeans at the Revolution's start, violent attacks directed toward whites (not accidental mine blasts) seemed to have been coordinated with political aims.

During the first year of the conflict, guerrillas moved against the fruit and cotton plantations inland from Mocimboa da Praia, forcing them to close down for the duration of the war. A printed expression of this antisettler policy appeared in the October 1964 issue of Mozambique Revolution, the editorial of which proclaimed that war "is the only means by which to convince the Portuguese people in Mozambique to get out."'30 In another revolutionary publication, it was described that "the militants of FRELIMO committed acts of sabotage to demoralize the Portuguese population and weaken the colonial economy."f31 Although the guerrillas wanted settlers to withdraw, they were not needlessly hard on smallholders. Thus, when in late 1965 the farmers in the Vila Cabral vicinity requested the rebels to refrain temporarily from mining the road to Manpula so they could evacuate safely, the guerrillas held off for a week.32 There is other evidence that they distinguished between smallholders farming their own plot and companies or plantations coercing African labor.33 A further explanation why some settlers escaped harm owes more to their accommodation than to the Forgas Armadas' protection. Most of the rich farmland on the coast of Lake Malawi became unsafe for settlers unless they were unarmed and paid a "tax" to the guerrillas. Those remaining around Vila Cabral came to an understanding to keep specified roads unmined on market days. On each journey to town, the white smallholders dropped a sack or two of potatoes at designated points for the rebel soldiers.34 Over in Tete when the colonial forces abandoned Vila Vasco da Gama, the guerrilla cadres gave the shopkeepers a receipt for their goods redeemable after the Revolution. Down in Sofala district insurgents
confiscated items from European shops promising to pay for them after liberation.35 After the Lusaka Accord, these forced taxes and appropriations were passed off as voluntary subscriptions by anxious settlers desperate to establish credibility as long-time well-wishers of the Revolution. In some cases white farmers, on the other hand, got on better with the FRELIMO infiltrators than with colonial soldiers who seized the settlers' stores and took over the farmers' fields to grow their own vegetables or to clear them for football.36

Unpinning the colonial economy also figured in FRELIMO's assaults on Europeans. When plantations and farms closed, it added debts to an already adverse Mozambican balance of payments deficit by reducing exports and requiring imports of foodstuffs. More and more, the south, in particular Lourenço Marques, grew to rely on agricultural products from Rhodesia and South Africa.37 Ambushing railway and roadway transports from Malawi and Rhodesia to the seaports of Beira and Nacala amounted to another variant of sabotaging the colony's economy which so heavily depended on transit and port fees. Tourism was an additional vital "invisible export" linked to Rhodesian commerce and to European deaths. Beira's beaches attracted thousands of white tourists each winter. Tourism more than transport fell off as a consequence of the violence. The guerrillas' most spectacular act of terrorism took place in the famed Gorongosa Game Park where they shot and killed a renowned Spanish surgeon, Dr. Angel Garaizabal Bastos, on his hunting trip in July 1973. His death and subsequent activities of the guerrillas, who operated from craggy, forested highlands on the park's periphery, sent the safari hunters packing for the Central African Empire and depressed the tourist trade in central Mozambique. FRELIMO pointed out that it could have multiplied white deaths when it raked with machine-gun fire the Chitengo Rest Camp.38 But the guerrillas had accomplished their objective of choking off the flow of twenty thousand tourists a year to the game park, and were now confronted with a rapid build-up of Portuguese soldiers in the park.

Demoralization of the settler community provided yet another reason for guerrilla assaults on non-Mozambicans. This end required careful calculation and timing, because too much civilian terrorism could have stiffened settler resistance and too little would have spared Lisbon pressure from Portuguese residents. After the first flush of revolutionary enthusiasm and initial success in sweeping away all but bits and pieces of the northernmost settlerdom, violence toward whites declined. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that FRELIMO operated in remote lands never widely populated by whites or in regions recently emptied of Europeans who feared the insurgents. Those settlers hugging their plots and houses took precautions or struck accommodations with the local maquisards.

Until three months before the MFA coup, known casualties among the expatriate community were almost negligible since the opening burst of antiwhite acts. Prior to the white abductions and murders in the central districts in early 1974, neither FRELIMO nor Lisbon made public the actual number of Europeans put to death.
by the insurgents. They shared a common interest in withholding figures but for distinct motives. FRELIMO, as suggested above, wanted to divide its opponents and escape charges of reverse racism. The Lisbon government hoped to continue and expand the trickle of emigrant farmers going to assist pacification. For its part, the colonial military command suppressed information on white deaths out of concern for its image as protectors of the population. By computing available reports of settler deaths from revolutionaries, Portuguese and independent recorders, an estimated number of less than 150 settlers met death at the hands of premeditated guerrilla assaults before the army toppled Caetano. Compared to the conservative estimate of four hundred Portuguese killed alone in the 1961 Angolan uprising or the thirty-two European deaths in the much smaller scale "Mau Mau" rebellion in Kenya, the Iberian settlers fared reasonably well in view of the prolonged and sometimes bitter nature of the fighting.39 After the Lusaka Accord, whites paid a heavy toll for black frustration and revenge.40 When FRELIMO resorted to anti-European terrorism on the Chimoio Plateau at the beginning of 1974, it did so for the clearly conceived ends of depressing European confidence and breaking down law and order.41 It shattered the myth of white invulnerability. One can only speculate on whether in its settler-directed violence FRELIMO fell under the influence of Zimbabwe partisans. When in December 1972 the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU) reopened attacks after a four-year lapse, it struck from westernmost Mozambique into the northeast triangle of Rhodesia at isolated white farmhouses and Europeans on country roads. No speculation, however, is needed on the ultimate effectiveness of the Mozambican guerrillas' antisettler assaults in calling into question the ability of the Forgas Armadas to ensure the safety of Portuguese colonists or in eroding the morale of the army as well as that of the civilians.

A small number of European deaths achieved both aims. In the settlers' view the most shocking was the stabbing deaths of the wife and son of a farmer named Diaz. Publicly FRELIMO denied the murders; privately, its representatives disclosed that they had been a mistake.42 The guerrillas meant to kill Diaz himself. To justify the contradiction in its policy of professed safety for unarmed Portuguese civilians, FRELIMO spokesmen argued that the farmer had been a PIDE/DGS agent or, in another version, an armed member of the local militia.43 Additional settler deaths and kidnappings were not long in coming. White farms were destroyed and their vehicles raked with gunfire around the towns of Vila Pery and Vila Manica near the Rhodesian border. FRELIMO attributed these incidents to PIDE/DGS forces led by onetime guerrilla commander Zeca Caliante who set out to sully the Revolution.44 Angered by what they considered the army's softness, more than one thousand Portuguese demonstrators, as noted above, protested in the streets of Beira and the two border towns. On the Beira-Malawi railway an ambush cost the life of a white conductor in the wake of which his fellow workers struck and residents of Inhaminga blocked passage of
northbound trains. South of Beira on the road to the capital, three European truck drivers were gunned down and their bodies mutilated. This preying on Europeans and their property represented an astute application of violence. As the Lisbon coup brought no immediate cessation in the colonial army's operations, FRELIMO continued its antisettler terror along with its stepped-up strikes on military targets. Shrewdly, it recognized the timeliness of persisting in its terrorist offensive, if only on a small scale. Rumor was that the guerrillas intended to obliterate the colonists. Rumor was wrong but it served as a potent stimulant to fear—a fear bred from the belief among whites that Mozambicans could be inclined to settle old scores. Despite FRELIMO's international assurances and those of its liberal foreign sympathizers that the Revolution was against Portuguese colonialism, not Portuguese people, the guerrilla murders spoke louder to anxious settlers. Mozambican whites feared, much more than outsiders can appreciate, that even if an antiwhite impulse did not motivate the revolutionary hierarchy, selective terrorism could give rise to a generalized onslaught on them by the African population.

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Apprehension had given way to anxiety and then assumed dimensions of panic. Fear of FRELIMO's radicalization to a full-fledged Marxist movement gripped the local Portuguese along with an hysteria about a reign of terror as had accompanied independence in the Congo (now Zaire). Since the assassination of the cosmopolitan Mondlane, whose partial Portuguese education, academic achievement and white American wife assured him a kind of acceptability and even admiration in the Portuguese community, white residents had grown uneasy with the spread of the war. Mondlane's replacement with Machel, a far more revolutionary and African personality, had done nothing to allay their deep anxieties.45 European deaths at the end of the war only confirmed their forebodings. Panic-stricken, the rural settlers rushed to the coast and by the first week in May they left Mozambique at a rate of one thousand a week.46 Their departure cost the independence government heavily in skills and capital. The size of the European exodus possibly surprised and alarmed FRELIMO. Although it had the means to inflict a hundredfold civilian atrocities, it suspended civilian-oriented violence and handed over fugitives to Portuguese authorities. Realizing the indispensability of settlers to managing the economy, the revolutionaries strove to display their political maturity and capability to govern a decolonized Mozambique. Even so, the guerrilla-instigated terror and the unrestrainable black violence, which came in its wake, made FRELIMO's political triumph an economic Pyrrhic victory. While moving to ensure the settlers' safety, the new FRELIMO government's nationalization of foreign property (and even the services of doctors, teachers and morticians) hastened the European decampment. The disappearance of the settlers shook the rivets out of the postindependence economy.

COUNTERTERRORISM

Just as limited amounts of calibrated violence can aid an
insurgent in political mobilization, so, also, an incumbent's excessive and imprudent mistreatment or reprisals can assist the rebels to militate the population against the government. Such was the case in Mozambique. Again and again, FRELIMO converts pointed to Portuguese acts as the prime factor for their decision.7 NonPortuguese observers substantiated this assertion.48 Following the 1961 Angolan revolt, the authorities in Mozambique toughened coercion and intimidation striving to stamp out a sister rebellion before it began in the east coast colony. The government, for example, unexpectedly executed in May 1961 chief Zimtambira Chiusse from the Ang6nia region. He had been under surveillance or in detention since 1955 for seditious remarks and activities.49 By July 1961, still more than three years prior to the Revolution, a jittery colonial government forcefully resettled groups of Makonde villagers away from the Rovuma River. Troops stationed in the north dropped napalm on deserted villages to impress the locals of their firepower.50 Dating from the preinsurgency period, ill-considered relations with humble folk, intimidation

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and political murder formed a component of Portugal's counterterrorism. The Revolution swelled their frequency.
Torture of suspected rebels or their sympathizers usually 51 accompanied police interrogation but soldiers were also implicated. The authenticity of massacres and tortures have been substantiated from charges by missionaries, admissions by individual colonial soldiers and confirmation by official army reports along with FRELIMO accusations so as to dissolve Lisbon's denials. Until the coup's aftermath, it remained Portugal's policy to deny that torture and murder were more than exceptional occurrences. Public discussion of the subject was interpreted as an attempt to sabotage the war in Africa. Privately, officials admitted the unwisdom of victimizing the common folk for guerrilla acts.52 What follows, instead of a listing of bloody deeds, is an examination which focuses on how violence, systematic or random, figured in Portugal's war effort.

ATROCITIES AND THE FORQAS ARMADAS
The evidence available suggests that much of the soldiers' maltreatment of Mozambicans resulted from unplanned, indiscriminate and retaliatory initiatives. Hatred, sadism and personal emotions account for sudden macabre outbursts unleashed after lengthy encounters with an elusive enemy, ever-present landmines and an alien land. The Anglican missionary John Paul, for example, passed on a story in which an angered colonial patrol shot its Nyasa guide for not locating a guerrilla camp.53 Another instance of explosive frustration ensued with the murders of suspected mine layers and harborers of guerrillas in the vicinity of Mocumbura village along the Tete-Rhodesian border in May 1971. This was a retaliation by Portuguese and allied Rhodesian troops for the deaths of their comrades.54 More coolly, Portuguese troops, in a FRELIMO version, also executed family members of a son who was presumed to have joined the guerrillas.55 Reportage of these types of murderous conduct, particularly from
missionaries, could be multiplied; but this is not the place to give a summary history of the shoot-from-the-hip violence of individuals or small groups. These killings, although explainable as desperate acts committed by desperate men in the heat, fatigue and tensions of combat, point to the inescapable conclusion that elements of the Foroas Armadas were poorly schooled in the realities of revolutionary warfare where reprisals serve the rebels' cause. Venting their anger or racism on suspect villagers by tossing grenades into crowded huts neither proved effective in halting hit-run skirmishes nor endeared the colonial forces to the rural population. Here as elsewhere, slackness in the regulation of direction and performance of field units posed grave problems in the command structure; but their exist strong indications pointing at times to specific orders to use limited extermination and torture which were issued by--or at least with the knowledge of--officers and officials. How far up the chain of command this applies, whether it was a verbally

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The role of the hard-nosed governor of Tete, Colonel Armindo Videira, in condoning and ordering terror seems more certain. A secret officers' report, commissioned by Caetano and later made public, acknowledged that the commander of Tete, whose position combined civil and military duties, gave the express orders which resulted in the most noted massacre in Portugal's overseas conflicts--the Wiriyamu incident. According to the testimonies of the Burgos Fathers, a Spanish order with a mission near the gutted village, an estimated four hundred Mozambicans (they listed eighty-six names) at Wiriyamu and surrounding villages were allegedly slaughtered on December 16, 1973. News of the incident transpired in the international press (after circulating in narrowly read church magazines) with the printing of Father Adrian Hasting's letter in The Times on July 10, 1973. This was one week before Caetano's visit to London to help mark the six-hundred-year anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Not unexpectedly, Lisbon countercharged that the release had been timed to disrupt and embarrass the Caetano state visit. Large demonstrations protesting Portuguese colonialism did in fact punctuate his heavily guarded tour. Meanwhile, spokesmen in Lisbon and Mozambique categorically denied any massacre at Wiriyamu (referred to as Wiliamento) while permitting journalists to investigate the site of an abandoned village in Tete. Later an officer's report divulged that white and black troops of the 6th Commando Group were dispatched by helicopter to the Wiriyamu vicinity with explicit orders from the Tete military commander to "mop up the land and kill any
living soul, for the area was 100 per cent terrorist." On August 18, the Portuguese National Defense Department issued a statement based on its inquiry, admitting "isolated units, contrary to express orders received, had, in at least one case, carried out acts of unjustified violence at another point of the region." Two days later a journalist somewhat sympathetic to Portugal, Bruce Loudon, wrote in London's Daily Telegraph that army investigators at Chawola (or Chuwala), a small village near Wiriyamu, found "no acts of brutality or unnecessary deaths except at Chawola." Here the army investigators counted fifty-seven decomposed corpses whose deaths reportedly occurred when advancing colonial troops opened fire on guerrillas using the inhabitants as shields. Portugal announced its intention of disciplining the offenders, but no stringent penalties came of the disclosures of "unnecessary deaths" at Chawola. It dismissed Colonel Videira and returned the joint governorship and military command to separate positions as had been the case before mid-1971 when Arriaga unified them for coordination in Tete.

Prior to the international stir, FRELIMO broadcasted no report of the Wiriyamu killings, casting doubts on its intelligence network. A pronounced African composition of the strike force has also raised speculation as the reason for its silence. Otherwise, it would have to admit that Portugal had succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of blacks in elite units and, most important, that they committed atrocities against their fellow Africans. Silence about Portuguese atrocities never featured as a rebel hallmark, and FRELIMO subsequently charged colonial forces with six largescale massacres and the deaths of 670 persons occurring before the Wiriyamu sensation. One systematic application of officially sanctioned violence against noncombatants consisted of the strafing of trails and water holes and the napalming of guerrilla forest bases. The objective of the air raids, minuscule in comparison to American saturation bombing in Vietnam, misfired in part. Like lower levels of terror, the airborne variety was intended to shake support for the Revolution. Lisbon charged that only the guerrillas' force and threats compelled the villagers to stay close to FRELIMO bases. According to the Portuguese interpretation, FRELIMO sought to foster solidarity between partisans and people in this way. In Lisbon's view, the application of bombing provided one method of disrupting both FRELIMO's control over the base people and the villagers' cooperation with the insurgents. The outcome failed to meet all the colonial army's expectations. Villagers did forsake the guerrillas but many streamed across the border seeking refuge, not Portuguese protection. A more cold-blooded employment of civilian elimination was said to have ensued in the villages on the Inhaminga Plateau. This neighborhood had been a breeding ground of pro-FRELIMO sympathies well before the outbreak of guerrilla sabotage. A missionary reported an active PIDE/DGS repression there as early as 1967. Over a period from August 1973 to March 1974, when the Dutch missionaries of the Sacred Heart left the area to protest the mass murders and church silence, soldiers and secret police were charged with
nearly two hundred Mozambican deaths. According to the missionaries' account, called the "Diary of Inhaminga," Portuguese forces applied intimidation, torture and mass killings in order to force resettlement of the population into aldeamentos, to immobilize the local Sena support for the guerrillas and to retaliate for rebel sniping at the Trans-Zambesian Railway.66

The crescendo of massacre charges coming from various missionary orders, Portuguese churchmen and even candid army officers, who admitted that their forces killed "three or four here, three or four there," indicated a sharply rising curve of civilian violence. What began as, more or less, selective maltreatment by individuals acting on their own initiative ended as prevalent counterterrorism in some instances ordered by officers for express political objectives. From the beginning of the conflict there existed a marked indifference toward Mozambican life. One early practice instituted by Portuguese soldiers entailed marching

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Mozambican men and boys down roads presumed mined.67 Not only did human mine detectors, when they survived, often become guerrilla converts or sympathizers but also this placing the lives of rural males in jeopardy held general as well as private significance for the Forgas Armadas. Put briefly, it was not a long step from the conditioning of human mine detectors to that of participating in direct violence against villagers suspected of aiding the guerrillas. The harmful consequences that hate campaigns, mass murder and indiscriminate counterterrorism engender in counterinsurgent forces themselves have been commented on by more than one expert.68 They embrace the lowering of morale, the increasing discipline problems, the projecting of a wrong impression of the army and government on the people, the stiffening of guerrilla resistance from fear of the incumbent's atrocities and the slow-mending aftereffects from a war of counterterrorism. Corresponding side effects of colonial violence manifested themselves in Mozambique where the level of civilian bloodshed surpassed that in Guinea-Bissau or Angola except the reprisals in the aftermath of its 1961 uprising.69

Contrary to the most elementary counterrevolutionary principles of eradicating popular grievances, the Portuguese persisted in harnessing forced labor in war zones, if not in the urban and southern sectors where it could be detected by foreign observers. Dragooned African workers built military projects and constructed aldeamentos. As a detested hallmark of Portugal's rule in Africa, forced labor had long been criticized by foreign humanitarians and even a few Portuguese officials. The 1962 Labor Code specifically outlawed fraudulent and coercive methods to recruit African workers. However, missionaries witnessed the continuance of the practice to the end of the war in contested zones.70

Lesser lapses in military discipline also blunted the edge of Portugal's hearts-and-minds programs. Soldiers and milicias appropriated villagers' chickens, livestock and furniture. Avarice was not just a Portuguese vice, however. The guerrillas also made forced food and revenue collections from terrified villagers. Further, they rifled the pockets of dead colonial soldiers for money to spend in the
canteens. Assaulting local women was another offense committed by both sides. Hut-burning and crop destruction were used to compel villagers to relocate in aldeamentos when peaceful persuasion failed. Southern Tete and the northern quadrant of the two central districts saw the most frenzied and coercive means utilized to force resettlement. A scorched-earth approach, designed to lay waste to shelter and sustenance for the guerrillas, accompanied village regroupment. Guerrilla mines and assassinations aggravated the suffering of the small people trapped in the exchange of fire. Such turmoil brought about vast wastelands devoid of most inhabitants. They fled to neighboring states, moved to aldeamentos or lived hand-to-mouth in the mato. Thousands of Makonde, Yao and Nyasa, as already indicated, migrated to Tanzania and Malawi from Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. Western Tete became nearly deserted as the Ngoni and Nhungwes retreated northward to Zambia and Malawi. Other groups took refuge in higher terrain relatively inaccessible to land-bound soldiers. There they existed under pitiful conditions or subordinated themselves to other guerrilla bands for direction. Government and army spokesmen explained that FRELIMO drove the local people into the mato or terrified them about fictitious Portuguese punitive raids so as to impress them more easily as carriers and auxiliaries. The truth of each contending claim cannot be verified. But this much seems certain: both sides were guilty of excesses against a frightened and disoriented rural population squeezed in the middle of bitter fighting.

THE SECRET POLICE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Inasmuch as the Portuguese secret police played a central role in organized intimidation, torture and intelligence gathering, a summarized discussion of its origins and imprint seems necessary. Modeled on the political police of Nazi Germany and trained by its experts in the 1930s, the Iberian counterpart steadily accrued power until it defied at times the state and armed forces themselves. Its ultrasecretiveness and pervasive powers made it a virtual state within a state. Its cruel and sophisticated tortures, along with other forms of physical and psychological pressures, did more than cement Salazar's authoritarian rule for decades, it paralyzed the elite political opposition and atomized the underlying population. Realizing its effectiveness, Salazar raised the number of PIDE/DGS inspectors in the African colonies during the 1950s to suppress nationalist stirrings. Wartime conditions and Lisbon's apprehensions nourished its already considerable powers overseas. In time Mozambique's Policia de Seguranca P6blica (the public security police--PSP), which earlier had commanded a larger budget and larger force than the PIDE/DGS, became an auxiliary arm of the secret police. The secret police used the PSP's facilities, such as its prison wings, undercover agents and communication channels and sometimes employed the regular police to do its dirty work of arrest and torture. Uncovering information about the rebel infrastructure in war torn districts had been the prerogative of the military; but gradually the PIDE/DGS's intelligence-
gathering functions broadened. During 1967 several new posts were authorized, including one at Nova Freixo and another at Montepuez. Prison and detention facilities were enlarged or erected with the principal ones being the Lourenço Marques Industrial Penitentiary, Central Prison in Machava, Mabalane Prison Work Camp in Gaza district, Beira Central Prison and Ibo Island Detention Center. Together they may have incarcerated as many as ten thousand inmates. The secret police expanded its existing network of informers from Portuguese settlers, foreign company employees and Mozambicans to include former prisoners from its Center for Rehabilitation at Machava. As aldeamento guards or junior-level officials, former rebels picked up much information that fell into the hands of the dreaded secret police.

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The PIDE/DGS also benefited by a close working relationship with both the Rhodesian Special Branch and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Special Branch inspectors and BOSS agents, for example, were sometimes present when their Portuguese counterparts interrogated suspects. The neighboring governments shared Lisbon's preoccupation with preventing a guerrilla advance into central Mozambique. With these inside tracks, the PIDE/DGS's knowledge of FRELIMO surpassed that of the army, whose intelligence officers were oftentimes not privy to combat data garnered by the secret police because of the mutual professional jealousy. The PIDE/DGS's power swelled not alone from its intelligence-gathering apparatus but from its special position outside the colonial government structure. It owed responsibility directly to Lisbon and then only to the Minister of the Interior, not the government as a whole.

Within and without Mozambique's borders, the secret police worked to destabilize the revolutionary movement and disrupt its activities. By infiltrating agents and informers into FRELIMO's political wing, it heightened suspicions and contributed to the internecine conflict so much a part of any exiled revolutionary group. In an interview, Machel stated: "On the basis of our personal experience, we know that in every hundred ex-prisoners or deserters, at least twenty-five to thirty are agents provocateurs." Contra-subversao furthermore involved the launching of decoy rebel movements with PIDE/DGS operatives as organizers to be a means of discovering and arresting dissidents. Revolutionary literature carried several charges of the secret police sending men disguised as guerrillas to commit atrocities in order to harm the rebel's image. The recognition of the mounting effectiveness of these countersubversive "dirty tricks" came into public view when Mozambique's minister of defense, General SA Viana Rebelo, expressed that "the only way of destroying FRELIMO is to use subversion." Aware of the under-the-table maneuvers, Machel warned that secret police infiltrators were "creating contradictions between people of different regions, confusing the definitions as to who is the enemy and undermining national unity." Taking into consideration the inclination of opponents to ascribe all bad fortune to the machinations of their enemy, Machel's warning still points to the adeptness of the PIDE/DGS in counterrevolution.
Consistent with this explanation, FRELIMO attributed almost all assassinations to “reactionary forces” backed by shadowy Portuguese agents. Preceding and following the bomb assassination of its first president, there ensued a series of still inadequately explained murders within the hierarchy. Between 1966 and 1968, for instance, assassins' bombs or bullets felled, among others: Military Commander Filipe Magaia, his deputy Paulo Kankhombe and Secretary for International Organizations Jaime Siguake. Whether another case of a revolution devouring its own children accounts for every one of these murders or of a lethal Portuguese response for some of them may never be known with certainty. Only Mondlane's death received anything approaching an impartial investigation.

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Interpol working together with the Tanzanian police concluded that the Moscow-postmarked package mailed to Mondlane in Dar es Salaam and others of similar make had been assembled in a military fashion in Lourenqo Marques from Japanese batteries traced to the Mozambican capital.82 Anyone familiar with the record of Portugal's secret police cannot doubt that it stood ready to fish in the troubled waters of “contradictions” in African politics, if merely by supplying book bombs. The intrigue cultivated by the secret police aggravated dissension but it cannot be deemed the root cause. More likely than not, a fair number of killings arose from the jostling for power which accompanied the exile tensions and progressive radicalizing of FRELIMO's program affecting the party's structure itself. The Portuguese quite possibly furnished assistance to disgruntled revolutionaries. Much more successful than the French who failed repeatedly to kill Ho Chi Minh, the Portuguese, if FRELIMO charges are to be believed, hit many of their targets albeit with the connivance of Mozambican handmaidens. As interpreted by its feeble rival, COREMO, these political murders demonstrated FRELIMO's vulnerability to infiltration.83 One miscalculation was in overestimating the likely disruption to the Revolution. FRELIMO struck back, although without the recognized "kills." In one publicized incident, the secret police were said to have uncovered a revolutionary plot to kill its agents in Tete town after one had been shot in a suburb.84 In a largely unknown case, a miniconflict raged between each side's operatives in Mueda enmeshing the lures of prostitutes, silent stabbings and booby-trap deaths in a web of espionage. Informers were also killed in Nampula, Vila Pery and Lourenqo Marques.85 Such lethal handiwork ultimately proved no more disruptive to the clandestine counterrevolutionary network than it did to the revolutionaries'. Stitching together scattered printed references and all-too-few oral accounts of former agents, foreign observers and victims, a murky sketch emerges of the PIDE/DGS's organization and methods. Structurally, the secret police apparatus conformed to the province's administrative breakdown. Each of the territory's districts had an inspector who supervised locally based subinspectors who in turn oversaw field agents and informers. These were made up of Mozambican laborers, civil servants, criminals and street people. NonAfrican civilians, military officials and civil authorities formed another component of the
"countersubversion structure." Mozambique's chief inspector (Joaquim Sabino at the time of the coup) answered directly to the Ministry of the Interior in Lisbon, not the governorgeneral like the ordinary police. Accurate statistics are hard to come by on its strength. A UN document in 1969 estimated there were 662 secret police in Mozambique and 1,116 in Angola out of a total of 3,027.86 No doubt, their ranks expanded as the focus of Lisbon's concern riveted on its east African colony. One informed journalist placed the figure at two thousand when the army brought down Caetano.87 Five hundred alone were temporarily detained in Mozambique after the coup.88

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Because of the rapid growth of its operations, a rising proportion of the personnel came from the officer corps, mostly captains. They held tough-minded attitudes toward the war and treatment of rebel suspects. Caetano's directives prohibiting the PIDE/DGS from engaging FRELIMO within Tanzania were said to have caused friction between the secret police and the prime minister. His limited tolerance for nonregime views (dubbed "liberal" by ultraconservatives) was another point of friction with the secret police who loathed any suspected liberalization.

Caetano's efforts to refurbish the secret police's unpalatable reputation and restrain its powers by renaming it the Directorate of General Security (DGS) and by slightly restructuring the organization brought no real checks to its power. Nor did this tinkering come close to curbing the ambitions of the PIDE/DGS's African branches or the general conviction in the efficacy of its counterinsurgency methods. In fact, this brief and feeble interlude was followed by granting additional authority to the secret police. On July 18, 1972, Decree No. 239 empowered it to use preventive detention for up to three years without the subject's right to judicial review for acts deemed "contrary to the territorial integrity of the nation."89

Unlike British practices in Malaya, the Portuguese police, secret or regular, rarely used trial or magisterial procedures to convict fugitives. Suspects were interrogated, tortured and trundled off to prison or shot out of hand. Due process of law, as represented in democratic states, was thus abrogated and with it went respect and trust in the colonial government. The point warrants elaboration, for hanging an enemy as a bandit (not assassinating or beating him to a pulp for being a communist) puts the contest in a legalistic, and not propagandistic, context. Thus a defendant is a lawbreaker, not a martyred member of a cause.

As an alternative to army operations, Lisbon entrusted greater combat responsibility to the PIDE/DGS in hopes of retrieving the deteriorating military situation in the central districts. Based on the Angolan precedent, the secret police formed a paramilitary unit, the flechas. They began operations in mid-1973 near the Rhodesian border in the vicinity of the town of Vila Pery. Airborne and commando trained, the small squads of a half-dozen men operated independently of the army on intelligence-gathering and counterguerrilla missions. The PIDE/DGS organized and deployed the flechas in a conscious attempt to replicate guerrilla capabilities of relative logistical self-reliance and operational freedom to
function in hotly contested zones. Comprised of 90 percent Mozambican volunteers, the flechas established a reputation as an effective combat force in their own right. But they also built up a grisly record for reprisals and cruelty--a fact Portuguese officers attributed to the enlistment of many former guerrillas who exhibited an intense hatred for FRELIMO and its sympathizers.90 Although the flechas raised more obstacles to FRELIMO's southward infiltration, they had no overall retardant impact. The secret police's extension into the military realm, however, indicated how much influence it wielded in Lisbon even at a time when the interests of the Forgas Armadas were in the hands of the redoubtable General Arriaga.

Not for the sway it held in the inner sanctums of the Lisbon government will the secret police be remembered in Mozambique's colonial period, however. Instead its legacy rests with its formidable power in the colony. Settlers, soldiers and Mozambicans-all feared its call. Among the settlers, PIDE/DGS agents tapped phones, eavesdropped on conversations and covered social contacts between whites and blacks widening the separation along racial lines. Whites were imprisoned and interrogated and a greater number were under surveillance for holding separatist sentiments. Its mistreatment of Mozambicans became a byword for all the excesses of Portuguese rule. Like other colonial officials and officers, the PIDE/DGS staff drew one African into inflicting pain on another (particularly by differing ethnic groups), although inspectors themselves entered into physical punishment. Justifying the means by the end, secret police officials and soldiers in the field defended torture of prisoners for the acquisition of combat information which needed to be obtained as quickly as possible for it to be reliable and to spare Forras Armadas lives.91

To accomplish its missions of intelligence-collection, the PIDE/DGS employed guileful techniques, too. Aware of the supernatural dimensions of the preliterate mind, inspectors turned this to their advantage whenever possible. One interrogation technique, for example, professed the power to read "the truth" on the foreheads of suspects. For humble villagers the claimed abilities could be convincing. FRELIMO cadres warned new recruits and civilian adherents of Portuguese tricks to humbug information from them.92 In other twists, psychological pressure was applied by confronting prisoners with false confessions from compatriots urging them to confess since everyone else had. Another method universally used by intelligence officers and called in the United States army the "Mutt and Jeff" routine involved alternating harsh and kind treatment by different officers.93 Responding to the kindness, including offers of water or cigarettes, from a sympathetic appearing interrogator after a bout with a fear-provoking counterpart, the prisoner might divulge rebel plans. Still another technique for gaining knowledge about guerrilla activities and local cooperation entailed the questioning of children about events in the village or aldeamento. Missionaries reported some children tortured by the secret police, but this practice was not broadly applied.94
So as to uproot the revolutionary network, the secret police, aided by the army and PSP, cast wide dragnets sweeping in hundreds of suspects in both rural and urban sectors. Knowledge of these sweeps in the countryside comes from missionary reports and interviews; information in urban centers surfaced in foreign correspondents’ columns. Official communications or Portuguese newspapers rarely acknowledged the incidents. The largest mass arrest recorded by the foreign press occurred in June 1972, when the colonial authorities rounded up some eighteen hundred Mozambican workers in government buildings in Lourenço Marques and a sugar plantation in Xinavane, about sixty miles north of the capital. Among those imprisoned were two hundred clergymen and leaders of Protestant churches. According to Portuguese releases, the president of Mozambique’s Presbyterian Church, Zedequias Manganhela, and another clergyman, Josué Siduvo, allegedly hanged themselves as an outcome of "six months of isolation and pressure of interrogation." A further explanation circulated informally in Mozambique and openly in the world press. This account attributed Portuguese actions to reprisals against the World Council of Churches for its grant of two hundred thousand US dollars to the main African liberation movements of which FRELIMO was one. A corollary to the reprisa theory extended to an official backlash against the White Fathers whose departure from the colony in 1971 was followed by their internationally publicized accusations of prevalent atrocities by Portuguese forces. If these expositions are plausible, they suggest an international factor at the root of counterterrorism. Such a sequence of causation and events, nevertheless, overlooks the internal reasons for the arrests. Mozambican churchmen, as part of the small indigenous elite capable of directing the participation of the African masses, cropped up as subjects for surveillance and harassment. A case in point was the sentencing of the Methodist Reverend Jaconias Massango to three years in prison for recruiting FRELIMO members and spreading anti-Portuguese propaganda in Swaziland. Other cases involved government charges against foreign missionaries for assisting the nationalists. The evidence in fact substantiates some allegations. Burgos Father José Maria Lechundi, for instance conceded that he sent young Mozambicans to join the guerrillas. At other times, the PIDE/DGS apprehended mission-taught youths because their education alone made them subversives in the eyes of the secret police. Another foreign-chronicled sweep netted two hundred individuals in June 1973. PIDE/DGS interrogators soon released most. Amnesty International, a European-based organization concerned about the fate of political prisoners since 1961, reproached Portuguese officials for torturing the remaining detainees and imprisoning them without trial. Father John Paul wrote of a mass arrest totalling 350 Africans near Nova Coimbra in July 1965. Other missionaries attested to the continuance of large-scale apprehensions in the countryside throughout the war.
Over and above FRELIMO's reluctance for waging subversive war in the towns of the south, the fact remains that the secret police's surveillance and repressive techniques helped keep the peace. Nowhere was this more clearly shown than in the screening of Mozambican workers at Cabora Bassa dam. This tight security helps account for the uninterrupted progress of the dam. Speculation should also turn on whether the arrest of a number of Makua may have contributed to nipping in the bud any more support for FRELIMO from that large community.100 Although the secret police thought that some urban networks escaped their scrutiny, they uncovered guerrilla undergrounds in the towns of Mueda and Tete.101

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Conversely, the secret police, as mentioned above, never severed the indispensable connection between the urban centers and back country. Unlike Britain's positive outcome during the Kenya Emergency, the Portuguese inability to do so represented a crucial shortcoming in their counterinsurgency police work. This is not to say that the secret police did not attempt to break the link. Realizing the role played by ethnicity in connecting town and country dwellers, the PIDE/DGS set out to arrest members of ethnic groups in cities presumed to be tainted with nationalist influence. Take as an example the round-up of Nyasa in Beira whose kinsmen along the northeastern edge of Niassa district lent support to FRELIMO. Despite ethnic arrests, the nucleus of a nationalist underground took root in Beira and other cities aided by the twoway traffic to and from the rural areas. Far too many venal, ignorant and crude men were in the PIDE/DGS for real efficiency and painstaking police procedures.

AN ASSESSMENT OF COUNTERVERIENCE
There will probably never be any reliable figures on the actual number or percentage of colonial forces who maltreated Mozambican civilians. As is common to all armed forces, a faction were sadists who delighted in cutting off ears and genitalia to display to onlookers in Portugal or Mozambican cities or who executed prisoners by shoving them from aircraft. Racism and awareness of officially condoned torture in prisons reinforced a latitude for individual or small-group terrorism. The scope for murderous actions permitted settler initiatives, too. The Dutch missionaries at Inhaminga gave accounts of settlers acting on their own or taking part in OPVDC operations which inflicted casualties on villagers.102 In the secret army report referred to earlier, the investigating officers concluded that the settlers killed an estimated sixty villagers during the final months of the war.103

Not unlike other counterinsurgent states, Portugal's record of punishing offenders was poor. Unless punished by the guerrillas or vengeful Mozambicans, the settlers got away with their crimes. For the shooting of captured or surrendered insurgents, colonial soldiers were to incur eight-year prison terms. Yet the actual number convicted was so minuscule as to cast doubt on enforcement of the program. Arriaga contended that in his nearly four-year tour of duty, which covered fifteen to twenty thousand military operations, only a dozen reports of misconduct reached him of which five had sufficient foundation to be tried before
military tribunals. An army communiqué announced that in 1971 and 1972 there were fifteen purported cases of bad conduct toward Mozambicans of which five were confirmed and only one was of a criminal nature. In the case of Tete's joint military commander and governor, Colonel Armindo Videira, who was implicated in the Wiriyamu killings, the Caetano government merely dismissed him. Soldiers incriminated in the Mucumbura shootings were simply punished by having their tours of duty extended by one year.

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Amid this picture of misconduct and judicial failings, there coexisted another, more benevolent, side to the incumbent's reactions. Not to be overlooked was the considerate treatment given to some guerrillas. Wounded insurgents in at least certain instances, as described, received first evacuation from combat and preferential care in hospitals. Defecting rebels obtained kindlier handling than the ordinary villager with much less in the way of propaganda value to offer. FRELIMO officials were especially welcomed by the government and used by it for countermobilization.

Here it should be noted as well that the Portuguese dispensed compensation to Mozambican civilians for army misdeeds. A tiny sum was sometimes paid to owners of burned huts. Care was given to not a few mine victims. On occasions, the government handed out sacks of beans and flour to starving refugees. Yet, on others, the authorities rendered little assistance to newly resettled aldeamento inhabitants during the height of a rainy season.

The Portuguese record of aid to newly settled aldeamento dwellers then, on the whole, was poor, although in situations it was explainable due to inadequacy of resources or mismanagement of supplies. In other instances, a critic could attribute wartime inattention to Mozambican well-being as an outgrowth of decades of neglect and misrule. Still, all Portuguese soldiers were not terrorizing ogres, and literature advancing that view was as onedimensional as it was propagandistic. Even a determined critic of army and secret police atrocities, Father John Paul, wrote that "most [soldiers] were very pleasant people." Individuals and groups helped civilians during attacks and difficult periods. Soldiers staffed aldeamento education and vocational training projects. They showed a genuine liking for African children, who trailed them around in small packs, expecting treats and friendship. (FRELIMO argued that troops used children for information and insurance from attack.) None of these positive entries can entirely balance the negative side of Portugal's conduct ledger but they do place it in perspective. A counterinsurgent might with some justification invoke selective terror for clearly defined ends, such as for tactical information, to avoid casualties. Another application of military psychological action entailed the display of dead guerrillas among local villagers. Its aim was to build respect for the government forces, if not loyalty. This was not a widely practiced procedure by the Portuguese forces who commonly held that they buried guerrilla dead in the field or wild animals ate them. More often than not colonial troops found no bodies after a skirmish with a foe who hit distantly and ran safely. When on the other hand the bodies of innocent victims were
exhibited to their fellow villagers, the Forgas Armadas were ridiculed for their ineffectiveness against the rebels and hated for their brutality. 108

Herein lies one of the irresolvable dilemmas of colonial counterrevolution. The Portuguese stood accused of inhuman treatment whereas FRELIMO's guerrillas tended to be forgiven or given Terror and Counterterror 141 the benefit of the doubt when the perpetrators were unknown. Local people as well as many foreigners remembered the ruthlessness and greed of a colonial administrator or soldier but overlooked similar behavior by an insurgent because he was of the same race and culture as the victims. The excesses of the underdog are tolerated or "understood" but those of the ruler are condemned. The Armed Forces' acts in the end, therefore, accentuated the pitch of hatred and suspicion. The recourse to instances of counterterror in the final reckoning was not so much an admission of defeat among the Mozambican people as a frustrated reflection of their opponent's tactics. But since repression nearly always stimulates what it sets out to repress, the revolutionary cause spread. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, if the guerrilla wins by not losing, then the counterguerrilla can make his own defeat less likely by not succumbing to terroristic provocations. Had the Portuguese, on the other hand, dealt brutally and systematically on an extensive scale as did the Turks against the Armenians or the Soviets against the Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas after World War II, then they would have been more effective in extirpating opposition. But ineffectual counterviolence on a sporadic basis served to harden resistance.

Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development

These liberated zones, because of the new type of power, new kind of administration, new way of life, are the targets of the enemy.

--Samora Machel

A European power can remain in Africa as long as it identifies itself with the Africans.

--Miguel Murupa

... [Revolution] is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where the processes of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change.

--Samuel P. Huntington

Revolutionary bases, or liberated zones as FRELIMO called them, accompanied the revolutionaries' political and military penetration into Mozambique. Insurgent regions were present in Mozambique during the wars of colonial conquest. But
there is an important distinction between traditional Mozambican resistance, which also carried out roving insurgent campaigns, and FRELIMO's liberated zones in remote forest enclaves. Nineteenth-century resisters often tenaciously defended their aringas against Portuguese columns, whereas FRELIMO guerrillas normally gave up ground without bitterend stands. As a rule, modern revolutionary warfare is a shadowy conflict. Partisan dominance within distinct localities has become standard operating procedure in the contemporary era of the rural-based revolution. Viewed from an uncritical vantage point, only slight departures appear in FRELIMO's liberated zones from base areas in, say, China or Southeast Asia. On closer examination, however, the

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dissimilarities stand in sharp relief: they were shaped by various phases of the Revolution, Portugal's counterrevolutionary measures and international considerations.

Despite its inability to hold ground in the conventional warfare sense against determined Portuguese assaults, the guerrillas established liberated zones, which served as forward bases for infiltration and raids. Sanctuary camps across the border functioned as the rear bases of the movement. But alive to the importance of international territorial claims to sovereignty, FRELIMO laid claim to wide arcs of land in the north and west and called them "Free Mozambique." This departure in emphasis from revolutionary practice in the Chinese case, where international publicity got less attention, legitimated FRELIMO's contention of de facto government and enhanced its popularity to the outside world. Mozambique's parallel is closer to the Vietnam conflict where, during the four-year prelude to the 1973 Paris settlement, Saigon and the Viet Cong lunged for territory and for recognition of their assertions. But pushed too far, the comparison breaks down, for FRELIMO never fought to incorporate the south into the north or for negotiated parcels of southern territory. Other distinctions in FRELIMO's utilization of liberated zones will be discussed later. At this juncture, it needs to be emphasized that the Portuguese denied the guerrillas' international title to territory and people as adamantly as FRELIMO claimed it. Such polarity of interests colored perceptions of what constituted liberated zones and the functions in them. Where the Portuguese scoffed at ragged knots of individuals huddled in forest clearings destitute of all but hand-carried possessions, the revolutionaries celebrated their base dwellers as participants in institutions freed from colonial rule and harbingers of a new order. Just as beauty has been acclaimed to lie in the eye of the beholder, so, then, perceptions of liberated zones can be attributed to the political persuasion of the observer. Colonial military and civilian authorities denounced as sheer propaganda FRELIMO's protestations to swaths of territory with social amenities for the inhabitants. Acknowledging a Portuguese presence in garrisons and fortified towns of the north and northwest, guerrilla spokesmen argued that vast rural areas exempt from normal civil administration justified their designation as liberated zones. But this clarification came after five years of extravagant guerrilla
declarations of huge blocks of territory under control. To be sure, most of the declared liberated zones had never felt the weight of Portuguese settlerdom or colonial administration in the preinsurgency era. During the Revolution, the Forcas Armadas' shadow was often visible only in forts and towns of the remote countryside, allowing partisans to roam freely. Over the same wide expanses Portuguese patrols wandered as well. Both might travel for days without meeting the other.

Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development

FOREST BASES

FRELIMO actually mobilized two distinct types of bases—the forest base and the popular base. It did not, however, make this distinction, although its literature referred to regions beyond the liberated islands as "advanced zones." These represented forward arenas where Portuguese garrisons, government posts and civilians were first coming under insurgent harassment. Both forest and popular bases saw colonial aircraft or patrols in varying degrees. The popular, or population, bases were villages in active Portuguese military sectors whose people clandestinely sustained FRELIMO partisans with food, recruits and porters. Forest bases, by contrast, sprung up in the least accessible and thickly foliaged highlands removed from easy road communication and with less risk of interference.

These divergent perceptions help to explain some of the disparity between Portuguese and FRELIMO claims to the amount of land dominated by guerrillas. During the war, FRELIMO's assertions steadily increased from 1967 until the last months of the war when it boasted over one-third of Mozambique liberated and over a million inhabitants within its sector. Disputing this contention, Lisbon argued that only small pockets of forest, at the most 8 percent of the country, sheltered some 60,000 Makonde in Cabo Delgado, 20,000 Mozambicans in Tete and only 6,000 people in Niassa. Fluidity in population numbers characterized the forest lodgments whoever did the figuring. When army helicopters swooped down, many of the inhabitants, whom FRELIMO sometimes coercively assembled, fled to the bush or to the relative safety of the aldeamentos. Lisbon's spokesmen, therefore, conceded merely small population estimates and minimal land pockets to the rebels. Even their location differed from insurgent declarations. Villages or aldeamentos nominally under colonial sway and a fortiori guarded by militia, on the other hand, were counted by Lisbon to be within its jurisdiction, even though their residents' loyalty could not be guaranteed.

Located in the northern tier of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete districts, the forest bases took root in their respective highlands—Makonde, Manda (or Vila Cabral) and Angónia plateaus. Nestled along foreign borders, they formed passageways through which weapons flowed south from sanctuaries and recruits traveled north for training. Within the forest bases, FRELIMO units secured rest and refuge, stockpiled supplies, instructed recruits in basic skills and set up tactical headquarters. Permanency usually figured little in their preparations, although some bases had bomb shelters built of logs and antiaircraft installations. Huts,
lean-tos and clearings were completed in two or three days; they could be abandoned within minutes of an alert. Air strikes often destroyed flimsy grass structures. The simplicity of the camps led Portuguese soldiers to speak pejoratively about their consisting merely of "fortified foxholes." Operation Gordian Knot, nevertheless, overran camps for six hundred inhabitants with self-contained social services. When the Forgas Armadas discovered and razed the makeshift buildings, the guerrilla forces relocated their camps with little effort but not without the loss of crops. Insurgent institutions, as FRELIMO never tired of reminding its sympathizers and detractors, were grounded in the mobilization of the base inhabitants, not in durable constructions. Forest bases functioned for imperatives other than military strongholds. They met vital international and internal priorities in addition to military logistics and guerrilla operations. Liberated zones brought indispensable foreign recognition to FRELIMO as the head of an insurgent state. A presence in even marginal spots, which were inflated in pronouncements to include sectors without a visible colonial administration (for that matter without a rebel infrastructure), signified to the indigenous people and, just as important, to foreign observers not only Portugal's weakness but also FRELIMO's prospects for victory. One huge block of FRELIMO-claimed country—the expanse between guerrilla lodgments on the Makonde plateau and the Vila Cabral highlands—was a wilderness virtually empty of people into which neither side permanently entered. Postponing a discussion of international support for Mozambican revolutionaries until the next chapter, here it needs to be said that dramatic claims to countryside were used to legitimate FRELIMO's contention of de facto government and to boost its credibility to the outside world. From as early as mid-1966, FRELIMO insisted: "There are many areas where our people are free, where the Portuguese cannot enter." In actual fact, the guerrillas could not block the Forgas Armadas from entry into forest bases when it brought enough force to bear. Mozambique's nationalists could not hold ground in the way the Chinese communists did in northern China. They placed neither their political and diplomatic capital (fixed in Dar es Salaam throughout the war) nor their main support services on home soil as the followers of Chairman Mao had been forced to do. After convening the much-publicized Second Congress within Niassa district on July 20-25, 1968, to evidence its possession and control of territory, FRELIMO declined to transfer its hierarchy from the Tanzanian sanctuary to Mozambican forest bases. Apart from journeys accompanying FRELIMO-picked visitors to liberated zones, almost exclusively the Cabo Delgado camps, Machel and his chief lieutenants remained outside more than in Mozambique. Since the goal of an insurgent revolutionary movement customarily focuses on out-legitimating and out-administering rather than outfighting an incumbent government, the liberated zone served as a rural retreat for a new society in the form of rebel institutions. Conforming to the pattern, FRELIMO's publications gave detailed descriptions, for instance, of its parallel health services. An account in Mozambique Revolution in 1972 listed one Provincial Central Hospital,
seventeen District Medical Posts and sixty First Aid Posts in Cabo Delgado
district.7 Detractors labelled such statistics as fabrications.8 Once again, the
discrepancy in colonial and revolutionary views arose partially from differing
images of what constituted a hospital or first aid post. In fact, the insurgent
hospital operated without any doctors and frequently

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without most medicines. A first aider’s rudimentary abilities extended simply to
preventive medicine tips, procedures for bombing raids, treatment of minor
ailments and vaccination against smallpox.9 Near the end of the war FRELIMO
revealed that scarce resources and the concentration on fighting resulted in
sidetracking nurses’ training and other health projects.10 Bush schools faced
similar handicaps in the shortages of properly trained teachers and minimum
equipment or supplies but FRELIMO’s Tanzanian offices published its own
schoolbooks.11 FRELIMO avowed thirty thousand primary pupils in its forest
bases, five hundred in secondary schools in Tanzania and seventy students
studying in foreign universities by 1974.12 However, it made similar assertions
with less credibility as early as 1966, just two years after the Revolution began.13
No figures appeared on primary education or health facilities in the transborder
sanctuary camps.

In spite of propagandistic pictures of well-being, conditions in forest bases were
harsh. A sympathetic missionary visited Matenje camp close to the Messumba
mission in Niassa in 1966 after a near-hit bombing raid. Afterwards he wrote of
the destitute scene: “Life had obviously been extremely primitive and conditions
appalling; no fresh water, no land for crops, few possessions.”14 More partisan
observers noted later in the conflict small fields and a blackboard for classes, but
none witnessed bountiful circumstances or refinements comparable to those in the
Chinese revolutionary bases.15 From time to time, would-be visitors, however,
were blocked from entry by Portuguese military activity.16 FRELIMO denied
access to its liberated zones to those it held to be critical of the Revolution.17
Sympathetic visitors reported embryonic political and administrative organization
for the purpose of mobilization and defense. They gave accounts of basic nursery,
health and educational services Some forest camps were said to have had small
traditional smelting furnaces which used veins of iron ore or, more frequently,
strips of metal from mined vehicles to fashion utensils and farming hoes.18
Modest amounts of soap and salt processing from local materials took place as
well. Unlike the independence of Chinese resistance bases from reliance on
foreign sanctuaries, the Mozambican revolutionaries never attained guerrilla
autarkies. Year-round self-sufficiency in food production was not achieved. Nor
did FRELIMO reach the degree of material or institutional sophistication of the
Chinese communist bases where the inhabitants printed newspapers, minted
coins, tanned hides and spun cotton.19 The preinsurgency poverty of the area and
the want of agriculturally skilled guerrillas and Portuguese herbicides precluded
complete self-sustenance or complex production. The guerrillas and their
adherents depended on armies of porters bearing foodstuffs across the border in
times of scarcity to supplement homegrown crops, wild roots and fish or game.
From the world outside in addition came small and infrequent luxuries—rubber sandals, mosquito netting, hair oil and matches. When colonial forces overran a forest base camps, especially during the Gordian Knot offensive, they contrasted the meager

148 Revolution and Counterrevolution material habitude with the quality of life in their finest aldeamentos and not the worst resettlement sites which lacked water, electricity, cleared fields and proper shelters. They missed the sociopolitical revolution taking place in the forest bases. Specifically, they underestimated the interaction between cadres and rural people. What in the last instance marked off FRELIMO’s revolutionary warfare from bygone rebellion was the resolve to dismantle the existing power relationships and introduce new organs of public authority. Disruption in their daily lives, according to FRELIMO, made the people of the base camps accept social reordering more readily than did the rural population in semiliberated areas. Adapted from Asian models, FRELIMO undertook to organize a pyramidal structure of elected people's management committees from the community, local and district level up to the FRELIMO-commanded province (synonymous with the colonial district) councils. Guided by FRELIMO, these management committees were to represent it, interpret its policy and implement its resolutions. At the hub of the framework stood the political commissars whose wide-ranging duties centered on war mobilization but included concern for social welfare projects. They aimed to introduce concepts of collective workplaces and cooperative cultivation on a limited basis. Beyond the specific functions of each component lay the intention of involving the inhabitants in the Revolution. The revolutionary administration also dealt with disputes encompassing tribal chauvinism, drunkenness, low motivation and social conflicts between cadres and populace or between men and women.

It was in the forest bases, as in the analogous Chinese case, where FRELIMO perceived the laying of foundations to form its hoped-for society. After independence, the minister of education and culture, Graga Simbine declared: "The model of the liberated areas . . . represents the basis of a new future society, specifically Mozambican and revolutionary." The revolutionaries set their sights on transforming society with FRELIMO at the center of politics and life with nationalism over tribalism, women’s emancipation over traditional male domination, socialism over capitalism and social justice over economic inequality. FRELIMO’s inauguration of revolutionary institutions in the forest bases and sanctuary camps conformed to the Eastern pattern of revolution as outlined in Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies. In the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, political mobilization and the shaping of new institutions, according to Huntington's view, came before the overthrow of existing order. In the Western pattern, by contrast, the decay and collapse of the old regimes, as in the French, Russian and Mexican revolutions, preceded political mobilization and the creation of a new order. Borrowed idioms from Asian revolutions and postindependence glorification of life in the liberated zones have given rise to blurred images of the true extent of
structural changes in forest base society. Yet these perceptions have a profound
imprint and compelling force on independent Mozambique's ideology, political
organization, collectivized agriculture and cooperative industrialization.25

Looked at another way, the revolutionary forest bases
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and sanctuary camps stamped a Mozambican imprimatur on foreign institutions,
but this process was far from completed by September 1974.
All things considered, there was, at any rate, less prodigious revamping of the
social and economic life in the forest bases than FRELIMO portrayed during the
Revolution.26 FRELIMO stopped colonial taxation and forced labor but it
mobilized inhabitants sometimes with force to transport supplies and produce
food. The availability of land and its village allocation made for social realities in
marked contrast to those in China and Vietnam where the revolutionaries reduced
rent and redistributed land in the peasants' favor. Because of the remoteness of
Mozambique's forest bases from concentrations of smallholders or plantations,
there existed no classic landless peasantry exploited by a landlord class. Even
where guerrilla activity scattered the settlers, rent reduction and land reform
programs were largely unnecessary since enough land for traditional cultivation
was in use. Additionally, the political commissar proceeded slowly in the
introduction of collectivized agriculture to avoid adverse political repercussions
during the fighting and to avert a diversion from the war effort.
It is important to note that a dispute arose within FRELIMO's Central Committee
about the relative priorities of the military struggle and reconstruction in the forest
bases in 1968-1969.27 With the rise of Machel to the presidency, the war lobby
prevailed. The Central Committee confirmed Machel as president in May 1970.
Without suggesting an exact parallel to a conventional soldier's outlook,
FRELIMO in a sense sought a "military solution" along with the new leadership.
It expended the bulk of its resources on guerrilla warfare rather than raising the
material well-being of the forest base dwellers. A consequent decline followed in
FRELIMO's social programs and training of nurses, teachers and agronomists for
the sanctuary camps and base areas.28
Agricultural production, to return briefly to the description of FRELIMO policy in
the forest farms, changed hardly at all. Security and not soil fertility determined
location of fields which were simply small clearings in the forest. Crops were
diversified to include beans, peas and mealies and techniques were improved, but
the actual production unit remained nearly the same as that of preinsurgency days.
Collective fields in the forest bases existed only in the traditional sense of the
village community--expanded by refugees--as the basic possessor of land and the
family as the basic producing unit. Instead of vigorous collectivization,
FRELIMO began a trend toward mutual-aid teams for planting and harvesting.
Neither these aid teams nor cooperative management through People's
Committees were wide departures from former village participation in cultivation.
Even these efforts suffered from a shortage of cadres with agricultural
expertise.29 In fact, ali fields of endeavor were hampered by a scarcity of trained
cadres fluent in local dialects. Machel himself had to speak through interpreters when he addressed followers in the north.

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So as not to imperil its expansion of guerrilla incursions, FRELIMO coexisted with remnants of capitalism by generally forgoing assaults on Portuguese farmers and shopkeepers in lands virtually under insurgent dominance. The revolutionaries did "tax" settlers as already mentioned. They introduced trade restrictions and strove to control the distribution of goods through People's Stores. Absolute social equality, nonetheless, eluded them. A tiny black market thrived and a new privileged stratum of chiefs and "chairmen" assumed the role of colonial exploiters much to the chagrin of FRELIMO's committed revolutionaries.30 Seen through the eyes of the postindependence Central Committee, "feudal structures remained as the main form of oppression" in areas devoid of colonial civil administration.31 Traditional virtues, values and institutions continued to endure as they had where Portuguese rule and colonial life had been weak or nonexistent before the Revolution. Sweeping them away was to be postponed until after decolonization.

Whatever their failures, the revolutionary cadres initiated certain redresses. Harvested crops, for instance, went to Mozambicans rather than colonial taxes or commercial companies. The insurgent government moved to further adult education as well as primary schooling. Interest, if not always enough medical treatment, was shown in the inhabitants' health.

Politicization preoccupied the cadres who held gatherings with a handful of villagers or large rallies with as many as several hundred listeners. The mutual hardships and shared dangers, so FRELIMO literature and commentators attest, gave poignancy to the revolutionary message. An anvil of revolutionary struggle, according to guerrilla accounts, forged an 6lan akin to what followers of Mao Tse-tung celebrated as "the Yenan spirit." Here in the sanctuaries and strongholds, as in the Chinese resistance bases, a set of revolutionary virtues crystallized--courage, diligence, self-denial, heroic sacrifice and continuing struggle (a luta continua). They now serve as shibboleths in a Marxist Mozambique while becoming hallowed and amplified into a transforming ideology. That the actual number of base dwellers was a comparatively slender faction in a population then of about eight million stimulates the articulators to make the creed all the more pervasive.

LISBON'S DENIALS
Lisbon, for its part, vehemently denied the existence of pieces of Mozambican territory under guerrilla jurisdiction with permanent amenities to the inhabitants. It ridiculed FRELIMO claims to embryonic political institutions and social services as blarney. In fact, the Portuguese counterclaimed that foreign journalists, such as Newsweek's Andrew Jaffee, had been duped into believing that guerrilla sanctuary camps in southern Tanzania were actually northern Mozambique.32 Corresponding to the nationalists' campaign to build credibility, Portugal induced like-minded journalists and observers to buttress its assertions of exclusive mastery of the colony.33
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But confirmation of FRELIMO's forest bases came from perceptive, if not always neutral visitors. From the evidence available, its base areas compared favorably with those in South Vietnam where the vehemence of American operations prevented consolidation of secure enclaves on the magnitude of revolutionary China's. Other than the well-substantiated land reforms in South Vietnam, the NFL's further social reordering is hazardous to document from independent reporters since they could not safely venture into the popular-type bases. A much less vigorous Portuguese counterinsurgency campaign, by contrast, allowed visitors to travel into Mozambique. Yet just as the Portuguese maintained showplaces for foreign tours, FRELIMO also concentrated attention on its most comfortable camps. In others, the ones visitors never saw, life was desperate and bore no relationship to the idyllic images in FRELIMO propaganda.

What strikes a note of incredibility was FRELIMO's propaganda announcements of crop exports and well-developed welfare services. According to its releases, the forest bases exported 222 tons of cashew nuts and 50 tons of sesame seeds along with lesser amounts of other goods to Tanzania for sale there and abroad during the 1973 harvest, a peak year.34 Falling into the same groove as its inflated reports of Portuguese casualties, FRELIMO overstated the crop yields from garden plots under siege from napalm, defoliants and herbicides. Chemical warfare indeed caused birth defects, digestive disorders and pulmonary constriction among the human inhabitants of the bases as well as damaged wildlife, fish and livestock. The exodus of settlers and the regroupment of the African population also brought about a decline in the food supply of the north. In reality then, the rebels were hard pressed to feed the base residents and contribute to the provisions of guerrillas infiltrating southward.35 Put more strongly, FRELIMO depended on transfrontier sanctuary farms to produce food for the Tanzanian-based training camps, refugee populations, sales in the Tanzanian market and life in the liberated zones. One example will suffice: a farming settlement at Mputa, Tanzania, with a population of twelve thousand sold tobacco, beans, maize, cassava and peas. During the last year of the war, it netted $1.5 million for tobacco alone and a further $2.5 million for other produce.36 Sanctuary camps in this way functioned as the rear bases of the revolutionary movement rather than the forest redoubts. The safety of the camps from attack with thousands of refugees from disrupted communities, moreover, gave rise to an environment conducive to more sweeping sociopolitical reordering than was possible south of the border. In foreign lands collectivization advanced under the influence of the Tanzanian example, itself a product of Chinese inspiration. FRELIMO camps paralleled the cooperative villages of Dar es Salaam's blueprint, and Tanzanian officials referred to them as Ujamaa villages after the fashion of their own village formula.37 Many of the projected reforms for agriculture had already been worked out on a grass-roots level north of the border thus constituting a kind of rehearsal of what was to be extended to all of Mozambique after 1975. Declared off limits to tourists and requiring entry permits for official guests, this
sanctuary zone from the Rufiji to the Rovuma rivers undeservedly got little attention by visitors bound for the forest lodgments inside Mozambique. Yet it was there that the functions of a protostate were most fully developed.

POPULAR BASES
FRELIMO's forest bases were located in the distant and poor borderlands. Outside these natural strongholds, the guerrillas were not the "fish in the water" of Mao Tse-tung's parlance, because there was little "water" left. Aldeamentos, flight to neighboring countries and warfare generally drained it away. The guerrillas' continuance in these outlying corners far from vital communication networks, natural resources and population centers amounted to a form of self-imposed containment. China's renowned revolutionary, under whose influence FRELIMO conducted guerrilla operations, prescribed the appropriate location of bases:
Inasmuch as the object of the bases is the capture of national political power they must have access to the sources of power. . . . This means that bases cannot simply be located where they would be safe due to topography or distance.38 Positioning them in "safe" topography contravened Mao's tested guerrilla strategy. Initially, however, the Mozambican revolutionaries chose securer regions in rugged country abutting foreign borders, for they put scant hope in militarily capturing political power. Instead, they aimed at a war of attrition to drive up Portugal's costs in blood and treasure by generalizing the insurgent incidents. Bottled up in remote toeholds in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, the attrition strategy, as it stood, broke down on the realities that by 1967 the Mozambican economy sped up and no signs of Portuguese faltering came into public view. Then the offensive for the central region pushed the fighting into the country's populated and resource-rich heartland. Once in southern Tete and the central districts, the rebels resorted to popular bases; that is to say, villages under guerrilla sway in areas of high Portuguese activity. When hostilities ceased, the rebels had rooted popular bases midway through Manica (Vila Pery) and Sofala (Beira) where the colonial government's military and much of its civil presence were still intact. Some two years before the coup a semiliberated zone had also been created along the western strip of Zambizia district which adjoins Malawi. The land area of the popular bases was larger than the territory of the forest bases, and it approached the one-third of national territory claimed by FRELIMO but only when combined with the woodland strongholds and the no-man's-lands unoccupied by either side. Within the popular bases, FRELIMO's victory lay in the psychological, not the territorial, realm. It held barely any ground outside the forest redoubts proper, but it conducted sabotage operations in most parts of the popular bases. Guerrilla units could not
exclude colonial army patrols from communities it had won over, but the brief Portuguese appearances resulted in no real loss of rebel influence over the villagers. Youths and cultivators stood lookout for approaching army patrols. Forewarned, the villages emptied of guerrillas, their wounded and other incriminating evidence disappeared until the troops left.39 The patrols met only peaceful locals whose sullen passivity betrayed their sympathies. On other occasions the Forgas Armadas entered deserted villages. Their inhabitants had expected government reprisals, and so they had fled to the mato for safety. After searching the huts, the soldiers returned to the barracks, a blow struck in the air. Organized in this manner, FRELIMO insurgents and cadres enjoyed a measure of safety in their villages during daylight and had near immunity after dark. Unless tipped off by a local informant, the For as Armadas had only suspicions to connect the locals with rebel actions. But even in clandestine operations, the guerrillas had to prove their efficacy and maintain a degree of accountability to the population. In partial fulfillment, the cadres taught the people how to bury their food to preserve it when the army burned their huts. They assisted refugees and northbound recruits by furnishing guides and food along the way. Or, they temporarily hid villagers until the danger passed.40 Mozambique's irregular terrain offered hideouts for local people and guerrillas alike during army sweeps. The many caverns in the Gorongosa highlands, for instance, afforded excellent hiding spots.

Inside the popular bases, FRELIMO endeavored to create new organs of public authority responsible to the revolutionary movement. Its politicomilitary strength in a given locality determined to a large extent the existence of parallel hierarchies. Ideally, village councils, the members of which were appointed or put up for community approval by the cadres, acted with the political commissar. Practically, village headmen together with the community cooperated with the guerrillas without FRELIMO restructuring the traditional authority except where a local leader's recalcitrance deemed his assassination. In areas of a lingering Portuguese dominance, the regedor sometimes tried to keep a foot in each camp by paying lip service to the colonial government while rendering secret assistance to the revolutionaries. The political fluidity of the marginal popular base between firm FRELIMO or colonial command generated complex reactions on the part of Mozambican colonial and traditional authorities. A postindependence FRELIMO spokesman gave this analysis:

With the appearance of the liberated zones, the regulos who had served the Portuguese usually followed them when they withdrew. Others integrated themselves into the local committee structures or, in larger numbers, stayed on the sidelines of the whole process, maintaining neutral positions. A considerable number of tribal chiefs, however, in some cases those who had been deposed by the Portuguese, affirmed their traditional authority over their tribes and as such came to be respected and obeyed. While not openly opposing FRELIMO, in the majority of cases they fomented tribalist or regionalist tendencies.
The popular bases also exhibited social stratification and traditional forms of exploitation which typified precolonial society as well as colonial life. They gave varying amounts of loyalty and aid to the Revolution but were not revolutionized to the extent of the forest bases, not to mention the sanctuary camps where People's Committees and commissars replaced the previous power relationships of chiefs or chefe de postos. Larger manifestations of such revolutionary vices as elitism, ambition and opportunism cropped up in these marginal areas than in secured FRELIMO camps. The revolutionizing process thus became a postindependence preoccupation in the popular bases along with country outside of thorough FRELIMO penetration in the course of the guerrilla war.

ALDEAMENTOS AND RESETTLEMENT

Patterned after Britain's "New Villages" in Malaya and the United States' "Strategic Hamlets" in Vietnam, Portugal's aldeamentos (fortified villages) had military and political objectives. Foremost among the military missions was insulation of the rural population from being influenced, infiltrated or attacked by the guerrillas. By regrouping scattered peoples into the confines of aldeamentos, Lisbon strove to evaporate the "water," to employ once again Mao's well-known metaphor, in which the guerrilla swims like a fish. Political priorities, as in Southeast Asia, dictated a wider scope for regroupment, however. Civilian and enlightened military authorities conceived of aldeamentos as the soundest method of bringing basic amenities to the rural sectors so as to undercut social grievances. Running water, electricity, schooling and medical assistance became economically feasible to compact communities otherwise out of reach for dispersed peoples. Gathering dispersed rural people close to transportation was also envisaged as a method to incorporate them into the economy. The Portuguese hoped to attract rebels and refugees from Tanzania to them and in this they largely failed. Thus the aldeamentos were Portugal's sociopolitical alternative to FRELIMO's liberated zones, a kind of white microrevolution.

Under General Arriaga's tenure, the army more than at any previous period had an appreciation for the military gains from regrouped and cared-for rural populace. Mozambique indeed saw the establishment of more aldeamentos than either Guinea-Bissau or Angola, with about 15 percent of its population regrouped. Together with economic development projects, resettlement constituted much of Lisbon's nonshooting approach to rural revolution.

The aldeamento scheme was foreshadowed by preinsurgency removal of Makonde settlements along the Rovuma in anticipation of transborder forays. When the raids unexpectedly came from within the country and with the assistance of local peoples, a regroupment strategy assumed urgent proportions. In 1965, Colonel Basilio Seguro, governor of Cabo Delgado, proposed a military village structure. A sporadic population, it was argued, was both prey to intimidation and a source of the guerrillas' food, information, shelter,
manpower and concealment. By merging into civilian pursuits with villagers when danger threatened, the infiltrators evaded identification. The next year, and one ahead of Angola, the civilian Overseas Ministry, with army trucks and troops, initiated the aldeamento policy that ultimately regrouped a reported 969,396 Mozambicans into 953 compact sites.43

Lest the impression be conveyed that Lisbon resettled nearly a million Africans in finished fortified compounds, it must be emphasized that Portuguese forces more often than not simply reordenamento (regrouped) rural families with the aim of "promoting economic and social progress" later.44 Regroupment first took place in Cabo Delgado where an alleged two hundred fifty thousand people were moved into 150 villages from a fifty-mile strip between the mouths of the Montepuez and Messalo rivers and inland for one hundred miles. From then on, the Portuguese relocated rural peoples either in response to actual guerrilla infiltration as in Tete or in anticipation of it as in southern Mozambique. They carried out the bulk of resettlement in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. The last two years of the war witnessed hasty and ill-conceived regroupment in Zamb~zia, Manica and Sofala districts.

Portugal's plans called for the first aldeamento south of the Save River in Gaza district at Macalauane on the right bank of the Limpopo in 1975.45 According to one Portuguese spokesman, 63.3 percent of the Cabo Delgado population had been relocated, 67.7 in Niassa and 44 percent in Tete by May 1974.46 By mid-1973, the colonial government estimated that within the war zones it had still to resettle some one and three-quarter million Africans and within the entire country it reckoned on regrouping a total of five million Mozambicans. 7 Table 4 gives one breakdown of regrouped persons and aldeamentos in the three main resettled districts.48 Added together, the population statistics for regrouped Mozambicans fell short of the nearly one million figure declared by Arriaga in 1973. After factoring in estimates from other districts, the actual figure stood closer to 750 thousand.

Table 4
Aldeamentos and Relocated Population by District in Mid-1973
Resettled District Aldeamentos Populi
Population
Cabo Delgado 238 262,000
Niassa 116 186,000
Tete 156 159,000

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Whatever the precise amount of regroupment, this massive displacement suggests the extravagantly military and bureaucratic scope of such an ambitious program. When it came to disbursing social welfare benefits, Portugal's reach exceeded its grasp. The accelerated aldeamento round-up usually ensued with the barest preparations for the new village sites. Settled on scarcely cleared locations, the
hastily relocated villagers experienced stress and discomfiture. Fortified for sieges and confinement, the concentrated aldeamentos, customarily two hundred to three hundred yards on a side, were encircled by barbed-wire fences, alarm systems, observation posts and bunkers. More dispersed layouts of up to two-and-a-half miles long for cattle pasturing in Tete, by and large, had less defense posture. Ideally, the aldeamentos, comprising fifteen hundred to three thousand inhabitants as opposed to traditional groupings of twenty to thirty people, were to be placed on sites possessing water, fertile soil, defensive possibilities and close proximity to patrolled roads for security and for integration into the economy. Laid out on a grid, the aldeamentos had their huts (two hundred to four hundred) constructed in straight rows with specified size and distances between them. Guards came from the ranks of the Forgas Armadas, PSP, Guarda Fiscal (Customs Police) and the OPVDC, but they were predominately Mozambican in composition with a tiny complement of army or police officers or NCOs. Residents farmed and grazed animals close by the perimeters during daylight hours. Failing to return before twilight curfew or neglecting to report strangers in the neighborhood were punishable offenses.

Amenities for residents varied with the distance from guerrilla incidents, the longevity of the establishment and the commitment of the Portuguese. Whether in combat or secured areas, only a handful had the promised benefits of well water, electricity, schools, first aid or health clinics. Murupa attested that a mere fifty-one had full electrical power. A South African writer argued that by mid-1973 Portugal had installed 737 schools and 495 clinics, and it had cleared twenty-five thousand hectares of farming land. Staffing schools and particularly medical posts was met almost singly by the army because of the difficulty in attracting civilian teachers, doctors and nurses to the rough, dangerous environment of rural Mozambique. A half dozen aldeamentos shone as prototypes for the many. A showplace, Chiulugo was located a short distance from Niassa district's largest town, Vila Cabral. It enclosed some three thousand Yaos. Its facilities included water fountains, health clinic, primary school, maize storage and a police and militia station. Relatively free from rebel attack, long-term establishment (1966) and the authorities' resolve to make it a model and showpiece for visitors explain Chiulugo's comparatively richer installations. Security from attack alone, nevertheless, did not ensure adequate facilities, for among the best constructed aldeamentos were those in Cabo Delgado--scene of high guerrilla activity. After independence FRELIMO in fact chose more Cabo Delgado aldeamentos for its communal village program than any other district.

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As an ambitious extension of these nonmilitary institutions, Arriaga embarked on the rejuvenation and expansion of Nangade village on the Rovuma. Located seventy-five miles inland from the Indian Ocean coast, Nangade underwent a brick and mortar transformation. Army engineers and African laborers constructed a cement town for twenty-five hundred Makonde people. Instead of the traditional mud-and-wattle huts, they put up concrete homes, schoolhouses for primary and secondary education, technical college, post office and market at the
cost of ten million escudos. New occupants paid the government a modest down payment and monthly mortgage for twenty years to own their home. Lisbon dispatched farming and fishing experts to modernize techniques and boost yields. Termed Operago Fronteira, Nangade was envisioned as one of a string of modern towns from Palma on the coast westward as far as Negomano at the confluence of the Rovuma and Lugenda rivers. Plans called for asphalt roads to link these new towns, and at either end connect with the apex point of Mueda to form an inverted triangle. At short intervals the roads were widened to form all-weather airstrips. Well-off and contented Mozambicans girded by tarred roadways were to form a "human border" blocking infiltration through the Rovuma frontierland to the Makonde Plateau.52 While some of the construction and road building was completed, time ran out for the completion of the pilot project, let alone its extension to the length of the river.

Less elaborately constructed groupings of aldeamentos to create similar "defense walls" in Niassa were awarded high priority in the Third National Development Plan (1968-1973). The northern triangle found together Vila Cabral, Maniamba and Muemba; the southern triangular cluster incorporated Mecanhelas, Molumbo and Lioma; the third aldeamento was in Zamb~zia district. Located right on the Malawi border, Mecanhelas endured regular FRELIMO assaults, prompting the Portuguese to arm six hundred of the local population.53

Once converted to the extramilitary operations of counterrevolutionary warfare, the colonial army command pushed ahead with unaccustomed zeal and faith reminiscent of other counterinsurgency forces who thought they had found with every new gimmick the essential ingredient for victory over revolutionary nationalism. But the rapidity of the guerrilla drive into central Mozambique outstripped Lisbon's belated regroupment schemes. Infiltrating into Manica and Sofala by July 1972 and firing repeatedly on road and rail traffic between Umtali and the port of Beira by December 1973, FRELIMO had interacted with large segments of the local population well before the Portuguese could introduce effective village resettlements. The breakthrough called for accelerated counter efforts, and the Portuguese relocated one hundred forty-six thousand villagers in Beira district alone in the six months from August 1973 to February 1974.54 This, as related in Chapter 3, accounted for General Arriaga's bolstering of this counterinsurgency institution by transferring substantial proportions of his troops to the displacing of rural peoples.

The slack in purely military operations was to be taken up by relying on the "forces of intervention," or mobile reserves. Over half of the thirty-five thousand regular-line metropolitan troops were employed in what Arriaga termed "social promotion."55 Although Arriaga abandoned less of a strictly military strategy than his Guinea-Bissau counterpart, General Spinola, he departed further from it than his Mozambican predecessors by adapting the army to implement social programs. Soldiers were employed in teaching Portuguese, the 3Rs and hygiene; others administered innoculations and medicine in a "peaceful revolution."56
More and more, Arriaga employed regular army units as instruments of social revolution. Wall posters in towns identified soldiers with education, medicine and multiracialism. Troops taught Portuguese, manual skills and farming techniques. Some officers, who became enamored with the mystique of the extramilitary side of counterinsurgency, embraced their mission as the be-all and end-all of the army's existence. Military actions, in their view, contained the nationalists just long enough to allow the civilian administration to develop the resources and, along with the army, to meet the material aspirations of Mozambicans.57 General Arriaga announced this approach in one of his many speeches to his troops as "convincing the minds and conquering the hearts."58 Civilian authorities were not unaware of the need to change in degree if not in kind the role of the civilian and military establishment to meet the challenges of a rural insurgency. In 1969 Governor-General Balthazar Rebello de Sousa, as one example, called for "a permanent revolution, a revision of institutions and men in all fields."159 As part of this effort, he made new appointments to the provincial secretaries of public works and communications, land and settlement and labor and welfare. But he stopped well short of not only a revolution but also a genuine revision of institutions. His plan to push the civilian side of counterinsurgency, however, irritated Arriaga who believed the Forgas Armadas better equipped to carry out a counterrevolution in the countryside. But the civilian side of the strategy never really materialized.

By their civic action exertions and development programs, the Portuguese displayed a dawning appreciation of what has been termed by the revolutionary theoretician Regis Debray as "revolutionizing the counterrevolution." Arriaga himself became a convert to reformist and preemption techniques to replicate the methods of the enemy. He came to interpret counterinsurgency, like regular war, as politics by other means.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ALDEAMENTO PROGRAM
As the cornerstone of Portugal's population-oriented development program and as a pivotal component of its counterrevolution in Mozambique, the aldeamento recipe for victory warrants an assessment. The appraisal is a complicated one. It is a facile conclusion that categorically judges the aldeamentos as either totally effective or totally ineffective. On wider reflection, the history of regroupment has had many failures and only one widely acknowledged but still very debatable triumph. The final judgment is mixed about this case--Britain's New Villages in Malaya--because the British resettled Chinese immigrants capitalizing on anti-Chinese resentment among the Malayans. A far more worthy but less touted paradigm of relocation was carried out in the Kenya Emergency (1952-1960). There, the British regrouped 100,000 of what they termed Kikuyu squatters, held 23,000 detainees and imprisoned 8,400 Mau Mau members.60 More importantly, their actions disrupted the vital bridge between the town and country by rounding up Mau Mau supporters, mainly Kikuyu, in Nairobi. Factors favoring British success encompassed a much smaller, less organized and poorly armed non-Marxist movement based almost exclusively on one ethnic group. As neither the
Malaya nor Kenya case is a compelling standard for comparison, Portugal's aldeamento experiment cannot easily be thrown into sharp relief by them. One advocate of rural revolution posits that the resort to resettlement is an admission by the incumbent government of having lost the peasant masses. But the maxim is not valid for the Makonde of Cabo Delgado or the Yao, Nyanja and Nyasa of Niassa, for Lisbon's rule was always tenuous in the extreme north. Stated in a phrase, it had never truly won them so as to be able to lose them later. It seems probable to conclude that population displacement in Cabo Delgado, as a case in point, limited infiltration southward since there was little manifestation of permanent guerrilla activity below the Messalo River prior to the Lisbon coup. The Makua-Makonde estrangement must, of course, be worked into the explanation of relative Portuguese success. Had not Lisbon resorted to the aldeamento scheme, it is reasonable to assume that FRELIMO penetration among the Makua would have been eased, however. Additionally, Portugal's unpreparedness in Tete facilitated FRELIMO's interaction among the scattered peoples of the northwest district. Here and later in the central districts, the delays and mistakes in satisfactory large-scale village resettlement left open the way for FRELIMO's lunge into the profitable and European-populated midlands.

Fixed within these parameters of mixed success and failure, a deeper examination can help clarify the distinct features of the aldeamento effort. Take as an example Cabo Delgado, comparatively the most thoroughly resettled district, where guerrilla raids on entrenched garrisons steadily intensified in audacity and firepower. All available evidence points to the inescapable conclusion in Cabo Delgado, as in Tete and elsewhere, of continued contact between aldeamento residents and cadres. In spite of the positioning of armed escorts, this most frequently occurred during daytime fieldwork. Even members of the self-defense militia collaborated with guerrillas, feeding, informing and occasionally turning firearms over to them. Inside the aldeamentos, insurgent undergrounds or pro-FRELIMO sympathizers weakened government attempts to have the population take positive actions on its behalf or to deny them contact with the guerrillas. Outside, the partisans fed on aldeamento crops in the nearby fields or cultivated their own narrow plots. The necessary airtight police and administrative apparatus, sometimes ascribed to repressive Portuguese authoritarianism by critics, was generally absent in the operation of most aldeamentos and regrouped villagers. Brutality substituted for efficiency in certain cases. There were instances where the inhabitants suffered reprisals for rebel shelling of the aldeamento or sabotage incidents in its vicinity. Milicias in other instances spared civilian lives either out of sympathy for the guerrillas or concern for their own welfare in the event of a FRELIMO victory. This accounts for the absence of widespread FRELIMO retaliation against the milicia guards after the war and for Portuguese suspicions of their trustworthiness during the conflict.
Mistrust of resettled populations led to caution in arming them. An army communiqué in January 1973 revealed that only two hundred thirty thousand persons took part in the self-defense system. Arming Mozambicans depended as much on interethnic animosities as on loyalty to Lisbon. The regular army or whiteofficered militia stood guard over communities of doubtful allegiance. Europeans were with few exceptions placed in command of Mozambican militiamen to prevent their slipping arms to insurgents. At any rate, Lisbon armed its self-defense villages and militia with World War I-vintage weapons, some captured from FRELIMO, and not the more highly prized G3s or other up-to-date firearms.

Formation and operation of the aldeamentos were almost certain to sow anti-Portuguese sentiments. And they did. The amount of ill will hinged on the magnitude of forced, as opposed to voluntary, participation. Accounts differ on the scope of coercion. Missionaries contended that relocation was carried out against the will of the people. Official presentations or sympathetic commentators to Lisbon argued that the guerrillas' blackmail, abductions and assassinations of the regedores and their subjects led them to bow, however reluctantly, to regroupment and to restrictions on their traditional ways. Droughts and cholera epidemics also worked to the advantage of resettlement when authorities promised relief on posters and leaflets (Aldeamentos: agua para todos--"Fortified villages: water for everyone"). The guerrillas' incapacity to care for all the internal refugees made the Portuguese alternative attractive to destitute civilians. Coercive methods and short notification periods (three days or even a couple of hours), nevertheless, characterized the establishment of far too many aldeamentos, and too many were set up without forethought to local agricultural practices and without proper consideration given to the adverse effects of varied ethnic composition. Mainly out of convenience, the government customarily maintained ethnic uniformity. When it was easier to gather differing groups together or when Lisbon strove to prove internationally its unique ability to maintain peace among varied peoples, the colonial authorities grouped them into a single location. In northeastern Cabo Delgado, where Makonde, Makua and smaller numbers of

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Yao and Ngoni converged, the government placed them in such showcase aldeamentos as Macomia and Palma for visitors. Whether they moved voluntarily or under compulsion, relocated villagers resented the displacement from their ancestral lands, the burnt huts, the loss of livestock, the close confinement and the regimentation of their movements. They missed sacred trees, favorite rocks and burial grounds. That government-settled whites inherited some lands in Cabo Delgado and Niassa vacated by aldeamento inhabitants exacerbated enmity between the races. Dissatisfaction with the aldeamento existence can be judged by the name given these villages in Tete, ntanga za mbudzi ("pens for goats"). Abuses were also present in the local administration of the aldeamentos. Giving wide latitude to local officials in the exercise of their duties--long a distinguishing trait of the Portuguese colonial edifice--opened the way for mistreatment of their
wards. It was argued that in spite of the privations and maltreatment aldeamento life spared the inhabitants from the perils of the traditional settlement where the army wiped them out as camps for the insurgents or the guerrillas intimidated or assassinated them. But the relative safety from the war's crossfire did not protect them from the abuses of unscrupulous low-echelon officials--Portuguese, Cape Verdean or Mozambican--br from African and white OPVDCs whose meager pay and slight social elevation made them behave more like thugs than protectors. Incidents of theft, rape and torture, while not generalized behavior, formed a part of the aldeamento experience along with hunger, poor sanitation, exposure to the elements during the construction phase and FRELIMO bombardments. In the better-run aldeamentos free of the worst harassment, the daily abrasion with a foreign lifestyle, Portuguese officialdom, soldiers and restrictive regulations produced alienation and disaffection among a rural populace formerly remote from colonialism.

The increasing educational and medical orientation moved closer to accepted norms of counterrevolutionary warfare but the implementation often went askew. It was characteristically disorganized, depending on the resolve and competency of district governors and local authorities, sometimes pitting them against each other for scarce resources and frequently running into the immobilizaqao of the bureaucracy. Underdeveloped and impoverished itself, Portugal lacked the wherewithal (with its own high level of illiteracy) for so enormous a project so belatedly begun.

The impact of the army's civic-action role had an impact on the military itself. Insofar as the Forras Armadas were concerned, the high command's conversion to the integration of political and military measures trickled down unevenly to the tactical level. At the field level, it ran counter to the traditional military outlook which army-conducted indoctrination never fully eroded. Instead, it bred ambivalence in many units about their mission. Officers staffing civic action programs resented the ruthlessness of elite troops for torpedoing their objectives.66 Settlers on the other hand opposed the new tactics as pale reflections of American methods in Vietnam and unsuited to underdeveloped Mozambique. To them the army was sinking in ambiguities.67

No military policy alone, no matter how well meaning or well administered, could overcome the basic dilemma that despite the military implications of many of the guerrilla actions, they were essentially political acts. As such, the counter response could have been more effectively managed by civilian personnel than military. Whereas the army tended to be abrupt, civilians were more patient in installing villagers in aldeamentos. Aside from the topmost levels, among them the Provincial Secretary for Lands and Development, Lisbon set forth no large-scale role for civilian personnel in civic action. The aldeamentos, particularly in the central zone, were almost wholly military in character, even though the Overseas Ministry was regarded as the better manager of protected villages. The Lisbon government, as in previous crises, turned almost exclusively to the army to
solve the problem of African nationalism. Military officers governed the guerrillainfiltrated districts and the conservative Governor-General Pimental dos Santos cooperated with Arriaga's extension of the army's responsibility for actions remote from conventional combat missions.68 The all-encompassing nature of the FRELI\'MO Revolution demanded broader participation than just the military to deal with the roots of social grievance and, more important, to introduce watertight security controls on population movement. Despite all their failings, a measure of aldeamento effectiveness can be deduced from FRELI\'MO's reactions to them. Labeling them "concentration camps," the guerrilla forces mortared and rocketed the protected villages on a fairly routine basis. FRELI\'MO struck most frequently and intensely in Tete, where regroupment stood a chance of slowing infiltration.69 Rapid-fire sieges were aimed at lowering Portuguese military prestige in local eyes and at negating whatever social benefits existed. But these shelling in fact strengthened the resolve of some village self-defense forces, such as Mecanhelas on the Malawi frontier.70 So, all regrouped or self-defended villages were not seedbeds of anti-Portuguese revolt. As for defense, the aldeamentos fared comparatively much better than the Diem regime's ill-fated strategic hamlets, although the latter faced the much more aggressive assaults of the Viet Cong. Yet the Portuguese administrators neglected to make constructive use of the positive reactions against rebel attacks. Their reluctance to involve aldeamento dwellers in self-government was an illustration of Portugal's ambivalence toward Mozambican rights and citizenship within the acclaimed multiracial and multicultural greater Portuguese nation. A major opportunity was missed in not building at least fledgling counterrevolutionary institutions in the fortified villages. Deficient in trained staffs and distrustful of Mozambicans, the authorities ruled out forming councils for the inhabitants' participation in local decisions, self-defense and the expenditure of simple taxes.71 Rather than fostering community spirit and promoting a sense of national solidarity the

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aldeamentos perpetuated colonial paternalism and subordination. In this respect, the aldeamento policy amounted to a microcosm of the Lisbon government's unwillingness to equip and legitimate a "native elite" to govern in its stead. These policies were not in keeping with the times or with the general aspirations for progress, full partnership and advancement so publicized by FRELI\'MO.

DEVELOPMENT

Aware of the financial strain of the FRELI\'MO Revolution, Lisbon progressively enlarged its commitment to modernize and diversify Mozambique's economy, hoping in the long run to have it assume more and more of the war's economic burden. An expanded and updated industrial and commercial infrastructure would also ultimately improve the lot of Mozambicans and demonstrate to the skeptical international community Portugal's capacity to develop the long-neglected colony.72 When nineteenth-century British humanitarians rebuked the Portuguese for slavery, Lisbon promulgated reforms "for the Englishman to see" (para o\' ingles ver). First, rising African nationalism and then the Revolution itself
radically reordered priorities. Thereafter, the Lisbon government instituted reforms and financed development "for the black man to see (para o preto ver). The aldeamento constituted a prominent dimension but not the only facet of the socioeconomic offensive.

Other aspects envisioned increased numbers of wage-paying jobs in an industrializing and commercializing society. Urban laborers, construction workers in particular, did see a raise in pay but never commensurate with white laborers, war-induced inflation or new taxes. The Portuguese were pleased by their progress in raising per capita income and publicized UN statistics showing favorable comparisons with other African states (see Table 5).

Mozambique's post-World War II development started before the Revolution with the first and second National Development Plans (1953-1958 and 1959-1964). A third Six Year Plan (1968-1973) came after a transition plan from 1965 to 1967, and allocated US $585 million (compared to US $863 million to Angola) for Mozambican projects. Lisbon, moreover, looked for international development funds. In the 1950s, it relaxed long-standing restraints against non-Portuguese investment. With the 1965 investment law, restrictions on international investing were discarded altogether and companies in nonstrategic fields could be 100 percent foreign financed. Foreign capital exceeded Portuguese capital, and the total investment to industry more than doubled to US $526 million from 1962 to 1969. During the first six months of 1973, plans for investment valued at US $400 million were approved.

The National Development plans earmarked major sums for transportation, hydroelectric power, communications, mining and manufacturing. Agriculture, forestry and livestock got sizeable backing, but health, education and housing received considerably smaller allocations. Mozambique's last twenty years of colonialism witnessed its most accelerated tempo of commerce, industry and agriculture.

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Table 5
Comparative Per Capita Income
(US dollars)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Territory</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>333</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese Guinea (Bissau)</td>
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<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>120</td>
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Lisbon planners centered the keystone of Mozambique's development on the Cabora Bassa Dam along the upper reaches of the Zambezi. They planned to sell its enormous electrical output (some 3.6 million kilowatts) to neighboring countries with South Africa purchasing the lion's share. They also foresaw dam water for irrigation and irrigated soil for European and African farm lands. In the distant but realizable future lay a vision of making the Zambezi navigable from the Indian Ocean to the Rhodesian-Zambian border. This would allow for the relatively inexpensive barge transport of the region's copper, fluospar, manganese, vanadium, nickel, chromium, asbestos and cokeable coal. Flushed with the economic possibilities of the Cabora Bassa complex, the Portuguese with typical hyperbole spoke of the region as the Ruhr of Africa.

Upon completion of the world's fifth largest dam, officials expected that Mozambique's augmented cement industry could fill its own needs and still export profitable quantities. Another spin-off of investment and construction projects was reflected in urban growth, transforming sleepy towns into bustling centers of activity, albeit often war related. Canteens, bars and shops catering to soldiers or construction workers sprang up even in faraway towns like Vila Cabral and Mueda. A westernized suburban community was created at Songo above the Cabora Bassa worksite to house the Portuguese, West European and South African engineers and their families for the dam's construction.

Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development

The communication network as well benefited from the war stimulus. Harbors were dredged, docks built and Nacala became a major east African port. Plans were underway when the fighting stopped to construct a massive harbor at Dobela Point, fifty miles south of the capital in order to rival South Africa's new installation at Richard's Bay. All-weather roads--a must for besieged garrisons or aldeamentos as well as for greater safety from landmines--served civilian transport, too. Preinsurgency Mozambique had relied on coastal shipping to meet trade and communication needs. Where rutted paths once crisscrossed the land, the army bulldozed dirt roads and tarred highways. Coastal towns were connected with each other and the interior by roads. Bridges spanned the Zambezi and Save as well as narrower rivers. At the time of the coup, roadways were expanding annually at a rate of 850 miles, and extensive highways linking interior towns were planned and funded. Although the mileage of asphalt road surface more than doubled during the Revolution, it still stood at only fourteen thousand miles in 1972.77 Judged by Western standards the record is perhaps unimpressive, but compared to the 850 miles of U.S.-built macadam roads in Vietnam from 1966 to 1972 or the 85 miles of asphalt roads constructed by the British during the twelve years of the Malaya Emergency, the Portuguese road-building record was respectable.

Because of the expense, Portugal laid much less railway track. One important exception involved the completion of the section linking Vila Cabral with the former railhead at Nova Freixo in Niassa in 1969 after twelve years of work and
delay. Inasmuch as air transport and air strikes figured in its counterinsurgency, the Forcas Armadas concentrated on upgrading existing airports and bulldozing scores of landing strips near small towns and fortified garrisons reaching 180 airfields and airstrips by 1972. Beginning the war with two international airports capable of handling large jets of the Boeing 737 class, the colonial government constructed seven more.

The private sector also spurted ahead nearly doubling the number of industrial establishments and employing one hundred thousand workers. According to Portuguese figures the total value of production between 1962 and 1970 rose from US $836 million to US $1,872 million. Manufacturing in consumer items, glass, chemicals, cement and petroleum refining accounted for from 14 to 15 percent of the GNP by early 1974. Significant as these modernizing transformations were, they represented counterinsurgency designs and large-scale development. But even the modest efforts to upgrade the traditional cultivation sector of the economy in which 93 percent of the population belonged went forward under the worst possible circumstances. Dislocations of war and regroupment in fact lowered agricultural yields in northern areas despite the installation of colonatos and aldeamentos. Cashew cultivation, Mozambique's foremost agricultural export, declined in Cabo Delgado whose propitious climate gave it a large slice of the prewar harvest. Cotton and maize from African farmers also fell off in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete.

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EDUCATION AND HEALTH
Cognizant that the daily lot of Mozambicans must be ameliorated and they must be persuaded by the advantages of membership in a Greater Portugal, Lisbon moved to rectify its educational neglect. The 1972 colonial budget put aside a hefty 361 million escudos for Mozambican education. Education is always a vehicle for propaganda, and Lisbon designed it in the words of one critic for "the inculcation of Portuguese values and promotion among African schoolchildren of a conscious identification with Portugal." Textbooks, for example, focused on Portuguese history and geography, and pictures showed European scenes to the Mozambican student. Lisbon placed a premium on primary and technical schooling. University education stood beyond the financial and scholastic reach of all but a tiny minority of African pupils, possibly numbering two dozen at the University of Lourenço Marques out of a student body one hundred times that figure.

Primary education accounted for 87 percent of the total 1972 enrollment of 605,068 pupils. Civilian staffing remained a critical problem, and the army, deficient in numbers and training itself, tried to bridge the teacher void. Murupa wrote in 1973 that the Forgas Armadas administered 417 primary schools with 10,600 pupils, for whom about one thousand soldiers were assigned. In spite of civilian and military emphasis, Lourenço Marques' Noticias disclosed that only 30 percent of the territory's school-aged children attended school in 1972. It estimated literacy at 7 percent. This record, as Lisbon pointed out, compared
favorably with many independent African states, but it did not convince Portugal's international critics nor FRELIMO that the status quo should be preserved. Health facilities, mobile medical teams and doctors were likewise boasted by colonial spokesmen to be ahead of independent African governments in Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zaire. FRELIMO countercharged that the Portuguese concentrated hospitals and doctors within urban centers in the south. Here again, the pattern was not at variance with independent African states where services converged in cities after decolonization. It took the appearance of FRELIMO, nevertheless, to move Lisbon toward greater concern for Mozambicans' health and to launch itinerant medicine in the backcountry. Coordination of the administrative network for rural development, hospital services, transport systems and educational matters came late with the first meeting of the governor-general with provincial secretaries and district governors in January 1971. But after this date coordination never flowed systematically anyway because of the stepped-up fighting. Warfare not only burdened the rural population with additional deprivation and oppression but also hampered the government's responses to alleviate depressed conditions. Improvements in the standard of living and more available education were no magic formula to arrest the spread of nationalism. Indeed it is difficult to make a case in Africa where aspirations Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development toward political independence have been bought off by promised or real socioeconomic advances by the colonial power. If anything, development hastens political emancipation. In part because of Portugal's espousal of modernization, education and urbanization in the form of aldeamentos, regroupment and swelling towns, the forces against its colonialism could only be strengthened as they had been in former British and French African colonies. Once set in motion, ameliorative endeavors spelled an end to the ancien regime not so much for Alexis de Tocqueville's argument that revotions occur in periods of economic and political upswing as for the changes they bring.88

REDAFITED RELATIONSHIP AND INFLATION
Reforms in the Mozambican-Portuguese relationship constituted the basic ingredient of a moderate option to Lisbon's flagging conventional colonialism. Considered more progressive than Salazar, Prime Minister Caetano introduced and carried out two broad policy modifications which represented breaks from his predecessor's course. In June 1972, a year and a half after Caetano presented his constitutional reforms to the metropolitan National Assembly, Mozambique and Angola became designated "states" within the Portuguese nation. This new Organic Law for the Overseas Territories advanced modest powers to the provincial governments "without affecting the unity of the nation." It replaced the Legislative Council with twenty-seven seats (largely appointed by the governorgeneral) and had a fifty-member Legislative Assembly. Twenty of the seats were elected by an educationally restricted franchise; the remaining thirty members were selected by reliable traditional authorities, businessmen's and officially sponsored workers' organizations and the Church.
For the sake of domestic consumption and international publicity, Lisbon, as noted in Chapter 5, electorally managed and calculatedly appointed a narrow non-European majority of twenty-six representatives to the Legislative Assembly in the March 1973 election. In this election only 109,171 ballots were cast from a white and black population of over eight million. Subject to Lisbon's ultimate veto, Mozambique's local assembly was empowered to legislate taxes and supervise spending of provincial funds. The metropolitan government kept its centralist authority over defense, foreign relations and financing from outside the province; its appointed governor-general held overall executive powers. Nonetheless, the new Organic Law advanced the first tentative step toward an incipient colonial federation but it was not a viable program by the 1970s.

The second major departure from New State policy undid the plan for economic integration of the colonies with the metropole. Back in 1963, Salazar had endorsed a ten-year program for gradual reduction of tariffs and an establishment of a common currency between the colonies and the metropole. Back in 1963, Salazar had endorsed a ten-year program for gradual reduction of tariffs and an establishment of a common currency between the colonies and the metropole. Over the years, Mozambique had accumulated huge debts with Portugal by purchasing goods with Revolution and Counterrevolution

their territorial escudos. When Caetano put forth the reversal of the Salazarian plan, the two "overseas provinces" had amassed obligations of 10 billion Portuguese escudos (US $367 million) or 5 percent of Portugal's annual Gross National Product. Under the revised system, Lisbon issued loans and inaugurated an alternate repayment machinery, which put Portugal on a similar basis to foreign countries. Put briefly, it required payment for goods and services in foreign or metropolitan currency, not Mozambican escudos. Under the altered arrangement, Mozambique continued to import more than it exported, although its balance of trade deficit declined.

By abolishing economic regulations over Mozambique's expenditures, the reforms dissolved many of the mercantile ties between colony and mother country. This dissolution also removed objections to Portugal's bid for a form of associate membership with the European Economic Community, which it attained on July 22, 1972. A younger generation of Portuguese economists, businessmen and technocrats worked for severance of the tie with Africa and for association with the Common Market to break the stultifying economic isolation of the Iberian peninsula. Nor was this all: the trend toward colonial self-funding for defense was accentuated and formalized. Lourenço Marques' share of the defense costs doubled between 1960 and 1970 to 28 percent of military expenditure. Taxes were imposed or raised on a wide variety of items and services including newspapers, entertainment, government documents and imported goods as the war dragged on. There were likewise some benefits for European businessmen in Mozambique. Much to their relief, the metropole no longer demanded exclusive purchase of certain commodities--wine, textiles, olive oil and leather products. Additionally, it dropped restrictions prohibiting colonists or foreign investors from setting up industries or firms that competed with metropolitan-based companies. This economic turnabout had begun to stimulate local production of
consumer items formerly imported. Figures placed annual economic growth between 6 and 8 percent dating from 1962 to 1973, well ahead of most sovereign African states to the pleasure of Lisbon.94 Assuming the politicomilitary situation would hold steady, the business community planned several new investments. Nearly four hundred new industrial establishments started operating in 1973 and overall industrial activity soared to 10 percent over 1972. One source contended that the textile industry experienced a 300 percent growth from 1970 to 1972.95 The initial shortages, however, spawned higher prices, and the territorial government spent more than it got in revenues. These difficulties lay beyond the colonial authorities' control, for they faced urgent outlays for the war and lost port and transit revenues due to the international sanctions and blockade against Rhodesia which cost the government an estimated $200 million from 1966 to mid-1971. The inflationary pump was further primed by heavy funding for Mozambique's economic infrastructure. Budgets for roads jumped from 354 million escudos in 1971 to 540 million in 1974 and expenditures for railways and ports leaped to 3,300 million escudos in 1974 from 2,000 million in 1971. One estimate

Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development placed 25 percent of the military's budget in construction of asphalt roads, hospitals and airfields in the north and northwest.96 Together with the economic reforms, the large sums of development capital expended in the final years of the war promoted an unbalanced and hectic prosperity. Inflation leaped to 15 percent in 1971, and became a grave concern to the governor-general's overall counterrevolutionary program.97 DEVELOPMENT AND REVOLUTION Development fueled revolution. It raised expectations among urban and village youths before the start of the Revolution or before the guerrilla cadres reached them. As such, it clearly defined the discrepancy between what individuals expected and what they were likely to obtain under continued colonialism and persisting racial attitudes of the settlers. In the countryside, the rural poor experienced freshly stirred frustrations with the rub of a distant government's alien regulations and ironically with glimpses of a better life as conveyed by that government's efforts to improve standards for them. Their hopes to escape misery and disease, as a case in point, were dashed when roving mobile units of the Servigo de Accao Psicossocial cared for the needy or disbursed farming information and then hurriedly shuffled off to the next village leaving the recipients more embittered than ever.98 In this sense the relative deprivation felt by rural Mozambicans in battle zones confirms Ted Robert Gurr's findings in Why Men Rebel that awakened anger, frustration and discontent, when focused on political objectives, can sustain revolt.99 Among some of those Mozambican workers (industrial, commercial and clerical) whose lives underwent gradual betterment and promised a continuation of the same, FRELIMO enjoyed sympathy, if not concrete support, because an independent Mozambique free of Europeans seemed to offer even larger rewards.
Change then interrupted the prevailing notion of irremediable abject poverty. The full scope of the socioeconomic counteroffensive, although not a break with counterrevolutionary theory, went further than most antiguerilla campaigns around the world. Lacking a political component, it could never satisfy its opponents, however. By way of contrast, FRELIMO enjoyed the great advantage of a challenger who can promise more once the incumbent is swept from office. The Portuguese had to stand on their record, not promises alone.

Economic growth is not the "decisive" cause of revolution but it must be enumerated among the necessary conditions. Being the agents of modernity in a foreign land as well as being locked in a protracted war--"the locomotive of history"--with indigenous forces, Portugal had the historical cards stacked against it. Even had Lisbon militarily defeated or contained the FRELIMO challenge, it could not have postponed the question of nationalism indefinitely. Only the form may have been modified to be more amenable to Lisbon's interests. The unsettling experiences of

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rapid and uneven economic modernization alone without political updating fanned a revolutionary situation. As in other disordered environments, the revolution sprang from the frontiers of social change, where the impact of western economic penetration, European ideas and modern mores proved most disequilibrating. Commercialization, mechanization and rationalization of the traditional African ethos generated societal traumas sharpened by racial antagonism and political alienation. Colonialism, even a liberalizing brand, and modernization induced social change which eroded ancient seawalls of custom. History shows that earnest and well-meaning reform exertions can hasten as well as forestall the coming of revolution.

8 Foreign Assistance
We are good friends with both Portugal and Rhodesia, and good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what their duty is if a neighbor's house is on fire. I assure you that whatever becomes necessary will be done.
--South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster
International support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country or any nation.
--Mao Tse-tung
What makes Mao's 1935 assertion so illuminating today is that neither he nor his emulators openly stressed the importance of foreign assistance to revolution. It nevertheless bears witness to the pivotal contribution of outside aid. Even the Chinese communists, the foremost exponents of self-reliance in revolutionary conflicts, were better able to pass from guerrilla campaigns to mobile, or conventional, warfare and to mount their final offensive against the Nationalists, when the Soviet Union turned over resource-rich Manchuria and large stocks of
captured Japanese materiel to Mao's forces in 1946. The years since China's Revolution have marked a mounting trend for international recognition and assistance to revolutionary movements just as some besieged regimes have enjoyed external backing. Examples of intrusive elements in local conflicts grid the globe and embrace the insurgencies in Greece, Southeast Asia, Algeria and sub-Saharan Africa. If anything, the internationalization of parochial wars has escalated as Cold War rhetoric has cooled. It is as if the East-West superpowers, confrontation had moved from a possible conflict in Europe to the Third World. This shift has been away from conventional warfare across the European continent, which could lead to nuclear holocaust, to brushfire wars fought by

172 Revolution and Counterrevolution proxies in the world's onetime peripheries. Safer from rapid escalation to World War III, these low-intensity campaigns have been entered into or orchestrated by East and West for essential resources, prestige or strategic vantage points. On a scale of international interference in African conflicts, the Mozambican Revolution stands about midway between the relative isolation of the Mau Mau rising against British rule and the massive intervention into the Angolan Civil War by the Soviet-Cuban forces and South African troops. Both Mozambican revolutionaries and Portuguese colonialists received armament, training opportunities and moral backing from their respective donors. Mozambique's independence war had progressed to the most internationalized of the three Luso-African conflicts before the foreign involvement on a grand scale in the twilight of Angola's colonial period. Along with Western alignment behind Portugal and the two communist giants' promotion of FRELIMO, the white regimes in South Africa and especially Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) came to more direct participation in Mozambique during precoup times than in either Guinea-Bissau or even Angola. Mozambique's geographical position, sharing contiguous borders with both white-dominated states and providing a communication gateway to the Indian Ocean for Rhodesia, evoked deep concern in Salisbury and Pretoria for the outcome of the fighting.

The complexities of outside actors were compounded by the presence of subconflicts within the main Mozambican battle. ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) guerrillas, for instance, jumped off Mozambican operational bases for forays into Rhodesia from December 1972, and Rhodesian counterinsurgency units moved at will into Mozambique against them and FRELIMO. Zimbabweans also fought in FRELIMO detachments against the Portuguese contrary to declarations about the Mozambican exclusiveness of their ranks. In addition to direct military and nonmilitary relief to recipients in the Mozambican Revolution, there existed much available literature on the conduct of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns. Field manuals, handbooks and political tracts from Mao Tse-tung, "Che" Guevara or Vo Nguyen Giap and their counterrevolutionary opposite numbers (particularly in French which many Portuguese officers spoke)
proliferated and complemented alien instruction. FRELIMO officials spoke of having studied the lessons of China, Angola, Vietnam, Algeria and Kenya. For their part, Portuguese officers were familiar with the writings of Mao and Guevara along with Roger Trinquier and Robert Thompson. Ready information from books as well as foreign cadres helps us understand the transformation of nineteenth-century indigenous risings into orchestrated revolutionary wars of the present era in Mozambique and elsewhere. This explanation similarly makes more comprehensible the reason why the incumbent forces readily adopt standard counterinsurgency responses, sometimes without proper modification for local configurations.

The determining impact of foreign involvement, however, is no less difficult to ascertain because of the recognizable patterns of FRELIMO and Portuguese politicomilitary maneuvers. Neither the dissemination of guerrilla or counterguerrilla know-how nor the extension of military hardware alone can be singled out as conclusive determinants of victory or defeat. Both camps depended on their respective foreign benefactors, perhaps FRELIMO more than Portugal, but the precise advantage it gave one over the other will remain a moot point obscured by heated polemics. Excluding the key contribution of the sanctuary camps in adjoining states to FRELIMO’s ultimate victory, the most that can be safely judged about international support is that neither side could have carried on in the manner it did without external patronage. The insurgency and countercampaign would then probably have been conducted along the lines of a Mau Mau revolt or nineteenth-century insurrection.

The purpose of this chapter is an exposition of verifiable external factors in the Mozambican Revolution. As with so many points in war and politics, the full story of foreign intrusion will emerge when none cares whether it does or not; which is to say not in the foreseeable future. That which follows is not intended as a cataloguing of the financial sums or material goods given to Portugal or FRELIMO during the ten years of colonial war in Mozambique. Others have attempted that. Rather, it is a synthesis of the types of assistance, the role alien sustenance played in the war and an evaluation of the kinds of outside support to incumbent and challenger, neither of which received excessive amounts.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PORTUGAL

Financial, military and diplomatic assistance to Portugal flowed entirely from the West. It sparingly underwrote Lisbon and its African wars for three principal reasons: Portuguese colonies possessed valuable resources with enticing investment opportunities, their location athwart the oil lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and adjacent to the staunchly anticomunist states of Rhodesia and South Africa conferred geostrategic prominence on them and their collapse would open a vacuum in the African subcontinent to what were assessed as instruments of Sino-Soviet designs. Lisbon’s spokesmen did their utmost to bolster these perceptions, particularly among NATO partners who furnished the bulk of monetary and combat support.2 American assistance was further predicated on Portugal’s possession of the Cape
Verde Islands and the mid-Atlantic Azores Islands which form a communications link with Western Europe and the Middle East. The essentialness of the refueling facilities on the Azores was driven home during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when West European states, under Arab oil pressure, closed their airports to American resupply transports bound for Israel. Only Portugal cooperated. Economic aid from the United States alone was put at $202 million from 1949 to 1968 with $120 million of that figure granted in the last six years. Renegotiation of the Azores base agreement in 1971 by the Nixon Administration gave Portugal $30 million under the PL 480 "Food for Peace" program and opened access to $400 million in Export-Import Bank credits, most of which was not used before the wars finished. Although these types of loans were to be spent in Portugal, they freed funds for the African wars. Moreover, they helped a hard-pressed economy combat inflation, improve balance-of-payment difficulties and finance development projects in the metropole.

Other Western countries advanced sizeable investment funds for Mozambique as well as Portugal. Faced with galloping defense costs, the Lisbon government, as noted in Chapter 7, relaxed embargos on external financing for Mozambican projects, which rose from 25 percent in the second Six Year Plan (1959-1964) to 40 percent by 1969. It expected non-Portuguese sources to pour in 36 percent of the investment total in the third development plan (1968-1973). Financial institutions and extractive corporations in France, Britain, West Germany and Japan in particular directed capital to oil and mineral exploration, sugar production, ore mining and cashew production. South Africa's Anglo-American Corporation reached into almost every sector of the country's developing economy. So prodigious had the South African share of the Mozambican market grown that by the last year of colonial rule, the Republic had replaced Portugal as the colony's largest trading partner and investor. Informed settlers and army officers thought that Portugal was biting someone else's bullet. They rankled at their homeland's economic frailty, resented the extensive South African investment and chafed at the image of Portugal as half defunct empire, half colony of wealthier Western nations. These feelings ran counter to pitted resolve and high morale. Their exact impact on the military's performance or its underlying motives for a coup are as difficult to gauge as it is to imagine Portugal without extraneous bankrolling. They certainly did little for the well-known Iberian self-esteem. Concern for South African investment among settlers may have led a Portuguese official to boast unrealistically about the Cabora Bassa project allowing for the settlement of one million Portuguese immigrants as proof of Portugal's retention of the colony in the face of Pretoria's financial encroachments. The outside funding, nevertheless, hitched Portugal's impoverished wagon to financial superstars for developing Mozambique's natural assets in a way impossible from Portuguese resources alone.

MILITARY AID TO PORTUGAL
Military assistance to Lisbon fell into two broad classifications: one type comprised weaponry, instructional opportunities or war-related equipment, such as trucks or transport airplanes; and the other involved outside military or paramilitary intervention against FRELIMO. Much of the American and European war materiel arrived via their NATO membership. American military aid was estimated to have totaled $349 million by 1968, $301 million of which was received by 1961. Thereafter Washington's contribution fell below $5 million annually.1 Military-related supplies, among them

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For sophisticated armament Lisbon, without its own capabilities, depended on grants or sales from the West. Of all military aid, aircraft were the most vital. Into this category fell spotter planes (Piper Cubs), prop-driven bombers (Harvard), jet fighters (German-made Fiat G-91--adapted for short runways and thus exceptionally suitable for bush operations), helicopters (Alouette and Puma) and air transports (Noratlas Boeing 707, C-47 and C-54) for the Forga A~rea Portuguesa (FAP).14 Likewise, the Portuguese navy got its frigates minesweepers, submarines and corvettes from European shipyards.15 While the mission of these larger ships was supportive, with no coastal barrages fired in the east African war, small patrol craft and inflatable boats were deployed constantly on Mozambique's waterways.

The army employed French Panhard armored cars and moved men in West German Unimog vehicles and Berliet troop carriers, which were assembled in Portugal. These same states and others also furnished handguns and rifles; West Germany, for example, sold ten thousand Israeli Uzi submachine guns to Portugal in 1961 and Belgium delivered the FN automatic NATO rifle. Periodically, FRELIMO exhibited captured NATO arms, as for example at the All-African Trade Fair in Kenya in January 1972, to point up its contention of West European complicity in Portugal's colonialism.16 Figures for arms transfers to Portugal declined markedly from US $175 million between 1966 and 1970 to $60 million between 1971 and 1974, which reflected greater spending on socioeconomic projects from the military budgets.17

The war also stimulated Portugal's light arms industry. Under German license and with German cooperation, it manufactured the G-3 automatic rifle which came to be the standard infantry weapon. The factory at Braco da Prata also turned out the HK 21 machine gun and the 60 mm mortar given much use in Mozambique. Despite what was viewed by Portugal's critics as its free access to an external cornucopia of military supplies, the Portuguese forces were in reality strapped in quantity and quality of their weaponry. The antiquity and
shabbiness of equipment often struck visitors. Outdated and worn-out planes made up the air fleet. Minuscule by modern criteria, its age and tortuous operating circumstances took their toll accounting for frequent groundings. Portugal's tiny artillery arm consisted of mainly World War II vintage cannons like the 155 mm howitzer.

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Besides, bombings and artillery concentrations proved of no great avail either in Mozambique or in South Vietnam, where the American effort dwarfed Portugal's feeble counterstrokes. The Forgas Armadas normally deployed its few field pieces defensively in fortified positions. They were generally ineffective against roving guerrilla units. Air power worked to the Portuguese advantage only against ascertainable or fixed targets, usually camps in the forest bases. Air mobility definitely benefited the Forgas Armadas in offensive maneuvers or in defensive relief missions but the dearth of helicopters denied Portuguese forces the mobility and surprise of the Americans or French in their counterinsurgency campaigns. Additional inadequacies beset Lisbon's military exertions. The want of effective mine detectors or sufficient batteries for the existing ones, as mentioned earlier, necessitated the use of the pica to probe roads for deadly landmines. Without enough repair and maintenance shops, the modest number of new pieces of equipment soon deteriorated in the alternating seasons of dust and mud. Portuguese troops did not think highly of their domestically manufactured G-3 automatic rifle. Officers recognized that when armed with the AK 47 the individual guerrilla's firepower surpassed the volume of his Portuguese counterpart. None of the luxuries—iced beer or hot Christmas dinners flown to front-line troops—of the Americans in South Vietnam was present in Mozambique. Bereft of reliable air support indeed made life in isolated garrisons on a near-animal level as well as precarious. Many are the stories of Portuguese soldiers huddling for weeks in cramped fortified posts of twenty to thirty men with only a handful of rounds for their weapons. Resolute guerrilla assaults would have overrun them.

Certain Western countries granted military instruction to a sprinkling of Portuguese personnel. In particular, France and the United States shared counterinsurgency practices. On the outskirts of Lisbon, an American twenty-five-man Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) carried on training in counterguerrilla techniques. A fraction of Portuguese officers journeyed to the United States for specialized training in flying combat support missions, electronics, communications or psychological warfare at Ft. Bragg. General Arriaga, as previously pointed out, visited the United States for two weeks before taking up his command in Mozambique. While touring American military installations, he talked with Vietnam veteran General Westmoreland and Air Force General Ryan. Their tactical influences on Portuguese operations included the coordination of ground and air assaults on rebel positions. The French training connection was more buried from public scrutiny than the American. Although the details of this relationship are not yet known, they encompassed a personal tie linking Portuguese officers with the
Gaullist party in general and Arriaga and President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in particular.20 An affinity of political interests among leaders and the similarity of antinationalist conflicts in their colonies were sharpened by Portuguese admiration for things French. Additionally many more Portuguese officers spoke French than English or German. There are only

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scattered reports of Lisbon's soldiers relying on the experience of French martial arts acquired from veterans of Algeria.21 But this slender documentation can be given credence by several parallel counterinsurgency institutions between the two countries. Among them are the mobile psychosocial units, helicopter tactics, elite forces with special missions and the concoction of a counterideology. West Germany may have schooled Portuguese espionage teams, although there is no hard evidence for the allegation. One British magazine charged that West German intelligence officers cooperated with the PIDE/DGS in a 1968 campaign against FRELIMO which culminated in Mondlane's assassination.22 Bonn's assistance definitely extended to the treatment of gravely wounded Portuguese soldiers. But no civilian administrators, black or white, underwent training in the West for staffing civic-action programs in Mozambique. This constituted a deficiency in Lisbon's counterrevolutionary posture together with those of other Western responses.23

The exchange of information was a two-way street. Western military missions periodically toured the African war zones at Lisbon's invitation and conferred with its officers.24 How much Western soldiers learned from the Portuguese about rural revolution in Africa has not transpired abundantly in military publications. Undoubtedly, the South African and Rhodesian defense establishments, because of their need to prepare for similar fighting, gleaned as much as possible from the successes and failures of their neighbor.25 Why, if Portugal stood so staunchly in Western ranks, was it not better supplied by its allies? Part of the answer lies in the unfashionableness of Lisbon's cause. Whereas financial investment in Portugal or Mozambique itself, it could be argued, played an indirect or noncombatant role in Lusitanian counterinsurgency, external military support for Portugal placed the West in a more direct antinationalist stance not calculated to win friends among independent African states. The international unpopularity attached to Lisbon's policy in Africa and the constraints on NATO equipment outside of Europe, although more honored at times in the breach than in practice, circumscribed greater logistical support. How FRELIMO--working alone or with other nationalist movements, communist states and Western sympathizers--attempted to isolate Lisbon from the world community will be touched on below. Here it needs only to be stated that the effort paid off. Satisfied with its advancement of social and economic development, Lisbon more than once invited UN representatives to its three African territories to judge for themselves, but there were never any takers. FRELIMO's international campaign to activate an "external force" to depress its enemy's strategic superiority was in a sense a version of Mao's beliefs in the
1930s that foreign factors (in this case the United States in the Pacific war against Japan) would destroy Japanese power in China.26 Lisbon persisted in seeking arms from Washington, alternately bargaining for them as a condition for use of the Azores or offering Mozambique's Indian Ocean port of Nacala.

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to the American navy but to no avail.27 Under internal pressure, Bonn also withheld some armament when it announced in mid-1971 the cessation of transfers of Fiat G-91 jet planes because earlier deliveries had been used beyond NATO's perimeters.28 There were other reasons for a less than wholehearted underwriting of Portugal's embattled presence in Africa.

Quite possibly, Lisbon's propaganda utterances that it verged on defeating its enemies may also have worked against additional Western assistance. The related matter of Portuguese pride and Lisbon's aversion to countenance foreign interference in its conduct of the wars likewise may have contributed to shortages. Long sensitive to foreign criticism (and with good reason), Portugal feared the loss of prestige or even some degree of its cherished sovereignty with alien meddling, no matter how well meant.29 Neither South African nor Rhodesian support came near to even the limited leverage Washington exercised on the Saigon government. In spite of Pretoria and Salisbury's proddings to run the war more aggressively, the Lisbon government clung to its direction, although Rhodesian forces had begun to operate almost at will in sections of western Mozambique in the several months preceding the coup.

Turning then to the role of South African and Rhodesian cooperation with the Portuguese government, it took many of the same American and European forms. According to Portuguese deserters, the Rhodesians, for example, gave instructions to the GEs.30 Salisbury's hospitals treated seriously wounded Portuguese soldiers and South Africa furnished equipment. One dimension of assistance from Mozambique's neighbors, however, stood in stark contrast to other Western aid--actual combat-force intervention. And while NATO staff officers occasionally held conferences with Portuguese commanders, lowerechelon South African and Rhodesian military and police officials talked on a day-to-day basis with Portuguese compatriots. This close cooperation among the three governments was as much pragmatic as ideological. At stake were one of land-encircled Rhodesia's main communication routes across Mozambique and South Africa's Mozambican buffer against onrushing African nationalism. United Nations sanctions against the Ian Smith government made his regime's dependence all the greater on the goodwill of Mozambique whose officials falsified documents on goods to and from Rhodesia. By using South African ports and that of Lourenço Marques rather than Beira, which the Royal Navy had patrolled since 1966, lavish sanction busting supplied the hard-pressed Rhodesian settler community with plentiful oil shipments.31 Survival and mutual interests dictated a policy of togetherness which extended to over-the-border help to the Forgas Armadas in Mozambique. Pretoria's supplies covered South African Willys jeeps, radio transmitters, horses for the tardily instituted cavalry tracking dogs and food flown into beleaguered posts like Mueda.3 Founded in 1967, the Southern Cross Fund first sent gifts of
cigarettes to Portuguese soldiers and then in 1970 donated equipment to hospitals in Mozambique. White South Africans also established the Mozambique Soldiers' Comfort Fund to give cigarettes, soap and other small amenities to those whom they viewed as being on the front lines for them. (North Korea furnished cigarettes to FRELIMO.) South Africans also displayed Sino-Soviet weapons captured from the guerrillas. To southern African whites, the Mozambican Revolution constituted a preview of their own future with the minority regime's forces pitted against communist-trained and -equipped African nationalists.

South Africa's intrusion into Mozambique's conflict reportedly amounted to the lower profile of paramilitary police units instead of regular army troops, and it is much less easy to verify than Rhodesia's frequent combat raids. Pretoria purportedly rotated about two hundred to three hundred paramilitary policemen on the south bank of the Zambezi near the Cabora Bassa construction site beginning in 1968. Their missions were said to have entailed protecting the dam, supporting the right flank of Rhodesia's northeast triangle and gaining experience in antiguerilla techniques. Pretoria's involvement, if any, was narrow in order to escape being dragged into an across-the-border confrontation should Mozambique fall to FRELIMO. More plausibly, it was claimed that South Africa disguised troop interference in Mozambique by allowing Rhodesian units to recruit from its Defence Force for combat duty into the Portuguese colony.

A South African presence on the Zambezi, which some political and military commentators in Pretoria regarded as the forward trenches, may have been judged as added insurance against guerrilla assaults on the Republic. Calling attention to this eventuality was the Portuguese interception near the town of Vila Pery in June 1968 of a small band of insurgents from the Pan Africanist Congress bent on a foray into South Africa. Clashes with South African forces were reported by FRELIMO, and denied by Pretoria and Lisbon. It seems that Pretoria fixed its real concern and hence its arena of active military involvement on Rhodesia which according to some predictions of the day seemed the most likely to topple to nationalist assaults. By its own statements and large forces in Mozambique, Lisbon appeared to have things in hand. So, South Africa instead dispatched two thousand paramilitary policemen, planes, helicopters and crews to Rhodesia. South African civilian pilots, however, on at least one occasion sold their services to fly defoliant missions in northern Mozambique. In sum, Pretoria's assistance amounted to more financial aid and material support than military intrusion, although it stood ready to offer that, too.

RHODESIAN INTERVENTION

The trajectory of Rhodesian military involvement, in contrast to that of South Africa, ranged higher and deadlier. Shared interests, if not always tight coordination, characterized the politicomilitary relationship between Portugal and Rhodesia. Certainty about the chronology of their collaboration is difficult to set forth. One initial sign of cooperation emerges with Salisbury's willingness to return fleeing nationalists after colonial...
authorities cracked down on NESAM, the Mozambican student group, in 1964.41 Another early feature of this close interaction showed itself before the Revolution in the granting of permission for the establishment of PIDE/DGS offices on Rhodesian territory. These actions represented a prelude to direct Rhodesian opposition to FRELIMO. Contrary to Salisbury’s denials, its troops operated in Mozambique on the minimum of "hot pursuit" from at least (and most likely before) April 21, 1971, when the first Rhodesian soldier was reportedly killed. In April 1973, Arriaga disclosed what had been assumed for two years, a "gentleman's agreement" between Portugal and Rhodesia enabling their respective troops to cross their common border in pursuit of FRELIMO or ZANU guerrillas.42

During the height of the Battle for Central Mozambique, Rhodesia’s earlier incursions went beyond "hot pursuit" forays by its elite Special Air Service (SAS). Salisbury in fact assumed zonal responsibility for antiinsurgency probes in the borderlands around the town of Vila Pery (Chimoio) with helicopter-borne Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI). Prior to this, more and more of western Tete had turned into a Rhodesian battleground. SAS and RLI detachments, ferried across the boundary, staged assaults and gathered local intelligence north and south of the Zambezi before returning to their bases.43 Portugal’s virtual abandonment of vast areas of western Tete left a vacuum and exposed Rhodesia to resumed ZANU infiltration, which began again in December 1972 against the tobacco-growing district of Centenary. The Smith government moved to fill the void. Mozambique’s authorities reacted to Salisbury’s charges of ineffectual measures against guerrilla operating in southern and western Tete by pointing to the establishment of FRELIMO camps just inside Rhodesia from which Mozambican guerrillas struck back across the border. FRELIMO had cleverly capitalized on the ill-defined frontier to hide staging bases, although the bush was thicker on the Mozambique side of the border. Its line of march proceeded down the string of poor Mozambican villages along the boundary to strike at Changara in southernmost Tete and into Manica district in the months preceding the coup. Seen from another angle, the border posed obstacles for FRELIMO. Mozambican informers slipped across the frontier to their safety and to their Rhodesian paymaster. From time to time, FRELIMO pursued informants into Rhodesian villages to kidnap or silence them.44 Given the high caliber of Rhodesian intelligence analysis and the information transference to the Portuguese army, FRELIMO border violations verged on necessity.45 Clashes with Salisbury’s forces inevitably ensued.

FRELIMO guerrillas accompanied ZANU insurgents in their raids in an effort to force the Rhodesians back on the defensive and to stand shoulder to shoulder in revolutionary solidarity with the Zimbabweans; but the Mozambican nationalists denied their cooperative ventures.46 This harmony of goals in the Mozambican Revolution foreshadowed the postindependence cooperation of Maputo with the Zimbabwean guerrillas and helps explain the People’s Republic of Mozambique’s stubborn commitment to the Zimbabwean cause.
The use of the borderlands by both FRELIMO and ZANU called for more integration of battle plans between the Mozambican authorities and the Smith government. So, by late 1972 Rhodesian visitations were often coordinated with the Forgas Armadas' sweeps in the vicinity of M-göe, Mucumbura, Metapse, Cachambha and Daue which lay in the belt of land between the Zambezi River and the Rhodesian boundary line. Angered by and anxious about Portuguese martial vigor, the Salisbury government dispatched its men to the fighting from a perception of necessity. Accordingly, Rhodesian forces switched from "hot pursuit" counter raids in western Tete to longer duration operations into central Mozambique. The incidence of Rhodesian strikes escalated along with their scale from three or four a month in 1971 to at least one a day in early 1974.47 These missions gave the SAS and RLI valuable insights into guerrilla actions which they put to use against the Patriotic Front guerrilla after Mozambique's independence. Furthermore, they confirmed their prejudices of overall Portuguese inefficiency while acknowledging and admiring the outbursts of Latin courage. Rhodesian soldiers accused the Portuguese infantry of singing, shouting or noisemaking to avoid contact with FRELIMO units. South African and Rhodesian military experts criticized their neighbor's regular units for being "camp oriented" but acknowledged that its elite units ranked high with crack troops anywhere. 8 Proud of their guerrilla nickname--"the ghosts"--Salisbury's troopers boasted that FRELIMO insurgents especially feared them.49 For their part, Portuguese officers and enlisted men spoke with respect for the Rhodesian's soldiering skills but expressed disapproval at their ruthlessness toward civilians and prisoners.50 They showed anger at their neighbors' slurs on their warring abilities and rebuked charges that South African and Rhodesian units played leading parts in the war as "insults to their national honour.1'5 Familiarity bred friction which had as much to do with differences in the Anglo-Saxon and Latin temperament as the usual esprit de corps among fighting men. Yet this friction appeared never to impair the effectiveness of Salisbury's sweeps which guerrillas and the Forgas Armadas appraised as tactically disruptive to FRELIMO. Explanations of Rhodesian success lie in the self-contained nature of their forays, their higher morale and their aggressiveness. They relied on their own logistical and intelligence resources, merely informing the Forcas Armadas where in the zones under their quasi-responsibility they would strike. These tactics and qualities were given more prominent display once Lisbon's imperium faded and Rhodesia stood nearly alone against its own multiplying adversaries. How much Smith's forces hindered FRELIMO's advances and consolidation of an infrastructure eludes a precise answer but the intervention was minimized by Rhodesians, Portuguese and Mozambicans for reasons of self-interest. None wanted to divulge the level of effectiveness: for Lisbon it meant a loss of face, for Salisbury an admission of its involvement and for FRELIMO an acknowledgment of Rhodesian adeptness. Had not the Smith government intervened, it is safe to conclude that FRELIMO infiltration would have been
less hampered, less dangerous and much more rapid. Revolutionaries have long memories, and the FRELIMO government did not forget Ian Smith's active military opposition to its struggle. In part this accounted for independent Mozambique's implacable hostility to Smith's political influence in whatever form across its western border.

The trend of reliance on Rhodesian and South African economic and military support indicated mounting external involvement in Mozambique. The Lisbon golpe, however, disrupted this alignment. Portugal's new MFA government told Salisbury to stop pursuit actions into Mozambique, yet it had scant power to back up its demand, for the colonial army was a crumbling institution after the toppling of the Caetano regime.52 For their own interests, South Africa and Rhodesia adopted a hands-off posture, even when a desperate band of settlers and frustrated soldiers staged an abortive revolt in Lourenro Marques on September 7, 1974. The ill-conceived uprising could have served as a pretext for their military intrusion and perhaps trusteeship of some sort of Portuguese settlers' republic south of the Save River. But Pretoria and Salisbury chose not to intervene.53

FRELIMO'S CAMPAIGN FOR RECOGNITION AND AID

Mao Tse-tung's rare expression about the primacy of international patronage for modern-day revolutionaries quoted at the beginning of this chapter has been observed recurrently in practice, if not always conceded in word. Since the Chinese Revolution, rebels have almost without exception subscribed to a self-reliance doctrine while turning empty hands to revolutionary brethren around the world. Conforming to this pattern, FRELIMO ascribed to revolutionary self-sufficiency, but relied heavily on external endorsers for funds, weapons and training. Liberation movements, nonetheless, cannot live by bread alone, and their needs in addition to material ones embrace foreign recognition, moral support and expressions of revolutionary solidarity. Besides, diplomatic underpinning to a revolutionary movement helps internationalize its demands and gives it a psychological lift. Additionally, FRELIMO's cause benefited from international pressure on Portugal to withdraw from Mozambique and its other colonies. The United Nations afforded the Mozambican revolutionaries an international forum to pour scorn on Lisbon and to isolate Portugal from Western nations. FRELIMO's President Mondlane soon assessed that the international campaign for recognition and aid was an extension of the internal conflict. Under his leadership, FRELIMO turned its diplomatic and propagandistic initiatives to attain wider attention and legitimacy. To publicize and legitimate itself as the genuine representative of the Mozambican people, FRELIMO printed bulletins, hosted tours of journalists and observers into secured areas of the forest bases and made visits to foreign states and to prominent world figures. Another method consisted of exchanging Portuguese prisoners through the International Red Cross.

Foreign Assistance
In contrast to Zimbabwe guerrilla attacks on churchmen, Mozambican cadres worked to carry on friendly, or at least correct, relations with foreign and Portuguese missionaries both for the local relief they rendered civilian and wounded guerrillas and for the international goodwill they transmitted on behalf of the revolutionary movement. Good relations with missionaries helped FRELIMO in pulling off something of a diplomatic coup with the pope. After the International Conference of Support to the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies in Rome during June 27-29, 1970, which the Soviet Union helped arrange through the World Peace Council, Pope Paul VI accorded a brief audience to Marcelino dos Santos, then FRELIMO Secretary for External Affairs, together with the heads of the MPLA and PAIGC.54 The papal conference caused a temporary rift with Portugal when it recalled its ambassador from the Vatican for a time. Typical of hard-pressed, fledgling nationalist movements, FRELIMO's communiques reprinted numerous endorsements of revolutionary solidarity and fraternal greetings from organizations and countries, mainly but not exclusively communist.55 Organization of African Unity (OAU) declarations of unity were given prominence in its bulletins just as Kenya's expulsion of Portuguese consuls in Nairobi and Mombasa was publicized to show continental disapproval of Portugal. For its part, FRELIMO reciprocated with declarations of unity and "brotherhood" with, say, the Vietnamese in "their heroic struggle against American imperialism" or with tributes to the Chinese and Soviet "trailblazers."156 All this made the Mozambican revolutionaries feel that their war belonged to the worldwide struggle against capitalism, racism and exploitation. Psychologically, this togetherness invested them with a heart-pumping morale boost.57 The morale pump was primed with revolutionary historiography in FRELIMO camps where "militants may learn the songs of the Russian revolution, read magazines from Cuba, see pictures of life in Vietnam"--the words are those of Eduardo Mondlane.58 Likewise, the UN provided FRELIMO with a significant endorsement. It recognized FRELIMO as the sole representative of the Mozambican people and granted the rebels observer status. Its resolutions confirmed the justness of FRELIMO's armed struggle for selfdetermination. And it condemned Portugal's colonial rule and called upon Lisbon to negotiate Mozambique's independence. All these actions strengthened the legal and moral basis not only for FRELIMO's revolutionary war but also for international donations of material aid to the nationalist movement.

In addition, FRELIMO strove with success to discredit Portugal's claims of legitimate sovereignty in Mozambique. It was aided by the running tide of post-World War II opinion against colonialism. It branded Portugal as colonialist; its government was identified with fascism, the PIDE/DGS with the Gestapo, the Legiao Portuguesa (Portuguese Legion, a paramilitary organization) with the Nazi SS and the ineffectual Corporative Chamber with Mussolini's corporative structure in prewar Italy.59 These types of arguments were aimed at the West where they made an impact. In part, they were responsible for American firms staying clear of the Cabora Bassa project and for English Electric for dropping out of it, not that Lisbon
was keen on having the participation of the United States anyway which it regarded as soft on nationalist movements. Although FRELIMO's initiatives to elicit Western aid succeeded only with individuals and foundations, except for the Scandinavian governments, its campaigns lessened Western governmental assistance (in the American case) or made aid to Portugal assume covert forms (in the West German case).

The Mozambican revolutionaries timed their attacks for political reasons. In November 1972, for example, they rocketed and mortared Tete airport to coincide with the attendance of FRELIMO delegates to the UN Committee on Decolonization. Their most spectacular action of this type involved the holding of the Second Congress in Niassa district with advance publicity so as to demonstrate to world opinion their control of Mozambican territory. Political and military delegates, as noted in a foregoing description, attended from most regions of the country and the leadership ventured from its headquarters in Dar es Salaam along with sympathetic journalists during July 20-25, 1968. The propaganda value of staging a full-dress conference on home ground counted for more than the real mastery of territory since the hierarchy returned to Tanzania and the cadres scattered to resume their arduous life of hide-and-seek in the mato. Whatever the legal or logical niceties of genuine physical possession, FRELIMO's claims to immense areas, as indicated in the previous chapter, conveyed the impression of a de facto insurgent state within Mozambique.

Given the scarcity of its resources, FRELIMO conducted a well-orchestrated campaign for recognition and legitimacy. Its high regard for soliciting foreign assistance was reflected in the issuance of a variety of publications for external consumption; the most broadly dispersed was the polished English-language Mozambique Revolution, which surpassed the smudged mimeographed leaflets typical of underground parties around the globe. Understanding the principles of Lenin and Clausewitz, it partly carried out guerrilla operations for international politics. Where self-sufficiency had been revered as a prescription for victory in China, the Mozambican revolutionaries and their compatriots in Angola and Guinea-Bissau transformed internal weakness and dependency on foreign donors into a political lever against Portugal's greater conventional power. They pleaded effectively for external backing and world pressure against Lisbon from communist and noncommunist sources. The following sections will summarize its successes in the West as well as in the East.

MILITARY AND NONMILITARY AID TO FRELIMO
Charting foreign military help to FRELIMO on a graph would show an eastward running curve as it moved upwards depicting increases in the amount of supplies and instruction. Prior to the first raids, announced military aid trickled from North African states, particularly Algeria and Egypt which had limited quantities of small arms and recent wartime experience. Because of its political victory over the French forces (1954-1962), Algeria for
a brief while assumed the international status of a revolutionary mecca. Some 250 Mozambican recruits, Samora Machel included, trained at Tlemcen in 1963. Egypt instructed a tiny contingent. So also to win friends south of the Sahara, Israel instructed young Mozambicans in radio procedure and first aid during these preliminary days, but FRELIMO expressed solidarity with the Arabs.62 Being African countries, Algeria and Egypt's contributions spared the FRELIMO leadership, at least temporarily, from what was seen at the moment as a pitfall in declaring itself by its actions to be pro-East or pro-West. Its initial platform, reflecting more a list of grievances and demands than an integrated ideology, similarly resonated a policy of nonalignment. It was during this period, before Portuguese pressure could be brought to bear, that the Ford Foundation in the United States supplied FRELIMO with funds for educational purposes. Yet almost right from the beginning FRELIMO literature criticized Washington for siding with Portugal and for waging war against the "heroic Vietnamese." As its program jelled into a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist statement toward the end of the 1960s, overt communist aid became ideologically acceptable as well as indispensable to carry on the hit-and-run fight. Since little aid flowed from the OAU, which was beset with a dearth of funds and military competency, FRELIMO soon looked elsewhere.63 It began contact with Peking and sent five delegations to China in 1963. Mondlane, who headed one of them, came away deeply impressed that the "historical struggle of the Chinese peoples has relevance to the present struggle of the peoples of Africa."64 As early as 1965, Tanzania permitted Chinese personnel to train Mozambican guerrillas in the southern quarter of the country.65 China's entry into the Mozambican Revolution was eased by its own close relations with Tanzania. Peking's building of the Tan-Zam Railway afforded a convenient cover for a heavy concentration of Chinese in Tanzania. President Julius Nyerere's philosophy and development projects bore a Chinese imprint with their emphasis on self-reliance. Peking's prodigious economic and military largesse to Dar es Salaam reinforced their ideological symmetry. The significance of the Tanzanian-FRELIMO connection lies in the impact of host states. As described by Professor John Marcum, hosts project "their own political personalities into the attitudes and habits of their revolutionary guests."66 In the Mozambican instance, the protégé became more thoroughly revolutionized than the Tanzanian mentor.67 Soviet aid evidently preceded Chinese. After Mozambique's independence former Chairman of the Presidium Nikolay Podgorny visited the country in 1977 to sign a twenty-year Cooperation and Friendship Treaty. At the occasion President Machel thanked the Soviet Union for its support to "FRELIMO from the very beginning of its existence."68 Although the Soviet bloc gave gifts of hardware and equipment which surpassed the Chinese, it sold four Russian ships to Lisbon for traffic with its colonies and Czech trucks for work on the Cabora Bassa dam during the war.69
Dependence on China and the Warsaw Pact states deepened with FRELIMO's expansion of the fighting into new regions and with Portugal's improving counterinsurgency forces. The much-vaunted guerrilla ideal of fighting almost entirely from captured enemy arms, as ensued in stages of the Chinese, Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, went unrealized in Mozambique, notwithstanding FRELIMO proclamations to the contrary. From time to time, FRELIMO leaders acknowledged in interviews their reliance on foreign-donated arms.70 Seizing up-to-date weapons in sufficient quantities became too difficult from an alert enemy who took pains to deny them to guerrillas. It was a propaganda myth that Portuguese troops cowardly dropped their weapons when guerrillas appeared.71 What few weapons did fall into FRELIMO hands were ordinarily secured from poorly trained and poorly motivated militias or from "gifts" by proguerrilla self-defense force members; but these Mausers, Thompson submachine guns and Lee-Enfield rifles dated from World War II or before.

As the conflict lengthened, the standard weapons of the guerrillas in advanced zones became the Soviet-designed but sometimes Chinese-manufactured versions of the AK 47 and AK 50 assault rifles.72 First observed in use by colonial soldiers in 1967, they gradually replaced antiquated rifles and carbines among front-line insurgents. Moscow moreover furnished the Soviet- and Czech-made RPD light machine gun, the heavier wheel-carriaged Goryunov M1943 and two types of antiaircraft machine guns (12.7 Degtyrev Shpagin and 14.5 GPU) which brought down an occasional prop-driven airplane. For shelling medium-ranged targets FRELIMO employed the Russian 82 mm mortars and the Chinese 75 mm recoilless rifle mounted on a tripod. After 1972 Chinese and Soviet 122 mm rockets were used, rarely accurately, as its basic siege instrument bombarding at distances of nine miles. The Chinese-manufactured Soviet RPG 2 antitank rocket, adapted to an antipersonnel role, was a favorite weapon of the guerrillas because a single fighter could transport and fire the newer version (the RPG 7) to explode a lethal rain of shrapnel over colonial troop concentrations. Late in the war FRELIMO was thought to have acquired the SAM 7 (Stella or arrow) missile, the same weapon system which downed so many American aircraft in Vietnam and Israeli warplanes in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Across the continent in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC reportedly shot down about six Portuguese airplanes in spring 1973 with the heat-seeking missiles. In Mozambique, a SAM was considered responsible for knocking down one plane in May 1974, nearly a month after the MFA takeover. But the months preceding the Lusaka Accord offered no confirmation of SAMs in FRELIMO possession.73 What helped to offset the growing weapons superiority of the guerrillas was their generally poor weapons maintenance.

Publicly, FRELIMO spokesmen complained of weapon and equipment shortages while Portuguese officials lamented the seeming abundance of guerrilla armament, piles of which they displayed at a military museum in Vila Cabral and at other military installations in order.
to convince visitors of the rebel's strong communist support. The missing references in FRELIMO's literature to bows and arrows as insurgent side arms, which appear no more after 1969, reveal the availability of additional weapons coinciding with its turning decidedly leftward in program and idiom. Certainty about the adequacy of Soviet and Chinese arm transfers is impossible to ascertain. But the augmented scope of FRELIMO's war-making capacity during the last three years of conflict and the size of captured guerrilla arms caches point to the conclusion that Mozambique's revolutionaries wanted for less and less while asking for more.

**POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTRUCTION**

Military training, like weaponry, became a Chinese and Russian preserve after the initial phases of instruction in North Africa. One Red star eclipsed in this constellation of external donors was that of Cuba. This absence of a prominent Cuban role is all the more noteworthy in light of Havana's active military intervention in Africa during the Angolan Civil War and its large educational as well as military mission to assist Mozambique after emancipation. Over in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC benefited from Cuban radio and medical teams along with training cadres. But FRELIMO-Cuban relations started on the wrong foot and continued out of step until the revolutionaries took power. A partial explanation of this initial coolness may lie in a 1965 visit to FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam by Che Guevara who asserted the supremacy of the Cuban road to revolution. A partial explanation of this initial coolness may lie in a 1965 visit to FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam by Che Guevara who asserted the supremacy of the Cuban road to revolution. Briefly, this formula proclaimed the organizational emphasis of military over political considerations and the concept of the foco over population mobilization. FRELIMO literature was always emphatic about the preeminence of the population in its struggle. Furthermore, Havana's pursuance of an independent line from Moscow in the mid-to-late 1960s may also account for FRELIMO wariness, already confronted with balancing Sino-Soviet friendship. Apart from a modest but unknown number of Mozambican trainees, Havana did little else but carry a half dozen FRELIMO speeches or articles in its bulletin *Tricontinental*. For its part, FRELIMO made few references to Cuba; it did salute but did not attend the first Tricontinental conference hosted by Fidel Castro in 1966.

Support from China was of importance. Approximately one hundred Chinese advisers functioned as instructors and arrangers of resupply in the sanctuary camps of southern Tanzania. The Chinese cadres along with Chinese-trained Tanzanian army officers gave basic instruction in small arms, explosives and tactics. Even FRELIMO defectors who denounced the political role of the Chinese admitted that Peking's cadres got on well with their trainees. Most informants agreed that their Chinese instructors behaved diplomatically: Peking's military emissaries made suggestions rather than issued demands, kept a discreet presence and paid attention to the particular sensibilities of the Mozambican authorities. They respected local taboos but abstained from fraternizing simply to make friends. They lived at the same level as the Mozambicans, wore similar...
clothes, ate similar food and shared their inconveniences. Advanced martial and political arts were imparted at the Nanking Military College, the special training center in Harbin and at other locations in northeast China. China's advisory program was geared to upgrading military and political effectiveness of Mozambican operations. The very sketchy evidence available suggests that the Chinese cadres were not entirely satisfied with the performance of their pupils. They looked askance at their easygoing Mozambican allies, and the Mozambicans expressed respectful amazement, if not always falling into imitation, at the rigorous puritanism of their mentors. Chinese cadres introduced self-criticism sessions as a control mechanism but it worked in their view in a haphazard and lackadaisical fashion. Disapproval of tribal friction was the major Chinese complaint. The inevitable abrasion arising from cooperation between students and teachers of widely different cultures did not appear to hinder either interaction or the Chinese mission. Even though the Mozambicans could not consistently meet Chinese standards, they undoubtedly operated much more effectively than without them. Meager reliable data have surfaced on Warsaw Pact personnel in southern Tanzania, except for East European doctors at the FRELIMO hospital in Mtwara. Moscow opened a number of its training centers to possibly hundreds of Mozambicans: Central Komsomol School in Moscow, Guerrilla Warfare Training School at Simferopol in the Ukraine and the Demolition and Sabotage School in the Crimea. East Germany began a comprehensive military assistance program after 1969, the details of which have not yet come into public light. Relations between Mozambican trainees and their Russian teachers are little known. While informants noted a clannishness among their Chinese instructors, the Mozambicans felt racial sentiments in their Russian hosts evident by their abruptness, lack of patience and superior airs. Chinese and Soviet cadres tended to socialize with their own. Portuguese authorities protested that as many as thirty Chinese advisors operated in Cabo Delgado and perhaps another ten advised in Tete district. Rumors circulated around army barracks and settler dining rooms of Chinese dead found in the north. There is no hard evidence to disprove that Chinese advisory teams functioned within Mozambique, but the deficiency in conclusive proof undercuts the credibility of these charges. Lending weight to this observation is the fact that Chinese involvement in fighting zones contravened the patterns of FRELIMO and China. With the exception of the Zimbabweans, whose enlistment in Mozambican ranks came about through common ethnic ties of the Shona-related peoples and through a common enemy in the Rhodesian government, no other foreign individuals or units served with FRELIMO on Mozambican territory. Elsewhere in Africa, the Chinese cadres, moreover, figured in supportive roles and not combat ones. Discounting charges of direct Chinese participation in the firing line cannot dismiss the overwhelming need Mozambique's rebels have...
had for Chinese or Soviet bloc support. Although there can be no firm estimate on the amount of communist patronage, this much is certain: the assistance was crucial. The transference of communist guerrilla techniques and mobilizing methodology counted heavily in the transformation of FRELIMO from a loose political front rebelling against colonial injustices into a revolutionary movement of Marxist persuasion. Without extraneous succor FRELIMO (nor Portugal it should be reemphasized) could not have carried on the war at the level it did. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-SOVIET HELP

Since much of FRELIMO's assistance came from the communist world, this raises questions (perhaps more for brief discussion than definitive answer) about its relationship with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and its association with Marxism. During the insurgency, FRELIMO subscribed more to a concrete populist appeal for mobilizing African villagers than an abstract Marxist-Leninist message. Above all else, nationalism—opposition to Portuguese rule and white settlerdom—united the revolutionary front and struck a responsive chord with segments of the preliterate masses, who held, if not a Western-type national consciousness, then a bitter xenophobic reaction to local Portuguese injustices and to disruption of their traditional way of life. Elements of the movement's inner circle were steadily radicalized by their revolutionary experiences and successively adopted the rhetoric, theory and blueprints of a Marxist revolution. An introduction to Marxism came to young Mozambicans from the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) while they studied in Portugal.85 Yet the most compelling exposure to Marxist programs arose in the course of the desperate midnight of war when Soviet and Chinese advice and literature offered a direction and a solution to waging rural-based revolution in an unevenly transitional society. The culmination of this evolutionary path crystallized after decolonization at the Third Congress in February 1977 when FRELIMO redefined itself as a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard party."86

Alone among nationalist movements in Lusophone Africa, FRELIMO got sustained aid from both communist superpowers over a long period.87 A substantial number of FRELIMO recruits obtained their guerrilla tactics from Chinese instructors or their Chinese-trained countrymen, but they were armed and schooled in specialized skills more and more by the Soviet Union or its East European allies. As such, FRELIMO confronted competing ideologies and rival camps for its political loyalty. Prior to the disintegration of colonialism, there was much external speculation on the brand of the movement's evolving Marxist orientation and much interpretation of FRELIMO's internal squabbles as manifestations of influence-seeking by Peking or Moscow.68 FRELIMO's exact position on the Peking-Moscow spectrum in the heat of the liberation war is not easily pinpointed. It sought to maintain amicable relations with the two and therefore refrained from taking positions that identified it with either.89 After receiving the Lenin Centenary Medal in 1971, Machel, for example, headed a delegation to Peking. The preeminence of China's ideological and organizational inspiration was
generally discerned by foreign commentators in its local decision-making and acceptance of the Maoist precedent that the peasantry is a sufficient basis for a Marxist revolution. Still, the Soviet bloc injected essential sustenance into the Mozambican cause, and FRELIMO's employment of many Chinese organizational techniques never sparked an open breach with the Warsaw Pact countries.

From hindsight, FRELIMO's relations with Moscow look much closer than the impressions given by its adaptation of Mao's guerrilla warfare tactics. One strength of Soviet leverage over China was evident in FRELIMO's arranging for the transfer of all Chinese assistance to come officially to the OAU's African Liberation Committee based in Tanzania, not directly from Peking in the way Russian help came straight from Moscow, arriving at the ports of Mtwara and Lindi.90 The Kremlin also permitted FRELIMO to communicate messages through its African embassies. Quantitatively, the Soviet bloc ranked as the single most important external supplier.91

A reliance on Chinese instructors in Tanzania allowed FRELIMO to assume a more or less evenhanded diplomatic and ideological posture as it received increasing quantities of Soviet bloc weaponry. The prevalence of China's advisors in Tanzanian camps precipitated the view of inordinate Chinese influence on the FRELIMO hierarchy. This assumption raises the issue of foreign manipulation, if not outright control as Lisbon charged, of the Mozambican revolutionaries. Portuguese civilian and military authorities reiterated the theme of Chinese (or Soviet) determination of FRELIMO policy and action to all who would listen. Even enlisted men produced for visitors Portuguese translations of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung found on guerrilla dead. Defectors, on behalf of their new allies, declared in press conferences or to visiting journalists that they deserted their former colleagues because they were "puppets" or "stooges" of Peking or Moscow. A onetime member of the Central Committee, Jo6 Alves Mugana argued: "Today the party is commanded by Communist China, although the Soviet Union, not wishing to lose completely the control it formerly had, still continues to supply much war material."92 Lisbon then interpreted communist assistance as a way of string-pulling.

Instead of acting as blind instruments of the Kremlin or the Forbidden City, the revolutionaries' ends of removing Portuguese tenure in Mozambique coincided with Soviet aims of disrupting Western influence in Africa. "Anti-communism," as Marshal Philippe Leclerc of Indochina fame remarked, "will remain a useless tool in the hands of the West until the problem of nationalism is resolved."3 The appealing doctrines and organizational structures of the Chinese and Soviets made a profound impact on the burgeoning Mozambican revolutionaries in search of a wartime and independence program. There were FRELIMO delegations dispatched to North Korea, North Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic and more frequent visits to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.94 Marxism molded the political orientation of the leadership whose utterings at times betrayed doctrinal
nonsense, repetition of stock phrases and ill-digested lessons of the German thinker and at other instances presented a clear perception of the realities of the war. Unlike the Greek ELAS, the Mozambican movement was not overburdened with inappropriate Soviet communist theory. Furthermore, in contrast to the Greek communists, it had other models notably the Viet Cong, whose stand FRELIMO likened to its own.95

Swept up by events, its espousal of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrines evolved into more than merely a radical critique of Portuguese exactions as it had become for café revolutionaries and shrill African politicians; it constituted a ready blueprint for attaining and holding power by political aspirants and for reordering colonial society toward a socialist egalitarianism. Communist aid and the socialist practices of the Tanzanian sanctuary state additionally paved the way for FRELIMO's Marxist alignment.

But it would be too facile a conclusion to draw that the lack of Western military aid and available communist assistance alone promoted FRELIMO's Marxist direction. This is a mea culpa contention of Western liberals who place the onus for the leftward drift of FRELIMO, or other rebel movements, on American or European governments for withholding aid. While undergoing progressive radicalization and purges, the FRELIMO inner circle in reality found not solely material backing from the "socialist camp" but in addition a paradigm for taking power in an authoritarian political environment and a gospel for modernizing a backward country.

From the revolutionaries' vantage-point, the bankruptcy of the West was not restricted to its failures to extend arms to Mozambique's guerrillas or to suspend war equipment to Portugal via NATO; it lay at heart in its philosophical poverty to advance a radical prescription to colonial rule and underdevelopment. The regimes in Peking and Moscow offered them historical inspiration for revolution and centralized economies to underdevelopment as solutions to Mozambican problems. And for the power-hungry they offered the power and protection of the communist party organization, free from meaningful accountability to the electorate at election time. In short, communist theory and practice gave them ideological justification for a new class. Additionally, the communist states lent moral courage to FRELIMO. Belonging to a world crusade and depicting the struggle as "our international duty" imparted a sense of unity. The psychological value of not being alone in a difficult guerrilla war should not be minimized by armchair commentators.

To avoid being stigmatized as simply a creature of Peking or Moscow, FRELIMO argued that the denial of Western providers of military material enjoined it to rely on the communist world. Seeking to establish its political independence from non-African donors, Mondlane made the doubtful assertion in 1967 that two-thirds of its international aid came from African countries.96 After that date it would have been absurd to announce such a pretension.

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WESTERN AID TO FRELIMO
Not all outlays to FRELIMO flowed from the East. Some came from the Western world. Its success in this arena was largely due to Mondlane who won the respect of groups and individuals as a man of culture, vision and broad education heading a legitimate nationalist assault against a colonial state denying Mozambicans their human rights. The long-unsubstantiated allegation that Mondlane in the early days of his presidency took money from the American CIA indeed has substance. FRELIMO benefited from the assistance of a number of anticolonial support committees in Western Europe. These liberation support groups rendered active assistance to a variety of Third World causes. In addition to spreading the grievances and programs of the revolutionary movements in Portuguese Africa, they printed a string of periodicals and pamphlets critical of Portugal and its NATO support. They put pressure on companies doing business with Portugal and they donated small gifts of money, blankets, clothing and school supplies. Finnish students, for instance, sent a printing press to FRELIMO. Support for FRELIMO and its companion organizations transcended student communities. Humanitarian institutions, religious bodies and persons of note made contributions. Hugh Kay, an expert on Roman Catholic affairs, wrote that "FRELIMO receives much more overt support from the Catholic foreign missions than any other Portuguese African rebel movement." The World Council of Churches awarded US $120 thousand to the operation of the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam from September 1970 to February 1974. Britain's Joseph Rowntree Trust contributed 30,000 to education, and the Ford Foundation gave almost 100 thousand to the Mozambique Institute before Portuguese pressure on Washington forced it to withdraw funding in 1965. OXFAM and the Lutheran World Federation also made donations. The Italian hospital, St. Maria Nuova, at Reggio Emilia provided orthopedic equipment, and a group in Bologna helped staff an educational camp in Tunduru, Tanzania, together with teachers from the United States, Canada and Britain who taught at the Instituto Mozambicano.

Toward the war's conclusion, sympathy and funds had come from Scandinavian governments. Sweden's government of socialist premier Olaf Palme allocated 150 thousand to the Mozambique Institute in 1971. Over the next two years it appropriated 3 million to the FRELIMO, PAIGC and the MPLA for "civilian activities." During 1973 the governments of Norway and Denmark followed suit with allocations of $2 million and $1.3 million, respectively, for "victims of apartheid and colonialism." In retaliation, shopkeepers in Lourenço Marques boycotted Danish goods. The out-of-power British Labour Party had an "appeal fund" which also gave some funds to the Mozambican cause. The direct impact on the war's outcome of Western money for the Mozambique Institute can be placed in its full perspective with the realization that it trained cadres and functionaries for duty without and within Mozambique.
revolutionary parties expect a "second front" to materialize while the authoritarian Salazar-Caetano regime remained intact. Resentment against the war and the draft surfaced now and then in the remarks of the Bishop of Oporto or a student protest at Coimbra University.105 Spontaneous and unchanneled, these outbursts were more signs of frustration with a war-focused society than telltale signs of a coherent war opposition. Their impact, if any, pertained peripherally to the chain of events leading to the military coup. Very different, it can be suggested, was the role of the underground opposition in Portugal and in exile.

Militant dissidents of colonialism in Africa and of autocratic government in Portugal, which they linked in tandem, contributed to the Mozambican revolutionaries' ultimate triumph in two ways—propaganda and sabotage. For propaganda outlets and other political objectives, the umbrella organization of the liberation parties, the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portuguesas (CONCP), allied itself with the main metropolitan opposition front. The Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN), of which the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the mainstay, exchanged information and cooperation in diplomatic initiatives with the CONCP.106 Together they passed out such antiwar tracts as Passa Palavra to Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique and the other territories, welcoming deserters. CONCP broadcast appeals for support in the mother country over the FPLN's "Voice of Liberty" from Algeria.

A respected student of the Angolan revolution concluded: "By furthering the growing awareness of and sympathy toward their cause within the Portuguese military, the CONCP-FPLN alliance helped prepare the way for the April 1974 Lisbon coup.107 But in concrete reality, the PCP, just like the Stalinists in the French Communist Party, never gave a priority to liberation in the African colonies.118

Sabotage within the metropole at times had a direct bearing on the war in Mozambique. Take as an example the spectacular bomb blasting of seventeen aircraft, among them eight Puma helicopters bound for Mozambique, at Tancos Airforce Base in 1971 by the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), the most resourceful of half-a-dozen revolutionary cells.109 The destruction of desperately needed helicopters in Mozambique set back Arriaga's American-style counterinsurgency operations and no doubt spared FRELIMO many casualties. Consisting of students, workers and exsoldiers who learned their explosive techniques in Africa, the ARA, which was to the ideological left of the PCP, sabotaged war-bound ships in Lisbon harbor, bombed the NATO headquarters and may have been responsible for the mysterious shipwrecking of the Angoche.110 FRELIMO hailed the demolitions as "a clear demonstration that here were revolutionary forces within Portugal which supported the freedom struggle of the people of Mozambique. . . ."111 While the Portuguese press printed no news of the bombing incidents, Prime Minister Caetano called upon

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the National Assembly to proclaim a state of subversion, illustrating once more that lengthy foreign wars build up tensions in their faraway homelands.112 Only the sanctuaries remain to be examined as a bulwark of foreign assistance.
THE SANCTUARIES
Romantics and well-wishers notwithstanding, without sanctuary granting neighbors there would have been no victorious Mozambican Revolution. Fact not fable recounts that the nationalist front was formed on and grew in foreign soil. Tanzanian jails, moreover, held the ousted factions of Simango and Kavandame following the internal feuds and purges within the FRELIMO leadership.
Transfrontier havens in Tanzania and Zambia also afforded two indispensable wartime services to the guerrillas: they allowed for the importation of guns and material destined for the forest bases or advanced zones, and they gave over enclaves for partisan training grounds and refugee camps. Recognizing this fact, Mozambican revolutionaries expressed their gratitude for the contiguous sanctuaries after the fighting. In his speech marking the investiture of the Transition Government on September 20, 1974, President Machel paid tribute to Tanzania and Zambia for assuming "the role of strategic rear and therefore made our victory possible.113 When returning the major transit-training camp in Zambia to the Lusaka government, onetime guerrilla commander and later National Defense Minister Alberto Joaquim Chipande called it "a secure and essential rearguard for opening and development of the front in Tete and the former province of Manica-Sofala.114
Contrary to revolutionary experiences in China, Cuba and Yugoslavia, where the guerrilla armies operated without foreign terrain, FRELIMO leaned on a broad range of training and logistical functions performed across the border. Figures vary on the actual number of guerrillas schooled outside the forest bases where FRELIMO claimed to instruct 80 percent of its fighters in basic military skills. Mondlane put the number at 150 trained guerrillas turned out each month from Tanzanian sites during the late 1960s.115 By 1974, some one thousand trainees were undergoing military instruction. In Tanzania, Nachigwea became the military headquarters and main training center (most Chinese advisers were concentrated there at the Center for Politico-Military Preparation), Dar es Salaam served as the political and diplomatic capital and site of the Mozambique Institute, the town of Bagamoyo lodged the secondary school and the seaport of Mtwara received most ship-borne aid and contained the Americo Boavida Hospital. This facility was named for the deceased head of the MPLA Health Service in Angola, and opened with a foreign and Mozambican staff of thirty-seven on June 16, 1970. It trained nurses and treated wounded.
Several smaller bases along the border functioned as staging points for infiltration across the Rovuma, namely Mbamba Bay on Lake Malawi, Songea, Tunduru and Chamba for penetration into Niassa district; and Newela, Mhiambwe, Mkunia and Sindano for entry into

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Cabo Delgado district. Nine refugee camps housed in 1971 about forty-five thousand Mozambicans, who were domiciled with some regard to ethnic background and to when they arrived in Tanzania.116
Not to be left out of the liberation crusade, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda similarly granted territory to FRELIMO as well as permitting COREMO, its weak
rival, to open an office in Lusaka and a military site at Macheka. FRELIMO's Zambian installations—Sinde Missale, Tchadiza, Kathumba, Cassuende, Cacholola and MwanyaWanthu—were employed less for training areas than for control and supply of infiltration. Circumstances dictated this approach. Owing to Zambia’s dependence on seaports for its copper exports and food imports through Portuguese-occupied Mozambique and Angola, Lusaka denied it had training bases, only "rest camps." It devised an elaborate legal facade designed to give it immunity from Portugal’s charges of abetting its enemies. Because Zambian law prohibited movements of armed men through its territory, the Lusaka authorities arranged to accept guerrilla weapons from Tanzanian officials and then delivered them to the infiltrators at the border with Tete. Zambia did hospitalize wounded guerrillas. Although FRELIMO recruited and instructed in its Zambian refugee camps, the revolutionary front conducted the brunt of its manpower preparations under Tanzania’s friendly auspices.

The Tanzanian and Zambian governments lent their radio stations (improved by the Russians in the Tanzanian case) and national frequencies to their FRELIMO guests who beamed broadcasts deep into Mozambique. Providing an alternate to the colony’s official Radio Club of Mozambique, these messages were not without propaganda effect on inhabitants and settlers.117

The sanctuary camps, as discussed above, grew food and cash crops for refugees, the guerrillas and to sell in markets of the host country and abroad earning money for revolutionary operations. These transborder havens also counted for more than just conduits of externally donated materiel and locations for the maquisards’ installations or staging areas relatively safe from Portuguese retaliation. They conducted experimentations in food growing, irrigation and soap-making. Above all, the sanctuary camps operated elaborate cooperative systems, furnishing models of collectivized life in much the same way that North Korean bases in Manchuria constituted a rehearsal of what was subsequently to be extended to Korean soil after 1945. Sanctuaries additionally gave FRELIMO great psychological and diplomatic value together with their military and political utility. Taking Tanzania and Zambia as classic host states to a rebel movement, it is instructive to turn to the ambivalent specimens of Swaziland and Malawi.

The Kingdom of Swaziland, of all countries coterminous with Portugal’s east African colony, pursued the lowest profile during the colonial war. Landlocked, monarchist and reliant on the South African economy after its independence in 1968, Swaziland was an unlikely state to become entangled on the side of a Marxist-led revolutionary movement. Appearances can be deceptive in Africa when

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the ingredient of nationalism figures in the association, and FRELIMO may have kept an office in Mbabane to act as a listening post, recruitment station and escape route for organizers in the southern quarter of Mozambique.118 Thanks to the twin facts that the Swazis span the common border and King Sobhuza II had but a token-sized police force, Swaziland could not have restricted frontier crossings by Mozambican nationalists. Tolerance of limited FRELIMO activity likewise stood
it in good stead with African nationalist feeling on the continent. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that South Africa moreover maintained agents in the microkingdom. Another account indicated, however, that "it is absolutely true that many FRELIMO militants who had sought refuge in Swaziland from the Portuguese were turned over by the Swazi government.119 If there is substance to these allegations, then Swaziland's ambiguous reflex vis-A-vis the war north of its border resembled in miniature that of Malawi.

The Republic of Malawi, keeping its options open, afforded only some of the sanctuary advantages associated with the nationalistminded host governments in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. President Kamuzu Banda granted no territory for sizeable guerrilla camps. Passageway over Malawi's terrain in fact was not completely within his capacity to deny, since his one-battalion army possessed too few men to patrol its lengthy borders which dropped knife-like into Mozambique. From the tip of this blade, FRELIMO easily struck at the Beira-Tete railway at points only thirteen miles from the Malawi boundary. As the shortest distance from northern Mozambique and Tanzania to eastern Tete, Malawi also figured as a key springboard for penetration into the northwestern district along with being used for points of departure into Niassa, Zamb---zia and Sofala districts.

Land-enclosed Malawi's refusal to back FRELIMO to the hilt arose from its geographical position and from Banda's economic development policies that required assured transit routes to the Mozambican ports of Beira and Nacala. Not only Malawi's own exportimport commerce hinged on secure passage but also its revenue stood to mount with Zambia's traffic across Malawian roadways and rail lines to Mozambique's seaports. It seems that in 1962 Banda sought and gained assurances from Lisbon on the use of Beira harbor and the railways leading to it after Malawi's independence in 1964. In return, he promised to deny Malawian soil for guerrilla shelter.120 Lisbon, for its part, responded later to the Banda government's desideratum by extending the Nacala railway to the Malawian border. The extra cartage as well raised the Portuguese rail receipts out of the red into profitable returns after 1969.121 Mutual security considerations with Portugal no less restrained Malawi's cooperation with FRELIMO. Coming to independence in July 1964, two months before the announced beginning of warfare in Mozambique, Banda's presidency soon faced threats from armed dissidents headed by exministers (chiefly Henry Chimpembere) who, like FRELIMO, got sanctuary space in Tanzania and Zambia. There was fear in the capital of Zomba (now moved to Lilongwe) that FRELIMO trained the rebels and would intervene with them in an invasion. Some

confirmation of this concern manifested itself in 1967 when Malawian security intercepted an ineffectual commando party dressed in FRELIMO uniforms moving into the southwest corner of the country from Tete. Sharing security problems, Zomba and Lisbon cooperated from 1964 to 1971. This cooperation benefited Banda when Portuguese patrols helped block Malawian rebel incursions, although the Forgas Armadas bombed his villages or violated the Malawian border several times in pursuit of FRELIMO maquisards.
Portuguese patrol boats kept a close watch on Malawi to thwart waterborne infiltration from potential pro-Chimpembere elements. Furthermore, Malawi patrol craft used Portugal's naval base at Mentangula for maintenance and repair. Portuguese officers commanded two of the boats apparently because Banda believed their loyalty and ability superior to that of Malawian personnel. For Lisbon's assistance, Malawi kept silent about most border violations. One exception was Banda's public complaint about the abduction of villagers for questioning in 1971. Another instance occurred at the end of that year. To make amends for the latter aggression, Portugal promised to pay compensation to the victims, relatives after its units killed several villagers. Additionally, it paid for a portion of the foodstuffs given to Mozambican refugees so as not to overtax Malawian patience or finances.

The Banda government aided Lisbon's military operations in concrete ways, too. It allowed the Portuguese to transship oil arriving from Beira by railway back over Lake Malawi by motorboat from its port at Chipoka to Mozambique's Meponda in Niassa district. By this indirect route, the colonial army avoided the mine-infested roads of the north. In order to conceal their identity, the sailors wore civilian clothes on the translake runs. Zomba also politically assisted the European settlers. It gave tacit approval to the existence of a tiny Mozambican lobby formed within its borders and headquartered in Blantyre—the Uniao Nacional Africana de Romb–zia (UNAR). Adumbrated already in this book as having a goal of independence for northern Mozambique, the UNAR fitted into Banda's hopes to detach this region and incorporate its Nyasa people with their ethnic brothers in Malawi. His aspirations were fanned by the elusive Jorge Jardim, the Beira businessmen and minence grise of settler politics, who acted as Malawi's honorary consul in Beira and Salazar and Caetano's go-between with Banda. The political and military impact of this scheme was negligible; it did demonstrate the chicanery into which neighboring states were drawn, nevertheless.

Still, Malawi's policy toward the Mozambican Revolution cannot be judged as clear-cut opposition to FRELIMO. Rather, it pursued a judicious practice of simultaneously traveling with hounds and hares. Continental opinion demanded some support for African nationalism. So, although Zomba interacted with Portugal against FRELIMO for its own defense and economic well-being, it alternatively cooperated with Mozambique's revolutionaries. It laid down ground rules for the use of its frontierlands for infiltration purposes. Malawi's Special Branch, for instance, arrested and detained for couple of weeks armed guerrillas traversing the country by bus before it returned them to Tanzania. Unarmed partisans were not detained. Officially, it prohibited the establishment of FRELIMO staging bases on its soil. Realistically, it lacked the capability to halt surreptitious passage through its remote borderlands.

The last three years of the Mozambican conflict witnessed an easing of restrictions on guerrilla transit. After 1971, when FRELIMO's assaults on the
Beira-Tete railway dissipated the value of a Portuguese alliance since the Forgas Armadas could not halt insurgent pressure on the Mozambican rail lines, Banda shifted ground slightly. Other factors in his reassessment were repeated Portuguese border violations, clashes between Malawian and Portuguese forces and a declining fear of Malawian dissidents. As a result, FRELIMO passage became more accelerated, overt and supported logistically by the Banda government. Refugee camps now stood open to FRELIMO recruitment and intelligence gathering. Any obstacles Malawi had placed in the way of guerrilla campaigns into Zamb-zia district in 1965, as FRELIMO claimed, were now relaxed. FRELIMO's principal employment of Malawi's border space, however, centered of strikes against the Beira-Tete railway in the vicinity of Sena. By the Lisbon coup, southern Malawi had been in effect transformed into launching pads for offenses into Mozambique.

Before leaving the subject of sanctuaries for a sketch of Portuguese reactions, mention must be made of the point hinted at above: Mozambique itself served as a sanctuary for ZANU guerrillas after December 1972. Zimbabwe partisans jumped off from bases in the thickly vegetated terrain adjoining the Rhodesian boundary. Viewing the Salisbury government as a lively threat to its tactical objectives, FRELIMO sought Zimbabwean support even before FRELIMO inaugurated fighting in Mozambique. When FRELIMO's headway in Tete opened northeastern Rhodesia to sporadic insurgent actions, ZANU moved its guerrillas along Mozambican infiltration trails. Cooperation extended further. Just as some two to three hundred Zimbabweans joined the Mozambican Revolution, so also FRELIMO and ZANU participated in some combined raids into Rhodesia.

In still another dimension of the sanctuary configuration, Rhodesia, too, was used by FRELIMO as a sort of obverse sanctuary, that is to say, where a friendly state (Rhodesia) lying next to a besieged incumbent (Portuguese rule in Mozambique) has its border region employed by revolutionaries without its permission or perhaps knowledge. Within Rhodesia's boundary country abutting Tete, FRELIMO set up minirefuge camps presumably out of harm's way until Portuguese complaints to Salisbury brought military actions against them.

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SANCTUARIES SPARED: STRATEGY AND SHORTCOMINGS

The essentiality of the transborder shelters to FRELIMO cannot be measured by Lisbon's limited military response to them. Judged by present-day preemptive assaults the Portuguese made inconsequential forays despite the urgings of the army and the PIDE/DGS to strike back or to subvert the host governments of Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere. From beginning to end, Lisbon never acted on any large-scale retaliation plan. Instead, it talked loudly on occasion and wielded a small stick. Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira in 1965 alluded to a doctrine of "legitimate retaliation" arising from President Nyerere's bestowal of sites for guerrilla bases in southern Tanzania.
In the same year, the Lisbon authorities threatened to close the ports of Beira and Lobito in Angola to Zambian goods unless Lusaka handed over FRELIMO guerrillas who allegedly killed two settlers. Lusaka refused and relations with Portugal proceeded coolly. Lisbon did not act on its threat, however. It did hold up Zambian imports of maize and grain at Beira in retaliation for Lusaka's support to Mozambican guerrillas and, most of all, its handling of an incident in which a COREMO band captured five employees of the Gabinete do Plano do Zambese (GPZ) near Fingo in Tete during February 1971. Embarrassed at being discovered for its assistance to Portugal's opponents, Zambian officials refused the COREMO party reentry and its members killed the GPZ surveyors inside Mozambique. The blockade lasted five months and obliged Lusaka to purchase grain from Rhodesia at inflated prices driving home its vulnerability to Portuguese screw-tightening.

Portugal generally confined its border actions to small "hot pursuit" operations, sporadic bombardments and overflights. Trespassing Tanzanian and Zambian air space by photographically equipped Canberra spotter planes commenced almost from the beginning of rebellion first in Angola and then in Mozambique. Its military counterstrikes against the sanctuary-granting states began soon after the conflicts started but failed to widen correspondingly in intensity or frequency with the escalation of the wars. In east Africa, limited fighting spread to the Tanzanian side of the Rovuma in 1966 when Portuguese commandos laid mines and fired on Makonde villagers. Colonial outposts regularly directed howitzer salvos and other weapons fire across the river. These shellings forced Dar es Salaam to evacuate to higher and safer ground the same riverine communities and fishermen which it had persuaded the previous decade to reside nearer the Rovuma. Either Portugal's officials ruled out combining demands for closing sanctuaries in western Zambia with shutting down FRELIMO camps in the east or they fell short of convincing Lusaka to terminate all Mozambican sites, no matter how restricted their activities. By mid-1968 with the opening of the smash-and-run war in Tete, southeastern Zambia drew fire as Portuguese warplanes bombed and strafed suspected guerrilla villages, sometimes killing innocent Zambians. Between two and three border incidents happened each month, for which Lisbon irregularly paid compensation for loss of life and property. Portuguese agents may also have dynamited in June 1968 the Luangwa bridge on Zambia's Great East Road, three miles from the Mozambican border and vital for diesel fuel to run Zambian mines and railways.
Transgressions on their territory provoked Tanzania and Zambia to adopt countering measures. Both purchased and deployed ground-to-air missile defense systems. Dar es Salaam asked for and got MIG fighters from China. Tanzanian antiaircraft batteries fired at allegedly violating planes and downed at least one T6 Harvard trainer in April 1972. Clashes between the Forgas Armadas and units of the host governments ensued from time to time, although all were minor and the precise circumstances uncertain. The largest frontier skirmishes reported in the press, as sketched above, involved the Malawi Rifles and the Forgas Armadas either within Malawi or on its border while colonial troops were in "hot pursuit" of FRELIMO forces.

No large-scale counterinterventions from the host countries into Mozambique eventuated. Two Zambian NCOs were captured eighteen miles inside Mozambique and displayed in the capital in early 1973 after claiming with some plausibility to have mistakenly crossed the border in search of FRELIMO individuals accused of crimes in Lusaka. An apparent rescue attempt was launched on Cago Coutinho to free the NCOs. Afterwards some of the dead attackers were found to have Zambian Defense Force identity cards. This was an exception, and virtually all of the host government's military actions belonged in the defensive category.

Political and economic considerations restrained Lisbon from offensives against the host states aimed at destroying centers of their economy or transportation. Whereas it could argue with certain validity to have mistakenly passed over the undemarcated Zambian and Malawian frontiers, its same excuses for crossing the Rovuma rang patently false. The Salazar-Caetano government labored under the fear of arousing further international censure of its colonial rule by widening military operations. Being insecure in its international position, Lisbon hesitated and lost the military gains of preemptive raids. Besides, massively destructive counterraids could have jeopardized the transit fees paid by Malawi and Zambia and wiped out the leverage that the communications routes allowed Lisbon to exercise.

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on the interior states. Portugal's continual green light to Zambian use of Mozambican rails and ports had an ironic quality to it, since Lusaka, at the minimum, lent jump-off points to anti-Portuguese movements. This required Lisbon to turn a diplomatic blind eye to Zambia's abetting rebellion in Lusophone Africa. The irony diminished in the years immediately before the coup. When Rhodesia angrily closed its border with Zambia on January 9, 1973, for harboring Zimbabwean guerrillas, Lusaka lost its transport right-of-way through Rhodesia to Mozambique's seaports. Consequently, the Zambians had to be less circumspect in their relations with Portugal, and allowed a wider utilization of their landscape for FRELIMO's military purposes. The border closure miffed Portuguese authorities whose transit revenues diminished and whose leverage over Lusaka similarly fell off.

Still, Portugal shrank from augmented reprisal raids. Against the advice of the army command and the PIDE/DGS, one of the points on which they were in
agreement, Caetano halted preparations for transborder combat raids and he issued directives prohibiting plans for subsequent missions. His political caution in not ordering hobbling and demoralizing counterattacks stands out as a serious military and ultimately a political miscalculation. Destroying or impairing the sanctuaries’ operations would not have won the war for Lisbon. In one sense, big preemptive assaults on the insurgent shelters would have been interpreted as an admission to have lost the war on home ground. But they would have helped to keep FRELIMO off balance and may have given the Caetano government the time for a political solution on which it had so tardily embarked. At the least, striking at the Tanzanian and Zambian bases would have helped restore an offensive spirit to the Forgas Armadas and bolstered sagging morale among officers and men. These were background factors to the MFA coup. Being spared Rhodesian- or Israeli-type retaliatory invasions did not exempt Tanzania or Zambia from civil turmoil and political interference stemming from their host role. Zambia, for one example, experienced an upsurge in crimes of armed violence when nationalist members robbed or sold their weapons to locals who used them in holdups. So serious did robberies become that the government in April 1974 imposed the death penalty for armed offenders. Since 1965 Lusaka authorities had tried to regulate exile nationalist parties by allowing only one office per movement in Lusaka, forbidding fund raising in Zambia and requiring special permission for activities outside the capital. In Tanzania, the residence of several thousand (one estimate put the figure at ten thousand) armed guerrillas and more than forty-five thousand Mozambican refugees posed a threat to peace and order, even though Dar es Salaam technically held supervisory powers over the camps. This anxiety heightened with the disorders at the FRELIMO headquarters in 1968 and an abortive rebellion by a clique of Tanzanian officers in 1970. Substance was further given to governmental concerns when in Zaire, sanctuary to Angolan nationalists, a mutiny broke out in the Kinkazu camp of the Frente Nacional.

202 Revolution and Counterrevolution de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) in 1972. The potential for disorder stimulated the Tanzanians to be security conscious, to place restrictions on FRELIMO movement outside the southern quarter of the country, to regulate the arms deliveries at Mtwara and to build up its own armed forces as a counterweight to the insurgent army. Another worrisome aspect of their host posture for the Nyerere and Kaunda governments revolved around a concern about Portugal’s readiness to bellow the glowing spark of ethnic grievance or regional secession present in most African countries. With minor exceptions, here again Lisbon backed away from all-out political interference. On a limited scale, officials in Angola took advantage of disaffection in Zambia’s Western province among the Lozi people by funding, training and arming secessionists in the 1960s. But nothing came of it. Befitting the paramountcy FRELIMO attached to its Tanzanian havens, Mozambique’s colonial authorities plotted more thoroughgoing subversive activities against the Nyerere government. With the concurrence of General
Arriaga, the PIDE/DGS backed a 1972 proposal to render assistance to anti-Nyerere dissidents led by the former Tanzanian minister for foreign affairs, Oscar Kambona. He had conducted an anti-Nyerere campaign from exile since 1967. The joint Portuguese-Kambona mission did not embrace the traditional counterguerrilla tactic. This scenario would have envisioned protracted counterskirmishing to foment a deep area of insecurity rendering military and logistical support not merely difficult but also costly and dangerous to the unfriendly neighbor. The obstacles of assistance over the Rovuma River, adverse international repercussions and suspicions by the Tanzanian Makonde of the Portuguese overruled this prolonged option. Instead, the plan called for the training of anti-Nyerere rebels, equipping them with captured FRELIMO arms and basing them within Tanzania to bring down the government by sudden local rebellions in the way that the administration on the offshore island of Zanzibar had been toppled in 1964. During 1971 about seventy-five pro-Kambona rebels underwent instruction in sabotage and subversion in northern Mozambique. To pave the way, in December 1971 and again in June 1972, Portuguese aircraft dropped leaflets with Kambona's photograph and with a call for Nyerere's overthrow. Anxious about antagonistic world opinion, Caetano vetoed the plan and dismantled the preparations, thereby incurring the enmity of the PIDE/DGS.146

The plan of this destabilizing operation lingered after the Prime Minister's veto. FRELIMO's attacks in the central districts revived interest in it as a viable scheme to pull the rug out from underneath the revolutionaries. Jardim tried unsuccessfully to carry forward the plan albeit with the sympathy and tacit support from sections of the army and the more active endorsement of the PIDE/DGS. In November 1972, Kambona, bearded and guarded, met Jardim in Lisbon. They hoped to obtain high governmental approval for remounting a Mozambican-based rebellion under the aegis of conservative settlers and the sponsorship of the secret police.

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Fearful of negative reactions at a juncture when its policy had begun a reorientation away from classic colonialism, the Caetano regime, much to the anger of Jardim, blew Kambona's cover by disclosing his meeting with the Mozambican settler in Lisbon's posh Ritz Hotel to a British journalist.147 With his plan aborted, Jardim reintensified his efforts for a reformist party as an alternative to the revolutionary front while working through Kaunda to secure a negotiated settlement with FRELIMO.148 But time and, most important, the army's will ran out.

FRELIMO's Coming to Power: An Interpretation
The Communist revolution . . . will be not only a national one; it will take place in all civilized countries, that is, at least simultaneously in England, America, France and Germany.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
The conception of the army as a passive instrument in the hands of the
government of the day works only to the extent that that government
can command the goodwill of the officer's corps.
--Katharine Chorley, Armies and
the Art of Revolution
Coming to the end of this survey of the Mozambican Revolution it is appropriate
to return to the question with which the work began: How did a Marxist-oriented
revolution take place in Mozambique whose backward economy and social
development would seem to have precluded it? The applicability of Marxist-
inspired upheavals to underindustrialized countries was recognized as a historical
trend before the October Revolution. Writing in Iskra during 1902, Karl Kautsky,
the leading theorist of the Socialist International, perceived this momentum: "The
epicenter of revolution has moved from the West to the East. The Chinese and
Vietnamese revolutions recorded even a further drift to the East than the Russian.
Now Marxist revolutionary ideas have gravitated south of the Equator with the
proclamation of people's republics in Mozambique and Angola--two sub-Saharan
states whose revolutionary wars and socioeconomic reordering set them apart
from the facade of Marxism in the Congo-Brazzaville or the Republic of Guinea.
Begun with limited aims of independence, Mozambique's rural revolt fostered
social tensions allowing for the radical fringe to assume control and direction for
an apocalyptic battle, a purification of society toward a Marxian millenium.

Strange as it may appear, as the spell has diminished and the unity has been
shattered among leaders and masses in the European core of the Marxist tradition,
the faith has gained fervent converts in the Third World. In this process, Marxism
has resembled late-nineteenth-century Christianity which was also spread to the
peripheral regions by cadres of Western missionaries and local disciples in a spirit
of militant, revolutionary chiliasm bent on a renewed world after universal
adherence and singular conformity had slipped in the Western core. Marxism in
export to the underdeveloped world sparks a new "chosen people" to engage in
decisive combat with the old corrupt order of capitalism and to bring history to its
consummation.

A glance at the map will show that it is in the Third World, short of economic
attainments, where Marxism, stronger in its offshoot forms than in Marx and
Engels' original preachments, has registered a vaster receptivity than in the
modernized capitalist states. Thus the new "child" of socialism in Mozambique
was in reality a Caesarean birth because the east African country had not matured
into a proletarian stage of capitalism ripe for the natural historical process of
violent transition. What the Mozambican Revolution has revealed to us once
again is that revolution is a living organism which changes with its circumstances.
This chapter focuses on separating Portugal's imperial collapse and FRELIMO's
rise to power from similar phenomena. The recent past is not easy to appraise.
Events have not yet sufficiently receded into time to give a longitudinal
perspective. The effort, even if it falls short of definitiveness, is worthy not only
to set the record straight but also to guard against the tendency to make a successful revolutionary takeover an invincible paradigm for all aspirants.

PORTUGAL'S DEBACLE

Portugal did not lose militarily in Mozambique (or Guinea-Bissau for that matter) but it did not triumph as the British had in Malaya or Kenya. Nor is there any lingering argument, like that of the French in Algeria, of approaching military supremacy for the colonial army over the rebels. For the Forgas Armadas there was no glimmer at the end of the tunnel once the guerrillas crossed the Zambezi. Conversely, no FRELIMO victory over Portuguese arms ensued on a Mozambican battlefield. There were no Waterloos, no Dien Bien Phus. FRELIMO's armed operations never approached Mao Tse-tung's third, or strategic offensive, stage of warfare when conventional tactics were to be employed. Except for the towns of Mueda, Vila Cabral and Tete the guerrillas proved incapable of "encircling the cities from the countryside"--to quote Lin Piao. Throughout the conflict the guerrillas mounted raids either from secure distances or against weakly protected targets and then ran safely. Only in Angola is there an example of a movement coming to power in

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sub-Saharan Africa by military conquest and that took place when the Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA triumphed over its rivals, not the Portuguese.2 FRELIMO won mostly because it endured despite all the militaristic folklore that radiates from an independent Mozambique.3 FRELIMO adhered to what has been termed a "psychomilitary strategy." Unlike the Mao and Lin Piao version of military victory, the Mozambican guerrillas followed in the footsteps of Algerie francaise where the imperial power suffered a shattered will, not a military defeat in a "third stage" showdown. A lesson from Portugal's wars, writes Professor John Marcum, is that "longterm [American] policies should not be grounded on the assumption that white 'European' armies do not give up in the face of black insurgents."5 Nor should they be based on the assumption of the inevitability of incumbent defeat.

Undoubtedly the two overwhelming advantages which accrued to FRELIMO arose from Portugal's failure to install a viable African government favorable to Lisbon and to mount effective retaliatory strikes against sanctuary camps. Lisbon possessed the means to accomplish both. It had the crack units for blitzkrieg transborder raids on the Rhodesian or Israeli model that would have disrupted FRELIMO support and training facilities while restoring a psychological offensive to the army. It has been amply borne out that small, militarized states (Rhodesia, Israel, Vietnam) can attack or invade their neighbors with relative international immunity.

Seeing the poor results of French counterinsurgency in Indochina and Algeria, Portugal could have opted more for a political solution by forming a Mozambican bureaucracy to its own interests. It held the white community under its thumb in a way London could never control the Rhodesian settlers. A half-a-loaf program of some form of moderate African majority rule certainly before FRELIMO's formation and possibly before its radicalization after 1969 would have spared the
Portuguese blood, treasure and an authoritarian regime. But fearing an economic exclusion by the financially rich and industrially developed West in a nominally independent (but neocolonized) Mozambique (and Angola and Guinea-Bissau), Lisbon, so the radical argument ran, could not adopt the British and French option of peaceful decolonization. Yet at the time of the MFA golpe, the Caetano government had shifted toward a program of disengagement. Squeezed by ultraconservative pressures against overhauling the colonial status quo, it hesitated and lost all. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was more a matter of Portugal losing the wars than guerrilla movements winning them. Full credit, nevertheless, must go to FRELIMO for exploiting Lisbon's faint-heartedness and policy vacuum in its drive for power.

Portugal failed to prevail but not so much for the supposed economic strains the wars placed on its economy. Commentators have argued that the financial outlay for military expenses and African development projects drove Portugal to the brink of bankruptcy and

208 Revolution and Counterrevolution eroded its capacity to sustain three far-flung brush-fire wars.7 A key feature of their argument pointed out that 45 percent or more of Portugal's national budget was said to have gone for defense and only 26 percent for schools, hospitals, police and administration. They cited a host of war-related woes--underdevelopment, worsening inflation, highest illiteracy rate in Western Europe (34 percent) and the exodus of young men and skilled workers to France and West Germany--as proof of impending fiscal shipwreck, neglecting the salient fact that a majority of the countries at peace were worse off.8 To be sure, the Caetano government maneuvered to curb its economic liability for the defense of its colonies by shifting a sizeable burden to Mozambique and Angola in the 1972 Organic Law, designating them states. This initiative also fulfilled the EEC's demand for association, which Lisbon obtained and which guaranteed enlarged foreign markets and expanded exports over its previous affiliation with the European Free Trade Association alone. No doubt the war taxed Portuguese resources and siphoned funds from metropolitan development and welfare but at a decreasing rate.9 Indeed the percentage revenue spent on the Forgas Armadas had declined significantly from 42.4 percent in the peak year of 1968 to 27.6 percent in 1974.10 The conclusion drawn of imminent financial breakdown not only overlooks fiscal reality but also begs the question of who actually brought down the Caetano government. Certainly, it was not verging on bankruptcy. Most important, the tie between economic problems and the MFA's action is tenuous at best.

A September 1971 economic survey of Portugal by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded that its balance-of-payment situation allowed "ample scope for dynamic development policies."11 Therefore, given the will to pursue its African wars, there was no purely economic reasons it could not carry the expense. Its foreign wars naturally caused Portugal to be more dependent on the loans and investment of OECD member states. Such financial assistance enabled Lisbon's minister of defense, Rui
Patricio, to boast at a Cape Town press conference in March 1973 that "Portugal has the financial resources to wage anti-terrorist wars in Africa indefinitely." If there is an argument for the West's bailing out Lisbon's African policy, it can be asserted for financial, not military, help. Nothing better illustrates the basic solvency of Portugal's balance of payments than the OECD's 1974 Economic Survey for Portugal: This means that Portugal's balance on current account with the rest of the world showed a surplus of $543 million in 1973. The size of this surplus (about 5 per cent of GNP) is fairly remarkable, especially since there was at the same time an acceleration of current transfers from government to the overseas territories. Another outside estimate in an article entitled "Portugal: Toward FRELIMO's Coming to Power" saw no serious faltering except for the "backward state of agriculture" and the rising inflation rate of around 10 to 13 percent. This is not to minimize the financial weight the wars had become; rather it is to make the point that FRELIMO's goal of driving threadbare Portugal to the poorhouse went unrealized.

Too much, furthermore, has been vented on the outflow of Portuguese manpower and skilled labor. After reaching a break in 1970, it slackened in the following two years and in 1973 witnessed a recovery flow affecting approximately one hundred twenty thousand persons. Additionally, while the active population employed in industry grew a mere 2.6 percent between 1962 and 1973, the contribution of manufacturing industries to the gross national product rose by 10 percent in the same period, indicating a large rise in productivity.

Not much of the impetus for the MFA coup-plotters, whose motives will be briefly considered below, derived from national economic anxieties. In fact, the overthrow of the Caetano regime inflicted much more economic dislocation than the final war years' inflation. Investors and foreign firms took alarm at the communist posturings of a faction of the MFA, the disorder in the streets, the workers' steep wage demands and the political instability. They withheld funds and closed down operations, limiting jobs while retornados flooded into the country from the former colonies.

Overplaying the economic card in the explanations of Lisbon's loss should not evoke underplaying a political-psychological one. Before taking up the coup-makers' rationale, there warrants a mention of two cornerstones of the soldiers' bid for political authority: first, the army had been the arbitrator of national politics since the early nineteenth century; and second, the Caetano regime appeared willing to let the army suffer the humiliation for the militarily unwinnable African wars. The Portuguese officer corps had never been far from the commanding political heights; they had been instrumental in bringing down the monarchy in 1910, in toppling the Republic in 1926 and in installing the New State. Moreover, the Salazar and Caetano administrations considered the armed
forces one of the bulwarks of their authority along with the church, secret police and several affluent families. Before 1970 the army appeared to have things in hand; a certain lackadaisical quality permeated both sides in Mozambique. But the guerrilla incidents in the country's midsection became the turntable of the three colonial wars.18

It seemed to the regimental-grade officers, who bore the brunt of the arduous campaigning in tortuous tropical conditions, that the army was being cast in the role of a scapegoat for the loss of the African colonies. A preview of this had been played out when in 1960 a revanchist Indian government reannexed the enclave of Goa. When this first tiny piece of the Lusitanian empire had crumbled, the defending armed forces, who put up a less than stubborn resistance to New Delhi's invading troops, were subjected to charges of cowardice and a score of the officers were cashiered. In the

210 Revolution and Counterrevolution government's eyes it was of little matter that the Goan garrison was being asked to sacrifice itself to the last man defending the indefensible.19 As observers of their own inability to bring about a military conclusion to the wars without an achievable political program, the army officers feared a repetition of the Goan scenario. As a consequence, the April 26 takeover had been preceded by conspiracies and abortive coups. In Portuguese politics, then, the army's direct involvement in running the country constituted a repetition of a familiar pattern, not an aberration.

To an extent, the type of wars Portugal fought reinforced political actions on the part of the officers. Where military men are expected to conduct themselves as "soldier-political workers" in foreign wars, it is unrealistic to expect them to be apolitical at home. In a sense, then, Portugal's counterrevolutionary chickens came home to roost with the toppling of the civilian regime. But too much was initially made of the MFA's politicization by the guerrilla movements. According to this school of thought, FRELIMO (and PAIGC) propaganda and the interrogation of guerrilla prisoners by Portuguese officers led to the MFA's conversion to Marxism, Leninism and Maoism.21

Owing to this ideological persuasion, one close observer noted that "the officers are determined to act as a fourth liberation movement."22 At most, officers had their political consciousness awakened by their own counterrevolutionary programs; but the MFA as a whole was not converted to the idea of sweeping revolution in Portugal. Next came a subsidiary version charging that the will of the officer corps had been poisoned by the induction of miliciano lieutenants who possessed radical notions absorbed during their university days.23 In late 1970, Defense Minister General Sa Viana Rebelo expressed concern about commissioning officers directly from the universities because they "are real centres of subversion."24 Writing from exile Caetano expressed himself in terms reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes in his Behemoth harangue against the universities for fanning rebellion. His Brazilian "testament" argued that it was in Portugal itself that young officers of "the armed forces received ideas which a itated their generation and circulated in the school corridors."25 Even in remote
posts in Mozambique, army libraries had Portuguese translations of well-read volumes by Malraux, Brecht and Gorky. After the avalanche hit, it could be asserted that war weariness was one of the main causes of the army's golpe but it was largely weariness of defensively fighting political wars in a policy vacuum. Demoralized by the French loss in Algeria and the American fiasco in Vietnam—two states better endowed in resources and in population than Portugal—Portuguese officers had wondered how long they could postpone a similar fate without reachable political objectives. Against this background one wonders why it took so long for the Forgas Armadas to crack. As one officer informant put it: "the Portuguese have not been a military people since the fifteenth century." Perhaps one part of the answer lies in the Latin character of resilience and laxity which kept the army from snapping for so long. Another rests with the generally lackluster aggressiveness of its guerrilla adversaries. Just as there was no visible, decisive guerrilla military victory, so, too, there was no tangible proof that rebel morale rose in dialectical fashion as counterrevolutionary spirits flagged. This usually materializes in protracted wars ending in a revolutionary triumph. The interminableness of the fighting, the absence of a foreseeable resolution and the apprehension of being minted for the role of scapegoat diluted the officers, will and acted as preconditions for their mutiny. Caught in this vise, the activating catalyst that propelled the officers into a formation against their political leaders stemmed from the "Rebelo decree" which placed the conscript officer on a par with the regular officers. The decree extended regular commissions to the milicianos in order to meet the army's swelling personnel requirements. This loss of status fell like the proverbial last straw on the young officers who compared their own fate with their better-paid brothers and cousins employed in Lisbon banks, multinational companies or as teachers in the universities. Portugal's modernization in itself had already lowered the prestige of captains serving in African backlands from what it had once been. Originating in what S. E. Finer would categorize as the "corporate self-interest of the armed forces," the MFA developed unchecked into a military conspiracy. Due to the regime's dependency on the support of the armed forces, it was reluctant to halt the growth of what Melo Antunes, one of its leading figures, called after the coup "a reactionary co-operative in defence of privilege." The same corporate spirit was strong enough to impede the secret police from operating within the army. A first and necessary prelude to revolution, according to many students of political upheaval, often comes with the loss of control over the armed forces. The Caetano government's policies had contributed to a loss of control over the loyalty of the army. Events in Portugal itself also seemed to call for resolute action by the army. Sensing the Caetano regime's isolation and vulnerability and fearing a reactionary takeover by elderly generals (particularly Arriaga who had returned from Mozambique in August 1973) and ultraconservative civilians, the MFA struck preemptively.
The MFA's choice of General Spinola to head the Junta of National Salvation, which smacked of "gaullism" rather than Leninism, assured wavering liberalization within a framework of continuity. A vague and mildly liberal proclamation in keeping with manifestos issued by other coup-makers pledged "the restitution to the Portuguese people of the civil liberties of which they have been deprived" and denounced the fallen regime for being "unable to define a concrete and purposeful overseas policy leading to peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds."32

Assessing the new government's program as less than a clearcut decision to grant independence, FRELIMO (and the other nationalist movements) resolved to keep mounting raids against Spinola's plan for a Lusitanian Federation.33 The coup took FRELIMO by surprise; as with the Lisbon military establishment, it was preparing for war through the 1970s. Senior Portuguese generals believed even after the coup that the military position in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau could be retrieved with the redeployment of troops from Angola where a wind-down of the fighting had begun.34

Although FRELIMO fought a struggle of attrition and stress hoping to lead to negotiated settlement, it revealed no discernible evidence of an impending coup bringing Lisbon's war machine to a halt. FRELIMO and the few Portuguese watchers predicted an ultraright colonels' coup and a die-hard defense in Africa.35 Surprise proved no embarrassment, and the guerrillas stepped up their raids encountering openly enthusiastic Mozambicans, fleeing settlers and a reluctant and demoralized colonial army. FRELIMO interpreted the April coup as a means "to find a neo-colonial solution."36 Seen from hindsight, it was simply a matter of time before Lisbon withdrew, although rumors abounded on the possibility of South African and Rhodesian intervention alongside a Portuguese settlers' bid for a Mozambican UDI.37 There was even talk of CIA involvement in resurrecting Paub Gumane's COREMO as a viable alternative to FRELIMO, although American embassy spokesmen denied the allegations.38 It did appear temporarily that some sort of settler movement led by Jorge Jardim and backed by white mercenaries might make a grab for power in the southern section of Mozambique during the chaotic period after the coup.39 Unsettled by foreign intervention into the Angolan Civil War, Mozambique stayed in a state of anxiety into its independence era.

FRELIMO'S WAY TO VICTORY

A sympathetic admirer of African liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies wrote after their independence that the revolutionaries "invented nothing new in the practice of such warfare. They adapted the experience of others, even others who ended in defeat."40 In general terms this rings true but to put the issue of comparison in general terms obscured not only the distinctions in FRELIMO's brand of revolutionary warfare but also masks the transformation FRELIMO underwent. Despite rough similarities, Mozambique was neither China or Vietnam nor were the Portuguese the French or Americans.
Put in socialist idiom, the Mozambican Revolution was started from a basis of bourgeois nationalism by a frustrated elite (within the context of Mozambique's underdevelopment) blocked in a bid to become masters in their own house. So as to gain a final victory over an intransigent colonial state, they had to transform the contest by calling upon the rural poor with appealing socioeconomic programs and with a degree of austerity for the leaders. This represented no wide departure from events in China. There, the

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Communist Party, deflected from duplicating a "proletarian revolution" in the precedent of the Russian October Revolution, turned by necessity from concentrating on an infant urban workforce to the peasantry in order to fashion a mass movement.

There are differences, however. The first step in the Asian revolutions had been the formation of a communist party. In contrast, the Mozambican Revolution was fomented by a loosely organized nationalist front, not a communist party, a Western political party or a resurgent tribal manifestation as among Kenya's Kikuyu during the Emergency. Here a clarifying distinction should be emphasized between the Mozambican liberation front and the communist "front tactics." In Southeast Asia, the communists penetrated and dominated other organizations such as trade unions, peasant cooperatives, women's leagues and even specific religious assemblages. No such formal groups existed in northern Mozambique. Instead of subverting preexisting organizations, FRELIMO had to create and build them as buttresses to the main effort. During the war, its two mass-type organizations--the women's league and the youth group--had moved barely to an embryonic stage. Their formation along with plans for others nevertheless conformed to the pattern of an enlarged state apparatus emanating from a modern revolution.41

Like Algeria's FLN, FRELIMO portrayed itself as nationalist in orientation above all else. Unlike its Algerian counterpart, which collided with a separate communist movement, FRELIMO evolved toward a Marxist-Leninist party--a process uncompleted at independence. This radicalization of a revolution is a story as old as the English Civil War and the French Revolution, where radicals outflanked moderates and found themselves in danger of being outbid by ultrarevolutionaries. Passed off with the innocuous term of radicalization, this deadly purging, as in other revolutions, entailed assassination including President Mondlane as personal ambition became indistinguishable from political redefinition. After 1970, Samora Machel argued that FRELIMO was a Marxist movement.42 To some observers this form of alchemy simply amounted to a takeover of a nationalist movement by communist elements as in the Asian nationalist revolution.43

But this not uncommon phenomenon, explained by one scholar as "the law of revolutionary hypertrophy," accelerated with aid and influence from the East and with the absence of aid and an alluring doctrine from the West.44 At its Third Congress in February 1977, nearly two years after independence, and when it reconsecrated itself a "Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party," FRELIMO formalized
the language of its transformation depicting the independence conflict as allowing for "the National Liberation Struggle to develop National Democratic Revolution and to build the foundations for the transition to the phase of Popular Democratic Revolution." In the parlance of Marxism-Leninism, FRELIMO initiated and combined the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" against colonial rule with the "socialist revolution" against class stratification.

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Channeling opposition to colonialism, however, preoccupied the mobilizing cadres far more than social reconstruction in the forest bases or sanctuary camps. Nowhere—not in China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, nor Cuba—was there less national consciousness than in Mozambique at the opening of the insurgency. Nor was there a timely Japanese or German invasion to build nationalism. In fact, FRELIMO's (and PAIGC's) success owes little to World War I and World War II in the way that the Marxist governments in the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia and Vietnam do. A Marxist movement four years before the Lisbon coup, FRELIMO (and PAIGC) was the first successful indigenous Marxist-inclined revolution not growing directly from conditions generated by major wars. Cuba is excluded in this generalization since a compelling case can be put forth that the Cuban revolution was not Marxist until after Castro attained power. This turn of events, as raised in Chapter 1, strikes a contrasting perspective on the claim of a causal linkage between international wars and revolution.

Returning from this digression to nationalism, even at the end of the insurgency the vast majority of Mozambicans, without a national religion, cultural unity or nationwide social structure, plodded on in parochial values, precepts and orientation. Portugal's colonialism and counterinsurgency programs loosened old moorings but a genuine "Mozambicaness" eluded the war years. The goal of "nation building" furnished another ingredient in transforming FRELIMO into a revolutionary movement, for the egalitarianism needed in building a national consciousness is common to many revolutionary ideologies. Egalitarianism provides a vital link connecting nationalism and revolution and in the Mozambican instance helped turn rebellion into revolution.

FRELIMO's mobilization drew upon and politicized three deep anti-Portuguese currents in Mozambican life: the traditional militarized resistance dating from the pacification campaigns; the xenophobic resentment of blacks to their alien, white overlords; and the alienation of a rural populace toward a central authority whose intrusions into their lives, even if well meant, caused anxiety and anger. Transcending these antagonisms to a Western-type of national sentiment progressed furthest amid urban educated youths and veteran cadres. But volatile corners of rural Mozambique, such as the Makonde Plateau in Cabo Delgado, could be stirred into rebellion.

Peering through Marxian lenses, Mozambique's socioeconomic conditions were not ripe for revolution. Marx and Engels had envisioned a proletarian revolution in the industrially advanced countries of the West. Then socialist forces could rationalize the means of production through worker management in order to achieve its full potential along with humane conditions. History, however,
capriciously veered in an unexpected direction: Marxist-stimulated programs emerged in economically backward lands. It can be argued that revolutionary ideologies owe varying debts to the Marxian tradition. Yet from clear-eyed hindsight, FRELIMO's Coming to Power

revolutionary luminaries like Mao, Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and their African apostles have had more in common with Lenin than Marx because they have been profoundly engrossed with the practical matter of capturing political power. What detonated the rebellious frontiers and catalyzed the tranquil sections, to return to the issue of revolutionary situation, was FRELIMO which organized armed insurrection and injected the fear of neutrality and the hope of change where none existed. Assistance in military techniques and weaponry came from the Soviet Union and China--two powers interested in the export of revolution. A survey, however short, of FRELIMO's attainment of political mastery would be incomplete without an attempt to fix its place on a popular support scale between the methods of Mao Tse-tung and the one advocated by Régis Debray. The Chinese interpretation of their own experience stresses the primacy of a mobilized and sustaining population behind guerrilla activities. Just as Mao altered Lenin's formulas to adapt them to China's domestic and international circumstances, so too have some post-Maoist professional revolutionaries seen less necessity of guerrilla operations backed by an extensive population infrastructure. Basing his systematization on Guevara's formulation, Debray developed the theory of the foco insurrecional. Comprised of a band of men, the foco operates with a minimal political-administrative structure and then to meet just the immediate logistical needs of its military operations. Their guerrilla actions create a revolutionary situation by attacking government posts, despised officials and local exploiters of the poor. The incumbent's intervention into the countryside in the form of depredations or modernization, or both, promote revolutionary recruitment. Thus, from the foco a people's army grows. Laid side by side the two theories present neat distinctions; but battlefield tactics seldom are neatly differentiated. Both logical inference and available evidence point to the FRELIMO practice of not treating them as mutually exclusive. The Cuban experience, in sharp contrast to the Mozambican Revolution, was "made up and always controlled by declassed sons and daughters of the middle class." Revolution in Mozambique found cultivators, plantation workers and simple village teenagers responsive to its operations. Building on trends that were strengthening, guerrillas recruited porters or auxiliaries, established political networks and pried out military intelligence. Hence FRELIMO often sought to enlist the local population behind its cause. The Portuguese did similarly in other communities. Nevertheless, cadres and colonialists alike encountered local populations who wished a plague on both their houses. Amid unfriendly or aloof peoples, guerrillas acted like foco or worked semiindependently. In the pell-mell race for the country's midlands, they were short of time to entrench full-fledged infrastructures comparable to those in Tete, Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts.
Aware of the diverse revolutionary theories, FRELIMO scorned the notion of the Guevara-Debray concept in theory and practice. The Mozambican revolutionaries came down in their pronouncements on the side of political action, not the militaristic means of Fidel Castro's coming to power as interpreted by Guevara and Debray. FRELIMO, nonetheless, did not underplay the role of violence in its struggle. Indeed, its literature contained shades of Frantz Fanon's ideas by believing that armed force tends to transform and liberate people's colonized personalities. In the course of the war, FRELIMO reported that these transformations enabled long-subject colonial peoples to overcome fear of the enemy and take part in the revolution. Like Fanon and Mao, FRELIMO was--and is--profoundly wedded to the creation of a "new Man."

The commitment to the baptismal qualities of violence notwithstanding, FRELIMO's formation followed the trajectory of communist parties in China and Vietnam in one sense; it organized first as a political entity and then fashioned a military instrument. According to Debray this was putting the horse before the cart: "The people's army will be the nucleus of the party, not vice versa." So far, so good, because Mozambique's revolutionary path appears to contradict the Debrayian scenario. But puzzles abound in Mozambique, and things are rarely as they seem. FRELIMO, for instance, is the first to admit that its most dedicated militants spring from those directly involved in the armed struggle. Nothing is more of a testimonial to a Debrayian aspect of the Mozambican Revolution than the fact that the FPLM (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique as the guerrilla army became called after independence) gave birth to the first Comités de Partidos (party committees)--a basic unit of a Marxist organization. Given its transition toward a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party in the course of an insurgency, the FRELIMO precedent represents permutations within the continuum of revolution in the Third World. In ideological terms the features of Mozambique's revolutionizing process are discernible in its appeals to nationalism, populism and Marxism. Historically distinct and sometimes mutually exclusive in the West, these three political currents have been peculiar to revolution in the Third World. Their exact confluence in Mozambican setting awaits historical observation. At this intermediate juncture, the prospects for the future seem to belie the hopes and promises of the past. Winning a guerrilla war is often easier than running a country.

Notes
CHAPTER I
For a brief and favorable account in English of Portuguese exertions during the Scramble, see Charles E. Nowell, "Portugal and
the Partition of Africa," Journal of Modern History 19, no. 1
(March 1947), 1-17.
pp. 63-79.
Allison Butler Herrick et al., Area Handbook for Mozambique (Washington,
p. 110.
6 This summary description of Mozambique’s peoples leans heavily
on the following works: Edward A. Alpers, Ivory and Slaves in East Central
Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1975), pp. 8-26; Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History (London: Rex
Collings, 1978), pp. 247-52; Allen F. Isaacman,
Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution; The
Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1972), pp. 3-16; and M. D. D. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the
Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule
pp. 21-31.

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Little has been written of Gungunyane in Portuguese or English.
Two worthwhile contributions by Professor Douglas L. Wheeler help to shed light
on his life and career; see "Gungunhana."
Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political Biographies, ed.
Norman R. Bennett (Boston: Boston University Press, 1968),
10 António Enes, A Guerra
d'Africa em 1895 (Lisbon, 1898), pp. 31115, 438-60, 543-72.
11 For more on this fascinating story, see Isaacman, Mozambique,
pp. 124-53; and Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi,
pp. 295-311.
12 Allen F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique:
The Zambesi Valley, 1850-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976),
pp. 156-85.
13 Nancy Jane Hafkin, "Trade, Society, and Politics in Northern
Mozambique, c. 1753-1913" (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1973),
pp. 359-403.
14 Josh Justino Teixeira Botelho, História Militar e Política dos
Portugueses em Magambique de 1833 aos Nosso Dias, 2d ed. rev.
15 Jorge Dias, Os Macondes de Mozambique, 5 vols. (Lisbon: Junta
de Investigações do Ultramar, 1964), I, 93.


The same issue has a poem depicting the ancestors as "a people divided" and in danger, p. 30. In the Independence Proclamation, President Samora Machel stated: "From the resistance of Monomotapa to the insurrection of Baru, Mozambican history can pride itself on the glorious feats of the masses in their struggle to defend freedom and independence," Mozambique Revolution, no. 61 (1975), p. 14.

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22 In the 1950 census there were only 4,349 African (not mestio) assimilados in a total black population of 5.65 million. Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Anuario Estatistico de Ultramar, 1959 (Lisbon, 1960), pp. 32-33.

23 D. P. Ebling, Consul (Lourenço Marques) to Assistant Secretary of State, Political Situation, March 20, 1939, 853N. 00/42, National Archives, Washington, D.C. This report also notes individual assaults on Europeans during the preceding New Year festivities.


Portuguese officials considered the Centro Associativo to be a front for FRELIMO.


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After the coup the Portuguese left file drawers full of secret police materials identifying agents and missions in Beira. These were destroyed by an Italian journalist sympathetic to Portugal. Giancarlo Coccia, The Scorpion Sting: Mogambique (Johannesburg: Livraria Moderna, 1976), pp. 184-85. Elsewhere the Portuguese generally destroyed secret documents in Mozambique. Official government sources for nonviolent protest can be found
in documents of the Arquivo do Instituto de Algodão and the Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial as well as oral statements by Mozambicans.


40 Interview. This officer's estimate seems plausible considering the firepower of the Portuguese forces and the fact that villagers fled at the sound of gunshots. Another source gave the figure of thirty-six killed. "The Story of Mozambique," Voice of Africa 4, no. 12 (December 1964), 21.

41 For one of many reconstructions of this event, see Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 118-20. See copy of FRELIMO First Congress Documents in Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique, p. 122.

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Paulo Gumane interviewed by the writer in Syracuse, New York, November 2, 1973. During the talk, Gumane gave examples of Africans unexpectedly emerging from obscurity to power. 46 "Mozambique Alerted," New York Times, September 6, 1960. 47 "Mozambique haunted by the war in Angola," Observer (UK), July 2, 1961; and "Jittery Mozambique is alerted for trouble," Sunday Times (South Africa), July 2, 1961. One Mozambican source stated that the authorities handed out arms to "Portuguese extremists in not only the northern districts but also in other regions of the country." "Manifesto of the Uniao Progressiva de Mocambique," Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa, p. 403.


52 Noticias (Lourenco Marques), October 26, 1963.

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61 Alberto-Joaquim Chipande, future Defense Minister in an independent Mozambique, wrote that "through organizers we planned that the people should rise at the same time--a real national insurrection." Quoted in Mondale, Struggle for Mozambique, p. 137.
Additionally, FRELIMO's Central Committee in a loosely worded declaration called for "general armed insurrection of the Mozambican people." Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 9 (August 1964), p. 2. Mondlane insisted, however, that the struggle would last "maybe 20 years, and then it will probably be a negotiated settlement like Algeria's." Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," p. 49. One student of the FRELIMO leadership points to early divisions on the course the war should follow. Barry Munslow, "Leadership in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, Part I," Southern African Research in Progress, ed. Christopher Hill and Peter Warwick (York University: Centre for Southern African Studies, 1974), pp. 142-43.
64 Interview.

CHAPTER 2


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For a description of this reorganization, see Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 152-53.

8 Estimates varied widely concerning the land and people under Portuguese or FRELIMO jurisdiction. See Africa Report 14, no. 1 (January 1969), 29, and 14, no. 2 (March-April 1969), 4.


10 No colonial army communiqués mentioned COREMO in 1970 but in January 1971 its own publication, 0 Combate, carried stories of activities in Tete around Zumbo. COREMO, in fact, captured five Portuguese GPZ employees.


13 Student opposition to Mondlane turned strident at the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania. One of the severest critics was Father Mateus Gwenjere, a young African priest from central Mozambique, who accused Mondlane of being a "traitor" because he "moves too slowly and speaks too softly." Students inflamed by Gwenjere disrupted the Mozambique Institute in March 1968, resulting in the suspension of activities until the following January.


the Transitional Government, September 20, 1974," a copy of
which may be found in The Tasks Ahead: Selected Speeches of Samora Machel
26 Quoted in Africa Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle
for Southern Africa (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 171. 27 Mao, Selected
Works, II, 195. 28 "The War," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 2
(January 1964), p. 3.
29 According to Professor Keith Middlemas in Cabora Bassa:
Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa (London: Weidenfeld

Notes 225 and Nicolson, 1975), p. 342, FRELIMO moved into Tete in order
to strike at Cabora Bassa. But FRELIMO spokesmen held that
even without the giant project, guerrillas would have penetrated
throughout the northwestern district to spread the number of
incidents. One corroboration for this point comes from an
interview between Middlemas and a FRELIMO representative in
Lusaka, Mariano Matsinha. Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, Stanford, Calif., Tape 12, Nl. 30 Kitchen, "Conversations with
Eduardo Mondlane," p. 32.
31 Samora Machel, "Why Do We Fight?" Tricontinental (Cuba),
32 Wilf Nussey, "Zorras Fight the FRELIMO Terror," Argus (South
Africa), August 3, 1972.
The Star (South Africa), October 26, 1971.
34 "It's not a question of preventing the building of Cabora Bassa.
We are trying to increase the price of it four or five times"—the words are Samora
Machel's. Andrew Jaffe, "Africa's Mini-Vietnam," Newsweek, November 27,
1972, p. 48.
After interviewing Portuguese officers, a South African correspondent wrote as
late as 1971: "The Portuguese now believe
that FRELIMO guerrillas will make a concerted effort to destroy
the giant Cabora Bassa." "Cabora Bassa Dam FRELIMO's 'Top Target,'" The
Star Weekly (South Africa), April 24, 1971.
36 Opello, "Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa," pp. 32-33;
Middlemas, Cabora Bassa, pp. 151-54; and Anthony R. Wilkinson,
"Angola and Mozambique: The Implications of Local Power,"
Survival (London) 16, no. 5 (September-October 1974), 223. 37
FRELIMO reported that Anga camp, one kilometer from Moqimboa da Praia, was
attacked and wiped out. "War Communiqué," Mozambique
Staffed by three Portuguese NCOs, the post was defended mainly
by a score of poorly trained African militiamen.
41 Not surprisingly, FRELIMO held this position; see "Editorial," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 59 (April-June 1974), p. 2.

226 Notes
42 Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin (UK) 14, no. 2 (April 1972), 18.
Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 19.
48 Henry Kamm, "Mozambique Guerrillas Achieving Main Aim: Making War Costly to Portugal," New York Times, May 26, 1974. Kamm's estimates square with the author's tabulations of Portuguese, UN and independent reckonings. Arriaga, for example, held that one soldier a day was killed or seriously wounded. Interview, October 13, 1977. FRELIMO's unrealistic figures would place the number at some thirty thousand dead. In 1971 alone it held that twenty-nine hundred troops were killed. "Building Up Victory," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 50 (January-March 1972), p. 1. Portugal's overall casualties were between ten and twelve thousand for all three wars.
Comunicado No. 8/73, Do Comando-Chefe Das Foras Armadas de Mozambique, August 24, 1973, p. 3.
51 For an analysis of the history and culture making the Vietnamese villager a stoic fighter as opposed to other Third World peoples

52 Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Chinese Communist Insurgent Warfare, 1935-49," Political Science Quarterly 81, no. 2 (June 1966), 170, 180 and 185.

By its own account, FRELIMO threw two thousand men against Mueda in January 1974. The guerrillas reportedly blew up a fuel dump.

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damaged three aircraft and bruised civilian and military morale.

Interviews.

56 Dennis Gordon, "Operation Checkmate," Rand Daily Mail (South Africa), March 9, 1974; and Venter, Zambezi Salient, pp. 29 and 46.

Interview. With a typical Portuguese outlook, the young officer decided not to kill or capture the lone guerrilla, who finally stopped laying mines, possibly because he ran out of the deadly devices. The officer feared that this mine-layer might be replaced by another who might show more ingenuity.

58 Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Tape 5, D14.

59 Interview.


62 Portuguese reportage of mine casualties represented a much higher death rate from this source than reported by American units in Vietnam where one study attributed 23.7 percent of U.S. deaths to mines and booby traps from January 1967 to September 1968. The same study concluded in one period of low combat intensity in July 1969 that 41 percent of marine deaths were caused by mines. Cited in Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 309. 63 Interviews.
did not appear until mid-October. Diario de Mocambique, October 13, 1964.

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Some of the internal dissension became public with Uria Simango's publication of his pamphlet, Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO, accusing the other top leaders of assassination and overweening ambition. "Communique," Executive Committee of FRELIMO, November 8, 1960, p. 2 (mimeographed). FRELIMO's postwar statement on factionalism hurting its war effort in Cabo Delgado can be seen in the Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 11.
One commentator wrote from observations in 1970 that there were more patrols in Angola than Mozambique, but in both cases "there is far greater dependence on convoys, forts and air strikes than is ordinarily the case in anti-insurgency campaigns." Bell, Myth of the Guerrilla, p. 119.
For one example, see "War Communiqu6," Mozambique Revolution, no. 27 (October-December 1966), p. 10.
14 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, II, 121-22. 15 The Portuguese army in Angola reported a dropping off of guerrilla activities because the insurgents were "faced with a crisis of ideas and fatigue," Notícias (Lourenqo Marques), July 3, 1973.

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22 "War Communiqu6," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 44 (September-December 1970), pp. 5-7. 23 Interview.
28 Pimentel dos Santos, "State of the 'State' Message," p. 9. 29 Interview with Matsinha, Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Tape 12, N1.
31 FRELIMO contended that defense of the dam immobilized thirty thousand men. "War Review," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 52 (July-September 1972), p. 5. However, this figure exceeded the total number of men in Tete.

The post-coup government in Lisbon in turn relieved Basto Machado and sent General Orlando Barbosa whose connection with the previous regime was less distinct.

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36 Michael Degnan, "The 'Three Wars' of Mozambique," Africa Report 18, no. 5 (September-October 1973), 9-10; the same quotation and information also appeared in F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, p. 24, a pamphlet published by the American African Affairs Association (New York, 1974).

A Guerra Subversiva e Seus Efeitos na Area de Influencia da T. Z. R. (Beira, Mozambique, August 30, 1974), p. 3. This is a mimeographed report printed by the Trans-Zambesi Railway.
42 "Mozambique Arrests Reported," Star (South Africa), June 24, 1972.
In the FRELIMO account, the outpost was surrounded by one thousand guerrillas, and the young Portuguese lieutenant capitulated to save lives, realizing the war was virtually finished.
These ideas were foreshadowed in António de Spinola's Portugal e o Futuro (Lisbon: Arcadia, 1974).
"Portuguese Move Troops to Cities," Sunday Times (South Africa), August 11, 1974. FRELIMO expressed knowledge of Lisbon's efforts.
For a sympathetic account of the abortive coup, see Clotilde Mesquitela, Mogambique: Sete de Setembro; Memórias de Revolução (Lisbon: Edições A Rua, n.d.), pp. 79-146.

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52 Among the more important were: President Uria Simango, Vice-President Paulo Gumane, National Advisor Mateus Gwenjere and Secretary of Education and Culture Joana Simiao. All but Simiao had had previous affiliation with FRELIMO; she had been secretary of GUMO and associated with COREMO. FRELIMO, Curso Político, pp. 74-76.
53 Interview.
Coccia, Scorpion Sting, p. 76.
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 119-20. 56 Interviews. Interview with General Arriaga, Lisbon, October 13, 1977, and other interviews.
58 One rare instance of a FRELIMO comment on the elite troops came
from three Mozambican deserters who testified that the GEs were Arriaga's "personal army" to undergird his plans for a settler-ruled Mozambique. "Why We Deserted," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 53 (October-December 1972), p. 15. 59

"0 General Kaulza de Arriaga recebeu ontem a homenagem dos GE e GEP por ele criados," Noticias (Lourenço Marques), July 8, 1973.

66 Outside observers were surprised by the small size and advanced age of the Portuguese air force in Mozambique. One journalist said it consisted of "about 25 helicopters and a mishmash of World War II-vintage, propeller-driven aircraft with only a few Italian Fiat jets--perhaps 40 to 50 planes altogether." David B.

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70 The ratio of these army combat troops to organic and direct mission support forces at the peak of the Vietnam war was 22.2 percent to 77.8 percent and excluded central supply, maintenance, training facilities and administrative overhead.
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 40.
Ibid., pp. 39-41.
76 Arslan Humbaraci and Nicole Muchnik, Portugal’s African Wars (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 38. Coccia placed the figure at the larger estimation; see Scorpion Sting, p. 16.
Dennis Gordon, "Operation Checkmate," Rand Daily Mail (South Africa), March 9, 1974.
Interview with Arriaga.

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81 An Italian journalist by a fluke stumbled onto a set of secret police files housed in the PIDE/DGS headquarters in Beira in August 1974. Before destroying the records to keep them from FRELIMO, he looked through what he thought were "more than a thousand" personal histories and reports of African, European, Chinese and Indian informants. Some card-carrying FRELIMO members served as agents of the secret police. Coccia, Scorpion Sting, pp. 183-84.
82 General Silvino Silverio Marques, "Razao Deste Livro," Africa: A Vitória Traida, p. 27.
83 Ibid., p. 31. Here it is contended that the MFA and the PCP and PS had similar meeting dates as well as a common goal of ending the African wars. This is offered as proof of collusion. 84 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975), 157-200. Mack's argument that the strains of faraway wars on the homeland invites defeat does not adequately address the reasons for "nonvictory" in the field. 85 Official figures themselves do not agree on the exact number. For one example, see the charts presented in General Silvino Silv-rio Marques, "Situacao Global em 1973-1974," kfrica: A Vitória Traida, pp. 71 and 85.
CHAPTER 4

1 There is evidence to suggest that the first officially acknowledged assault on Chai was partially organized by FRELIMO guerrillas in the town of Mueda, not exclusively from Tanzanian bases. "The First Combat," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 30 (August-September 1967), pp. 9-10.

2 Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique, p. 149.

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Mariano Matsinha interview, Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Tape 12, NI.


6 It is only in this limited, skewed sense of war-related depression that Mozambique fits the paradigm developed by James C. Davies. Davies wrote: "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic development and social development is followed by a sharp reversal." James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in When Men Revolt and Why, ed. J. C. Davies (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 136; first published in the American Sociological Review, Vol. 27 (February 1962). Mozambique's Revolution stands apart from this analysis. First, the country's village, subsistence economy was largely unaffected by the cyclic fluctuations of the business cycle. And second, Portuguese development, although concentrated on the urban areas and large-scale enterprises, was in the ascendency before and during the insurgency.

Frente de Libertagao de Mo~ambique, First Congress Resolutions, reprinted in Mondlane's Struggle for Mozambique, p. 122.

Frente de Libertagao de Moqambique, Second Congress Resolutions on National Reconstruction, reprinted in Mondlane's Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 192-94.

an analysis of this point.
11 Interview. The Portuguese sometimes gave this explanation for the loss of entire ethnic groups. In fact, entire communities were neither won nor lost by one side.
13 Graça Simbine, Minister of Education and Culture in the People's Republic of Mozambique, "New Social Relations in Mozambique," reported in Ikwezi (UK) 12, no. 4 (December 1976), 47. 14 Interview.

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15 For a vivid account of one of these bush meetings, see Cornwall, Bush Rebels, pp. 94-95.
16 Interview with General Arriaga, October 13, 1977, and others. 17 "We Value Africa's Aid," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 52 (July-September 1972), p. 3.
19 In one case a Mozambican named Hilírio established a legend around the northern town of Ancuabe (forty miles inland from Porto Amelia) for his uncanny ability to detect mines. The local guerrillas, sensing supernatural powers, refused to fire at Hilario who wore brightly colored clothes to identify himself on convoy rides. Interview.
20 Isaacman, Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, p. 199. The Ian Smith regime mounted a counterspirit campaign among the Shona people to convince them that their spirit, Mhondora, was against the Zimbabwe guerrillas and was for the government forces. Nicholas Carroll, "Tribal Spirits in Rhodesia," Sunday Times (UK), March 11, 1973. The Portuguese colonial government mounted no similar systematic program. 21 Interview.
22 Paul, Mozambique, p. 139.
25 Interview with Mariano Matsinha, Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Tape 12, N1.
26 "Shaping the Political Line," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es
236 Notes
Virtually every testimony of FRELIMO leaders and followers stresses the feeling of being blocked from upward mobility. For the views of ordinary folk, see José Capela, ed., Mozambique Pelo Seu Povo (Porto, Portugal: Afronamenta, 1974). FRELIMO’s Mozambique Revolution carried statements of resentment against colonial privilege in nearly every issue.

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Interview with General Arriaga and other interviews. 48 Cornwall, Bush Rebels, p. 50.
Armand Doll, for twenty years a Nazarene missionary at Manjacaze in the southern district of Gaza, related the reasons for the leave-taking of two youths from his station. Each had about six years of schooling and they looked to FRELIMO to further their education and their ambitions. Interview on May 17, 1979. 51 "Mozambique Revolt," The Sun (Baltimore), December 19, 1975. 52 Reported in Swift, Mozambique and the Future, p. 92.
For more on this recruitment method, see Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, p. 35.
60 Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique, p. 139; and Comunicado No. 4/67 Do Comando-Chefe Das Forças Armadas de Mogambique, Abril 23, 1967, p. 3.
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61 Miguel Artur Murupa, Perspectivas da Africa Portuguesa: 
63 Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal and Its Empire: The Truth 
64 Some information on the composition and views of the MDM can be 
found in United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on 
. . . Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, Document A/AC. 109/L. 625/Add. 2, May 12, 1970, 
pp. 195-98.
65 Noticias (Louren o Marques), October 29, 1972.
66 One mild exception in FRELIMO's international magazine was a 
poem, "Mae Africa" (mother Africa) which distinguished between "good" and 
"bad" Europeans while calling upon African warriors 
to "conquer evil whites." Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), 
67 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 7.
68 Nuno Rocha, Guerra em Morambigue (Lisbon: Ulisseia, 1969), 
pp. 92-93.
69 Interviews and de Melo, Mogambique, Norte, pp. 76, 146 and 188.
70 The intense anti-Portuguese feelings and the sometimes savage 
expression of them can be seen in Sithole, FRELIMO Militant, 
pp. 156-60.
71 "Priest Sent Recruits to Frelimo," The Times (UK), June 13, 1974.
72 For an example of one of the most gullible in swallowing tales 
of European support for FRELIMO, see Roger Mann, "Mozambique: 
What Future for Whites?" Africa Report 20, no. 6 (NovemberDecember 1975), 
41-42.

For those seeing the Marxist ideology of the liberation movements 
as an important factor in the MFA, see Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden 
Revolution in Portugal," New York Review of Books 22, no. 6 (April 17, 1975), 
30; and Rona Fields, The Portuguese 
Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement (New York: Praeger, 
1976), p. 34. Other analysts detect professional grievances and 
corns as having more weight. Howard J. Wiarda, "The Portuguese Revolution: 
Towards Explaining the Political Behaviour 
of the Armed Forces Movement," Iberian Studies 4, no. 2 (Autumn 
1975), 57; Ben Pimlott, "Were the Soldiers Revolutionary? The 
Armed Forces Movement in Portugal, 1973-1976," Iberian Studies 7, 
no. 1 (Spring 1978), 14-16; and Porch, Portuguese Armed Forces 
and Revolution, pp. 34-36.

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Africa: A Vitria Traida, p. 85, notes only thirteen desertions between 1964 and 
1969. FRELIMO publications mention only a few

One typical example is given in a pamphlet by George Houser and Herb Shore, Mozambique: Dream the Size of Freedom (New York: Africa Fund, 1975), p. 61.


The author obtained some handwritten notes in Portuguese from sources in Mozambique. Photocopies are filed under the author's name in the archives of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.


80 Degnan, "Three Wars' of Mozambique," p. 13, and many interviews.

81 For some examples of this viewpoint, see Vasco Lourenço, MFA: Rosto do Povo (Lisbon: Portugal–lia, 1975); Galvão de Melo, MFA: Movimento Revolucionario (Lisbon: Portugal–flia, 1975); and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Cinco Meses Mudaram Portugal (Lisbon: Portugal–lia, 1975).

82 Machel's father had been a Protestant pastor. As a young man, Machel had been denied further educational advancement unless he opted for Catholicism, something he refused. Interview with Doll, May 17, 1979. In addition to his Marxist outlook, this personal resentment may account for Machel's confrontation with the Church in 1979.


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86 For an analysis of peasant millenarianism, see Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement
in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Norton, 1965), chs. 4-6.

CHAPTER 5
3 "Black Troops Fear Reprisals," Star Weekly (South Africa), June 1, 1974.
Details of the racial breakdown can be found in Comunicado No. 1/73 Do Comando-Chefe Das Forqas Armadas de Moqambique, Janeiro 27, 1973, p. 3. A figure of seventy-two to seventy-five thousand troops was set forth in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (London: Paul Elek, 1971), p. 669. Another source reported a total of sixty thousand troops, black and white, Expresso (Lisbon), October 5, 1974. Earlier, for the 1971-1972 period a reliable source gave the figure of 45,000 for Mozambique, 60,000 for Angola and 25,000 for Guinea-Bisseau, The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 21-22. The increased troop strength for Mozambique in 1974 can be accounted for by the stepped-up fighting there and the decline in Angola. FRELIMO after the war claimed that it faced the incredible figure of five hundred thousand OPVDCs. Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 19.
8 Financial Times (UK), September 14, 1971. About ten to fifteen thousand refrat-ríos (draft dodgers) left year in the 1960s. Between 1961 and 1974, an estimated one hundred ten thousand draftees failed to report for military service. Porch, Portuguese Armed Forces and Revolution, p. 32. There was also some wrangling by well-connected young men for student or medical deferments.
From exile in Brazil, Caetano wrote that Africanization did not reduce Portuguese casualties; see Depoimento, p. 173. 10 "FRELIMO Makes Small Gains among Whites," Guardian (UK), January 10, 1975.

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An analysis of how fraternization can undermine the discipline of a counterrevolutionary force can be found in Katharine

12 Even FRELIMO literature noted the disproportionate ratio of black troops to white officers. For example, AnGa post, less than a mile from Mogimboa da Praia, had sixty Mozambican militia to three Portuguese officers. "Interview with a Portuguese Prisoner," Mozambique Revolution, no. 50 (January-March 1972), p. 12.


17 Interviews and Rocha, Guerra em Moambique, p. 105. 18 "0 general Kaulza de Arriaga presidiu a importante cerimonia." Noticias da Beira (Mozambique), June 8, 1971.


24 Radio Report recorded in Facts and Reports (Netherlands) 4, nos. 15 and 16 (August 3, 1974), 19; and Expresso (Portugal), May 18, 1974.

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26 General Spinola in Guinea-Bissau abandoned Lisbon's policy of cultural assimilation and encouraged ethnic communities to concentrate on development within their regions. Lars Rudebeck,

27 Cornwall, Bush Rebels, p. 82; and interviews.
28 This form of indoctrination was not widely used by other territorial commanders. See "Entrevista com General Kaulza de Arriaga," Noticias (Lourenco Marques), December 2, 1972; and "Mozambique Attacks Are Possible," The Star (Johannesburg), January 29, 1973.
29 Not like his fellow commanders, General Spinola discarded Lisbon's long-held mission of cultural assimilation for a "pluricultural" policy with the African societies. This shift, dictated by pragmatic concerns to win over the population of Guinea-Bissau, recognized the right of Africans to retain their identity.


The hostile reaction of the settler population in Mozambique, which Guinea-Bissau almost totally lacked, provides one explanation for the absence of a similar program in the east African colony.

Swift, Mozambique and the Future, p. 50.

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Confidential discussion between author and a U.S. Consulate official in Lourenro Marques (Maputo), July 8, 1973. For obvious reasons, these "con games" were not played in combat units.
38 Degnan, "'Three Wars' of Mozambique," p. 10.
Interviews.
40 Interviews and Douglas Porch, "Decolonization and Military Revolt: The French and Portuguese Experience Compared," paper read before the Second International Meeting on Modern Portugal,

Dennis Herbstein, "Vorster's Men Get Psycho-war Kit," Sunday Times (UK), April 3, 1977. These officers as well advise their men on correct relations with African villagers.
Interviews.
45 Paul, Mozambique, pp. 168 and 184. A postindependence observer argued that the Lourenço Marques' railway system "received large contingents of full time forced laborers right up to 1972."
46 Interviews.
47 Comunicado No. 1/74 Do Comando-Chefe Das Forças Armadas de Mozambique, 29 Janeiro 1973, p. 8. 48 Ibid.
49 Arriaga, Portuguese Answer, p. 81, diagrams IV and V. 50 According to defectors from FRELIMO, there was resentment against the "chairborne leadership in Dar es Salaam. See statements in Calvert, "Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique," p. 82. 51 Samora Machel, "The Enemy's New Methods," Mozambique Revolution, no. 57 (October-December 1973), p. 4.
52 Gibson, African Liberation Movements, p. 284. Also, according to FRELIMO, Kavandame had been dismissed from his post for "corruption" (defined as exploiting peasants) on January 3, 1969, three months before his defection. Central Committee Report to

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the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 15. But since Kavandame had not been inside Mozambique since 1967, his falling out probably had more to do with the issue of Makonde secession for an independent state, radicalization of the movement and personal ambition.
Interviews.
Interviews and Swift, Mozambique and the Future, p. 70.
58 Interview with General Arriaga, October 13, 1977; and Murupa, Perspectivas da Africa Portuguesa, p. 80. In the wake of Gordian Knot, for example, Veronica Namiva, Manuel Mussa Katur, Miguel Murupa and a reported seven thousand civilians and rank-and-file guerrillas were brought over to the Portuguese side.


61 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, pp. 18-19.


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72 Before incarceration for ties with FRELIMO, Arouca had worked for the Overseas Ministry and held a high post in the Banco Nacional Ultramarino. His standing with FRELIMO at war's end was low. Denied participation in its ruling circle, he turned
to opposition politics. After independence, he headed an organization, Mozambican Resistance Movement, bent on militarily undermining FRELIMO's rule.

73 Interview.
Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 18.
Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, p. 300; Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp. 28-29 and 90; and John McCuen, The Art of Counterrevolutionary War (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1966), pp. 33-37. For a Portuguese criticism of the powers enjoyed by regedores as impediments to social change, see Alexandre Cancelas, Contributo para uma Politica Social Mo.ambicana (Braga, Portugal: Editora Pax, 1972), pp. 175-78 and 204-6.

77 See Expresso (Portugal), May 4, 1974, for a presentation and discussion of the GUMO program.


246 Notes
80 "Jorge Jardim e Kaulza de Arriga indigitados para ministros de um governo fantoche presidido por miguel Murupa," Notícias (Lourenço Marques), May 26, 1974.
82 Interview.
89 Brendan F. Jundanian, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," Comparative Politics 16, no. 4 (July 1974), 530. 90 Ibid., p. 528.
FRELIMO publicized the unrealistic settlement notion to such a degree that it has become uncritically accepted even in objective postindependence works. For an example, see Kaplan, Area Handbook for Mozambique (1977), p. 56.  

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Although many of the colonato's teenagers from Madeira were untrained and unprepared for farming or hardships, other colonato residents possibly made their most fruitful contribution in agriculture production. The few hundred Montepuez colonists, according to government figures, produced 5,200 out of 19,200 tons of Cabo Delgado's cotton in the 1970-71 season. Noticias (Lourenqo Marques), December 18, 1971. 100 Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 89-90.

CHAPTER 6
"In Mozambique," Mozambique Revolution, no. 25 (June-July 1966), p. 8; and Mondlane's Struggle for Mozambique, p. 165.
6 Directorate-General, Information Office, Secretary of State for Information and Tourism, "African Massacres and 'Massacres,'"
Comunicado No. 10/71 Do Comando-Chefe Das Forcas Armadas de
Mocambique, 21 October 1971, p. 3, stated that forty regulos and
fumos (chiefs) had been victims of guerrilla assaults in Tete
within the previous three months.
Adrian Hastings, Wiriyamu (London: Search Press, 1974), pp. 34
and 55; and Paul, Mozambique, p. 115.
8
Interview.
Caetano, Depoimento, p. 181.

248 Notes
10 Tortura na Colônia de Mocambique, 1963-1974: Depoimentos de
Presos Políticos (Porto: Afrontamento, 1977); and "Torture, Massacre and
Destruction in Mozambique," Objective: Justice,
Special Supplement No. 1 (New York: United Nations, September
11 Peter Paret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960s (New York:
Præger, 1962), p. 34.
13 Bosgra, "Portuguese Source: Large-Scale Fighting in Mozambique,"
p. 15.
14 Middlemas, Cabora Bassa, p. 152.
15 Information Bulletin (Cairo) 2 (June-July 1966), 9; and "Communiqu& No.
14," Mozambique Revolution, no. 16 (March 1965),
pp. 4-5. FRELIMO argued that it "systematically spared" the
lives of survivors of mined vehicles. ""The Attacks That Shook
Mozambique," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 53
(October-December 1972), p. 5. More often than not, victims of
mined cars and trucks were spared because they fled the site
before the guerrillas appeared.
16 The Portuguese army did mine infiltration paths and the spaces
below bridges where guerrillas hid from aircraft, or sought to
blow up the bridge's support structure. But generally the armed
forces experienced a serious shortage in mines as well as mine detection devices.
Interview with General Arriage, October 13,
1977.
17 From captured, defected or surrendered FRELIMO militants the
Portuguese estimated, according to another source, that the guerrillas had killed
450 Makonde people in their campaign against uncommitted Africans between
18 Portuguese authorities reported an increase of kidnapped Mozambicans from 177 between April and June 30, 1973, to 775 during the corresponding period of the next year. David B. Ottaway, "Guerrillas Winning Control of Mozambique," Washington Post, August 18, 1974.


For one testimony in print, see Zeca Caliante's statement in De Villiers, "Portugal's Wars," pp. 251-52. Alves Mugana testified that the violent emphasis was committed on Chinese instruction. Swift, Mozambique and the Future, p. 92.

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21 In the Algerian war the FLN killed more Muslim inhabitants than the French. Arslam Humbaraci, Algeria: The Revolution That Failed (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 64.

22 "Conclusoes do inquerito ao 'Ancoche,'" Diário de Noticias (Portugal), July 17, 1971. This is a report of the DGS. To this day, the Ancoche incident remains a mystery.

23 Father Jos& Sangalo, "Priest Explains Alleged FRELIMO Massacre," Anti-Apartheid News (UK), March 1974, p. 2. 24 According to FRELIMO, its leading figures rejected random attacks on Europeans, urban terrorism and perhaps a coup attempt in the capital. These discussions reportedly took place before the 1968 Second Congress. Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 6.

25 Paul, Mozambique, p. 69.

26 There was an unconfirmed report of an attempt during December 1964 to place a bomb in Lourenço Marques' SA cathedral, which had been built with black prison labor. United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on . . . Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Document A/6000/Rev. 1, p. 157.


29 Marvin Harris, Portugal's African 'Wards' (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1958); and Sebastian Soares de Resende, Ordem Anticommunists (Lourenço Marques, 1950).


31 ,"Ae95es de Sabotagem," Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), no. 14
"FRELIMO Faces the Future," African Communist (UK) (Fourth Quarter, 1973), p. 6. This is an interview with Vice President Marcelino dos Santos.
Paul, Mozambique, p. 163.
"Diary of Inhaminga," p. 11.

250 Notes
Interview with Antonio Rita-Ferreira, Head of the Center for Information and Tourism, Lourenço Marques, June 23, 1973.
38 "Offensive on All Fronts," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 56 (July-September 1973), p. 5.
A total figure for the postcoup period is also difficult to estimate. It would include deaths in the September and October riots in the capital, which claimed about one hundred white lives, and many settler deaths in the backcountry that went untallied.
Interview with Mariano Matsinha, FRELIMO representative in Lusaka, Zambia. Middlemas Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Tape 12, Nl.
Interviews.
46 For a graphic description of the harried departure of one band of upcountry settlers, see Coccia, Scorpion Sting, pp. 203-5.
Virtually every FRELIMO publication and especially Mozambique Revolution carried testimonies of converts and recruits. For example, see "The Making of a Freedom Fighter," no. 51 (April-June 1972), pp. 10-11.
48 "Diary of Inhaminga," p. 1; Paul, Mozambique, pp. 130 and 147; and interview with Armand Doll.
Paul, Mozambique, p. 184.

Notes
For more on differing opinions on General Arriaga, see Bruce Loudon, "Mozambique Command Changes," Daily Telegraph (UK), July 24, 1973.
"African Massacres and 'Massacres,'" p. 9. 60
61 Professor Middlemas endorses this version and wrote that "some of the circumstantial detail of rape and mutilation cited by Father Hastings was fabricated later." Cabora Bassa, p. 159.
As with the Mueda massacre, the toll of over four hundred deaths is an excessive estimate; the figure was actually closer to the eighty-six listed by name.
64 "African Massacres and 'Massacres,'" p. 10. 65 Paul, Mozambique, p. 197.
67 This practice was first confirmed by an outsider who was not sympathetic to Mozambican nationalism. Lord Kilbracken, "Beleaguered Outposts in Savage Warfare Supplied by Air," Chronicle (Bulaway, Rhodesia), October 2, 1965.
69 This is the author's impression, and Amnesty International drew a similar conclusion in Report on Torture, p. 176. 70 "Diary of Inhaminga," p. 2.

252 Notes

An African source maintains that the secret police had been in Mozambique since the early 1950s. Chikomuami Mahala, "The Horror of Mozambique," Africa South in Exile 5 (October-December 1960), 59.


The Dutch branch of Amnesty International reported the number of political prisoners in Mozambique "probably well in excess of 10,000." See "Portugal, 25,000 Political Prisoners," Facts and Reports (Netherlands) 2, no. 23 (November 11, 1972), 15.

Letter of July 6, 1978, to author from Peter Pringle, British journalist, who was temporarily detained by Portuguese authorities for his research activities surrounding the Wiriyamu in August 1974. According to Raimundo Valoi, Central Committee member, BOSS was also responsible for breaking up FRELIMO sympathy cells in the capital itself. "The 'Heroes of Mozambique,'" Peoples Power, no. 14 (Summer 1979), p. 29.

78 In one instance, the Portuguese were accused of hiring a kidnapper to abduct UNAMI President Jos Balthazar de Costa Chagonga.

United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, Petitions to the Committee, Document A/AC 109/Pet. 59, p. 2.


82 David Martin, "Interpol Solves a Guerrilla Whodunit," Observer (UK), February 6, 1972. After the coup and his capture, former Vice President Simango confessed that he and Silveiro Nungu (another FRELIMO official) transported the bomb to Mondlane. Nungu was executed a few weeks after the Mondlane assassination.


Notes
CHAPTER 7

After an interview with Samora Machel, the journalist lain Christie wrote: "And to further clarify the point, 'liberated zone' does not mean the complete expulsion of the colonialists. There are still Portuguese there but they are isolated in a few small garrisons." "Building a Nation in Battle-torn Mozambique," Sunday News (Tanzania), April 2, 1972. For a discussion of the refutations of the Portuguese and their sympathizers, see Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa, pp. 331-33.


Comunicado No. 7/73 Do Comando-Chefe Das Foras Armadas de Mozambique, July 23, 1973, p. 1. Murupa contended that FRELIMO claims constituted a mathematical impossibility since only 1,300,000 people lived in the three districts and most were under Portuguese control. For his figures, see Perspectivas da Africa Portuguesa, p. 26.

4 Interviews.


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8 Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, pp. 18-19. FRELIMO posited that by 1969 it had vaccinated one hundred fifty thousand persons against smallpox. For wartime figures, see Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 40 (September 1969), p. 44.

10 "Offensive on All Fronts," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 56 (July-September 1973), p. 4.

11 "Editorial: Central Committee Reviews the War," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 53 (October-December 1972), p. 2. FRELIMO issued its own educational publications in order to present its view of Mozambican history. For one example, see Hist6ria de Morambique, Livro de Hist6ria para 4a Classe (Dar es Salaam: Departamento de Educa9ao e Cultura de Frente de Libertarao de Mozambique, 1971). Machel's views of the political importance of education can
be found in Samora Moisès Machel, A Nossa Luta (n.p.: Imprensa Nacional de Mo-ambique, 1975), pp. 32-42.

12 These figures were taken from a postindependence source, and those for students studying abroad seem realistic. Carol Collins, "Education for the People," Southern Africa (U.S.) 10, no. 5 (June-July 1977), 22.


14 Paul, Mozambique, p. 146.

15 Many journalists, camera teams, delegates and other sympathetic observers gave favorable accounts of activities in FRELIMO claimed zones. For a listing of most of these visitors, see Richard W. Leonard, "FRELIMO's Victories in Mozambique," Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion (U.S.) 4, no. 2 (Summer 1974), 38-40.

16 "Portuguese Foiled Frelimo Moves," Star (South Africa), November 25, 1972.

17 One of those was F. X. Maier, Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique, p. 9.


19 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Garden City Publisher, 1939), pp. 221-24.

20 Interviews.


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24 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), chs. 5 and 6. 25 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, February 3-7, 1977, ch. 1. A translated and printed copy was distributed by the London-based Mozambique, Angola and Guinea
Information Centre.
Among those sympathetic to Portugal's cause were F. X. Maier, Al J. Venter, C. F. de Villiers and other South African reporters. Following the international press coverage of the Wiriyamu incident, Lisbon allowed in many correspondents, some of whom were critical of Portuguese policies.
Even higher (and more inflated) figures of production were passed on for 1969 by the World Council of Churches' bulletin on FRELIMO (November 1970, p. 14), when it reported the following export figures in kilograms from Cabo Delgado district alone: cashew nuts, 53,041; sesame seeds, 414,782; and groundnuts, 530,159.

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Interviews.
"Diary of Inhaminga," p. 5.
41 Simbine, "New Social Relations in Mozambique," pp. 48-49. 42 "We can achieve final victory if the accompanying psychological and social operations are successful. Even more important than military success is the need to persuade the population that their best interests are with us," said General Arriaga. Marvine Howe, "Lisbon General Reports Gains in Mozambique War," New York Times, March 15, 1971.

258 Notes
Comunicado No. 12/70 Do Comando-Chefe Das Foras Armadas de Mogambique, December 22, 1970, p. 3.
Arriaga, Portuguese Answer, p. 75.
57

58 A number of General Arriaga's speeches are compiled in his Coragem, Tenacidade e F (Lourengo Marques: Minerva Central, 1973), p. 165.


61 Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary War and Counter-Insurgency," Journal of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (1975), 16-17.


63 "Portuguese Source: Large-Scale Fighting in Mozambique," p. 15.

64 Comunicado No. 1/73 Do Comando-Chefe Das Foras Armadas de Mocambique, 29 Janeiro 1973, p. 4.


66 Interview.

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67 Middlemas, Cabora Bassa, p. 151. 68 General Arriaga stated that he "had a good working relationship with Pimental dos Santos." Interview with General Arriaga, October 13, 1977.


70 Comunicado No. 6/73 Do Comando-Chefe Das Fortas Armadas de Mocambique, 28 June 1973, p. 3; and interviews.

71 There was little independent criticism from Portuguese authorities on how to improve community relations in Mozambique. One exception is Alexandre Cancelas, Contributo para uma Politica Social Mogambicana (Braga, Portugal: Editora Pax, 1972), especially pp. 126 and 133-34.


Wheeler and P~lissier, Angola, p. 248.

This UN table, for example, appeared in a booklet published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portuguese Africa: An Introduction (Lisbon, 1973), p. 76; and in Murupa, Perspectivas da África Portuguesa, p. 47.

76 A breakdown of funds for specific projects in the third Six Year Plan can be found in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portuguese Africa, p. 67.


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91 "News Review--Mozambique," BOLSA Review (UK) 18, no. 93 (September 1974), 572. This shows a decline from $54 million in 1970 to $13 million in 1972.

92 The terms of the agreement came into force in January 1973. By that time Portugal's trade with its African territories had been overshadowed by trade with Europe. Africa took 25 percent of Portugal's exports and provided 14 percent of its imports. Western Europe, on the other hand, furnished 58 percent of its imports and took 54 percent of its exports. "Between Africa and Europe: A Survey of Portugal," Economist (UK), supplement, February 26, 1972.

For a discussion of the different currents of thought for Caetano Portugal's development, including the "modernizing technocrats,"

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98 Interview; and see Cancelas, Contributo para uma Politica Social Mogambicana, p. 126, for detracting remarks about the Servigo de Acqao Psicossocial not doing enough to further community development.
101 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 265-96; and Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History 23 (December 1963), 529.
CHAPTER 8

6 The Azores agreement additionally provided an oceanographic vessel on a no-cost lease basis, a grant of $1 million for educational projects and, most importantly for the overseas conflicts, a gift of $5 million in nonmilitary excess equipment to the Portuguese Ministry of Defense, which included cranes, roadbuilding machinery, harbor equipment and engineering instruments left over from the Vietnam war. For details, see Department of State, Extension Azores Agreement, Press No. 290. December 9, 1971.

262 Notes
The Eximbank did make a loan of $1.5 million to private banks in Lourenço Marques to help finance imports of U.S. goods and services by small and medium-sized concerns. "Mozambique: Foreign Loans," BOLSA Review 6, no. 69 (September 1972), 529.
14 Bosgra and van Krimpen, Portugal and NATO, pp. 11-55.
16 Radio Report from Nairobi, February 28, 1972, printed in Facts and Reports (Netherlands) 2, no. 6 (March 18, 1972), 5.


One striking lesson learned from the collapse of Portuguese officer morale and its part in the Lisbon coup by the South African government has been seen in its dispatch of psychological action officers to each battalion to watch for telltale signs of "Communist influence," "low morale" and poor treatment of African subjects. Denis Herbstein, "Vorster's Men Get Psycho-war Kits," Sunday Times (UK), April 3, 1977.


For an insight into the depth of Portuguese passions about Africa, see Marcelo Caetano, Razoes de Presenca de Portugal no Ultramar (Lisbon: n.p., 1973).


Antonio de Figueiredo, "Portugal Helps to Bust Sanctions,"

38 FRELIMO publications evinced more respect for South African troops because of their higher motivation and their being accustomed to African climate and terrain. "Communiqu6 No. 11," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 16 (March 1965), p. 5.
Repeated South African denials can be found in Argus (South Africa), March 11, 1971; and in the Cape Times (South Africa), June 20, 1973.
40 "Mr. Vorster's Offer of Military Aid to Portugal," The Times (UK), December 23, 1970.
Portuguese authorities reciprocated by handing back the internationally known poet and activist Denis Brutus.
Intelligence documents in the author's hands point to a high degree of detail in Rhodesian knowledge of FRELIMO camps in Mozambique. These reports assess arms caches, numerical strength of Zimbabwean men serving in FRELIMO units, number of radios, proficiency of the guerrillas and local defense preparedness. Some of these documents are filed with the archives of the Hoover Institution.

A Rhodesian officer made this estimate to a reporter from London's Evening Standard, according to FRELIMO. "Offensive on All Fronts," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 56 (July–September 1973), p. 7.

Venter, Zambesi Salient, p. 138.

50 Interviews.
52 "Junta Tells Rhodesia: Keep Out," Star Weekly (South Africa), May 25, 1974. FRELIMO falsely claimed military superiority over Rhodesian and South African forces as the reason for their withdrawal from Mozambique.
Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 19.
There were published signs of a South African-sponsored mercenary invasion under the command of "Mad Mike" Hoare of Congo fame. But BOSS evidently prevailed against the scheme. John de St. Jorre, A House Divided: South Africa's Uncertain Future (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1977), p. 24. In an interview with a British writer before the coup, Arriaga speculated that if Portugal withdrew from Mozambique, then it would be replaced by South Africa in the south and by Rhodesia in the central districts.
John Sykes, Portugal and Africa: The People and the War (London:
For a copy of the speeches, resolutions and documents relating
to the Rome conference, see Sechaba (London) 4, no. 9 (September
For a listing and sample of FRELIMO reception of foreign endorsements, see the
following issues of Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam): no. 30 (August-September 1967), pp. 2-6; no. 36
(October-December 1968), pp. 9-12; and no. 41 (October-December 1969), pp.
38-39. FRELIMO had membership in Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (OSPAA), Afro-Asian-Latin American
People's Solidarity Organization (OSPAAAL) and the World Council of Peace (WCP).
56 "Editorial," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 13
(December 1964), p. 2.

57 See "International Solidarity," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 55 (April-June 1973), pp. 1-2, for an example of
the psychological lift that international recognition and assistance gave to FRELIMO.
58 Mondlane, Struggle for Mozambique. p. 184.
"Editorial," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 16
(March 1965), p. 2.
60 Middlemas, Cabora Bassa, p. 49.
61 Other reasonably high quality publications were: Voz de Revolucao, a
publication of the Central Committee, and 25 de Septembro, an organ of the
guerrilla army.
62 Israel is not often mentioned as a donor, and FRELIMO never
publicly acknowledged its help. H&lio Felgas, Os Movimento Terroristas de Angola, Guin&, Mozambique (Lisbon, 1966), p. 73;
During the period 1967-1968, FRELIMO received only $28,000 of a promised
$264,000 from the OAU. Sunday Telegraph (UK), May 21, 1969. Most African
states were habitually in arrears on their
pledges.
64 Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 1 (December 1963),
p. 9. Later a woman delegate, Selina Simango, wrote that she "learned many
things about the role of women in the [Chinese]
revolution," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 6
(May 1964), p. 4.
65
It was at this time that Peking switched from military assistance for internal wars
in Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo (Zaire)
to support of liberation movements. SIPRI, Southern Africa,
p. 375.
69 "Soviet Ships for Portugal," Portugal Report, September 1971. This publication was edited by the Portuguese embassy in Bonn.

Notes

70 See the interview with Marcelino dos Santos in "FRELIMO Faces the Future," African Communist (UK) (Fourth Quarter, 1973), p. 6. 71 On at least one occasion FRELIMO admitted: "Contrary to the myth that the enemy soldiers abandon their weapons in order to escape more easily, the Portuguese soldiers deploy great efforts and even risk their lives in order not to leave on the battlefield any weapons which can be used by the guerrillas." "Shaping the Political Line," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 51 (April-June 1972), p. 17.
72 Apparently the guerrillas preferred the Chinese version for its plastic stock. For more information, see Kaplan, Area Handbook for Mozambique (1977), p. 17.
76 The prominent Latin American writer who wrote the Havana-authorized version of Cuban intervention into the Angolan Civil War, stated that Cuba aided FRELIMO from 1963 but gave no details. Gabriel García Marquez, "Cuba in Africa: Seed Che Planted," Washington Post, January 12, 1977.
76 A brief account of Che Guevara's visit is given in Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), no. 17 (February 1965), p. 10.
76 For example, see Marcelino dos Santos, "An International War," Tricontinental (Cuba), no. 23 (March-April 1971), pp. 5-15; and
80 Ibid.
81 One journalist reported that there were Soviet instructors around the northern town of Arusha. Swift, Mozambique and the Future, p. 187.

268 Notes
85 Interviews with members of the Portuguese Communist Party, October 15, 1977.
86 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, pp. 37-42.

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FRELIMO publications carried quotations from Ho Chi Minh, among other revolutionaries. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 40 (September 1969), p. 39. 96 Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane," p. 50. For years allegations that Mondlane had accepted money from the CIA dogged his footsteps. In fact he was given US $10,000 in 1963. Telephone conversations of George Ball/Karl Kaysen, May 9, 1963, and William Averell Harriman/George Ball/Wayne Fredericks, May 10, 1963, in the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library. This is cited in Richard Mahoney, "The Kennedy-Salazar Skirmish over Portuguese Africa," paper read before the Second International Meeting on Modern Portugal, Durham, N.H., June 23, 1979, p. 59. 98 The most visible and resourceful were Afrika Kommittee in West Berlin, Comité National de Soutien aux Luttes de Liberation dans les Colonies Portugaises in Paris, the Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo in Milan and, the most prominent, the Angola Comité in Amsterdam. In North America, the two most significant were in Canada: the Liberation Support Movement in Vancouver and the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies. 99
104 "Mozambique Traders Slam Door," Star (South Africa), May 6, 1972. Dutch goods were also banned.
Marcum, Angolan Revolution, II, 226.

270 Notes
108 Interviews.
ill "FRELIMO Hails Bomb Blast in Lisbon," The Nationalist (Tanzania), June 5, 1971.
112 "Portugal May Proclaim State of Subversion," The Times (UK), November 17, 1971.
119 Simon Ngwenga, "Class Struggle in Swaziland," Ikwezi (UK) 2, no. 3 (August 1976), 8.
Notes
271
135 Accounts differ on who was responsible for the bridge explosion. Middlemas (Cabora Bassa, p. 140) maintains that Lisbon hired a Scottish engineer to blow up the bridge, and Wilkinson ("From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution, pp. 278-80) argues that a Rhodesian farmer, who was irate with Zambia for allowing guerrillas to use its territory, was responsible.
137 "Portuguese Plane Downed," Cape Times (South Africa), April 17, 1972. Portuguese authorities denied that the plane had violated Tanzanian airspace.
Notes 273
6 Amilcar Cabral, assassinated leader of the PAIGC, expressed this argument first and most clearly: "The fundamental characteristic
of Portuguese colonialism in our time is a very simple fact: Portuguese colonialism, or, if you prefer it, the Portuguese economic infrastructure, is unable to afford itself the luxury of neocolonialism. It is from this point that we can understand the stubborn hostility of Portuguese colonialism towards our peoples." This quotation comes from Cabral's address to a CONCP conference in Dar es Salaam in 1965. See "The Nationalist Movements of the Portuguese Colonies," Selected Texts by Amilcar Cabral, ed. and trans. Richard Handyside (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 64.


8 Marcel Niedergang, "Le Portugal Malade de l'Afrique," Le Monde (France), April 1, 1972; "Between Africa and Europe," Economist (UK), supplement, February 26, 1972, p. 21; Marvine Howe, "Portugal at War; Hawks, Doves and Owls: How Long Can Portugal Hold Out in Africa and at Home?" Africa Report 14, no. 7 (November 1969), 18; and Portugal and the EEC (Amsterdam: Angola Comitê, 1973), pp. 5-8. This pamphlet also noted economic assistance from the EEC and the EFTA.


15 "Emigration Drains Resources," Financial Times (UK), July 9, 1971. Such pieces dwelled on the fact that emigration had made Paris the second largest Portuguese city without proper weight given to cash inflow of migrants’ pay checks to relatives in the homeland.
18 In addition to the writer, a number of observers have concluded that it was the war in Mozambique more than in the other territories that tipped the balance against the Portuguese military effort. For instance, see Neil Bruce, Portugal: The Last Empire (New York: Wiley, 1975), pp. 63-65; John S. Saul, "The Revolution in Portugal's African Colonies," Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, no. 2 (1975), 329; and David Birmingham, "The Twenty-Seventh of May: An Historical Note on the Abortive 1977 Coup in Angola," African Affairs 77, no. 309 (October 1978), 561. 19 Porch, Portuguese Armed Forces and Revolution, pp. 35-36. 20 Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal," New York Review of Books 22, no. 6 (April 17, 1975), 30.
21 One officer on the political left and not representative of the bulk of the MFA made this point. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Cinco Meses Mudaram Portugal (Lisbon: Portugalia Editora, 1975), pp. 62, 81-82, 86 and 88.
22 Figueiredo, Portugal, p. 17.
23 Caetano, Depoimento, p. 176.
24 "Minister Warns of Threat to Portugal," Guardian (UK), December 31, 1970.
25 Caetano, Depoimento, p. 176.
27 Interview.

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33 de Spinola, Portugal e o Futuro, pp. 111-48.
34 Silvino Silv&rio Marques, "Estava a Guerra Perdida?" Africa A Vitoria Traida, pp. 263-64. To the rhetorical question "Was the War Lost?" that entitles his chapter, General Marques and the three other generals in the book answer that victory was betrayed --hence the title of their book.


As pointed out above, these rumors had circulated from the early 1970s. For one UDI-type scenario, see "Out of Africa," Africa Reports 17, no. 7 (July-August 1972), p. 5.


42 Daily News (Tanzania), February 7, 1977; and Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, pp. 10-12.


276 Notes
45 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 18.
46 For more on nationalism and revolution, see Hagopian, Phenomenon of Revolution, p. 150.

For the basic Maoist texts, see Mostafa Rejai, ed., Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, 1969). For analysis of Chinese views of "people's war," see John J. Taylor, "The Maoist Revolutionary Model in Asia," Current Scene 9, no. 3 (March 7, 1971), 1-19; and


51 See the interview with Marcelino dos Santos in "FRELIMO Faces the Future," African Communist (UK) (Fourth Quarter 1973), p. 3.


Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1970), pp. 35-60.

There are numerous references to change in Mozambican personalities as a result of exposure to violence and warfare. For just one example, see "Editorial: 25th of June--the Starting Point," Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), no. 51 (April-June 1972), pp. 1-2.

References to "creating a new man" or "creating a new mentality" are frequent in independent Mozambique. See Samora Machel's investiture speech as he assumed the Presidency on September 20, 1974, Mozambique Revolution (Lourenro Marques), no. 61 (Independence issue, n.d.), p. 21; and Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, pp. 14, 35 and 41.

56 Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, p. 106.

57 Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of FRELIMO, p. 34.

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Aside from a handful of works, historians and political scientists have not comprehensively focused on or analyzed Mozambique's revolutionary struggle itself. There are, of course, a number of articles and newspaper accounts which represent a committed point of view. There are, however, half a dozen excellent books in English which treat the antecedents to the guerrilla war years of 1964-1974. Among the foremost books which discuss in detail Mozambique's resistance or accommodation to Portuguese conquest and colonial rule are Edward A. Alpers's Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Allen F. Isaacman's Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambezi Prazos, 1750-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), and The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambezi Valley, 1850-1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); M. D. D. Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi: Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1973); and Leroy Vail and Landeg White's Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of Qualimane District (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

Isaacman has become the chief exponent of establishing a continuum of African resistance to Portuguese expansion and colonialism not only in the volumes cited but also in many highly regarded journal articles. He has also been the most enterprising in the use of oral sources for his work. Vail and White in their volume have followed in both these traditions. Isaacman, Newitt, Vail and White have tended to concentrate on Afro-Portuguese interactions along or near the Zambezi Valley, whereas Alpers focused on the northern Mozambique seacoast along with the useful dissertation by Nancy Hafkin, "Trade, Society and Politics in Northern Mozambique, c.1953-1913" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1973).

Portuguese expansion itself is treated in its epic form in English by the British historian Charles R. Boxer. Two of his most well known books are The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1425-1825 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969) and Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1425-1825 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). But it was Professor James Duffy's Portuguese Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) which served as a primer and source book for studies of the African side of the colonial situation in Angola and Guinea-Bissau as well as Mozambique. Another volume of this genre but without the same impact is Ronald H. Chilcote's Portuguese Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967); it caught the crest of the rising wave of African nationalism in Portugal's colonies and of awakening interest in Lisbon's possessions by a younger group of Western scholars. He provided another contribution. His Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: A Bibliography of Documentary Ephemera Through 1965 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969) and his Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa:
Documents (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972) furnished materials for the study of opposition and nationalism in Portuguese Africa. Much of the small amount of literature that deals with Mozambique and anticolonialism also touches on other former Portuguese territories. An important volume of this type of Russell G. Gamilton's Voices from an Empire: A History of Afro-Portuguese Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975) which explores literary reactions to Portuguese rule. The volumes by Chilcote and Duffy also discuss Lisbon's territories other than Mozambique. Other examples are A Guide to Official Publications: Portuguese Africa (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1967) compiled by Mary Jane Gibson and Portugal in Africa: A Bibliography of the UCLA Collection (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972) by Gerald J. Dender et al. Both these latter selections have useful sections on Mozambique's modern history. Studies covering the revolutionary war in Mozambique have been done by students and journalists as well as academicians. Possibly the most useful book for understanding political considerations and important aspects of the war in its last stages is Keith Middlemas's Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975). Middlemas visited Portugal, Mozambique and neighboring African states to speak with Portuguese officials and FRELIMO leaders. The tape recordings of his notes of these interviews are in the archives of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California. Another important book in English but from the white viewpoint is the South African journalist Al J. Venter's The Zambezi Salient: Conflict in Southern Africa (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1974). A useful but less important study is a dissertation by Walter Opello, Jr., "Internal War in Mozambique: A Social-Psychological Analysis of a Nationalist Revolution" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1973). An eyewitness account from an Italian newspaper journalist of the last months of the war is supplied by Giancarlo Coccia's The Scorpion Sting: Mogambique (Johannesburg: Livaria Modenna, 1976). From the FRELIMO viewpoint, the best single book is from its assassinated president Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique.
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For books and articles on the army coup in Lisbon, the reader should consult the notes, where articles, UN documents, source books, reports, newspaper coverage, memoirs and political tracts are cited from both sides.

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About the Author
Thomas H. Henriksen is a historian on the staff of Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He is the coauthor of The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush, coeditor of Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations, editor of Communist Powers in Sub-Saharan Africa, and author of Mozambique: A History as well as numerous articles on African history and politics.

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