The ambiguous champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years

http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.canp1b10001
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| Author/Creator | Freeman, Linda |
| Publisher | University of Toronto Press (Toronto) |
| Date | 1997 |
| Resource type | Books |
| Language | English |
| Subject | Coverage (spatial): Canada, South Africa |
|           | Coverage (temporal): 1946 - 1990 |
| Source | Northwestern University Libraries, Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies, 327.71068 F855a |
| Rights | By kind permission of Linda Freeman. |
| Description | This book is a comprehensive study of Canadian relations with South Africa, with particular concentration on the years from 1968 to 1994. It provides a detailed account of Canadian economic ties and foreign policy on South Africa. As the title indicates, it finds the policy to be ambiguous, with attempts to be critical of South Africa while at the same time retaining ties with the apartheid regime. |
| Format extent (length/size) | 504 pages |

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THE AMBIGUOUS CHAMPION:
CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE TRUDEAU AND MULRONEY YEARS

The Ambiguous Champion is the first comprehensive and critical study of Canadian foreign policy towards South Africa. Linda Freeman challenges the conventional belief that successive Canadian governments took the high road, leading the international struggle against apartheid. She shows that Canadian policy, like the policy of other Western states, was complex, ambiguous, and contradictory. Freeman's approach offers an alternative understanding of the forces shaping Canadian foreign policy.

Legend has it that Canadian prime ministers, from Diefenbaker to Mulroney, led the way in the international campaign against the apartheid state in South Africa. Yet before Mulroney came to power, except on a few occasions in the Commonwealth, his predecessors did little to support the antiapartheid cause.
While Mulroney did significantly better, invoking concrete economic sanctions and tackling Margaret Thatcher within the Commonwealth, the policies of his government were compromised and limited; the claims made for them excessive. The state championed a cause, but followed through in a highly ambiguous way. Central to the explanation is an exploration of the influence of groups within civil society, especially the private sector, on the formation of state policy. Attention is also given to the role churches, trade unions, universities, anti-apartheid groups, and the media played in calling for a stronger Canadian policy against apartheid.

LINDA FREEMAN is Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. She is a founding member and chair of the Canadian Research Consortium on Southern Africa, which published her edited collection Democracy, Structural Adjustment and Transformation in Southern Africa in 1996.

LINDA FREEMAN
The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1997
Toronto Buffalo London
Printed in Canada
Printed on acid-free paper
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Freeman, Linda, 1943The ambiguous champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Canada - Foreign relations - South Africa.
2. South Africa - Foreign relations - Canada. I. Title.
FC251.S68F74 1997 FI029.5.S6F74 1997
32-7. - 0(a
FS55b
327.71068 C97-931094-6
University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

This book is dedicated to the memory of my father, Michael Freeman, to my mother, Jean Freeman, and to my sister, Anne Ferguson.
Acknowledgments
The research for this book was funded, in its early stages, by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Special thanks are due to three anonymous reviewers and to my colleagues at the Canadian Research Consortium on Southern Africa (CRCSA) for intellectual support. I am also indebted to Paul Puritt, Anne Ferguson, and the Southern African Report collective. The research assistance of Grant McNeill, Andrea Clark, Pam Scholey, Tsegaye Dessalegn, Hein Marais, Allison Black, and Hugh Nangle is gratefully acknowledged, as is the editorial assistance of Clyde Sanger. Help from Bill McCarthy and Marilyn Burke at the Mulroney Photo Archives was especially appreciated.

My thanks also go to the many officials and individuals who gave me interviews that, by necessity, were off the record.

Abbreviations
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd
AIA Africa Information Afrique
ANC African National Congress
AP Associated Press
ARMSCOR Armaments Development and Production Corporation (South Africa)
AWEPAA Association of Western European Parliamentarians against Apartheid
AZAPO Azanian Peoples' Organization
CAUT Canadian Association of University Teachers
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCC Canada, Cabinet Conclusions
CCFMSA Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa
CCIC Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CCODP Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
CCSA Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa
CDC Canada Development Corporation
CEA Canadian Exporters’ Association
CFAR Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform
CHCD Canada, House of Commons, Debates
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIBC Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency

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CIDMAA Le Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe
CIIA Canadian Institute of International Affairs
CIIPS Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
CIIR Catholic Institute of International Relations, London, England
CLC Canadian Labour Congress
COSATU Confederation of South African Trade Unions
CP Canadian Press
CSC Canada, Statistics Canada
CSN Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux
CUSO Canadian University Service Overseas
DBS Dominion Bureau of Statistics
DEA Department of External Affairs, Canada
DEA PO Department of External Affairs, Press Office
DEAIT Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Canada
DEASS Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches
DEC Development Education Centre
DND Department of National Defence, Canada
DOD Department of Defense, USA
DOF Department of Finance, Canada
DOJ Department of Justice, Canada
EC European Community
EDC Export Development Corporation
EEC European Economic Community
EPG Eminent Persons Group, Commonwealth
ESCOM Electricity Supply Commission, South Africa
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
G-7 Group of Seven (major industrialized countries)
HBMS Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company
HOC  House of Commons, Canada
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Association
IAWGSA  Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa
ICCAF  Inter-Church Coalition on Africa

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ICFTU  International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IDAFSA  International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation, South Africa
IDRC  International Development Research Centre
IFP  Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ISCOR  Iron and Steel Corporation, South Africa
ITC  Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Canada
MCARA  Manitoba Coalition against Racism and Apartheid
MDM  Mass Democratic Movement
MP  Member of Parliament
MPLA  Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
NAC  National Archives of Canada
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP  New Democratic Party
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIBMAR  no independence before majority rule
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMC  Office of Munitions Control, U.S. State Department
OPSEU  Ontario Public Service Employees Union
PAC  Pan Africanist Congress
PDL  poverty datum line
PEMD  Program for Export Market Development
PM  Prime Minister
PMO  Office of the Prime Minister
PQ  Parti Qu~b6cois
QIT  Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation
RCMP  Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Renamo  Resistencia Nacional Moqambacina (Mozambican National Resistance (formerly MNR))
RTZ  Rio Tinto Zinc
SACTU  South African Congress of Trade Unions

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SADCC  Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF  South African Defence Force
SAETF  South (later Southern) Africa Education Trust Fund
SAIRR  South African Institute of Race Relations
SASOL  South African Oil and Gas Corporation
SATS  South African Transport Services
Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King (on left), with South African Field Marshal Jan Smuts, post-World War II Victory Parade, London, England, 8 June 1946. King talked of Canada's 'special bond with South Africa? (NAC/C9279)

Paul Martin (on right), chairman of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, talking to W.C. du Plessis, chairman of the legation of the Union of South Africa, before a U.N. Ad Hoc Political Committee discussion of race conflict in South Africa, 24 October 1955. The cooperation of Canadian diplomats with South Africa in the United Nations in this period was warmly appreciated. (NAC/PA139777)

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker on his return to Ottawa from London in March 1961, after helping to secure South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. (Duncan Cameron/NAC/PA197093)

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (on right) with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania at the 1973 Commonwealth meeting in Ottawa. Trudeau disappointed African leaders with his lukewarm support for southern African liberation. (NAC/PA196186)

Gerald Bull (centre), president of the Quebec-based Space Research Corporation, sold South Africa the most advanced artillery system in the world, which was then...
used in regional wars and for the development of an arms export industry.  
(NAC/PA 196183)

"May I see an adequately eloquent wine of inmecocble political origin, with  
ideologically pure bouquet and lacking in exploitive vintage ovrone..."  
(Norris, Vancouver Sun)

Canadian trade unions stole a march on the Canadian government, with early,  
close relations with African National Congress officials in exile. From centre,  
clockwise: Paul Puritt, Canadian Labour Congress; Dulcie September, ANC  
representative for France (later assassinated by a bomb placed by a South African  
agent); Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC; Shirley Carr, president of the CLC;  

Canadian and South African trade union leaders at an Ontario Federation of  
Labour conference in Toronto, November 1986. From left: Peter Mahlangu,  
representative of the South African Congress of Trade Unions and later of the  
ANC in Canada; Sean O'Flynn, secretary-treasurer of the Ontario Public Service  
Employees Union; Jay Naidoo, general-secretary of the Congress of South  
African Trade Unions; Cliff Pilkey, president of the OFL; unidentified union  
oficial. (CLC)

Prime Minister Mulroney tried to charm British Prime Minister Thatcher into  
supporting sanctions, but she made clear that she had moved only *a tiny little bit'  
as a compromise to keep the Commonwealth together, Commonwealth meeting,  
Nassau, the Bahamas, October 1985. (Andy Clark/NAC/PA197221)

In 1985-6, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group attempted to negotiate a  
peaceful end to apartheid. In South Africa (from left), Archbishop Edward (Ted)  
Scott, primate of the Anglican Church of Canada; Sardar Swaran Singh, senior  
cabinet member, government of India; Dame Nita Barrow, president of the World  
YWCA and World Council of Churches; Malcolm Fraser, former Prime Minister  
of Australia; Winnie Mandela, then wife of Nelson Mandela; John Malecela,  
Senior cabinet minister, government of Tanzania; Lord Anthony Barber, chairman  
of the Standard Chartered Bank and senior cabinet minister, British government;  
and General Olusegun Obasanjo, former head of government, Nigeria.  
(Archbishop Ted Scott)

The largest anti-apartheid demonstration in Canadian history, Toronto, 1986.  
(Margie Bruun-Meyer)

The August 1986 Commonwealth mini-summit in London on sanctions against  
South Africa ended in visible discord. From left: Prime Minister Pindling of the  
Bahamas, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Prime Minister Mulroney, Prime  
Minister Gandhi of India, and Prime Minister Thatcher. (Andy Clark/NAC/PA  
197226)

Prime Minister Mulroney's activism in the struggle against apartheid reached its  
summit on a trip to southern Africa in 1987. At Victoria Falls (from left),
President Kaunda of Zambia, Prime Minister Mulroney, President Mugabe, and President Masire of Botswana. (Andy Clark/NAC/PA 197227)

In an attempt to discredit the Canadian government, South African Ambassador Glenn Babb (wearing white scarf) visited Chief Louis Stevenson at the Peguis Indian Reserve, Manitoba, 10 March 1987, to publicize bad conditions on Canadian reserves. (Dave Bonner/Winnipeg Free Press)

Students at the University of Toronto protested the decision to invite South African Ambassador Glen Babb to speak on campus, January 1986. (Margie Bruun-Meyer)

At the Vancouver Commonwealth conference in 1987, Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal (on left) worked closely with Prime Minister Mulroney to counter Prime Minister Thatcher's attempt to belittle sanctions. (Bill McCarthy/NAC/PA 197232)

Press conference with President Kaunda (on left) and Prime Minister Mulroney at the Commonwealth meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1989. Both were antagonized after Prime Minister Thatcher issued a statement of dissent from an agreement on sanctions she had just proposed and signed. (Bill McCarthy/NAC/PA 197234)

Although many believed Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark was responsible for the new stronger policy on South Africa, he expressed misgivings about sanctions and attempted to check Mulroney's enthusiasm. (Bill McCarthy/NAC/PA 197236)

Canadian actor R.H. Thompson (on right) hugs Albie Sachs, ANC cadre (now South African Supreme court judge), in Toronto in March 1989 after a dramatization of Sachs's jail diaries from his experience as a political prisoner in South Africa. In 1988 Sachs was maimed by a car bomb planted by South African agents in Maputo. (David Hartman)

A street party in Toronto celebrating the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and the Pan Africanist Congress, February 1990. (David Hartman)

Nelson Mandela (now president of South Africa) in Toronto, June 1990. (David Hartman)

THE AMBIGUOUS CHAMPION

Introduction

It is to the honour of large parts of the world that they reject Apartheid, even if only half-heartedly so, even if for self-serving reasons ... even if the outrage is intended to divert attention from the dirt on their own doorsteps.
Breyten Breytenbach

While many areas of Canadian foreign policy remain the subject of controversy and contest, on South Africa, the conventional wisdom is that Canadians were ‘on the side of the angels.’ Such sentiments reflect a general consensus about the apartheid state. Brutal and oppressive regimes existed elsewhere in the world, but no other enshrined the criterion of race at its constitutional core. In apartheid South Africa, every aspect of a person's legal, political, economic, and social position was determined by race. A white minority held a monopoly of political and economic power and a disproportionately high share of the national wealth. The black majority had become outcasts in the land of their birth.

Legend has it that Canadian prime ministers, from Diefenbaker to Mulroney, led the way in the struggle against apartheid. Consider, for example, the characterization offered by Mulroney: 'I remember ... with pride,' he said, 'the stand taken by Canada's Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, at the Commonwealth Conference of 1961 which resulted in South Africa's withdrawal from that body ... Mr Diefenbaker's action marked the beginning of international pressure on the apartheid regime, pressure that was then sustained and intensified in Canada by the governments of Prime Ministers Pearson, Trudeau, Clark and Turner. And this to the great individual personal credit of these leaders.’

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As the pioneer of Canada's anti-apartheid policy, John Diefenbaker is remembered for his support of the emerging multiracial Commonwealth. While Britain and the other white dominions cast around for ways to keep apartheid South Africa in the organization, Diefenbaker joined with the non-white Commonwealth in the early 1960s in recognizing that this was not possible. For this alliance, he earned the dismay of Britain, the approbation of the 'new' Commonwealth, and the loathing of the South African delegation.

Lester Pearson continued this trend, attempting to prevent differences over Rhodesia from destroying the Commonwealth. Even after Rhodesian leader Ian Smith proclaimed a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for his white minority regime, Pearson was able to secure tolerance for Britain's policy of economic sanctions and its refusal to use military force. In his ability to gain the trust of the non-white Commonwealth, the London Sunday Times called Pearson 'an honorary Afro-Asian.'

Pierre Trudeau's most significant intervention on southern African issues also took place within the Commonwealth. His ability to secure agreement on a declaration affirming the principle of non-racialism at the Singapore conference in 1971 prevented the exodus of Afro-Asian members. The issue this time was Britain's decision to resume arms sales to South Africa. At the end of the conference, Trudeau was singled out for his efforts at conciliation, allowing both Britain and African members to save face. Thus within the Commonwealth, many considered that Canadian leadership had been strategic in helping the organization survive.

When Brian Mulroney came to the table, his role was slightly different. Like his predecessors, he joined African and Asian leaders in an attempt to secure
Commonwealth unity, but this time as a protagonist rather than a conciliator. On a number of occasions, Mulroney personally confronted British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a vigorous battle over sanctions on South Africa. In addition, he committed Canada in principle to diplomatic sanctions and introduced the first concrete economic sanctions against South Africa ever adopted by a Canadian state. This in the teeth of opposition from his own party, caucus, Cabinet, and civil service.

For these initiatives, Mulroney and other Canadian leaders have taken a great deal of credit. At the United Nations, Third World diplomats responded emotionally to Mulroney's pledge that if South Africa did not abandon apartheid, Canada would end all economic and diplomatic relations. One delegate told Canadian Ambassador Stephen Lewis that he never thought he would live to see the day that a white Western leader would stand up the way Canada had on the question of apartheid.4 Others lined up to shake Mulroney's hand. The issue, Lewis said, went 'right to the soul of black Africa and Asia.'

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Within South Africa itself, the black community scented hope in anything that Pretoria hated. While pro-government South Africans regarded Canada as an enemy, anti-apartheid forces had been forced to reappraise their conviction that only the communist world and the Nordic countries cared about their plight. In the view of one black South African journalist,5 Canada's anti-apartheid action had made it 'the conscience of the major Western governments.' A succession of African leaders bolstered this perception, and Nelson Mandela paid special tribute to Mulroney's efforts to combat apartheid when he visited Canada in June 1990. Such are the events which have built the common wisdom6 about the Canadian government's role in the struggle against apartheid. Yet this study will show that, even for the Mulroney period, the general view is simplistic and distorted, that Canadian policy was limited, and the claims made for it excessive. The Canadian state, no less than other Western states, was faced with hard and soft options in its approach to the regime in South Africa and with competing internal and international pressures. As in much of the West, its record is complex, ambiguous, and contradictory.

Alternative Ways of Analysing Foreign Policy

Central to the differences between appearances, rose-tinted memories, and the historical record lies a tendency, in popular accounts at least, to focus analysis at the level of the prime minister - hence the personalizing of foreign policy and some amnesia about the past. While the canon of foreign policy analysis in Canada does better, moving to the level of the state more broadly considered, this study will go one step further.

It will show how other levels of the state (provincial and municipal) and groups within Canadian civil society were extremely important in shaping the approach taken by federal governments. Here, the definition of civil society is necessarily wide,7 encompassing dominant forces within the private sector as well as the churches, trade unions, universities, and anti-apartheid groups which emerged to contest official policy.
Indeed, until the mid-1980s, the influence of the private sector and its allies within the state stood out. The dominant approach was spelled out in a White Paper; the government was to pursue a policy which would both trade and condemn, 'balancing' interests of economic growth and social justice. Although vigorously contested by other groups within civil society, this policy became the 'common sense' guiding successive administrations.

Four principles dominated this discourse: a commitment to free economic relations; a belief in the positive effect of unrestricted commerce on South African development; optimism about the consequence of dialogue between Canadian and South African officials; and opposition in principle to the adoption of armed struggle by South African liberation movements.

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Ironically, it was a Conservative prime minister who ultimately challenged the central features of this approach. On the sacrosanct principle of the free exchange of capital and goods, Mulroney imposed concrete economic sanctions. On the issue of dialogue, Mulroney said he believed that the white regime had had more than enough time to come to its senses. In his view, the way of dialogue started 'with the repudiation of apartheid' and ended 'with the full and equal participation of all South Africans in the governing of their country.' Mulroney also made clear that, while his government could not condone violence, it understood the reasons why groups like the ANC took up arms.

Out of this history, two central issues emerge: first, a need to understand the forces that kept policy relatively the same over much of the period since the Second World War and, second, the nature and significance of change in the Mulroney era. Thus, the analysis will examine domestic and external structures which produced the long continuity in policy and then the strategic conjunctures that precipitated change.

Here, two historic moments are pivotal: the Trudeau government’s reforms of 1977 following the Soweto riots2 and the adoption of sanctions by Mulroney’s government in 1985-6 after the Vaal uprising made large areas of South Africa ungovernable. What needs to be explained in both cases is not only the fact of a policy change after a lengthy period, but also why contradictions in the first era (1977) were subject to only a temporary resolution, with a further reckoning postponed to the second (1985-6).

While such conjunctures produced a new coalescence of forces, there was no inevitability about what would emerge out of them. Hence, one must look at the origins, direction, and nature of struggles within the political process itself; of necessity, historical narrative will complement the other elements of analysis sketched here. Taken together, the rudiments of this approach suggest an alternative way of understanding foreign policy, one that may have a broader application for other cases. The theoretical ramifications of this study will be explored further in the concluding chapter.

Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, it is rarely appreciated just how close the relationship between official Canada and South Africa was at the end of the Second World War. Chapter 1 traces the cooling of this special relationship
forged in the imperial connection, but challenged in the postwar world. It explores
the impact which three Canadian prime ministers had on crises within the
Commonwealth provoked by white rule in southern Africa - Diefenbaker's

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role in securing South African withdrawal, Pearson's approach to UDI in
Rhodesia, and Trudeau's involvement in defusing the crisis over the resumption of
British arms sales to South Africa. It will be argued that Diefenbaker's role was
much more equivocal than Conservative mythology would suggest, and that in
both of the other cases Commonwealth unity was preserved, but at the expense of
African interests.

While the first chapter emphasizes the external context, Chapters 2 and 3 are sited
largely within Canada, exploring the discourse that dominated thinking about
South Africa in the Trudeau era and the structures of power that helped to shape
policy. Groups within civil society emerged to contest the main thrust of policy,
but they were not strong enough to prevail. Instead, they were left with gestures -
minor policies to bear out the theme of 'social justice' articulated in the 1970
White Paper. In 1977, moreover, dominant forces within the Canadian
government allied to interests in the private sector were able to neuter the first
serious bid to reform Canada's South Africa policy.

Following the rise to power of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Western
support for South Africa grew, justified by a reassertion of the central themes of
constructive engagement. Chapter 4 traces the way in which participation in
efforts to resolve the issue of Namibian independence became an excuse for doing
virtually nothing to offend South Africa. Indeed, the atmosphere grew warmer as
the Canadian government joined the larger Western powers to support the South
African government's application for a $1 billion loan from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). In this period, economic measures taken for ostensibly
anti-apartheid reasons were largely cosmetic an end to Commonwealth tariff
preferences, which did not favour Canadian interests, and a token code of conduct
for Canadian companies in South Africa.

The more serious sin of omission explored in Chapter 5 was the failure to exercise
greater vigilance over breaches of the arms embargo. The signal case in point,
although there were others, was Space Research Corporation's sale of the most
advanced artillery system in the world to South Africa's Armaments Development
and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR). The G-5 and G-6 guns subsequently
became one of the central components of South Africa's arms export trade. The
indifference of federal civil servants to this and other cases revealed not only an
underlying sympathy for South Africa, but also the Islip twixt cup and lip' in
setting and implementing policy.

The ascent of Mulroney to power brought a dramatic break with past policy on
South Africa. Chapter 6 assesses the new constellation of forces in South Africa,
in the international community, and in Canada which helped to secure this
momentous change. A wave of protest in South Africa in the mid-1980s
galvanized international opinion, while in Canada the election of a new gov-
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erment opened the way for change. Pressures from provincial and municipal levels of government, trade unions, churches, universities, and a broad anti-apartheid movement overrode forces within the civil service and private sector that had blocked previous attempts at reform. Chapter 7 examines the legendary role that Mulroney played within the Commonwealth in 1985 and 1986, despite the determined opposition of Margaret Thatcher to sanctions. It also traces the steady escalation of Canadian sanctions.

Yet the initiatives were short-lived, a matter of two years before the great powers indicated that they were not prepared to do more on this issue, and Mulroney fell into line. Chapter 8 explores the forces within Canada that emerged to oppose the new policy. Groups within the Department of External Affairs, the Conservative party, and Canadian society regarded sanctions with abhorrence and worked to return the policy to the status quo ante. In this project they were assisted by the South African embassy, which also extended its overtures to renegade elements from Canada's First Nations. In turn, important groups within the anti-apartheid community were less outspoken than previously, coopted by considerable financial assistance from the federal government.

Support for Mulroney's original policy continued to be expressed often and publicly, but the substance was beginning to wear a little thin. Chapter 9 turns to the pivotal year of 1987 and the key role that Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Joe Clark played in stalling the drive for additional sanctions. The contradictions within the Canadian position began to appear in a trip by Clark to South Africa, the treatment of African National Congress (ANC) President Oliver Tambo in Canada, the tolerance shown to a senior Renamo official active in Canada, and the Commonwealth conference in Vancouver.

In the final years of the 1980s, the international campaign against apartheid stalled, and the role taken by Canadian leaders dwindled. Although Clark moved to centre stage through his position as chair of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA), he acted to defuse rather than inspire additional actions. Chapter 10 explores the way in which this retreat steadily eroded the high regard that Canadian leaders had earned from their earlier policies.

Ironically, some of the damage to Canadian credibility was repaired in the transition period of the 1990s. Chapter 11 assesses the pressures underlying the delay in lifting Canadian sanctions long after South African President F.W. de Klerk began the process of ending apartheid. It will be shown that the official commitment to unity within the Commonwealth proved a stronger factor in determining the timing of the end to sanctions than the considerable impatience of forces within the Canadian state and private sector.

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Finally, Chapter 12 assesses the record on sanctions and assistance. Although Canadian sanctions were commonly believed to be both comprehensive and mandatory, virtually stopping economic relations, this chapter will show that sanctions were partial and, in important cases, voluntary. The nature of Canadian
assistance evolved as conditions changed in South Africa, growing in size and complexity. Both programs reflected the changing patterns of interest and power within Canada discussed in earlier chapters.
To establish just how far Canadian policy moved on this issue, this study will begin with an exploration of the immediate postwar relationship between Canada and South Africa, especially as it was shaped within the Commonwealth. It will show how later predispositions had their roots in earlier associations.

PART ONE: THE POLITICS OF BALANCE

1
The Cooling of the 'Special Relationship'

Canadian sympathy with South Africa goes beyond the warm relationship which unites us with all parts of the Commonwealth and amounts to a special bond.'
Mackenzie King to South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, 1942

In the period of uncertainty after the Second World War, the Canadian state, in company with most Western countries, treated South Africa as a friend and ally. As the Cold War closed in, this relationship was strengthened, especially as the West became uneasy about Soviet influence on African nationalism elsewhere on the continent. At the same time, South Africa was going through dramatic changes, with the ascent to power of the National party in 1948 and the imposition of its policy of apartheid, the Afrikaans term for separate development. For the West, this development set up contradictory strains in its policies which were not untangled for forty years. They were expressed in a Western consensus which condemned the increasingly brutal repression of South Africa's black majority, and yet lauded South Africa as an ally against communism, refused to interfere with bilateral relations, and denied meaningful support to South Africa's black population. Canadian officials, like their counterparts in other Western countries, made increasingly strong statements against apartheid, but continued to support full economic and diplomatic relations with the white minority regime. In Canada, these cross currents gained in intensity, as the relationship with South Africa changed from the warm comradeship of the wartime alliance and Commonwealth connection to a more distant association as the postcolonial world began to take shape. This chapter explores the slow cooling of the

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relationship between the governments of Canada and South Africa, which, at a diplomatic level, went into a deep freeze in 1961 and then resumed on a correct but distant basis until the mid-1980s. The incident that precipitated this change was Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's role in the crisis over the compatibility of South Africa's membership in the new multiracial Commonwealth. Indeed, as apartheid intensified, the issue of South Africa's status in world bodies became an important consideration for Canadian
policy makers. Similarly, the attempt by a white minority to retain political power in Rhodesia raised the question of democratic rights and social justice elsewhere in the region. In both issues and in Britain's decision to resume arms sales to South Africa in the early 1970s, Canadian leaders had to juggle relations with Britain and South Africa against their desire for influence in Africa and their interest in having the Commonwealth survive. Each of the three Commonwealth crises provided an opportunity for officials to rethink Canadian policy on southern Africa; they constituted strategic conjunctures and provide revealing glimpses about the nature of Canadian interests.

It has become the stuff of legend that Diefenbaker kicked South Africa out of the Commonwealth, Lester Pearson was a helpful fixer in resolving differences over Rhodesia, and Pierre Trudeau defused the crisis over British arms sales to South Africa. While each in turn helped to bridge the gap between the old and new Commonwealth, this study will take a harder look than most previous accounts at the terms on which agreement was secured. It will be argued that Diefenbaker's role was much more equivocal than Conservative mythology suggests and that in both of the other cases solutions were found at the expense of African interests.

This chapter focuses largely but not exclusively on the external context where the Commonwealth and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations became the site for international pressures in the evolution of the Canadian state's policy towards South Africa. The next two chapters look within Canada at the relations between the Canadian state and civil society in shaping policy. Both dimensions had their origins in earlier history.

The White Dominion Connection
In the first fifteen years of the postwar period, warm relations at an official level between Canada and South Africa were taken for granted. Although both countries had important national communities hostile to British imperial culture, they had been white dominions in the British Empire and Commonwealth, and had fought on the same side in two world wars.2 The affection for South

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Africa was intimately bound up with respect for Jan Smuts, one of the Commonwealth's most widely admired leaders, an elder statesman who had helped establish both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Thus, in the two issues facing South Africa in the early years of the United Nations, the status of South West Africa (now Namibia) and the treatment of Indians inside South Africa, the Canadian government's position offered some comfort to South Africa. On the first question, South Africa wanted to end the League of Nations mandate in South West Africa and incorporate the territory as a fifth province. The Canadian position was ambivalent. Alone among the white dominions, Canadian representatives agreed with the U.N. General Assembly that South Africa should consider a trusteeship agreement, but they also supported the South African position that it had no legal obligation to comply. In the second case, Canadian officials (partly compromised by legalized racial discrimination against East Indians in western Canada) initially would not support India's complaints about the treatment of South African Indians.3 In 1946, Prime
Minister Louis St Laurent expressed doubts about the assembly's competence to intervene on this issue, and backed Smuts's proposal to refer the question of U.N. jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice.

With the election to power of the National party in South Africa in 1948, the West had to deal with a government whose senior figures had opposed the allies, openly supporting the Nazi cause. While the relationship that ensued would never be as cordial as it had been with Smuts, at this stage the West was not prepared to alienate or isolate South Africa. Indeed, South Africa continued to be considered a strategic ally of the West in the struggle against communism and as a source of key minerals.

In the 1950s, Canadian policy on South Africa was formulated within the larger context of these general Western interests. Cold War considerations inclined the Department of External Affairs (DEA) to support defence ties with South Africa, including the sale of Sabre jet fighters for the South African Air Force and parts for other aircraft with counter-insurgency capabilities.

At the same time, this was the heyday of those who believed in Canada's special role as a 'middle' power. Thus within international organizations, Canadian governments, more than their counterparts in other old dominions of the Commonwealth, tended not to side automatically with the British government's gentle approach to the new regime in South Africa, although it did not stray very far from it either. The wish was to act as a bridge between the interests of the United States and Britain, on the one hand, and the lesser powers, on the other. However, as countries in Asia and Africa emerged from colonial rule, it became more difficult to straddle these two worlds.

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Despite growing repression in South Africa in the 1950s, bilateral relations between the two countries continued to be very warm. The South African High Commissioner in Ottawa described Lester Pearson and Paul Martin as 'good friends of South Africa' with whom he 'got on famously.'

C.D. Howe, the second most powerful politician in the St Laurent government, told a Canadian High Commissioner going to South Africa in 1954 that the South Africans were 'good people to do business with and to encourage the relationship.'

This was the period, too, when South African officials regularly came to Canada to examine reserves set aside for First Nations, following colleagues who had studied residential schools in earlier parts of the century. Such visits, sanctioned by the departments of Indian Affairs and External Affairs, built on earlier relationships developed in the nineteenth century when the British Colonial Office established systems of segregation in both countries.

From the 1940s to the 1960s, officials in both Canada and South Africa continued their collegial approach, paying close attention to each other's treatment of aboriginal people. Although political leaders in Canada did not endorse the crude racialism of the National party, they did not openly protest it either. Significantly in this period, the St Laurent government did not instruct Canadian diplomats in South Africa to make representations about the steady imposition of racialist policies. It was left to the press and opposition parties in Canada to condemn the disenfranchisement
of South Africa's coloured population, the repression of peaceful protest, and the steady imposition of apartheid legislation.

The tenor of official policy, particularly within the Department of External Affairs, was based on the belief that South Africa's rulers would respond in a reasonable way if only the rest of the world did not hector them into a defensive position. In this view, as long as there was any hope of reversing apartheid, care should also be taken not to alienate the 'moderate opinion' of the liberal opposition in South Africa. Hence, the counsel of a Canadian delegate to the United Nations 'not to adopt too inflexible a position which would prevent progress towards a solution however far from ideal that solution might be.' Canadian officials would have greater influence, it was believed, through understanding and quiet pressure, and they went to great lengths to see that official South Africa was not antagonized.

Taken at face value, the approach was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Afrikaner movement that had come to power in South Africa. In the emphasis on rationality, it missed the psychological, moral, and religious dimensions of the white regime's crusade to introduce apartheid - not to mention the economic privilege and political power which apartheid secured for them in perpetuity. This was not a regime which could be coaxed into flexibility or adaptability to the postcolonial world. The policy also over-

The Cooling of the 'Special Relationship' 17 estimated the capability and sincerity of much of the white liberal opposition in South Africa.

At this point, however, this ingenuous view about the configuration of power in South Africa still had few costs. The calculation was that Canadian governments could retain their close friendship with South Africa without alienating the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Thus in international meetings, Canadian officials had no compunction in working to soften the initiatives of countries that attacked the steady imposition of apartheid in South Africa. As a rule, they opposed efforts to isolate South Africa, counselling against 'speedy solutions' when other countries urged reform.

In meetings of heads of government in the Commonwealth in the 1950s, the convention was that it was unacceptable to criticize a fellow member. As India and Pakistan bitterly disagreed with the policies adopted by South Africa's National party government, the issue of South Africa was simply too controversial to be discussed.14 Canadian officials believed in the tradition of noninterference in the internal affairs of other members, arguing that complete self-government was the raison d'etre for Commonwealth membership. They also indulged in the wishful thinking that if the South African government could be persuaded to accept the membership of Ghana and Nigeria in the Commonwealth, it might also reform apartheid.15

At the United Nations, there was some, albeit minimal, distancing. The Canadian delegation did not support an attempt by the British and Australian governments to have the 'race conflict' and 'treatment of Indians' items dropped from the assembly's agenda. It also supported resolutions on South West Africa regretting
South Africa’s unwillingness to consider a trusteeship and supporting a committee to examine reports from the territory. However, Canadian officials opposed investigations of apartheid and voted against or abstained on U.N. resolutions directly singling out South Africa for condemnation of its racial policies, especially the treatment of South African Indians. Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson considered an Asian proposal for a commission to assist consultations between South Africa, India, and Pakistan in a study of race separation in South Africa to be ultra vires. The philosophy of the St Laurent government was that the proper role of the U.N. General Assembly was ‘to discuss anything as the town meeting of the world.’ But in terms of South Africa, Pearson made clear that this did not mean it was competent to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states by certain types of resolutions or by setting up committees and commissions to visit those countries and report and possibly take action at succeeding assemblies.” Under Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, apartheid was a domestic matter, and, in Pearson’s view, the United Nations had no jurisdiction. Although Pearson expressed his conviction that ‘Discriminatory policies of any kind anywhere

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are contrary to the spirit both of the charter and of our times,’ he was not prepared to do more. Not surprisingly, South African officials welcomed the Canadian government as an ally and were grateful for its support. In 1957, Canadian diplomats were singled out by South Africans for their lobbying on behalf of South Africa in the United Nations. When Diefenbaker first came to power in 1957, he sustained the cordial relationship with South Africa, responding coolly to overtures from an American delegation led by Eleanor Roosevelt and Martin Luther King Jr which asked him to join with world leaders in condemning South African racialism. They were told that Canada disapproved of racialism everywhere and saw no reason to single out any one country. At this stage, the Conservative administration, like Liberal governments before them, still believed in keeping South Africa’s confidence and in the value of friendly, discreet persuasion. This approach seemed not to take seriously the candour of the National party government of Hendrik Verwoerd, whose representative in Canada made no secret of his government’s intentions. ‘The White South African,’ the high commissioner said, ‘has no intention of committing suicide – even in the best democratic tradition, through the ballot box ... whatever happens to the individual, the race or the species must go on.’ Both Diefenbaker and Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green came to this issue with a strong prior attachment to Smuts and a romanticized view of his country. In Parliament, Green praised Smuts as ‘one of the outstanding world statesmen of my time,’ and argued that South Africa had ‘a long record of worthwhile accomplishments which it would not do any harm for the Canadian people to recall.’ Leading figures in the Tory administration were thus
Yet the South Africa that Green eulogized had undergone a radical change: Smuts’ party had been defeated in 1948, and the National party governments of the 1950s lost no time in tabling apartheid legislation. Attempts by African and Indian leaders to organize non-violent resistance to this process through the Defiance Campaign, resulted in thousands of arrests and mass treason trials. When Verwoerd became the prime minister of South Africa in 1958, there was a brief flurry of Canadian support for stronger action at the United Nations led by Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith, but this was reversed when Howard Green replaced him. Thus in 1958, the Canadian government supported a U.N. General Assembly resolution mildly critical of South Africa's racial policy and urging negotiations with India and Pakistan over the treatment of South African Indians. However, the following year it abstained on a similar resolution. The reversal was explained as a reaction to the zeal of the supporters of the second resolution and a desire to dampen the Afro-Asian enthusiasm for increasingly strong resolutions. Previous resolutions had been 'formulated in a spirit of goodwill towards South Africa and with appreciation of the complexity of its problems'; but, for External Affairs, the current resolution sponsored by Ghana and India was too uncompromising. The unfolding horror of apartheid still had not overridden official Canada's preference for a soft approach. At home, the Diefenbaker government dismissed groups within civil society that challenged this close friendship with South Africa. When a Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) delegation urged the government in January 1960 to support South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth, Diefenbaker gave this idea short shrift. Despite his 'strong feelings in respect of discrimination,' he said he was not prepared to support such actions. Nor, in his view, should Canadians judge South Africa: 'I ask you,' he said, 'what would be our reaction in Canada if some other part of the Commonwealth were to criticize us?' However, by 1960 this policy had become dated. Relations between Canada and South Africa did become cooler, coincident with the process of decolonization. In particular, 1960 marked the emergence on the world stage of new nations in Asia and Africa: eighteen African colonies gained independence that year and the Commonwealth acquired a non-white majority. One year later, African, Asian, and Latin America members constituted two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly, and anti-South African resolutions (supported from the beginning by communist countries) became considerably stronger and more numerous. Canadian diplomatic relations with African states other than South Africa expanded dramatically from six to twenty-one, and an Africa Division was created in the Department of External Affairs. While the climate for change had been building for a number of years, the event that triggered the first serious reappraisal of Canadian policy was the massacre of sixty-nine black protestors in South Africa in March 1960 during a peaceful demonstration against the pass laws at Sharpeville. Shortly after, Diefenbaker
decided to side with Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth in securing South Africa's withdrawal. This event signalled the beginning of the end of Canada's warm relationship with South Africa in the postwar period. Its importance in the mythology about the history of Canada's South Africa policy requires that Diefenbaker's role be examined closely.

South Africa, Diefenbaker, and the Commonwealth

At first, Diefenbaker's response to the Sharpeville massacre was strikingly cautious and weak. In Cabinet at the end of March 1960, Diefenbaker said he did not think Canada should change its policy and interfere in the domestic affairs of South Africa; nor did he want the House of Commons to have a public debate on apartheid.32 'No beneficial purpose,' he told the House, 'would be served by diplomatic protests or by even more extreme measures to intervene in this tragic situation.'33 In Diefenbaker's view, outspoken criticism threatened to make matters worse. He preferred restrained responsibility, and opposed collective and public expression of condemnation or disapproval of South Africa in the upcoming Commonwealth meeting in May. 'One could not allow the Prime Ministers' meeting to become a judge and jury of the action of individual members,' Diefenbaker said.4 The essence of the Commonwealth, in his view, was 'the independence of each nation,' and making South Africa a "pariah" was not what was required.'35 In Cabinet Diefenbaker expressed dismay at what seemed likely to be a showdown. 'Altogether,' he said, 'the situation could only be described as a mess.36

Diefenbaker may have been encouraged in this approach by dispatches from the Canadian High Commissioner in South Africa, James Hurley, who, like many of his successors, consistently misread the significance of events in South Africa. Hurley believed that the South African government would improve its racial policies, although more junior diplomats considered it unrealistic to expect any changes at all.37 At any rate, the momentum of events at two Commonwealth meetings in 1960 and 1961 induced Diefenbaker to abandon this strategy, to make a series of statements which got steadily stronger, and to take a major role in the events which transpired.

As the 1960 Commonwealth conference took place only two months after the Sharpeville massacre, the question of South Africa's racial policies and their compatibility with a multiracial Commonwealth could not be avoided. At this point, Diefenbaker's approach was couched in Cold War terms; that if the Commonwealth did not accept the equality of all races as a basic principle, it could not serve as a bulwark against communism.38 He made a private appeal to South Africa's Foreign Minister Eric Louw to offer at least a token gesture to its critics, restoring three or four electoral constituencies for non-whites.9 However, the South African delegation would not compromise. Louw said that his government would not countenance even one non-white member in Parliament. In his public defence of apartheid, he also suggested quite erroneously that South Africa had the general support of the Commonwealth for its racial policy.
At the same time, Louw had to broker a change of status through the Commonwealth; the South African government had decided to hold a referendum to test public approval for transforming South Africa into a republic. The established precedent in the Commonwealth was that when a country changed its form of government, it had to apply for readmission. Given the circumstances of the Sharpeville massacre, Commonwealth members were not prepared to give assurances in advance that South Africa would be accepted back. At any rate, for most of the non-white Commonwealth, the policy of apartheid was totally unacceptable. African and Asian countries on the brink of independence stated that they would not join the Commonwealth with an untransformed South Africa as a member. The meeting adjourned with a decision to reconvene in 1961 to consider this issue.

In the period between the two conferences, Diefenbaker at first expressed discomfort with the movement to deny South Africa renewed membership in the Commonwealth. He told the South African high commissioner to Canada that he had done everything in his power to deny the introduction of a vote of censure of South Africa in the House of Commons, as he believed it would have passed unanimously. Two months before the second conference, Diefenbaker also proposed without success a compromise to put South Africa on probation, giving the National party government time to make concessions. The problem, of course, was that the Verwoerd regime was not prepared to change its policies nor delay the decision on South Africa's status in the Commonwealth. Shortly before the second conference, however, Diefenbaker's position hardened considerably. He informed British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Verwoerd that he intended to condemn apartheid in his opening remarks. He also made it clear that he would not support automatic readmission for South Africa if its government was unprepared to pay even lip-service to the idea of racial equality.

Diefenbaker's switch was remarkable, given the forces arrayed against him on this issue. In London, Canadian High Commissioner George Drew had close personal relations with South African diplomats. Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green and his department wanted South Africa to stay. In Cabinet meetings, Green warned that if Diefenbaker led the move to exclude South Africa, the Conservative party would suffer severely at the polls. Within the Cabinet, moreover, a sizeable number of ministers held pro-South African views, and parts of the debate were couched in racialist discourse, replete with South African disinformation. A particularly distinctive example can be seen in the argument of one minister:

It was easy for Canadians to condemn the apartheid policy because Canadians would not have to face the alternative. The Canadian government had given the vote to the Indians, but this group was not sufficiently numerous to threaten to take political control.

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The Boers had settled in South Africa before the Bantus (sic), and if the Boers’ immigration policy had from the outset been like Canada’s at this time, the negroes would still be in a very small minority there.’ Others feared the changing racial composition in the Commonwealth and saw South Africa’s departure as a weakening of the white side. The general counsel to Diefenbaker was to criticize apartheid, but to try to defer the question of South African membership and, above all, to assume a low profile.47

Until the Sharpeville massacre, the record of the Liberals was not significantly different. Lester Pearson admitted that his party had been cautious about condemning South Africa directly, fearing that open criticism would weaken its liberal community. In a debate on foreign policy in the House of Commons in February 1960, Paul Martin registered the Liberal party’s strong opposition to the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth.48

After Sharpeville, however, the Liberal position changed: for Pearson, recent developments showed conclusively ‘that South African policy was moving ... in the wrong direction.’49 The Canadian Parliament now had ‘not only the right but the duty to criticize, publicly dissociate ourselves from and, indeed, protest against the apartheid policies of the government of South Africa.’50 Apartheid was clearly ‘incompatible with the nature of the commonwealth as a multiracial association.’52 Yet, when South Africa ultimately withdrew, Pearson, like Diefenbaker, responded with great nostalgia and sadness, taking ‘no satisfaction out of this withdrawal.’53

Thus, by far the strongest response in Parliament came from the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). Its spokesman Hazen Argue tore into the Diefenbaker government’s ‘soft response’ to Sharpeville and its weak role in the United Nations.4 He criticized its failure to issue a strong diplomatic protest and called for an embargo on South African imports. In abstaining from even ‘moderate and well considered’ U.N. resolutions, Argue charged that Canadian diplomats had favoured good relations with South Africa over the more important consideration of racial discrimination. He told Diefenbaker that ‘if the commonwealth is to be strong, we must take all possible steps to remove the cancer in the commonwealth body which is damaging to its existence and is weakening its strength.’

Outside of Parliament, opinions were mixed. The private sector took a dim view of any change in relations with South Africa. Nevertheless, the overwhelming consensus of the press was to call for South Africa’s exclusion from the Commonwealth.6 A Toronto Star correspondent, Norman Phillips, was arrested and deported from South Africa for his coverage of police brutality after the Sharpeville crisis.7 Other groups within civil society called for strong opposition to apartheid. Academics and the Canadian Council of Churches had written Diefenbaker urging that he subscribe either to a declaration of racial
equality or the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms. The National Federation of Canadian University Students met with Diefenbaker to discuss the possibility of Canadian mediation. The Canadian Labour Congress again urged the government to take a firm stand against apartheid. As scholar Frank Hayes suggested, 'these domestic forces were not decisive, but neither...[could] they be ignored. There was an accumulation of feeling on this subject as opinion in the world at large became more aware of racial issues, and the South African issue was one on which a clear decision could not be avoided."

Although Diefenbaker had been unprepared at first to take a leading role in ostracizing South Africa, he was uncomfortable with the position put forward by External Affairs and its allies. On a number of occasions, he intimated that were he not head of government, he would express his own abhorrence of apartheid in stronger terms. Diefenbaker valued the Commonwealth and did not want to see it disintegrate; at the least, he was partial to the connection with the monarchy. He was also well aware of the opportunity the Commonwealth gave Canada to meet the new African and Asian members and to exert influence in a way not possible elsewhere. Given his sensitivity to the issue of Canadian independence, the Commonwealth connection provided a useful counter to U.S. influence. Finally, Diefenbaker was strongly inspired by Cold War concerns and argued that 'communism marches on the application of discrimination.'

Ultimately, the most important domestic influence in helping Diefenbaker develop the policy that was to emerge came from Secretary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Privy Council R.K. Bryce. Bryce was much less concerned than External Affairs in finding "some respectable way of avoiding South Africa's exclusion from the Commonwealth." In his role and influence, Bryce was to foreshadow a second occasion twenty-five years later when Stephen Lewis, Roy McMurtry, and Roger Bull helped Mulroney break with the conventional wisdom on South Africa within External Affairs. While officials cast around for excuses to do nothing, hunting for some factor internal to South Africa which might warrant waiting for improvements, Bryce understood both the significance of the new Commonwealth that was emerging and the likelihood that South Africa would not meet its basic social and political requirements.

It was Bryce, for example, who proposed a declaration on racial equality to which all members could subscribe, removing the stain of apartheid from the Commonwealth's reputation. The Department of External Affairs opposed the suggestion as whimsical and inappropriate, recommending a much milder requirement - that South Africa promise to work towards racial equality. Diefenbaker also faced conflicting pressures at the international level. Before the second Commonwealth conference, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan urged Diefenbaker not to take a firm public position against the readmission of South Africa: 'John Diefenbaker is going to be troublesome about South Africa,' Macmillan wrote in his diary. He is taking a "holier than thou" attitude which
may cause us infinite trouble. For if the "Whites" take an anti-South African line, how can we expect the Browns and Blacks to be more tolerant?"

Countering British dismay at Diefenbaker's stronger position, eloquent pleas of African leaders, notably Julius Nyerere, then chief minister of Tanganyika, and Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the banned African National Congress, clearly had an effect. Nyerere asked, 'How can Canada, or any other Commonwealth country which believes in justice and human rights, vote for the inclusion of South Africa? ... A vote in favour of South Africa ... could logically be interpreted as a vote against the future membership of countries such as Tanganyika whose political philosophy condemns any form of racial discrimination as evil.'

Following the referendum in South Africa in October 1960 which supported the proposal that South Africa become a republic, Verwoerd made his feelings clear: 'South Africa will not permit herself to be subject to any form of humiliating treatment ... [and] South Africa's claim to continued membership will be based on the existence of positive common interests, without the existence of any right or design to interfere in the domestic affairs of member-States - even though other members may hold differing views.'

Lest any Commonwealth member not get the point, the South African high commissioner in London spelled out the implications of the South African position: 'When the Prime Minister asks for permission for the Union to stay in the Commonwealth, he will most certainly not crawl, beg or compromise the self-respect of the South African nation. And above all he is most certainly not going to compromise on principles. He will in no circumstances be prepared to endanger the continued existence of a white South African nation.'

A day before the second conference, a member of the National party was quoted in the London Sunday Times as saying, 'What people in other member countries don't realise is that most Afrikaners regard South Africa's membership as conferring a favour on the Commonwealth rather than receiving one.'

By now Diefenbaker and a good part of his Cabinet understood that the upsurge of nationalism elsewhere made apartheid more than a domestic question within South Africa: 'Although theoretically apartheid and readmission were separate issues,' the Cabinet concluded, 'in practice they could not be divorced.' In fact, 'the apartheid aspect was by far the more important and an equivocal position on civil rights would be damaging to Canada's international position and to the Prime Minister's national position. If Premier [sic] Verwoerd insisted on forcing the issue of readmission at this time, it was not unreasonable to require him to make some compromise on apartheid as the price of readmission.'

The Cabinet believed that the minimum requirement should be agreement to a resolution affirming non-discrimination as a basic principle. They also felt that a white nation should propose such a resolution, and that as the second speaker in terms of seniority in the Commonwealth, Diefenbaker should undertake the task.

In Belfast a few days before the 1961 conference, Diefenbaker signalled that he was not prepared to compromise the new Commonwealth for the old. 'No one
wishes to interfere with the domestic affairs of any member,' he said. 'No one would like to sit in judgment on his fellow-member. But on the other hand ... Any association that hopes to play an effective role in the world must ... endeavour to bring about co-operation and understanding between races.'

At the conference itself, however, Diefenbaker temporized at first, arguing that it would be premature and unwise to decide at this meeting what answer to give to South Africa's request for readmission. Then he brushed aside a careful strategy prepared by Macmillan and Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies; they had planned to deal with the question of admission as a matter of routine first, before moving on to a full debate in conference on South African affairs. Instead, Diefenbaker began immediately with the latter. Diefenbaker proposed a declaration of principles for the Commonwealth which would include non-discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race or colour. 'Some public recognition of the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth was necessary,' he argued, 'if the association was to be preserved.' However, Diefenbaker was not able to secure agreement on the declaration: the Commonwealth opted for a general statement of concern about apartheid and decided against postponing the decision about readmission. At this point, Verwoerd waived his objection to the discussion of South Africa's affairs and gave his consent to a discussion of racial policy; however, on the substance of apartheid, he was unyielding. He refused to subscribe to the principle of racial equality or even to agree to accept diplomatic missions in South Africa from non-white Commonwealth members without submitting them to the indignity of separate treatment. Backed by his hard-line Foreign Minister Eric Louw, Verwoerd rejected any compromise as the 'thin edge of the wedge.'

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As British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys put it, 'Dr Verwoerd was talking a totally different language from that of the rest of his colleagues. He is deliberately trying to swim against the whole current of world thought. He is trying to put history into reverse.' In Macmillan's words, it was 'Dr Verwoerd's attitude and method of arguing his case, as well as the inflexibility of his dogmatic position, which finally turned the balance.' MacMillan added that had 'Dr Verwoerd shown the smallest move towards an understanding of the views of his Commonwealth colleagues, or made any concession, had he given us anything to hold on to or any grounds for hope, I still think that the Conference would have looked beyond the immediate difficulties.'

In heated discussions, it became clear that for almost everybody else, the principles of apartheid and Verwoerd's deep racialism were incompatible with the multiracial ideals of the Commonwealth. On the suggestion of Macmillan, Verwoerd was induced to withdraw his application that South Africa remain as a member of the Commonwealth once it became a republic. Diefenbaker's role at the 1961 conference has become the stuff of legend and of Conservative mythology. One observer, Derek Ingram, has gone so far as to suggest that of all the attitudes taken at the conference, Diefenbaker's was surely...
by far the most important' in preventing the division of the Commonwealth into white and non-white camps.3

There is no question that Diefenbaker's decision to side with the Afro-Asian majority helped scuttle Macmillan's efforts to paper over divisions,4 bringing Canada into collision with its former ally, South Africa, and with Australia and New Zealand. Macmillan had entered the conference wanting to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth, allowing its application on constitutional grounds, while at the same time expressing the strongest disapproval of its racial policies.5 Before the conference, he had written Diefenbaker pleading with him not to support the move to expel South Africa, and had sent a personal envoy to bring three Asian countries on side on this issue. New Zealand's Prime Minister Holyoake was new, but shared the British position. Not un-conscious of the significance of this debate for Australia's racially exclusive immigration policy, Menzies supported South Africa's view. He argued that consideration of apartheid in the Commonwealth amounted to unwarranted intervention in South African domestic affairs.6

Most telling, South African officials at the 1961 meeting left feeling that Diefenbaker's attitude had tipped the scales against them, and one chided him publicly as being 'immature and childish,' 'the incarnation of evil and hypocrisy,' recording privately his view of Diefenbaker as 'a vicious fellow.'87

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Verwoerd's private secretary contended that, in closed sessions, Diefenbaker was 'openly hostile' and left 'no stone unturned to make matters difficult for South Africa.' Years later, South Africans were still convinced that if Pearson had been in office some compromise would have been found."9 Yet, ironically, as an External Affairs official present at the meeting noted, 'nothing had been more constant in Diefenbaker's approach than his search for a tolerable way of averting South Africa's withdrawal."90 When Diefenbaker ultimately abandoned this hope, the praise from the rest of the world was out of all proportion to his cautious role. The credit which he earned was for breaking ranks, thus ensuring that at least one of the old white dominions was not ranged against the newer non-white members. Diefenbaker, himself, believed that a formal vote on this issue along racial lines would have ended the Commonwealth.9

At the same time, Diefenbaker remained regretful about what had transpired. He returned home to a Tory rally in Ottawa to declare that he hoped that the South Africans would return to the Commonwealth in due course: 'There will always be a light [for South Africa] in the Commonwealth window,' he said, in a remark echoed down the years by other Canadian politicians.92 In fact, leadership in securing South Africa's withdrawal had been taken not by Diefenbaker, but by the leaders of India, Ghana, Nigeria, and Malaysia (then Malaya).93 In closed sessions, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stood out, leading 'with clarity and conviction.'94 He never wavered in his understanding that South Africa's racial policies were incompatible with a multi-racial
Commonwealth, and that this principle was more important than the convention that the domestic policies of Commonwealth members should not be discussed. From the sidelines, Tanganyika's Julius Nyerere, with the backing of ANC President Albert Luthuli, played an important role in lobbying the prime ministers and in warning that 'to vote South Africa in is to vote us out.'95 The choice really was between a rump Commonwealth of the former white dominions or the new multiracial Commonwealth that ultimately appeared. As the Guardian stated, 'The operation is over and the unhealthy limb has been removed ... With South Africa as a member, the life of the Commonwealth, and still more its further growth, were in serious doubt. Now the Commonwealth can be expected to live and grow with vigour.'96

At the very least, this period marked the loosening of 'the special bond' that had characterized Canadian-South African relations in the past. However, residues of the earlier relationship remained within the state and particularly within groups in civil society. From the private sector, J.R. Bradfield, an executive of

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Noranda Mines and the president of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, made clear that 'most of us deplore the part our government has played in South Africa leaving the Commonwealth.'97 In July 1961, moreover, a poll taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) found that the majority of Canadians (50 per cent) favoured Canada continuing a friendly relationship with South Africa and not criticizing its racial policy.98 Only a tiny group (5 per cent) favoured no relations at all, and a slightly larger one (11 per cent) approved of friendly relations only if South Africa changed its racial policy. More of the sample (26 per cent) thought South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth weakened rather than strengthened (16 per cent) the organization.

For its part, the Diefenbaker government made it clear that it had reached its limits on this issue. The Conservative Cabinet brushed aside objections to continued Commonwealth preferences for trade with South Africa.99 As Canadians exported nine times as much by value to South Africa as South Africans exported to Canada,1°° the government was not prepared to go against economic self-interest. It also refused to stop the export of arms, O although it did support a voluntary U.N. Security Council arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 (Resolution 181), excepting the sales of spare parts for equipment previously supplied to South Africa.

The ambiguity of continuing full bilateral relations after participating in South Africa's diplomatic disgrace represents something of a paradox. At the least, as Hayes suggested, 'Canada's policy developed more out of concern for the preservation of the Commonwealth than out of disappointment with South Africa and its race policies.'°2 This was a theme that was to reappear in future Liberal administrations.

Following the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth, the Canadian government adopted a carefully equilibrated policy in other international fora. In this period, it supported resolutions that specifically deplored apartheid and called
on South Africa to observe its obligations by working towards independence in South West Africa (Namibia). Canadian officials recognized now that the failure to make progress on the Namibian issue was not because of extreme positions taken by the anticolonial majority, but by South Africa's flouting of world opinion in its virtual incorporation of Namibia into the Republic. However, this slightly harder tone did not include support for economic and other sanctions at the United Nations or in the Commonwealth.

The Canadian government also opposed attempts to expel South Africa from the United Nations and abstained on a Nigerian resolution to remove South Africa from the International Labour Organization. In September 1961, Howard Green explained that although Canada disapproved of apartheid and hoped that the policy would be modified, 'it is not likely that such a modification can be brought about by actions calculated to force South Africa out of international bodies, thereby further isolating it from the international community, and from changing ideas and world conditions.'

Lester Pearson reaffirmed this approach when he became prime minister in 1963. Having South Africa as a member of the agencies of the United Nations, he argued, was better than leaving them out as 'they can be exposed to public opinion and ... their policies can be attacked.' In contradistinction to the Commonwealth, which represented certain values and traditions, he believed that membership in the United Nations should be as nearly universal as possible. On the issue of continuing trade preference for South Africa, a matter criticized by New Democratic Party (NDP) MPs in Parliament, Pearson's government took the same line as its predecessor, defending them as a bilateral agreement. He placed no restrictions on Canadian economic relations with South Africa, not even on official promotion of trade and investment.

Canada in the Commonwealth after Diefenbaker

After Diefenbaker, Canadian governments continued to act as mediators in the Commonwealth, though with very mixed results. While Diefenbaker had sided with the Afro-Asian Commonwealth in 1961, the approach taken by his successors involved a step back to the 1950s-style role of Canadian officials acting as 'helpful fixers.' Canadian governments positioned themselves between Britain and the white dominions, on one side, and the rest of the Commonwealth, on the other, on the issue of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in the 1960s and on Britain's arms sales to South Africa in 1971.

In the context of power imbalances within the Commonwealth, this attempt to repeat a 1950s role in later decades meant that, in most cases, the Canadian state served less as a neutral or 'honest broker' and more as a broker for British interests, helping to arrange solutions which brought the lesser powers on side, but on terms which accentuated their weakness. In this way, Canadian diplomats were able to help the Commonwealth survive the crises that successive British governments precipitated in their accommodation of white interests in southern Africa.
For the new Afro-Asian Commonwealth, the lack of support for non-white majorities in southern Africa challenged the very basis of their membership in the organization. However, until the late 1970s, the resolution of these crises was almost always at the expense of African interests.

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Pearson, Rhodesia, and the Commonwealth
In the period immediately after South Africa's withdrawal, the subject of apartheid no longer dominated the Commonwealth agenda. Instead, with many of the countries in the region gaining independence, attention turned to events in Southern Rhodesia, where it appeared that the government was heading towards independence on non-democratic terms.107 Thus, the issue of white minority rule again became pivotal for the definition of the Commonwealth and for the struggle over the approach that Britain adopted.

For Pearson, as with Diefenbaker, the survival of the Commonwealth was important. As an institution, its value lay in the broad range of contacts it afforded Canada with countries from the South. Therefore, in the Commonwealth crisis over Rhodesian independence, the interest, as Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin explained, 'was not fully but largely based upon our concern for the continued integrity and unity of the Commonwealth.'10 The point was to defuse crises in the short term and hope that the institution would continue to meet another time.

At the same time, the approach to the Rhodesian issue that Pearson inherited from the Diefenbaker government involved a fundamental misreading of the intentions of the ruling Rhodesian Front. In 1962, the Canadian delegate to the United Nations indicated that his government did not believe that the present leaders of Southern Rhodesia intended to retain white control permanently. The real issue, he said, was 'not whether Southern Rhodesia is moving in the right direction but whether it is moving fast enough.'019 From 1962 to 1964, Ottawa had given its unreserved support to British policy, abstaining on all Rhodesian questions in the United Nations on the grounds that such action would interfere with consultations between London and Salisbury. "0 When Ian Smith became the Rhodesian prime minister in 1964, his clear commitment to white minority rule forced a reassessment in Canada, coinciding with the rise of Pearson's Liberal party to power.

At Pearson's first Commonwealth meeting in London in July 1964, British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home tried to fudge the issue by not including Rhodesia on the agenda. When this was not possible, Douglas-Home, supported by Australia and New Zealand, insisted that Britain did not have the power to intervene in the affairs of a self-governing colony, as long as the government remained within the bounds of constitutional action. Nor would he commit Britain to granting independence to Rhodesia only after the territory had achieved majority rule.

By contrast, the African delegates wanted the Commonwealth to convene a conference of black as well as white Rhodesian leaders to work towards inde-
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dependence on the basis of majority rule. They called for the release of African political leaders from prison and the abolition of discriminatory laws. As in the previous 1961 crisis over South African membership, they threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth if the principle of racial equality was not honoured. At this conference, Pearson prevented a split in the Commonwealth along racial lines by supporting statements on racial equality and non-discrimination in the final communiqué. He also proposed an appeal for the release of African leaders from detention and letting Smith know that the Commonwealth would neither recognize a unilateral declaration of independence nor give such a regime diplomatic support in the United Nations. For these actions, President Nyerere of Tanzania spoke of Pearson as 'the Great liberal.'

With the exception of Diefenbaker and a rump of Conservative, Creditiste, and Liberal MPs, parliamentary support in Canada for Pearson's Rhodesia policy was broadly based. The opposition represented the ultra-right view; generally sympathetic to the white Rhodesian cause and opposed to majority rule, this group considered sanctions ineffective, illegal, and an unwarranted interference in Rhodesia's domestic affairs. Some even called for Canadian diplomatic recognition of the Smith regime, and one Liberal backbencher suggested that the government sponsor Rhodesian membership in the United Nations. But such views were held by a minority.

The commitment to racial equality as a fundamental principle of the Commonwealth consolidated the position taken in 1961 when racial issues were no longer considered to be exclusively domestic issues. It also provided a standard by which to measure Rhodesia in the coming years. However, Pearson's support for the non-white Commonwealth had two important limitations: he sided with Britain against the use of military force if an illegal regime was declared in Salisbury, and, quite strikingly, he did not support a universal franchise as a precondition for African independence.

African members wanted Britain to respect the precedent established in Kenya, Aden, and British Guiana, where swift military intervention by British troops had been used in response to colonial crises. However, even before Smith announced a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), Britain ruled out military action. This approach gave the Rhodesian government considerable leeway to go forward to UDI without fearing the short-term consequences. It also embittered African opinion, which noted that the sole factor differentiating this crisis from others was that the rebels were white.

On this crucial issue, Pearson took the opposite position to the non-white Commonwealth. At first, his approach was low key, urging measures to support 'moderate elements among Southern Rhodesian voters,' even while he

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recognized that they constituted *a small minority of its population." In 1964, Pearson said that while Canada was entirely on their (the African Commonwealth) side in principle, 'Nevertheless, it was quite impracticable to do some of the things they wanted, such as enforcing racial equality on Rhodesia by
military action, if Rhodesian independence was declared unilaterally."5 'Nothing but chaos would come from attempting to use force to change the situation, whether this was military force, or even political or economic force used prematurely.' 16

On the second issue, Pearson broke with the non-white Commonwealth in his support before UDI for something less than a one-person, one-vote system of majority rule as a necessary precondition for Rhodesian independence."7 To shift attention from the unpalatable aspects of this stance, Pearson pledged Canadian support for a program of assistance in the form of scholarships for Rhodesian Africans and capital assistance for Rhodesian railways and irrigation. As Hayes noted, by focusing on the 'functional means of acquiring rule,' Pearson helped develop a measure of consensus, and Britain was given additional time to find a settlement."8

While valuable in themselves, the aid programs served an additional political purpose; they helped soften opposition to British policies. In the next few decades, Canadian governments often used the offer of assistance to countries in the region as a device to ease tension between Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth. However, in the context of the strategic questions at issue, they also constituted a soft option.

Shortly before UDI in November 1965, the Canadian delegate voted against a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling on Britain to employ whatever means necessary, including force, to bring about an acceptable political settlement. After UDI, believing that 'the unity and integrity of the Commonwealth' were at stake,"9 the Canadian government severed all relations with Rhodesia and imposed full diplomatic and economic sanctions. 2

Afro-Asian anger at Britain's refusal to end the rebellion of UDI by force led to a request for a conference in January 1966 exclusively dedicated to the Rhodesian issue. Neither Pearson nor Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain were anxious to confront the non-white Commonwealth,2’ and Menzies of Australia refused to go. As Tanzania’s22 and Ghana had already severed relations with Britain over its failure to take a stronger line, Nyerere and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana also stayed away. They had judged correctly that Britain was not prepared to act more decisively on this issue.

At the January 1966 conference, Pearson attempted to rebuild confidence by preventing 'a clear win or loss for any given point of view.'23 In the process, he managed to persuade the African delegates to accept Wilson's position that

The Cooling of the 'Special Relationship' 33 economic sanctions would be effective and to give them more time. Pearson also proposed the establishment of a committee to monitor and augment the effect of sanctions'24 and accepted that a Canadian chair this committee.125 A second committee was established to administer a special fund to provide training for African Rhodesians.126

Pearson's approach was based on the hope that economic sanctions would make military sanctions unnecessary. However, its soundness was undermined from the start. From early 1966 on, the British government had quietly allowed the
deliberate flouting of sanctions by British oil companies, including British Petroleum (BP) in which the British government had a 51 per cent share. Cynically, Britain secured U.N. Security Council authority to stop oil tankers using the port of Beira, but not the port of Lourenço Marques. Yet, BP and Shell Oil supplied more than half of Rhodesia's oil through the latter port; other oil was supplied through South Africa. Acting in flagrant bad faith, the Wilson government continued to argue for economic sanctions as the core of Britain's Rhodesia policy in the Commonwealth at the September 1966 meeting - even though it knew British oil was being exported to Rhodesia with implicit government permission.

At the September 1966 Commonwealth meeting Pearson also supported strengthened economic measures' as 'the best way of attaining our objective even though it will take longer than we expected.' He argued that consideration of military sanctions was premature and offered support, instead, for limited mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia in the United Nations. At this point, Pearson also ruled out blanket sanctions that would extend to the region as a whole: 'Rather than achieve a speedy solution in Rhodesia, a general mandatory sanctions resolution ... would tie that country to South Africa, and would link a satisfactory solution of the Rhodesian problem with a long and difficult economic siege of South Africa.'

On the other key issue of majority rule, the Canadian government's position was closer to but not identical with the Afro-Asian position. The non-white Commonwealth wanted NIBMAR (no independence before majority rule) and a universal franchise. As Nyerere explained, 'There is no point in bringing down an illegal minority regime in order to substitute a legal minority regime. It is not just the question of legality which matters: it is the question of majority rule before independence - Britain remaining sovereign until there is majority rule in Rhodesia.' Yet while Pearson supported NIBMAR, he was prepared to settle for something short of one-person, one-vote right away; in this view, measures would be adopted to provide for progress towards a universal franchise. However, the gradual approach had to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

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In the September 1966 meeting, Pearson was nominated to mediate between the Afro-Asian position, which insisted on NIBMAR and effective sanctions, and Britain, which wanted neither. The agreement he secured was that if Britain could not secure a settlement by the end of 1966, it would adopt the principle of NIBMAR and request the Security Council to impose selective mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia.

Pearson's position in the 1965 and 1966 Commonwealth conferences has been lauded for bringing the non-white Commonwealth on side on the Rhodesia issue at a time when feelings were running high. The London Observer claimed that 'only Lester Pearson, among the older Commonwealth leaders, was tuned into the new Commonwealth.' while the London Sunday Times noted that Canada was considered to be 'practically an honorary Afro-Asian' for the committee drafting the final communiqué.
There is no question that, in the turbulence of the Commonwealth crisis over Rhodesia, Pearson played an important role. He was the one representative of the old Commonwealth who was able to meet the new Commonwealth halfway and thus to preserve some semblance of unity.\textsuperscript{35} Had the Commonwealth disintegrated, moreover, it would have been much easier for Britain to abandon its responsibility in Rhodesia and leave the black majority to white minority rule. Yet, in retrospect, Pearson's skill delivered a compromise based on considerable ingenuousness about British intentions.

Economic sanctions were a thin reed on which to rest a Commonwealth policy promising quick, effective action. Not only were British companies breaking sanctions with the cynical knowledge of the British government, but Portuguese and South African companies kept Rhodesia supplied with oil and other vital imports.

The official approach in Canada was not much better. When subsidiaries of Bata and Massey-Ferguson, two Canadian corporations based in Rhodesia, exported products to South Africa in violation of sanctions, Canadian officials were unprepared to do anything about it. As Canada no longer had a mission in Salisbury, they explained, they could not validate the claim.\textsuperscript{36} Although investments in Rhodesia were prohibited by Canadian law (the U.N. Rhodesia Regulations of 1967), the government "made little effort to enforce its own regulations in spite of strong evidence to indicate sanctions violations."\textsuperscript{37} Falconbridge continued to operate its Rhodesian subsidiary, maintaining normal corporate ties with its head office in Canada. The government approach to sanctions on investment was typified by 'cynicism and unconcern';\textsuperscript{38} its refusal to monitor capital flows to and from Rhodesia left a gaping hole.\textsuperscript{39} As to the issue of military action against Rhodesia, many believed, along with Canadian political science professor Douglas Anglin, that 'a British invasion of Rhodesia was militarily feasible and, if undertaken early enough, would have succeeded fairly quickly.'\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, as Anglin pointed out, 'All the dire predictions concerning the spillover effects of a resort to force' did in fact materialize, 'but as a result of the failure to employ force.'\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, the terms of the Commonwealth negotiations did a disservice to the interests of the Afro-Asian Commonwealth and even more to Rhodesian Africans. A strategic moment was lost and UDI was declared in November 1965. In January 1966, Wilson assured the Commonwealth that the illegal regime in Rhodesia would be dismantled 'within a matter of weeks rather than months,' failing which Britain would apply more vigorous measures. (Wilson also finally committed Britain to NIBMAR and accepted U.N. Security Council sanctions.) However, the Rhodesian regime lasted another fourteen years, during which the black majority was left to struggle with little direct support from the Commonwealth. Moreover, Pearson could do little when Wilson abandoned NIBMAR in 1968, opting instead for a royal commission to test proposals agreed with Smith aboard HMS Fearless. These terms offered no promise of majority rule or even a guarantee of unimpeded progress towards majority rule under a transitional
When Pearson retreated in 1968 from an earlier commitment in the Commonwealth that force should be used if sanctions failed, African states began to doubt his sincerity as well.42
In retrospect, then, Pearson's contribution was quite mixed. His ability to secure compromises and to encourage African members to continue giving Wilson the benefit of the doubt may have kept the Commonwealth together. At the least, it provided a counter-force to the temptation in Britain simply to recognize the Smith regime. However, it also reduced pressure on Wilson to act more decisively, and there is little doubt that British policy prolonged the life of the rebel Rhodesian regime.

Trudeau, the Commonwealth, and Southern Africa
When Pierre Trudeau succeeded Lester Pearson as prime minister, he came to the Commonwealth with an idiosyncratic view of its purpose. At his first conference in London in 1969, Trudeau said that he saw the Commonwealth less as a body that would take action and more as a forum where 'men of good will' could discuss and debate important issues.43 He suggested that the Commonwealth's great value was in allowing the ventilation of ideas and letting 'honourable men ... [agree] honourably to disagree.'
To some extent, this approach put Trudeau at odds with the non-white Commonwealth. In the context of events in southern Africa and of the British government's highly duplicitous role, the vision of the Commonwealth as a debating society made light of the substantive issues that had been central to the struggle of most African members for independence. Disillusionment with the British government and the Commonwealth remained high in Africa in this period: The main factor preventing a mass exodus was the desire of the non-white majority to have a forum within which to exert pressure.

On Rhodesia, Trudeau sustained Pearson's equivocation on majority rule as a prerequisite to independence. In London, he indicated that he would accept something less than NIBMAR if the alternative contained real guarantees for eventual majority rule and was acceptable to the Rhodesian people. As a Canadian journalist noted, 'Since no one yet knows whether or not the Fearless proposals are acceptable in Rhodesia, either to the Ian Smith regime or the people, and since it will obviously take considerable time to test opinion there, Mr Trudeau's statement amounts to major support for the British position and strategy.' 44 The NDP's David Lewis added that 'A position on Rhodesia which says "NIBMAR is possible but not necessarily NIBMAR" is a betrayal of first principles and cannot but do damage to the future of the Commonwealth.'45 The Canadian government began abstaining on U.N. resolutions reaffirming NIBMAR. It also backed the Pearce Commission, an unsuccessful British effort to secure support in Rhodesia for a settlement that would not have significantly altered white minority control.46

On the next major issue to confront the Commonwealth, the British government's decision to resume sales of arms to South Africa, Trudeau was drawn into a mediating role. Ironically, the Canadian government's review of foreign policy the
previous year had rejected the Pearsonian conception of the Canadian government as a 'helpful fixer' in foreign affairs, as it concentrated too much on 'role and influence' and not enough on substantive issues that reflected Canadian interests. Yet in the crisis that ensued over British arms sales to South Africa, Trudeau fitted easily into a Pearsonian approach.

The issue proved particularly divisive for the Commonwealth. On Rhodesia, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Labour government had at least paid lip-service to the aspirations of the black majority, but his successor, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, took a much harder line. In July 1970, barely a month after the Conservative election victory, Heath announced that Britain intended to resume arms sales to South Africa. The decision was couched in Cold War terms - that British and Western interests were threatened by the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and by Russian and Chinese influence in Africa.

In reactivating the Simonstown Agreement with the South African government, the Heath government argued that it had an obligation to protect vital Western interests by strengthening the defence of the Cape route.

In addition, substantial economic and political interests were at stake. Under Labour governments the deterioration of British-South African relations had resulted in a diversion of South African arms imports from Britain to France and Italy. Segments of the Conservative party openly sympathized with white minorities in Rhodesia and South Africa, and discounted entirely the value of the new multiracial Commonwealth that had emerged in the previous decade. Many felt that the prospect of Britain joining the European Economic Community made the Commonwealth redundant.

Heath made it clear that he did not intend to allow British policy on this issue to be influenced by non-Britons, even from the Commonwealth. Indeed, he insisted that, for the Commonwealth to have value, we ask our Commonwealth colleagues to accept that our right to take decisions in pursuance of British interests is no less than theirs to pursue policies which serve their interests.

Making the same case as South African leaders had in 1961, Heath argued that the Commonwealth must be an institution where 'genuine differences of approach and of interest can be clearly recognized, rationally discussed and, where necessary, accepted.'

Not surprisingly, reactions to such sentiments in the Commonwealth were strong, with alarm about British policy being expressed again in threats by African members to leave. While the rotation of regular heads of government meetings outside London had just begun in Singapore in 1971, the transition to a new, less imperial Commonwealth was exceedingly fragile. Arms sales to the apartheid regime contradicted the organization's fundamental commitments and threatened to undo even the slim achievements of the 1960s. As Nyerere put it, 'There are good reasons of morality and principle why Britain should not sell arms to South Africa now or in the foreseeable future ... arms sales are fundamentally different from any other kind of trade and imply a degree of support and approval for the
country to whom they are supplied ... The sale of arms to South Africa therefore means support for the enemies of the African people.'"

Generally, the Trudeau government did not support arms sales to South Africa on the grounds of Canadian support for the U.N. Security Council arms embargo. In this stance, it was supported by most of Parliament and by significant quarters of opinion in civil society. The New Democratic party called on Trudeau to join with the prime ministers of India and Zambia in a personal letter asking the British government not to proceed with the sale. Liberal and NDP MPs publicly discussed the value of expelling Britain from the Common-

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wealth, if necessary. At a press conference in London, Canadian Conservative leader Robert Stanfield stated frankly that 'any strategic benefits that Britain might obtain from such a deal would be more than offset by the harm that such an action would do to our multi-racial, world-spanning Commonwealth family.'

Stanfield's shadow foreign affairs critic, Gordon Fairweather, urged Heath 'not to lock yourself into the policy of arms sales,' and told Trudeau that he could count on opposition support.

However, the Conservative party in Canada was not united in this view. Ironically, Diefenbaker led hawkish Conservative opinion backing British arms sales on Cold War grounds. Conservative MPs also argued that the government's failure to protest French sales of one hundred Mirage jets to South Africa made action against Britain inconsistent.'

MP Heath Macquarrie declared that it would be 'reprehensible' if Canada should withdraw from the Commonwealth on this issue.57

Other sectors of civil society took a slightly harder line than the government. A Toronto group representing academic, church, and other non-governmental organizations published The Commonwealth at Stake urging 'a firm position' against British arms sales, including possible withdrawal. Six Canadian professors teaching at Makerere University in Uganda argued against Canadian involvement in an association that 'chooses to support the racist policies of South Africa.'

The Canadian Labour Congress sent a telegram protesting efforts to renew British arms sales to South Africa. Two public meetings were held to coincide with a visit by Heath to Ottawa to demonstrate public opposition to the proposed sales. Editorials in the Canadian press called the British decision 'a major blunder' with 'the danger of a naval war between Russia and South Africa ... a pretty remote one.'

The Toronto Star added that official protests from Canada would carry more weight if the government cancelled its sales of spare parts for military aircraft to South Africa and Commonwealth trade preferences. Just before the conference, the Star argued that 'moral and political implications of this issue far outweigh the marginal military considerations' advanced by the Heath government.'

The Canadian government's ability to negotiate and communicate with African leaders was enhanced by its imposition in November 1970 of the U.N. embargo on spare parts for military exports to South Africa and its instructions to government-owned Polymer Corporation to divest itself of its holdings in South
Africa. However, Heath's impatience and rigidity made the task more difficult on the other side. Trudeau's initial response was to communicate his misgivings about the decision to Heath and other senior British leaders. He warned that African

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members of the Commonwealth would regard a resumption of arms sales as 'an implicit gesture of acquiescence in the policy of the South African government towards the African population."62 Trudeau also pointed out that Heath's move violated the U.N. embargo on arms sales to South Africa.

In the period leading up to the conference in Singapore, Canadian and British leaders met regularly to see if some accommodation might be reached.63 Trudeau also sent his Special Assistant Ivan Head to reconnoitre African views and to encourage attendance at the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. Head reported back that the least that African heads of state would settle for was the acceptance by the Commonwealth of the declaration of principles supporting non-racialism prepared by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, failing which they promised to leave the organization.

Tension between the British and Canadian governments climbed before the meeting in Singapore. During Heath's visit to Ottawa, Trudeau continued to make representations about the proposed arms sales, but Heath told Trudeau to stay out of his way.65 The Commonwealth could not survive, Heath stated publicly, if it were 'to try to bind other countries so that they were not able to pursue their own national interests.'166 He went into a rage over the proposed declaration of principles, especially its provisions on assistance to regimes practising racial discrimination. Heath called the declaration an interference with Britain's domestic affairs and a contradiction of the Commonwealth principle of autonomy in foreign policy. Again at a meeting over dinner in New Delhi before the conference in January 1971, their discussion escalated into a 'no holds barred' exchange, and Trudeau and Heath left for Singapore as 'opponents.'67

During the conference, Trudeau put on a tour de force employing hard-bitten political analysis, intellectual bullying, and deliberate obfuscation to cool out the bitter differences between Heath and African leaders. Some sense of what was to come was given in a press conference as Trudeau left Ottawa for Singapore. He insisted that arms sales were 'just one item on the agenda,' and he wanted to consider other items as well, notably 'techniques of improving ... the parliamentary democratic system.' 16R

Within executive sessions, Trudeau combined stirring declarations against racial discrimination with an insistence that members concentrate on the long-term prospects for the region - specifically, on how to avoid communist penetration and racial wars in southern Africa.69 Trudeau suggested that, unless African leaders could guarantee that there would be no race war and could predict correctly the future of the subcontinent, they had no grounds to ask Britain to stop arms sales: 'You are just asking the British to take the first step,' Trudeau said, 'but you're not telling them or us or any of us what the
At one point, Trudeau also tried to divert African anger to France, which had contracted to build three submarines for South Africa. Central to this approach was Trudeau's familiar tactic of sidelining a direct discussion of the issue at hand - arms sales - by focusing on more general questions: witness his extraordinary claim that 'the issue of whether to sell or not to sell [arms] ... is a relatively secondary one.' Julius Nyerere, for one, saw this sophistry for what it was. He sat in glum silence through the meeting and left early.

Ultimately, Trudeau worked successfully to bring together the Australian and British positions with the rest of the Commonwealth. A revised declaration of principles both recognized 'racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness ... and an unmitigated evil' and stated that 'no country will afford to regimes which practise racial discrimination assistance which in its own judgement directly contributes to the pursuit or consolidation of this evil policy.' Each country then was left as the judge of its own actions.

As the decision remained tentative to the end, Trudeau and Head were jubilant when the conference ended with the declaration in place and the Commonwealth intact. The meeting also decided to establish a committee to study the safety of navigation in the Indian and South Atlantic oceans rather than the more pertinent question of the importance of the Cape route for Western shipping. Some observers viewed Canada's role in helping resolve this crisis as 'remarkably successful,' indeed Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore singled out Trudeau for praise for his efforts at conciliation. The evidence, however, is mixed. The compromises served to 'save the faces' of countries that had threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain persisted in arms sales, but they were unable to soften Britain's hard-line position resurrecting the Simonstown Agreement. Britain delayed arms sales to South Africa until after the Commonwealth meeting, but went ahead with a sale of seven Wasp helicopters to South Africa in February 1971, a defiant, if somewhat token gesture.77 Arms sales to South Africa remained official British policy until a Labour government returned to power in 1974.178

Following the announcement of the sale, India, Malaysia, and Nigeria withdrew from the committee to study navigation, and in the end it never met. Once again, a Canadian leader had helped work out a compromise to keep the Commonwealth alive, but in a way which reproduced British strengths and African weakness; a meagre accomplishment at best.

In succeeding Commonwealth conferences, Trudeau continued to exert an ambiguous influence on southern African issues. In Ottawa in 1973, he expressed some sympathy with the cause of southern African freedom fighters, but he was extremely cautious. Trudeau told Commonwealth journalists that Canada would support liberation movements through humanitarian but not military means. He said he respected people who risked their lives to fight for a cause, but as a head of government he had not supported many: 'Canada prefers to
stand outside of wars if that is possible,' Trudeau said, 'and that is our attitude with the freedom fighters too.'79 At the same time, the Canadian government continued to oppose economic sanctions against South Africa.80 Nyerere and others left the Ottawa meetings disappointed; they had expected more from Trudeau than this stonewalling.

At later Commonwealth meetings, Trudeau's position was inconsistent. In Jamaica in 1975, Trudeau said that he would not support an endorsement of the black war of liberation against Rhodesia.8' He also opposed hearing from Bishop Muzorewa of Rhodesia, on the grounds that it would create a Commonwealth precedent for hearing a Quebec secessionist.'82 At the London conference in 1977, Trudeau said that while he hoped for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, he could understand the armed struggle of black freedom fighters.'3 At the 1977 meeting, Trudeau supported the Gleneagles Declaration calling on Commonwealth members to discourage sports contacts with South Africa. However, Canadian policy fell far short of the declaration's injunction that governments should discourage participation in sports events that included South Africans. Trudeau made clear that Canadians would not be stopped from going to South Africa to take part in sporting events, but that they would not be subsidized by government funds.84 In a classic gesture of impatience with press questions about post-Soweto South Africa, Trudeau simply dodged the issue, suggesting that Idi Amin's brutal regime in Uganda should be discussed along with southern Africa.'85

Thus, three Canadian prime ministers - Trudeau in Singapore, Pearson in London and Lagos, and Diefenbaker in London - were able to defuse crises that posed severe problems for the Commonwealth.' However, while Diefenbaker sided with the non-white Commonwealth in 1961, in the succeeding cases, Canadian leaders acted more as intermediaries between Britain and the old dominions, on one side, and the newer members of the Commonwealth, on the other.

On each issue, these tactics helped the Commonwealth through the strains of its transition from an imperial organization to a much less unequal association. However, on the questions of majority rule in Rhodesia and British arms sales to South Africa, there were real costs. In each case, a resolution was achieved and tension defused, but in a way which served Britain and at the expense of African interests.

Given that this record was still the best of the 'white dominions,' African leaders encouraged Canadian governments to stay on track, and generally gave them a better reputation than they deserved.'87 Their approach in the Com-

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wealth, together with similar pressures in the United Nations and la Francophonie, provided external constituencies to which the state felt the need to legitimate its policies.

Thus, such organizations constituted an international influence on Canadian policy, and their expectations provided an incentive for Canadian leaders to keep alive their rhetorical opposition to apartheid and even to make the odd gesture in concrete policy changes. The other key forces shaping Canadian policy on
southern Africa came, of course, from domestic quarters. Their power can be seen in their ability to constrain successive Canadian governments so that, even in the dramas of the various Commonwealth crises explored above, their interests were secured.

The Hyper-Real Discourse of 'Balance'
The boundary between fact and fiction, realism and fantasy, [blurred] ... into indistinguishability, and places like ... South Africa [became] ... the scenes of fantastic hyperreal threats to Western civilization.

The reluctance of Canadian leaders to side automatically with the old white dominions in the Commonwealth on southern African issues after 1961 created expectations in Africa that more support would be forthcoming. However, as the decades wore on, this hope ebbed. In South Africa, the long night between Sharpeville and Soweto, with apartheid in place and resistance quelled, was echoed in Canada by a policy that did little and changed less. Successive Canadian governments - from Diefenbaker to Pearson and Trudeau - adopted an approach whose main contours stayed remarkably the same.

This was the era when Canadian governments chose both to trade and to condemn: to support full relations with a country that Canadian leaders also regularly denounced. The approach was codified in the 1970 government White Paper on foreign policy.2 Canadian leaders would express a commitment to social justice, but not one significant enough to interfere with the 'better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment in [its] ... growing economy.'3 The two objectives were held to serve different Canadian interests, coexisting in a balance. While such views were not hegemonic (in that sections of civil society vigorously opposed them), sufficient agreement was secured by those in power to sustain the policy until the mid-1980s. Thus, the consensus in official circles about two sets of issues - the appropriate relationship for the Canadian state

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and Canadian society towards South Africa and possibilities for non-violent change - became an important part of the process, a central element in resisting and even blocking change.

As a discourse4 about Canadian-South African relations, these propositions hardened into a formula, transcending objective material reality and becoming somewhat "hyperreal."5 Their roots lay in historical, cultural, and ideological associations, and their premises reflected the views of a generation of leaders who had been in their thirties and forties in the 1950s when South Africa was generally regarded as a friend and ally.'

As noted in the previous chapter, the historical attachments drew on the joint membership of Canada and South Africa in the British Empire and the Commonwealth, shared wartime experiences, and a deep respect for General Smuts. Allied to these traditional associations were questions of identity reflecting the commonality, as white Christian Westerners, between those in power in Canada and South Africa.
At its worst, the world-view that emerged from this identity was frankly racialist. In the 1940s, senior Canadian officials openly expressed views which would almost never surface in later years. In a personal letter to a legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs in 1944, for example, Canada's Acting High Commissioner to South Africa, J.C. Macgillivray, denied that South African blacks were 'repressed, ill-treated [or]... discriminated against.' He scorned miscegenation and described blacks as being 'of a very low type' who would, 'if ... given advancement and even a very little social standing ... create much more trouble in this country than the negroes do in the United States.' He complained that 'all the non-whites [were] coalescing under communist guidance, if not leadership, to question the dominance of the white minority.'

Such views lasted longest in the Canadian private sector which, together with right-wing forces within civil society, expressed a bias that was truly distinctive. At his company's annual general meeting in 1964, Garfield Weston insisted that South Africa 'never was a black country' adding that it was 'ridiculous to give the black man the vote, because his morals are not ours and his Christian ethics are completely absent.' Unaffected by the events of the following two decades, financier and press baron Conrad Black concurred that "'One man, one vote," a euphemism for massacre, expulsion, or subjugation of the whites, is a non-starter and everyone except Desmond Tutu knows it.' In this view, white rule kept black tribes from each othet's throats; majority rule, on the other hand, would bring political instability, violence, and economic chaos.

More typically in the right-wing media, such sentiments were cloaked in appeals to the 'kith and kin' factor. In an interview on Global television, for example, journalist Peter Trueman argued that 'the white South Africans ... are people very much like we are ... they fought beside us in two world wars ... we have tended, in our natural distress and disgust about the plight of the black in South Africa, to overlook the plight of five million white people who aren't very much different than we are.'

Such views were part of a culture of identity that provided the climate within which many Canadian officials operated. They help to explain the extraordinary tolerance shown to white South African regimes and the eagerness to believe that vague promises of reform were genuine. At best, Canadian politicians and officials were gullible. Warmed by memories of the old imperial association, they fundamentally misread the character of white minority regimes and tolerated for far too long the horrors which they perpetrated. The response to the imposition of apartheid was timid and ineffectual. Similarly in the international sphere, alliances were considered natural with the white Western world; whereas for a very long time, the Afro-Asian world was considered 'other,' and their initiatives suspect. Such presumptions inevitably shaped attitudes towards black South Africa.

Particularly in the early period, few Canadian officials, if any, took the trouble to know black South African leaders or to take their struggle seriously. Their tone was paternalistic and hypocritical, especially when black South Africans eventually resorted to armed struggle. Western governments would not help black
liberation movements militarily, and they denounced such groups as communist and terrorist when they turned inevitably to communist countries for military assistance. Officials also discounted the importance for Canada of better relations with other African countries that stronger support for black South Africans would have produced.

Indeed, until the end of the Cold War, a set of strategic assumptions strengthened the bond forged by shared identities and prejudices. These emphasized South Africa's role as a regional outpost for Western interests, a bulwark against communism in a 'dark continent.' Thus, it became the duty of Canada and the West to defend the Cape route as a lifeline for Western shipping, and to keep open access to South Africa's supply of vital strategic minerals: 'Continued Western influence and pressure in the area is essential,' a confidential External Affairs document stated, 'if the emerging regimes are not to become extremely radical from disenchantment and disillusionment.'

The weight given in analysis to intangible factors like Cold War alliance, ideological compatibility, shared identity, and historical association is, to some degree, interpretive. Nevertheless, they add an important dimension to an explanation of Canadian policy, as official statements attempted to produce a 'common sense' upon which the policy was constructed.

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As noted at the outset, the central tenets of this 'common sense' were set out in the government White Paper on foreign policy in 1970. From then on, 'discourse' tended to be a repetitive monologue, reflecting a consensus which dismissed alternative views. Its four central principles included: a commitment to free economic relations; a belief in the positive effect of unrestricted commerce on South African development; the efficacy of friendly persuasion and full diplomatic relations with the South African state; and opposition in principle to the adoption of armed struggle by South African liberation movements.

Commitment to Open Economic Relations

Both the Canadian state and Canadian corporations operated within the paradigm of a liberal capitalist, Whiggish ideology. Thus, Canada's economic links with South Africa were defended as flowing from general principles about the proper relationship of foreign economic policy to foreign policy. This approach involved a neo-liberal view of the distinctive roles of the state and the private sector; the state was not to interfere with the decisions of the private sector, and certainly not to place sanctions against economic relations. Indeed, for many years, politicians and government officials deemed political considerations to be illegitimate in the framing of foreign economic policy.

The 1970 White Paper defended trade with South Africa as an expression of the principle of 'trade in peaceful goods to all countries and territories regardless of political considerations. This principle has motivated Canadian trade with China and Cuba, as well as with authoritarian regimes of the right and left with whose policies Canada does not agree.' Successive governments upheld the principle of the unimpeded flow of capital and goods for peaceful purposes between all countries except (as in the case of Rhodesia) where under Chapter VII of the Charter, the U.N. Security Council
decided to impose mandatory international sanctions. On South Africa, Trudeau made his position crystal clear: 'As far as the private sector is concerned,' he said in 1977, 'we will not interfere in trade nor investment.' Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson added that 'it is the responsibility of the boards of directors of the individual company concerned to decide whether to invest in a particular country.'

For its part, the private sector also disclaimed responsibility for allowing or disallowing investment in countries like South Africa. Anthony Hampson, chairman of the Canada Development Corporation (CDC), for example, argued that it was not appropriate for the Canadian private sector to consider the political implications of doing business in South Africa: 'I do not agree,' Hampson wrote in 1972, 'that individual corporate managements should be making decisions of an essentially political nature ... it is the duty of management to do business where it makes sense to do business ... Political decisions should rest with the appropriate level of government and parliament; business should follow the laws these bodies lay down and not take it upon themselves to impose boycotts of one kind or another at the request of particular groups in society.'

With both the private sector and the state deferring to each other, nothing was ever done in this period to inhibit full economic relations with South Africa. Canadian policy could only begin to change when South Africa came to be viewed as an exception to such general rules. Yet for many years, Canadian officials were not inclined to consider the specific criteria that distinguished South Africa as a special case. They feared that the establishment of a precedent would hurt general Canadian interests, especially given the growing dependence of the Canadian economy on trade. Indeed, the configuration of power and interest embodied in this attachment to general principles ruled out official support for economic sanctions until the mid-1980s.

A central paradox of this strategy was that it was held more for ideological and political than for material reasons. Sanctions would have cost the state comparatively little. In the context of general global economic relations, the Canadian stake in South Africa was minuscule. Yet, economic involvement in South Africa was stubbornly defended by a succession of Canadian governments - from Diefenbaker to Pearson to Trudeau. When public agitation to lessen ties with South Africa became quite vocal, Canadian officials and politicians continued to oppose stronger action and even to continue government promotion of economic relations with South Africa.

Even more perverse, the very marginality of these interests became the excuse (until the mid-1980s) for doing nothing on sanctions, on the grounds that economic relations between Canada and South Africa were too small to affect the issue one way or another. Officials regularly argued that there was no point in sanctions if they merely made Canadians feel good while other Western countries moved to fill in the gap. At any rate, at this point, they had no intention or incentive to depart from the Western consensus on this issue.
A second central argument in this discourse was to argue that economic relations would contribute to economic development in South Africa, would liberalize apartheid, and would improve the living and working conditions of black South Africans. Thus, for many years, Canadians in government, the media, academia, and the private sector put the case for constructive engagement.22

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John Diefenbaker, for one, believed that the 'healthy interchange of goods, ideas and people,' was 'the best hope for breaking down barriers of ignorance and prejudice.'23 'If South Africa's industrial sector develops,' a Globe and Mail editorial also asserted, 'so does hope for black political advancement.'24 Just as corporate requirements for skilled human resources broke the white monopoly on industrial employment and the rise of a black industrial labour force forced legal recognition of black trade unions, so, too, (in this view) would the growth of a prosperous black middle class bring about the end of apartheid.

Hence, sanctions were considered inappropriate interference with the private sector, harmful to the well-being of black South Africans. As late as 1982, two of Trudeau's Cabinet ministers argued that 'we must deal with South Africa in the context of state-to-state relations,' and 'we cannot ignore the deprivation and suffering which extreme measures would impose.'25 The Globe and Mail went so far as to argue that 'Disinvestment would be unwittingly, an ally of apartheid.'26 Those who supported sanctions were dismissed as sentimental; either policy lightweights indulging in dangerous idealism and false piety or 'frustrated primitives who wanted hot emotional satisfaction.'27 As a memorandum released by Shell Canada put it, 'Those clamouring for punitive action against South Africa or for total "disinvestment" should not relieve their frustration by attacking private enterprise.'28 Cool reason dictated resolute opposition to sanctions and not giving in to anguish, frustration, or anger. Maintaining economic and diplomatic relations, in this view, was essential for Canada to retain influence in South Africa.

The two central propositions in official policy - about the importance of liberal economic exchange for Canada and the purported benefits for South Africans of foreign economic involvement - naturally led to a third set of views about appropriate means to effect change.

Friendly Persuasion and the Apartheid State

Canadian governments, along with most of their Western counterparts, emphasized the crucial importance of sustaining a dialogue with South Africa through full bilateral relations. The point, it was asserted, was 'to bring South Africa to its senses and not to its knees.'29 Constant reference was made to Diefenbaker's offer that 'there will always be a light in the Commonwealth window' for a South Africa free of apartheid,30 that it had only to return to the civilized norms of the international community and all would be forgiven.31 Polite diplomatic relations were held to be essential in encouraging the process of change in

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South Africa, a constructive way of working against apartheid. Foreign pressure, by contrast, simply stiffened Pretoria's resistance to change.32

Representatives of the Canadian private sector concurred. As the president of DeLeuw, Cather and Company put it: 'South Africans are very isolated in their thinking yet they are very conscious about the opinions of others. For instance, no Canadian can visit South Africa without being questioned about his attitudes to the country and its politics by just about everyone he meets. Consequently South Africans will always be influenced for the better by a liberal Canadian approach.'33

While the first two aspects of official discourse had roots in ideological predispositions and the economic self-interest of a few corporations, this third set of ideas operated as a rather shabby cover for the West's support for the status quo in South Africa. African leaders in the rest of the continent regularly took senior Canadian officials to task on the question of dialogue.

Following a meeting with Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp in 1971, General Gowon of Nigeria told Canadian reporters that this approach to solving racial issues in southern Africa 'stinks.'34 Gowon pointed out that South Africa wanted to 'lure' top black African leaders into a dialogue, offer them 'chicken-feed economic aid,' and essentially do nothing about the plight of its own black subjects. On a tour of West Africa in 1975, Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen met with much the same response. With the exception of officials in the Ivory Coast, no one agreed with the approach. The Ghanaian Commissioner of Foreign Affairs asked MacEachen, 'How can we talk of dialogue when the Government of South Africa won't even respect or talk to the black people within its own country?'35

The assumption in Canadian policy about the ability of the West and Africa to reach South Africans through reasoned argument was not shaken by the steadfast commitment of the South African state to apartheid. As noted earlier, the emphasis on rationality missed the psychological, moral, and religious dimensions of the white regime's transformation of South African society and the economic and political privilege which it secured for them. As history would show, this was not a regime that could be coaxed gently into flexibility.

Non-Violence and Gradual Change for Blacks

Rhetoric about the potential of the existing South African state to mend its ways persisted and underpinned a fourth pillar of official Canadian discourse on South Africa - a refusal to recognize, take seriously, or support major indigenous forces for change.6 Particularly in comparison with the Nordic

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countries, Canadian officials displayed a profound ambivalence about the bona fides of black politics and an aloofness from South African liberation movements. In their insistence that such groups forsake the armed struggle, they stayed well within a comfortable, albeit hypocritical, Western band of opinion.

The Department of External Affairs had very distant relations with representatives of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in Canada; contact was infrequent and, in this period, never at a senior level. While
Canadian governments would not curry favour with the South African state by recognizing the Bantustans to which it had given a spurious independence," they tended to ignore other internal organizations and their leaders as well. Until policy changed in the mid-1980s, Canadian diplomats and officials relied for their non-media information on other Western countries, on white South African officials, and only rarely on senior figures from the mass democratic movements.

While the Canadian government had supported resistance movements in Europe during the Second World War, for most of the postwar period, it gave little or no support to the black liberation movements in South Africa (or the region).38 The queasiness of Canadian leaders about the legitimacy of the armed struggle in South Africa was not a product of Gandhian-style pacifism. Most had no qualms about the Second World War, the Korean War, or, in most cases, the Vietnam War. Few had protested the British war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands or the American-led Gulf War, let alone U.S. invasions of Panama, Grenada, and Cuba. Yet, in the case of South Africa, where unrestrained violence had been integral to the maintenance of an undemocratic minority regime based on race, armed opposition by the black opposition was considered ultra vires.

Thus, despite the South African state's increasing militarization, its fifty-year record of rebuffing African attempts at peaceful negotiations, its brutal response to even mild protest, and its devastating military campaign of destabilization in the region, southern African liberation movements were lectured relentlessly about their resort to armed struggle:39 'The Canadian government is opposed to giving aid to violence,' Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, explained on a tour of Africa in 1971, 'It's part of our principles.'40 Fifteen years later, Joe Clark made exactly the same point in urging 'peaceful means' on the ANC.41

The hypocrisy in this piety was not lost on South African church leaders. As the Reverend Allan Boesak pointed out, 'in the West violence had always been accepted with astonishing ease as the solution to a nation's problems. War and revolution ... throughout history (had been) the sacrosanct modalities of political progress. Yet somehow, in the case of South Africa, the rules of war and the pretexts of revolution are held ... to be beyond the pale of Christian propri-

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ety.42 Preferring non-violence, South African church leaders nonetheless understood that opponents of apartheid in South Africa were given little choice. Yet the advocacy of non-violence remained a central aspect of Canadian official discourse on South Africa until apartheid ended.

The official unwillingness in Canada to ally with the representatives of the black majority and the acceptance of the status quo posed a fundamental contradiction to the objective of social justice. Their insistence on peaceful change stood in stark contrast to their sombre assessment of the region's prospects.43 It was not that official foreign policy makers in Canada misunderstood conditions in southern Africa. Central to their analysis in the 1970 White Paper was a recognition of the apparent inevitability of an escalation of racial violence, heightened tension, and increased risks of conflict. They also noted that, for the
white minorities in southern Africa, 'the application of the concepts of political and racial equality would be ruinous to the existing way of life and ... [would therefore] be resisted to the bitter end.'

It was just that, during this period, the approach was premised on the existence rather than the justice of continued white rule in southern Africa. In this light, the call for peaceful change represented more a pious wish than a credible response to the militarized nature of the apartheid state and the lack of alternatives for the black majority. It also represented a degree of ideological incompatibility. Canadian officials were uncomfortable with the commitment of liberation movements to social revolution and socialist ideology and their links to the communist world.

These then were the precepts that kept official discourse on South Africa in a rigid mould well into the 1980s. Repeated as an official mantra, the commentary became ever more surreal. 'Except for apartheid,' a Canadian trade official claimed at one point, 'we have no quarrel with South Africa.' When the inconsistency of condemning the very regime with which one sustained full diplomatic and economic relations was pointed out, officials insisted that the approach was consistent with a 'balance' between the objectives of economic growth and social justice. The tautology of such reasoning simply covered the refusal to do more than muddle along in a highly compromised fashion, ignoring the issue of support for the black majority living under apartheid.

Counter-Hegemonic Discourses

While successive Liberal and Conservative administrations kept the faith, opinion within civil society in Canada was much more divided. Some groups, particularly those linked to the private sector, sympathized with white southern Africa and would have liked more tangible gestures of support for beleaguered white regimes. They especially opposed any action which singled South Africa out from treatment accorded to other countries and would have abandoned even the rhetorical opposition to apartheid; but they were in a minority.

More typically, vigorous opposition to the state's genteel treatment of white regimes began as early as the 1950s. The grounds for disagreement ranged from a John Stuart Mill brand of liberalism to solidarity with the objectives of liberation and socialism expressed by the liberation movements. The former point of view based its case on moral, political, and material grounds, while the latter also stressed the strategic imperative of full support for the armed struggle and for a non-capitalist future in South Africa.

The liberal reformist view attained national attention in 1970 in the Black Paper, a publication of a committee whose members included a wide crosssection of groups in civil society. Opening with a direct challenge to the official White Paper's philosophic basis, it asked, 'On what possible scales can Canada's revulsion from the immoral, inhuman indignity of apartheid be overbalanced by the returns from less than one-half of one per cent of this country's total trade?'
The Black Paper also directly opposed the official view that South Africa could not be excepted from the general rule of full economic relations with all countries regardless of political considerations: 'While tyranny and political oppression are familiar evils,' it argued, 'apartheid is more reprehensible because its oppression is based not only on differing political ideologies and the lust for power exercised by a minority, but also centrally and fundamentally on the criterion of race.'5 Adding that it was 'sophistry to suggest that Canadian policy towards oppressive regimes must be the same in each case,'52 the Black Paper argued for a much stronger policy towards white southern Africa. In fact, a precedent existed in the Canadian government's support for U.N. Security Council resolutions forbidding arms sales to South Africa and imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia.

As to the claim that full economic relations with Western countries would produce political change, the Black Paper pointed out that apartheid had flourished and became more entrenched in the very decades of strong Western involvement in the South African economy and its greatest period of economic growth. In the meantime, the white minority in South Africa benefited disproportionately from economic improvements.3 Moreover, executives of Canadian corporations acted less as agents of change in South Africa than apologists for South Africa in Canada. As the White Paper itself had recognized, Canadian corporations were in South Africa precisely because of the 'better than normal opportunities' for economic returns.

As for the view that Canadian diplomats should cultivate good relations in order to gain influence, the Black Paper discounted their influence 'in the allwhite cocoon of Pretoria.' ‘We are not dealing with minor wayward prejudices,’ it said, ‘which South Africa can be shamed into abandoning. We are dealing with a system which secures status, power, and a very high standard of living for its white ruling class by using the full power of the state to ensure that the non-white majorities are kept in permanent subjugation.’54

In the context of cycles of repression and rebellion in South Africa and, in particular, the violent nature of the South African state, official platitudes about the necessity for peaceful change had become irrelevant and only served to destroy Canadian credibility. For the Black Paper, the Canadian government's opposition to the legitimate struggle of the liberation movements and its refusal to offer them non-military assistance was disingenuous and unhelpful.

On this issue, the Black Paper was supported by wide sections of the Canadian church community. As one United Church moderator argued on his return from South Africa, to condemn the armed struggle by South African blacks was 'to miss the point.'55 Violence by blacks in South Africa, he said, was a response to the violence of government oppression. It was 'a kind of hypocrisy and racism,' he added, 'for us to say categorically that people in that situation can't take up arms.' For Anglican priest Michael Lapsley, the official position was 'like condemning the violence of the mass murderer and also condemning those who are defending themselves against such murders.' An Anglican archbishop added after his trip to South Africa that the inspiration for the ANC was primarily Christian and that the
central issue 'is not communism versus the West but racist government oppression versus the legitimate aspirations of the black people.' At this conjuncture, however, the liberal reformist position did not advocate total economic sanctions. The Black Paper accepted as 'depressingly realistic' that the time was not propitious: 'Until international and Canadian opinion is prepared for an economic confrontation with southern Africa,' it noted, 'it is unreasonable to ask our government to impose a full embargo on Canadian trade with southern Africa.'

While more radical groups accepted the primary thrust of the analysis offered in the Black Paper, they were less constrained by the 'depressing reality' in their suggestion of appropriate policies. Using President John Vorster of South Africa's claim that *each trade agreement, each bank loan, each new investment is another brick in the wall of our continued existence,* this position supported full sanctions against white regimes. Instead of 'working both sides of the street' through the politics of 'balance,' it proposed that the Canadian state take sides in a more forthright commitment, aiding the struggle of the black majority and particularly South African liberation movements.

At the same time, recognizing that Canadian policy in southern Africa was 'the inevitable by-product of the structure of Canada's economy and society, the country's own colonial status and capitalist imperatives,' this approach linked the two struggles. Opposing unjust and oppressive structures abroad became an activity which complemented struggles against injustice and exploitation at home. 'Indeed,' as John Saul, a professor and leading member of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) argued, 'the primary contribution of Canadians to the African cause would be to carry out their own "liberation struggle" at home.'

Not surprisingly, except for brief flashes in the mid-1980s, this perspective had little resonance within the state. The imperative of 'taking sides' with black southern Africa, the notion of solidarity, was still not one that official Canada was prepared to embrace. Indeed, powerful forces within the state fought stubbornly against such views, supported by important allies within civil society. In the next chapter, we shall explore the structuring of such interests to understand the ways in which these struggles played out in the Trudeau era.

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The contradiction which lies at the heart of Canadian policy will be a much more difficult one to straddle in the future than it has been in the past ... for all those who would ... seek to work both sides of the street in Southern Africa ... an increased polarization between the various protagonists has taken place ... even a refusal to act will be much more clearly revealed as a choice of sides.

John S. Saul'

In the Trudeau years, the approach to South Africa was established early, reconsidered briefly, and then reaffirmed as an item of faith. The system of
apartheid could be called detestable, worthy now (as it had not been in the 1950s) of denunciation in the appropriate international fora. Yet official support for full economic and diplomatic relations never wavered. Even contraventions of the U.N. arms embargo were let by with a wink and a nod. A tacit understanding emerged as a modus vivendi in both Canada and South Africa; when it came to matters of serious import, especially for economic interests, the question of apartheid's 'abhorrent nature' was simply put to one side. The pretence was opposition to apartheid; the reality was business as usual. In this approach, Canadian policy lay fully within the Western consensus. Enunciated as the 'tar baby option' in a review of U.S. policy towards southern Africa, the strategy called for a partial relaxation of measures against white regimes in southern Africa in the 1970s; the understanding was that they were a permanent reality. It was hoped that increased assistance and diplomacy in independent black Africa would mitigate damage from close relations with white southern Africa and would ease tensions between South Africa and its neighbours.

The West wanted all things - to retain South Africa as an ally, but not to lose influence either with the rest of Africa in the Cold War competition for power. In the realpolitik view of Kissinger and Nixon, the alliance with white southern Africa was of paramount importance. South Africa served as a bulwark against communism both as a supplier of key minerals and in its location near important international shipping lanes. Similarly, Portugal was retained as an ally within NATO even during the final stages of its colonial wars. Henry Kissinger recognized that the West had a stake 'in not having the whole continent become radical,' or move in a direction incompatible with Western interests. The Canadian government's South Africa policy reflected the alliance between these larger Western interests and forces within Canada; together, they played an important role in establishing the long continuity in policy. However, they are less useful in showing why reform came on to the agenda. Here the conjunctural element is important: in 1976, conditions changed in South Africa, in Canada, and in the broader international arena, provoking a reexamination of policy. So, while discourse and structure established the evolving language and basis of power, a new conjuncture reshaped coalitions and opened up the prospect of change. At the same time, in this historical moment, Western convictions were shaken but not overturned by the season of protest in South Africa. The Canadian government proposed reforms, but these turned out to be more cosmetic than substantive - the effect on Canada's economic relations with South Africa was negligible. Instead, the fundamentals of the policy were reaffirmed in the conviction that the white regimes would survive and that black liberation was a remote possibility, fraught, in any case, with dangers of socialist leanings. The politics of this process meant that commitments made by Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson were overridden successfully by more powerful forces within the state. Here the element of agency, of combinations and recombinations of forces, merit our full attention.
Part of the story involves examining the impact of powerful groups within civil society that played a significant role in shaping and maintaining policy. Their views were shared by officials located in key ministries in the state and by national and international corporations with whom they were linked. Western powers accepted the reality of white rule, and international organizations were timid and ineffectual in confronting the issue. At this stage, attempts by the

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anti-apartheid movement to secure a different emphasis were met with little more than token gestures.

When Trudeau's administration reviewed Canadian policy on South Africa at the end of the 1960s, he recognized that the existing policy was inconsistent: 'We should either stop trading or stop condemning,' he said; yet the policy which was to prevail throughout his tenure continued to do both. Officials made it clear that trading relations would be broken only when the U.N. Security Council adopted mandatory economic sanctions. Initially, Trudeau also refused to abandon Commonwealth preferences on trade with South Africa, arguing for their beneficial economic impact on Canada. In Parliament, the approach was given enthusiastic bipartisan support from Conservative spokesman, Heath Macquarrie, who saluted the policy as a 'mark of maturity' and a welcome end to 'pious preaching of pusillanimous platitudes.'

A succession of Liberal ministers - starting with Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp and Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC) Jean-Luc Pepin - believed ardently in the essentials of the policy laid out in the 1970 White Paper, and their successors stayed the course. In the 1970s, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was particularly active in lobbying against sanctions. Its incorporation into an expanded Department of External Affairs and International Trade in 1982 was an important change, giving a central place to the representation of economic self-interest in the framing of foreign policy. Close connections to the private sector were built into government structures through joint participation on boards of directors of government agencies like the Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the now defunct Canada Development Corporation (CDC).

Yet, paradoxically, the cost to Canada of imposing sanctions would have been small. In comparison with total Canadian trade and investment, Canada's economic involvement in South Africa was marginal. In fact, Canadian exports to South Africa declined from 0.7 per cent of total exports in the 1960s to 0.3 per cent in the 1970s to 0.15 per cent in the 1980s. 2 Canadian imports ranged from a mere 0.3 per cent to 0.4 per cent of total imports in the 1960s and 1970s and declined to 0.2 per cent in the 1980s. As early as 1970, Canadian trade with the rest of Africa was greater than with South Africa, and by 1976, Algeria, alone, surpassed South Africa as the top African market for Canadian goods. In the period from the end of the Second World War to 1970, South Africa was the tenth most important market for Canadian goods - but in the Trudeau years, only the fifteenth.
Of greater importance were financial flows to South Africa, particularly in the 1970s. However, at its height, direct investment in South Africa was only 0.073 per cent of total direct foreign investment (and indirect investment about 1 per cent of total indirect investment abroad), after which investment declined steadily in the 1980s and almost disappeared by 1990. Loans also peaked in the 1970s, and then Canadian banks also lost interest. By the mid-1980s, with some exceptions, Canadian banks stopped lending to South African institutions. Given this marginal stake, the question then becomes, what were the forces and interests that produced such strong support for economic relations during most of the period of apartheid rule? Beyond the commitment in principle explored earlier, one part of the answer lies in the Trudeau government's trade and industrial policy, and a larger part in the structural links between the state and a network of domestic and international corporations in the private sector.

Objectives in Trade and Industrial Policy
A central thrust of trade and industrial policy during the Trudeau years, the rectifying of structural imbalances, was addressed in the 1972 Third Option paper; its goal was to increase manufactured exports and to diversify Canadian economic relations outside of North America. Relations with South Africa fitted both objectives.

Although South Africa's share of total Canadian trade was insignificant, it was by far Canada's most important trading partner in Africa in the two decades after the Second World War. From 1950 to 1969, no less than 70 per cent of Canadian exports to Africa went to South Africa. While its share declined in the 1970s, this trade was less dependent on government sponsorship and subsidies than in the rest of Africa. Therefore, South Africa retained its importance even though Algeria became the largest market for Canadian goods by the mid-1970s.

South Africa was not only one of the two most important African markets for Canadian goods in the 1970s, but also the nature of Canadian exports fitted with the Canadian government's objective of diversifying the composition of Canadian trade. Canadian goods sold in South Africa in the 1970s were primarily (84 per cent) end product and semi-finished manufactured goods. In fact, during this period, this proportion was higher than the ratio of Canada's manufactured exports worldwide to total Canadian exports (68 per cent). Such exports helped lessen very large overall trade deficits, and vehicles and vehicle parts had a not insignificant multiplier effect on the level of employment and the development of auto parts industries in Ontario and Quebec.

Thus, by helping diversify the composition and destination of Canadian exports, the contribution of the South African market to Canada's trade strategy was larger than its rather small comparative share of total trade. Moreover,
Financial flows from Canada complemented the pattern of increasing trade. With profits said to be more than twice those in Canada,2 Canadian direct investment in South Africa doubled in the 1970s.23 Counting the value of total assets rather than the book value of direct investment,24 at its peak in 1981, the worth of Canadian direct investment in South Africa was about $Cdn 1.1 billion.5 In the 1970s and 1980s, Canadian financial institutions provided major support to the South African government and its agencies. Canadian banks lent $US 470 million directly and participated in the multi-billion dollar loans through international bank consortia,26 while Canadian investment dealers underwrote bond placements of over $US 1 billion.27

State and Civil Society: Private Sector Interests

Beyond its suitability for trade and industrial strategies, the official commitment to economic ties with South Africa directly reflected the interests of the Canadian private sector. Before contemplating economic sanctions, any government in Canada would have had to take into account the concerns of a few large powerful corporations connected to a network of American, British, and South African corporations.

While the Canadian banks involved in South Africa were owned by Canadians, companies in trade and direct investment were owned predominantly by foreign interests. A small group of eight transnational corporations accounted for the larger part of 'Canadian' exports to South Africa in the 1970s.21 In 1981 at the peak of 'Canadian' direct investment in South Africa, only six corporations, all foreign controlled but Canadian based, provided 83 per cent of the direct investment in South Africa.29

These corporations - Canadian, American,3 British, and South African were closely related. One study of the top twenty-eight Canadian-based companies that operated in South Africa in the 1970s found that they shared ninety interlocking directorships with the five largest Canadian banks also involved in lending through international consortia to South Africa.3’ Thus, a relatively small number of large Canadian-based companies (about twenty-eight to thirty at their peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s) were related through patterns of ownership, overlapping memberships on boards of directors, and partnership agreements to a chain of transnational corporate interests whose combined stake in the South African system was much larger than Canada's alone.

Interwoven in this cluster were South African corporate interests in Canada - notably Anglo American32 and the Rembrandt Group through Rothmans.

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International;33 together they controlled 90 per cent of the South African companies (seventy-four of eighty-three) operating in Canada.34 Rothmans focused on Canada's brewing, tobacco, and wine industries, while Anglo American invested in mining, power, and railway transport. Total South African investment in Canada was slightly more significant than Canadian investment in South Africa.

One particularly strong example of the close corporate connections between Canada, South Africa, and the United States was evident in a pattern of relations.
established by the Bank of Nova Scotia. From 1969 to 1984, the bank was the primary distributor and importer in Canada of South Africa's Krugerrand - the gold coin that helped South Africa earn a 25 per cent premium on its gold exports. In 1980 the president and chief executive officer of the Bank of Nova Scotia, Cedric Ritchie, became a director of MINORCO, an overseas investment arm of two of South Africa's largest conglomerates, Anglo American and De Beers. MINORCO controlled a New York company, Inspiration Resources Corp. that wholly owned Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting, one of the most important companies in northern Manitoba. Not surprisingly, in later years, Ritchie broke with the Mulroney government's sanctions policy, making a major loan to MINORCO in 1989.

A second important set of relations existed between Canadian, British, and South African corporations. The Montreal-based company Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation (QIT) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, later of the London-based Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ). QIT entered into an agreement in 1976 with the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a corporation affiliated with the South African government, and a South African mining company in a $300 million development of iron- and titanium-bearing beaches at Richards Bay, Natal. Rossing mine in Namibia, a source of uranium for Eldorado Nuclear of Canada, also had extensive connections with British and South African interests. It was owned partly (10 per cent) by Rio Algol of Canada, along with its parent company RTZ, IDC, and private corporations from France and South Africa. Other subsidiaries of RTZ were involved in the early 1980s in mining exploration ventures with the Saskatchewan Mining and Development Corporation. A Rio Algol subsidiary, Atlas Specialty Steels, imported its ferro alloys from South Africa and was a major force in later years in having these items excluded from economic sanctions.

In addition to these transnational networks, another factor helping to build the consensus for economic relations was the prominent role of executives from South Africa in the Canadian corporate world. At one point, no less than four of the top twelve managers of the Bronfman group had been born in South Africa. South Africans were also at the helm of BMW Canada and Volkswagen.

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During Trudeau's administration, the power of such forces was self-evident: At the same time, the refusal to do more for the cause of black southern Africans had
attracted critical attention in the first years of his government. As President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania put it to a University of Toronto audience in 1969, Neither free Africa nor the Western world has the right to ask the peoples of Southern Africa to accept indefinitely the present humiliation, oppression and foreign domination ... Will Canada at least understand that freedom means as much to us in Africa as it does to any other people? ... if Canada cannot support our struggle, will it at least be able to refrain from giving comfort and help to those who would deny freedom and dignity to us?4

Much as Canadian officials were unwilling to move Canada's South Africa policy beyond fairly narrow limits, they were not immune to Nyerere's logic.45 In particular, they did not want to lose legitimacy in Africa, in the Commonwealth, and at home. Such pressures encouraged the state to play, at times, an ambiguous role - consistent only within the contradictory principles of its general policy of sustaining and promoting full economic relations and yet somehow giving weight to the value of social justice. As Professor James Eayrs observed, what the approach amounted to was 'not necessarily at the expense of Social Justice, but at the expense of Social Justice if necessary.'46

The Soft Option - a Diplomatic and Aid Presence

Although the central issue for the region was the seeming impregnability of the apartheid state, the chief beneficiaries of the 'social justice' component of Canadian policy in the early 1970s were the independent countries immediately north of South Africa.47 While Nyerere and others had urged Canadian leaders to assist black majorities struggling against white rule, the Canadian government's response was to offer only minimal support to them through multilateral programs.48

The thinking behind such priorities was consistent with the belief that white rule in southern Africa was likely to remain indefinitely. As Mitchell Sharp explained in 1971,

We should realize and accept that our capacity to influence the white racist minorities in Southern Africa is limited and can best be exercised multilaterally through the United Nations and the Commonwealth. What we can do ourselves is to offer economic and political support for the developing countries of black Africa ... This is bound to be more rewarding for Africans and Canadians alike than wasting our energies in empty gestures designed to tell the world of our moral rectitude on racial questions.49

A heightened diplomatic profile and new programs of development assistance for the region would also counter the negative impression of diplomatic and economic relations with the apartheid state. Thus the Canadian government's decision to base a new high commission in Lusaka in 1973 was intended to symbolize Canadian support for countries in the front line of the racial confrontation in the region, as was Mitchell Sharp's trip to Zambia and Tanzania in 1971, the first by a Canadian foreign minister.50 In the early 1970s, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) also developed a significant aid program in the region - with bilateral disbursements
escalating, in nominal terms, from a token $3.5 million in the 1960s to $250 million in the 1970s to $755 million in the 1980s. Southern Africa's share of Canada's total bilateral aid to Africa increased from 2 per cent in 1970-71 to 16 per cent in 1979-80.

The rationale for this assistance was political as well as developmental. A central objective was to help independent African countries decrease their dependence on the South African metropole in trade, transportation, and communications. In addition, as Canadian diplomat William Barton explained, the successful evolution of the independent countries in the region would 'stand as proof that there is no foundation for the racist arguments of minority regimes that stability, justice and civilization will be undermined should the majority African peoples of their countries be permitted a full and equal voice in the government of their countries.'

At the same time, there was also an explicit interest in influencing and moderating African reactions to South Africa and keeping these countries in the Western camp. Echoing Kissinger, a confidential External Affairs document contended that 'continued Western influence and pressure in the area is essential if the emerging regimes are not to become extremely radical from disenchantment and disillusionment.'

In itself, Canadian assistance to the region was impressive in its scope: Canadian-supported infrastructure projects helped weaken the stranglehold that South Africa exercised on southern African trade through assistance to railways, roads, water supplies, harbours, power generation and transmission, telecommunications, and aerial geomagnetic surveys. Major programs of technical assistance, mostly to the civil services of African states, also made a significant contribution to human development.

However, the positive impact of this program was diminished by regulations that stipulated that 80 per cent of disbursements must be tied to procurement in Canada, and two-thirds were to have local content. The problem was that there was no inherent compatibility between African needs and Canadian capabilities. In a number of cases, the inappropriateness of projects put into question their developmental impact.

Moreover, once South Africa mounted its devastating campaign of destabilization in the region, putting the safety of a number of Canadian-supported aid projects in question, the limited utility of the approach was obvious. Ultimately, the region's fate depended on the larger issue of the future of the apartheid regime. Substituting development assistance for sanctions, as President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia put it, was simply 'fattening us for the slaughter.'

A second change also seemed to make a positive contribution to the struggle against South African dominance in the region, but it involved primarily diplomatic rather than substantive measures. By 1966, Canadian governments had moved from their policy of qualified support for South African control of South West Africa (now Namibia) to a policy that no longer recognized South Africa's
jurisdiction and promoted Namibia's eventual independence. Thus, Canadian diplomats backed initiatives in the United Nations to terminate South Africa's mandate. It also recognized an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1971 that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia was illegal. However, beyond the change in recognition of jurisdiction, the Canadian government would not go. It refused to recognize the legal authority of the Council for Namibia, a body established by the U.N. General Assembly to govern the territory. It also voted against a resolution in 1973 giving observer status to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the main Namibian liberation movement. Canadian officials argued that Namibia could not be administered from New York," and therefore the Council's role should be restricted to education about Namibia.

More materially, the government continued to oppose any hindrance to economic relations with Namibia, reaffirming its general principle of not interfering with the operations of Canadian companies abroad. Officials firmly rejected the notion that the commercial operations of Canadian companies in Namibia constituted 'plunder and theft' and indicated their opposition to any attempt by the Council for Namibia to seize foreign corporate property. Accordingly, the Canadian government flouted non-mandatory U.N. Security Council resolutions (276 and 283) of 1970 that called upon states to discourage commercial, industrial, and investment activities in Namibia. Canadian officials were instrumental in derailing a Security Council resolution proposing mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa because of its continued occupation of Namibia." The government also abstained and reserved its position on the Council for Namibia's Decree No. 1 (1974) that termed foreign exploitation of Namibian resources illegal.

While Canadian trade commissioners in South Africa were divested of their responsibility for Namibia and, officially, the Export Development Corporation (EDC) was no longer to offer loans or export credits for companies in Namibia, in practice little changed. The EDC made no distinction between exports to South Africa and to Namibia (an approach adopted also by Statistics Canada), and Commonwealth preferences still applied. Bowing to influence from the Department of Finance and pressures from the private sector, the government even refused to cancel credits for the taxes paid by Canadian corporations to the South African administrative authority in Namibia. In 1977, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson explained that, 'we want to be very sure that we do not penalize Canadian companies that may have been active in that country for legitimate and perfectly acceptable purposes.'

Such concessions amounted to official Canadian recognition of South Africa's jurisdiction over Namibia, an acknowledgment which stood in direct conflict with its support of U.N. resolutions that declared South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal. By granting such concessions, moreover, the Canadian government underwrote the depletion of Namibian resources over which Namibian people had no control and from which they received almost no material benefit.
In this climate, Canadian companies actively exploited opportunities for economic activity, primarily in agriculture and in mining. However much Ottawa may have considered Canadian private sector activity in Namibia ‘legitimate and perfectly acceptable,’ corporations operated within the context of a contract labour system, minimal rights for African workers, appalling working conditions, and extremely low wages.

For example, the Hudson's Bay Company was centrally involved in the marketing of karakul fur from Namibia through its majority holding in Hudson's Bay and Annings Ltd. Of the total production of lamb pelts designed for luxury markets under the trade name Swakara, 60 per cent were handled by Hudson's Bay operations in Windhoek. At the same time, the treatment of black workers in the agricultural sector, especially on the karakul farms, was infamous. Monthly wages ranged from about $4.50 to $17.50 for shepherds. Working conditions were so terrible that only the oppressive context of the apartheid contract system enabled the farms to secure a labour force.

In the resource sector, Canadian companies (Brilund Mines, New Wellington Mines, Inco, and Syracuse Oils) pursued mineral explorations in Namibia supported by Canadian consultants and service companies (Scintrex, Geoterrex, McPhar, and A.C.A. Howe International). Texasgulf, a company ultimately controlled by the Canadian government through the CDC, secured concessions to explore for oil in Namibia from South African authorities. Others (Falconbridge, Rio Algom, Cominco, and Noranda) maintained significant investments, exploiting non-renewable resources against the explicit intent of U.N. resolutions. Falconbridge even joined in partnership with the South African government through its parastatal, IDC, to take a 75 per cent share in the development of a Namibian copper and silver mining company, Oamites Mining Company (Pty) Ltd. The after-tax rate of return on assets for Oamites ranged as high as 54 per cent in 1973, with $2.1 million taxes paid to the South African administration. After only three years of operation, Falconbridge had recouped its entire original investment along with sizeable yearly dividends.

Although Oamites was described as ‘the most modern mine in Southern Africa’ and, by Vice-President George Woodroofe of Falconbridge, as ‘a project of which we are indeed proud,’ labour conditions and wages were described by the International Committee of Jurists as ‘akin to slavery.’ After a major strike in the Namibian mining industry in 1971-2, black wages increased to about $40 per month in another world from their North American counterparts and half the recognized minimum of the poverty datum line, a standard originating in South Africa to indicate the amount of money necessary to afford a family (usually of five) bare survival.

Thus, Canadian corporations took full advantage of the system imposed by South African control. They continued to obtain licences and concessions and, in some cases, even cooperated with the South African army. Their representatives in Canada also denied that there were political questions arising out of
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their operations. Woodroffe contended that 'the fact that we are carrying on operations through subsidiary companies in South West Africa does not involve us in any claims of South Africa to sovereignty over South West Africa. We are simply carrying on our business of developing mines, which we believe is a very useful purpose under the existing laws of whatever country our operations are in.' Woodroffe disclaimed any corporate responsibility 'to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, nor to insist that these countries recognize our values and mode of living ... We must recognize the local law,' he said. Falconbridge's involvement in Namibia was sufficiently odious to provoke questions in the House of Commons and commentary in the Canadian press. However, the government, Trudeau personally, and the Department of External Affairs stood firm in its defence of Falconbridge and other Canadian corporate activity in Namibia. The most that the Canadian government would do was to advise Canadian corporations that they were operating in Namibia at their own risk, including the risk that they might be eventually nationalized or expropriated. While Secretaries of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson and (later) Mark MacGuigan periodically re-examined the paradox of Canadian credits granted for taxes paid to a regime that the Canadian government had declared illegal, ultimately the department of Finance's uncompromising view won the day and the tax credit arrangement continued. In fact, for all intents and purposes, Canadian companies was allowed to treat Namibia as if it were part of South Africa. By contrast, in 1970, the U.S. government announced a series of tougher measures to discourage economic involvement in Namibia: it would not protect private investment nor would it allow Export-Import bank guarantees for trade with Namibia. After the U.N. Council for Namibia passed the Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources in 1974, American companies withdrew from mining and prospecting in Namibia. In fact, Brilund Mines established a holding company in Toronto (though its headquarters were listed as New York and Dallas) for its Namibian operations, primarily to benefit from the Canadian government's softer attitude. This 'softer attitude' was particularly evident in the uranium sector. In 1966, Rio Algom became involved in the exploration, extraction, processing, and sale of Namibian uranium through a small share in Rossing mine. One Chairman of Rio Algom, a director of Rossing, said he was proud of the association, that Rossing was a mainstay of the Namibian economy, and that there were 'no racial barriers in employment opportunity, promotion, pay or any other matter.' In fact, not unlike conditions at Falconbridge's Oamites mine, working conditions, wages, benefits, and living quarters at the Rossing mine were described as 'shocking, horrifying and the worst available in Namibia' in 1980.

Hearings for the U.N. Council for Namibia. Wages, housing, and medical services were all organized in accord with the apartheid system, and those who attempted to unionize Rossing were arrested. Even Clemens Kapuuo, a Namibian chief later associated with the South African administration, noted that 'the Africans who
... brought to these mines ... will work for periods of twelve to eighteen months deprived of their natural family life, unable by current laws to negotiate their salary, and prevented under strict laws from bettering their conditions, benefit but little.'85 The top range of most African wages was below the household subsistence level; like the poverty datum line, a minimum needed to sustain a family.86 At the same time, profits in 1979 were estimated to be U.S.$400 million.87

The Canadian connection8 was strengthened by the export of uranium from Rossing in Canadian ships to Eldorado Nuclear, a Canadian Crown corporation, for processing and re-export.89 In the process, the origins of this uranium became obscured - falsely labelled as South African - hindering the full compliance of other countries like Japan that wished to observe the U.N. Council for Namibia decree opposing the exploitation of Namibian natural resources. Not surprisingly, Canada was named, along with other Western countries, in a U.N. General Assembly resolution requesting that it 'take measures to prohibit their State-owned corporations and other corporations, together with their subsidiaries, from all dealings in Namibian uranium and all prospecting activities in Namibia.'90 Instead, in this period the Canadian government was an ally of the South African government9 in an international effort to stabilize the price of uranium after the United States closed its market to foreign suppliers.92 The federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources included South African government officials in secret negotiations to establish a uranium cartel and in the substantial economic benefits flowing from the agreement.93 When the cartel was faced with an anti-trust action by the United States, Canada, South Africa, and the other members cooperated to rebuff what was considered extra-territorial behaviour. As scholar Clarence Redekop noted, 'Questions of social justice in South Africa did not weigh heavily on the minds of decision-makers concerned with the issue in Ottawa or, for that matter, in Washington.'94 Not surprisingly, the Canadian government abstained from U.N. General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

Sanctions on Sports
While, to some extent, action on South African control of Namibia turned out to be more illusory than real, the Canadian state did support sanctions against South Africa in two areas - against arms exports and against relations with

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South African athletes and sports organizations. However, even here, the mood was one of compliance rather than enthusiastic support, and, in the case of arms sanctions, a significant breach did enormous damage to the anti-apartheid cause (see Chapter 5).

Early sports sanctions had severe limitations. Non-white Commonwealth countries had served notice that they would organize boycotts of Olympic and Commonwealth games unless host countries imposed sports sanctions against South Africa.95 Once the momentum for sanctions began to build in the 1970s,96 the Canadian government joined in. In 1972, the Canadian government announced that it would stop providing funds to Canadian athletes competing in South Africa
and to Canadian sports bodies if South Africans were invited to compete at their meets. In 1975 and 1976, this new policy was enforced, with funding withdrawn from the Track and Field Association and the Olympics for the Disabled; further breaches, the government made clear, would jeopardize general federal funding. Following a New Zealand rugby tour of South Africa in 1976 during the Soweto riots, African diplomatic pressure to make sports a symbol of the larger struggle against apartheid intensified. In 1976, African countries boycotted the Montreal Olympics because New Zealand was participating. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa also announced that, unless New Zealand was barred from the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton in July 1978, African Commonwealth members and probably some Caribbean members would boycott them as well. In an attempt to defuse the crisis, Commonwealth countries, including Canada and Britain, accepted the Gleneagles Declaration in 1977 which pledged all Commonwealth heads of government to discourage sports relations with South Africa.

The Canadian government's next step in 1977 was to impose visa requirements for all South Africans visiting Canada, and the following year refused visas for South African sports officials or participants acting as national representatives at events in Canada. In 1982, financial support was withdrawn from Canadian athletes participating in nationally representative competitions involving South African athletes in third countries.

At the same time, the government's ambivalence about sanctions was expressed in its lax application of these regulations. Generally, the government relied on the sports' governing bodies to monitor compliance with their regulations, and these bodies tended not to notice South African participation. As long as sporting contacts were unofficial, South African athletes could compete against Canadian athletes. Moreover, for over a decade after the Gleneagles agreement, the Canadian government exempted such sports as tennis, golf, motor car racing, and professional boxing from the boycott on the grounds that these athletes were 'professional businessmen and women.'

Tennis Canada

The Politics of 'Balance' 69 continued to receive substantial funding from the federal government in spite of the fact that South African players participated regularly in annual national tournaments.

Although the sanctions on sports and arms sales, together with the new Namibia policy and increased assistance in the region, represented the 'social justice' thrust of Canadian policy, taken together, the policy was quite limited. Sanctions against sports heightened the psychological cost of apartheid to white South Africans, but the loopholes also gave cause for hope. The Namibia policy offered little tangible support for the black opposition to South African control, while aid to the region substituted for greater assistance to blacks inside South Africa. In fact, such measures were designed primarily to mitigate criticism about the acceptance of white power in South Africa reflected in continuing full diplomatic and economic relations. As such, they constituted soft options, consciously designed to ward off
demands at home and abroad for harder sanctions on Canadian trade and investment.

The Birth of an Anti-Apartheid Movement

During the 1970s, forces within Canadian civil society members of opposition parties (primarily the NDP), churches, trade unions, NGOs, universities, and exiled South Africans - emerged to contest the dominant thrust of this policy and to form the core of an anti-apartheid movement. In the early 1970s, they began to lobby the government vigorously - so vigorously that the South African ambassador termed a teach-in on 'The Liberation of South Africa' sponsored by Oxfam Canada in Toronto as 'hate propaganda.'

In 1970, the Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa, representative of churches, academics, and NGOs, prepared the Black Paper as a critique of the government policy of 'balance,' arguing for a greater priority to social justice.

A year later, the group also urged stronger opposition to British arms sales to South Africa.

In 1973, a People's Forum on Southern Africa provided a platform for such views during the Commonwealth heads of government conference in Ottawa.

In this period, the founding of the ecumenical Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) was to give the anti-apartheid movement one of its most enduring, effective, and informed lobbies. The coalition was inspired partly by a group based within the YWCA of Canada which had produced an influential study in 1973 assessing the nature and effect of Canadian investment on apartheid.

In its campaign against corporate and bank involvement, the taskforce met with senior corporate executives, conducted spirited questioning at corporate annual general meetings, and submitted shareholder resolutions to stop business dealings in South Africa. In October 1979,

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one of its members, the United Church of Canada, sold $400,000 worth of shares in Falconbridge to protest, inter alia, its investment in Namibia.

The taskforce met with a range of reactions, but most were informed by the general corporate belief that issues of social justice, human rights, and democratic freedom were out of order in business meetings. In some cases, these feelings led to outright hostility - the Bank of Montreal cut off microphones to church representatives.

The 'hassle factor' engendered by taskforce activities was central in muting corporate activity in South Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s, and, in some cases, even causing their withdrawal.

The greatest taskforce success came out of its campaign to stop Canadian banks from participating in international consortia providing major financial assistance to South Africa. In 1978, these efforts bore fruit when the Royal Bank of Canada announced that it had made no new loans to South Africa since 1976 and would refrain from further loans which supported apartheid.

After that, Canadian banks steadily decreased their South African exposure, either making a public commitment or quietly ending financing for South Africa.

In 1976, NGO activities were coordinated through an Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa which in 1981 became a working group for the
Canadian Council for International Co-operation. Ad hoc coalitions were also formed to support assistance in the region: for Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, and SWAPO refugee camps in Angola. At the same time, university communities began to grapple with the issues of boycott and academic freedom. A few Canadian academics, most prominently Kenneth Hilborn of the University of Western Ontario, accepted invitations from the South African government and its administration in Namibia to visit the region. Not surprisingly, Hilborn regularly supported South African government policy and opposed Canadian sanctions on white southern African governments.07 However, the majority of academics wanted stronger government action against apartheid. One pro-apartheid South African academic, J. Moolman of the Africa Institute of South Africa, was asked to leave the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies in Victoria in 1976. In the 1970s, the question of Canadian bank loans and Canadian investment in South Africa provided a central focus for anti-apartheid activities on university campuses, within the trade union movement, and the NGO community.08 The Ontario Federation of Students removed its funds from chartered banks that had participated in major loans to the South African government and its agencies. The initial battle of the 1970s, however, centred around state promotion of trade with South Africa. In the anti-apartheid view, the fact that Canadians traded with South Africa was bad enough, but that the state promoted this trade was unacceptable. Within Parliament, NDP MP Andrew Brewin persistently questioned the government's refusal to end Commonwealth trade preferences.9 The Politics of 'Balance' 71

The Battle over Trade Promotion

The campaign against public support for trade with South Africa started over the Ontario government's support for private sector participation in trade shows in Johannesburg. While the significance of the first delegation in 1970 was missed, the second in 1973 caused a furore in the Ontario legislature, the press, among anti-apartheid groups, and especially in the black community. Opposition to the trip also focused on the military links of three of the firms represented. Civil servants in both federal and provincial trade ministries had encouraged the delegation on the grounds that increased exports would reduce Canada's trade deficit with South Africa. Ontario Minister of Industry and Tourism Claude Bennett argued that the Human Rights Code was 'not an item that is taken under consideration ... when deciding on trade missions to any countries.'0 Even though this trade would benefit South Africa, Bennett said, 'we are principally concerned about how we can advance the [economic] cause of Ontario.'" With 60 to 70 per cent of Canadian exports to South Africa originating in Ontario, trade promotion was not a small consideration.

The provincial NDP, led by Stephen Lewis, mounted the attack inside the Ontario legislature, and demonstrations and protests attracted support from the Ontario Federation of Labour, trade unions, the United Church of Canada, the YWCA, liberation support groups, the National Association of South Africans in Canada, and a plethora of other non-governmental organizations. However, the strongest
reaction came from the black community. An angry editorial in the black publication Contrast accused the Ontario government of racialism: "The Black people of this province have been insulted openly by the flippant mercenary approach of the government." The National Black Coalition of Canada added that the trip was 'a slap in the face for Black people' in Canada.

While the provincial government refused to back down and the federal trade service assisted the tour, no similar missions to South Africa were planned in subsequent years. Public reaction to proposed tours of Metro Toronto officials in 1976, the Ombudsman for the Ontario government, and the Ontario Teachers Federation in 1982 resulted in their cancellation.

In contrast to those who wanted to end Canadian economic ties with South Africa, most institutions in the state were involved in a whole-hearted effort to develop and expand them. The Canadian government concluded a taxation agreement with South Africa as early as 1956, assuring Canadian corporations that profits generated in South Africa would not be subjected to Canadian taxes. In maintaining the Commonwealth preferential tariff with South Africa, Canada, along with Malaysia and New Zealand, were the only countries granting South Africa more favourable treatment than others under the terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT). In the 1960s and early 1970s, the state focused its resources for trade promotion in sub-Saharan Africa on South Africa. By the early 1970s, Canada had two trade commissions in South Africa, one in Johannesburg and one in Cape Town; with five Canadian commercial representatives compared with six for the rest of the continent.

Like the Ontario government, the federal trade service regularly facilitated Canadian private sector participation in trade fairs and missions in South Africa and assisted provincial trade delegations. Under its Programme for Export Market Development, in the period from 1968 to 1973 alone, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC) financed fifty projects designed by Canadian industry to increase exports to South Africa. The ITC house magazine Foreign Trade featured articles promoting Canadian trade and investment with South Africa that ignored its political climate. Describing South Africa as 'a country which knows where it wishes to go and how to go there,' one cover story urged Canadian economic involvement in South Africa, assuring readers that it would pay large dividends for the future. For much of the 1960s and 1970s, the EDC also concentrated its support (export credits, loans, and insurance) for Canadian exports in Africa on South Africa. While during the 1960s, an average of only 5 per cent of total Canadian exports to South Africa were financed by the EDC and its earlier organization, by 1974 the proportion had climbed to 20 per cent. By the mid-1970s, however, Canadian governments began to show signs of uneasiness with blatant promotion of economic relations with South Africa, and they began to tone down their activities. At the federal level, the articles in the ITC house magazine promoting Canadian trade with South Africa stopped completely in 1975. More significantly, the government started to waver in its
approach towards Crown corporations that were directly involved in South Africa. In April 1970, the Cabinet decided to have Polymer, a wholly owned Canadian government corporation, give up its $4 million holding in Sentrachem, a South African synthetic rubber company.2 A general precedent seemed to have been established that, while the government would continue to defend private sector trade, no Crown corporation was to profit. Prime Minister Trudeau took the lead in saying that it was time for the government to bring its investment practices into line with principles espoused in the United Nations. The divestment, if handled without notice and with some discretion, he added, would cost the government 'very little or nothing at all.'22

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However, with strong opposition to the Polymer divestment from ITC Minister Jean-Luc Pepin, Minister of Supply and Services James Richardson, the EDC, the CDC, and the private sector, other investments were retained: In 1970, Air Canada concluded a sales agreement with South African Airways that lasted well into the mid-1980s. At first, until public opposition forced their cancellation, it even involved the joint provision of packaged holiday tours for Rhodesia23 and South Africa in which practices of racial discrimination were observed.24 In 1974, a senior Canadian Broadcasting Corporation official appeared in Johannesburg attempting to fill the gap opened by British Equity's ban of sales of British television drama.25 Obviously, the Polymer divestment was to be the sole token of official distancing from the rewards of apartheid.

Senior officials of the Canada Development Corporation made no secret of their intention to invest in southern Africa, whatever the tenor of official policy.26 In 1973, the CDC purchased a controlling interest in Texasgulf, a company with mineral rights in the Western Transvaal. Although Texasgulf shares constituted only about one-third of CDC assets, it contributed over 68 per cent of CDC's total profits.27 Thus, the CDC ignored all protests, even though Texasgulf was actively looking for oil in Namibia, a vitally important commodity for South Africa.2 The government's failure to ensure a CDC divestment illustrated the lukewarm quality of its commitment to abandon a direct interest in the South African economy.

At the provincial level, results were also tentative and ambiguous. While in power in the 1970s, NDP governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba either took South African liquor and wine imports off display or banned their purchase outright. However, with the defeat of the NDP in these provinces, succeeding governments overturned this policy and resumed imports of South African alcohol.29 By the end of the 1970s, only the Parti Québécois retained the ban.30

In sum, for most of the 1970s, anti-apartheid forces were vocal, but not particularly strong. Dominant forces in the state and private sector continued to exert a powerful influence on policy at both provincial and federal levels. Their hold was not shaken until 1977, and then only briefly. Moreover, the change when it came was more in the form of an interruption than a break with the past, with its origins in the turbulent politics of the region and South Africa itself.
Above all, profound changes within southern Africa in the mid-1970s began to shake Western assurance about the prospects for indefinite white rule in the region. Beginning with the disintegration of the Portuguese empire and the independence of Mozambique and Angola and continuing with the stepped up intensity of the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia, white minority rule seemed on the way out. As Western policy had been based on their indefinite survival, there was considerable uncertainty about the West's future influence in the region. When the Soweto riots escalated into a countrywide protest, it seemed that the future of apartheid itself was at issue. The evidence of widespread support for the students and the state's characteristically brutal response attracted the first serious international attention to South Africa since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.

The riots and then the murder of Stephen Biko provoked a number of European countries into imposing sanctions. Holland, Denmark, Norway, and later Sweden restricted export credit insurance to South Africa. Several Scandinavian countries also provided direct assistance to liberation movements in the region, even while comparatively centrist or conservative administrations were in power. Even West Germany, whose trade with South Africa was comparable to Britain's, placed limits on export guarantees. In the United States, the Carter-Mondale-Young team signalled their interest in human rights in American foreign policy, including a new approach towards southern Africa. The United States had already established rigid controls on export credits and insurance for trade with South Africa. Despite the conviction of many officials that Canada was a leader on South African issues, Canada was following the pack and had to act quickly or be left behind.

Another factor prompting action in 1977 was Canada's membership in the U.N. Security Council (from 1977 to 1978). During this period, Canadian officials were part of a Western effort to pre-empt a Third World offensive for even tougher measures, including full diplomatic and economic sanctions, against South Africa at the United Nations. As it was, the Security Council was swept up in the prevailing anti-South African mood and passed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in November 1977. Canada's membership in the Contact Group, a five-nation attempt to negotiate the independence of Namibia, also necessitated a credible response after Soweto.

Finally, the Commonwealth connection and, in particular, the hosting of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton in 1978 meant that the Canadian government had to move carefully to avoid a sports boycott. Already, informal representations had come from Commonwealth leaders, with President Nyerere of Tanzania suggesting to Trudeau that Africa needed a strong moral gesture from Canada on South Africa.

Clearly, there were important international forces promoting action at this time. In addition, pressure mounted within Canadian society and inside the Canadian state. The University of Toronto's Scarborough College deplored the visit of two South African senior administrators and, following student demon-
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stratifications, cancelled a meeting with them. After Soweto, the Toronto Star excoriated the government's policy of 'balance,' calling it two-faced.34 On the claim that this approach gave Canada influence in South Africa, the Star remarked acidly, 'This is plain nonsense. Worse it is a cover for selfish interests.' In an even stronger third editorial, the Star insisted that 'moral concerns should influence foreign policy and human rights are central to our concept of a good society.'3 The federal government was forced finally to snap out of the long somnolent rigidity of its approach. Early in 1977, Jamieson had told a church group that he did not want 'moral' gestures visited on the private sector, but by September he seemed to have changed his mind: 'Up to now we have taken the position that offshore it is none of our business,' he said. 'But I think that's a bit of a cop-out.'

By December 1977, it seemed that the government was prepared, as a matter of policy, to end all official promotion of trade with South Africa and thus to move out of the sterile era of 'balance.' Jamieson announced to the House of Commons that the government was 'phasing out all its government-sponsored commercially-supported activities in South Africa.' In addition, trade commissioners were to be withdrawn and commercial offices closed in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Programs which promoted trade - participation in trade fairs and the organization of trade missions - were cancelled. The EDC could no longer use its government account for export credit insurance, loan insurance, and foreign investment insurance for South Africa. Jamieson also hinted at more comprehensive measures dealing with EDC support for economic relations with South Africa in the future and the end of the Commonwealth preferential tariff on trade. Henceforth, South Africans coming to Canada would have to apply for visas. Finally, Jamieson promised a code of conduct and ethics to guide Canadian corporations with direct investments in South Africa.

At face value, Jamieson's commitment that Canada was going to phase out all its government-sponsored commercially-supported activities in South Africa was a striking departure from the past. In fact, the 1977 reforms marked a small victory for the principle that South Africa was a special case and that political considerations could come to have some bearing on foreign economic relations. Jamieson admitted that the 1977 measures were 'an exceptional decision and one taken after many years of consideration. South Africa is a case unique in the present-day world. It is the single country in which racial discrimination has been institutionalized as a basis for the entire social, political and economic system.'

The shape that the reforms actually took had been the product of six months of intense battles within an interdepartmental committee set up to review Canadian policy on South Africa and within the Cabinet. On the side of reform, the

Department of External Affairs had allies in the Prime Minister's Office, the Privy Council Office, and CIDA. On the other side, the Departments of Finance and
ITC were supported by the EDC, the CDC, and the private sector; in short the 'seat of power' within the Canadian state.

In Cabinet, Jamieson had the support of the Minister of Sport Iona Campagnola who wanted to avoid a boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton. His strongest opponents were ITC Minister Jack Horner and his deputy, Bob Latimer. Speaking in Parliament about principles which should govern international trade, Horner made the traditional case that 'there are two different considerations here. It is not, really, for us to judge the moral commitments of a country ... if we are to lend money we have to judge a country's creditworthiness.' Although ITC and its allies did not win their case in Cabinet, they were able to ensure that the measures were sufficiently emasculated so as to leave Canadian economic relations with South Africa virtually unaffected.

The cosmetic nature of the reforms became quickly apparent. The withdrawal of the trade commissioners was a concrete change in policy, but the stationing of a locally appointed commissioner in the Canadian embassy in Pretoria (and a businessman who had been successful at helping the Smith regime in Rhodesia evade sanctions at that), detracted significantly from even the symbolic strength of the gesture. From late 1979 on, the Pretoria office reappeared in the lists of Canada's overseas commercial offices. Moreover, the removal of the trade office suited plans to cut back ITC's overseas service for reasons of economy.

Canadian exports to South Africa from 1971 to 1973 had been in a slump, falling below the level of the previous seven years. While exports improved in the rest of the 1970s, Canada still had a trade deficit with South Africa every year after 1971, for a cumulative deficit for the decade of $333 million. Even so, most Canadian trade and investment in South Africa was less a product of the trade commission's efforts than other considerations. For a number of Canada's important exports to South Africa - sulphur, wood pulp, fertilizers, and newsprint - price was the primary factor in exports. A great deal of Canadian trade and investment was related to intrafirm decisions particularly exports of automobiles and mining and agricultural machinery where corporations like Ford Canada and Varity Corporation (then Massey-Ferguson) exported to their subsidiaries located in South Africa. Also, where long-established relations existed between suppliers and importers, the services of commercial officers were not necessary.

As to the one other concrete economic action, the withdrawal of EDC facilities (loans and insurance) on government account, this particular account had not been used for South Africa throughout the previous decade. Rather, it had been the EDC's corporate account that covered South Africa, and this remained open for business until 1981, though loans were small - a mere $3.8 million in the 1960s and $6.1 million in the 1970s.

Canadian officials defended keeping export credit insurance and guarantees against political risks or non-payment offered by the EDC to small- and medium-sized Canadian companies, and they refused to separate the coverage of South Africa from the global coverage that they offered to Canadian exporters. In
particular, the EDC distinguished between assistance offered to companies in Canada and financing that provided loans to purchasers in South Africa. Thus, the EDC tripled its coverage of Canadian exports to South Africa from $70 million from 1970 to 1977 to $211 million from 1978 to 1985.11 Far from having been phased out, the EDC became even more active in supporting trade with South Africa.

Through its Programme for Export Market Development (PEMD), ITC continued to meet a portion of the costs incurred by Canadian corporations going to South Africa to explore its market potential and for those submitting proposals on major capital projects.4’ In fact, the average annual support to the private sector under this program increased from about $35,000 in the six years before the 1977 reforms to about $38,000 in the six years following the reforms.’47 The PEMD even met a proportion of the cost of South African buyers visiting Canada - though only one came after 1977 as compared with twelve before.

In short, the Canadian government ensured that economic relations between Canada and South Africa were safeguarded rather than curtailed, and it suspended only those facilities that had already fallen into disuse. In response both to strong lobbying from the Canadian Exporters' Association (CEA) whose secretary stated that the reforms were ‘a case of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face,’48 and to their own predictions, government officials chose a highly literal interpretation of Jamieson's commitment and ignored the spirit of his commitment.

What the 1977 reforms amounted to, then, were the closing of trade commission offices and the suspension of one EDC facility that had not been used for years. In its insistence on retaining the most important commercial support activity, the EDC insurance coverage, the government was able to ensure that Canadian trade with South Africa would not be hurt.

The reality was not only increased official support for Canadian trade with South Africa, but also dramatic growth in total two-way trade. In nominal value, Canadian exports doubled in the eight years following the reforms as compared with the eight years preceding them, and South Africa remained the second largest market for Canadian exports in Africa. Even discounting for inflation, the real dollar value of Canadian exports to South Africa increased from $83 million in 1977 to an annual average of $119 million from 1978 to 1985. Moreover, the rate of growth of Canadian exports to South Africa from 1977 to 1982 was double the rate for Canadian exports worldwide and higher than that for any of the leading OECD countries.149 While Canadian corporations may have lost the occasional contract for capital equipment to competitors with access to official loan financing, Canada's average annual export of end products to South Africa still increased by a nominal value of $21.5 million more from 1978 to 1985 compared with the eight previous years.

Overall, then, the economic effect of the 1977 reforms was negligible. For years federal civil servants staunchly defended them as representing significant progress in Canadian action against apartheid. However, scholarly observers Keenleyside and Taylor were closer to the mark when they pointed out that 'such gestures may
be worse than no action at all, for they tend to trivialize the problem and give the impression of movement where there has been none."0
The problem was that Jamieson had overstepped the bounds of the consensus established by hard-fought battles in the interdepartmental committee and in Cabinet." Specifically, there had been no agreement to end all government support for economic activities in South Africa or on a code of conduct to guide Canadian corporations in South Africa. Jamieson's unilateral moves provoked anger and alarm within both the federal civil service and the private sector. Forces led by the departments of ITC and Finance moved swiftly to limit the damage to their interests and were able to restore almost the status quo ante until the Mulroney government came to power.
Thus the power of dominant forces within the Canadian state was demonstrated in a striking fashion in their successful limitation of the first serious attempt to alter the politics of 'balance' on South Africa and in their derailment of other measures under consideration. The Canadian state seemed to have come a long way from the cordial relationship with South Africa described by Mackenzie King; however, its opposition remained at the rhetorical level.
With only a few exceptions, the approach of Canadian governments to South Africa in this period displayed both of the characteristics ascribed by American scholar Alan Wolfe to late capitalist states. In his view, they were 'as doctrinaire in their devotion to power as an end in its own right as they are pragmatic about the ends for which that power is used.'52 Not surprisingly, this approach was accompanied by, at best, a blindness, and, at worst, a denial about the full political and moral implications of their actions: 'One is left with lack of principles and ideological rigidity,' Wolfe concluded; indeed, the worst of all worlds.

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For the remaining period of Liberal governments from 1978 to 1984, moreover, policy became increasingly inflexible as the brief hint of change that had come to life in 1977 turned into a rigid defence of the status quo. With no compelling conjuncture to shake this thinking, the adherence to 'balance' became unshakeable, a formula repeated mindlessly even as forces within southern Africa were building to erode its premises.

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All economic questions, except the most trivial ones, are basically political questions and all political questions are basically moral questions.
Joan Robinson
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.
Milton Friedman
While the gestures of reform in 1977 showed that the Canadian government was not unaffected by international and domestic anti-apartheid opinion, their lack of substance indicated the essential nature of its alliances and priorities. In the following years, this process was intensified by the rise to power of Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and the consequent chilling of the Western climate for anti-apartheid action. In this period, the West abandoned even the pretense of putting pressure on Pretoria, and the uncertainty of the post-Soweto period gave way to even closer cooperation with the South African state. The change was facilitated by Reagan's Under-Secretary of State Chester Crocker whose theory of *constructive engagement* provided the analytical underpinnings for the approach. Above all, Crocker advocated patience and understanding of the whites in power: 'A tone of empathy is required,' he said, 'for the awesome political dilemma in which Afrikaners and other whites find themselves.'

In Crocker's view, even the South African Defence Force (SADF) was 'a lobby of modernizing patriots' rather than 'an instrument of domestic brutality or ... the rogue elephant of southern Africa, crashing across borders and wrecking Western interests.' Crocker argued that the key was to minimize confrontation, to stop the 'indiscriminate attack' on all aspects of the South African system. 'Constructive engagement,' he said, 'is consistent with neither the clandestine embrace nor the polecat treatment.'

Denying that the United States had the power to coerce Pretoria, Crocker advocated an even warmer dialogue, including public meetings with South Africa's top leadership. In his mind, Western investment in the South African economy was more appropriate than economic sanctions.

With P.W. Botha now in power in South Africa, the West could once again make believe that change was in the offing. The South African state seemed to be moving away from the rigid adherence to apartheid associated with John Vorster and Hendrik Verwoerd. However, this assessment proved to be quite misleading. While Botha himself recognized that 'we must adapt or we will die,' his initiatives were in service of a counter-revolutionary strategy designed to shore up rather than to end white rule. In the process of 'modernizing' apartheid, Botha's regime contradicted Crocker, setting new standards of domestic brutality and inaugurating genocidal wars of destabilization in the region.

In any event, the warmer relations of Western governments with South Africa in this period were produced less by the purportedly reformist intentions of the Botha regime than by Cold War interests. Crocker's premise was clear: 'The real choice we will face in southern Africa in the 1980s,' he argued, 'concerns our readiness to compete with our global adversary in the politics of a changing region whose future depends on those who participate in shaping it.' Botha's government saw the issue in even more apocalyptic terms: a 'total strategy' was needed to protect free enterprise from the 'total onslaught' orchestrated by 'the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia.' Thus the Cold War card was played to great effect, virtually ending significant Western support for anti-apartheid actions until the mid-1980s.

As part of this consensus, the Canadian government swam with the tide. Anti-apartheid actions by the Canadian state went into a deep freeze. The Nordic countries had shown their preferences too openly, Canadian officials contended, and had lost the ear of Pretoria. Diplomats were delighted to be part of the
international effort to secure Namibian independence, using the initiative to deflect further measures against South Africa. Canadian finance ministers supported South Africa’s request for a loan from the International Monetary Fund, ignoring technical and economic as well as political and moral grounds for turning it down. Middle-power illusions made officials only too happy to be ‘one of the boys,’ but, in their mind, the slightly more progressive one. Not only had the Western consensus shifted, but a global recession hardened support for the interests of the corporate world. In the early 1980s, the restructuring of External Affairs to incorporate international trade brought economic interests to the heart of foreign policy. In this conjuncture, neither officials in the civil service nor corporate executives involved in South Africa felt any compunction about pursuing economic interests in South Africa. Although Commonwealth preferences were finally ended in 1980, almost twenty years after South Africa left the Commonwealth, they had provided little net benefit for Canadian companies. A code of conduct formulated ostensibly to require Canadian corporations to act as reformist models for non-racialism was utterly token. Taken together, the primary intent of such gestures was to deflect criticism. To say that an instrumentalist interpretation of state policy in this period is convincing is to understate the case. Not unlike the South African government’s own attempts at reform, the Canadian state wanted to be seen to be doing something, without altering the status quo in any significant way. Underneath all the usual statements abhorring apartheid, the Canadian state was taking care of business. Until South Africans themselves initiated the next round of resistance to apartheid in the mid-1980s, the Canadian state was content with the interest of economic benefit and the comforting nostrums of constructive engagement.

The Namibian Diversion

As Western countries reverted to the carrot rather than the post-Soweto stick on South Africa, they turned increasingly to the question of Namibian independence as a way of proving their bona fides in southern Africa. The argument became that each issue would be dealt with in sequence - first Namibia and then South Africa. Thus, five Western members of the U.N. Security Council (Britain, the United States, West Germany, France, and Canada) established the Contact Group in April 1977 as an informal body to negotiate with South Africa on this issue. Ironically, the Contact Group’s chief effect was to transform opposition to South Africa in the West into a nebulous and unprincipled neutrality.” During its lifetime, membership in the Group was used as a justification for doing almost nothing on South Africa itself. Indeed, William Barton, Canada's principal representative on the Contact Group from 1977 to 1980, observed that all five Western countries manipulated this initiative ‘as a stalking horse to conceal their unwillingness to act against South Africa under any circumstances.” In the coincidence of interests, South Africa could call the West's bluff with impunity, taking full advantage of initial dithering and the warmer climate
provided by the Reagan administration. ‘By all accounts,’ one writer observed, the South Africans proved ‘to be masters of diplomatic techniques,’ and ‘geniuses at how to buy time.’3 Long after it had abandoned any intention of settling the issue, the South African state played along, gulling the Contact Group in aimless negotiations.14 In so doing, it was able to gather intelligence, promote its views, and sidetrack Western opposition to apartheid.

When South Africa went ahead with its own internal settlement in Namibia through the Turnhalle Group in December 1978, the Contact Group persisted with plans for U.N.-supervised elections the following year. Although the South Africans torpedoed this possibility by bombing SWAPO camps in Angola, the Contact Group soldiered on, rejecting stronger measures proposed by the U.N. Council for Namibia.5

In the early 1980s, the South African government took advantage of the Reagan administration’s more sympathetic approach, abandoning all but a superficial interest in the Contact Group’s terms for a resolution in Namibia. It began to destabilize almost every country in the region, conducting regular raids into Angola to bomb SWAPO camps.6 At the same time, South African strategists were able to use Washington’s preoccupation with the Cold War by insisting that a resolution in Namibia should be linked to a larger regional settlement which included the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Once ‘linkage’ was introduced into negotiations, the interest of the Reagan administration shifted, and the question of South Africa’s departure from Namibia became secondary.17

At any rate, with the increasing resort by American diplomats to unilateral initiatives, the Contact Group became defunct, for all practical purposes, by June 1982.” A year later, France declined to participate in future meetings, and the Group limped along as a spent force until December 1988 when a settlement on Namibian independence, outside of the Group’s auspices, was finally achieved. Although Commonwealth countries were not spared military incursions from South Africa, the larger Commonwealth powers were no more prepared than the Contact Group to take strong action against South Africa. Instead, at both the 1981 and 1983 Commonwealth meetings, Trudeau and Thatcher insisted

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that negotiations between South Africa and the Contact Group must be allowed to take their course, and that Commonwealth initiatives against South Africa might jeopardize them.

Even as the Contact Group floundered, Canadian leaders were at pains to insist that a settlement was just around the corner if only support for the negotiation process stayed firm. Their commitment to the process had begun in the first years of the Group when Canadian diplomats had chaired many of the negotiating sessions. Thus in early 1981, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Michel Dupuy, spoke out strongly against a call for mandatory sanctions against South Africa by the Security Council. ‘Such a course,’ he said, ‘would probably put an end to United Nations’ efforts and could indefinitely delay progress towards Namibian independence.’19
When the Canadian government undertook one small further action to stop the promotion of trade with South Africa in August 1981, it went out of its way to do so quietly so as not to antagonize the South African government. The South African government would be 'very much put out' by stronger action, one External Affairs officer explained, and the Contact Group needed its support in the current Namibian talks. Officials believed that to act against South Africa would prejudice Canada's position as a negotiator. As two Canadian Cabinet ministers put it, 'Canada's determination [is] to play the most constructive role possible in seeking a peaceful settlement to the Namibian issue while ensuring that Canada's impartiality would continue to be acknowledged' (emphasis added).  

In October 1981 at a time when the Contact Group had almost entirely lost its credibility, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan refused to alter existing policy on tax credits or uranium imports on the highly optimistic grounds that a settlement of the Namibian issue was just around the corner. 'The law does not always immediately adjust to morality,' MacGuigan said, 'and we are in a situation now where there is a reasonable chance of proceeding to a settlement of the Namibian problem in a very short time.'  

As to linking a settlement in Namibia to changes in Angola, Canadian officials originally supported the United States but moved, as one journalist observed, 'to toughen their image from that of U.S. handmaiden to moral henchman.' In May 1983, Gerard Pelletier told the Security Council that while the Canadian position was not to make the resolution of Namibian independence conditional on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, 'It is nonetheless evident that these regional security concerns exist and pose an obstacle.' Quietly, other Canadian diplomats explained that this meant tacit Canadian support for the concept. In this conjuncture, Canadian officials also did not challenge U.S. assistance to UNITA, a rebel group fighting the Angolan government. By October, however, with the credibility of the Contact Group in tatters, Pelletier conceded that 'Namibia should have its independence regardless of what happens or what does not happen in Angola.'  

Not surprisingly, SWAPO leaders distrusted the Contact Group, calling for a much harder line, including economic sanctions, against South Africa. As the years passed with no significant result, SWAPO opposition to this initiative mounted. Eventually, one senior SWAPO official, Toivo ya Toivo, said that the Contact Group was dead and must be forgotten, 'because its aims and objectives are not to assist decolonization but to delay the independence of Namibia for its
own advantage. The Group has completely abdicated its responsibility. We have no confidence in it. We disagree totally with Canada on this.'30

In the end, the Canadian government's performance on Namibia left it vulnerable to this criticism. In putting its emphasis on the Contact Group long after any hope for the initiative had evaporated, the approach precluded a stronger policy on South Africa. When added to official support for corporate activity in Namibia and minimal assistance to SWAPO, the record compared unfavourably with the more principled stand of the Nordic countries. At best, it was a policy based on deliberate ingenuousness; at worst, it had abandoned 'neutrality,' becoming dangerously complicit in the dark era when the South African state tore its people and the region apart.3

Constructive Engagement and Canada's South Africa Policy

In fact, international and Canadian corporations played a vital role in helping South Africa through its post-Soweto crisis. From 1976 to 1977, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with strong support from the United States and Britain, made available a series of credits amounting to U.S.$423 million to tide South Africa over the temporary loss of foreign capital.32 This assistance was more than the IMF provided to all other African countries combined, lagging only behind credits to Britain and Mexico.33 Publicly announced international bank loans rose from about $300 million in 1977 to an annual average of over $700 million over the next three years.34 South African trade with five major Western countries, including Japan, doubled from about $8 billion in 1977 to $16 billion in 1980, and direct investment increased significantly. South Africa had once again become an attractive place to do business.

The renewed interest of Western corporations and governments in 'constructive engagement' provided an important context to structure the evolution of Canadian policy on South Africa. During the remaining Trudeau years and the short-lived Clark administration, the approach did not change. Government officials were at pains to indicate that the 1977 measures represented the most that could be expected and that only official encouragement of trade with South Africa, not trade itself, was at issue. Trudeau, himself, made this point absolutely clear when he stated that, 'as far as the private sector is concerned, we will not interfere in trade nor investment.'35

For many in the Canadian civil service, the reversion to the earlier policy of defending economic relations with South Africa was a welcome return to 'normality.'36 Many bitterly resented the breach in principle that the 1977 reforms represented, and they were determined to ensure that the flow of capital and goods to and from South Africa would continue unhindered. Uncomfortable with a discourse which would include economic relations as a weapon on foreign policy issues, they returned to the original orthodoxy with relish.

Echoing this mood, a group of powerful individuals formed the Canadian South African Society in 1979 to launch a counter-offensive to the prodisinvestment initiatives that had emerged within Canadian civil society earlier in the 1970s. In 1976, the Confederation of Church and Business People had also been established.
by corporations, smarting from groups like the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) - in their view 'a selfrighteous leftist minority.'

A third source of pro-South African sentiment was found among Canadian MPs who had visited South Africa at the expense of the South African government or the South African Foundation. The South African embassy targeted members of the influential Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, but also offered free trips to other MPs. Only a few like Steve Paproski, Conservative MP for Edmonton West, turned down these invitations (he received no fewer than six or seven offers in eight years). Of the twenty-five or more MPs who went to South Africa on free trips in the 1970s and early 1980s, almost all returned to praise South Africa and to defend its policies.

Although the approach of the Canadian government on South Africa in this period was more sophisticated than the views of many of these MPs, its fundamentals were not all that dissimilar. The new consensus emerging within the Canadian state and in powerful circles in Canadian society was that interfering with Canadian economic relations was not worth the gratuitous and ephemeral rewards of improving Canada's stature in domestic and international anti-apartheid circles.

This emphasis was given added impetus by a restructuring of the state apparatus which brought international trade under the purview of the Department of External Affairs. As one leaked memo put it, Trade and economic matters will be a primary focus of the new department, [which] will be radically restructured to aggressively pursue international export markets in the development of foreign policy ... creating a department that is different from what now exists.

Thus, an enlarged External Affairs in tandem with the Department of Finance proved to be a formidable force in stonewalling domestic pressures for a stronger policy against South Africa. Critics who pointed to the increased repression and deterioration of black living standards which had accompanied periods of economic growth in South Africa in much of the 1960s and early 1970s were brushed aside. In an exchange with the interchurch taskforce TCCR in the early 1980s, the government rejected every one of nine recommendations put forward to strengthen Canada's opposition to apartheid.

Further indications of the Canadian state's orientation in this period quickly appeared. The Department of Finance sustained an uncompromising defence of its support for South Africa's requests for loans from the International Monetary Fund well into the 1980s. The Department of External Affairs wrote a code of conduct for Canadian corporations in South Africa in conjunction with the very companies it was meant to guide. Economic self-interest was also central to the abrogation of the Commonwealth trade preferences.

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Canada and the IMF's Seal of Approval

In this conjuncture, Western approval for a request from South Africa in 1982 for a loan of $1.07 billion from the IMF was hardly in doubt. Ostensibly, the loan was needed to cover a massive deficit (almost $4.5 billion) in the current account of
the balance of payments. However, the size of the loan request coincided closely with an increase in South Africa's defence budget, and it soon became obvious that South Africa did not need the loan at all. No fewer than sixty-eight countries in the IMF opposed the loan, as did 121 members in a non-binding vote in the U.N. General Assembly. Five IMF executive directors said South Africa did not meet the standards of conditionality imposed on other borrowers.

However, in Canada, the Department of Finance (under whose purview the issue arose) strongly supported the South African application. Brushing aside academic and church criticism, Finance Minister Marc Lalonde argued that the grounds for support were technical, not political - the applicant's credit rating was good, its debt service burden small, and its reserves relatively strong. Lalonde said that South Africa had the right to be treated on the same basis as any other IMF member and that Canada did not want 'to be accused of meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states.' He added that the government believed 'that we must maintain and strengthen the apolitical stance of such institutions as the IMF ... so that, in the midst of civil and economic turmoil, at least some positive efforts to promote the economic well-being of countries can continue [and] ... we need to utilize other diplomatic channels to express our dissatisfaction towards regimes that are violating basic human rights.' Accordingly, in the vote within the IMF, Canada delivered the 4.19 per cent of the votes that enabled the Western powers to gain a slim 51.9 per cent majority in support of South Africa's application.

Secret minutes of the IMF meeting showed that South Africa had, in fact, been given preferential treatment; its supporters had disregarded technical grounds for rejecting the application. The financial shortfalls experienced by South Africa at the time of its loan application were caused partly by a drop in the gold price on which half of South Africa's foreign exchange earnings rested. However, observers also attributed them to inadequate budget restraints and, in particular, massive military expenditures. There was also the question of excessive subsidies to the white agricultural sector.

More fundamentally, there were structural inefficiencies in the apartheid system which were antithetical to free market principles and damaging to the South African economy - aberrations in domestic consumption levels of its black majority, in labour market policy (with restrictions on labour mobility and the contract labour system), and in the inferior system of education for South African blacks.

Normally, countries asking for IMF loans were required to change policies which involved excessive state interference in the market. However, in this case, such conditions were not attached; indeed, the question of anomalies in the economic logic of apartheid was not addressed. Nor did the IMF program call for a reduction in the size of the large budget deficit or even for credit restraint. The South African government had recently lowered reserve requirements in anticipation of increased domestic borrowing - an approach antithetical to the usual IMF demand for a tight money policy and overlooked by the IMF in
evaluating the application. South Africa was not required to remove its subsidies on domestic energy or its 10 per cent surcharge on imports. Finally, South Africa was allowed 80 per cent of its loan request before having to fulfil any conditions.

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In terms of disbursement, $689 million of the total loan was to come from the IMF's compensatory financing facility, the largest withdrawal from this facility in the IMF's history. A number of IMF directors pointed out that the facility had been designed to help poorer Third World countries and was inappropriate in the case of a semi-industrial country with an annual per capita income of about U.S.$2,000.50 Certainly, given its credit worthiness and its very low (7.9 per cent) debt-servicing ratio, South Africa was in a position to apply for private sector loans.52 It soon became clear that South Africa wanted to take advantage of the IMF's cheaper financing to pay off more expensive foreign debts to private foreign creditors.

In the period that followed, a series of events confirmed the political basis both of South Africa's request and of Canadian and other support in the IMF. After drawing down about three-quarters of its loan, South Africa did not pick up the remaining instalments. An IMF team visiting South Africa in early 1983 commended this decision and also asked for early repayment, as the mission predicted a U.S.$1.5 billion current account surplus rather than the U.S.$1.5 billion deficit for which the loan had been promised.53 As an editorial in a pro-government South African newspaper, Beeld, pointed out, South Africa had used the loan process as a test of Western political support and as a means of securing the IMF 's seal of approval.' In its view, the loan application was 'not a matter of weakness ... actually we could get along without the loan ... but the interest rate is so attractive ... it's a feather in our cap since granting of such a loan means our house is in order.'54 Moreover, as the loan was granted in the form of balance-of-payments support, the financing was fungible and available for any use by the South African government. Thus, South Africa's ability to secure a loan to compensate for a balance-of-payments deficit that never materialized amounted to a handsome Western credit of about $760 million for the apartheid state on very easy repayment terms.

As to the Liberal administration's determination not to impose political considerations in IMF decisions, this was a rule much observed in the breach. In 1983, Allan MacEachen, Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, told the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that Canada would use its influence to block international funding for Vietnam because of its continued occupation of Cambodia.55 In the case of Central America, Canada's voting record in the IMF also suggested less neutrality than "conforming to U.S. foreign policy interests.56 Clearly, when it suited the Canadian government, criteria beyond the purely technical determined support for international financing through the IMF.57 It was also absurd to claim, as Lalonde did, that the Canadian government did not interfere with the internal...
affairs of South Africa - given the plethora of official statements opposing apartheid and the measures already taken, however token. Although the Mulroney government moved ahead of previous Liberal administrations on many aspects of policy towards South Africa, its Minister of Finance Michael Wilson continued to defend Canadian support for South Africa in the IMF in the identical terms of his predecessors. Wilson said that Canada had not advocated formal sanctions by the IMF and would not do so because of the IMF's functional and technical mandate. As the seat of power within the Canadian bureaucracy, the Department fought a successful battle well into the 1980s against measures that would have penalized South Africa.

Two other issues emerged in this period to demonstrate the government's priorities: the abrogation of Commonwealth trade preferences and the establishment of a code of conduct for Canadian corporations based in South Africa. Taken at face value, both measures would seem to have discouraged economic relations; however, neither affected the Canadian private sector negatively. In the case of Commonwealth tariff preferences, the government was ending an agreement that had provided minimal benefit to Canada. As for the code of conduct, the government's attempt to regulate corporate activity was so insubstantial and its implementation of the code so half-hearted that the measures seemed designed more to disarm critics than to monitor the behaviour of Canadian corporations.

The Commonwealth Preferential Tariff
In July 1979, the short-lived Clark government announced that it was cancelling the British Preferential Tariff Agreement of 1933, commonly known as the Commonwealth preferences, to take effect in January 1980. By any reasoning, the tariff had represented an anomaly - in place almost two decades after South Africa had left the Commonwealth and at a time when Canada was one of the few countries subsidizing trade with South Africa. The very fact of a trade preference was in direct philosophical contradiction to the principle of free trade advocated by both Liberal and Conservative governments. The survival and longevity of these preferences must be understood, therefore, in the strategic relationship of key Canadian corporations to powerful sections of the Canadian state. Chief among the former were representatives of Canada's sugar importing and refining industry. In the early 1960s, Redpath Industries, a Canadian subsidiary of Tate and Lyle, a British transnational with sugar estates in South Africa, decided to purchase the main part of its sugar from South Africa and Australia rather than from the Caribbean. Also, at the end of the 1960s, two sugar companies, West Gain and Cartier, had been able to get subsidies from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce to construct new refining capacity on the understanding that they would be able to import the high grade quality of sugar that South Africa provided 'most reliably' at a preferential rate. The increasing importance of South African sugar imports in Canada was also a product of a major restructuring of the world's sugar trade following the Cuban Revolution when the United States and Britain shifted their sugar purchases to
other Caribbean suppliers. Following its withdrawal from the Commonwealth, South Africa had lost its quota in the British market and turned to Canada for its only premium price market. With the preferences, South Africa received a price advantage in the Canadian market over Cuban and other non-Commonwealth producers which helped overcome higher shipping costs. Thus, Canadian sugar imports from South Africa increased dramatically, from $100 million and about 15 per cent of total sugar imports in the 1960s to $600 million and just under 30 per cent in the 1970s. For the twenty years following 1965, with the exception of one year, South Africa was one of the top three suppliers of sugar to Canada. It should be noted, moreover, that preferences offered a subsidy to an extremely wealthy class in South African society. In the 1980s, white farmers constituted 31 per cent of the wealthiest economically active group of South Africans, the "super-rich," whose wealth exceeded $640,000 annually. In the same period, black farm workers' monthly wages averaged $38 to $40; in the sugar mills, monthly wages for blacks were $125 compared with $800 for whites. In the 1970s, a series of ITC ministers, including Alastair Gillespie and Jack Horner, opposed abrogation of the treaty. Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp defended the agreement on the grounds that it had 'benefited Canada over the years' and had 'been supported by different sections of the Canadian economy.' The Department of Finance wanted to keep the tariff as a lever in the bargaining process until the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations ended in 1979. Finance then provided the impetus to end the agreement. Also, after Tate and Lyle sold its sugar estates in South Africa, Redpath let the Canadian government know that it would not oppose the end of preferences, but continued to import sugar from South Africa until the mid-1980s. Finally, there were good economic reasons for the change. For a long time, South Africa had had a definite advantage under the agreement. In 1970, all South African goods entered Canada under the preferential tariff, while only 13 per cent of Canadian exports to South Africa were accorded this preference. By the end of the decade, 60 per cent of South African goods still enjoyed the preference, while only about 2 per cent of Canadian goods were given the equivalent in South Africa. Even the South African sugar exporters got more (three-quarters of the 1¢ rebate from the preferences) than the Canadian importers, who got the rest. Moreover, Canada had less to lose than South Africa: previous healthy surpluses in trade with South Africa had been transformed in the 1970s into a cumulative deficit of $333 million. Canadian exports to South Africa in the 1970s constituted a mere 0.3 per cent of total exports, while South African exports to Canada averaged 2.6 per cent of its total exports. With the end to a domestic interest in the preferences, the Canadian government could have used the issue to political advantage had it wanted to signal its commitment to the anti-apartheid cause, particularly as the announcement was made just before the 1979 Commonwealth conference in Lusaka. Yet, in contrast to the hyperbole accompanying the 1977 measures, the decision to end the tariff in 1979 was made quietly and explicitly on economic and not political grounds.
Therefore, on his way home from Lusaka, Prime Minister Joe Clark was treated to a blast rather than praise from President Nyerere for Canada's 'blood-money' trade with South Africa. Nyerere had realized that while preferences had ended, support for Canadian trade had not.

In the 1980s, the Liberal government never wavered from its commitment to trade in peaceful goods with South Africa, refusing even to consider a ban on Krugerrand sales in Canada as 'either a constructive or a legitimate step to take.' Thus, two-way trade between Canada and South Africa increased in nominal terms to an annual average of $466 million from 1980 to 1985 compared with an annual average of $214 million in the 1970s.

Whitewashing Canadian Investment

While the end of tariff preferences removed an anomaly which did not serve Canadian interests, the establishment of a code of conduct to guide Canadian corporations in South Africa seemed to be a measure to encourage reform. In principle, codes had been adopted by a range of Western countries - the Sullivan principles in the United States, the British code, the EEC code, and the Canadian code - to encourage corporations to have a liberalizing influence in South Africa, demonstrating the effectiveness of racially non-discriminatory practices in the workplace.

Codes underpinned constructive engagement's proposition that patterns of economic development and political liberalism which had evolved together elsewhere would also come to South Africa despite the unique historical relationship of capitalism to the development of the apartheid system. One Globe

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and Mail editorial, for example, argued that 'the best hope for reform in South Africa lies in the eventual creation of a prosperous black urban class whose rising social and political aspirations will be impossible for the current political system to contain.' In this view, 'Western democracies, should ... resist pressures to halt investment or trade relations with South Africa. But they should insist that their companies act in South Africa in ways which promote racial equality.'

Such rationales for codes were never particularly convincing. Indeed, the attraction of South Africa for foreign corporations was in good part the substantial profits which came from the conditions offered by the apartheid system, conditions that stalled the development of a prosperous 'black urban class.' (In 1981, the average annual rate of return for U.S. transnationals in South Africa was 24.8 per cent after taxes.) However, most corporations viewed their increasing stake in South Africa as benign and refused to deal with the political implications of their participation in the apartheid economy.

Foreign companies also took advantage of generous South African government incentives to locate in the homelands or the border regions where even fewer controls on wage rates and working conditions gave them virtually carte blanche. At any rate, the reformist thesis ignored the reality that improving conditions for a few black workers (where codes were, in fact, observed) would still leave the fundamentals of the apartheid system intact. Codes provided nothing for the
majority of South Africa's black population in the smouldering townships or for the impoverished Bantustans. In the light of growing discontent, their timetable for change was indefinite and distant. In any case, as SACTU researcher Ken Traynor argued, South African workers wanted more than codes: 'They are fighting not just for jobs, not for better working conditions, not for non-racial toilets and the right to eat lunch beside your white supervisor. That is not what the struggle in South Africa is about. The struggle is very clearly to gain the political rights we have grown accustomed to in this country. They are talking of the destruction of the apartheid system ... and then ... building up a democratic state.'

Codes were, in fact, less a device to bring about change than a means to legitimize continued exports of capital and technology from the West, the lifeblood of the South African economy. They emerged as a tactic to deflect criticism about the refusal of Western governments to interfere with corporate involvement in South Africa.

The code in Canada surfaced in April 1978 following sustained criticism of Canadian corporate activity in South Africa by the press, the YWCA, and especially the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR). A series of articles in 1973 by a Canadian journalist, Hugh Nangle, showed that while Canadian companies in South Africa were quite profitable, almost all paid their employees below the poverty datum line (PDL) - a standard originating in South Africa to indicate income needed to secure the barest necessities of life for a family (usually of five). A similar investigation by a British journalist, Adam Raphael, resulted in a British parliamentary inquiry, but the Canadian government stonewalled criticism in the House of Commons. Beyond urging Canadian companies to be 'good corporate citizens in ways that will make the Canadian people proud of them,' it was not prepared to do more. Until 1977, External Affairs resisted the idea of a code of conduct as constituting an extra-territorial interference in the internal affairs of another country, a principle that had been used in Canada to oppose U.S. legislation regarding trade by Canadian subsidiaries of American corporations with Cuba and China.

While Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson was unwilling at first to interfere with Canadian corporations, he faced growing domestic and international criticism of their behaviour. Both the United States and the EEC had dealt with this problem by enacting codes, and the British government had set down guidelines as early as 1974. Therefore, Jamieson decided on his own to announce a Canadian code in his December 1977 statement, ahead of Cabinet agreement and without prior departmental consultation.

At the same time, the code was drawn up in a manner which demonstrated the priorities of the state and the unequal power of different groups in society. Although extremely active on this issue, TCCR was able to have its opinions heard only through aggressive pushing and even then just over the telephone. The
Canadian Labour Congress was also given only a perfunctory hearing. By contrast, the private sector, that the code was ostensibly meant to constrain, was actually involved in drafting its provisions.88  

Inevitably, the code turned out to be 'the most feeble of all the codes established by Western governments,'9 in NDP MP John Rodriguez's words, *as effective as a roaring rabbit.'90 The code contained six mild recommendations, including the obligation to report annually on corporate activities and policies, and exempted corporations operating in Namibia. Unlike the Sullivan principles, a code introduced in 1977 in the United States, no attempt was made to encourage companies to sign pledges committing their subsidiaries in South Africa to uphold basic non-discriminatory principles. Nor were there suggestions of follow-up actions such as on-site inspections. No instruments were established for monitoring compliance with the code. Reporting procedures were vague, and the process was to be voluntary, with no penalties for noncompliance. By contrast, the U.S. government used Reverend Sullivan and the

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firm Arthur D. Little to monitor, grade, and publicize the nature of U.S. corporate involvement in South Africa.

Until Brian Mulroney came to power, only a few of the Canadian corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa reported to the Canadian government and only one (Alcan) after 1981. Even Canadian Crown corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa failed to produce reports. When reports did appear, they were too vague and general to assess the contributions of Canadian companies towards the objectives of the code. In any case, the reports were never analysed or published in this period and no one in the civil service was responsible for them.

The tacit understanding between the state and the private sector about the code's non-purpose was quite clear. A Falconbridge official stated that he saw the Canadian code as just 'a survey to examine to what extent Canadians were involved in South African business,' with no hint of its reforming intent.9 For their part, Canadian officials rejected calls to improve the code and impose mandatory compliance, suggesting that the effect of Canadian investment was too minor (with Canadian companies affecting under 1 per cent of South Africa's total workforce) to be worth the bother.2 In addition, they defended a double taxation agreement which enabled Canadian companies with subsidiaries in South Africa, as in Namibia, to deduct payment of taxes to South Africa from their tax bill in Canada.93

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan, together with his Minister of International Trade Ed Lumley, went so far as to argue that the code was 'normative rather than legal in character,'94 and that it was merely designed to encourage Canadian companies to do better. A less polite but more revealing indication of the federal government's attitude to the code came from an External Affairs official who asked, 'Does it make sense for Canada to stand up on its ethical high horse? What the hell's in it for us?'95 There seems little doubt that the Canadian code, even more than the others, served as an attempt to
legitimize the status quo rather than to induce liberalization in the apartheid system.

By contrast, the Scandinavian countries bypassed the codes completely, seeing them in their true nature as nothing more than a foray into public relations. Norway, in 1978, and Sweden, in 1979, banned new investment in South Africa outright, and in 1985 Sweden tightened its legislation by stopping the long-term leasing of equipment by Swedish companies to their subsidiaries. Sweden also stopped new loans and other capital exports to South Africa and Namibia. Ultimately, even the Reverend Leon Sullivan, the individual responsible for inspiring the U.S. code, repudiated this approach and called publicly for disinvestment.96

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For its part, the South African government ensured through legislation that foreign corporations would serve its purposes and not those of their home governments. In 1970, the National Procurement Act reminded foreign companies that, in an emergency, the state would require production and delivery of strategic goods or their companies would be taken over. In 1978, the Protection of Business Act restricted the enforcement in South Africa of certain foreign judgments, orders, and codes, specifically prohibiting the provision of certain information by subsidiaries. The Key Points Act of 1980 required specified corporations to store weapons on their premises and to organize militia reserve units for civil defence.

Such South African legislation enabled Canadian companies, unenthusiastic to begin with, to justify their failure even to report under the code. Many claimed that their South African partners refused to release information that would have enabled an accurate assessment of the company's influence on reform. As Bonnie Greene of TCCR noted, 'If they [Canadian corporations] are asked, for instance, to disclose direct and indirect sales to the South African government and its agencies, that information has to be passed through a South African government official, and therefore when we ask for that information, they are unable to give it to us.'97 Other corporations argued that, as they held minority holdings in their South African subsidiaries, they only had a seat or two on boards of directors and were not involved in management decisions.99 Being a junior partner enabled a Canadian company to be a silent partner, not only refusing to report under the code, but also disclaiming responsibility for the performance of their South African company.99

In fact, rather than acting as a liberalizing force inside South Africa, Canadian corporations, like other Western corporations, became integrated not only into the system of apartheid but also into its defence. After almost a decade of struggling with Canadian corporations over their practices in South Africa, the TCCR found no serious interest in human rights, 'no corporate conscience struggle with the issue of whether or at what point co-operation with a gross and systematic violator of human rights would become unacceptable. What one is generally treated to are ethically unsustainable rationalizations like: If we don't do it, others
will; there are other places that are worse; we must make a profit for our shareholders."0°

The codes were ineffectual in changing such attitudes. One U.N. study found that they did not make a significant contribution to improvements in wages or industrial relations,'0' and that the record of foreign companies was often worse and usually no better than local South African companies.2 At the same time, the contribution of foreign TNCs to the South African economy in capital in-

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flow, technological development, and diversification in the strategic and energy sectors far outweighed benefits brought black workers by the codes.03

Some Canadian corporations constructed educational and recreational facilities and provided employment for black people. Generally, though, the wages were pitifully low, working conditions highly adverse, and living conditions often the single-sex hostels of the migrant labour system. All of these Canadian firms were absorbed by the fundamentals of the apartheid system. Two in particular, Falconbridge and Bata, represented the nadir of Canadian involvement, while Ford Canada's record was mildly better.

Falconbridge, Apartheid, and Mining
In its involvement in South Africa's mining sector, as in its Oamites mine in Namibia, Falconbridge utilized the fundamentals of the migrant labour system, blocked trade union organization, and established a racial pyramid in its employment practices." As one of its officials confessed, Falconbridge was an inextricable part of the apartheid system.

At Western Platinum, Falconbridge's nickel-platinum mine,105 all the black employees, who constituted 94 per cent of the workforce, were hired on oneyear contracts and lived apart from their families in single-sex dormitories. Falconbridge indicated in the mid-1980s that Western Platinum planned to provide married living quarters for up to 3 per cent of the total workforce permitted by legislation, but these seemed to have been provided exclusively for the minority of mixed-race employees.

When the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) tried to organize workers at Western Platinum and took them out on strike in July 1985, the company called in the police who killed three strikers and crushed the strike. The company argued that the mine was in Bophuthatswana where organizing was illegal, even though the mine itself was situated in a 'white spot' in the 'homeland,' an enclave of 'white land' within the fragmented territory given to ethnically and racially defined groups. This technicality had not prevented either white employees or coloreds from organizing; the former had no less than four trade unions to represent them, and the latter three.

Black workers exclusively occupied the bottom two levels of unskilled and semiskilled employment. In 1970 they were paid roughly 25 per cent of the poverty datum line (PDL), under 5 per cent of wages paid to white miners.'06

Fifteen years later, the gap had narrowed to four to one107 and, at an associated refinery, three to one.08 A Falconbridge official defended these practices to a parliamentary committee, arguing that 'in fact the whites are in the ... senior
positions and the blacks are in junior positions. I am not denying that. That is just the way it is in South Africa ... The system automatically segregates the jobs ... There is no question of whether you want to or whether you do not want to. It is a law.'109

In June 1986, the administrator of Canada's code named Falconbridge as one of five Canadian companies paying wages below the poverty line. Once these wages and working conditions became public knowledge in Canada, Falconbridge hired a public relations expert to repair any harm done to the company image as an easier alternative to improvement at Western Platinum.

Bata, Exploitation, and KwaZulu
Bata's operations in South Africa also became the subject of increasing press and union interest in Canada, but the company remained defiant to the end. Although core parts of the Bata empire were based in Bermuda and Switzerland, its operations were coordinated in Toronto."0 As an important employer in South Africa, with about 3,250 employees in 1985, and with the third largest investment within Bata's international holdings (behind India and Pakistan), Bata's operations in South Africa were significant. They were divided between two different locations - three of its companies were based in the Pinetown-Greytown areas, and two were situated in the 'homeland' of KwaZulu at Loskop and Keate's Drift."2 Yet, Bata's record was, if anything, worse than that of Falconbridge. Its employment practices were so awful that they became the subject of repeated controversy in the 1970s and 1980s. The Canadian Labour Congress sent a researcher to investigate Bata's operations in the mid-1980s and worked with South African trade unions to put pressure on Bata. Canadian reporters, Hugh Nangle in the 1970s"3 and Michael Valpy in the 1980s,"4 brought the terrible conditions in Bata's companies to national attention in Canada."5

Bata's management style was suited to South Africa, with no black on its board of directors, and no black functioning at the levels of president, vice president, treasurer, or company counsellor in any of its companies."6 In other respects, working conditions and wages varied quite dramatically between its plants. In the Pinetown-Greytown area, where 70 per cent of Bata's workforce was employed, Bata belonged to the National Industrial Council of Footwear Manufacturers which bargained with the unions on an industrywide basis. Yet as late as 1982, the wages paid in these companies were still only two-thirds of the PDL and half the amount stipulated by the Canadian code - sufficient 'to

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achieve a standard of living significantly above the minimum level required to meet their basic needs."17 By 1986, wages had improved in these plants, with Bata claiming that they met the requirements of the Canadian code.
In KwaZulu, however, Bata's operations remained to the end one of the worst examples of Canadian corporate practices in South Africa. Bata's companies took full advantage of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's highly repressive administration and laws which denied basic rights to working people. Besides low wages and
rough working conditions, Bata actively opposed attempts at unionization in a style harking back to the nineteenth century.

In the early 1980s, Bata paid wages considerably below the PDL, with the result that its wage bill in KwaZulu was just over one-third of the wage bill in its plants in the rest of South Africa. At Loskop, a plant that Bata co-owned with the South African government, the average monthly pay for workers was about $160 as compared with the barely human household subsistence level for a family of six of $194, not to mention the amount stipulated by the Canadian code, which would have been about $337. Some workers at Loskop received as little as $82 (R60) as their monthly salary. At Keate's Drift, wages were even lower; after ten years service, the average weekly wage was $37. However, even this meagre amount was more than the rate for piece-work offered to many workers at Keate's Drift. In KwaZulu, Bata's black workers were given almost no opportunities to move into semiskilled or skilled positions. After considerable attention in the Canadian press to Bata's wretched performance, the company raised its wages in its KwaZulu plants, Bata officials claimed, to above code requirements. However, even then, workers who complained to the labour board about low wages in Bata's plants in KwaZulu were blacklisted and unable to get further employment.

In terms of working conditions at Bata's plants in KwaZulu, a report by South Africa's National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) described them as involving "compulsory overtime, suspension of lunch breaks, periodic assaults and intimidation by supervisors, absence of sick leave and a failure to register a substantial part of the work force, resulting in the loss of rights to unemployment benefits." Canadian trade union officials reported that work often lasted until 1:00 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. When Bata employees denied these allegations, Canadian embassy officials in Pretoria investigated and corroborated the NUTW report. In addition, in KwaZulu, Bata provided no medical, pension, or disability insurance plans, no assistance for medical and health facilities, housing, or education services whatsoever.

The difference in conditions between Bata's KwaZulu plants and the others was related to two key factors: the Pinetown-Greytown companies were unionized and predominantly male, the KwaZulu plants were non-unionized and 90 per cent female, with most of the women the sole income earners for their families. Bata suppressed all attempts at union organization, refusing to meet with the NUTW after it had signed up 71 per cent of the Loskop plant in 1982 and 75 per cent of its employees at Keate's Drift in 1984. At Loskop, Bata broke a four-month strike and destroyed the union by shifting production to other factories and by reducing the workforce to one-third and firing the rest. When a union organizer appeared in the community, Bata called in the KwaZulu police who detained him and told him he could not visit Loskop without the company's permission. At Keate's Drift in 1984, Bata fired workers active in the union, continuing to deny even that the NUTW was trying to organize in KwaZulu.
Although Bata's behaviour was in clear contravention of at least six aspects of Ottawa's code, the Canadian state's response illustrated how farcical the code exercise actually was, even on its own terms. The Canadian code stated that 'companies should extend customary basic rights to such bargaining units [unions], i.e. to organize for the purpose of negotiation, to solicit support among employees, to disseminate trade union information material, and to engage in other traditional trade union activities on company premises.' Yet, when the NUTW appealed to the Canadian government over Bata's attempts to break these unions, the most that Canadian officials would do was to meet with Bata officials in South Africa and in Canada. The Canadian embassy in Pretoria told the NUTW that the code was purely voluntary and that they could not do more without applying Canadian law extra-territorially to South Africa. Generally, Canadian officials were reluctant to take on high-profile representatives of the Canadian corporate world like Tom Bata, even when his companies broke sanctions against Rhodesia by exporting to South Africa.

Not surprisingly, Bata felt no need to respond to this gentle persuasion, and refused to negotiate with the NUTW over its employment terms in KwaZulu. Until October 1985, Bata would not even provide reports to the Canadian government under the code on the grounds that this would offend South African authorities. When the company did report, it was named as one of five Canadian companies paying its workers below the poverty line. Yet the government was not prepared to do more than to encourage the company to change through publication of reports under the code. Thus, Bata was able to flout the code's provisions with impunity and to demonstrate its essentially feeble nature. In this case, the Canadian state retreated from even the reformist project of the code in its alliance with one of Canada's most powerful transnational corporations.

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Ford's Mildly Better Record
While still benefiting from the apartheid system, Ford Canada's nominal subsidiary was not involved as deeply in the grossly exploitative practices characteristic of Bata and Falconbridge. Ford's U.S. parent company chose to operate its holdings in South Africa through its Canadian subsidiary to benefit from Commonwealth preferences and other trade and tax agreements between Canada and South Africa. Ford did not submit reports under the Canadian code, but it did adhere to the tougher Sullivan principles, providing full disclosures in the United States every year.

During the 1970s, Ford South Africa began desegregating its facilities, and it was one of the earliest North American companies in South Africa to recognize black councils and coloured trade unions. Generally, Ford paid above the minimum wages needed by workers to survive and offered a package of fringe benefits which included training and educational programs for workers and their families. Ford provided equal participation for non-whites in pension and retirement plans and in sick pay plans. Early on, it adopted an affirmative action policy which resulted in a significant increase in Africans and coloureds in semiskilled jobs, but subject to the approval of white unions.
At the same time, Ford did benefit from general South African conditions: it paid its assembly-line labour force $20 an hour less in South Africa than in Canada, while selling its products at comparable prices.34 Also, after the establishment of the union at Ford's plant in South Africa in 1978, a number of issues, notably wage levels and the firing of black leaders, were settled only after bitter strikes. Ultimately when Ford left South Africa in 1987, its settlement was better than most foreign companies. After five months negotiating with the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), Ford donated 24 per cent of its holdings to an employee trust on the condition that the dividends be used for community projects. However, the balance of its shares went to Anglo American,35 leaving it with a controlling interest, and the non-white labour force with only token economic power.

From the slightly reformist approach taken by Ford to the wildly exploitative stance of Bata and Falconbridge, there is little evidence to suggest that the Canadian code had much influence on the behaviour of subsidiaries of Canadian corporations in South Africa. The worst companies like Bata increased their wages a little, but continued to ignore the most elementary trade union rights. Falconbridge was enmeshed in the system of migrant labour for South African mines and absorbed effectively into the apartheid system. Thus, the

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reforming effect which these corporations were supposed to have on the South African system was virtually non-existent, while they, themselves, continued to profit from its fundamentals.
As noted at the outset, the reformist thesis implicit in the codes never constituted a serious attempt to overturn the bases of the apartheid system. Instead, the codes served to legitimize the continuance of ‘business as usual’ in response to mounting criticism of the partnership of international corporations with the apartheid state and the ineffectual response of Western governments to this relationship. On the whole, the Canadian code served these purposes admirably.

Thus, the structural factors defining policy in this period were overdetermining. They not only shaped the approach in Canada, but also operated within the larger context set by international corporations and the more sympathetic attitude taken to South Africa by the larger Western powers. Once the turbulence of the Soweto period had abated, the consensus of international corporations was to flood back to South Africa to take advantage of its rich minerals and cheap labour. Hence the Western powers, including Canada, were quite prepared to push through a decision to grant South Africa a major IMF loan at a time when it was spending heavily on military activities against its own people and other countries in the region.

Given the support for economic involvement, it is not surprising that Canadian and other Western governments also overlooked corporate assistance to South Africa's strategic and military sectors. As a result, one Canadian corporation, Space Research, was able to provide South Africa with the foundation for an arms export sector and, single-handedly, to set back the anti-apartheid cause.
Arming Apartheid
Even if we had the means to reduce the ability of the South African whites to become more economically and technologically self-sufficient which we do not, we would certainly not be inclined to do so. Like all other peoples, they have a perfect right to self-preservation, and like all other respectable nationalities, they should be commended for having the collective pride and motivation to defend themselves.

Conrad Black’
During the 1970s, international arms embargoes seemed to constitute a key exception to the record of Western reluctance to take strong action against the apartheid state. They were designed to slow if not halt the supply of arms from the West worth over $1 billion from 1963 to 1975. This process culminated in the mandatory U.N. Security Council Resolution (418) in 1977, which followed the voluntary arms embargo (Resolutions 181 and 182) in 1963, extended in 1970 (Resolution 282) to include a ban on spare parts.
Yet in most defence and foreign policy establishments in the West, considerable sympathy existed for South Africa as a proxy in the battle against Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. As a result, South Africa's military sector had little difficulty in importing high technology weapons systems or in developing the capacity to produce arms locally under licensing to Western companies.
Subsidiaries of Western TNCs based in South Africa continued to supply goods to meet South Africa's defence needs and Western banks continued to provide financing for sections of the South African state.
This benign attitude to the creation of a strong military arsenal in South Africa stood in striking contrast to the approach taken towards the struggle by black South Africans against apartheid. In a period in which the South African...
the 1963 embargo, it continued to allow the sale of spare parts for military equipment and aircraft supplied before the resolution.4 In 1970 the government expanded the embargo to include these exceptions,5 and in 1977 backed the comprehensive arms embargo. However, it placed no restrictions on the flow of investments or on the transfer of technology to assist South African domestic arms production. Significantly, the embargo did not apply to goods that had a potential military as well as civilian use, leaving a huge loophole which was never closed in the Trudeau era.

At the least, support for U.N. embargoes promised credibility and substance. Yet the Canadian government's pledge in this area was, if anything, more cynical than its approach towards the economic 'reforms' of the late 1970s: it interpreted the resolutions very narrowly and transgressed quite dramatically against their intent.6 While the 1977 mandatory resolution required all states to stop providing arms and related materiel to South Africa without qualification, Canadian exports of strategic and military goods were denied at first only to military end-users and then in 1986 to departments and agencies of the South African government. In the dying years of apartheid, it was revealed that a number of Western countries, including Canada, had even helped South Africa develop a capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the Canadian government would not do more; from 1978 to 1983, it opposed or abstained on all U.N. resolutions that exerted pressure on South Africa in military, nuclear, or economic areas.7 (Not surprisingly, it also voted against resolutions which advocated terminating economic relations with South Africa, including those that proposed the strategic question of an oil embargo.) It did not support resolutions that endorsed armed struggle as a legitimate means of combating apartheid and abstained where the ANC and PAC were designated as the sole authentic representatives of the South African people.

The cynicism was also reflected in the way Canadian and other Western governments failed to put in place measures to legislate, monitor, and enforce the arms embargo. The emphasis was less on what should not be sold, in keeping with the U.N. embargo, than on what Canadian corporations could sell without the state being publicly embarrassed by an open violation of its commitment. The approach reflected general Western strategic thinking and NATO's close connections with South Africa's military establishment. In 1972 NATO began secret contingency planning with South Africa's armed forces in defence of southern Africa, the Cape route, and the adjacent Indian and South Atlantic oceans.' Through NATO, South Africa was given access to information on weapons and general intelligence matters.9 It was also fully integrated into the purchasing program of NATO countries through access to its military codification system. Within NATO, countries sold military equipment among themselves with no restriction on subsequent resale.

Even more striking, the Canadian government cooperated with other Western countries in helping South Africa develop a civilian nuclear industry which secretly built nuclear bombs.'0 Scientific exchanges continued between officials...
from Canadian and South African nuclear industries, building on the shared
experience of the uranium cartel. Both were in attendance at a series of
conferences on nuclear issues - for example, uranium exploration methods at a
conference in Paris in June 1982 and another technical conference on nuclear
matters in Saskatoon in 1984. While visa restrictions were placed on official
sports representatives from South Africa in the 1970s, the Canadian government
refused to block South African nuclear experts. The government supported South
Africa's membership and participation in the International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA), the U.N. body charged with carrying out nuclear safeguards,
until it was suspended in 1979. It also opposed IAEA resolutions that called for
the termination of all transfer of fissionable material, technology, and facilities to
South Africa.

With this and other Western support, South Africa's Armaments Development and
Production Corporation (ARMSCOR)II was able to build six nuclear bombs and
eventually to possess enough highly enriched uranium to make at least eighteen
more.'2 As South Africa refused in this period to sign the Treaty

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on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons3 or to allow inspections of its
uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, it was able to proceed in secret to develop
a capability that posed a deadly threat to the region.4

Canadian Companies and the Defence of South Africa
Given the approach taken towards the nuclear sector and collaboration through
NATO, it is not surprising that the arms embargo was only loosely enforced. A
wide interpretation of U.N. resolutions allowed subsidiaries of Canadian
companies based in South Africa free rein, and some dealt directly with the South
African military and police. Any interference, it was argued, would involve extra-
territorial jurisdiction.15 In this view, U.N. resolutions dealt only with trade and
not with products manufactured in South Africa, nor with capital flows from
Canada to South Africa.

Thus, subsidiaries participated in South Africa's system of civil defence and
provided arms, equipment, and technology to the South African security forces. In
fact, all corporations doing business in South Africa helped in the maintenance of
state security as they topped up or paid the full salaries of employees conscripted
into the armed forces.

In the case of civil defence, subsidiaries of Alcan, Ford, Massey-Ferguson, and
Quebec Iron and Titanium were designated Key Points industries and were
required to train militia and store weapons on their properties.6 Also, the
chairman of Alcan's South African subsidiary (Hulett Aluminum) was a member
of the Defence Advisory Board of the South African government, a body which
sought to integrate state security planning with economic objectives.7

Once Canadian subsidiaries were located in South Africa, they were bound by the
National Procurement Act under which the state could require production and
delivery of strategic goods. Accordingly, by 1979, Ford had supplied the South
African military and police with almost fifty thousand vehicles.” Hulett
Aluminum was even more directly involved, producing casings for rocket shells,
aluminum fins for bombs, and specialized sheet metal for armoured plating.'9 Its explosive powder for mine blasting was easily convertible into weapons-grade aluminum powder.20 Through its connection to the international Alcan group, Hulett had access to wider technical resources and to specialized alloyed material for military use.

Most Canadian corporations like Alcan opposed any interference in their subsidiary's operations as they did not want to impair good relations with their shareholders.2' Some like Massey-Ferguson (now Varity Corporation), with Conrad Black then at the helm, made no secret of their support for white South Africa. One Massey-Ferguson subsidiary, Fedmech, produced industrial loaders which were used for forced population removals and the destruction of black housing.22 Another sold strategic technology to a South African company for the production of heavy diesel engines used in armoured personnel carriers (Hippos and Rhinos) and trucks for the South African Defence Force.23 Through a wholly owned British subsidiary, Perkins Diesel Engines, Massey-Ferguson was party to a fifteen-year licensing agreement with Atlantis Diesel Engine Company (ADE), a firm established by the South African government to ensure self-sufficiency in diesel engines to meet the country's agricultural, commercial, and military needs.24

The strategic implications of Atlantis Diesel meant that U.S. companies were prohibited from bidding on the contract to produce diesel engines under a 1978 law barring U.S. companies from selling anything that could be used by the South African military or police forces. Although a general manager of ADE stated that foreign companies were well aware of the military aspects of the project,25 Canadian officials emphasized agricultural uses for the engines. They said the engines were too small for tanks and that Atlantis Diesel had no direct contacts with the military. However, in 1985, Massey-Ferguson's chairman, Victor Rice, stated quite frankly that the company had been faced with an ultimatum from the South African government either to provide the technology to Atlantis Diesel or someone else would be asked to do so.26 Shortly after, it became public knowledge that SADF trucks were supplied with diesel engines manufactured by ADE using Perkins designs.27

From 1979 to 1986, Massey-Ferguson refused to produce reports in compliance with the Canadian code, claiming that, under the Protection of Business Act, its subsidiaries were prevented from releasing such information especially to a minority shareholder.28 When the information finally was supplied, Massey-Ferguson was named one of five Canadian companies whose subsidiaries paid wages below the poverty line to its non-white South African employees.29 Despite the fact that the federal and Ontario governments had given Massey-Ferguson about $200 million30 in a time of financial distress, they resisted calls to put pressure on the company.3 As one federal official observed, 'the federal government wasn't interested in what this particular subsidiary was cooking up with somebody ... If it doesn't bother the British government, why should it bother Canada?' 32
Canadian banks played a more indirect role than Canadian industries in strengthening South Africa's military capabilities, but their activities were equally significant. They participated in international consortia whose loans not only restored general confidence in the South African economy after Soweto but also buttressed the system as a whole. As researcher Doug Williams observed, 'The maintenance of state security ... (had) become the responsibility not just of a professional armed force, but of all government departments, corporations and individuals with a stake in maintaining the system.'33 Many of the institutions of the South African state that received Canadian bank loans the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), and the South African Transport Services (SATS) - had direct links to arms production, nuclear power development, and the military.

Thus, Canadian bank loans to ISCOR, an agency coordinating a vital strategic sector in South Africa and one that shared directors with ARMSCOR, were, in the view of some observers, 'as important for South Africa's defence industry as the shipment of guns and bullets from abroad.'34 ESCOM was involved in the development of South Africa's nuclear capabilities,35 while SATS developed South Africa's infrastructure, including the construction of military grade roads, airports, and landing strips, not to mention its provision of bulldozers for the demolition of black housing. Yet in this period, the Canadian government refused to interfere with such capital flows or to acknowledge their relevance for the embargo.

Dodging the U.N. Arms Embargo
The Canadian government's decision not to interfere, even when Canadian loans and investments supported South African military capabilities, was consistent with its general 'hands off' approach towards private sector activities in South Africa. When questions arose regarding the ban on military exports, the Department of National Defence, the domestic arms industry, and the former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce easily overrode concerns of the Department of External Affairs.

The embargo was administered through the Export and Import Permits Act whose export control list had two parts: military products that could not be exported to South Africa and dual-purpose items that might be put to either military or civilian use which required individual export permits. Responsibility for the prevention of breaches of the act rested with the RCMP and federal customs officials. External Affairs kept the list of export permits secret because companies wanted commercial confidentiality. The Canadian government also would not make public information about the licensing of strategic materials for sale in South Africa. The Canadian government refused to enact specific legislation or to spell out regulations, insisting that general procedures were sufficient. In fact, the Canadian government was lenient in enforcing the ban on military exports and failed to recognize the clear military nature of many dual-purpose exports. Close monitoring of the embargo never seems to have happened.36
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The approach led the private sector to believe it could ignore the policy, making the state’s loose enforcement vulnerable to exposure. Sooner or later the contradiction between promise and delivery was bound to be exploited and then disclosed; the inevitable result damaging not only those on the receiving end of the weaponry but also the mythology around Canada’s bona fides.

Space Research and the Development of South Africa’s Supergun

The Canadian company involved in the most dramatic breach, Space Research Corporation (SRC), had long been closely associated with Canada’s defence establishment and sections of the Canadian state. SRC had also developed close connections with such circles in the United States, Israel, and South Africa. The case was to expose the blatant way in which international collusion among such interests overrode the U.N. embargo and Canadian and U.S. arms export laws with ridiculous ease.

In 1977, the very year in which the Canadian government agreed to the mandatory U.N. arms embargo, Space Research was involved in a project which would dramatically augment the South African state’s capacity for offensive military action. In the process, it contributed to the development of an internationally competitive arms export industry in South Africa. Ultimately, Space Research provided South Africa with a supergun and artillery system capable of firing tactical nuclear weapons.

From October 1976 to 1978, Space Research smuggled highly sophisticated technical equipment relevant to artillery performance and manufacture by air or sea from Canada and the United States to South Africa without the necessary export permits. These exports included approximately 60,000 extended range artillery shells, at least four 155-millimetre guns, three advanced prototypes with sophisticated computer-directed firing systems, ballistic testing equipment, demonstration projectiles, and other equipment worth $50 million. During the smuggling operation, Space Research president Gerald Bull travelled to South Africa along with a team of SRC personnel to help the South African army test and become familiar with the new artillery system.

South Africa’s interest was to fill an important gap in its military capabilities dating back to the Angolan civil war in 1975-6, when its armed forces had been outgunned by superior Russian artillery, particularly 122-millimetre Katyusha rockets. SRC’s 155-millimetre artillery system, which came to be known as ‘the Kalahari Ferrari’ or ‘the Quebec battery,’ admirably fitted the bill. With an ability to fire up to forty-two kilometres, SRC’s artillery system delivered shells with greater accuracy at twice the range and two and a half times the weight of explosives as their rivals. The system was even able to use a small two-kiloton nuclear ‘smart bomb.’ The size and sophistication of the devices were such that they could have been packed in a satchel and taken anywhere. Significantly, one of the clauses of the deal prohibited the sale of this technology, guns, or components ‘to any Communist country or any country in Africa, south of the Equator.’
For the region as a whole, this new capacity in long-range bombardment was a chilling addition to South Africa’s campaign of destabilization in the region. It was employed to great effect against refugee camps and in military campaigns in southern Angola and Namibia. In fact, a high-ranking South African military official went so far as to claim that ‘the most important factor that emerged for us ... [in Southern Angola was] the success of our G5 and G6 guns, which we believe are the best artillery in the world.’

SRC’s interest in this project was in no small part financial: the deal promised a return to solvency and the discharge of considerable debts to the First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia. At the time, Bull admitted that ‘our international business has furnished the basis for the continued existence of our operation.’

In an extraordinary breach of the intent of the arms embargo, the South African parastatal ARMSCOR actually bought a 20 per cent interest in Space Research’s Quebec operations. Equity ownership enabled ARMSCOR to control the technology relating to the new weapons system and to gain access to SRC’s research for the U.S. military. South African experts, including the South African colonel who had commanded South Africa's artillery in the 1975 Angola war, came to Canada to work out the finer details of transferring the artillery shells and howitzer technology to South Africa.

With control of the patents, the South African military was able to manufacture the artillery system and shells as early as April 1978 and eventually to develop from it the world’s most effective and sophisticated mobile battlefield artillery, the G-6 gun. By 1982, the South African government was in a position to launch an international campaign to promote South African exports of the G-5 and G-6 guns. ARMSCOR used the guns to barter for oil in Iraq, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates and to sell Chile the licence to produce the G-5 gun. The artillery system and vast quantities of ammunition were supplied to both sides of the Iran-Iraq War and to both sides of the Gulf War.

Thus, the artillery system became central to South African arms exports, an enterprise which eventually brought in more than $1 billion annually. ‘On the back of its deal with Bull,’ one observer noted, ‘Arm scram had developed a major arms industry.’ In sum, the world's most advanced artillery technology, developed by a Canadian company with Canadian government assistance, played a major role in strengthening South Africa’s defence capabilities and in wreaking havoc in the region.

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Friends in High Places: Collusion, Complicity, and Betrayal
Space Research’s shipments to South Africa continued unhindered after the U.N. mandatory arms ban in 1977 and after public attention had been brought to its sales by Zimbabwean nationalist (later senior minister) Joshua Nkomo in Ottawa in October 1977. The tardiness and slipshod nature of government controls on Space Research in Canada and the United States were related to the close relationship between the company and defence establishments in both countries; by any standards, SRC’s influence and connections were impressive.
In Canadian government circles, SRC55 was seen as a ‘key component’ of the munitions industry with a strong potential for increasing military exports. At its peak in 1979, SRC had commercial connections in twenty to thirty countries and sales of $40 million, up from just $2 million in 1970.6 By the time the firm went into bankruptcy in 1980, SRC had received considerable assistance from the Canadian government. The Department of National Defence financed many of the steps required to develop, test, and promote the artillery shells and was interested in Bull's self-propelled artillery system.57 The Canadian Commercial Corporation administered contracts for SRC worth at least $7 million, and the Canadian armed forces relied on SRC for important production work. One of SRC’s subsidiaries, modernized with the assistance of over $11 million in grants from the Canadian government,” was the sole supplier of gunpowder, explosives, and chemical products for military use in Canada.

Connections to various branches of the U.S. government, in particular the CIA and Pentagon, were even stronger than to the Canadian state. Gerald Bull, once described as ‘the great white hope of the U.S. army,’59 was given retroactive U.S. citizenship by a private act of the U.S. Congress in 197260 to legitimize his access to highly classified material, and several of his employees were granted security clearances.6 Over the years, SRC did a small but steady business with the U.S. Department of Defense, about $9 million from 1968 to 1979.62 Bull's company was well placed when the CIA received a request from South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS) for a supply of extendedrange 155-millimetre ammunition. Not only did CIA officers establish the original connection between SRC and South Africa in 1975, but they also smoothed SRC's way through potential opposition at the Pentagon and State Department.63 SRC's close links to the U.S. military were built into its corporate structure. Two retired U.S. army generals (one who had been a former chief of U.S. army intelligence and the other the president of the oldest military college in the U.S.) and a former commander of American forces in Berlin sat on SRC-U.S's board of directors. For about a decade, Arthur D. Little Inc., an American research and consulting firm closely connected to the U.S. Department of Defense, owned a major share of SRC-U.S. Bull even hired Richard Bissell, a former deputy director of the CIA, as a lobbyist for SRC in Washington.

A third international partner, the Israeli military, worked with the CIA in passing Bull's artillery system on to South Africa. Israel itself had been introduced to SRC as a customer for Bull's new extended-range artillery shells after the Yom Kippur War. A year after using the shells to great effect against PLO bases in Lebanon, Israel invited South African military officials to see the artillery in action. Originally, Israel had been intended as one of the conduits to South Africa for SRC's artillery shells. However, in 1977 the Carter administration made clear to Israel that it expected a stronger position against South Africa if it wanted U.S. support to continue at the same level, and the routing changed.

A range of arms dealers and corporate interests64 linked to SRC extended the network that planned and delivered the artillery system to South Africa. Among
these, Poudri~res R6unies de Belgique (PRB), one of the largest ammunition dealers in the world,65 established with SRC two shell companies to handle the sale of the artillery system and shells to ARMSCOR. The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce guaranteed a $3.7 million letter of credit from a Belgian bank to enable SRC to fulfil its supply obligations. Thus, top-level government connections, transnational corporate networks, and the structure of the company facilitated Space Research business with ARMSCOR.

The support of both the U.S. and Canadian governments was reflected in an unusual arrangement whereby SRC’s 10,000-acre property straddled the Quebec-Vermont border, most of it on the Canadian side. The International Boundary Commission permitted SRC to build a private road linking the two parts, thus allowing employees and goods to move freely from one side of the border to another. Because of its geographical position, Space Research had enormous flexibility and scope for illegal shipments of arms and technology.

The complex arrangements on the SRC site left customs authorities in both countries with a fuzzy understanding of jurisdiction. SRC was registered as two companies in North America - SRC-Quebec in Canada and SRC-U.S in the United States - but operated as one in every aspect of its production and sales."

The Canadian government and, in particular, Canadian Customs considered both sections as coming under American law, while the U.S. government believed that the larger Canadian portion was under Canadian authority. Thus, exports from the Canadian side were technically from neither nation and Canadian customs officials did not monitor traffic from the Canadian exit.

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As the United States had tougher legislation regarding the arms embargo, SRC regularly shipped shells through Canada to Antigua where they were transferred to ships for South Africa." Space Research paid $500,000 a year to the Antiguan government in return for exemption from customs and immigration laws, thus securing customs clearance on all its shipments. SRC was also given the right to set up a testing range with its own security force for protection.69 These arrangements enabled SRC to bring in clients from South Africa and Israel in total secrecy for a demonstration of the 155-millimetre shells.

Reports of SRC’s arms sales to South Africa began to surface in 1977 from dock workers in Antigua following the rupture of one of the containers and as the true destination of the ships became common knowledge. Although Britain still had constitutional responsibility for Antigua in the late 1970s, it adopted a very noncommittal low profile towards the SRC affair. It did not conduct its own investigation on the grounds that it would constitute interference in Antigua's internal affairs. The British deputy in charge of Antigua assured Prime Minister Bird of Antigua that if the United Nations sought to investigate SRC, Britain would *resist any independent inquiry.'70

Ultimately, the case became a cause cibre in the Eastern Caribbean, as trade unions, trade union federations, the media, community groups, opposition newspapers, and politicians protested the complicity of the Antiguan government in this breach of the arms embargo.71 The SRC case was debated in the Antiguan
House of Representatives, with the proceedings carried live on national radio. A respected church leader condemned SRC’s southern African connections as an affront to Caribbean people, and Antiguan trade unions embargoed handling of cargo for SRC. In 1978 the Caribbean Congress of Labour imposed a ban on products destined for Antigua unless the arms shipments to South Africa stopped and until SRC was expelled.

While both the Canadian and U.S. governments eventually investigated Space Research Corporation, their intervention was too late to be effective. Customs inquiries in the United States actually began at about the time that South African President P.W. Botha announced South Africa’s ability to manufacture ‘in record time’ the artillery system. A grand jury was convened seven months later, but its hearings dragged on for eighteen months. Thus, SRC was able to continue its shipments, using a Canadian export licence for 35,000 more artillery shells, purportedly for the government of Spain but actually for South Africa.

When SRC eventually came to trial in the United States, the proceedings were secret and the punishments were relatively slight. Bull and former SRC President Ronald L. Gregory were able to plea bargain for a sentence which in

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1980 put them in a minimum security prison in the United States for four and four and a half months respectively, and the case was shelved. SRC was also fined $25,000 on this charge and a further $20,000 on four counts of filing false information on U.S. Customs Service documents, a pittance given the estimated $19 million value of the deal to SRC. Even so, given his long service to the U.S. and Canadian governments and his close association with the CIA, Bull regarded the conviction and imprisonment as a betrayal. Bull died a bitter man, still angry, still attempting to gain a pardon. He insisted that he had been forced to accept the jail term to deflect attention from government complicity in his business. As his lawyer pointed out, the U.S. government had been involved from the start, encouraging SRC to help Israel, even though Israel was a known conduit for technology transfer to South Africa and for connections with ARMSCOR. In Bull’s view, the U.S. interest (and his) was to support the South African government in its fight against the MPLA government in Angola and its Soviet and Cuban allies.

Bull’s claims had substance both in terms of government policies and procedures. There were good reasons for the manner in which the U.S. government and justice system dealt with this case. First, there was the spectre of CIA involvement and high-level government acquiescence in the deal.” The CIA’s sympathies were strongly pro-white South Africa and disdainful of the black African cause. In 1975, as part of their close working relationship with BOSS and the South African military, the CIA had made an unsuccessful official attempt to get extended range ammunition for the South Africans’ 155-millimetre howitzers for use in Angola. There was evidence to suggest that they had succeeded clandestinely on this second more covert attempt, assigning an exagent with a ‘top security’ clearance to facilitate the deal with SRC. As a report on the SRC incident by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa commented several years
later, 'At the very least, this episode suggests serious negligence on the part of the Agency. At most, there is a possibility that elements of the CIA purposefully evaded US policy ... Of particular concern ... was the appearance of possible US government authorization of SRC shipments to South Africa.'

That the case came to trial at all reflected the stronger anti-apartheid sentiments in Washington under the Carter administration than during the Nixon and Ford regimes. However, major forces within the U.S. defence and foreign policy establishments still supported the role of the South African military, especially its anti-communist objectives in Angola, as serving U.S. national security interests. In March 1982 with the Reagan administration in power, none of the House subcommittee suggestions to tighten control over government, in particular CIA evasion of the arms embargo, was taken further.

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In fact, neither the American nor the Canadian governments had established procedures which would have detected and stopped the export of the artillery system to South Africa. There seemed conspicuously little interest in following up reports of South African attempts to purchase SRC's artillery system and shells. ARMSCOR arms buyers regularly visited the United States and Canada, and SRC officials, including Bull, travelled to South Africa on business. In a conclusion which would apply also to Canada, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa observed that "collecting information on the embargo's operation was not high on the list of any agency's priorities; procedures for sharing and centrally assessing relevant information did not exist, and most fundamentally - there was no clear delineation of organizational responsibilities for obtaining relevant intelligence, evaluating it and acting upon it."

Almost all the equipment sent to South Africa was acquired in the United States, mostly from U.S. Army plants and supply stocks. With loose and illdefined procedures, sympathetic American army officials approved two SRC requests to use a government-owned ammunition plant to manufacture 65,000 shell forgings, nearly all of which went to South Africa. In breach of their own rules, they asked virtually no questions and made no attempt to verify the supposed destination of the shells. In turn, the U.S. State Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC) director exempted what SRC had called 'shell forgings' from the need for an export licence, even though they had no other industrial use except in the manufacture of artillery shells. In so doing, OMC misapplied its own regulations. In the case of the sophisticated ballistics instrumentation testing system sent by plane from New York to South Africa, SRC simply neglected to make an official application for export permission, even though the materiel had only a military application. Not surprisingly, customs officers investigating this case for a grand jury were given little cooperation from either the CIA or the OMC.

The ability of SRC to work through the system was graphically demonstrated in the final shipments of shells through Antigua. The U.S. navy actually chartered vessels to help SRC, even though dockworkers in Antigua refused to unload the shells. As the shells were shipped in U.S. government vessels, they did not need an export permit.
In Canada, despite the alarm sounded by Nkomo, the official reaction was also slow and ineffectual, illustrating the refusal of Canadian authorities to take such leaders seriously. Even the evidence accumulating in the Caribbean was dismissed as mere dockside scuttlebutt, partisan mudslinging, or radical rhetoric from left-wing black power groups; the social status and political location of the messengers harming the credibility of the message. When Prime Minister Bird of Antigua visited Canada in January 1978 a few months after the scandal broke, the issue was not even raised. Although the close association of Bird and his son with SRC was common knowledge, the scope and authorization of the original RCMP investigation of SRC in Antigua was to be determined by its government. After an initial preliminary RCMP investigation in Canada, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson said he doubted there was anything to Nkomo's allegations, adding that there was no evidence that the arms originated in Canada. The Canadian government continued to stonewall long after there was good reason to be more cautious. An SRC official had admitted early on that Space Research had shipped artillery shells from Saint John, New Brunswick, but covered up their ultimate destination, saying they were empty shells destined for tests in Antigua. Abundant testimony from the Caribbean indicated a strong case that the embargo had been broken. Yet RCMP investigations continued for a year without any significant findings.

In fact, Canadian authorities were not prepared to change their original disclaimer until late 1978 when word came through that a U.S. Customs investigation had turned up evidence that Space Research had been engaged in serious wrongdoing and that the United States government planned a Grand Jury investigation. The case was finally blown open in November 1978 when journalists in Canada and abroad broadcast and published the full story. The longevity of official disbelief and/or disinterest in Canada considerably aided SRC's activities. In the late 1970s, Canadian government agencies still cooperated with Space Research, and senior officials stoutly defended the company's value to Canada. While Canadian diplomats in the field, particularly in the Caribbean and southern Africa, understood only too well the potential damage of this case to Canada's reputation abroad, such concerns were overridden at senior levels of the policy-making process in Ottawa.

In March 1978 the Canadian government actually licensed the final export of shells for export after SRC produced a certificate from a Spanish defence official stating that the shells were for their own use and would not be exported. Memos from the RCMP suspicious about this sale were brushed off or ignored by External Affairs and ITC. When a shipping agent in Barcelona issued papers stating that the shells were being returned to Canada, the shells moved on, but to South Africa and not to Canada. A senior Space Research official stated that if any of the shells had reached South Africa, it was not because the company planned it. 'But what if they did?' he added, 'Who really cares? They're not for
use against the blacks in South Africa but for defence against the Communists who want to attack South Africa from outside the country.'

Branches of the state in Canada continued to work closely with SRC and Bull long after evidence of a breach of the arms embargo seemed fairly conclusive and groups from within civil society (the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) and the Quebec teachers federation) had demanded that the Department of Justice lay charges. In November 1978, Minister of National Defence Barney Danson reassured Parliament that the corporation was 'all right.'9' Officials of the Canadian Commercial Corporation continued to help Bull sell his weapons technology overseas;92 the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce to offer the company grants ($3 million) and loans ($5.3 million); and the Department of Regional Economic Expansion grants ($1 million).93 By late 1979, eighteen months after the United States government began to move on this case, Canada's Department of Justice was still only "considering" charging the company.94

Even as Gerald Bull was about to go to trial, Canadian government agencies tried to work out a reorganization plan to help the company out of serious financial difficulties in return for the Bull family relinquishing control.95 Unfazed by the charges against Gerald Bull, officials made clear that any reorganization must retain Bull as his technical expertise was crucial to the success of the company. After Bull's conviction and imprisonment in the United States, ITC Minister Herb Gray admitted that a Cabinet committee was considering taking shares in the company, an arrangement which would have put the Canadian government into partnership with South Africa's ARMSCOR.96

Senior government officials left no doubt about SRC's importance to Canada. Major-General Ernest Creber, the associate assistant deputy minister of defence for materiel, said that losing Dr Bull and his research team to other countries would be a serious loss to Canada.97 In Creber's view, Space Research had a valuable 'propensity for innovative work,' a real potential for exports, and a production capability with 'long-term implications for the defence support of this country.' After Bull and his associate were sentenced to jail, officials of Space Research were still scheduled to attend a secret government-sponsored conference on long-range artillery systems. 'They would be involved in the conference,' an ITC official explained, because 'they have not been found guilty of anything in Canada and they have the technical expertise.'98

Eventually, not quite three years after the RCMP began its investigation and after five months of secret hearings, Space Research was charged in Canada with abrogating the U.N. arms embargo and fined another $55,000 after officials pleaded guilty to shipping shells and howitzer parts to South Africa and to falsifying export certificates. Part of this fine was the maximum $25,000 for violating the Export and Import Permits Act. However, the chief Crown prosecutor did not charge Bull and Gregory, pleading the expense and trouble involved, and the case was closed.99
Reaction in Canada to the end of this affair was mixed: The Ottawa Citizen backed the judgment, claiming that 'our authorities have done better in this case than ... many governments.' However, Jean-Claude LeClerc of Le Devoir was closer to the mark in a scathing depiction of Canadian authorities as inept and blind.'0'

The approach taken in Canada (and the United States) to the whole SRC affair can be understood only in the context of the general cynicism in which Western countries treated the arms embargo. Otherwise, it was, by every reasonable standard, outrageous. It strains credulity to believe that Bull was acting without tacit official approval, given the intimate knowledge which both governments had of his weapons research and production. The close links which Bull continued to have with the defence establishments in both countries right up to his conviction led to a suspiciously weak prosecution of the case.

In retrospect, the Space Research case was the 'Iran Contra' scandal of the early 1980s. It was also the most significant Canadian contribution to the South African war effort and to its arms export industry. At the Organization of African Unity and in the United Nations, the case blotted Canada's record. Within the Caribbean, Canada now stood in the ranks of other Western powers tarred by hypocrisy on South Africa. Cubans, on the receiving end of the G-5 artillery system, could testify firsthand about Canadian complicity. In southern Africa, the case added to the scepticism with which leaders had come to view all Western countries. Indeed, SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma claimed that the Canadian government's approach towards the SRC affair disqualified it from any useful role on the Contact Group or further peace initiatives on Namibia.

What was different about the Space Research breach was its strategic importance and the fact that the violation was detected. Usually, the conflict between the principles of Canadian foreign policy and its commercial and strategic Cold War interests was muffled, with exceptions slipping by. In this case, the official disinterest in tracking violations of the state's commitments backfired. For the Canadian state, the case was a public relations disaster of the tallest order. Indeed, it was a national disgrace.

A Blind Eye to Dual-Purpose Exports

Nevertheless, Canadian governments showed little inclination to strengthen its procedures, allowing wide latitude for exports to South Africa that might have either a civilian or a military use, particularly in comparison with equivalent exports to the Soviet bloc. Despite its growing self-sufficiency in arms production, South Africa needed a wide array of accessories that were not specifically military but contributed to the functioning of a technically sophisticated industry for the military and police. Ostensibly, the U.N. Security Council had addressed this problem in the 1977 resolution when it stated explicitly that

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states should prohibit ... the supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, electronic and telecommunications equipment and computers to South Africa.

Although Canadian industry had particular expertise in precisely these categories, the government allowed dual-purpose items to be exported to South Africa unless there was clear evidence that the equipment ... is to be used for military purposes or against the civilian population."02 At the same time, it did not adequately monitor or investigate the end use of such goods. External Affairs simply accepted the contention of the customer in South Africa that it was a commercial and not a military organization.

The one noteworthy exception was the veto in 1964 by the Pearson government of a sale of ten thousand trucks by Ford Canada to the South African government. At the time, Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin argued that 'all trucks capable of being used for military purposes come within the meaning of the resolution."03 However, the criterion of potential military use was abandoned after this case, and, generally, Canadian officials exempted dual-purpose items from sanctions unless the South African military, paramilitary, or police were the direct purchasers.

In the case of a sale of three CL-215 amphibian water bombers in 1975, the end-user was the South African government's forestry department. While the Department of External Affairs defended the civilian use of the water bombers, the manufacturer, Canadair (at the time, a Crown-owned company), described the plane as 'long range patrol amphibian; a high capacity spray aircraft; a versatile resource survey platform; a utility emergency transport ... particularly in internal troop-lift operations' (emphasis added)."04, 'The CL-215's large cargo capacity made it ideal for supply drops and troop deployments, as easily used for military as for civilian purposes.

Despite the fact that the sale was made to a South African government department, senior External Affairs officials resisted criticism and tried to pass the issue off as a 'bona fide commercial concern."05 They insisted that critics would have to prove military use for the government to take action and that, in any case, the Canadian Ambassador to Pretoria had been asked to monitor the planes' end use - after the sale had been made. In fact, no serious end-use monitoring was done by any branch of the Canadian government.

A more direct case of an embargo violation came to light in 1981 when it was discovered that Levy Autoparts had shipped reconstituted Centurion tank engines and parts to South Africa. South Africa used Canada as a spare-parts depot for military tanks and truck components throughout this period."06 Conveniently for Levy, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce classified spare parts and engines as civilian material. Yet, as one company official explained, 'Truck parts can be used in tanks. After all, what is a tank? It's a

modified truck.'"07 Therefore, Levy could sell to practically any country, including South Africa, without an export permit. It simply called the parts truck parts and claimed that the engines were used for hauling coal."08

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The Department of External Affairs and the Department of Justice refused to investigate the case, and the RCMP would not proceed without a departmental request. One ITC official explained that Canadian companies could take advantage of a loophole to ship trucks to the South African Air Force, and admitted that this was a very grey area. Thus, Levy Autoparts was able to flout the essentials of the arms embargo with impunity.

While engines for tanks and amphibian planes had an obvious direct military application, computers constituted a more indirect, though absolutely essential component of South Africa's military capabilities. As Anthony Sampson noted, 'In the use of electronics the line between civil and military was always blurred ... sophisticated communications [are] now inseparable from means of repression.' Computers were vital not only for the South African armed forces, police, and arms industry, but also for the application of racial segregation.

As South Africa was dependent on foreign computer equipment and technology, stronger arms sanctions would have been very effective. As it was, the mandatory arms resolution of 1977 did not mention computers explicitly but implied their inclusion in the ban of 'related materials.' In fact, Western countries sold computers and electronic equipment to South Africa freely in this period, arguing that they had a civilian use. Once purchased, it was almost impossible to determine whether this equipment was passed on to the military or police.

Eventually in July 1985, the Canadian government banned the sale of all sensitive technology and goods, including computers, to the government of South Africa and its agencies, extending the ban in September 1988 to all private sector end-users. However, before the ban was in place, two transnational corporations used their Canadian subsidiaries as conduits for sales of computers and electronic equipment to South Africa, and in the process strengthened South Africa's strategic capabilities.

In the first case, the Canadian subsidiary of the U.S. transnational company Control Data supplied computers (five Cyber 825 computer systems and six cyber mini-815s) to ISCOR, the principal supplier to ARMSCOR, in June 1984. As the applicability of the minicomputer systems for military design-aided capacity had been documented, External Affairs did get end-user certificates from the South African government, ISCOR, and Control Data, stating that, under no circumstances, were the computers to be used for military purposes. In his first year as secretary of state for external affairs, Joe Clark accepted his department's contention that, although ISCOR was a state-owned corporation, it was a commercial concern and could not be considered to be a military consignee.

However, there were doubts that this pledge was meaningful, given Control Data's record of evading the arms embargo in the past. An internal Control Data memorandum revealed that the company knowingly violated the U.S. embargo by selling information and storage and retrieval products which helped the South African police administer the pass laws. About half of the revenue from Control Data's subsidiary in South Africa came from the public sector national and local
governments and parastatal corporations. Besides ISCOR, Control Data's
computers were used by the Atomic Energy Board and ESCOM. Its disc storage
devices were employed in police computers, and its Plato educational software
system was advertised in a South African military journal. When President
Reagan lifted limited U.S. curbs on arms sales to South Africa in 1981, Control
Data sold one of its most powerful computers to South Africa with a capacity to
break codes and to model nuclear explosions and the impact of the use of nuclear
weapons.
In terms of its Canadian subsidiary, Control Data used Canadian employees to
contribute consulting services and technical advice to South African military
research and development. In 1978 Control Data Canada sent its top computer
expert to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in South Africa
to help develop state-of-the-art computing ability.
Given advances in satellite technology and telecommunications, Control Data
Canada opened up the possibility of unmonitored military collaboration between
Canada and South Africa through a shared database, computer power, and design
software. 'The ease of the transfer of this technology and hardware,' one observer
noted, 'makes a mockery of Canada's supposed rigorous pre-screening of export
permits.' In July 1985, Joe Clark admitted that the computers (worth $3 million)
had ended up in the hands of the South African police.
In the field of electronics, there is a strong presumption that a British-based
transnational corporation Plessey also used its Canadian subsidiary for intended
sanctions breaking. Since the 1950s, Plessey had been central to the development
of the South African computer industry. It was also one of the two main
suppliers of radar equipment, including computers, to the South African Defence
Force. This equipment became a part of the military's mobile radar system to
protect Pretoria's strike force during deployment. Plessey also trained South
African Air Force personnel.
In 1981, Plessey Canada began exporting component kits of a private digital
telephone exchange for assembly in Plessey's South African plant. South Africa
needed the kits as it did not produce random access memory (RAM) chips
nor microprocessors. There is strong circumstantial evidence - Plessey (South
Africa)'s collaboration with the South African military and ARMSCOR and the
use by the British army of Plessey's technology - to suggest that Plessey was
using its Canadian branch to hide their exports to South Africa. After an
investigation by Revenue Canada, Plessey was charged with a failure to apply for
an export permit for controlled goods. Revenue Canada claimed that, although the
case against Plessey was quite strong, the political will to carry through a more
serious prosecution on an arms embargo violation charge did not exist.
Once again, the case illustrated the vagueness of the definition of military goods,
the ineffectual nature of the procedures for enforcing the embargo, and a
disinterest in rigorous enforcement. Clearly, the Canadian system of controlling
arms exports to South Africa did not work. The export permit system with the
screening of applications and customs controls was supposed to enforce the
embargo, but the system operated on the honour system, relying on the corporations themselves filing for export permits. There was little in the system to identify breaches of the embargo before goods were exported if the corporations ignored the restrictions, especially as customs and the RCMP were so unenthusiastic on this matter. Even where the media did raise the alarm, as in the case of Space Research, the bureaucracy's response was glacially slow. Despite this record of evasion of the spirit and intent of the arms embargo, the Liberal government refused to review government legislation and enforcement mechanisms. The government's concern was to limit compliance to a very narrow reading of Canada's commitments and certainly not to impose more effective measures. Doing the minimum on the arms embargo on South Africa became the maximum to be expected until the government changed. The government's position on each of these cases demonstrated an effort less to live up to the intent of the embargo than to justify dubious transactions. Given that the arms embargo was the most important sanction in the Canadian state's anti-apartheid campaign in this period, the failure to enforce it adequately spoke volumes in Pretoria. Along with other Western countries, the Canadian government was sending a de facto statement of support rather than of opposition.

A Cold Shoulder for Black Liberation
This impression could only have been strengthened as the approach of the Canadian state towards the African National Congress (ANC) moved from lukewarm to cold. In company with many other Western countries, official Canada displayed discomfort and ambivalence in its relations with the ANC, and looked for alternative ways of supporting black South Africans. As a result, the Trudeau government never formally recognized the ANC or the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). In the eight years of Liberal governments in which the ANC had a full-time office and accredited mission in Canada, contact was restricted to the most junior Canadian officer in the Department of External Affairs.126 Early in the 1970s, it seemed that the government would be more directly supportive of South African liberation movements. As a result of pressure from African countries and southern African liberation movements, the 1973 Commonwealth conference in Ottawa produced a final communiqué which recognized 'the legitimacy' of their struggle 'to win full human rights and self determination.'127 Trudeau also promised assistance to people in the liberated areas of southern Africa and in adjacent African countries through matching grants to Canadian and international NGOs. However, Trudeau made clear that this assistance was to be strictly humanitarian: 'We are not going to supply hand grenades ... to the freedom fighters.'2 He was also not willing at this stage to affront the regime in Pretoria. Assistance would go to South Africans inside South Africa only on the proviso that it would be acceptable to the South African authorities. Until 1979, the government did not exclude the ANC from the general provisions of the 1973 commitment.'29 In March 1974, Mitchell Sharp reaffirmed the government's commitment to the liberation movements in South Africa as well as...
in Namibia and Rhodesia, in his contention that 'Peaceful humanitarian aid is one tangible method of demonstrating where we stand on the issues of racist and colonialist injustices.' Indeed, guidelines put forward by CIDA in January 1975 reiterated the commitment to support 'the indigenous populations in southern Africa who are victims of racist and apartheid policies' through humanitarian and developmental projects.

Organizations like CUSO, Oxfam, MATCH, and the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP) began to establish programs with the ANC - some planning well into the future with full CIDA cooperation. Through its projects division and with CIDA help, CUSO provided about $111,000 to ANC projects in the 1970s. Other agencies supported clinics, day-care centres and production training workshops with the ANC.

With the election of a Conservative government in 1979, however, the policy towards the ANC changed. At first it seemed that the government was simply tightening vetting procedures when it informed NGOs that projects dealing with southern African liberation movements or with Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa had to be approved in writing by the director general of CIDA's NGO division and External Affairs either in Ottawa or in the field. By December, it had become clear that the government had instituted a change in policy. NGOs found that all their project proposals for CIDA dealing with the ANC were rejected, including some that had been passed routinely in the past. In fact, the aid policy was under review until August 1980 when a CIDA official finally confirmed that assistance to the ANC was henceforth ruled out. The government opposed 'the use of violence either to promote or to prevent political and social change in South Africa.'

In the case of the other southern African liberation movements, the situation was different: SWAPO had been declared to be the legitimate representative of the Namibian people by the United Nations, and the Canadian government did not recognize the legality of the South African administration of Namibia. The Canadian government had also supported U.N. resolutions declaring the Smith regime illegal and imposing full sanctions; hence, aid to ZANU and ZAPU was acceptable. At any rate, by the time the Clark government instituted this new policy, the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe was almost over.

In the early 1980s, officials insisted that the government had always opposed assistance to the ANC. Any assistance that had been granted in the past, they claimed, was a result of sloppy administration or a failure to transmit the policy to junior levels of the civil service.

In fact, a number of Canadian NGOs had worked closely with CIDA to develop projects with the ANC in the 1970s. The planning for funding on a multiyear basis belied the official claim of the 1980s that the Canadian government had never provided such assistance. What seems more likely is that it never occurred to anyone that the 1973 Commonwealth commitment did not include the ANC.

However, the election of the Conservative government in 1979 emboldened Cold
War forces within External Affairs who were interested in controlling or stopping Canadian NGO assistance to Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos, as well as to southern Africa. During this period, security branches of the government also monitored groups in Canada who supported the antiapartheid struggle.34 In the hardened approach, the government was responding with extreme sensitivity to public opinion in Canada, much of which had denigrated southern African liberation movements as 'terrorist' and 'communist.' The outcry in the Canadian press and Parliament after the 1973 Commonwealth commitment had delayed the original assistance for almost a year,'35 during which liberation movements in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola were well on their way to assuming power at independence.

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In 1979, two incidents heightened the sensitivity of the newly elected Conservative government to this issue. During the 1979 Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, the Toronto Sun touched off a furore by erroneously reporting that Canadian aid was supporting the military programs of Zimbabwean liberation movements. Also that year the Anglican church and its head, Archbishop Ted Scott, had been strongly criticized for its support for World Council of Church grants to SWAPO and the two liberation movements from Zimbabwe. In this climate, officials at External Affairs and Conservative politicians moved to construct a new policy.

Once the approach was changed, Liberal politicians were only too happy to concur that they, too, had never favoured support for the ANC. In June 1981, Mark MacGuigan told IDAFSA136 that, as long as Canada was in the Contact Group, it would not become involved publicly in anti-apartheid work as it would harm Canada's 'neutrality' with South Africa. The spirit of the 1973 Commonwealth conference, which had flickered in the mid-late 1970s, had died by the early 1980s. As late as July 1984, External Affairs officials were still stating publicly that the Canadian government did not recognize the ANC and did not support the ANC's violent methods.137

After stopping financial assistance to the ANC, the state was at pains to placate criticism from anti-apartheid forces, pointing to its contributions through programs operated by the United Nations and the Commonwealth: the U.N. Education and Training Programme for Southern Africans (UNETPSA) (about $2 million), the Inter-University Exchange Fund (IUEF) (about $1.5 million), and the small U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa (about $0.23 million).138

In addition, from 1977-8 on, CIDA began acting as a conduit for matching assistance to Canadian NGOs involved in aid projects inside South Africa. Some of the earliest projects inside South Africa were organized by the Canadian Labour Congress in connection with black trade unions and through Oxfam Canada and the Coady International Institute. In 1983, CIDA began a $1.5 million five-year scholarship program for black South Africans organized by the World University Service of Canada. A range of other projects were supported, including some in the homelands.39
While the assistance was meant to deflect criticism from the anti-apartheid community, it was a minimal gesture. During the entire Trudeau era, total financial support for black South Africans inside and outside South Africa through bilateral and multilateral contributions from the Canadian state amounted to only about $7.3 million.

In addition, the program was fairly limited in scope, focusing primarily on educational assistance for refugees and individual scholarships inside South Africa. Its approach matched quite closely Pretoria's own strategy of producing a new privileged class in the black community that would identify with the apartheid regime, serving as a buffer against the dispossessed black majority. At this point, the assistance served the anti-apartheid cause only indirectly and in the long term, and it did nothing for the immediate strategic needs of South Africans struggling against apartheid. The decision to stop funding humanitarian projects for the ANC in 1979 was a telling indication of the state's reluctance to confront the apartheid regime in any significant way; its alternate programs constituting an easy and token way out.

In 1973 at the Ottawa Commonwealth conference, the foreign minister of Tanzania had asked that, even if the Canadian government could not aid the cause of liberation, at least could it not help 'our enemies.' Yet the approach was exactly opposite: material assistance to South African liberation movements was cancelled, scholarships and small NGO projects substituted, and military collaboration continued.

In sum, the period between the 1977 'reforms' and the election of the Mulroney government in 1984 marked a new low in the official Canadian approach to South Africa, a distinctively determinist phase. Purported reforms masked a reaffirmed commitment to the interests of the Canadian private sector, on the one hand, and the larger strategic and material interests of the West, on the other. The influence of sections of civil society opposed to Canadian policy towards South Africa dwindled into obscurity.

During the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of the West had settled back into an understanding that little was likely to change in South Africa after the Soweto riots and that the West's interests lay with the status quo. The policy of codes and embargoes became the subterfuge to placate antiapartheid opinion while masking the underlying collusion. The solution was to seem to be doing something without doing anything at all. If they had any value at all, it was to begin the process of separating Western countries from full support and identification with white South Africa. Only with a new conjuncture, a changed international response to dramatic events in South Africa, and a new domestic configuration in Canada, could change and anything like a genuine anti-apartheid policy begin.

PART TWO: MULRONEY, THE COMMONWEALTH, AND SANCTIONS
Forces for Change: The New Conjuncture

History teaches us many lessons. Out of the seemingly contradictory experiences of our collective and personal lives, we can say only that there are times when we must compromise and times when we should not.'

In 1985, Canadian policy on South Africa appeared to have changed fundamentally. Gone was the old policy of 'balance' with its anti-apartheid rhetoric and careful commitment to the short-term interests of Canadian corporations. In its place was an explicit promise to invoke total economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, barring significant progress to end apartheid. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's dramatic statement at the United Nations promising full sanctions was followed by a sustained campaign within the Commonwealth and the imposition of concrete economic sanctions.

The decision to adopt sanctions was part of an international response to the latest round of violence in South Africa, as the state attempted to crush the most significant wave of black opposition since the Soweto riots. The immediate issue was black disenfranchisement in the South African government's new constitution, which had given token representation to the Asian and coloured populations, but had left the black majority out altogether. The initiative was part of a program of reform started in the late 1970s as the government of P.W. Botha attempted to defuse the growing political and economic crisis of the apartheid state without altering the fundamentals of white minority rule and privilege.

The struggle against the constitution built on a decade of organization and resistance that started in the 1973 workers' strikes in Durban, gained momentum in the student-coordinated Soweto riots in 1976, and continued with community-based civic associations, student and parent organizations, women's groups, trade unions, national umbrella organizations like the United Democratic Front (UDF), and a revitalized African National Congress (ANC) underground.2

The insurrection of the mid-1980s began in the Vaal triangle (the area around Pretoria and Johannesburg) and spread to almost every township in the country, building on consumer and rent boycotts and increasingly strategic trade union activity coordinated by a new trade union federation, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In the tradition of Sharpeville and Soweto, the protests moved beyond the issues at hand into a full-blown challenge to the apartheid system.

For a time, South Africa's enormous machinery of repression was unable to quell popular action or to maintain effective control in the black townships where mass-based organizations began to assume effective leadership of the local population. A two-day work stoppage in November 1984 was observed by almost one million black workers. To regain power, the South African state imposed successive states of emergency, detained without trial 33,000 people (including 11,000 children3 under eighteen), 4 tortured countless prisoners, and continued to remove whole populations from their homes. The state banned more than twenty-five organizations working peacefully to end apartheid, including the UDF, and attempted to prevent trade unions from engaging in political activity. Heavy
restrictions were placed on the media, and foreign journalists were either refused entry or deported.

Added to this was South Africa's genocidal campaign of destabilization in the region which resulted directly or indirectly in one and a half million deaths, created four million refugees, and virtually destroyed the Angolan and Mozambican economies.5 South African armed forces raided its neighbours regularly and supported armed proxies in Angola, Mozambique, and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Countries that shielded refugees (Botswana and Lesotho) faced border restrictions and continuing threats. By the end of the 1980s, the cost to the independent countries of southern Africa amounted to over $62 billion.6 As journalists David Martin and Phyllis Johnson noted,

The impact of apartheid on the region, in economic, human and ecological terms, represents a holocaust that few outside the region, and many within it, neither know about nor can comprehend. The economic costs probably exceed the foreign debt of the SADCC region by three times. The mental and physical scars are deep. The human cost is on a staggering scale in some countries, for a generation that has known nothing but war, a cost to be carried forward for decades. And for the region's ecology, apartheid has exacted from it a price from which it can never recover.7

The ferocity with which the South African state reacted to the challenge to its authority and the brutality of its policy of destabilization created a reputa-

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tion sufficiently odious abroad that South African officials and their sympathizers were placed on the defensive. As the international media filmed police attacking peaceful demonstrations, clubbing kneeling church representatives, and breaking up funerals with tear gas, a consensus began to build for stronger international action.'

The New International Conjuncture

In this very charged moment, most Western governments began to shake off their lethargic acquiescence to the status quo and to press the South African government to change its system. By 1985, even President Reagan had been forced to enact sanctions to pre-empt stronger measures put forward by the U.S. Congress. The European Economic Community (EEC), Japan, and Britain considered mild measures, and the Commonwealth made sanctions against South Africa central to its meetings in the 1980s.

Yet it was international banks and corporations that took the first step, ahead of Western governments. In 1985, South Africa suffered a net capital outflow of almost R10.4 billion,9 and the rand fell to a new low, doubling the South African debt. When foreign banks refused to reschedule payments, calling in short-term loans worth $11 billion in summer 1985, they precipitated a crisis in the South African economy.'0

Initially, the South African government declared a moratorium on repayment of part of its short-term external debt." Then it agreed to run a current account surplus to finance repayments, and debts declined from 43 per cent of GDP in August 1985 to 15 per cent of GDP at the end of 1992.-12 However, these funds
came from savings, leading to a net outflow of capital (more than R40 billion) sorely needed for domestic investment. Also debt forced Pretoria to keep growth under control to avoid higher demand for imports which would have endangered the current account surplus. In this climate, companies with equity holdings in South Africa began a wave of disinvestment. 3 The rand fell precipitously and general confidence in South Africa as a good place for business evaporated. Not surprisingly, sections of the corporate world, including key business leaders in South Africa, began to urge a political resolution to protect its stake in a system from which it had profited for so long. As Zach de Beer, a director of Anglo American, put it, 'We dare not allow the baby of free enterprise to be thrown out with the bath-water of apartheid.' 4 During this period, South African companies moved ahead of the South African government, taking the first initiative to meet with the African National Congress in Lusaka in 1985.

The view that Western interests, including corporate interests, were threatened not served by the maintenance of apartheid represented the 'progressive wing' of international opinion which stood in direct antithesis to the anti-sanctions views of leaders like Margaret Thatcher and West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Thatcher, in particular, fought vigorously within the Commonwealth against sanctions and tended to denigrate the ANC, offering assistance to the region as an alternative to direct action against South Africa. 5

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The most eloquent spokesman for the 'progressive wing,' Malcolm Fraser (a former prime minister of Australia), argued that, without sanctions and other tough measures to end apartheid, moderation would be swept aside, terror and destruction would be South Africa's future, and the 'government that emerged from all this would be extremely radical, probably Marxist, and would nationalize all western business interests.' 6 In a time of considerable uncertainty about apartheid's longevity, the intention was to signal to black leaders that the West was on their side. The hope was that they would eschew the socialist objectives of the liberation movements, welcome Western companies, and keep South Africa in the Western camp.

Canada and the New International Conjuncture

The disagreement within the West on appropriate strategies and the exodus of Western corporations produced an opening which greatly influenced the reform in Canadian policy. At the same time, this new conjuncture coincided with the election of a Conservative government in Canada led by Brian Mulroney. Unwedded to the doctrinaire formulations of the past, this new administration was given the opportunity to develop a fresh approach at a time when the issue of apartheid had captured world attention. As other countries began to initiate action, the Canadian government had to move or be left behind. That it seized the chance to develop a radically different policy astonished many sections of Canadian society and, indeed, many Conservatives.

This chapter will explore the political and social forces that gave rise to this striking reversal in Canadian policy from 1985 to 1987: in the state at all levels, in the approach which Canadian banks and corporations adopted to the South
African crisis, and in the heightened activity within Canadian civil society. The emerging consensus for a new tougher policy was fuelled by extensive media coverage of events in southern Africa in the early years of Mulroney's first administration.7

To the amazement of many, the role that Prime Minister Mulroney played in developing a new policy in his early years in power was absolutely vital. Mulroney's political philosophy was closer to Thatcher and Reagan on other matters of public policy, and yet on southern Africa he advocated a much stronger policy than either of the others were prepared to countenance. Mulroney was also far ahead of his Cabinet, his party, and caucus, and, in the early years, took over leadership on this issue from the Department of External Affairs. In a style reminiscent of John Diefenbaker in 1960-1, Mulroney made up his mind and brought the rest of the government with him."

In the process, Mulroney was able to rise to the stature of an international statesman in a way few would have thought possible, especially as he was following the very polished performance of Pierre Trudeau. While Nordic leaders had long called for and enacted strong measures against apartheid, their position was a known quantity. Mulroney surprised many in his passionate commitment to stronger action against apartheid, not only in the Commonwealth but also in meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7). Previous leaders had confined their remarks to condemning apartheid, but had offered little else. Now Mulroney was one of a select but informal group in the Commonwealth which attempted to broker a new policy.

Mulroney came to the question of apartheid with strong personal convictions,19 some say, developed in his university years, certainly affected by television coverage of events in South Africa from 1984 to 1986. He was deeply influenced by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Alan Boesak, and presidents Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, and Robert Mugabe. Beyond this principled opposition to apartheid, there were political benefits to be gained from seizing the moment, benefits which could not have been lost on a seasoned political veteran like Mulroney. In the United Nations following his commitment that barring reforms to end apartheid Canada would sever relations with South Africa, Mulroney had dozens of U.N. representatives rushing to shake his hand. There is no question that he relished the limelight.

Mulroney's appointment of Stephen Lewis, a former NDP leader in Ontario, as Canada's ambassador to the United Nations and Roy McMurtry to London two non-career diplomats - meant that he had strong and independent support on this issue from key ambassadors. Lewis, in particular, had ready direct access to Mulroney.20 In terms of career diplomats, Roger Bull in Harare was influential in reflecting the views of the frontline states2 on sanctions and in countering the more cautious views of his peers in other African posts, including and especially South Africa. Mulroney thus assembled around him a new generation from the one that had guided Canada's South Africa policy in the previous twenty years,
one that had grounds for scepticism that a policy emphasizing patience, dialogue, and the maintenance of economic relations would end apartheid.2
With a fresh electoral mandate, moreover, the Conservative government could respond to the deepening South African crisis with tougher measures. The importance of the new political conjuncture inside Canada cannot be over-

134 Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions emphasized: strong convictions, a new energy, and a willingness to rethink Canada's southern Africa policy were essential in overriding the opposition of many in the civil service who remained committed to the policies of the past. At the same time, Mulroney's policy, especially on economic sanctions, seemed to break ranks with important allies; the Tory government, no less than its Liberal predecessors, had strong links with the corporate world. Yet, as we have just seen, this was the period when the private sector was reassessing the attractiveness of South Africa as a place to do business. Hence, thinking about change in South Africa became considerably more fluid, opening a space for fresh alternatives. In sum, the changes reflected less a fundamental shift in the power of domestic forces and interests than a response at the political level to the dramatically new conjuncture at home in Canada and abroad in South Africa. In this way, the new policy demonstrated the relative autonomy of the Canadian state from key forces wedded to the policy of the past.
What made this initiative autonomous was that it ran counter to the strong official commitment to the principle of free trade in goods and services, so central to the Mulroney administration's policies with the United States and Mexico. In the early years of this administration, many within the civil service in Canada had great difficulty accepting sanctions and fought hard against the new initiative. Sections of the Canadian corporate world disagreed with the general thrust of the policy, continuing trade, equity investments, and loans, and opposing or ignoring Mulroney's voluntary sanctions.
What made the autonomy relative was that sanctions were neither mandatory nor comprehensive, and the force of the policy dwindled quite quickly. Only a branch of the Canadian corporate world involved in trade was affected by mandatory sanctions, and then only for a short period. At the same time, the new policy was in tune with the deeper logic accepted by influential sections of international corporate opinion and Western strategic thinking that apartheid must go if Western interests were to be preserved.
Along with Malcolm Fraser, senior figures in the Mulroney administration, including Mulroney himself, worried that, if the West did not act on South Africa, the potential for revolutionary change and Soviet influence would be much greater, both in the period of turbulence in the mid-1980s and when white control inevitably ended. The concern was to ensure that a 'renewed South Africa still remains very much in the western sphere.'23 Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson expressed the emerging consensus when he said that, 'ultimately, the case for sanctions rests not on an uncertain morality, but on the long-term interests of the West.'24
Joe Clark, in particular, warned that if the black majority in South Africa believed that the West had abandoned them when they needed help, that would give a 'strong card' to the Soviet Union. On a number of occasions he talked about the potential and substantial 'Soviet threat in southern Africa': 'Soviet influence grows in violence and in vacuums, and it is profoundly in the interest of the West to seek to stop that violence, and fill those vacuums.' 25 'Continued intransigence on the part of the South African government,' Clark added, [would] 'drive more and more people to radical solutions.' 26

This approach turned thinking around, emphasizing the importance of black South Africans rather than the white regime in the Cold War competition for influence in the region. It played an important part in changing official relations with the representative organizations of the black majority, especially the ANC. Clark said that while the ANC 'leadership includes many who are moderate, and some who are not ... if countries like Canada turn away from the ANC, that would make everyone immoderate, and not only add to the prospect of violence, but give credence to the Marxist component.'27 Thus, in June 1986 for the first time, senior officials of the Department of External Affairs met with Mac Maharaj, a senior member of the ANC's national executive. A month later, the official ANC representative to Canada was invited to address a committee of the House of Commons, also for the first time. 28 From then on, such meetings and representation became commonplace.

The government's new thinking was endorsed by the opposition Liberal party. During the parliamentary debate on South Africa in June 1986, Liberal MPs agreed that unless the West did something for black leaders in South Africa, the only option left to them would be violence and revolution, that South Africa would fall, 'into the Communist clan.'29 As MP Brian Tobin explained, 'If any of us were in that situation and found ourselves abandoned by people who could make a difference, the western world, then I have no doubt in saying that I would embrace whatever manifesto would put a gun in my hand, I would embrace whatever philosophy would give me at least the dignity of standing on my own two feet, and I would embrace whatever individual would allow me at least the dignity of expressing myself ... by whatever means.'30

Given this bipartisan support, the policy that emerged represented more the new administration’s interest in playing a significant part in Western action than a challenge to the structured representation of interests inside Canada. The varying shades of opinion in the West over the relationship of capitalism to apartheid provided an opportunity for Mulroney to develop a new policy that broke with the past without abandoning the interests of all sections of the corporate world. Indeed, while Canadian governments in the past had faced a community united in its support for open economic relations with South Africa, Mulroney found the private sector rethinking its role. The consensus about the long-term prospects of South Africa as a good place for 'business as usual' had been shaken.
Canadian Companies and the New Conjuncture

During this period, Canadian corporations adopted a range of different strategies to meet the turbulent conditions in South Africa. A few diehard Canadian corporations remained in South Africa, notably Varity Corporation (formerly Massey-Ferguson) and Quebec Iron and Titanium (QIT). Other Canadian affiliates were engaged in pharmaceuticals, mining, and construction. Reasons for staying ranged from profitability, confidence in the future for their products and services, desire not to yield the field to their competitors, and inability to either sell their shares or retrieve the true value of their equity. With the value of the rand significantly lower in the 1980s than the 1970s and the introduction of regulations on capital repatriation reducing the value of their holdings by another half, there were strong disincentives for corporations to leave. They stood to lose considerably by selling their properties.

Nevertheless, many sections of the Canadian corporate world did opt for varying degrees of withdrawal. By the mid-1980s, Canadian banks and financial institutions had virtually stopped subscribing to credits, underwriting bond purchases, or lending to the South African government and its agencies. Canadian investment portfolio managers dumped their South African holdings, predominantly in gold funds. Most Canadian companies joined the larger corporate exodus and sold their shares in South African affiliates, including standard bearers of constructive engagement like Ford Canada and other more hard-line defenders of investment in South Africa - Alcan, Bata, Falconbridge, Noranda, International Thomson, Moore Corporation, and Dominion Textile. Total direct Canadian investment plummeted from $550 million in 1984 to about $19 million in 1990.

The move away from direct equity involvement reflected a mixture of corporate judgment that South Africa was no longer good for business and sensitivity to public criticism. South Africa's economic prospects had become decidedly gloomy, with slow or uncertain growth and the rand plummeting in value. Some firms simply found that their subsidiaries were no longer profitable. At the same time, the 'hassle factor' of press and shareholder attention had begun to take its toll. Once large pension funds started to divest their holdings from companies involved in South Africa, the cost of continuing...

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became too great. Canadian companies with substantial interests in the United States, notably Ford Canada and Thomson publications, were not prepared to see them jeopardized by vigorous sanctions campaigns at the local, municipal, and state levels. Redpath Industries stopped buying sugar from South Africa in the mid-1980s because, as one official explained, "We didn't want people picketing our refinery." Redpath Industries stopped buying sugar from South Africa in the mid-1980s because, as one official explained, "We didn't want people picketing our refinery." 38 Faced with shareholder resolutions asking it to divest in 1987 and 1988, even Varity started to protest state repression against blacks in South Africa on the grounds that it helped those arguing for companies to leave. In many cases disinvestment was replaced with continued arms-length relations. Ford carried on a trading relationship with its former South African subsidiary by supplying vehicles, components, service parts, management and technical...
assistance, and by allowing continued use of its trademark. Bata moved across the border to Swaziland, happy to escape the unfavourable publicity generated by its operations in South Africa in the past. Alcan agreed to provide technical assistance to its former affiliate and to supply materials for wire and cable production. It also continued to purchase manganese under a contract with a South African company. In 1988, Varity sold its small share in Atlantis Diesel Engines, but retained a technology transfer agreement.

Nevertheless, the decision by a range of Canadian corporations to limit their interests in South Africa provided a new context for Canadian government action. While exporters and importers continued to exert pressure on the state for open economic relations, the corporate community as a whole was divided, as investors and bankers moved to more profitable sites elsewhere. Thus, opposition to the new policy was considerably more muted than it would have been a decade earlier.

At the same time, other levels of the state and civil society in Canada were adopting a new militant position on South Africa. In fact, the federal government was in danger of being upstaged by provincial and municipal governments, while trade unions, churches, universities, and NGOs were well on the way to building a national anti-apartheid network. They constituted a pressure within Canada for the federal government to do more.

Provincial and Municipal Government Action

Although uneven, provincial action on South Africa was earlier and tougher than federal government sanctions. In August 1985, a month ahead of Joe Clark's first promise, the leader of the Manitoba Conservative party and later premier of Manitoba, Gary Filmon, called for the end of all ties to Pretoria. In May 1986, Ontario Premier David Peterson invited Archbishop Tutu to speak to a special session of the Ontario legislature, the first occasion of this kind for a foreign dignitary in thirty-four years, and at which Tutu received a standing ovation.

Provincial governments began their anti-apartheid action by again ending sales of South African wine and liquor. In 1985, Manitoba, Ontario, and the Northwest Territories joined Quebec and ordered existing stock to be sold as soon as possible. While a premier's conference in St John's in August 1985 failed to gain unanimous participation, it did provide the opportunity for Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island to join the boycott. After a pause and in response to a vigorous two-year sanctions campaign by churches and trade unions, Newfoundland also imposed a ban, followed in June 1986 by Saskatchewan and New Brunswick. Two signal hold outs, the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, did not join in until federal government legislation forced their compliance.

Ironically, the activism of provincial governments caught the federal government off guard, and its first reaction was entirely negative. Wedded to the policies of the past, External Affairs officials complained that the liquor boycott would undermine Canada's reputation and would violate GAIT. One argued that it was
'irrelevant whether it's wine from South Africa. It could be rubber boots from Poland.'” Some believed Mulroney just did not like the provinces stealing a march on him.45 While Quebec and Manitoba led the way on the liquor boycott, in most other actions, the Ontario government was way out in front.46 In September 1985, it banned the purchase of South African goods by provincial institutions, nine months ahead of a similar federal measure.47 Legislation was introduced in April 1987 authorizing trustees dealing with registered charities and pension funds to dispose of South African investments or to decide not to purchase them without fear of lawsuits." This initiative assisted the anti-apartheid campaign against officials (as in the case of York University) who had argued that divestment would constitute imprudent behaviour and would leave them open to lawsuits,49 and was an important factor in gaining the board of governors' support for total divestment at the University of Windsor. A third measure of even greater significance was the decision to stop dealing with institutions which helped finance the South African government. In February 1989, the Peterson government excluded Swiss banks from a $500 million Eurobond financing of Ontario Hydro because of their continuing role in underwriting government of South Africa loans.50 Two years later, the NDP government dropped two top European bond underwriters, Deutsche Bank of Germany and Banque Parisbas of France, from its circle of bond marketers for the same reason." By contrast, the federal government refused to sanction third parties dealing with South Africa. Canadian municipalities also took direct, militant action ahead of the federal government. City councils from east to west voted for sanctions ranging from divestment in companies with South African ties to a boycott of South African products and, in the case of Vancouver, to a restriction on city business with firms like Shell Canada that refused to curtail their dealings with South Africa. The city councils of Regina, Ottawa, and St John's declared themselves apartheid-free zones. To demonstrate its sympathies, the city of Toronto named a boulevard after Archbishop Tutu, and city officials were prohibited from attending functions with representatives of the South African government.5” Metro Toronto banned the purchase of finished goods, foods, and beverages from South Africa for all its departments, boards, and commissions, and ordered that pension plans for civic employees not invest in South African government bonds or in companies that did business in South Africa. The city council in Montreal announced that it would not buy from companies with South African links54 and extended the ban to selling or leasing buildings or properties to such companies or making grants to them for industrial, residential, or commercial properties.55 In addition, South African government representatives were prohibited from taking part in public events or activities. All the material that South African organizations sent to libraries was clearly marked in terms of its origins.
Civil Society and the Pressure from Below
From at least the early 1970s and in some cases much longer, groups and individuals in trade unions, churches, universities, teachers federations, and other NGOs constituted a third important constituency, urging all levels of government and the private sector to take stronger action against South Africa. Long before it became fashionable, they established ties with South African liberation movements and anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. This broadly-based network constituted the most enduring and sincere source of anti-apartheid opinion and action in Canada.

Canadian Trade Unions: Direct Action and Research
Canada's trade union movement pressed early for stronger official action against apartheid and for greater assistance for black trade unions in South Africa.

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Generally, unions called for immediate comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, solidarity with the ANC, and greater assistance for the frontline states in southern Africa. Trade unions also wanted government legislation allowing Canadian workers to refuse to handle South African commodities without threat of discipline from their employers. Unions led the way on direct action campaigns, pension divestment, and union and consumer boycotts.

At the international level, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), under presidents Joe Morris and Shirley Carr, joined in campaigns through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), regularly protesting South African suppression of trade union rights for black workers. In March 1986, thirty thousand Canadian workers (in company with Australian, Swedish, and Finnish workers) refused post, telephone, or airline business with South Africa for three days. In 1987 the CLC also called a national consumer boycott of Shell Canada, as its parent company Royal Dutch Shell had worked actively to overcome international sanctions against South Africa. CLC President Shirley Carr also publicly referred to the system of 'semi-slave labour' that supported Shell; how striking miners at one of its mines in South Africa had been 'forced to work at gunpoint' and how union supporters had been fired.

Labour unions were also central in pushing provincial governments to act. In Quebec, the CSN (Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux) was an early militant force in the anti-apartheid movement. OPSEU (the Ontario Public Service Employees Union) mounted campaigns to end the purchase of South African goods by provincial institutions and to have pensions funds divest from companies with South African links.

When the British Columbia government would not join the provincial boycott on South African wines, for example, the B.C. Government Employees Union workers went out on a one-day strike. The B.C. Federation of Labour and the International Longshoreman's and Warehousemen's Union also refused to unload a shipment of South African steel. Although a B.C. Supreme Court injunction banned a union picket in the latter case, the action added pressure on those companies trying to continue business as usual.
The two centres for coordination of trade union anti-apartheid action were the International Affairs department of the CLC and the SACTU Solidarity Committee. CLC officials established early strong links with South African trade unions and, from 1976 on, funded programs of assistance (largely worker education and training) for trade unions inside South Africa. Following the formation of FOSATU (the Federation of South African Trade Unions) in 1979, CLC officials initiated direct contacts and in 1982 invited the FOSATU executive to the CLC convention. Although CLC representative Paul Puritt was denied a visa by the South African government from 1983 to 1989, he was able to manage project funding through meetings with South African trade unionists in Europe, Canada, and southern Africa. He also established close relations with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed inside South Africa in 1985.

In turn, South African trade unionists became an important part of the CLC's educational, fund-raising, and mobilizing work in Canada, participating at conventions, provincial trade union meetings, labour courses, and city and district labour councils across Canada. In 1984, Cyril Ramaphosa, the general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, came to Canada and in 1986 Jay Naidoo, the general secretary of COSATU, led a delegation to the CLC national convention, receiving pledges of long term financial support.

A second current of support for South African trade unions coordinated by the SACTU Solidarity committee (SSC) complemented the work done by the CLC. Formed in 1980, the committee undertook extensive educational campaigns with Canadian unions on South Africa, raised funds, and mobilized support for sanctions campaigns. Their unique contribution, in the period when they were led by Ken Traynor and Ken Luckhardt, lay in their detailed research on Canada's economic links with South Africa, drawn in many cases from their union contacts. This information constituted one of the key resources for the anti-apartheid movement, putting the issue of South Africa centrally on the union agenda.

Their publications and coordination enabled unions to detect and publicize loopholes or breaches of sanctions. The committee also performed an important educational role with the media and with parliamentarians. Their 1985 publication, Trafficking In Apartheid - The Case for Canadian Sanctions against Apartheid attracted national attention in its assertion that barely four hundred jobs were at risk if the Canadian government adopted comprehensive economic sanctions.

At the same time, the Solidarity Committee's loyalty to a South African trade union federation in exile, the Lusaka-based South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), had a divisive effect within the trade union movement and the anti-apartheid community. In particular, this alliance brought the committee into bitter conflict with senior officials in the CLC. Operating from a social democratic perspective, CLC officials had been disturbed by SACTU's communist connections, its direct links to the ANC, and its insistence that it be the sole channel of assistance to South African workers and their organizations.
Most seriously, the alliance led the Solidarity Committee to underestimate the significance of COSATU and to oppose direct links to non-SACTU unions inside South Africa. As SACTU's influence was in decline (it ultimately disbanded in 1990), this fundamental misreading meant that union loyalties and a significant part of Canadian union funds were devoted to a spent force. The committee's success in attracting and maintaining the support of unions of the stature of the Canadian Auto Workers, the Canadian Union of Postal Workers, and the Communications Workers of Canada undermined the contribution which might have gone to the trade union mainstream in South Africa during a crucial period in the struggle against apartheid.

Canadian Church Opposition to Apartheid
Along with the trade union movement, Canadian churches played an invaluable role in creating the climate for sanctions in the first place and in never letting up on pressure for tougher measures. Two coalitions - the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) formed in 1974 and the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (ICCAF) formed in 1982 - were absolutely vital in shaping inter-denominational, ecumenical policy on southern Africa. As we have seen, TCCR's work centred around research on Canadian economic links with South Africa and persistent pressure on the private sector in Canada to decrease them. ICCAF was formed to establish closer contacts with African churches and to do broader development education in Canada. The Canadian Council of Churches urged the government to sustain its strong campaign. Church delegations visited South Africa regularly when they were permitted entry, and they maintained close relations with South African churches. On their return to Canada, a delegation from the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada called for economic sanctions and early specific deadlines. In the late 1980s, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace collected 120,000 signatures urging the government to take a tougher stand on apartheid and to do more to strengthen the economies of the independent countries in the region.

Within the church community, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) continued in the 1980s to lead the campaign to end corporate involvement in South Africa, as they had led the battle against bank loans and purchases of Krugerrands in the 1970s. For almost twenty years, Renate Pratt, Bill Davis, Bonnie Greene, Moira Hutchinson, and Marjorie Ross, together with ministers, pastors, nuns, and priests persisted in the face of abuse, condescension, and ridicule from corporate executives and the business press. These tactics were sustained for many years against firms which withdrew (Alcan and Falconbridge) and those that did not (Varity, Rio Algom, and Shell Canada). The taskforce also campaigned against Canadian government borrowing from Swiss and German banks that provided financial support for South Africa.
Social Action versus Free Speech: The Universities and Apartheid

A third major site of civil society agitation, university campuses, focused both on the need for a stronger government policy on South Africa and for universities themselves to sever connections with South Africa. To express their solidarity with the majority of black South Africans, Canadian universities also gave honorary degrees to South Africans leading the anti-apartheid struggle.

Campaigns were launched to divest university holdings in companies with South African links, to boycott South African goods and services on campuses, and even to end advertisements in student newspapers from companies involved with South Africa. Opposition to South African embassy officials speaking on campus provoked major debates on the issue of free speech.

Similar questions arose in debates over whether or not to conduct scholarly research in South Africa, particularly once the government imposed a voluntary ban on scientific and cultural exchanges. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) rejected an executive recommendation to cease supporting such work on the grounds that the best way to oppose apartheid was to support research into the system. In 1988 after consulting with ANC officials, the Canadian Association of African Studies supported academic contacts inside South Africa if they in no way supported apartheid and received backing from mass democratic organizations.

Most university administrations hoped to quell campus agitation by some form of conditional or qualified divestment, usually only from companies that had not implemented the Canadian code of conduct or the Sullivan principles. Divestment was primarily from short-term investments and endowment funds, although some universities went further and also divested their pension funds. At the weakest, some universities attempted to sidestep the issue, by writing to companies to express concern.

The struggle on this issue became increasingly bitter and student action increasingly insistent as groups invaded presidents' offices and shouted down opponents at meetings of governing councils. The Charlatan, a Carleton University student newspaper, remarked acidly that its administration 'has once again proven that it has the moral fibre of day-old Jello.' In reply, most press editorials denounced disruptive student activism as boorish and counterproductive.

Faced with the depth of feeling about divestment by students and faculty, most major Canadian universities were compelled to opt for stronger divestment policies. Donald MacSween, the chair of the McGill board's social re-
grounds. After six years of conditional divestment, McGill University was the first to opt for full divestment in November 1985, withdrawing from banks still making loans to South Africa, selling holdings in corporations controlled directly or indirectly by South African interests, and divesting from corporations with direct investments in South Africa. After a considerable battle, Carleton University decided in March 1987 not to have any dealings with South African owned or controlled companies or to purchase South African goods. In September 1987, Queen's board reversed an earlier decision, after student referenda, a faculty ballot, and a vote in the senate indicated strong support for total divestment. Others, like Lakehead, Simon Fraser, Trent, McMaster, Western, and the University of New Brunswick, chose to divest only from shares in companies that had not adhered to the Sullivan principles and to concentrate on 'human investment rather than financial divestment.' This usually meant the creation of scholarships for non-white South Africans. Following the 1986 report of the administrator of the Canadian code, the University of British Columbia sold shares and would not invest in companies operating in South Africa where an alternative was equally attractive. The University of Alberta merely wrote to companies that continued to do business in South Africa.

At one extreme pole, President George Connell and the governing council of the University of Toronto fought a determined battle against the majority of the student body and faculty association which favoured the action taken by McGill. The administration argued that it was improper for the university to become involved in this issue, that political considerations should not be brought to bear on business judgments, that political action was the prerogative of the individual, not the institution, and that the university should not embark on a campaign to correct injustices outside the university. To do so, in Connell's view, risked inviting political interference in university affairs.

On two issues related to South Africa, the question of South African officials speaking on campus and the decision to retain or divest from economic links with South African linked companies, the University of Toronto became not only a site of struggle but also a centre of larger controversy, as the same issues resonated in the press and on other campuses throughout the mid-late 1980s.

The first case, militant student action prevented a Hart House debate on divestment with South African Ambassador Glenn Babb in November 1985. A mace was thrown at Babb by Lennox Farrell, who was then charged with assault, but acquitted. Following this incident, four professors sought a permanent injunction to prohibit any representative of the South African government from speaking on campus in support of apartheid. While conceding in principle that everyone had a right to be heard if invited by a group within the university, this quarter of opinion argued that inviting a prominent South African official demonstrated 'an extraordinary lack of seriousness and sensitivity.' As Professor Cranford Pratt pointed out, there was not a sufficient benefit 'to offset the pain it was bound to cause to many members of our community, black, brown
and white, to see a major university society honour the representative of a racist regime in this way.’

On the other side, the university administration argued that South African officials had a right to speak on campus and promised to invite the ambassador back as a matter of policy; it also opposed the professors' court application. The Globe and Mail concurred, arguing editorially that, 'if there is one place where abhorrent ideas and heated issues should find a forum for debate, it is the university campus ... Awareness is not approval; it informs opinions.'

Connell and his administration also rejected any form of economic action to demonstrate opposition to apartheid. In their view, prudence in investment meant that political, social, moral, and other non-business factors were not appropriate considerations in dealing with business judgments. Moreover, Connell believed that corporations in South Africa did not necessarily inflict social injury on their employees and could engage constructively. On this basis, he fought for more than three years against the campaign to have the University of Toronto divest from companies involved in South Africa.

At first in September 1985, Connell agreed to selective divestment in companies that had not applied the principles of the Canadian code. Then when the administrator of the code found that four of the companies in which the university had investments did not meet its requirements, Connell reneged, arguing that the code was not specific or detailed enough to establish benchmarks against which company performance could be measured. He wrote instead to the Canadian government suggesting that it improve the code. In March 1987, Connell had sufficiently strong support from his Council that he was able to throw out a second motion to consider divestment.

At this point, the campaign against Connell's policy intensified. Prominent alumni like Michele Landsberg lambasted the university for its lack of principle, for its choice of 'the smooth-faced status quo' over enlightened dissent. Seventy-two professors called for Connell's resignation and the faculty association passed a motion of censure of Connell for, inter alia, his stand on the divestment issue. Despite his unpopularity, Connell never wavered from his position that it was not the role of government bodies of universities to comment on issues outside their terms of reference.

Ultimately, a combination of militant student action and faculty protest resulted in a governing council vote (opposed by Connell) to proceed with full divestment in January 1988. Even then, the administration was able to delay action until the time for sanctions passed. While Connell was exceptional in the tenacity of his opposition, the long struggle at the University of Toronto kept the issue very much alive on campuses for most of the 1980s.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement

Long before the crisis of the mid-1980s in South Africa, universities, churches, and trade unions had joined with other groups to form an anti-apartheid community. During the 1980s, this movement mushroomed, as 150 organizations were involved in southern Africa support work, linked by a monthly network.
bulletin. All over the country, anti-apartheid networks focused on community-based education and organizational work. In addition, two resource and information centres on southern Africa - the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC) and Le Centre de l'Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique Australe (CIDMAA) in Montreal became vital coordinating centres at the national level.99

Unlike the United States, Canada did not have a strategically situated black activist community with significant leverage on the state. While black groups were important in initiating anti-apartheid actions in Toronto100 and Halifax, elsewhere black Canadians tended to express anti-apartheid opinions through the black press and through broadly based anti-apartheid organizations.

Generally, anti-apartheid activities were targeted at the level of the state, but some struggles focused on local boycotts of South African products and pickets of ships offloading South African goods. Campaigns to promote disinvestment added a strategic force to the campaign against official policy. Corporate boardrooms and annual general meetings became significant places of struggle where groups fought indefatigably to make continued investment and trade with South Africa costly in time, trouble, and public image.

As time went on, the national organization of anti-apartheid work became increasingly institutionalized. In 1986-7, the Canadian Council for International Co-operation convened the Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa (IAWGSA) which became an organizational focus for NGO anti-apartheid activities. In 1987, this network launched two major national conferences: Taking Sides in Southern Africa held in Montreal102 in February-March and

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the Parallel Commonwealth conference in Vancouver in October. In 1988, the South Africa Reference Group (SARG) became a second organizational focus for Canadian support organizations with direct partnership relations with antiapartheid organizations in South Africa.

Coordination of anti-apartheid work extended to regional and local levels. In Quebec, for example, six regional solidarity committees organized educational work on southern Africa through a network called Afrique-bec, and CIDMAA brought together about twenty organizations in Montreal for anti-apartheid work.103 The Manitoba Coalition against Racism and Apartheid (MCARA), incorporated in 1986, combined about forty organizations, including people from the African Canadian, First Nations, academic, women's, labour, and religious communities. In 1989, groups from B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba established a Western Canadian Network to coordinate action against apartheid.

The cultural community in Canada joined in this broader network, organizing fund-raising concerts against apartheid. In mid-1986, the largest anti-apartheid demonstration in Canadian history was organized in Toronto with ten thousand people parading through the city and fifteen thousand gathered in front of the provincial legislature to hear Archbishop Tutu speak. In the evenings, Artists against Apartheid organized two 'Freedom concerts' as a musical tribute to those working against apartheid. Two years later, twelve hundred people joined with the
ANC and Ontario NDP leader Bob Rae in Toronto, another six hundred in Montreal, and four hundred in Vancouver to celebrate Nelson Mandela’s seventieth birthday and to demand his unconditional release from prison. In a strong commentary on the government's refusal both to diminish relations with the white regime in Pretoria or to offer support for the main liberation movement, activists met in Toronto in May 1989 to honour the new ANC representative, Peter Mahlangu, who presented his credentials and introduced himself to the 'people of Canada,' prominent Canadian politicians, and antiapartheid figures.104 While the government of Canada had full formal diplomatic relations with the white regime in Pretoria, it had only informal contacts with the ANC, and sent no representatives to this event. In the past, such groups had been active without changing the policies of previous governments. Yet their utility was to be in place, ready to move when a more propitious conjuncture appeared for Canadian government action, and to keep the pressure on when the Canadian government faltered. They also galvanized action at the community level. Although the unity and force of the movement was to diminish in later years, in the mid-1980s, it provided important support for strong government action.

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The climate produced by intense media coverage in Canada on South Africa also assisted the anti-apartheid effort, bringing a new dimension of immediacy to its work. Both Southam News and the Globe and Mail opened bureaux in the region during this period and the Toronto Star, Canada's largest daily newspaper, posted a full-time correspondent in Johannesburg. Television crews sent back firsthand coverage of the unfolding drama of the uprising and its repression. The result of media interest and anti-apartheid momentum was an informed Canadian public supporting stronger action by the state. Whereas in mid-1985 the Gallup poll found that less than one-half (48 per cent) of Canadian respondents claimed to have heard of South Africa's racial policies, by early 1987, the figure had climbed to 82 per cent.105 Of those aware in 1987, about 70 per cent said their sympathies were with the black population, with only a tiny percentage (6 per cent) sympathetic to the white government.06

With this dramatic increase in attention and shift in sympathy came growing support for much tougher government action, including severing all relations. While in July 1985 only 19 per cent of the survey felt that Canada should condemn and cut off all relations with South Africa, a year later, that figure had doubled to 35 per cent.07 In the 1986 poll, an additional 40 per cent felt that the government should urge South Africa to abandon apartheid, but should maintain relations. Fewer than 30 per cent opposed and 40 per cent favoured economic sanctions.10

Thus the time was ripe for the federal government to move. The images of resistance and repression in South Africa portrayed through the media had made a powerful impact on Canadian public opinion. Key sections of civil society and provincial and municipal levels of the state in Canada were already out in front with sanctions. Ahead of everyone else, international banks and corporations had
begun to impose their own kinds of sanctions. Above all, Canada had a new
government with a leader prepared to seize the moment produced by this new
conjuncture, dragging some very vocal opponents within the state along with him.

Seizing the Moment
If there are not fundamental changes in South Africa, we are prepared to invoke
total sanctions against that country and its repressive regime. If there is no
progress in the dismantling of apartheid, our relations with South Africa may have
to be severed absolutely ... The combination of internal dissent and external
condemnation is obviously taking its toll on the government. The Mandelas, the
Tutus, the Boesaks will one day prevail.

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the United Nations General Assembly 23
October 1985

The new domestic conjuncture within Canada, taken together with a tougher
mood in the international community, provided the conditions for Prime Minister
Mulroney to move Canadian policy out of the sterile era of 'balance.' Indeed, in
his first two years in power, Mulroney did more on South Africa than Trudeau
had in his entire fifteen. For a time, this initiative overrode and bypassed powerful
forces within the state which were antagonistic to the new approach. The paradox
was that this opposition and the main thrust of the ideology which had determined
policy in the past were strongly represented in the Conservative party.
Indeed, it is a considerable irony that it was a neo-conservative Tory prime
minister who ultimately challenged the nostrums of 'Whig' policy on southern
Africa: On the sacrosanct issue of promoting a free exchange of capital and
goods, Mulroney imposed concrete economic sanctions. On the issue of dialogue
and keeping a light in the window for white South African regimes, Mulroney
stated that this community had had more than enough time to come to their
senses. On the question of violence, Mulroney stated that, while his

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government could not condone violence, it understood the reasons why political
movements like the ANC took up arms. On the Cold War alliance with white
South Africa, Mulroney argued that the region and a future non-racial government
in South Africa would be lost to the West unless it gave the black majority more
support.2

Unlike previous Liberal administrations, the new government was prepared to see
South Africa as unique and exceptional. As Mulroney put it, only South Africa
has established colour as the hallmark of systematic inequality and repression.
Only South Africa determines the fundamental human rights of individuals and
groups within its society by this heinous method of classification.'3 Thus
sanctions did not undermine the general commitment to the free exchange of
goods and capital; but apartheid set South Africa apart as an extreme case.
Taking their cue, officials argued that new possibilities invalidated earlier
thinking and gave hope for change. As the white regime became increasingly
unacceptable, the ANC came to be seen as a key player rather than simply a
'Communist terrorist' organization. 'While previous governments had tended to
focus one-sidedly on the 'violence' of the ANC's armed struggle, officials now argued that 'the root of violence in South Africa is apartheid.' Although at this stage the government was not prepared to provide direct assistance to the ANC, its program of assistance inside South Africa increased dramatically, from about $2 million in Mulroney's first year in office to about $17 million in 1992-3. Overall, Canadian assistance to South Africa during the Mulroney period was eleven times that of the Trudeau era ($82 million as compared with only $7 million).

The Canadian State and the New Conjuncture
At first, Canadian policy on South Africa in the new Mulroney administration was indistinguishable from that of its predecessors. Without a clear signal from their new political masters, External Affairs officials simply carried on with their old policy, but with some cross currents. At his own insistence, Stephen Lewis took part in a U.N. General Assembly debate on apartheid in November 1984, the first for a Canadian representative in many years. At this stage, he offered nothing new, reiterating the government's rhetorical opposition to apartheid and its reservations about the effectiveness of comprehensive economic sanctions. Ironically in terms of his later views, Lewis also argued against the total isolation of South Africa and for the maintenance of diplomatic relations, asserting that 'racist mentalities feed on isolation.' The only hint of a change from the Liberal past was Lewis's recognition

'Seizing the Moment'
'On this less than perfect planet' that South Africa's legislated and institutionalized racialism set it apart as a special case.' Significantly, Muironey telephoned Lewis after the speech to say that the policy was not good enough.' The lack of clear political direction began to show in the next six months. In December, the government endorsed a U.N. resolution to end trade, military, and nuclear collaboration with South Africa and to support liberation movements. Yet, an External Affairs statement accompanying the vote indicated that the Canadian government still supported dialogue with South Africa: 'We do not change people's minds by refusing to talk to them.' Sanctions, in this view, were not timely, and the private sector was to be left strictly alone.'

However, the heightened repression inside South Africa and raids into neighbouring countries began to have an effect. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre in March 1985, the killing of forty-five black demonstrators by the South African police touched off a wave of parliamentary criticism led by NDP MPs John Rodriguez, Jim Manly, Howard McCurdy, and Pauline Jewett. Rodriguez introduced a private member's bill proposing a ban on further Canadian investment and bank loans in South Africa and on Krugerrands.'

Although a month earlier Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark had asked his officials to reassess Canada's policy towards South Africa in more than the general terms of the foreign policy review currently under way, the government was still not ready to move; it opposed each of Rodriguez's proposals. In the House, Gerry Weiner, Clark's parliamentary secretary, made a case
consistent with previous policy: Sanctions would foster violence and economic privation for the black majority in South Africa and for the other countries in the region. Foreign companies had a positive effect, and, in any case, the Canadian government would not extend Canadian laws extra-territorially to other countries. A ban on the sale of Kruggerands would interfere with the principle of free trade in peaceful goods and services. Anything beyond assistance inside South Africa would prejudice the foreign policy review under way.

By June, however, Stephen Lewis was sounding a clarion call for tougher U.N. Security Council action, particularly on South Africa's refusal to comply with Resolution 435 on procedures to bring Namibia to independence. 'Just as the system of apartheid has only one defender,' he said, 'so freedom for Namibia has only one obstacle.' He cited, the 'prevarications of the last seven years, the contempt for UN resolutions, the perpetual state of strife, the introduction of yet another illegal interim government, the recent revelations in Angola, and above all, the prolonged suffering and oppression of the Namibian people, must surely win from this Council a resolution ... which will lead to a breakthrough.' Lewis denounced the concept of linkage as 'palpably outrageous,' holding Namibia hostage to 'irrelevant and extraneous issues.'

The most significant commitment was a decision to end the toll processing of Namibian uranium by the Crown corporation Eldorado Nuclear. However, as existing contracts were to be honoured, Namibian uranium continued to enter Canada three years later, and, two years after that, shipments were resumed following Namibian independence. Other measures tightened up the arms embargo, restricting the export of sensitive electronic equipment, especially computers, to the South African government, the police, and military, and to other agencies involved in the enforcement of apartheid. The government also applied the voluntary U.N. embargo on imports of South African arms.
A pot pourri of measures indicated the government's willingness to mop up existing anomalies and to move forward on greater assistance inside South Africa. At this point, the government discouraged the sale of Krugerrands and clarified the sports boycott to discourage sports relations between nationally representative Canadian and South African teams. The post of labour officer was created at the embassy in Pretoria to work with South African trade unions and the Canadian Labour Congress. The government also began to increase assistance with a pledge of $5 million for education and training.

Joe Clark presented these measures as the Canadian government's response to the 'rising tide of revulsion in Canada and elsewhere at the injustices of apartheid.'22 They were defended in terms of their political and symbolic force, joining the West in sending a signal to the Pretoria regime. He even suggested that Canada was now ahead of the United States, Australia, Japan, and France.23 However, the domestic response was sceptical. The Globe and Mail noted that the government's claims 'to be in the front-line of Western anti-apartheid activity are somewhat inflated.'24 Another journalist said simply that 'though the policy presents itself as a response along lines advised by Tutu, it more resembles a policy a la Buthelezi.'25

At this point, Clark rejected bans on other imports from South Africa as 'extreme measures,'26 and he seemed disinclined to do anything more that might injure the interests of Canadian companies in South Africa. He also made clear his opposition to downgrading diplomatic relations with the Pretoria regime. When new South African ambassadors were posted to the United States and Canada, the U.S. government delayed accepting credentials whereas the Canadian government promptly accorded recognition.27

In other respects, the hard-line approach sustained by the South African government forced the pace. At the end of July, it imposed a state of emergency, which the Canadian government 'vigorously condemned,' and detained over fifteen hundred activists without charge. Calls in Parliament28 and in the press29 for the recall of Canada's Ambassador Edward Lee from Pretoria as a sign of collective Western dismay over South Africa's course seemed to bear fruit. Lee returned to Canada, but his stay was brief, and his visit was to be understood, the government announced, not as an act of protest but as assistance in discussions with the private sector30 Lee argued, moreover, for Clark's 'moderate' policy as a way to retain influence in South Africa and he opposed ending diplomatic ties as 'opting out.'3' In fact, the Canadian government maintained full representation up to ambassadorial level with South Africa throughout the chilliest moments of the mid-late 1980s.

Again, events in South Africa prodded the government into stronger action. Hopes had been raised in August that South African President P.W. Botha's speech to the National party in Durban would offer concessions to the black majority. With another rigid defence of existing policies, Botha precipitated a new Western consensus instead.2 As Liberal MP Warren Allmand put it, it was 'time to play hard ball with South Africa.'33
Mild sanctions were already in place for members of the European Community (EC), and, following South Africa's imposition of the state of emergency, France withdrew its ambassador and banned new investment. The Scandinavian countries were well on the way to adopting total mandatory sanctions. Pressure rose within the U.S. Congress as well for a strong set of economic sanctions, forcing President Reagan to produce compromise measures. Once again, the Department of External Affairs found itself in an incongruous position. For a country that liked to insist that it was a leader on such issues, the government had to act quickly or be left behind. The U.S. sanctions were central in forcing the pace in Canada.

The Voluntary Sanctions of 13 September 1985

Accordingly, for the first time, Clark indicated in the House of Commons that something more was in the wind. He announced a commitment in principle to total economic and diplomatic sanctions 'if other measures do not work,'34 'unless there is tangible movement away from apartheid.'35 At this point, however, the government's emphasis was on the qualifications rather than the commitment. The second set of sanctions was almost entirely symbolic. The measures were mild and largely voluntary.31

The government asked, but did not require, Canadian banks to ban loans to South Africa (most had not provided any since the 1970s)17 and Canadian companies not to sell crude oil and refined oil products to South Africa (also not a Canadian export to South Africa in the past). An embargo on air transport was announced, though it meant little beyond the cancellation of a few charter flights. Clark appointed an administrator to oversee the Code of Conduct concerning the Employment Practices of Canadian companies operating in South Africa, and hinted that the government might consider discouraging South African investment in Canada.3 Additional assistance of $1 million was offered for families of political prisoners and detainees in South Africa. In sum, a package was put forward which kept the Canadian government part of the general sanctions effort, but little more.

In the initial stages, the integrity of this new direction rested on the commitment in principle to full diplomatic and economic sanctions. In itself, the promise marked a clear departure from the policies of previous Liberal governments and indeed from any previous Canadian government. In this new conjuncture, the policy received strong support from the Liberal party and the NDP, though both were impatient with the token nature of this second set of sanctions.9 Consistent with the general trend, Canadian leaders started to make much stronger speeches at the United Nations. Although Clark repeated his pledge on total sanctions in September, it was not till Mulroney's speech to the General Assembly in October” that the government's commitment received much attention. At the end of October, Stephen Lewis sustained this tone, arguing

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that the international community must keep the pressure 'relentlessly on' South Africa. "There are moments in the lives of nations,' he said 'when the immorality of one invites the opprobrium of all. This is such a moment ... Over the next six months ... we must use every device, every initiative, every opportunity, every diplomatic skill, every debate, every appropriate forum, within the United Nations, beyond the United Nations, individually and collectively to persuade South Africa that peaceful change alone makes sense, and that peaceful change can only be achieved when apartheid is forever expunged from the vocabulary of human and political behaviour.'

Such sentiments enhanced the stature of the Mulroney government dramatically, especially as Third World and African countries were unused to hearing white Western leaders making these sorts of promises on an international stage. They also followed Mulroney's strong support for sanctions at the Commonwealth heads of government conference in Nassau in October 1985, the first in a series of Commonwealth meetings in which he took a leading role.

Mulroney, Sanctions, and the Commonwealth

Mulroney's involvement in the Commonwealth drive for greater sanctions against South Africa in 1985 and 1986 marked the high point of his policy. Although he was a neophyte at his first meeting in Nassau in 1985, he joined with more experienced leaders to create a united opposition to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's anti-sanctions position. Mulroney's commitment reached a peak at the Commonwealth mini-summit in London in August 1986, where he personally confronted Thatcher and committed Canada to a series of concrete economic sanctions. Later meetings reaffirmed this approach, but none surpassed the mini-summit. The key events of the mid-1980s became a central component of the early strong thrust of Mulroney's South Africa policy.

At Nassau in 1985, Mulroney formed part of a triumvirate with Prime Ministers Bob Hawke of Australia and Rajiv Gandhi of India who, along with Secretary-General Sir Shridath Ramphal, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, led the Commonwealth effort to persuade Margaret Thatcher to support stronger sanctions. Although Thatcher's unyielding opposition meant that they were able to agree only on a set of mild sanctions at Nassau, the accord stipulated further action. If in six months this process had not brought about concrete progress in ending apartheid, then the heads of government of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the Bahamas would meet again to review the situation.

This first set of Commonwealth sanctions included little that the Canadian government had not already implemented, with the exception of a commitment to discourage all cultural and scientific cooperation with South Africa except where it contributed to the end of apartheid. Although the agreement reflected a compromise largely on the terrain of Thatcher's anti-sanctions position ('They have come around to our view,' Thatcher said), a momentum had been established. In his attempt to sustain the Commonwealth initiative, Mulroney made exaggerated claims for Thatcher, insisting that she had moved 'enormously,'
that her record was 'immaculate,' and that there was 'no more implacable foe of apartheid than Mrs Thatcher.' However, Thatcher made it clear that she was not prepared to cooperate. Any hope of a united Commonwealth message of disapproval to Pretoria was torpedoed by her gloating after the meeting that she had moved only 'a tiny little bit.' The compromise 'was worth some price to keep the Commonwealth together,' she said.

Most significantly, the Nassau meeting agreed to bring together a group of eminent persons with a mandate to travel to southern Africa to attempt to establish a process which would lead to the dismantling of apartheid. The Canadian government supported the idea and nominated Archbishop Ted Scott as its representative. In 1986, this Eminent Persons Group (EPG) travelled to southern Africa for meetings with a broad range of South Africans; members of the government and opposition parties, and leaders of the trade union federation COSATU, of the United Democratic Front (UDF), and of AZAPO. Significantly, they also met with ANC leader Nelson Mandela while he was in prison. In the region, the EPG talked to leaders of the ANC and the frontline states, and in London with the head of the PAC. Hope started to rise that this initiative might bear fruit.

However, in May 1986, the EPG initiative was aborted when South African military forces bombed the capital cities of three frontline states (Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) at a time when the EPG had been attempting to work out a settlement in Pretoria. Not surprisingly, the EPG concluded unequivocally that, after examining the government's *programme of reform,* 'we ... have been forced to conclude that at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid.' They also saw 'no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative government.'

The Canadian government's response to the end of the EPG mission was swift. Mulroney expressed his 'outrage' at the South African raids in the strongest possible diplomatic language and recalled the Canadian ambassador for consultations. He also summoned a senior official of the South African embassy to express Canada's anger at South Africa's sabotage of the initiative.

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and again suggested that Canada was considering breaking diplomatic relations. More than any other action, South Africa's treatment of the EPG made up the government's mind. As Clark explained later, the government realized that if a fair-minded group like the EPG was going to fail after its exhaustive interviews and patient attempts at negotiations, then it was time for other measures. Following the raids, the situation inside South Africa deteriorated, with clear signs that the Botha government had decided to stonewall international pressure. In June, as the cycle of violence and repression continued, the South African government declared a renewed nationwide state of emergency and detained ten thousand people without charge.

The Third Round of Sanctions - June 1986
In Canada, opposition parties and broader sections of Canadian society again clamoured for an immediate and effective response, influenced not only by events in South Africa and the powerful report of the EPG, but also by the eloquent request for help from Archbishop Tutu to the Ontario legislature. In June 1986, the federal government produced its third set of measures and initiated a new set of diplomatic consultations. The most important of the new sanctions was the decision to halt procurement of South African products by federal institutions and to request provincial governments to follow suit. The federal government also ended non-resident accreditation for four South African attaches and asked the tourist industry to stop promoting trips to South Africa. Finally, the government allocated $2 million more to scholarships for black South Africans.

However important as gestures, these measures were still fairly trivial, still more symbol than substance. Government purchases from South Africa amounted to less than $1 million. The banned South African attaches already lived in the United States, and the ban on tourism was 'economically meaningless.' Most important, the new sanctions did not touch Canadian investment or trade (the latter amounting in 1985 to $380 million).

Not surprisingly, the leader of the opposition, John Turner, wanted to know 'Why this constant postponing of concrete action and economic sanctions against South Africa?'

Liberal MP Jacques Guilbault complained that the measures seemed 'cowardly' and were sending the wrong signals to the South African government. NDP MP Ian Deans noted that the Canadian government had 'taken the mildest possible choice. We continue to make strong statements but ... we opt out.'

Deans wanted the government to tell every Canadian company to get out of South Africa. Liberal MP Warren Allmand asked that voluntary sanctions be converted to mandatory sanctions. For the House of Commons in general, the six weeks delay before the Commonwealth met again in August seemed an unconscionably long time.

Basically, the government was saving stronger sanctions for joint action within the Commonwealth where they would have the greatest effect. Mulroney claimed that the June sanctions were only interim measures, that they were a portent of more to come, barring significant change in South Africa.

The struggle between the impatience and frustration of opposition parties and the caution of the government came to a head in an emergency debate in June. Liberal MP Lloyd Axworthy insisted that it was 'time to break out of the conventional modes, out of the diplomatic niceties, the minuets of the international world. At some point one must take one's conscience in one's hands and go with it, let it lead and not follow.' Axworthy urged the government to press visiting U.S. Vice President George Bush to propose mandatory economic sanctions in the U.N. Security Council. NDP MP Pauline Jewett also wanted the government to put pressure on Margaret Thatcher. Liberal MP Brian Tobin argued that 'a Commonwealth which cannot respond to what is happening today in South Africa is a Commonwealth not worth saving.'

Ian Deans said simply,
'If we see someone in distress, someone drowning, we do not stand on the shore and look around hoping that others will join with us in rescuing that person before we take action.'

At this point, however, the government was still not ready to move on its own. As Barbara McDougall, Minister of State for Finance, explained, 'there is a time for boldness and heroics. However we do not believe that this is the time.'65 MP Benno Friesen added that 'the reason Canada has as much influence as it does is because it does not sell that credibility easily or cheaply ... we have to use that credibility ... to work with others.'66 Elsewhere, however, a mounting consensus for tougher action was evident: the joint House and Senate Committee on International Relations recommended that the government adopt full economic sanctions and work inside and outside the Commonwealth to promote sanctions by other countries.67 It also advocated expanding contacts with black political organizations, specifically the ANC, expanding scholarships for black South Africans, and increasing assistance to help the frontline states cope with difficulties caused for them by international sanctions on South Africa. In July, the House Standing Committee on Human Rights adopted a resolution calling upon the government to prohibit economic relations with South Africa and to consider assistance to frontline states in southern Africa affected by international sanctions.68 Archbishop Scott, Canada's representative on the EPG, told the House Human Rights Committee that if it came to a choice between continued membership in the Commonwealth and racialism, 'Canada has to take a stand against racism.'19 In the past, Scott had been a member of the Confederation of Church and Business People, an organization formed inter alia to counter the influence of groups like the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility on issues like South Africa.7" However, following his experience with the EPG, Scott's position was significantly different from the Confederation's, and he became a leading voice in the campaign for greater sanctions.7 Veteran columnist Christopher Young said simply that the South African crisis 'no longer leaves room for partial measures. There is no more time to wait and see.'72 Most editorials, while urging Mulroney to broker a united Commonwealth position, urged him to exert leadership at the mini-summit.73 Until the mini-summit in London in early August, the government kept its powder dry. It rejected a proposal through External Affairs from three Canadian high commissioners in Africa that Canada join the African, Asian, and Caribbean boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in July and August.74 The decision to boycott or not became a statement of where a Commonwealth country stood on South Africa; others had chosen this action to express their displeasure at Thatcher's opposition to sanctions. Although the Canadian government dithered, its eleventh-hour decision to stay in the games reflected a range of considerations. Primary among these was the effect of a Canadian withdrawal. With the second largest team, a departure could have easily torpedoed the games and seriously antagonized Thatcher right before the
mini-summit. Although the Canadian government was not prepared to be a 'bitter ender,' competing with only a rump of other white Commonwealth teams, its preference was to keep the games afloat.

At the same time, neither Canada's Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport Otto Jelinek nor the Canadian sports community wanted to leave. Jelinek made no secret of his general opposition to the sports boycott and claimed a withdrawal would neither change Thatcher's mind nor help South Africa's black population. He suggested that the Commonwealth Games Federation should punish financially those who would use the games as a forum of protest. Officials of the Commonwealth Games Association of Canada said that Canadian athletes would participate regardless of the government's decision, and its vice president said that he would tell the federal government 'to go to hell' if it decided to leave the games.75

The London Mini-Summit
On this issue and on the more general question of sanctions, the government was still hanging on to the hope that it could influence Britain to join the rest

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of the Commonwealth. As Mulroney's envoy Bernard Wood put it, 'the approach has been ... we'll use whatever leverage we have to bring along those who have more leverage.'76 He anticipated that Canada would operate 'a little more behind the scenes, modestly, to try and get others to move and not necessarily making grand gestures.'77

With its $2.5 billion in trade with South Africa in 1986 and £3 billion in investments,79 the importance of Britain for Commonwealth sanctions was unquestionable. However, senior British leaders indicated that they were in no mood to alter their course. Indeed, attitudes to the Commonwealth were moving from indifference to hostility and contempt. Margaret Thatcher disavowed responsibility for possible defections from the Commonwealth and said that, in any case, 'it's their club ... not mine.'0

In June, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe told Clark that Canada's pro-sanctions position was 'hypocritical' and 'unhelpful.'8 In a brief stop at Mirabel airport en route to Expo in Vancouver, Thatcher said that she regarded support for sanctions ill-considered.2 She questioned the morality of depriving non-white South Africans of employment and of Britain being forced to import strategic minerals from the main alternative supplier, the Soviet Union. She defended the reforms taken by the South African government as positive steps and urged moderation in the call for sanctions.

On the other side, African leaders, particularly Kaunda, believed Mulroney was the only Commonwealth leader who could make Thatcher change her mind.3 However, they were not prepared to sacrifice stronger action against apartheid for unity within the Commonwealth, and some threatened to leave, barring effective measures on this issue. Kaunda, for one, said that it was not that he believed that the Commonwealth could not continue to play a positive role on sanctions, but that 'he was not sure he could bear to sit through more Commonwealth meetings
in which one member was refusing to act on the basic principles of the
association.84

Following the rejection by South Africa of the overtures made by the EPG and its
dismissive treatment of the British foreign secretary in late July, Mulroney and
the other six leaders designated at Nassau met in a mini-Commonwealth summit
in London in early August. Their mood, according to Mulroney's envoy, Bernard
Wood, was sober and determined, with the frontline states prepared to make
sacrifices to put pressure on South Africa.5 While the members recognized the
value of British interests, Wood believed that it would not be enough this time for
Britain to move 'only a little bit.'

Mulroney left Canada with broad support within Parliament and Canadian society
for stronger action, including comprehensive mandatory sanctions.6 He left no
doubt about his position. The Commonwealth, he said, 'must stand for

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strong moral principles, which must rise above balance sheets and commercial
trading patterns, and deal with a fundamental evil that exists in South Africa ...
The Commonwealth stands for reasonableness and honest compromise - or it
stands for nothing.'7 The hope against hope was that a consensus would be
reached.

During the London meeting, Mulroney pulled absolutely no punches, challenging
Thatcher head on, but also employing his legendary negotiating skills and
personal charm to bring her around." The meeting, he said, had 'nothing to do
with balance sheets. It has to do with human dignity.' Young South African blacks
would be watching the meeting, he said, and would remember the outcome.89 He
offered to match British action - 'You tell me, how much do you want? I'm
prepared to put it on the table.'90 He appealed to Thatcher to use her power to
lead the way for other major Western leaders, particularly Ronald Reagan. All to
no avail.

As a result, for the first time on an issue of this importance, the Common wealth
agreed to differ, with all but Britain agreeing to honour the sanctions set out in the
Nassau Accord. As a Commonwealth Secretariat official put it, 'Six countries
other than Britain feel strongly that if there has to be a question of unity or
credibility, the time has come for the Commonwealth to be seen as credible on
this issue.'9

All but Britain agreed to end the import of agricultural products, uranium, coal,
iron, and steel from South Africa.92 Except in the arms sector, these measures
constituted the first concrete mandatory trade sanctions adopted by a Canadian
government against South Africa. On the basis of 1985 shipments, they affected
Canadian imports from South Africa valued at about $88 million.93 The Canadian
government also joined with the other members to ban new investment or
reinvestment of profits and extended the voluntary ban on new loans to South
Africa to the private as well as public sector. There would be no further federal
government contracts with majority-owned South African companies.94 Non-
nationals would no longer be allowed access to consular facilities in South
Africa.95
Thatcher would only agree to a voluntary ban on tourism, which had been cut in half anyway, and a ban on new investment (but not reinvestment), which, in any case, had virtually ceased. She also agreed in advance to implement any European Community decision to ban the import of coal, iron, steel, and gold coins from South Africa. Despite the paucity of her response, Thatcher claimed that because of Britain's sizeable investments and dealings with South Africa her measures were of greater substance than those of the other six.

While Mulroney tried to insist that Thatcher was against apartheid as much as he was and that 'she endorsed sanctions very emphatically,' he was using Irish blarney to prevent a deeper split.96 Mugabe was closer to the mark in expressing his 'utter dissatisfaction' with Thatcher's position which, in his view, made Britain 'an ally of apartheid.' Rajiv Gandhi summed it up very clearly, 'Britain is not the leader anymore - not in the Commonwealth because it is compromising its basic principles for commercial ends.97

In leading this initiative, Mulroney, Hawke, and Gandhi moved into the vacuum created by Thatcher's abdication of leadership in the Commonwealth. Mulroney distinguished himself by confronting Margaret Thatcher in front of the other members and arguing their cause with great passion. Later in 1986, Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal paid full tribute when he said, 'It will be forever to the credit of Australia and Canada - of Bob Hawke and Brian Mulroney - that when the Commonwealth was on the crossroads of apartheid, they stood shoulder to shoulder with their non-white colleagues.9

On 1 October 1986, the Canadian government put into effect the London sanctions and moved quickly against challenges to these commitments.0 When a South African government agency, the South African Tourist Board, published an advertisement in the Globe and Mail inviting Canadians to come to South Africa to 'see for yourself,'0 Clark immediately introduced legislation which closed the board's offices in Canada. Clark also closed down the offices of South African Airways in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal.

The Globe defended its decision to accept the advertisement on the grounds of free speech,103 and the Alliance of Canadian Travel Associations representing three thousand travel agents argued that 'Canadian vacationers and business people should be free to travel as they see fit.'104 The manager of the South African Tourist Board complained that Clark was 'setting a dangerous precedent against the liberties and freedom of choice of Canadians.'0 The right-wing press in Canada complained that the government was flouting a Canadian tradition of being able to go anywhere.10
However, at this point, the government left no one in doubt about its intentions. Clark publicly criticized the Globe's decision to publish the advertisement as a contravention of official policy and as an act of collaboration with the South African government. 'The only conclusion one can draw,' Clark said, 'is that the Globe and Mail places advertising revenue ahead of a leader-

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ship role in speaking out against apartheid.' In late October, Clark also moved to tighten a loophole which had left Air Canada with a general sales agreement with South African Airways facilitating travel to and from South Africa. When Falconbridge ignored his request for voluntary compliance with the government's ban on new investment in South Africa Clark responded promptly again. Barely three weeks after he had written asking for the company's support, Falconbridge invested almost $32 million in one of its South African affiliates, doubling its interest. Clark issued a communiqué publicly regretting Falconbridge's action,"0 and Deputy Prime Minister Don Mazankowski sent a sharp letter to William James, president of Falconbridge, summoning him to Ottawa to discuss his company's disregard of government wishes. "Clark said he hoped the Falconbridge case would be the exception and not the rule. Otherwise he said the government would have to reconsider its preference for voluntary rather than legislated sanctions.

Clark also met with B.C. Premier Bill Vander Zalm to discuss his meeting with South African Ambassador Glenn Babb. On that occasion, the premier had expressed his enthusiasm for trade with South Africa in defiance of the tenor of federal government policy. Clark told Vander Zalm 'that it would be helpful for all aspects of government and indeed the private sector in Canada to contribute to, rather than detract from ... pressure' on South Africa."2

Having adopted a strong position internationally, the government was clearly in no mood for deviations at home. However, the cost of sanctions was considerably less than suggested by Mulroney's stirring rhetoric. While lovers of South African wines and brandy lost out, agricultural products formerly imported from South Africa, particularly citrus fruit and sugar, were available from other sources. In terms of the ban on iron, steel, coal, and uranium imports, Canadian producers were happy to see the end of competition from South Africa. At the same time, ores like ferrochromium, ferrovanadium, and ferromanganese needed by Canadian specialty steel producers were exempted from the ban. 'Obviously 'balance sheets' still had a place in the government's willingness to adopt sanctions and, to some extent, Thatcher was correct in pointing out that this most ardent champion of sanctions had nothing much to lose. However, the fact that mandatory trade sanctions were adopted at all still marked a concrete step forward for the Canadian state.

The momentum established at the London meeting continued and was reflected next in Mulroney's decision to tour southern Africa in January 1987. The significance of this trip was heightened by the fact that Mulroney was the first Western head of state to visit Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980. On the tour, Mulroney reiterated earlier promises that Canada would invoke
Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions

total economic sanctions against South Africa and was considering cutting off
diplomats' relations as well. His public attacks on apartheid as 'odious' and 'evil'
were widely broadcast, as were his promises to take further punitive action
against South Africa: 'Despite all the pressure brought to bear' on Pretoria, he
said, it had "still not lost its prejudices.' 14 In his view, dialogue could only begin
with the repudiation of apartheid."5

In the past, Canadian heads of government had condemned violence routinely and
kept the ANC at a distance. In a recent meeting with ANC leader Oliver Tambo,
moreover, U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz had attacked the ANC's 'violent
tactics' as leading 'to a catastrophe for all."6 Given the close relations which
Mulroney had established with the Reagan administration, many expected more
of the same. However, on this occasion, Mulroney made clear that while the
Canadian government could not condone violence, he could at least understand
why the ANC pursued the armed struggle."7 In Harare, Mulroney went further
than any previous Canadian prime minister when he said, 'We understand the
ANC's contention - "You ask us to drop our arms to do what? ... Accept more
repression? Accept more brutality from the apartheid state that is armed to the
teeth?"' Mulroney added that he saw Canada "very firmly on the side of those
who yearn for freedom,' and he said he expected to meet the ANC's president
Oliver Tambo very shortly.

In retrospect, the London mini-summit and Mulroney's trip to southern Africa
marked the high point of the Canadian government's commitment to strong action
on South Africa. While there were some initiatives in later years to sustain its
credibility, none recaptured the hope and enthusiasm that saturated government
statements in this period. In October 1986, for example, Mulroney told the House
of Commons that Canada would be 'persuasive, principled and victorious' in
bringing the abuse of apartheid to an 'urgent end.'"9

At least on this issue, Mulroney was able to coast for much of his tenure on the
reputation that he earned during this period. Canadian editorials said he had 'not
put a foot wrong' on his 1987 African tour and called his performance
'statesmanlike.'20 Dan Turner suggested that 'people like George Schultz and
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher make people like Robert Mugabe and
Oliver Tambo impatient. People like Brian Mulroney make people like P.W.
Botha annoyed. It may not be much. But it's taking a side.'21 The leaders of the frontline states never forgot the role that Mulroney played in
securing sanctions over Britain's determined opposition. As late as 1990, Kaunda
again paid tribute to Mulroney and his colleagues for helping the Commonwealth
avoid 'being branded as a racist organization' and called Canada 'another front line
country against apartheid."22 By this time, however, the record had become
increasingly tattered.

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The evolution from champion to rhetorical posturing was a product partly of
Mulroney's loss of hope that the great powers (principally Britain, the United
States, Germany, and Japan) would move on South Africa in this period. While Mulroney and others had encouraged the non-white Commonwealth to settle for little in the way of concrete sanctions at Nassau in the hopes of bringing Thatcher around, that hope was torpedoed in London. As early as May 1986 Stephen Lewis noted the 'depression, anger, betrayal and frustration' in the United Nations, the 'sense that the greatest moral issue of the day ... is not engaging the major powers who have to take the strongest positions. 123

The conflict between the energy that had been generated in the Commonwealth and the disinclination of the great powers to go much further came into focus at the G-7 (the group of seven major industrialized countries) meeting in Venice in June 1987. Mulroney had gone to this meeting as the 'delegate' of southern African leaders and kept in regular contact with President Kaunda during the summit. He had publicly stated his interest in seeing South Africa discussed, and had taken soundings before the meeting to see if the G-7 might form a second 'eminent persons group' to work for an end to apartheid.24 However, the larger Western powers, in particular Helmut Kohl, were not of the same mind and firmly put Mulroney in his place. They would not even include the issue of South Africa in the final communiqué.125

At this point, Mulroney faced dwindling prospects for a breakthrough and diminishing returns for him personally in struggling against the odds. With the refusal of the major Western powers to move, the struggle against apartheid lost momentum. Mulroney had hit the proverbial brick wall, and his campaign started to wither. From then on, Canadian leaders kept up their strong rhetoric, but, for awhile, the heart had gone out of the policy.

Backlash against Sanctions
No-one wants to accept that the whites have done a lot of good things for blacks. Communists are trying to destroy what white people have built. If the black people come to power, that will be destroyed.
William VanKoughnet, Conservative MPI

Following the setback in Venice and until President F.W. de Klerk began the reform process, the Mulroney government lapsed back into a policy on South Africa reminiscent of past Liberal governments. Once again ringing rhetoric was accompanied by minimal action. After 1987, a stall on additional Canadian sanctions was complemented by efforts to restrain further militance within the Commonwealth.

The reversion to an earlier approach demonstrated that, while dramatic initiatives might have taken Canadian policy off in a new direction for a year or two, powerful interests in Canada had simply bided their time, waiting for a more propitious moment to re-emerge and exert their influence. Such pressures operated at all levels of the state and civil society.
Senior civil servants, particularly in the Department of External Affairs, were not happy with the rupture with tradition that sanctions had represented, and remained unenthusiastic about the policy as a whole. From the parliamentary caucus to grass-roots supporters, important members of the Conservative party felt the government had adopted a 'left-leaning' policy on South Africa.2 Some
sympathized with the plight of white South Africans and facilitated the work of the South African embassy in Canada. A handful of renegade leaders from Canada's First Nations joined in, using the South African issue to embarrass the federal government over its failure to resolve their claims. Associated with this network were various interests from the private sector,

Backlash against Sanctions

The Department of External Affairs - a Hotbed of Cold Feet

A central component of the reaction to Mulroney's South Africa policy came from senior echelons of the Department of External Affairs and other state institutions at the federal level. While decisions were ultimately the responsibility of politicians, perceptions of senior civil servants were important in determining how issues should be understood and the weight to be given to a range of objectives. As Cranford Pratt has noted, 'They constitute a formidable barrier to the intrusion of ideas and objectives that run counter to them.'

In general, a strong predisposition in such circles precluded attaching much importance to questions of human rights in foreign policy. Instead, such issues were regarded with irritation, as 'soft intrusions into the hard realities of international politics' which opened the way for self-defeating posturing, reduced effectiveness, and inflexibility.' Not surprisingly, the case of South Africa was considered to have taken up far too much of the government's time and attention for an issue peripheral to Canadian interests.

In the past, such forces had coalesced in a successful emasculating of the first timid reforms in Canadian policy towards South Africa in 1977. Now, in the second round, senior civil servants did not like the measures of the mid1980s and were opposed to additional sanctions thereafter. Generally, they regarded Mulroney's policy as 'adventurist,' leading Canada far too far away from its principal allies, Britain and the United States.

Although Mulroney was keen on cordial relationships with his major allies, on this issue he fought Thatcher and challenged President Reagan to take stronger action. For the mandarins, the more appropriate strategy was to position Canada in the middle. Before the 1985 Commonwealth conference in Nassau, officials worried that African members were looking to Canada as their strongest ally, while Britain also saw Canada as a friend. 'The risk,' one said, 'is if we get too far out in front of the British. Then they will never listen to us.'

The resistance to change, or 'grooved thinking,' lay in a commitment to the older policy of 'balance' and a real discomfort with economic sanctions; they
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touched a strong ideological nerve in the context of the government's commitment
to free trade and open economic relations. In the early years of the Mulroney
administration, officials in the Department of External Affairs continued to argue
for constructive engagement, insisting that investment in South Africa did not
support apartheid. In this view, no country could be quarantined, and sanctions
ended by damaging the nations imposing them, while less scrupulous countries
reaped the benefit.

When the Department of External Affairs set up a Southern Africa Task Force in
1985, its first two directors were cautious or opposed to the direction promoted by
Mulroney and the PMO. The first, Eric Bergbusch, fought hard to maintain the
policy of trading and condemning. In private meetings with Canadian churches,
trade unions, and the press, Bergbusch continued to express views considerably
closer to Thatcher and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl than to Mulroney. He
opposed economic sanctions, preferring measures that would not hurt Canadian
corporate interests, and he argued that diplomatic relations with South Africa
constituted a key entry point for Canadian influence. Bergbusch feared change -
'One doesn't want to create chaos and call it victory' - and had reservations, on
Cold War grounds, about realigning Canadian policy to support organizations like
the ANC.

Bergbusch also did not seem particularly interested in assistance to help frontline
states cope with the retaliation threatened by South Africa if sanctions were
imposed." It took energetic pushing by the head of CIDA's SADCC division to
disseminate a study on the effect of sanctions for Canadian aid programs in
southern Africa. Members of the External Affairs taskforce did not accept its
main thrust - that South Africa would likely be seriously hurt by sanctions and
that, with international assistance, the region could develop alternative trade and
transport routes to avoid South Africa.

In the face of institutional stonewalling of this nature, Mulroney used a device
commonly employed in the past to promote his more activist views on southern
Africa. In 1985 and 1986, he sent Bernard Wood, director of the North-South
Institute, as his personal emissary to meet with African leaders before the
Commonwealth meeting in Nassau in October and before the minisummit in
London. As in the case of Ivan Head with Trudeau and Robert Bryce with
Diefenbaker, Wood reported directly to Mulroney and thus was unhindered by
the External Affairs bureaucracy. When asked why normal diplomatic channels
were not being used, Wood explained that the Commonwealth meetings involved
'some pretty tough bargaining.' Hence, Wood was being used as a special
channel, as 'a personal representative with very direct, confidential lines of
communication' between Mulroney and African heads of state.

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Nevertheless, the tug of war continued. During the January 1987 trip to southern
Africa, government officials in Ottawa and in his entourage were dismayed at
Mulroney's support for additional punitive sanctions. While Mulroney stated
clearly that Canada had 'imposed economic sanctions against South Africa - and
we will impose more,' they insisted that no further sanctions would be forthcoming for the time being. At a time when sanctions had affected only about one-quarter of Canada's total trade, they even suggested, quite erroneously, that Canada had few sanctions left to impose.

While Mulroney was clearly sceptical about the reformist intentions of the Botha regime, officials believed that Botha was 'almost moderate,' offering the best chance of reform short of majority rule. Their position - that stronger sanctions would *play into the hands of right-wing extremist elements in South Africa pressing President P.W. Botha to take a harder line' was passed off as Mulroney's view.

Individuals who supported Mulroney's position from within External Affairs were ridiculed (one was told he had a ' lurid imagination') and marginalized. A pivotal official in this category, Canada's high commissioner to Harare, Roger Bull, correctly analysed the impact of the uprising in South Africa from 1984 to 1986 and supported the conclusions of the CIDA study on the effect of sanctions in the region. Bull also caused consternation in British and Canadian diplomatic circles in his public opposition to a British document which argued that the frontline states did not fully appreciate the potential damage which sanctions would cause to them and that sanctions would have a minimal impact on South Africa. Bull called the British study patronizing and said it was based on erroneous data.

Canada's ambassador to South Africa, Ed Lee, initially disagreed with Bull, but later he told a Canadian journalist that Bull had been correct. However, the honesty of this reappraisal was exceptional; the foreign policy establishment was furious with Bull and simply bided their time. Officials tried to sideline and discredit him and, above all, to have him recalled. They regularly failed to inform him about decisions taken in Canada relevant to his jurisdiction until well after the news broke in the press. Only the intervention of Mulroney kept Bull in the field in this crucial period over the attempts, on two occasions, by the undersecretary of state for external affairs to call him back to Ottawa. Although Bull's perspective had become common wisdom by the end of the decade, he remained a pariah for having broken ranks with the accepted ' truth' in Ottawa.

Support for Mulroney's policies also came from individuals who were not career civil servants but had been political appointments: Roy McMurtry, then Canada's high commissioner in London, and Stephen Lewis as Canada's am-
when the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa met in Harare in 1989.

On his retirement from his post at the United Nations, Stephen Lewis revealed that to make any headway at all on southern Africa he had to bypass the 'moribund bureaucracy' of External Affairs to take 'the political route.' He conferred directly with Mulroney and his staff, with Jodi White, Clark's political aide, and with Lucien Bouchard, Canada's ambassador to Paris.22 However, within External Affairs Lewis found 'a lack of creative energy [and] a tendency to be repetitive ... passive and rigid ... Most of their analysis on the situation is superficial and trivial. There is no courage or imagination on the Southern Africa desk and they take so long to do things.'23 Lewis added that, 'I never, but never, once saw anything truly thoughtful or analytic about South Africa ... the quality of the research and the material I saw was entirely pedestrian.'24

The closer Lewis got to the top, the more stultifying he found the process. Senior mandarins resisted policy initiatives from outside or from the ranks, and yet they seemed incapable themselves of making imaginative recommendations. Officials did not want *anything that rocks the boat*; they were 'always talking about a collective demarche, but the truth is that they don't have their hearts in a strong policy.'25 In Lewis's view, they were 'largely a brake on the Prime Minister's instincts.'26

This assessment extended to the very top. Lewis described Joe Clark as 'a very cautious man ... who wanted to move in concert with others, and ... to analyze every single implication of what he did.'27 'There comes a point,' Lewis said, 'when caution itself is an obstacle ... with everything deteriorating in South Africa and ... destabilization crippling the economy of the region.'

Roy McMurtry was also surprised by the climate of opinion that he encountered in External Affairs.26 When he first arrived at his post in London, senior officials tried to dissuade him from attending the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, suggesting he send a more junior representative. McMurtry disagreed and later became the chair of the committee.

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Once Lewis and McMurtry left, an important source of support inside the state for Mulroney's original direction evaporated. While there were a number of officials within External Affairs who backed Mulroney's policy in the late 1980s, notably John Schram in the Pretoria embassy and Lucie Edwards and Carolyn McMaster in the Southern Africa Task Force, they were not strong enough to counter the opposition to further measures.

In late 1989, External Affairs finally wreaked their revenge on Roger Bull. In a ruse to get him home without alerting the PMO, officials promised Bull reassignment as chair of the department's special taskforce on southern Africa. When he agreed to come home, they then revoked the offer.29 After lasting just under six years in Zimbabwe against all the odds, Bull was rusticated, after some down time in Ottawa, as Canadian consul to Seattle.

Private Sector Opposition to Sanctions
A second current of opposition to the policy and especially to sanctions came from the private sector. As we have seen, until the Mulroney government imposed sanctions, a consensus had existed between the state and the private sector which allowed the unimpeded flow of capital and goods, protecting foreign economic policy from political considerations. To be sure, banks had stopped providing new capital and companies had extracted their equity investments from South Africa; but, in the context, they argued, of an unpropitious climate for business. At the same time, influential quarters of opinion within the private sector and the press were unhappy with the abrogation of the principle of free trade that sanctions represented. Most believed strongly in the benefits which continued Canadian commerce brought to all South Africans.30 Globe and Mail editorials lamented the 'defeat for the rationale that foreign firms, by their presence in South Africa, could be a force for reform.'31

The views of the private sector became pungent, if somewhat defensive. James McAvity, a former president of the Canadian Exporters' Association and president of the Canadian South African Society, said the society 'could deal more competently with South Africa than that goddamn Canadian Government which is just trying to incite hard feelings. Why should the South African Government be influenced by what that pipsqueak Mulroney says?'32 Senior figures from the private sector lobbied top officials in the Mulroney administration, often with 'silly, reactionary letters' influenced by South African propaganda and the right-wing press in Canada. Canadian companies that ultimately joined the corporate exodus did so often after registering strong opposition to the government's approach. Thomas Bata

172 Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions insisted that groups inspired by 'misguided idealism ... seem to believe that they serve the common man ... if they attack the work and motives of Canadian and other entrepreneurs who, in fact, are creating jobs and social progress in Canada and abroad.'33 Bata officials had to be threatened with a subpoena before they would testify in front of a House of Commons committee dealing with South Africa.34 Given these views, it is not surprising that the private sector opposed or ignored as best they could the intent of government policy, except where it coincided with their assessment of economic prospects in South Africa.

Sections of the corporate sector involved in trade were definitely unhappy about the way in which Mulroney’s approach was costing them business. Sherritt Gordon Mines of Toronto lost a $3 million order for blank nickel coins from the South African Mint to a West German company 'because of the way Canada has spoken up.'35 Electrolizer, formerly the sole supplier of machinery for South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), complained bitterly when they lost a contract worth about $1 million in 1985 because it was no longer considered a reliable supplier.36 The Canadian Exporters' Association lobbied against sanctions, particularly disliking the embargo on high technology goods and products with a dual civilian and military purpose.

Canadian corporations also joined with South African companies to promote trade in commodities banned by sanctions. In October 1986, six Canadian gold mining
companies, together with producers from South Africa and five other countries, launched the World Gold Council, an organization formed to market gold. A similar promotional organization, the International Coal Development Institute, was formed in November 1985 with three large South African companies and Westar mining of British Columbia as founding members. Yet trade in both coal and Krugerrands was banned by Canadian sanctions.

Members of the advertising community in Toronto also attempted to carry on as usual. Despite the government's people-to-people sanctions, they organized an international conference of advertising executives, including South Africans, in Toronto in 1988 and asked Ontario Premier David Peterson and Toronto Mayor Art Eggleton to address the gathering. They were dissuaded from holding a South Africa Day on 16 June, the anniversary of the Soweto uprising, only by irate protests from the local anti-apartheid community and the prospect of an angry demonstration. What they had intended to do, as one observer noted, 'was the equivalent of holding a Schutzstaffel [SS] veterans' reunion on a day set aside to commemorate the Holocaust.'

Ultimately as well, the South African group was excluded when Peterson and Eggleton announced that they would cancel their participation. Having bowed to the inevitable, William Leckie, the president of the Outdoor Adver-

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The views of the private sector in Canada were shared by important sectors of opinion within the Conservative party itself. There was no question that the prime minister was well ahead of his party on this issue and, in some respects, almost alone. The growing caution in government policy on South Africa in the late 1980s was undoubtedly produced by the storm of opposition which was building within its own support base.

Before coming to power, the Conservative party of the 1970s and 1980s had not been known for its support of anti-apartheid struggles. As we have seen, John Diefenbaker opposed sanctions on Rhodesia and approved the resumption of British arms sales to South Africa in 1971. In the early 1980s, forty Conservative MPs attended a five-day seminar on South Africa in Toronto as guests of the South African embassy. Many were directors of South African owned companies in Canada.

In addition, Conservative MPs travelled regularly to South Africa as guests of the South African government and returned to support its aims and objectives. After a trip in 1977, for example, Robert Coates, later a minister of defence in the first Mulroney Cabinet, hailed South Africa's homelands policy and called South West Africa (now Namibia) 'the most refreshing experiment in black Africa today.'
Dan McKenzie, another Conservative MP, from Winnipeg, found South African blacks too primitive for self-rule, but said they made great mechanics.43 Many, like Lloyd Crouse, Donald Munro, and Ronald Stewart (all Conservative MPs) came back touting South Africa as a bulwark against communism, while Jake Epp saw South Africa as a country that needed to be protected from the communist threat. Robert Wenman and David Nickerson insisted South Africa was making significant changes.

However, the most passionate defence of both South Africa and the sponsored trips came from John Crosbie, Conservative MP for St John's West and later a minister with senior portfolios in the Mulroney government. In 1981 in the House of Commons, Crosbie answered the critics of his pro-apartheid sympathies by declaiming that 'I have gone there and seen, you big loudmouth. Have you been there? You keep your mouth shut till you go and learn for yourself, you professional bleeding heart. I can tell you they are dealing with their economic problems one hell of a lot better than we are.'

Not surprisingly, one of Mulroney's early gestures in July 1985 was to halt further free trips for Conservative MPs at the expense of the South African government. Initially there was some grumbling from a small group of ten MPs in 1985, with William VanKoughnet (who had accepted a free trip in 1984) arguing through a press statement that the Canadian government's criticism of South Africa's human rights record was not fair.45

On a few occasions, Conservative MPs continued to defy the voluntary ban on tourism,6 and one, David Nickerson from the Northwest Territories, even joined the controversial tour sponsored by the South African Tourist Board in November 1986. On his return, Nickerson insisted that apartheid was a thing of the past and argued for 'positive assistance rather than negative sanctions.'47 He complained that the government's 'bad policy' did not recognize that 'the whites have done a lot of good things for blacks.'4 In May 1988, Nickerson sponsored a private member's bill asking the government to reconsider its South Africa policy and to rescind sanctions. He wanted a reversion to a 1950s-style 'friendly approach' to reward South Africans for their 'remarkable progress' over the past few years. 'South Africans,' he said, 'do not need us kicking them when they are down, which is what sanctions do.'49

At times, the dissent from government policy provided comic relief. The wilder views of Donald Blenkarn, chairman of the prestigious Standing Committee for Finance and Economic Affairs, became public knowledge when Canadians sympathetic to South Africa released a letter he had written to Clark."0 Blenkarn argued that nothing less than a trusteeship in southern Africa would end apartheid and keep communism at bay. Instead of sanctions, he urged Canada and other Western countries to occupy Angola and Mozambique militarily to 'choke off' South Africa. 'In both actions,' he wrote, *we eliminate the Commies, we take charge, we are the influential people and the game is played the way we want it.5' As the Globe and Mail put it, Blenkarn was 'at best naive, at worst neo-colonialist
...Southern Africa cannot be the "white man's burden," but Mr Blenkarn certainly is the External Affairs Minister's.52

At this stage, the Blenkars, VanKoughnets, and Nickersons could be easily marginalized as a right-wing fringe and an embarrassment. Such views represented one pole in the spectrum of opinion within the Conservative government; indeed, Coates and Blenkarn belonged to the ultra-right World AntiCommunist League.3

However, they were not the only Conservative MPs to support the white regime in Pretoria and to argue that the government had no business supporting communists (in their view, the ANC). Even within the mainstream of the

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Conservative caucus, there was a substantial body of opinion that Mulroney's policy was simply wrong, that sanctions would not work, that it was inappropriate to single out and penalize South Africa, and that reforms would happen eventually. Many were uncomfortable that Mulroney had parted company with Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl. Their natural affinity with the private sector made them increasingly uncomfortable with the call for increased economic sanctions. At the very least, they felt that the government had gone too far and needed to slow down.54

Despite these reservations, in the early years of the Mulroney government, most Conservative MPs went along with the new policy, maintaining caucus discipline.5 The initiative had earned Mulroney praise at home and abroad and had mitigated the effect of domestic problems and scandals. However, from 1987 on, Mulroney had to fight pitched battles. Stephen Lewis reported that opposition within Cabinet was 'so deep, so truculent,' that, particularly as the 1988 election loomed, Mulroney did not want 'an internal showdown.'56 After Walter McLean left the Cabinet, there was no one left who was enthusiastic about the policy save the prime minister. Clark remained mired in doubts, and his talk about sanctions fatigue really 'was an interesting revelation ... of [his] own frame of mind.'57 Not surprisingly, pro-South African feelings within the Conservative party and caucus were encouraged and supported by the South African embassy in Canada. In May 1987, for example, the wife of Tory MP Robert Wenman used his mailing privileges to circulate South African propaganda to all spouses of MPs. Booklets referred to South Africa as a 'model multi-racial society' and to opponents as 'immoral, non-Christian, pro-Marxist-Leninist' revolutionaries."

Federal government MPs were also the target of a campaign which the embassy waged to protest the first official visit of ANC President Oliver Tambo. The South African ambassador wrote personal letters to every federal MP and senator, stressing the ANC's use of violence.

In addition, every MP received a video and pamphlet59 which asked that each 'consider carefully' the record of the ANC 'before our country commits itself to communist terrorists'. The ANC was depicted as a perpetrator of shocking violence, especially through its use of necklacing to eliminate moderate black opponents. More, it was associated with the KGB, the IRA, the PLO, the Red Brigade, and the Baader-Meinhof group in an international terrorist conspiracy.60
Even assistance to the frontline states ('African dictatorships') was opposed on the grounds that they provided bases for 'ANC terrorists.'

Central to the evidence backing up such charges was the testimony of Craig Williamson, presented as a former member of the ANC and South African Communist party, but in fact a highly successful spy for the South African

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Security Police. Despite the compromised nature of this vital source, the video greatly undermined support for Mulroney's policy in the Conservative caucus and party at large.61

The South African Embassy and Canadian Society
The role of the South African embassy in coordinating opposition to the Tambo visit reflected the new importance of Canada in the international anti-apartheid struggle; after the United States and Britain, Canada became the third major target for South African propaganda.62 Thus, the South African embassy's ability to launch its campaign against sanctions was an ironic by-product of the Canadian government's decision to maintain full diplomatic relations. While, for Canada, keeping the embassy in Pretoria meant being able to work more effectively with anti-apartheid groups, the sword cut both ways.

The strategy employed by the embassy was directed in the first instance by South Africa's ambassador to Canada, Glenn Babb, who arrived in August 1985 in the early period of Canada's stronger anti-apartheid policy. Although his twenty-month tenure was quite brief, Babb's flamboyance gave him an extremely high profile.63 At the same time, Babb and his colleagues were entering an era of deep freeze in official relations. Indeed, they found a sympathetic hearing at any level of the Canadian state almost impossible. Babb was able to meet one supportive provincial premier, Bill Vander Zalm of British Columbia in late 1986, but this was exceptional.4 Generally, official South Africans were treated as outcasts and pariahs, met with silent contempt at the level of the state and outright hostility in civil society.

Embassy personnel therefore turned to influential groups within Canadian society and Canadian universities and worked on the Conservative party at its grass roots. As large cities attracted hostile demonstrations, the embassy concentrated on small towns and communities, particularly those with Tory sympathies.65 The embassy also targeted offices of professionals (lawyers, dentists, and doctors), libraries, school boards, banks, and offices of corporations in an extensive circulation of South African government publications. It also took out full-page advertisements in Canadian newspapers,66 and responded vigorously to negative articles in letters to the editor.

The embassy touted South Africa as a bastion of free enterprise in its appeal to the private sector in Canada and to service organizations like Rotary,67 Kinsmen, Kiwanis, Knights of Columbus, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the Junior Presidents Group. Trips to South Africa arranged by the South African government's Bureau of Information were offered to members of such groups and to selected academics and journalists.6 Invariably, these 'tourists'
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returned to Canada to put the official South African case and to argue against Mulroney's sanctions policy.9

The embassy's message was predictable and repeated whenever South African diplomats were able to find an occasion.70 The South African government was portrayed as being cautiously pro-change as it sought to maintain the diversity of its 'multi-ethnic society.' P.W. Botha was presented as a progressive force, someone whom the white right did not trust and against whom they might revolt.7

The interests of the white minority were advanced through the concept of group rights, presented as an alternative to individual rights, but in reality promising a continuation of white control.72 Conveniently, the notion of what constituted a group fitted the historic policy of divide and rule. Thus, Babb argued that there was 'no such thing as blacks as a group,' only smaller ethnic identities - Zulus, Xhosas, Sothos, Tswanas, and others.73 However, this principle did not apply universally: despite historic differences between Englishand Afrikaans-speaking communities, not to mention Greek, Italian, and Portuguese South Africans, whites were presented as a united, socially integrated community.

Babb played upon 'kith and kin' sentiments, arguing that 'the whites are really the people who need to be appeased the most as far as their fears are concerned.'74 He compared their concern for survival with those of Quebec francophones in North America. Babb appealed to racial sensibilities in Canada through constant references to 'black on black violence' and to, what he termed, the chaos elsewhere in Africa: 'We don't see much light north of the Zambezi,' he said. 'We don't see minorities being protected. We don't see any of those elements of ... Western civilization being propounded.'75

At the same time, opposition to apartheid, particularly by the ANC, was denigrated as 'terrorist' and 'communist': 'the end result of [an ANC] takeover,' Babb said, 'will be a Marxist tyranny and an end to all freedoms. Will the West never learn?'76 In sum, South Africa was presented as the key to a defence against a Soviet takeover of Africa. Babb warned the Canadian government 'of mistaking its ideological enemies for its friends,' insisting that it was an error to believe that South Africa was 'a moral and racial issue rather than an ideological one.'77 He reminded Canadians that the West was dependent on South African supplies of strategic minerals, especially platinum, and threatened to retaliate against its neighbours if sanctions were adopted.78

The central thrust of Babb's message was that apartheid was finished, that the South African government was committed to reform, and that it needed time and understanding to transform South Africa.79 As Babb put it, 'The government earnestly seeks a post-apartheid era that will respond to the rea-
South African diplomats and their supporters was that South Africa was like a zebra - shooting the white stripe would cause the whole animal to die."
The South African Embassy and Canada's First Nations
Shortly before Babb left Canada in 1987, he made his most dramatic impact through overtures to Canada's First Nations. As we have seen, the common experience of controlling an aboriginal population had been an early theme in Canadian-South African relations, with South African officials coming to Canada for help in establishing its own systems of segregation and apartheid."
Now in the late 1980s, Babb suggested that speeches by Mulroney and Trudeau on self-government for Canada's First Nations (advocating that these groups have their own homelands and cultural, economic, and political institutions) would not have been out of place among early apologists for apartheid in South Africa.3 While Canadian leaders did not hesitate to condemn apartheid, he charged that they failed to improve social conditions on reserves and stalled on pledges of self-government. Babb even suggested that blacks under apartheid in South Africa were better off than Canada's First Nations community. In an ironic historical reversal, Babb turned to these communities, seeking ways to discredit and embarrass the Canadian government.
South African embassy officials asked First Nations organizations and bands for tours of their reserves and offered all expenses paid trips to South Africa. A few Canadian First Nations leaders, primarily based in the Prairies, accepted. Chief Louis Stevenson of the Peguis Indian reserve in Manitoba invited Babb to see the deplorable conditions on his reserve and asked for $99 million in foreign assistance. Ignoring the protests of other Manitoba chiefs, Stevenson honoured Babb (to the delight of the South African press) as a 'champion of minority rights,' and argued that the treatment of Canadian natives was comparable to apartheid."4 'Canada's treatment of its aboriginal people is hypocritical and makes a mockery of the image it portrays to the rest of the world,' Stevenson claimed. 'Before criticizing the actions of other countries,' he added, 'Canada should clean up its own back yard.'
Babb also exploited First Nations claims to sovereignty, proposing treaties, encouraging sanctions-breaking trade, and attempting to get aboriginal recognition of the sovereign independence of South Africa's putatively independent homelands. Some of Saskatchewan's band leaders were attracted by the pros-

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pect of equal status, and four6 accepted an invitation from the South African Tourist Board to visit as a high-profile VIP delegation of 'opinion makers.'
Significantly, the trip coincided with one by Joe Clark in August 1987, and the group held a press conference to denounce the Canadian government's South Africa policy, in light of conditions on Canadian reserves. They also accepted a treaty for student exchange, with the South African government providing bursaries and university places in South Africa for disadvantaged native students. Accompanying the First Nations leaders were leaders of pro-South African associations - the president of the Western Canadian Society for Southern Africa,
the chair of the Canadian Friends of South African Society, and the president of the B.C. Free Speech League. Thus, a network of ultra-right disaffected Conservatives, pro-South African elements, and small businessmen joined with a few renegade First Nations leaders to embarrass the Canadian government and to support Pretoria's counter-offensive.

Clearly though, the four First Nations leaders accepting South African government hospitality did not represent the aboriginal and Mdtsi community in Canada. At best, they represented four bands in Saskatchewan of the over five hundred registered bands in Canada. Like the class that was created to run the governments of South African bantustans, this group of native leaders emerged from institutions established by provincial and federal governments in Canada to manage aboriginal social and economic development.7 Some were members of the Saskatchewan Indian Business Development Association established by pro-South African elements in the Saskatchewan private sector interested in resuming trade with South Africa.” All had been associated with the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. Some also were members of the riding association of Conservative Cabinet Minister for Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Bill McKnight. They constituted the right-wing element9 of the aboriginal population.

Virtually all representative organizations of First Nations people in Canada and the national organization of registered bands, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), repudiated this approach. While the mainstream leadership agreed that aboriginal communities in both countries had been treated badly by their governments, close relations with the South African embassy in Canada made no sense to them. In Canada, to be sure, a majority white government had denied the aboriginal minority meaningful control, even on their reserves, but, in South Africa, a minority white regime had denied almost all basic rights to the overwhelming black majority.

Thus, the identification of the overwhelming majority of organizations representing Canada's First Nations was with people representing South Africa's black majority, not with diplomats representing the white minority regime. George Erasmus, national chief of the AFN, left no doubt that his organization could not, ‘in any way, see ourselves aligning ... with such an oppressive regime.’90 Unlike Chief Stevenson, they were not prepared to gloss over conditions faced by black people in South Africa to advance the cause of their constituents.91 The Ontario Mdtsi and Aboriginal Association, representing two hundred thousand Mdtsi and First Nations people not living on reserves, stated that while it understood the frustration underlying such initiatives, nevertheless, “our sympathies and solidarity are with the majority black population of South Africa as they struggle for their freedom. We will not be used as pawns by the white minority regime in its propaganda war.”92 Manitoba chiefs, including chief Jim Bear of a tribal council composed of eight bands, asked Stevenson to withdraw his ‘outrageous' invitation.93 Canada's top three hundred First Nations chiefs dissociated themselves from his approach, and
one stated that they did not 'agree with anything Babb represents.'94 In April 1988, Vern Belgard, vice-chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, refused to meet with the new South African Ambassador, J. Hendrik de Klerk, and said he opposed trips of some native people to South Africa. Instead, the Crees of Quebec invited senior members of the African National Congress to observe their discussions on self-government. Elijah Harper, as Manitoba's minister of Native Affairs, also invited Archbishop Tutu to visit a reserve at Red Sucker Lake. Through the aegis of Oxfam Canada, the AFN sent a vice-chief, Alberta Cree leader Lawrence Courtoreille, and an Innu representative, Jackie Ashini, on a tour of South Africa to build stronger links between the two communities. Courtoreille returned to call on the Canadian government to end all trade and diplomatic links with the apartheid regime. He denied any comparability between the aboriginal claim for self-government and South Africa's homelands policy. Above all, he said that he hoped to remove any impression that Canadian First Nations leaders supported South Africa's concept of racial separation.

Dirty Tricks, Disinformation, and Managing the News
With the departure of Babb, the campaign in Canada's First Nations community wound down, and the embassy turned back to traditional strategies. The new ambassador, J. Hendrik de Klerk, continued to make South Africa's case and to attack Canadian policy anywhere he could drum up an invitation. In one of his most important speeches at the Hamilton Golf and Country Club in March 1988, he complained about the refusal of Cabinet ministers to meet him.

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and the ban on MPs travelling to South Africa. De Klerk argued that the Canadian government appeared to be aligned with unrepresentative black leaders like Archbishop Tutu or radicals who sought the violent overthrow of his government and its replacement by a "one party Marxist Leninist regime."96 'In order to be recognized by the Canadian government,' he said, 'a black leader must be either a radical theologian or a Marxist extremist.'

De Klerk also attempted to deny and cover up the growing evidence of destruction, death, and dislocation caused by his government's policy of destabilization in the region.97 He argued that South Africa was a benevolent neighbour, interested in economic cooperation, and hampered by sanctions. Beyond shortages of capital, skills, and technology, the 'real problems' of the region, he said, were related to inappropriate domestic policies of black governments - 'a lack of fiscal discipline and, in some cases, open corruption.' He also argued that, as trade between South Africa and these countries had increased, their support for sanctions was hypocritical.

As the embassy continued to be frozen out within federal and provincial government circles, it turned to the local level - service clubs and smaller communities - and to grass-roots opinion.9 In early 1988, for example, Atlantic Canada became the target. Representatives of the South African government and trade council attended the meeting of the Royal Commonwealth Society in Charlottetown and met with MicMac representatives. The fruit of this offensive in
small towns all over Canada was seen in the pressure exerted on Conservative MPs to change government policy.99

Such campaigns were an inevitable by-product of the South African diplomatic presence in Canada, but other activities went much further. An aggressive strategy combined an effort to manage the news about South Africa with a full repertoire of 'dirty tricks.' South African representatives wanted to counter information of the sort that had led to the ground swell of public support for sanctions. Indeed, Ambassador de Klerk's period was characterized, most centrally, by a dramatic escalation in disinformation, distortion, and deception which went far beyond ordinary South African government propaganda.100 As Donald Woods, the exiled former editor of a South African newspaper explained, South Africa was extending to the external world the tactics that it used at home. It 'tries to bully outside as well as in,' he said. 'That's their style. In a normal society it doesn't work.'0

From December 1986 on, the Canadian media was affected by the tight control that the South African government placed on media reporting inside South Africa. Although the Toronto Star managed to keep its South African bureau, the Globe correspondent could not get a visa. The ambassador toyed

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with the Globe's desire to return, promising that he could use his influence to help a correspondent get a visa, but only if the Globe stopped using the work of Phillip van Niekerk, a South African journalist disliked by his government.

Within Canada, the embassy had always contested the mainstream media's presentation of South Africa. After a much acclaimed but critical look at South Africa in 1985 by the CBC, no Canadian television network news team was allowed entry. In November 1986, Babb protested through a diplomatic note the way in which the Canadian media, particularly CBC television, engaged in an 'unremitting campaign ... clearly aimed at creating a climate for the operations of the African National Congress.'02 He also complained about the prominence given to Archbishop Tutu and Allan Boesak on news programs like 'The Journal'.

More sinister still, black South Africans interviewed by 'The Journal' in South Africa were arrested, beaten, and killed by South African police.03

With a $30 million increase in South Africa's overseas propaganda budget in the late 1980s, the South African embassy went on the offensive, going to extraordinary lengths to put its case to the Canadian people. In particular, page-long advertisements in major Canadian newspapers sponsored by the embassy became a regular phenomenon.04 The day before Tambo's visit, advertisements appeared across Canada, attempting to discredit the ANC by linking it to the practice of necklacing.05

Before the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa meeting in Toronto in August 1988, the embassy again published a letter from the ambassador asking the committee for a 'fair hearing.'06 On this occasion, de Klerk complained that South Africa was being 'singled out for special condemnation,' and he asked Canadians to give South Africa credit for its 'accomplishments' and 'substantial progress.' After the conference, South African
Foreign Minister Pik Botha published a defence of South African reforms and attacked sanctions.

The embassy also commissioned a poll which, they suggested, showed only qualified support for sanctions, timing its release for the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee meeting in Canberra. While 61 per cent of Canadians supported sanctions in principle, only 37 per cent continued to support sanctions if they produced economic hardship for black South Africans.

Using these results, de Klerk called for investment rather than sanctions and encouragement rather than isolation.

Polls and advertisements were relatively open and legitimate means of pressure. However, the embassy adopted an ‘anything it takes’ approach, utilizing deliberate deception to get its message across. During the Calgary Olympics, for example, de Klerk's press attache, Dermot Bennett, placed an advertisement in the Calgary Herald arguing for South Africa's readmission to the games under the name of a non-existent committee, Freedom in Sport.

Bennett also regularly used his two middle names, Aubrey Hulett, to submit supposedly neutral comment and even proposed guest editorials to smaller local newspapers. A special package was sent to French-language newspapers in Quebec outside urban centres. Once published, the South African embassy then circulated this material to its mailing list of nine thousand Canadians as purportedly independent opinion.

The South African embassy also recruited two graduate student supporters at the University of Manitoba, initially to write letters to Mulroney, Clark, MPs, and newspaper editors. Originally contacted by a consultant for the South African embassy, they were later asked by its third secretary to infiltrate anti-apartheid groups in exchange for expense money approved by the South African ambassador. When the Manitobans consulted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), they were asked to be double agents.

Attempts to delegitimize the churches as centres of opposition to the regime, and to paint them as surrogates for the armed resistance movement, constituted a new and dangerous direction in the propaganda offensive.

Suspicions were raised that a forged South African Council of Churches pamphlet requesting help from anti-apartheid groups in Canada for ‘petrol bombs, tyres for necklaces and sjamboks for People’s Courts' had originated in the embassy. A second mailing, purportedly coming from the World YWCA and YMCA, contained similar sorts of disinformation.

The Canadian Right on the Offensive

In its campaign to influence Canadian public opinion, the South Africa embassy was aided by organizations sympathetic to the South African government and by the far right-wing fringe of Canadian politics, 'aging bands of anti-semites, racists, fundamentalists and redbaiters.' Indeed, the anti-ANC video that had appeared in Canada just before Tambo’s visit had been coordinated by these forces.

Narrated by Peter Worthington, a former Conservative party candidate and right-wing journalist, the video was distributed by Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform...
(CFAR), a group linked to the World AntiCommunist League (WACL), an ultra-right body with connections to the neo-Nazi movement."8 Prominent Tories belonging to the WACL included John Gamble (a one-time candidate for the Tory leadership), Robert Coates, and Don Blenkarn. The Unification Church of Reverend Moon also played a part in sponsoring the video.

In Western Canada, support for apartheid was mobilized by a range of groups: the Canadian League of Rights and its anti-Semitic publication, Cana-

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dian Intelligence Service, the Western Canadian Friends and Supporters of South Africa Society, and the Friends of Springbok Association. Such associations organized letter-writing campaigns to the Canadian government and to Canadian newspapers arguing the South African case. The Vancouver-based magazine, International Conservative Insight, featured conservative, pro-South African, anti-sanctions coverage."9

While such organizations represented the right-wing fringe of Canadian society and politics, the major national lobbying association for South Africa in Canada, the Canadian South African Society, had members drawn from the very core of public and corporate life.20 Formed in 1979, its three hundred members came mainly from large corporations but also included academics,2 MP s, senators, churchmen, and even a Quebec Superior Court judge. Its directors included, among others, Paul Leman (director of Alcan Aluminum and several other major Canadian companies), a secretary of Redpath, a former chairman of the Montreal Board of Trade, and, significantly until July 1985, its vice chairman, Maurice Sauv6, the husband of Canada's then governor-general and, in his own right, a former Liberal Cabinet minister and director of Barclays Bank of Canada. About 90 per cent of the society's funding came from the South African Foundation (an organization funded by the corporate sector in South Africa to promote South Africa abroad).2 Its president, James McAvity, said the society wanted to use its influence and connections to round up business for our people in South Africa and to correct 'the wrong impression' people get about South Africa.'23 He believed 'there will be no surrender of [white] power in South Africa, you can be sure of that.'

A second important organization, the Canadian Friends of South Africans Society, centred around David Scott-Atkinson, a well-connected public relations consultant in Toronto associated with right-wing causes. His firm was hired by the South African embassy to provide advice about how to get its message across in Canada.4 Besides helping distribute and popularize the Worthington video and writing to Canadian newspapers in support of the South African government,'25 Scott-Atkinson and his society also sponsored a visit to Canada of a highly compromised South Africa cleric, Bishop Isaac Mokoena, during the Vancouver Commonwealth conference. Mokoena's purpose was to appeal to the Commonwealth to lift sanctions and to discredit Archbishop Tutu's support for them. However, Mokoena's claims to his title, his following, and his impartiality were dismissed as 'fraudulent' by the Council of African Independent Churches in
South Africa and by Frank Chikane, general secretary of the South African Council of Churches.26
At the same time, the Ottawa International Junior Chamber of Commerce joined with a service organization, the Optimists, and a group of South African businessmen to sponsor the trip to Canada of a second dubious representation of black opinion in South Africa: Easu Mahlatsi, the ‘mayor’ of Lekoa township near Johannesburg and three of his municipal councillors. This second group had also been invited by the Association of Canadian Friends of Black South Africans, a Vancouver-based organization linked to Scott-Atkinson.
Like Mokoena, Mahlatsi’s role was to publicize black opposition to sanctions against South Africa in the period before the Vancouver Commonwealth conference and to counter the impression of South Africa presented by Archbishop Tutu and Oliver Tambo.21 Mahlatsi and his councillors, like Mokoena, represented those blacks who had decided to throw their lot in with the South African government. Elected by about 5 per cent of the municipal electorate, such officials were imposed on the people, had little power, and in no way represented them. They were regarded as straightforward collaborators with apartheid structures, had absolutely no popular support or credibility, and had to be guarded constantly by the South African police against their own constituents. Yet they were presented by Canadian service clubs as legitimate sources of black opinion.
For many years, other groups and sections of the press in Canada tried to portray Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland government, as the best prospect for black leadership in South Africa.128 Buthelezi claimed to operate at arms length from the apartheid state, having eschewed the offer of ‘independence’ given to South Africa’s homelands. He presented himself as a moderate democrat, speaking for the majority of South Africa's blacks.29 At this point Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders were in jail, the organization was banned, operating underground and in exile. Therefore, the field was clear for other initiatives. Organizations like the Canadian Club and the Fraser Institute (a Vancouver-based right-wing 'think tank'), along with financier Conrad Black, welcomed Buthelezi to Canada. Such circles warmed to Buthelezi's pro-capitalist antisanctions position, his opposition to armed resistance, and his insistence that the ANC promised a repressive, one-party socialist future.30 The right-wing Confederation of Church and Business People joined with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs to give Buthelezi a platform to speak against disinvestment. Government officials met with Buthelezi regularly, justifying this approach on the grounds of dialogue and consultation with all shades of opinion in South Africa. Thus, evidence of Buthelezi's intolerant and repressive rule in KwaZulu and of declining support for him was largely ignored, and he was portrayed by his sympathizers in Canada in this period as the premier black leader.3 The Globe and Mail claimed he was ‘as authentic a black leader as Nelson Mandela or other African National Congressmen’" and ‘the best hope, if not the only
hope, for the emergence of a moderate black leadership from the ashes of apartheid.'133 The Globe particularly liked his opposition to disinvestment and economic sanctions, suggesting that while Bishop Tutu deserved his Nobel Prize for peace, Buthelezi rated 'a prize for economics'.134

Like Buthelezi, the Globe did not believe that the ANC would 'assured democracy and racial equality.'35 It argued that the ANC would secure a 'black takeover' through terrorist tactics31 and would refuse to share power with groups like Inkatha. The right-wing press also vilified the ANC for its Soviet connections, communist membership, and adoption of armed resistance.'37

Thus, in this period, sections of the press in Canada not only misjudged the role of Buthelezi, Mandela, and the ANC, but also put forward deeply conservative, anti-democratic, and racist views, ones that were not far from official opinion in Pretoria.3 While the principle of universal franchise is a fundamental principle of liberal democracy, Globe editorials in the 1980s argued that the non-white population in South Africa did not have sufficient 'education, upward economic mobility and political experience' to be given the vote.39 It even suggested that South Africa's 'white tribe' could give other South Africans lessons in democracy!

He Who Pays the Piper ...

Such views in the press and other sections of civil society, taken together with the changing mood in official Canada, operated without an adequate challenge from the anti-apartheid movement itself. Activists began to worry not only about the lull in action by the state, but also about the rut into which the anti-apartheid movement seemed to have fallen.40 Just as the steam was going out of the sanctions campaign at provincial and federal government levels, certain disturbing trends also started to surface14 amid signs that sections of the anti-apartheid movement had been constrained by their financial dependence on the federal government. Most controversial of all was an attempt to centralize anti-apartheid activities in Canada along with a direct alliance with the ANC.

With the enormous increase in Canadian funding for development work in Africa in the 1980s, an artificially inflated network of NGOs emerged to coordinate work on southern Africa. However, as aid cutbacks became a yearly reality in the late Mulroney administration, NGOs were in a bind. As one observer noted, their structural relation to CIDA funding sources was such that, consciously or unconsciously, they began to carry out 'a kind of self-censorship.'42 Some were put in an invidious position, compromised in their ability to launch independent critiques of government policy.

These tendencies had surfaced in the late 1980s, but came into full view in the final national anti-apartheid conference held in Ottawa in May 1990. The Backlash against Sanctions 187
taming of what had been an independent pressure on the state was evident in matters trivial - the change of the title of the conference from 'Taking Stock' to 'Taking Strides' - to the attempt to bar critics of government policy from attending the conference.143 In discussions of Canadian policy, the conference organizers
gave an exclusive platform to the External Affairs official in charge of the task
force on southern Africa, but none at all to independent opinion. Key organizers
explained privately that they felt the confrontational style of previous anti-
apartheid conferences was 'old-fashioned' and that a 'conciliatory' approach to the
Canadian government was in order.

Although this view was partly an attempt to respond imaginatively to new
developments in South Africa, it also reflected the position in which some NGOs
now found themselves. One organization in particular, the Canadian branch of the
International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAFSA), had been
transformed by substantial government funding. Before the Conservative
government came to power, despite its sterling work in assisting the legal defence
of black political prisoners and then in helping their families, IDAFSA had
received a chilly reception in Ottawa. Its contacts in this period had been confined
to junior officers in External Affairs, and the organization itself had been denied
charitable status on the grounds that its activities were too political.

After the 1984 election, IDAFSA's fortunes were dramatically reversed, and a
cordial relationship ensued. The organization became an important conduit for
government assistance to South Africa, attaining charitable status in 1988. In this
era, almost 90 per cent of IDAFSA's funding ($8 million) came from the federal
government.45 Not surprisingly, this transformation was accompanied by a
dramatic change of attitude towards the state and to critics of state policies.
Thus, to some extent, the process of depoliticization and co-optation scattered the
energy and focus of the movement as a whole, making it less effective as a centre
for pressure on the government. At the same time, a second difference had
strategic implications for the future and, in the long run, was even more
damaging.

In the late 1980s, a section of the anti-apartheid movement, together with the
Canadian branch of the ANC, attempted to establish a more tightly organized
national anti-apartheid organization which would give explicit support to the
ANC's Freedom Charter46 and the 'liberation forces, the ANC, SACTU,
COSATU and the UDF.' It was proposed that the ANC sit inside the executive of
this new body with full voting status.

This initiative posed a number of problems. With the changes attendant in South
Africa, particularly after the release of Mandela and the commencement of
negotiations, ANC membership on the executive of the anti-apartheid move-

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ment in Canada would have unduly restricted both partners. The ANC was soon
to be in a quasi-diplomatic relationship with the government of Canada, while the
anti-apartheid movement required autonomy and independence so that it could
apply pressure when needed.
Others felt that this direct linkage to the ANC might also inhibit a badly needed
expansion of the anti-apartheid movement. In its heyday, churches, trade unions,
and NGOs had joined together to widen the scope of anti-apartheid work in the
broader Canadian community. By the late 1980s, however, there was concern
that, in relying on these traditional partners, insufficient attention had been paid to
new social movements representing women, the unemployed, ecologists, and, above all, to relations with the black community in Canada. In sum, the question was whether the proposed linkage would help the anti-apartheid community break out of its ghetto to attract new support from mainstream Canada.

Parts of the anti-apartheid movement in Canada also wanted connections with South Africa to include a broader range of partner organizations. In particular, Canadian churches and trade unions that already had close relations with their counterparts in South Africa did not want these monitored or controlled in any way by a central organization.

Even more important, there were significant differences of opinion about the appropriate relationship to the ANC itself. One current of opinion reflected in Western Canadian anti-apartheid coalitions endorsed the ANC as 'the leading voice of the people of South Africa,' adopting an uncritical and somewhat obsequious tone: 'Our group continues to be inspired by the example of the ANC and its representatives,' one address by a Manitoba Coalition representative stated in June 1992, 'and is enlightened by the ANC's judicious and precise assessments of the obstacles that remain before the dismantling of apartheid is irreversible.'

Others within this community had strong reservations about a direct linkage, even if the ANC was the premier liberation movement, and chose a more independent position. Judging from experience elsewhere in southern Africa, the concern was that, once a liberation movement came to power, there was no guarantee that it would continue to be responsive to its base. Therefore, this current of opinion believed in the strategic importance of supporting mass organizations within civil society in South Africa, rather than on the forces that would inhabit a post-apartheid state.

As the question of a close inside affiliation of the ANC to the proposed organization was ultimately revealed to be against ANC policy, the differences over this issue were resolved, but they did lasting damage to the cohesion of the movement. The proposed centralized network was also overtaken by events.

Backlash against Sanctions

However, the splintering of the movement in this moment of change, both on the question of relations with the ANC and with the Canadian government, significantly weakened its force, giving advance warning of its eventual disintegration.

This process of division, co-optation, and depoliticization removed a key irritant from within Canadian civil society and complemented the dwindling energy for sanctions within the state. At the same time, the counter-attack to the general thrust of Mulroney's South Africa policy was gathering steam within the Conservative caucus, the federal civil service, and the private sector, aided and abetted by the South African embassy and its allies within the ultra-right in Canada. As the South African state regained control at home and some acceptance abroad, it seemed an inappropriate moment to do more. Within this context and preoccupied by key policy issues at home, it is not surprising that Mulroney's...
ardent support for intensifying sanctions fizzled within the space of only two years.

Running on Empty - The Politics of 'Sanctions Fatigue'

Franklin Roosevelt said that there are many ways to go forward but there is only one way of standing still. If we add it all up, we will see that we are really only treading water.

Lloyd Axworthy, Liberal MP

Within Canada, 1987 was a pivotal year, marking the end of movement forward on sanctions. It was an uncertain period, with the change in direction cloaked in ambiguity and contradictions. Forces producing this new moment came not only from powerful interests within Canada but also from the international arena. Central to this conjuncture was the ability of the South African state to halt the campaign to make the country ungovernable and to bring the waves of protest and resistance in the black townships under control. Draconian emergency restrictions remained in place until 1990. Activists continued to be banned, detained, and killed; political organizations shut down; and demonstrations severely curtailed. Although they remained active, labour unions were forbidden to engage in political activity and suffered from increasing state repression. The menacing presence of South African security forces in African townships, schools, and at funerals became the norm, and their use of intimidation a way of life. Yet the tightening of censorship laws in December 1986 effectively prevented the international media, particularly television, from bringing these events to international attention. The momentum for change which had seemed unstoppable had been halted, if only for a time.

In celebration of their success, South African officials taunted the West with a rejuvenated belligerence. 'My government wishes me to make it clear to you,' said a South African ambassador to the U.N. Security Council, 'that we will not bow to your threats and demands. We reject your accusations with contempt and invite you to do your damnedest.'

With the South African state back in control, Western corporations once again returned. Although cautious about new financing, international banks rescheduled loans on more generous terms. While South Africa had only been able to secure a one-year agreement with the banks in 1986, a year later it gained a vital three-year 'breathing space' from international pressure. Companies from Taiwan, Switzerland, West Germany, Turkey, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom dramatically increased their trade with South Africa.

At the same time, key Western governments retreated to moral suasion, claiming that sanctions had only increased South African intransigence. The Reagan administration ignored the compulsory provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which required additional measures in 1987 and 1988, and refused to take further action. Within the European Community and the Commonwealth, British officials made no secret of their interest in destroying the sanctions.
campaign and revived the discredited discourse of constructive engagement.' At the same time, the U.S. and British governments slashed contributions to the ANC and SWAPO through U.N. agencies by up to 80 per cent.7 By late 1987, the Canadian government's activist policy on South Africa had also run out of steam. The energy which had motivated the prime minister and his staff in the mid-1980s dissipated after the failure to secure great power support in Venice in 1987, and the campaign never regained its momentum. For the rest of the decade, the Mulroney government's 'step by step' approach - which had talked about 'ratcheting up' sanctions - reverted to marking time, merely tidying up anomalies in the existing policy.

On certain occasions, particularly at meetings of the Commonwealth or la Francophonie, the old spirit re-emerged. Thus at the Commonwealth conference in Vancouver, Mulroney asserted that Canada would stay in the forefront of the international campaign against apartheid 'by vigorously promoting economic sanctions.' He pledged that 'Canada cannot be [merely] benignly interested in the greatest moral debate that is going on. Canada has to be on the high ground and provide leadership to its friends and allies around the world.'8

The reality, of course, was much pettier, with earlier leadership declining to the squalid politics of stall and delay; the pretensions seemed to become grander the more hollow the substance of policy. After August 1986 little of significance was added to the first concrete measures. Although Cabinet approval for additional sanctions was in place in early 1987, no new additional sanctions were adopted that year.

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Thus the renewed dedication in Mulroney's statements was more in the nature of an Indian summer than a return to the committed activism that had riveted the Commonwealth in 1985 and 1986. It was also somewhat reactive: Margaret Thatcher regularly impugned Mulroney's sincerity and patronized the rest of the Commonwealth. In return for his eloquence, Mulroney was given a warm reception and lavish praise in the Commonwealth, if nothing else than to keep him on side.

Wanting to Be a Player: The Vanity Factor
Given great power indifference and his absorption in domestic questions of free trade and constitutional reform, Mulroney retreated from his direct, committed involvement on South Africa. This diminished role provided a space for Joe Clark and for conservative forces within the Department of External Affairs to put forward a softer approach. While it was commonly assumed that Clark was the progressive force behind the original policy, he opposed sanctions at their inception, tolerated them in their heyday, and started talking about *sanctions fatigue* as soon as it was politically possible. His support for the policy was guarded and minimalist: "I think generally that sanctions don't work. But in this case we took the view that there was nothing else that would work."

Clearly, Clark was affected by the opposition of his department and unhappiness within the Conservative party at the general thrust of the policy. At times, it seemed that he might be balancing his reputation as a Red Tory with a cautious
approach on this issue. However, his strong speeches against apartheid' and even at times for sanctions worked against this end, and there is no evidence that he saw this issue in terms of personal advantage. Instead, Clark's approach seemed to oscillate between the traditional preference for staying within the orbit of larger Western partners and a belief that Canada was uniquely situated to mediate on this issue.

In the early period, Clark attempted to put a brake on Mulroney's "adventurism" in accord with those within his department who wanted the Canadian state not to stray too far from the United States and Britain. Clark accepted that this position meant 'limitations on independent action.' Initially, therefore, his views on South Africa were in some respects closer to Thatcher and Reagan than to Mulroney. When Mulroney's determination to impose sanctions prevailed, Clark bowed to the inevitable, but was ambivalent about its direction. 'Strong views on apartheid,' he said, 'are a dime a dozen.' He preferred 'an instrument which

The Politics of Sanctions Fatigue 193 offers some tangible prospect of leading to change."2 Thus, Clark was the apostle of caution, wanting to make each advance in conjunction with others. The problem was that Western interest in sanctions flagged. Particularly within the Commonwealth, once Britain would not take part, collective trade sanctions would have involved primarily Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, three of South Africa's smaller economic partners. Therefore, officials in Clark's department did not regard Commonwealth trade sanctions as a serious option. With the pause in the broader sanctions campaign, Clark turned to mediation and to Pearsonian traditions which stressed the Canadian government's role 'as a trusted and honest broker.'3 Clark believed that Canadian diplomacy possessed *precisely the talents which can overcome confrontation,'4 and that South Africa was 'a question where we can make a difference.'5 In his view, Canada had more influence than others in the West:'6 'We are members of a number of organizations, that give us, in our judgement, more influence ... than other countries might think they have.'7 In an epic folie de grandeur, Clark acted on this conviction in a tour of southern Africa in August 1987. Generally, this approach exerted a profoundly conservative influence on the direction of policy. The role of mediator required a more neutral, uncommitted position than the activist stance of the mid-1980s. Indeed, Clark believed that the Nordic countries, 'whose international credentials are as good as ours,' were not as acceptable because they had 'not been as evenhanded in their approach. 18 Being 'evenhanded' meant paying no more than lip-service to the promise of more sanctions. Officials suggested that new measures were under consideration, but the timing was never right. First, Canadian officials wanted to wait until after the South African elections in May 1987 to support P.W. Botha against the resurgent white right. Then, action was delayed until the Commonwealth could jointly decide. Eventually, the propitious moment became after the next meeting of the G-7 in June 1988.

The government also attempted to deflect criticism by suggesting after the first measures that there was little else to do.19 This, despite the fact that the
interchurch taskforce listed twenty-seven additional initiatives to widen, tighten, and intensify economic and other sanctions against South Africa.2° Chief among possible options not adopted were mandatory financial sanctions, a total ban on imports, and an end to the export of sulphur.2' Yet throughout this period, Canadian leaders continued to insist that Canadian government policy on South Africa was based on high moral principles and, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that Canada led the way.22 The press in Canada tended to repeat this conviction regularly and uncritically.23

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At the same time, the record clearly shows that the Canadian government followed rather than led the sanctions campaign. The Indian government imposed comprehensive trade sanctions ahead of everyone in 1946, and withdrew its diplomatic mission in 1954. The Nordic countries were always ahead of Canada, in both the timing and severity of their sanctions.24 On diplomatic relations, Norway and Denmark cut their ties with South Africa, along with New Zealand, Brazil, and Argentina; whereas Canada never did. Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden5 imposed full economic sanctions on South Africa and Namibia, while Canadian sanctions were limited and many of them voluntary.26 A huge loophole existed for business through Namibia which was never included in Canadian sanctions. U.S. sanctions were also tougher than Canadian sanctions, a product of an activist Congress overriding White House opposition.27 The United States banned all new U.S. investment and bank loans; prohibited imports of South African gold, textiles, military vehicles, minerals and agricultural products not on the Commonwealth list;28 and had tighter restrictions on sales to South Africa. Local initiatives went well beyond those of the central government. A large number of states, cities, and pension funds would not invest in corporations, and most jurisdictions would not deal with banks that maintained economic links with South Africa,29 a policy that only the Ontario government espoused in Canada. In one case alone, divestiture by the state of California in the mid1980s amounted to $10 billion.30 Not only were Canadian sanctions less comprehensive, but also key sanctions, particularly financial sanctions, were voluntary. As disclosure was not required in Canada, monitoring Canadian financial institutions was difficult. When it suited their purpose, Canadian banks simply ignored sanctions. In terms of support for indigenous forces fighting apartheid, Canada's contribution was also rather less than more. Early on, the Nordic countries established close working relationships with South African liberation movements and, together with Holland and Belgium, provided funding for ANC offices in their countries and strategic assistance inside Africa. While the Mulroney government met regularly with ANC officials in the 1980s, it offered minimal material assistance, even for humanitarian projects. The government did not support ANC offices in Canada, nor would it allow the ANC to set up an embassy in Ottawa as the Kenyan government had done in Nairobi. While Sweden led the world in providing about $400 million in mostly humanitarian assistance to the ANC from
the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, Canadian assistance was risible at less than $500,000. In 1988 after eighteen months of negotiations with CUSO, the federal government backed only one of five proposed projects ($195,000 for an ANC creche), turning down management.

The Politics of Sanctions Fatigue The comparisons even for assistance to the SADCC countries showed a similar record: by the late 1980s, Canada's contribution was about $195 million as compared with $225 million from Denmark and $340 million from Sweden. From Opposition to Stonewalling on Sanctions Yet, over and again, Clark and his officials insisted that the Canadian government led the anti-apartheid campaign and that there was little left to do. This mythology became the 'hyper-real' discourse of the late Mulroney era; its function was to prevent further measures which they believed would damage Canadian influence. The approach emerged out of Clark's initial strong opposition to Mulroney's activist policy. Within Cabinet, Clark's original position was to counsel caution and to argue against economic sanctions as ineffectual in themselves, harmful to black South Africans, and damaging to the prospects of peace. He also doubted that they would bring white South Africans to the negotiating table. Clark's preference was for voluntary action by individuals and groups within civil society. In his view, broadly based, diversified action sent a far stronger message to South Africa than actions required by the law. They also helped build and extend a national consensus by securing willingly cooperation of Canadians at all levels of society in measures to oppose apartheid. In particular, Clark felt that the private sector was better situated than the state to lobby South African officials and businessmen about their policies. He encouraged individual, municipal, and provincial action to complement anything done at the level of the state.

To this end, in September 1985 Clark organized a series of meetings with provincial officials, executives of private companies, and bankers. He suggested that the bankers make no new loans to South Africa and make renegotiation of loans difficult. He also encouraged companies to take the code of conduct more seriously. At this point, Clark advocated a mix of caution and constructive engagement - not getting in deeper, but continuing to play a role. Clark's emphasis on individualism was given further expression in a series of registers established to record the anti-apartheid activities of Canadian provinces, municipalities, private institutions, organizations, firms, and individuals. In October 1985, Clark wrote to 20,000 individuals asking them to let him know what they had done in the campaign against apartheid, some suggested

196 Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions as a means to test the water about government sanctions. In 1987, just before the South African election in May, Clark asked another 30,000 households to add their names to the register, insisting again that the 'actions of individual Canadians
are as important ... as those taken by governments, groups, unions and companies.42

However, with the growing crisis in South Africa and momentum building for sanctions, Clark could not stonewall indefinitely. Once having accepted that sanctions were unavoidable, Clark argued for incremental pressures in a step-by-step policy geared to reform in South Africa. The credible argument was that a gradual escalation would preserve some measures with which to respond to events, that an immediate adoption of total sanctions would use up all opportunities at once. Its weakness was that movement forward virtually stopped after only thirteen months.

The dynamic which unfolded saw an impatient prime minister responding to the acceleration of events with an instinctive preference for sanctions, a minister attempting to rein in this enthusiasm, and a department firmly anchored to the policies and thinking of the past. While Mulroney wanted to take strong action, Clark argued that Canada's influence was limited, that voluntary sanctions were effective, and that, above all, it was important to keep Canada's powder dry. Within the Commonwealth, Clark stressed the importance of unity, while Mulroney tackled Britain's opposition to sanctions head on.

The struggle over Canadian sanctions policy first came to public attention during the summer of 1985. The initial proposals for sanctions sent by External Affairs to Mulroney were excessively mild and had to be rewritten at his insistence before presentation to the press in Baie Comeau on 6 July 1985.11 For the next two months, Clark continued to express public scepticism about sanctions and his preference for working cooperatively with the private sector.4

However, by late August, Mulroney began to call for a stronger policy to express Canadian dismay at President P.W. Botha's insensitivity and failure to deal with South Africa's crisis.45 At first Clark was able to change Mulroney's mind after Mulroney stated publicly, without prior discussion in Cabinet, that he would push for serious sanctions within the week.46 The commitment came as a surprise to Clark, who said the government's preference was 'to pursue routes other than sanctions because sanctions have very broad implications.'47

In an interview on Global Television a week later, Mulroney said that his earlier remarks had been his first instinctive reaction to the situation, that he now agreed with Clark's more moderate and mature approach: that sanctions might do more harm than good, and that 'the policy of disinvestment and sanctions would have a very negative impact on those who need our help most of all.'48 However, he also expressed concern about the disinterest that the South African government had shown in helping blacks progress.49

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Mulroney's responsiveness to Clark on this occasion may have been part of his general attempt to build confidence in their working relationship. Nevertheless, a week later, Clark was overruled, and, as we have seen, a second set of sanctions went into effect in September. Given the all-party consensus in Parliament for stronger sanctions, however, this second set fell short, revealing Clark's continuing influence and caution. While the sanctions were entirely symbolic,
Clark insisted that 'the evidence, so far, is that voluntary measures have worked.'50 Obviously, the government was indulging itself in easy measures. As NDP MP Howard McCurdy put it, 'We talked loudly but carried only a toothpick.' Both the NDP and the Liberal party called for fixed deadlines for reform in South Africa.2 However, Clark said he did not want to be bound by dates that 'acquire lives of their own' and would prevent flexible responses to changing developments.3 He argued that, by itself, Canada had limited influence, so he preferred to act in cooperation with the Commonwealth.

The difficulty was that a growing body of opinion within the Commonwealth wanted mandatory sanctions and strong collective action. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania appeared in Ottawa to say that while 'we in Africa welcome [initial sanctions] ... like Oliver Twist we ask for more.' At this point, however, Clark was more sympathetic to the opposing camp within the Commonwealth, agreeing with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe who appeared to make the counter-case against sanctions.

The differences between Mulroney and Clark in this period, though subtle, continued. At Nassau, Mulroney’s speech resonated with commitment to stronger action, while Clark was more cautious. Mulroney insisted that the Commonwealth must respond to the quickening pressure for change in South Africa and that it would be judged by how it met this challenge,4 but Clark talked before the meeting about the importance of 'unity and movement.'5 When the opposition pressed in the House of Commons for a stronger policy, Clark said that 'Canada would not choose as a preference to disrupt our economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa,' and promised 'intermediary steps to be considered first' in consultation with the Commonwealth.6 The different tone and approach continued following the end of the EPG mission. Mulroney said that in the twenty-five years after South Africa left the Commonwealth, the world had changed but 'an evil regime [in South Africa] has not changed in its fundamentals one bit.'7 He added that the white regime had had more than enough time to reform and that he was considering ending Canada's diplomatic relations. Clark, by contrast, pleaded for time to develop a joint effort with larger countries on sanctions.

During the Commonwealth mini-summit in London, Mulroney fought passionately against Thatcher and for a strong Commonwealth package of san-

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Curiously, Clark attempted to dilute proposals in drafting sessions which, the other foreign ministers pointed out, had been accepted already by Mulroney.8 Reflecting back on this meeting, Clark told reporters that, in his view, 'the British government moved more than they have been given credit for.' He added, on a visit to London the following January, that he did not intend to 'harass' Britain about its position on sanctions.59 By contrast, Mulroney, on tour in southern Africa, was pledging that he would do everything in his power to make Thatcher, Reagan, and other Western leaders take action on this issue.60 He said that 'in terms as stark and as realistic' as he
could, he would try to convince them of the risks for peace, of the tragedy that would inevitably unfold unless they worked together on a 'progressively urgent basis.' 'The way of dialogue is not making progress but is regressing,' he warned. In his view, the prospect of violence was much more likely in the absence of economic pressures. Obviously, he had some persuading to do closer to home.

From early 1987 on, Clark's misgivings and reservations about sanctions seemed to have hardened. He delayed adopting further sanctions even though he had Cabinet and prime ministerial approval for more in January. Yet from time to time, he still pulled out the militant anti-apartheid language of the government's original commitments. On his trip to southern Africa in August 1987, for example, he spoke eloquently about the willingness to adopt full sanctions if there was no prospect of reform in South Africa. In September at the United Nations, Clark said, 'We are at a critical stage in the campaign to end apartheid. There must be no relenting in that campaign, no pause in the pressure - because a pause might suggest apartheid is acceptable, and it is not. The pressure against apartheid must continue and increase.' However, his intentions appeared in quieter passages: in his U.N. speech, the key phrases followed: 'the challenge,' Clark said, 'is to find peaceful and effective means to build that pressure.' Around such qualifications, the government steadily retreated from significant action.

The difficulty was that, having made the commitment so publicly in 1985, the government could not backtrack without losing face. Thus the approach was to insist that full sanctions remained the ultimate weapon, but, like the nuclear deterrent, one that the government sincerely hoped it would never have to use. Increasingly, Clark began to talk about mediation and negotiations as the way to exert pressure, with full sanctions again treated as an *extreme* position which would reduce Canadian influence.

At the national anti-apartheid conference, Taking Sides in Southern Africa, held in Montreal in February 1987, Clark made it clear that he thought that government policy had gone far enough. He 'reported' general Canadian scepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions, discomfort with singling out South Africa in a world of human rights abusers, and apprehension about 'the methods and motives of the African National Congress.' Clark said he agreed with only the third of these concerns. In his view, the ANC's resort to armed struggle and its links with the Soviet Union seriously limited its ability to reach Canadians who opposed apartheid. Hence, the government would not give official recognition to the ANC and would continue to keep the proverbial light in the window for the South African government. Obviously, Clark's heart was still in dialogue, and his approach antagonized the audience drawn from more militant quarters of anti-apartheid opinion.

Clark continued to express his 'misgivings' about economic sanctions at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights in March 1987. He acknowledged that they were important as a gesture of support for the black majority, a peaceful means of exerting pressure, and a means of increasing the cost of apartheid. However, he also noted their costs: 'They distort and restrict
international trade, and they can adversely affect both Canadians and some of apartheid's victims.'67 Despite persistent questioning by opposition MPs,68 Clark refused to provide a timetable for further sanctions.

Clark was not prepared to support diplomatic sanctions either. In May, he defended the government's decision to accept promptly the credentials of J. Hendrik de Klerk, the new South African ambassador to Canada, as keeping 'lines open that may allow us to take advantage of any inclination for change that might occur there.'69 Given that the week before de Klerk's accreditation, South African defence forces had conducted a bombing raid in Zambia, Clark's position suggested a softening of the government's approach. By June, Ted Scott, Canada's representative on the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group, had become exasperated: 'If you're going to give leadership,' he said, 'you don't do it just by talking.'70

Don Quixote in Southern Africa
In fact, Clark's interest was to cultivate rather than to restrict diplomatic relations as a way of restarting the negotiation process in southern Africa. He was strongly influenced by the visit of sixty prominent Afrikaner intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians to Dakar in July to meet ANC officials. In turn, Clark embarked on his own brief and controversial tour of southern Africa the following month.

In attempting this mission, Clark obviously had different expectations about the potential for negotiations than Mulroney. As we have seen, on leaving Zimbabwe in January, Mulroney told journalists that his 'sad conclusion' was

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that 'the way of dialogue is not making progress but is regressing.'71 By contrast, Clark retained the rather ingenuous belief that he was uniquely situated to restart the process.72

Thus, in true Don Quixote fashion, he embarked on a whirlwind ten-hour trip to South Africa (after a brief visit to Lusaka and Maputo). His aim was to talk to a variety of South African leaders - 'black and Botha, Buthelezi and Tambo, Mandela and Afrikaner'73 and to 'carry the case, on one day, to the African National Congress and ... on the next day to the South African Government, thus providing the possibility of some capacity to breathe life into the negotiations.'74 Had the Canadian government adopted one 'extreme,' of breaking all relations or the other of doing nothing, Clark asserted, the role of gobetween would not have been possible.

A second objective was to defuse pressure from the Conservative party and the right-wing press in Canada who wanted an official visit to South Africa to balance Mulroney's trip to the frontline states.75 The complaint was that there had been almost no firsthand official contact between Canada and South Africa.'76 Also, External Affairs officials produced polls which they said showed national concern that Ottawa had been unfair and overly intrusive in South Africa's domestic affairs.77

An additional interest was to prevent further acrimony in the upcoming Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver, especially as British officials reported Thatcher's firm opposition to any more sanctions against South Africa. Thus, one
of the purposes of Clark's trip was to encourage African members to consider further development assistance in southern Africa as an alternative to increased sanctions against South Africa. At any rate, Clark's belief that he could regenerate the process of dialogue in South Africa belied all the evidence. He was attempting to influence a securocratic state led by the verkrampte leadership of the 'old crocodile' P.W. Botha. This was a regime that only recently had put down the most serious challenge to apartheid with great brutality and was continuing its destructive campaign in the region. Only a little over a year before, the Eminent Persons Group said that it had found no evidence of serious interest in reform, and the Botha government had used bombing raids in the region to signal its rejection of the group's initiative.

Given the record of the previous two years, moreover, the Canadian government was hardly a neutral force for mediation. Mulroney's pro-sanctions role in the Commonwealth had not endeared the current Canadian regime to the South African state any more than Diefenbaker's role had pleased them in the past. Clark, himself, was 'thoroughly detested' by South African officials, not only for Canada's role in the Commonwealth but also for its support for anti-

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apartheid forces in South Africa. En route to South Africa, Clark infuriated Pretoria by describing the ANC (regarded by them as a communist and terrorist organization) as 'an organization that would prefer to seek peaceful solutions' and one that was not controlled by communists. Nor did he endear himself to them when he added that 'the system of apartheid is at the root of violence in southern Africa.'

Even before the trip, South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha had written Clark telling him that he would not be welcome in South Africa if he wished to use the visit 'to buttress preconceived ideas ... Mr Clark must learn,' Botha's statement said, 'that he cannot prescribe to us. He is not welcome if he wishes to stage a circus.' Botha said he found Canada's involvement in anti-South African sanctions to be offensive. Generally, Clark's visit was regarded as little more than an unpleasant joke by white South African officials, politicians, and most of the white press.

While Clark stated publicly in Lusaka that he believed the ANC was willing to negotiate with Pretoria, P.W. Botha replied that the ANC had been successful in impressing 'useful idiots' from foreign countries and that there was 'no question of negotiations with the ANC.' Clark's request to meet Nelson Mandela, then in his twenty-fifth year in jail, was denied.

In this context, the result of Clark's trip varied quite dramatically from his expectations; his view of his influence was revealed as immodestly pretentious. In South Africa, Clark was told rudely by the press8 and politely by Foreign Minister Pik Botha to mind his own business. Shortly before he arrived, a progovernment newspaper bluntly told Clark to 'get lost.' The meeting with Pik Botha was less a collision than a non-meeting of minds. Clark talked about finding a means to negotiate the end of apartheid and reiterated
Canada's intention to impose total sanctions if the South African government did not change its policies. He was interested in determining whether there was any prospect for resuscitating an EPG-style of mediation, but decided that the deep fear and suspicion between the two parties precluded this possibility. He was interested in determining whether there was any prospect for resuscitating an EPG-style of mediation, but decided that the deep fear and suspicion between the two parties precluded this possibility.

For his part, Botha expressed the South African sense of betrayal by the West: 'What is to them a headache,' he said, 'is to us survival and existence.' He added that he did not understand *why the West expects from us negotiations that must inevitably lead to the installation of a Marxist regime in South Africa.' 'We gave gone as far as we can,' he added. 'We are not prepared to capitulate, to surrender, to change ourselves out of existence.' The two foreign ministers, it seemed, left the meeting agreeing to disagree.

The 'coincidental' arrival of four Canadian First Nations leaders in Pretoria at the same time as Clark also diverted attention to the Canadian government's own rather dismal record with aboriginal people and left it vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy. Noting the high infant mortality rates, poor housing conditions, and high unemployment in the Canadian aboriginal community, Pik Botha found it 'rather odd ... that a powerful nation like Canada, with all its wealth, cannot do more about this problem - about what is only a small fraction of the Canadian population. It seems to me this must be due to racist attitudes on behalf of Canada.' While Clark was given a mere two-and-a-half hour meeting, Pik Botha treated the First Nations delegation to a sit-down dinner in the garden of his official residence. This debacle in public relations caused one Canadian editorial to lament that 'Clark looks more like an honest patsy than an honest broker.' Among the anti-apartheid forces in southern Africa, moreover, the interest was less in Canadian proposals for mediation than in seeing Canada adopt a tougher position. Clark's host in Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda, categorically rejected any suggestion that the Commonwealth should change its priorities, and he urged Canada to keep sanctions first and assistance second. Kaunda said, 'We need assistance. We need it badly. But it's ... adding insult to serious injury, to say that we'll help SADCC and keep quiet [about the real issue of ending apartheid].'

Every other black leader whom Clark met in southern Africa told him that Canada should tighten sanctions. UDF representative Allan Boesak suggested that Clark should also work for an international ban on air links with South Africa. ANC officials in Lusaka asked Canada to break diplomatic relations with South Africa: 'You cannot just go on talking to South Africa,' a senior ANC official argued, "because the talking hasn't achieved anything.' Yet when Clark returned to Canada, he brushed these views aside. Despite the strong message given to him by African leaders and the ANC in favour of tougher sanctions, he suggested that because the ANC did not raise the issue with him directly during his meetings, they shared his priorities. In reality, Clark was putting a brave face on what, by any standards, was one of the most disastrous, if uncharacteristically flamboyant, initiatives of his career. As one commentator put...
it, 'The old image of Canada, the selfless arbitrator in world problems, is as dead as a dodo. Joe Clark is not Lester Pearson.'94

A Chilly Welcome for Oliver Tambo
Clark's African safari was followed almost immediately by the long delayed meeting in Ottawa with the president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo. The occasion had great symbolic importance, given the distant approach adopted by Canadian governments towards the ANC in the past. Also, Mulroney was the first Western head of state to meet with Tambo.

However, the climate was inauspicious and the encounter added to the growing suspicion in Parliament and the press that the government was retreating. As noted earlier, Tambo's visit had been bitterly attacked by the South African embassy and its supporters, and a range of Conservative MPs used the occasion to bring into the open their disquiet with the overall direction of the policy. The result was that Tambo was treated to a rather cold and patronizing welcome. Prime Minister Mulroney is reported to have pulled out the South African embassy's advertisement that demonized the ANC and quizzed Tambo about its contents.95 Both he and Clark told Tambo that 'accusations that the ANC is a violent Marxist organization' made it difficult for them to mobilize public opinion in Canada against apartheid. Although Tambo had been invited to Canada on the grounds that the ANC would 'be part of any solution in Southern Africa,'96 some officials insinuated that the visit was private. It was made abundantly clear, moreover, that the meeting did not convey official recognition or support for the ANC.97

In January at Victoria Falls, Mulroney had stated that while he could not condone violence, he at least understood why people resorted to armed struggle against the South African state. In August, he was handling the issue in a manner consistent with South African government propaganda. The request that the ANC consider temporarily ceasing the armed struggle as a fillip to Canada's stature before the Commonwealth conference was given the short shrift it deserved. In his response, Tambo insisted that the call for an armed struggle was not 'violence.' 'Violence means just irresponsible, indiscriminate killing of people. That is what the regime is doing to us, to the blacks ... for nearly 40 years.'98 'If you want to talk about violence,' he asked, 'what violence exceeds that of apartheid?'99 Just as the world sought peace when it fought Hitler, so, too, was the ANC fighting for peace in South Africa. In his view armed struggle was just as legitimate in South Africa as in other battles to overthrow colonial regimes. To term the ANC's demands for universal franchise as an invitation to chaos, moreover, was a racialist argument. 'Democracy means democracy,' Tambo added. 'It doesn't mean that the blacks seize all the power and use it against other people. We see a South Africa where we recognize one another as simply South Africans.'00

In terms of the nature of its support, Tambo noted that communists had belonged to the ANC since 1921, and the ANC had no intention of conducting
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a witch-hunt now. He pointed out that the West had fought alongside Stalin against Hitler during the Second World War. Why, then, he asked, was it inappropriate in this case for the ANC to accept help from the Soviet Union. Would it not be more productive, he concluded, for the West to cooperate with the Soviets in ending apartheid.

While the ANC leader left Canada after having been received by officials at the highest level in Canada, the tone of their remarks had not been encouraging. The visit had, to be true, irritated the white regime in Pretoria and had lessened the diplomatic isolation in which the ANC operated. However, beyond these achievements, the visit had provided cold comfort. On the key issue of more sanctions, Tambo left Ottawa empty-handed. On the question of support for the ANC's struggle, he had been given little to cheer him on his way. Indeed, Tambo wondered publicly why a sympathetic government like Canada would use South African propaganda as the basis for official discussions.

Tolerance of an Odious 'Refugee'

The government's ambiguous position was expressed in a second case which seemed to contradict the essence of Canadian policy. Just before Tambo came to Canada, the Department of Immigration accepted a senior official of Renamo, Francisco Nota Moises, into Canada as a refugee cum landed immigrant. Yet the Canadian government had repeatedly condemned Renamo, financed aid projects inside Mozambique, and eventually provided security assistance to protect them against Renamo attacks.

Renamo, the Portuguese acronym for the Mozambican National Resistance, was a rebel group, sponsored originally by the Rhodesian army and later by the South African military, for use as surrogates for their campaign of destabilization in Mozambique.102 From 1981 on, according to the Gersony report for the U.S. State Department, there were 530,000 Renamo-related deaths, 5.9 million lives threatened by war-created famine, and $7 billion damage to the economy.03 Renamo became notorious for its systematic use of rape, enslavement, torture, mutilation, beatings, and mass killings in its drive to topple the government of Mozambique. Its destruction of the country's infrastructure and social services wiped out not only the advances since independence but also much that had been created during the colonial era as well, producing, in the words of the Gersony report, 'one of the most brutal holocausts since World War II.' Moises had applied for refugee status from Kenya, a country known for its sympathetic collaboration with Renamo. A Catholic church group in Victoria had sponsored Moises on the grounds that his life was in danger, without realizing the significance of his affiliation." Canadian officials from a variety

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of departments presented a confused and contradictory account of their knowledge about Moises' connection to Renamo. At first, immigration officials in Nairobi said that, as far as they knew, they were dealing with 'an ordinary refugee sponsored by a church group.'105 A security check conducted by the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) also failed to block his entry; nothing in his file indicated to them that he was a threat to national security in Canada. However, Moises had not been given normal clearance as a genuine political refugee from the UNHCR, and Moises himself claimed that he had made a lengthy statement about his ties to Renamo in Nairobi which, he believed, was passed on to higher authorities. The immigration official interviewing him asked for literature on Renamo, assuring him of his ability to continue his work after landing in Canada. At no time did the official suggest that he or the Canadian government considered Renamo a terrorist organization. Six months later, the Department of Immigration confessed that they knew that Moises was a member of Renamo when they granted him entry.

Under the terms of the U.N. convention on refugees, claims to refugee status are nullified if the individual engages in political activity. Yet, as the secretary of Renamo's Department of Information and an important fund-raiser, Moises resumed his duties without interference from authorities in Canada. In fact, Moises was the third-ranking official in the Renamo leadership based outside of Mozambique and belonged to the Renamo National Council. He returned to Renamo-held territory in Mozambique in January 1988 while living in Canada, and regularly travelled to Europe to meet with other Renamo leaders. From Victoria, Moises issued press releases on Renamo letterhead and wrote letters to the editor of major North American newspapers promoting Renamo's cause.

His base in Canada provided Renamo with a North American centre, with links to ultra-right wing groups, notably the World Anti-Communist League, and to mainstream American Republicans such as Senator Robert Dole.

Once the case came to light in June 1988, the Mozambican government sent a diplomatic note requesting Ottawa to explain its decision, and then made repeated representations either to expel or silence Moises. Canadian NGOs involved in Cooperation Canada-Mozambique (COCAMO), a consortium managing an aid program in Nacala, Mozambique, pointed out that Canadian projects and cooperants were put at risk by Renamo activities. Opposition MPs and, in particular, NDP MP Lynn Hunter urged the government to intervene, but found the government uncooperative, prone to obstruction and delay.

At first, External Affairs officials expressed surprise at Moises' presence in Canada and insisted that the case in no way contradicted the government's abhorrence for 'the reprehensible activities and tactics of Renamo.' Indeed,

Joe Clark had described Renamo's activities as 'terrorism.' On his visit to Mozambique about the time that Moises was entering Canada, Clark seemed to have been genuinely moved by the effects of destabilization on Mozambique. At the United Nations in September 1987, he also spoke about Canadian aid workers 'who fear that the projects they build to help people will become targets of terrorists, and put at risk the very lives they are working to improve.' Yet two External Affairs officers arranged to meet Moises after his arrival in Victoria in 1987 and maintained contact with him until the news of his presence became a public scandal in mid-1988. According to Moises, officials were
keenly interested in Renamo, and assured him that he could work for his organization, provided he did not act against Canada.

When Clark finally ordered a review of Moises' status, the case took six months to resolve, and Moises was permitted to stay. The Department of Immigration said no rules had been broken and found no reason to act against him; they refused to reopen his case or to conduct an inquiry. A Security Intelligence Review Committee concluded that CSIS had been sloppy and ignorant, woefully uninformed in screening Moises, but that did not explain the approach taken by other branches of the state.

Given the government's general policy on southern Africa, its decision to allow Moises entry and status, reaffirmed after its investigation, was a distinct anomaly. One explanation lies in intelligence links between Canada and the United States. Moises, one source suggests, may well have been sponsored by a branch of the CIA trying to wean Renamo away from its loyalty to its hardline military supporters in South Africa." At least one senior Canadian official remains convinced that the CIA exerted pressure on the Canadian government to cooperate by admitting Moises. If this is the case, then Moises' residence in Canada underlines the extraordinary power and autonomy of Western intelligence networks from government policy. At the least, the contradictions posed by the official tolerance of his activities suggested not only internal divisions within the state but also some weakening of the commitment to the general policy.

The Commonwealth Summit in Vancouver

In the period leading up to the Commonwealth heads of government conference in Vancouver in October 1987, signs of a retreat on Canada's South Africa policy prompted renewed questioning by the parliamentary opposition." The leader of the Liberal party, John Turner, demanded a complete severing of ties with Pretoria and assured Tambo that the Liberals were with him in the

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struggle against oppression. The NDP called for total sanctions and even an understanding that the ANC's violence 'might be absolutely essential to the struggle.'

Before the meeting, Mulroney said he had seen no sign that the South African government was moving towards multiracial democratic rule in 1987." When asked if Canada might sever diplomatic relations, Mulroney indicated that, in the absence of any genuine dialogue within South Africa, the government was closer to this step. Typically, Clark's response was ambiguous: on the one hand, he admitted that 'we are not making nearly enough progress against apartheid. The situation is getting worse.' Yet, at the same time, he dismissed tougher measures as 'quitting.' Though the policy was of graduated steps, Clark continued to talk about new sanctions as an all-or-nothing proposition.

This, despite a poll done for the Department of External Affairs in September that showed 48 per cent of Canadians supporting limited sanctions and another 24 per cent in favour of total sanctions." A sizeable group (37 per cent) thought the Canadian government should do more. At this point and for the rest of the decade,
Clark's 'sanctions fatigue' was a characteristic more of senior echelons of the state than of public opinion in Canada. Behind the scenes, the Canadian and Australian governments had been the target of strong lobbying by British officials. The British wanted the Commonwealth to abandon sanctions (in their view, a 'negative' approach) in favour of the more 'positive' strategy of increasing assistance to the frontline states, the six countries (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania) within southern Africa that bore the brunt of South Africa's wars of destabilization.\textsuperscript{22} In early September, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe put this case successfully to his counterparts in Ottawa, partly because Clark, too, wanted to avoid another acrimonious debate on sanctions in the upcoming meeting. Shortly before the summit in Vancouver, therefore, Clark told African diplomats that he saw no point rehashing differences with Britain and that Canada would not propose new sanctions. Henceforth, the emphasis would be on development assistance for the frontline states,\textsuperscript{23} increased assistance to opponents of apartheid inside South Africa,\textsuperscript{24} and improved public awareness in Canada. Clark had even accepted the case for some security assistance for the frontline states. 'Stability,' he said, 'requires transportation systems that don't break down and aren't blown up.'\textsuperscript{25} In its essence, Clark was now supporting the British approach.\textsuperscript{26} Yet the British attempt to substitute assistance, even military assistance, to the frontline states as an alternative to sanctions was opposed by the frontline states themselves. In their view, strong sanctions represented the psychological dividing line between talk and action on South Africa, and they wanted stronger, not weaker pressure.\textsuperscript{27} While their need for assistance was not in doubt, 'it would be a grave mistake,' they felt, not to make the elimination of apartheid the top Commonwealth priority.\textsuperscript{28} Otherwise, the regime in Pretoria would continue its campaign of destruction in the region, negating even the salutary effects of the proposed assistance. Such assistance on its own, Kaunda said, was 'just like fattening us for the slaughter.'\textsuperscript{29} It quickly became apparent that another showdown was looming. British Prime Minister Thatcher was coming to Vancouver in a highly combative mood. Shortly before the meeting, she signalled her intentions by sending an official British trade delegation to South Africa. Britain also tried to block efforts in the European Community to channel $42 million to anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa because, in Thatcher's view, they were too 'radical.' Thatcher's view of her 'host Canadians' was that they 'wanted to be more African than the Africans.'\textsuperscript{130} At the conference, Thatcher resurrected the theory of constructive engagement, arguing that the pressure of internal factors - the fifteen million people who would be born in the next fifteen years (most of them black) and the present necessity of finding a thousand new jobs each day - would force government accommodation. In short, capitalism would gradually erode the 'illogic' of apartheid. In this view, sanctions were counterproductive, stiffening white South African resistance to
change. The most that the British government was prepared to offer was that it
would not abandon existing sanctions.

Although Thatcher insisted on her right to hold a contrary position without her
motives being questioned, her officials dismissed support for sanctions elsewhere
in the Commonwealth as emotional grandstanding. They said they had won the
battle on sanctions ('there was no steam' for them now), and went on to launch a
well-orchestrated campaign of disinformation, suggesting that the Canadian
government's support for sanctions was hypocritical.

While there were legitimate areas for criticism of Canadian sanctions policy,31
Thatcher's team deliberately set out to confuse the issue. Although trade sanctions
did not go into effect in Canada until October 1986, Thatcher used the 1986 trade
statistics to suggest that the Canadian government was not living up to its
commitments. Canadian companies had stocked up on supplies from South Africa
in 1986 in anticipation of sanctions and so imports had grown 44 per cent and
total two-way trade 27 per cent over 1985. The following year, of course, trade
figures reflected the new sanctions regulations, as total two-way trade dropped to
less than half of the previous year, with imports down to one-third and exports
down to two-thirds of 1986. At the end of the confer-

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ence, four heads of state - Hawke of Australia, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Kaunda of
Zambia, and Gandhi of India - publicly chastised Thatcher for her dirty tricks and
discourtesy. However, Thatcher continued well into her retirement to use the 1986
figures to suggest that Mulroney had only been engaged in moral posturing.'
Thatcher also became openly dismissive of the ANC. At the Vancouver
conference, she claimed that it was nothing more than a 'terrorist organization.'
Anyone who thought that the ANC was going to run the government in South
Africa, she added, was 'living in cloud cuckoo land.'33 She declared that she
would never talk to any ANC leaders and denied that British officials had met
with ANC representatives, even though her foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe,
had recently seen ANC President Oliver Tambo. Unfortunately for Thatcher,
history belied her predictions on South Africa. Change began just over two rather
than twenty years after the Vancouver meeting, and the ANC became the official
government of South Africa in May 1994.

While the meetings started with a general disinclination to renew old battles with
Britain, opposition mounted as the conference went along. Thatcher's "self-
righteous and condescending" attitude and her aggressive attempts to discredit
Mulroney went over the top of official tolerance. The Commonwealth secretary-
general pointedly remarked that it was 'a self-fulfilling prophecy when it is said
sanctions don't work, especially by people who don't apply them.'13' Though
close philosophically to Thatcher on other matters, Prime Minister Seaga of
Jamaica disagreed with the notion of "sanctions fatigue" (a phrase coined by Joe
Clark), arguing that sanctions had affected the South African economy adversely
and should be maintained and intensified.'35 Mulroney had started the conference
looking for common ground.'36 However, Thatcher's behaviour stiffened his
spine. Mulroney said that he had 'gone to the mat before with Britain,"37 and
obviously was prepared for more rounds on this occasion. He was strongly
supported by Stephen Lewis who gave background briefings to the press to
underline Canada's resolute commitment to tougher measures. In closed sessions,
Mulroney intervened on a number of occasions to support other Commonwealth
leaders who most forcefully put the case for sanctions - Gandhi, Seaga, Mugabe,
and Kaunda.38 He also made clear, as he had on his January 1987 trip to southern
Africa, that it had never been the view of his government that the frontline states
should be expected to commit economic suicide through sanctions to demonstrate
their opposition to apartheid.139

As host, Mulroney chose his closing remarks to launch his strongest attack on the
anti-sanctions position (adopted only by Britain). He asked the other leaders to
consider what the Americans would do if five million blacks ruled

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twenty million whites in Canada.4' As a senior Canadian official observed,
Mulroney's audience of largely black heads of state were moved by this 'white
leader of a prosperous nation talking about the hypocrisy and double-standards of
the West towards Third World blacks.' At the same time, Thatcher was 'absolutely
furious,' intensely aggravated by the suggestion that the Americans would
intervene. In the room, you could have heard the proverbial pin drop.4'

Such moments became the stuff of legend. The solidarity and friendships forged
earned the government enormous tolerance when it began backsliding on the
commitment to adopt total sanctions. They took the Canadian government into the
post-apartheid era on a wave of good will and recharged Mulroney even when he
could not stay the course.

Yet, the Vancouver conference ended more on Thatcher's terms than on
Mulroney's. It was able to agree on increased assistance for the frontline states,
especially Mozambique. Priority attention was to be given to developing the
Limpopo railway line and the port of Maputo to ease traffic congestion in the
region and to reduce dependence on South Africa. Increased assistance was also
promised inside South Africa for black education and for the defence and support
of detainees and their families. In the key area of sanctions, however, no
agreement was possible. At the end of the conference Mulroney reasserted 'that
sanctions do work, that they shall continue to be applied, and that they must be
applied more intensively.' 42 For her part, Thatcher argued that the lack of 'a
single additional measure or sanction against South Africa' demonstrated that
'further progress cannot be made along those lines.' 43

The rest of the Commonwealth hoped that a program of action had been
established which would increase pressure against South Africa. Specifically, this
involved a process to universalize sanctions through a new Commonwealth
Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.‘” As a subsidiary purpose,
the committee was to look at ways to combat the effects of South African
censorship and propaganda. While Britain did not see the value of the committee
and refused to be a member, the rest of the Commonwealth believed it was
essential to keep the Commonwealth struggle against apartheid alive.

Commonwealth Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal concluded the conference,
noting that 'you had been told before this conference that sanctions were off the boil. I think you know now that for most of the Commonwealth, sanctions are on the front burner and South Africa does not like the heat.'

Mulroney's support for this view put him at odds not only with Margaret Thatcher but also, to some extent, with Joe Clark. Before the summit, Clark had declared himself 'pessimistic' about sanctions and more interested in other policy instruments. He claimed that he had been 'beating the bushes for new sanctions' with little effect, even in the Scandinavian countries. (In fact, Den-

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mark, Norway, and Finland had already unilaterally imposed a total trade ban on South Africa, which Sweden followed.) There was, he kept repeating, 'a temporary sanctions fatigue' among Western leaders, and 'lonely little sanctions offered by countries ... like Canada don't have much impact on their own.'

In fact, the idea for the Commonwealth committee lay in Clark's department, though with a different purpose than the one that emerged. Originally, the hope had been to include Britain, and thus deflect attention from Mulroney's overblown promises on sanctions. However, with Britain unwilling to join and given the entirely different mandate, the committee became the next cross for the department to bear. To their chagrin, it became the arena within which the disjuncture between Canadian promises and performance was constantly brought to light.

The stage was now set for Clark to take a more central role in the formulation of Canadian government policy on South Africa. In the next few years, except on a few occasions, Mulroney turned his attention to central issues of his administration, not least the 1988 election. Moving into his new position as chair of the Commonwealth committee, Clark's approach became highly visible and controversial, astonishing and disappointing those who believed the committee would provide a strong centre to act against South Africa.

10
Stalling on Sanctions: The Twilight Years

I think we've lost moral [stature]. I think we've lost credibility. I think we've lost momentum. I think we've lost our heart on this issue and I frankly don't understand it.

Stephen Lewis'

In the last years of the 1980s, the climate for action against South Africa turned from chilly to cold. The South African state had beaten off the immediate challenge to its authority, and the consensus in the West was that it was open to reform. This view was given added strength in 1988 when South Africa came to an agreement with the United States, Cuba, and Angola on Namibian independence. The breakthrough gave South Africa an enormous boost in international circles. Once again, the West was willing to give the white regime the benefit of the doubt, and sanctions were definitely off the agenda.

Then, with F.W. de Klerk replacing P.W. Botha as National party leader in South Africa, a new attitude seemed to be taking hold, albeit in terms of sharing power
rather than universal franchise for the black majority. In early 1989, de Klerk told the South African Parliament that drastic change was needed as the present system could not last indefinitely. Once discussions between the white regime, imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and other ANC officials became public knowledge, Western governments kept a watching brief. A breakthrough and some form of political settlement seemed possible.

Yet there were grounds for continuing scepticism: the system of apartheid remained fundamentally unchanged. The South African government's offer of 'power sharing' was confined to municipal levels in ways unacceptable to the black majority. The forced incorporation of black communities into the 'home-

lands' continued, along with rigid enforcement of the Group Areas Act. Most of the legislation underpinning apartheid remained on the books.

The state also sent clear signals that it would not tolerate even peaceful opposition. In 1989, two thousand non-violent opponents of apartheid were detained without trial, about 10 per cent of them under eighteen. Equally debilitating when these prisoners were released was the use of restriction orders which amounted to a form of self-policing house arrest. The Delmas treason trial ended with the imprisonment of leaders of the United Democratic Front and the churches. The state continued to use a distorted interpretation of the doctrine of 'common purpose' to sentence groups such as the Upington 14 to death. A non-violent defiance campaign by the Mass Democratic Movement was met with tear-gas, beatings, detentions, and killings.

In the face of this sombre, if uncertain, situation, the Canadian government remained rhetorically within the anti-apartheid camp. At the Commonwealth heads of government meeting at Kuala Lumpur in 1989, Prime Minister Mulroney said that he had 'looked around and saw no one else' doing anything about South Africa, and that he had 'staked out for my successors the high moral ground' of opposing apartheid unequivocally.3 However, by then, his record on this issue had become sufficiently poor that the Canadian press dismissed such claims as 'self-serving to the point of vulgarity' and 'tasteless posturing over the fate of suffering people.'4

The difficulty lay in the resoluteness of Mulroney's original commitment at the United Nations in 1985. As we have seen, he had promised that unless conditions improved his government would invoke total economic sanctions and end diplomatic ties. By the end of the 1980s, no one in government attempted to suggest that reforms to apartheid had been significant; yet no one was willing, either, to fulfil the pledge.

Policy on South Africa in these years was couched in a way that would suggest that the Canadian government was still on side. However, it was intended to inconvenience few interests and hurt absolutely no one. Substantial new sanctions were resisted, while total sanctions were regarded as a trump card to be played only 'when all else had failed and the avenues to peaceful change had been closed.'5 The positive gloss was to emphasize Canadian assistance and moral support for the victims of apartheid in South Africa and in the region. In fact the
policy defended existing relations with South Africa on the ground that it gave the Canadian government status as a player (‘you have to be in the game to influence its outcome’);6 the old Trudeau policy of dialogue, with a modernized twist. Central to this process was a shift within the Canadian state. With the exception of Commonwealth meetings, Mulroney lost interest in this issue, leaving Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions
the field to Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark and the Department of External Affairs. This was the era where the central issues of Mulroney’s tenure as prime minister were fought out - the free trade agreement, the 1988 federal election, and proposals for constitutional reform that led to the Meech Lake Accord. Small wonder, given great power disinterest in sanctions and hints of change in South Africa, that Mulroney let his commitment to stronger action on South Africa drift.

In the Department of External Affairs, significant quarters of opinion had always believed that the 1985 commitment to total sanctions had been a mistake. Now it was an albatross and a source of endless indignity. When they could, External Affairs officials were quite happy to use the settlement in Namibia as an excuse for limiting action on South Africa. As we have seen, the Trudeau government had argued that membership in the Contact Group precluded action against South Africa. Now, the prospect of Canadians helping to shepherd Namibia through elections provided the rationale for neutrality towards South Africa. As one official from External Affairs explained, ‘It’s not an ideal time to disturb the weaning mother.’7 Accordingly, in the last years of the 1980s, the Canadian government muted its approach. While it did tighten sanctions on arms exports, sports relations, and government relations with South African-owned companies; these were measures to close loopholes rather than new steps forward. The most significant new item in this period, the decision to provide security assistance for Canadian aid programs in Mozambique, was a gesture as much in service of the government’s campaign for a seat on the U.N. Security Council as to counter South African destabilization.

The minimal nature of this program reflected considerable uncertainty, even gloom in Canada about prospects for change in South Africa. Ironically, only twelve months before F.W. de Klerk abolished apartheid legislation, Canadian diplomats expressed their conviction that only long-term economic growth would undermine apartheid, and that in a very gradual way.8 While there was no question that the momentum of the uprising in South Africa had been stopped, Canadian officials overestimated the capacity of the South African state to ride out what had become an acute crisis. They also underestimated the capability of the mass democratic opposition.

For example, Canada’s ambassador to Pretoria, Ronald MacLean, believed that the state of emergency had effectively smashed and silenced black political resistance.9 He also felt that the crisis within the white political leadership following President Botha’s stroke made it ‘impossible for the white community to
come to terms with the black majority for at least a decade.' MacLean dismissed the reform potential of Botha's successor, F.W. de Klerk. In his

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view, there was 'simply no Moses poised to come from the wilderness to lead them [the white community].' It could be years, he argued, even decades before there was a non-racial government elected by universal franchise in South Africa. In February 1989 MacLean told a group of NGOs in Harare not to 'accept thirty years as a suitable [time frame for change], but let's be realistic.' On this occasion, Clark also responded impatiently to calls for complete democracy: 'If we are talking about one man, one vote,' he said, 'then we should pull out Ambassador MacLean now and end diplomatic relations.'

Yet once the prospects for change improved, the consensus was to give South Africa a breathing space. It was time, as one editorial put it, to consider "a little carrot instead of a big stick." In 1987, the Canadian government's retreat from activism had been ambiguous, especially in the light of Mulroney's role at the Commonwealth conference in Vancouver. However in the last years of the 1980s, the breach between promise and performance had become undeniable.

Unfortunately for Clark, such contradictions could not be hidden. His position as chair of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa gave a prominence to Canadian evasions that, at times, reduced Canada's stature considerably.

Given the general thinking behind Canadian policy, the Commonwealth committee was primed for conflict. At face value, its mandate from Vancouver was to find ways to 'widen, tighten, and intensify' sanctions. As chair, Clark had a pivotal responsibility to coordinate stronger action. Yet against the wishes of most of the committee and in defiance of large sections of Canadian public opinion, he resisted further sanctions. With Australia also moving closer to this position, the Commonwealth was becoming dangerously divided on racial grounds. As the process moved along, the respect earned by Mulroney's past performances wore thin. By the end, the government's credibility was in tatters.

A Slow Start in Lusaka

At the first meeting of the committee in Lusaka in February 1988, Commonwealth Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal warned that 'those who deplore but do no more are seen by South Africa as friends, friends bearing comfort, friends encouraging defiance.' Most of the other foreign ministers agreed on the importance of new sanctions, goaded by British Prime Minister Thatcher's claim in Nigeria the previous month that 'we have won the argument. What we have now is rhetoric.'

By contrast, Clark insisted that 'there was no question of new sanctions being discussed at the meeting.' At most, he wanted the committee to look at ways to tighten up the observance of existing sanctions. Clark believed that the

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'best prospect for an end to apartheid' was to restart EPG-style negotiations.' His particular interest was in finding ways to counteract South African propaganda
and censorship and to promote dialogue with and among opponents of apartheid. As 'the curtain comes down within South Africa,' he explained, 'the campaign intensifies outside, to portray as reform, proposed institutions in which no black leader will participate; to caricature all opponents of apartheid as communists or killers; to exploit prejudice.'

In the end, the committee agreed to commission two studies: one by the Commonwealth Secretariat on the general application and impact of sanctions; and one coordinated by the governments of Australia, Canada, and India on financial sanctions. Clark also offered about $1 million for a strategy to combat South African propaganda and censorship.

The slow start in Lusaka did not go unnoticed, particularly as considerable research on sanctions was already in the public domain. In Canada, the Winnipeg Free Press said that if the Lusaka meeting was an example of 'the payoff to be expected,' then money and time can be saved by disbanding the committee and leaving the issue in the hands of the Commonwealth Secretariat. Nobody, the Free Press complained, seemed ready 'to make a single commitment to do anything.'

Shortly after the meeting, the South African government expressed its defiance of this Commonwealth initiative, imposing new restrictions on anti-apartheid organizations, particularly on their foreign funding. Although Clark conceded that there was 'increasing repression' in South Africa and that a bad situation had 'been made much worse,' his response was limited to calling in the South African ambassador for discussions and to keeping Canada's ambassador 'a little longer' in Ottawa for discussions. In a well worn gesture and despite the new restrictions, Clark also offered more aid to victims and opponents of apartheid, particularly in the union movement. However, he refused to consider diminishing diplomatic relations.

During the mid-late 1980s, there is no question that there were grounds for keeping the Canadian embassy in Pretoria. As Clark pointed out, in light of the South African government's censorship policy and propaganda campaign, it provided an invaluable listening post. The embassy was also a useful conduit for aid funds for hundreds of small projects, many for anti-apartheid activities. Travel restrictions meant that activists were often prohibited from travel, so while they could not come to Canada, Canadian aid officials in the embassy could go to them. Also representatives of the embassy appeared in solidarity with opponents of apartheid at trials, vigils, funerals, and demonstrations. Cutting political and diplomatic relations would have meant that supportive countries, like Canada, would leave while the United Kingdom and West Germany would stay.

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However, while this was a solid case for some representation, it did not provide the rationale for full diplomatic relations up to the ambassadorial level. The ambassador could have been removed semi-permanently and the embassy reduced in status to a consulate. In practical terms, diminishing the embassy's status would not have hurt economic relations: Japan, operating with only a consul-general, was South Africa's chief trading partner. Removing the ambassador would also
not have harmed the ability to garner intelligence or to support anti-apartheid activities. Most Canadian aid funds were distributed through Canadian NGOs rather than the embassy. A consulate could still have conducted relations with non-official groups, becoming, as Allan Boesak suggested, a 'people's embassy' in a way not open to the full embassy.

Within civil society in Canada, moreover, there was strong pressure from the media, opposition political parties, and the CLC for either a lessening or a complete rupture in diplomatic relations. For its part, the ANC was adamant that stronger diplomatic sanctions should be taken: 'They are there to attend funerals,' said Fumie Gqiba, the ANC's chaplain. 'How long are they prepared to do that, and not attack the root cause of those funerals?'

Yet Clark refused to consider the question of diplomatic sanctions, even mild ones, treating the question almost exclusively as an all-or-nothing proposition. 'Do we walk away in disgust or do we try to use and build our influence despite our profound disappointment?' he asked.:

Taken together with his unwillingness to impose additional economic sanctions, Clark's measured step-by-step approach had been exposed by Pretoria as little more than bluff.

The steady erosion of the government's position in 1988 became increasingly obvious as Mulroney began to parrot the bland formulae of Clark and External Affairs in House debates. Whereas in the recent past he had expressed considerable doubt about the openness of the white regime in Pretoria to dialogue, now he insisted that Canada's most helpful role was to promote dialogue. He also suggested that any diminution of diplomatic relations would mean that Canada would 'cease to be a player.'

When the G-7 conference opened in Toronto in June 1988, Mulroney ignored parliamentary calls for tougher action on South Africa. His interest, he said, was primarily in working out a common approach to agricultural subsidies with his old nemesis, Margaret Thatcher. As in Venice, the major Western powers said absolutely nothing about South Africa in their final communiqué, although, as host, Mulroney was able to include a series of declarations about South Africa in his appended summary of political issues. Obviously he had learned his lesson. Following the summit, Mulroney was able to provoke an angry response from P.W. Botha by sending a message to honour Mandela's seventieth birthday. Botha said Mulroney was 'dangerously close' to aligning himself with the

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forces of 'violence and terrorism.' However, as even West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe had used the occasion to call for Mandela's release, Mulroney was acting very much in the Western mainstream.

The next gesture involved a tightening of sports sanctions. However, the initiative was designed primarily to spare the Canadian government embarrassment. The timing of the new ban was intended to avoid having two South Africans competing at a tennis tournament in a suburb of Toronto at the same time that the Commonwealth foreign ministers committee was to meet in the city centre.
Thus, in July 1988 the government decided to deny visas to South Africans entering Canada to participate in a sport. In the past, South African athletes in golf and tennis had been exempted from the general sports ban under the convention (known as the 'Mulroney loophole') that where the international federations still allowed South African participation, the ban did not apply. Athletes were regarded as independent professionals playing for a living without national affiliation. Now any Canadian playing against a South African in Canada would forfeit federal government funding and eligibility for national teams. However, this ban was only a token of government policy and not a promise of more to come.

'Show Business' in Toronto

At the second meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa in Toronto in August 1988, most foreign ministers came prepared for action, encouraged by the quality of five excellent studies in front of them. However, Clark attempted to divert attention from sanctions through an arts and entertainment festival, a public forum on South African censorship and propaganda, and a candle lighting ceremony to rekindle the light to end the darkness of censorship in South Africa. He insisted that the focus of the Commonwealth committee meeting would be on the Canadian strategy to counter South African propaganda and censorship rather than new sanctions. This approach angered and distressed the Commonwealth secretary-general and African delegations. Ramphal opened his remarks with a strong defence of sanctions as 'the single most effective peaceful path to change in South Africa.' In a rebuttal to Clark's notion of 'sanctions fatigue,' he added that there was 'no weariness with sanctions on the part of those who call for them.' Nigerian General Olusegun Obasanjo and the foreign ministers of Zambia and Zimbabwe endorsed this view, saying that the main issue was the need to make sanctions really bite and to work on the security needs of the frontline states. In private, delegates expressed sharp criticism of Canadian attempts to divert attention from sanctions.

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attention from sanctions. 'A deficiency of news from the outside world,' asked one senior Commonwealth official, 'is that really the principal deficiency facing black South Africans? I don't think so.' In exasperation, Nathan Shamuyarira, the foreign minister from Zimbabwe, asked Clark in a closed session what his problem was. Clark suggested, quite erroneously, that the Canadian public did not want a stronger policy. As Shamuyarira pointed out, an Angus Reid poll showed that Clark had solid public support for tougher sanctions. In fact, 41 per cent of the sample believed the Canadian government should take tougher action against South Africa, as against 29 per cent who felt that current sanctions were about right.7 A second poll conducted for External Affairs right after the conference found even stronger support for tougher measures. In this sample, 47 per cent favoured either total sanctions or more sanctions than the government had in place with only 24 per cent satisfied with the current level.
In the end, Clark, with the support of the Australian foreign minister, blocked seven of the ten recommendations to tighten economic sanctions and said privately that he was opposed to any further reduction in trade with South Africa. Instead, he offered $1 million for his campaign against South African censorship and propaganda (half the sum originally envisaged). The meeting concluded with exhortations to governments to tighten up economic sanctions and the arms embargo. However, the specificity and urgency within the studies had been glossed over; Clark's stonewalling had prevailed.

Although Ramphal attempted to paper over differences at the end, delegates left in a subdued manner. The invited ANC representative at the conference, Johnny Makatini, said simply that 'the outcome falls short of what we expected.' One African official complained that, in contrast to Lusaka where the meeting was all business, in Toronto (with the public forum, movie gala, arts festival, and media advertising), they had been treated to *show business.' While Kaunda, Mugabe, and Hawke opened meetings of this Commonwealth committee in Lusaka, Harare, and Canberra; Mulroney sat the meeting out in Baie Comeau.

After retiring as Canadian ambassador to the United Nations in August 1988, Stephen Lewis began to campaign publicly against this refusal to act. In his view, Canada's behaviour was 'timid and indefensible. We are on the verge of dereliction of our commitment.' For Lewis, the issues of censorship, propaganda, and assistance were of peripheral importance. 'You don't bring the South African government to the negotiating table,' he said, 'by jack up the communications possibilities or giving scholarships to black students.' In his view, 'Canada should have introduced mandatory and comprehensive sanctions months ago.' The way in which Clark and his officials had been casting around for harmless alternatives to effective sanctions signalled to Lewis that the commitment to sanctions was over.

In fact, the second measure adopted in 1988 was one of the few significant gestures in this period. In September at the United Nations, Mulroney announced that Canada would offer $4 million for military training, logistical support for defence forces (clothes, food, fuel, spare parts, and communications equipment), and balance-of-payments support to help meet security needs of Canadian aid programs in Mozambique. This initiative was designed to deal with the harsh reality that rebel Renamo forces, trained and supplied by South Africa, posed a real danger to the Limpopo and Nacala railway lines being rehabilitated with Canadian assistance.

In the past, the Canadian government had been asked repeatedly for such support, following the example of Britain's direct military assistance or the Nordic approach which regularly added a 10 per cent security levy to the cost of projects in Mozambique. Although Roy McMurtry, chair of an earlier Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, had announced that Canada would consider sending 'non-lethal' military aid to countries bordering South Africa in September 1987, Mulroney was not ready. His fear was that the
Conservative caucus, already up in arms after the Tambo visit, might torpedo the general policy.

The decision to go ahead a year later was related primarily to an interest in winning a seat on the U.N. Security Council. Tradition had it that, at least once each decade, Canada would sit on the Council. However, Canada faced strong competition and needed support, particularly given the negative effect of Clark's performance in Toronto. Security assistance was a credible gesture and earned Canada high-profile public support from Mugabe and leaders of other frontline states.

At the same time, Mulroney faced a federal election in Canada in two months and did not want this initiative to become an issue. The precedent of the 1970s, when assistance to southern African liberation movements had caused a strong public backlash, made the government apprehensive. The goal was to bolster Canada's international reputation without stirring up a hornet's nest of opposition at home. Thus, while Mulroney had announced the original sanctions program at the United Nations in 1985 in ringing tones, on this occasion he chose his words carefully. The new initiative was presented not as a measure to counter South African destabilization, but as assistance 'to preserve ... development initiatives' in the frontline states of southern Africa. Mulroney flatly contradicted President Mugabe's depiction of the program as military assistance.

A few weeks earlier, the government had also tightened other measures to help in its campaign, extending the ban on government contracts with majority South African owned companies in Canada to include government grants, contributions, and sales. Liberal MP John Nunziata had discovered that three South African owned companies in Canada - Boart Canada International, Hard Materials Research, and Longyear Canada - had received either federal contracts or grants from External Affairs' own Program for Export Market Development.

In the end, the Canadian government triumphed on all fronts: it secured an easy victory at the United Nations, topping the poll for the Security Council seat. Mulroney also convinced much of the press and public in Canada that the new program for Mozambique was not military assistance. Except for the right-wing press, most editorials were positive. A Gallup Poll found that 46 per cent of Canadians supported the initiative, and the issue did not become a scandal during the federal election.

Disgrace in Harare: Canada in the Dock

While success at the United Nations provided some reassurance about Canada's stature, in southern Africa, the sparkle did not last long. By the third meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa in Harare in February 1989, increased economic links between Canada and South Africa put the sincerity of the Canadian government into question. Shortly before the meeting, trade figures for the first eleven months of 1988 showed that Canadian imports from South Africa had increased 68 per cent and its exports 44 per cent over an equivalent period in 1987.
Significant editorial opinion in Canada agreed that it was time for the government to honour its commitments, to put up or shut up. As Guy Cormier noted, 'Quand on prêche la chasteté, il faut éviter de coiter en public.' Even the Globe and Mail urged Prime Minister Mulroney to turn again to the apartheid issue with the passion and intensity he displayed in 1985. On a visit to Canada sponsored by the Canadian government shortly before the Commonwealth foreign ministers' meeting, a leading anti-apartheid activist from South Africa, Mohammed Valli Moosa, expressed his disappointment that the Mulroney government had 'watered down and backed away' from its commitments, failing to meet the expectations that it had created. Although External Affairs officials believed that Clark could ride out the storm, he was by now on thin ice. The strategy to draw attention away from sanctions to Canadian assistance inside South Africa had floundered. 'Sanctions are the central issue,' Stephen Lewis remarked. 'They can't get away from it ... if Canada thinks this is some clever stall, it's an illusion.' Clark himself admitted that the trade statistics made it harder for him to carry the case against trade with South Africa into the international arena.

He attempted to mitigate the effect by visiting a fertilizer factory in Harare to demonstrate that some of the Canadian sulphur counted in Canadian exports to South Africa was actually transshipped to Zimbabwe. However, as Zimbabwean imports constituted only about 5 per cent of the sulphur shipped to South Africa, his attempt to save face was not particularly convincing.

Clark's already shaky credibility was not helped either when South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha published a letter that he had written to Clark before the conference asking that he use his 'position and influence during the meeting ... to promote ... a more cooperative approach.' As South Africa had just agreed to leave Namibia, Botha said, 'it's not the time to be putting pressure on Pretoria.' While Clark then published the letter, his original silence was seen in Harare as a sign of bad faith towards the committee.

Before the Harare meeting, African leaders made no attempt to hide their feelings about the increased Canadian trade with South Africa. Their willingness to speak out publicly, after the warm approval Mulroney and other Canadian leaders had been accustomed to receiving, spoke volumes about their frustration over the stall in international action against apartheid. The fact that Canada, too, seemed to be backsliding was more than some African leaders could silently bear. African foreign ministers told Canadian journalists that while they had taken Mulroney's commitment 'to secure a more concerted application of global sanctions' at the Vancouver Commonwealth conference seriously, now they had doubts. 'Some of the glow is fading from Canada's image in the region,' one said. They were 'disturbed' and 'astounded' by the increase in Canadian trade with South Africa. The host of the meeting, Foreign Minister Nathan Shamuyarira from Zimbabwe, expressed 'dismay' that the trade existed at all, and Ben Mkapa,
the foreign minister from Tanzania, said that the increase underlined the fact that voluntary sanctions had no teeth. They also disagreed with Clark's emphasis on the anti-propaganda campaign at the expense of sanctions. Shamuyarira pointed out that the $1 million that Canada was spending on its anti-propaganda strategy was 'peanuts,' compared with what Zimbabwe had to spend every day to counter South African destabilization. He broke off a meeting with Clark to conduct him personally on a tour of sites in Harare destroyed in the previous three years by South African commando raids. A comprehensive report for the committee on the effects of destabilization - well over a million dead, millions homeless, and an estimated $35 billion damage since 1980 added to the sense of urgency and betrayal. These feelings were compounded by the predicament in which many of the countries of the region found themselves. Destabilization regularly destroyed alternative

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transportation routes, and 60 per cent to 80 per cent of their total trade was still routed through South Africa. Most of these countries were not themselves in a position to invoke full sanctions without risking economic suicide. In a decade of dramatic reverses in commodity terms of trade, they had become increasingly dependent on cheaper supplies in South Africa. Seeing the international sanctions campaign wind down meant decreasing hopes for autonomy for themselves in the near future, let alone for their compatriots inside South Africa.

Hence the willingness of the Zimbabwean foreign minister to go after Clark over breaches of the arms embargo by Canadian companies and, in particular, their sale of components for military equipment to South Africa through third party countries. The Canadian government did not monitor the final use of components, and there was some evidence to substantiate these claims. However, when Clark arranged a meeting with Shamuyarira and threatened to walk out of the conference, Shamuyarira softened the accusation, saying that he had not intended to single Canada out on this issue. Obviously, the future of the committee had been put in doubt.

Even more devastating was the disclosure during the foreign ministers' meeting that, with the approval of the Canadian government, the Bank of Nova Scotia had provided a $600 million loan to MINORCO, a company controlled (71 per cent) by the Oppenheimer family through the two largest South African conglomerates, Anglo American and De Beers. As the chairman of the Bank of Nova Scotia was a director of MINORCO, the loan was an expression of the tight links between Canadian, European, and South African companies.

MINORCO had originally been established in the mid-1970s as an overseas investment arm of South African interests wanting to reduce their vulnerability and exposure to political change in South Africa. On this occasion, it was involved in an ultimately unsuccessful takeover bid of Consolidated Gold Fields, a British mining company second only to Anglo American in world gold production. Control over Consolidated Gold Fields would not only have made MINORCO one of the world's major forces in minerals but would have also given it a market capitalization similar to Anglo's own. At the same time, it would have
been conveniently situated at arm's length from South Africa in the heart of the European Community.

Yet, curiously, External Affairs decided to adopt narrow legalistic grounds on which to approve the loan. As MINORCO was based in Luxembourg and the Bank of Nova Scotia's London branch provided the money, the loan was considered to be a European transaction with a European company. In contrast, the U.S. Congress and the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea opposed MINORCO's bid, understanding that it would place extensive holdings in South African hands and increase its control of strategic supplies of titanium and zircon.

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In Harare, Ramphal said the Canadian government had ignored the spirit of the financial ban when it approved the loan. 'If I had been asked,' he said, 'I would have said no! That loan was to a company controlled by a South African company ... It should not make any difference whether the company is based in Luxembourg or Pretoria ... Clearly it is against the spirit and intent of ... Commonwealth sanctions.' Ramphal pointed out that the original call for sanctions was not a 'legal document' but a 'political statement' meant to cover such cases, and the Commonwealth Secretariat would certainly tighten the wording before the next ministers' meeting.

Although Ramphal tried to paper over differences, referring to 'courageous political decisions' which Canada had taken in the past, the damage was done. One Canadian official lamented that 'there are always tough talks between friends but some of the knocks have been hard this week.' To his credit, Clark did not reply to his critics by using the issue of the region's growing trade with South Africa against them. His position was that the economies of these countries were so inextricably intertwined with South Africa that they had very little option.

The rest of the committee did not want to lose as important an ally as Canada, especially in the context of British intransigence. However, they had come to the end of their patience with Clark and made no secret of their irritation and disappointment at the leakiness of Canadian sanctions. The South African press, for its part, made effective use of Clark's predicament: 'If the world cannot see that Mr Clark ... has his trousers around his knees,' remarked Beeld, the largest Afrikaans-language daily, 'then the rest of the world has become blind.'

Whatever gloss the government tried to put on the Commonwealth foreign ministers' meeting in Harare, the successive scandals had been extremely embarrassing, undermining whatever credibility Clark had left. Harare represented the nadir of Canadian involvement on the committee and demonstrated how far its reputation had fallen since the London mini-summit in 1986. After Harare, some wondered how Clark, now very much on the defensive, could continue.

The reaction in Canada to the debacle in Harare was vocal and harsh. Opposition MP Sheila Copps said the government had made Canada 'a laughing stock because of the way we allow loopholes to be used,' and NDP MP Howard McCurdy said Clark should simply 'acknowledge that the rules just aren't good.
enough and he should change them. '8' Canadian churches also began to take a highly militant position on Canadian government backsliding. In March, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP) handed Clark a petition with 120,000 signatures calling for effective economic sanctions and diminished diplomatic relations. In July, Archbishop Scott again called for stronger economic sanctions.

The churches argued that, given the increase in Canadian trade with South Africa, merely maintaining existing sanctions was tantamount to relaxing them. They were also sceptical, with good reason as it turned out, that international bankers would respect financial sanctions. 'What is lacking,' in their opinion, was 'not sound analysis on the part of those who call for comprehensive sanctions, but political will to act on the part of countries like Canada.'2 'True leadership,' they concluded, 'means setting an example for other nations ... If the price of our solidarity with other Commonwealth countries is stalemate on the sanctions question, then surely our emphasis on Commonwealth solidarity is misplaced and should be replaced by solidarity with those who struggle for change in South Africa.'

By August, it was clear that this constituency was getting on Clark's nerves. When the Canadian Council of Churches wrote of their 'profound disappointment' at the failure of the government to fulfil its pledges83 Clark angrily rejected their advice as 'dated,' 'ideological,' and unsophisticated.4 The correspondence that ensued provided a revealing glimpse of the frustration and chagrin building in Clark and his department at not being able to abandon Mulroney's pledge, even though the policy had substantially changed. 'Sanctions,' Clark wrote, 'are not a test of sincerity, despite the emotions they attract. They are a tool to exercise influence.' To reduce or eliminate rising imports from South Africa, without alternatives, he wrote, would mean a loss of 'thousands of Canadian jobs.'85 It would be irresponsible, 'to ask Canadians to bear such a burden alone and probably with a minimal effect on apartheid.' Without further 'collective action,' it was clear that further Canadian sanctions were out.

A poll taken after the Harare meeting showed that the criticism by the churches, press, and Parliament was more in touch with Canadian public opinion than the government. In fact, support for stronger measures was hardening in Canada: about 53 per cent of the sample called for tougher measures and 65 per cent wanted clear rules and regulations rather than voluntary guidelines to direct the Canadian private sector.86

The most that Clark had to offer were a few gestures to tidy up what had become a public relations disaster. He contacted the chief executive officer of the Bank of Nova Scotia, but merely to arrange that they work together to review the voluntary ban on loans to South Africa! Procedures were also made more specific so that strategic goods would not end up in South Africa.87 By putting South Africa on the Area Control List, the government was able to

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monitor more closely the export of computers, software, telecommunications equipment, aircraft, helicopters, and four-wheel-drive vehicles. During 1989, the Canadian government also began to address the remaining grey areas in sports sanctions: particularly Canadian-South African sports contacts in third countries. In tennis, for example, Canadian players continued to compete against South Africans all over the world, and Tennis Canada continued to get federal aid. Also there was the question of Canadian athletes competing with athletes who ignored the international boycott and were listed on the U.N. Register of Sporting Contacts with South Africa.

While External Affairs was reluctant to get too far out in front of other white Commonwealth nations or to impose 'too great a burden' on Canadian golf and tennis, it soon became obvious that existing prohibitions were not working. In June 1989, a South African travelling on a British passport and seven golfers on the U.N. register participated in the Canadian Open tournament in Oakville, and a South African equestrian had taken part in a World Cup qualifying event in Toronto against a directive from the Canadian Equestrian Federation. Hence the Canadian government proscribed 'sporting contacts between Canadians and South Africans whether they take place in Canada, in South Africa or in a third country' and whether they are amateurs or professionals.' The government indicated it would gauge compliance with the ban in funding decisions and urged sports organizations to do the same in their support for individual athletes.

Canberra and the Sanctions Report

However, these measures constituted the limit of further action. Clark announced, that, henceforth, his policy would rely on persuasion: dissuading other countries from increasing economic ties with South Africa and exerting pressure on international banks to toughen the repayment terms of South African loans. The difficulty with Clark's emphasis was that the Commonwealth itself was behind both the Nordic countries and the United States in the scope of trade sanctions. Leading from the rear on the basis of exhortation rather than example was not a particularly effective policy. The emphasis on financial sanctions also left the foreign ministers committee vulnerable to the decisions of international banks. It soon became apparent, moreover, that the earlier tactic of commissioning studies in lieu of action now posed a problem.

The Sanctions Report, the general study on sanctions commissioned by the foreign ministers committee in Lusaka and written by a body of independent experts, put forward a detailed case against Clark's position on trade sanctions. The study argued that sanctions, including trade sanctions, were 'an essential part of the negotiating process not an alternative to it'; that the object of sanctions was 'not to punish, but to facilitate.' In this view, rapid action on sanctions would bring discomfort to the white community, would diminish business confidence, and would create further pressure for negotiations.

The study proposed two avenues for action: a five-year program of steadily diminished trade with South Africa ending in a total trade ban and stronger financial sanctions. It showed that if existing Commonwealth and American
measures on trade were extended and more widely adopted, 37 per cent of South African exports would be subject to sanctions in the first year. While the goods embargoed under such sanctions would have a strong negative impact on South Africa, importing countries could find supplies elsewhere.

In addition, South Africa's imminent debt crisis opened a unique 'window of opportunity' for pressure. In June 1990, the agreement with international banks to freeze repayment of South Africa's U.S.$14 billion short-term debt expired, of which $9 billion was technically due. An additional U.S.$3 billion in long-term debts, largely bonds, also came due in 1990 and 1991. The extra burden of repayment came at a time when South Africa's capacity to pay was diminished: the South African economy had been in a slump during much of the 1980s. Its foreign reserves were dangerously low. If the banks were less generous in rescheduling South Africa's debt than they had been in 1987, South African obligations could double or triple. The Sanctions Report research team advised early publication of the study to build momentum through the summer for a steady escalation of trade sanctions to complement the more broadly accepted campaign for financial sanctions. However, as chair of the foreign ministers committee, Clark carried enough clout to frustrate these intentions. He wanted to postpone publication until after the heads of government met at Kuala Lumpur or even later. In the spring, Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Emeka Anyaoku flew to Ottawa to plead for the immediate release of the study, but to no avail. Only vigorous argument by the other members of the committee in Canberra and the leaking of the study to the press by NGOs in Canada and Australia stymied Clark's efforts to suppress the report entirely.

The caution was part of a general disinclination to put additional pressure on de Klerk in a strategic period. Not only were discussions under way with the ANC, but there was concern in the West about the resurgence of the white right in the upcoming September elections in South Africa. The South African Government was also fully involved in the process leading to the first non-racial elections in

228 Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions Namibia in November. The British government encouraged Canada and Australia to counter the call for additional sanctions and, according to a senior civil servant in Canada, applauded Clark's ability to delay the release of the report. In his opening remarks to the meeting in Canberra in August 1989, Clark did not hide his opposition to the Sanctions Report. Its recommendations, he said, reflected the views of independent experts but not necessarily those of the committee. Full trade sanctions, in his view, were not an effective weapon at this stage or even in the period suggested by the study. Along with Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, Clark promoted instead a second study on international financial links to South Africa written by two Australians. Clark also pledged that Canada would offer a significant contribution ($14.7 million) to a second phase of assistance to black education in South Africa. However the integrity of Clark's position was again open to question. Canadian imports from South Africa rose 80 per cent in the first five months of 1989 over the same period in 1988. The assistance seemed simply to be another attempt to
avoid additional sanctions. Even Commonwealth Secretary General Sonny Ramphal, who ordinarily tried to keep a common front, questioned the Canadian government's sincerity and said he hoped the Canadian government would 'shape up.'

Except for Australia, the rest of the committee disagreed sufficiently with Clark that the recommendations of the Sanctions Report on trade as well as on financial sanctions were put forward for consideration at the next heads of government meeting at Kuala Lumpur in October. The committee also wanted to close loopholes in existing arms, oil, and computer sanctions.

Sports sanctions also re-emerged as an issue at Canberra as British and Australian rugby players had announced that they would tour South Africa in 1989 as part of the centennial of the South African rugby board. In January 1990, a British cricket side also planned to visit South Africa. Both tours threatened to torpedo the next Commonwealth Games in Auckland, and Australian involvement was a serious embarrassment for the host government of the meeting.

Instead of addressing this breach of sanctions, Clark used his by now familiar tactic of sidestepping the direct issue and offered financial assistance for sports in poorer Commonwealth countries: travel subsidies, scholarships, programs to share equipment and expertise, and support for poorer countries wishing to host the games. He also suggested that the Commonwealth Games Federation offices should be moved from London to a developing nation. When his proposal was accepted on the eve of the rugby tour, a walkout at the next games was probably averted.

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While the assistance was imaginative, it did not help enforce sports sanctions. Nor did it lessen anger in non-white Commonwealth countries about the rugby and cricket tours. Many were disappointed that Clark had not tried to extend the new Canadian initiative (which denied entry to all South African athletes) to the entire Commonwealth. Had the new rules barred South African athletes from competing in Britain and Australia (such as at Wimbledon or the Australian Open in tennis), their isolation would have been almost complete. In August 1989, moreover, Commonwealth action would have complemented the International Olympics Committee ruling that anyone competing in South Africa henceforth would be ineligible for the Olympics.

Kuala Lumpur and the New Terrain

Although the Canberra meeting had revealed divisions, the majority hoped that the larger meeting of heads of government in Kuala Lumpur would strengthen the case for additional pressure on South Africa. However, in the interim, two developments created an entirely different atmosphere, changing the terms of the debate from whether the Commonwealth should or should not add new sanctions to whether it should continue with sanctions at all.

The first was a striking softening of the atmosphere in South Africa itself. Shortly before the conference, the South African government released eight senior political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba, and Ahmed Kathrada. Next, de Klerk held an unprecedented three-hour meeting with South
Africa's leading clergymen - Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Reverend Frank Chikane, and Reverend Allan Boesak - and his government eased restrictions on demonstrations. News of secret talks between officials of the white regime and anti-apartheid leaders, including Nelson Mandela, gave grounds for hope of further progress.

While the release of senior political prisoners was undoubtedly timed to defuse support for stronger sanctions, it seemed that more than mere manipulation was in the wind. At the same time, the anti-apartheid camp was uneasy; South African churches and trade unions urged the international community not to let down their guard. Editorials in the Canadian press also called on Mulroney either to hold a steady course or to toughen sanctions until there were clear signs that apartheid was over.

However, Clark believed that de Klerk should be given a chance to deliver on his promises, and he used this moment to reiterate his opposition to new sanctions. In Clark's view, other countries would not support sanctions and Canada had to balance their effects against the impact at home. Therefore, he

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secured the consent of the foreign ministers committee to override the decisions at Canberra, proposing instead a breathing space of six to seven months from additional sanctions. The view, in the words of one of his officials, was that 'if someone is crying "uncle," is it reasonable to go on kicking him?'

Even Mulroney joined in, using External Affairs' tired cliché about wanting to bring South Africa to its senses, not its knees.

On this new terrain, debate shifted to the question of whether a reduction in Commonwealth pressure was in order. On one side, alone against the other forty-eight members, Thatcher said that talk of sanctions at this stage was 'totally irresponsible' and argued for encouragement not punishment of de Klerk. The debate for the contrary position was led by the host, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who argued for continued and even increased pressure.

The Canadian view was that the reforms provided proof that sanctions had worked, that they were responsible for what had happened in South Africa. However, while recognizing that sanctions would undoubtedly be a less central issue for the Commonwealth in this new phase, the Canadian government was not yet prepared to lift them. As Clark put it, 'to reward talk of reform rather than real reform ... would be seen as settling for less than is necessary.'

The debate at Kuala Lumpur was interrupted by a second development - the news that the international banking community, including Canadian banks, had decided to reschedule South Africa's short-term debt. While not eliminating pressure on South Africa, the conditions were considerably easier than the terms recommended in Canberra. With nearly 70 per cent of the loans held in British banks, Thatcher had managed an end run around the rest of the Commonwealth. Although the decision had been made two weeks previously, de Klerk timed its announcement for the day of the Commonwealth debate on sanctions.

The easing of South Africa's financial crisis left the policy pushed by Clark in Canberra in limbo. He had hoped to use strong financial pressure to soften his
refusal to consider additional trade sanctions and he had believed that his lobbying efforts with the banks had been effective. In this vacuum, Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke recommended a modest package of measures for the conference: a limit to trade credits for South Africa, a stronger arms embargo, Commonwealth research to monitor the impact of financial pressure, and the continuation of the foreign ministers committee. In the end, these proposals were accepted, along with a statement of preconditions that the Commonwealth felt were necessary for negotiations in South Africa.

Margaret Thatcher dissented on four points, but her agreement to the rest appeared to give limited blessing to the majority Commonwealth position. Clark praised Britain for 'seeking to enlarge the areas of agreement rather than

Stalling on Sanctions 231 disagreement."12 The Commonwealth, Ramphal concluded, was sending *a clearer and stronger' signal than ever before to South Africa. However, as at Vancouver, Thatcher indulged in a gesture of defiance and bad faith. Without consultation and immediately after the Kuala Lumpur statement had been presented, she broke precedent by issuing a minority statement that heaped scorn on the agreement she had herself proposed."3 She reiterated her opposition to increased pressure and called for a more positive outlook towards Pretoria, rewarding change as soon as possible with a lifting of sanctions. Thatcher's betrayal infuriated almost everyone: Mugabe called her behaviour 'unacceptable and despicable,' adding that it was meant to tell 'black people of South Africa that Britain is a supporter of apartheid and ... apostles of apartheid that Britain is still their friend.'"4 Mulroney noted that other countries had had to 'water their wine,' moderating their support for stronger measures to achieve the declaration and deserved loyalty and fairness in return."15 'When you sign a document at five,' he said, 'you don't repudiate it at six.' 6 Characteristically, Thatcher replied that if she was alone against the other forty-eight leaders she felt 'very sorry for the 48.'

The contretemps at Kuala Lumpur once again reinserted Mulroney into the debate on South Africa. However, unlike earlier conferences at Nassau, London, and Vancouver, the press review of Canadian policy on South Africa and the role played by Mulroney and Clark became increasingly critical. In the beginning of the sanctions campaign in 1985, Mulroney had received strong support from all but the right-wing press in Canada for his policy of graduated sanctions. The Toronto Star, for example, said that the approach was 'precisely the right stance at the right time.'"7 The Halifax Chronicle-Herald added that Canadian initiatives were 'judicious and well-deliberated.'"8 However, as the government failed to adopt stronger sanctions in the late 1980s, a note of uneasiness started to appear. 'Mulroney's silences on South Africa grow longer and the meaning of his words grows vague ... He risks making a mockery of Canada's voice if he only talks and doesn't act,' commented the Globe and Mail."9 By the end of the decade, the gap between immodest claims and slim measures had begun to take its toll.
The press launched an unprecedented attack on the lull in the sanctions campaign and, in particular, on Joe Clark's role in stalling further Commonwealth initiatives. Veteran political columnist Richard Gwyn said that the current approach was 'trashing Canada's foreign affairs legacy.' "No nation," he added, 'can preach to others when its own foreign policy is so obviously dishonest.' A Globe editorial entitled, 'Asleep at the Wheel,' asked: 'Does Joe Clark need a vacation? Or is he taking one?' It accused Clark of 'timidity in the face of significant international questions' and of making 'a vice of caution.'

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Following the disastrous meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa in Harare, the press bemoaned the loss of Canadian credibility and started writing about Canada's "rapid fall from grace." Mulroney 'should either have kept his mouth shut in 1985 at the United Nations General Assembly in New York,' one editorial argued, 'or prepared a coherent strategy to follow through on his promise to act against South African apartheid.' The Ottawa Citizen contended that rather than leading the international fight against apartheid, Canada was 'just another member of the pack. And a hypocritical one at that ... Clark and the prime minister should admit they give priority to domestic political and economic interests and stop strutting around the international stage espousing principles they aren't prepared to live up to.' The Toronto Star added that Clark and Mulroney 'should reflect on Canada's credibility with as much care as they scrutinize South Africa's performance.'

Thus by the time F.W. de Klerk began the process which led to the end of apartheid, the performance of Canadian leaders in the international sphere, especially the Commonwealth, cast serious doubts on the integrity of their original policy. Even initiatives of some merit, like the security assistance to Mozambique, were presented cautiously rather than as forthright expressions of solidarity. Most striking of all, the sanctions policy that had started in July 1985 had reached its peak in August 1986 and then dwindled at the end of the decade. More often than not, leadership a la Mulroney had descended to extravagant boasting, while leadership a la Clark involved sacrificing stronger measures on the altar of the rather vain hope that Canada could become a 'player' in negotiations to end apartheid. Such a stance precluded not only tougher sanctions against the South African government but also genuine support for the ANC. In sum, the approach had imposed limits on Canadian policy without much tangible benefit.

In retrospect, the period of an empowered political level exercising a measure of relative autonomy from the structural constraints on Canadian policy had ended very quickly. Not only had the international context changed, but conditions at home were not propitious to continue in this vein. Mulroney had tested the limits and then responded to them as forces opposed to the general thrust of his policy gathered strength. Strategically located in the state, the Conservative party, the private sector, and other sections of civil society, such forces far outweighed broader Canadian
public opinion. At the same time, the anti-apartheid community, weakened by divisions and strategic confusion, failed to offer a counter-pressure of any significance. The lack of great power support for a stronger policy gave the government very few options. Thus, it was not until the 1990s when the government in South Africa initiated a process of reform that the Canadian government moved out of its ambiguous position and resumed, rather unhappily, its position of genuine leadership on this issue. Commitments in the Commonwealth which had placed Canadian leaders at centre stage in the past, now acted to prevent a quick removal of sanctions.

To every birth its blood. Mongane Serote

The sea change in South African government policy in the late 1980s represented closure on forty lost years. At this point, the contradictions generated by apartheid could no longer be resolved by piecemeal reforms. The high cost of internal repression and destabilization in the region had begun to bite. South Africa faced a fiscal crisis of the state, a crisis in white morale, and an international impasse. The withdrawal of South African troops from Angola after their defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 brought into focus the human, strategic, and economic, costs of sanctions. The move to a settlement on Namibian independence became the prelude for change in South Africa itself. The coincidental end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet bloc removed the grounds for Cold War suspicions. With the replacement of P.W. Botha by F.W. de Klerk as president in 1989, a new and surprising willingness to entertain the unthinkable began. Ultimately, the calculation from the experience of Ian Smith and white Rhodesia was that coming to a settlement with the black majority from a position of strength was better than delaying the process and losing the ability to guide events. Accordingly, in February 1990, the regime in Pretoria lifted the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist party (SACP), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and a number of other anti-apartheid organizations. The government freed ANC leader Nelson Mandela, lifted the state of emergency, abandoned apartheid legislation, and embarked on a transition to the 'new South Africa.'

However, while the 1990s opened on an optimistic note, movement forward was tortuous and fraught with danger. The negotiation process was extremely difficult, reflecting the fundamental reality that power still resided in the apartheid state and, at its core, with the security forces. A democratic future with a universal franchise meant the unmistakable end of political control by those who held power in the interim.
Not surprisingly, the white regime sought to control the transition and to minimize any real change in the post-apartheid dispensation. In Parliament a month before the first negotiations were to start, de Klerk said that 'majority rule [was] not suitable for a country like South Africa because it leads to domination and even to the oppression of minorities." He proposed instead "power sharing' to ensure 'group rights' and various measures which essentially involved a white veto.

During this same period, South African security forces embarked on a campaign of covert violence, creating a dangerous environment for constitutional proceedings. Destabilization techniques honed in the region destroyed the social fabric of the townships, and a climate of fear, distrust, and uncertainty pervaded the entire country. Added to this, the grinding reality of poverty made the life of most non-white South Africans even worse than during the apartheid years. In this revolutionary moment, the fluidity of political events and the indeterminacy of change kept the outside world off balance.

Canada and the South African Transition

The reforms introduced by de Klerk in February 1990 were warmly welcomed in Canada, but there was no consensus on how to move on this new terrain. For the Canadian state, as for the larger international community, it was a strange period, full of unexpected eddies and undertows. Canadian policy emerged out of a confusion of cross currents, as interests within civil society collided with commitments in the international arena.

With the end of the Cold War, moreover, one of the key forces shaping Western policy on South Africa had disappeared. In the vacuum, Clark contended, the African continent, was 'open as never before to values and institutions closer to our own.' If we betray the future of a multiracial South Africa, he argued, 'our morals will be judged hollow, mere cant disguising greed and self-interest.'

However, the approach adopted by the Canadian government in the transition period was less wholehearted than Clark's sentiments suggest. What followed was a highly ambiguous approach.

While there was jubilation at the release of Mandela, the Canadian government also moved quickly to establish closer relations with the white government in Pretoria, warmly praising de Klerk. At the same time, the Canadian government did not accede to de Klerk's request for a quick end to sanctions, waiting, along with the rest of the Commonwealth, for a signal from Mandela. Connections with the ANC were stronger than ever before, but the Canadian government would not provide direct financial assistance to help the ANC establish itself inside South Africa during the transition. Instead, the Canadian government attempted to demonstrate its bonafides through a general program of assistance inside South Africa which helped prepare the ANC to assume power.

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Other forces within Canada also had to feel their way in the new conjuncture, many expressing considerable scepticism about the apartheid regime's commitment to reform. The uncertain political denouement, the escalating violence, and the declining economy caused some companies to hesitate before
committing fresh capital. Others involved in trade were impatient to end sanctions so that they could resume full economic relations. Although sympathetic, the Canadian government did not respond immediately to Canadian exporters, honouring its commitment to lift sanctions only when the rest of the Commonwealth agreed. In other respects, however, the state began to soften its position, attempting a greater impartiality towards the main protagonists. Given the bitter historical context and the turbulence of the transition, this approach ensured that the policy remained controversial to the end.

Making Up with White South Africa

The most immediate change was a dramatically different attitude towards the regime in Pretoria, including an unguarded, uncritical admiration for President de Klerk. Even as South Africa spiralled into a quasi-civil war, the Canadian leadership found it difficult to abandon its new-found infatuation. This approach gave de Klerk a lot of latitude in his attempt to present himself as a reformer while at the same time working to secure the interests of the white community. Initially, the thaw in relations between the Canadian and South African governments was marked by the inclusion of South African diplomats at official functions and in informal meetings and dinners with members of the Cabinet. When de Klerk announced early in 1991 that he intended to remove most of the key acts establishing apartheid and again after the successful referendum supporting de Klerk's reform initiatives in March 1992, Mulroney was effusive in his praise. De Klerk, Mulroney declared, had shown 'visionary leadership' and 'demonstrated great courage.'

Clark also believed that the time had come 'to focus a little more on dialogue with ... white South Africans,' and in May 1990 he met with South

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African Foreign Minister Pik Botha in Athens en route to a meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa. Clark's successor, Barbara McDougall, joined in, describing de Klerk as 'engaging, knowledgeable ... [and] realistic.'

Senior South African officials who came to Canada in 1990 to test the waters and to repair relations were warmly welcomed. Even Walter McLean, an MP known for his anti-apartheid views, opened a session with delegates from the discredited tricameral Parliament by suggesting that an overly rigid definition of clear and irreversible change in South Africa was not useful in deciding when to resume normal relations. For his part, the leader of the South African delegation, Lambert Fick, argued that reform was unstoppable, sanctions were 'yesterday's story,' and that Canadians should 'join us in getting rich.'

Canadian officials remained remarkably upbeat about the regime's bona fides even as the transition became dangerous and bloody. Revelations of South African government funding of the Inkatha Freedom party did not shake this confidence. In autumn 1991 in Toronto, Canada's ambassador to South Africa, Christopher Westdal, said the government was prepared to give de Klerk 'the benefit of the doubt.' He blamed the ANC rather than the government for delays.
in the process and said that he did not believe that de Klerk was engaged in any sleight of hand or hidden agenda.

South African officials built on this predisposition, pleading for understanding, support, and especially the withdrawal of sanctions. Outsiders were encouraged to view the South African state as divided among itself, with de Klerk's faction needing external support to keep the reform option alive.

A considerable proportion of Canadian press commentary agreed, with two veteran Canadian journalists, William Johnson and Richard Gwyn, taking the lead. Johnson argued that 'Canada must quickly deliver a dividend to de Klerk to strengthen his hand against the die-hard racists who will oppose any move to end apartheid.' Gwyn added that if the West did not lift some sanctions, 'the voice of the hardliners will get louder, while de Klerk will have less and less to say in justification of his policy.' The Ottawa Citizen added that de Klerk was "as sincere a reformer as the white community is likely to produce; if the ANC cannot talk with him, they cannot talk with any white leader.'

Democracy if Necessary, but not Necessarily ...

Throughout the transition, the sympathy for de Klerk in the press shaded over into support for protection of the white minority. Some editorials expressed doubts that the democratic process should go forward at all, expressing views that would not have been unwelcome in Pretoria.' Take, for example, the

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consistent position of Canada's 'national newspaper', the Globe and Mail, which championed power sharing and protection for white South Africans. In April 1990, it presented as equivalent the needs of the privileged white minority (about 15 per cent of the population) and the non-white majority." The Globe also advocated a powerful second house to safeguard 'group interests' against 'the unbridled power of majority rule.' Generally, its suggestions seemed designed to frustrate the intent of majority rule.

The campaign for white rights continued. In December 1991, a Globe editorial argued that, given 'the fears of whites,' it was 'far from unreasonable for the white minority to seek measures beyond an independent judiciary and a bill of rights, safeguards with a poor record of success in Africa.' In the same camp, the far-right Toronto Sun dismissed the ANC's call for universal franchise, stating that it 'would guarantee a horrible civil war in which both black and white would be consumed.'

Yet, as the national director of the South African Legal Defence Fund, Ntobeko Maqubela, explained to a parliamentary committee in Canada, there was a 'fundamental difference between ... democracy as understood universally and what de Klerk is coming up with ... this concept of power-sharing. It's a deliberate attempt ... to make sure the white minority does not lose their power, both politically and economically ... [it is] apartheid in disguise.' A minority of Canadian newspapers shared Maqubela's scepticism. When talks broke off in South Africa in 1992, the Edmonton Journal observed that 'the impasse has come down to this: President de Klerk is not willing to accept the principle of majority rule in a parliament representing all South Africans ... [but was] demanding some
sort of guarantee for white power, a white veto or enhanced white representation." As a Times-Colonist editorial pointed out, de Klerk was 'quite right when he says minorities are threatened where majorities rule. But that potential danger is less than the injustice of having majorities threatened when minorities rule, which is the case at present in South Africa.'

The new Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall seemed to share the Globe's preferences. On her trip to South Africa in April 1992, she refused to support simple majority rule. In a telling phrase, McDougall said that the Commonwealth's demand at the last summit was for 'the sharing of power.'

Canada, she said, had no intention of prescribing the kind of constitutional model that would be best for South Africa. Democracy was the goal. What shape it would take was up to South Africans. The only requisites were that the goal be reached through negotiations and free and fair elections.

While the tone of McDougall's general remarks might be interpreted as a cautious response in changing times, this last comment together with her effusive praise for de Klerk, hinted at underlying sympathies. On the other fundamental issue clouding the whole period of transition, the escalating violence, however, her hands-off attitude began to approach partiality.

South Africa's 'Killing Fields'

Although the historical record is not yet clear on President de Klerk's direct personal relationship to the macabre events of the early 1990s, there is now no question that elements within the South African state, especially the security forces, were involved in an attempt to halt the transition or, at least, to prevent the ANC from coming to power. Thus for the white regime, a two-track policy emerged: de Klerk presented a new, attractive face to the world community, while sinister forces continued to batter South Africa's non-white majority. In the contest for power, the savagery and chaos in South Africa's townships, squatter camps, and commuter railway lines hurt the ANC, weakened its constituency, and kept the organization off balance as it attempted to re-establish itself around the country.

In the process, the white regime came into alliance with right-wing elements not only among its white compatriots but also in the black community. Foremost among such associates were Chief Buthelezi, the Inkatha Freedom party, and the KwaZulu police, but they also included 'homeland' leaders and others who had benefited from the apartheid system. The patron-client nature of these relationships was revealed in the scandal known as Inkathagate, when it was discovered that the South African security police had funded Inkatha activities.

An internal memo showed that Buthelezi had asked for police assistance to counter the ANC and 'expressed extreme gratitude for the extent of the financial assistance provided.'

The political nature of the battles of the early 1990s was hidden at times by an attempt to portray the violence as a straightforward ethnic contest of Zulus versus Xhosas, raising fears that, when white control was lifted, savage tribal warfare would ensue. Such interpretations emphasized the lasting power of historical
identities constructed in the early nineteenth century when a powerful Zulu kingdom was formed at the expense of other groups. Yet the conflict in the Natal area from 1985 on was largely between Zulus and Zulus. Only when Inkatha moved into the townships around Johannesburg in July 1990, in its bid to become a national organization, did the struggle become overtly inter-ethnic. Underlying the political dimensions of this struggle was the historical context of apartheid, a system that had emphasized difference and separation.

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Conditions of dispossession, extreme inequalities, and deprivation provided dry tinder for the conflagration which was to ensue and for the criminal violence which became endemic.23 After February 1990, the state, which had spent forty years creating and imposing this system, now had to operate in reverse. Obviously, it was not a neutral force, and it had a lot at stake in the outcome. The question became whether the state was simply unable or was deliberately refusing to deal with the carnage which ensued.

Central to this issue, as studies demonstrated conclusively and overwhelmingly, was the role of Inkatha and the KwaZulu police force in initiating cycles of violence.24 By mid-1992, outside observers spanning the political spectrum from Amnesty International to the U.S. State Department also deplored the collusion of state security forces.25 Clear evidence emerged of the training, organization, and support given by elements in the security forces to Inkatha and, more grimly, of the regular involvement of Inkatha and South African security force in vigilante activity and massacres.26 In one horrific example, Allister Sparks, a widely respected South African journalist, wrote after the Boipatong massacre that 'every man, woman, and child I spoke to in Boipatong told me they believed the police had escorted the attackers from a nearby migrant workers’ hostel, housing supporters of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party, into their township and out again after the slaughter. [South Africa’s police force] has discredited itself by its deeds and its cynically disingenuous explanations until it is seen not as a peacekeeper but as a feared and deadly enemy.’7 In March 1994, the Goldstone Commission confirmed the ANC's long-standing contention that senior South African police generals were in charge of a third force which, inter alia, provided arms for Inkatha.

As time went by, there is no question that groups in the ANC as well as Inkatha were caught up in the spiral of reciprocal 'tit for tat' violence.28 Particularly in Natal, ANC leaders like Harry Gwala were involved in a virtual civil war. In many areas, ANC self-defence units, established to protect townships, operated outside the control of the political leadership and some degenerated into bands of 'comtotsis,’ comrades some of the time and petty criminals at others.

By mid-1992, the violence was widespread, and it seemed that the country was spiralling out of control. Security forces operated with impunity, believing they could kidnap, torture, and murder without fear of discovery or punishment. Individuals and committees attempting to work out a peaceful resolution were targeted for assassination. With the police force seen as hostile and dangerous,
people took the law into their own hands; kangaroo courts, 'necklacing,' and brutal vigilante punishments became commonplace. Yet the state's respon-

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sibility for law and order, invoked so freely in the past, was strangely absent in this period.

While the interests of the state and its white allies were fairly transparent in the continuation of divide-and-rule politics, the bitterness of divisions within the black community was less easily understood. What had been a struggle for political control between supporters of Inkatha and the UDF in the NatalKwaZulu area in the mid-1980s intensified into a desperate campaign by Buthelezi in the 1990s to reverse his descent into political oblivion. Once Mandela was released from prison, Buthelezi's dream of being South Africa's first black head of state evaporated; but he was determined to remain central to any political dispensation.

Misreading the Transition
As the violence in South Africa escalated during the transition period, the state in Canada adopted a non-committal approach to mounting evidence of the collusion of South African state security forces with Inkatha. It was not that officials did not understand what was going on. Off the record, one said he believed that Buthelezi was the prime instigator of the fighting because he was 'terribly afraid of being marginalized in the negotiating process, so he's upping the ante now ... trying to make a role for himself by killing enough people that [other political leaders] will have to pay attention to him.'

It was just that the brutality of the transition jarred with the official perception of de Klerk, and it took officials a long time to accept the underside of his government and its allies. In the early days of her new portfolio, McDougall noted that the state had the ultimate responsibility for security in the townships. After the massacre at Swanieville squatter camp, she said that de Klerk and his colleagues 'must take decisive action to ensure that the security forces uphold the rule of law without fear or favour.' However, the following year, the message had changed. Although Mandela had broken off talks with the government after the Boipatong massacre (he said he could 'no longer explain ... why we want to talk to a regime that is murdering our people'), the Canadian government had retreated to a bland and ingenuous formula. McDougall repeatedly said that everybody was responsible both for the violence and for finding solutions to end it.

After the Bisho massacre in September 1992 when South African security forces had acted as advisers to the Ciskei military, McDougall took a fresh look at the obligations of the South African state. 'Although all parties in South Africa share responsibility for the continuing political violence,' she said, 'the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests

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with the Government of South Africa.' Although only slightly stronger, McDougall's revision was long overdue.
Elsewhere in Canada, there was little agreement about the role of the South African state in the chaos. Some journalists drew parallels between the regime's
two-track approach (negotiations above and violence below) at home and its role in Mozambique where it had signed the Nkomati Peace Accord and continued support for Renamo. Oxfam Canada and CIDMMA urged the Canadian government to organize an international observer team to investigate violent incidents.4

However, most editorial comment downplayed the political and material struggles underlying the violence, emphasizing instead its 'tribal nature' (the Globe talked of 'an orgy of tribal bloodletting') and building a stereotypical misconception of 'black on black violence.' Globe editorials simply could not bring themselves to believe that anything more than *rogue elements' of the security forces had any role in the violence.7 At its worst on the ultra-right, Eric Margolis wrote that 'behind the few educated black leaders are angry masses of uneducated blacks who are only one step out of the bush. Africa's heart of darkness may be about to snuff out modern South Africa.'3

A Platform for Buthelezi

While the reluctance to take the full measure of the de Klerk regime in Canada reflected at best an interest in encouraging its reformist impulse, the approach to the Inkatha leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was part of a studious determination by the Canadian government to appear impartial. Polls regularly placed Buthelezi third in national standings in South Africa at about 5 to 10 per cent compared with 65 per cent for the African National Congress.9 However, no one doubted that he was a force to be reckoned with, and Canadian officials periodically extended invitations to meet with him. Until the 1994 elections, Buthelezi was regarded in some official quarters as equal in status to Mandela.

At short notice, Mulroney invited Buthelezi to see him when he appeared in Canada on a private visit in November 1992. Given his blood-stained notoriety, questions were raised about the propriety of the meeting. While his supporters portrayed him as a man of peace and democracy, Buthelezi's role in the constitutional process had become that of a spoiler, not only killing his way to the table but also threatening secession if his demands were not met. However, McDougall said that she wanted to meet Buthelezi to encourage him to offer 'positive gestures' to end the violence, rather than 'finger pointing' and inflammatory language.40 She insisted that it was important to talk to all South African leaders, adding that 'we're not getting in the middle of battles between Mr Mandela and Chief Buthelezi for stature.'4 Given the

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difference between 65 per cent and 10 per cent, her approach was extremely generous to Chief Buthelezi.

Nevertheless, Buthelezi was given a significantly different reception than the one accorded Mandela. He was not in Canada on an official visit and he did not address Parliament. At short notice, a meeting was cobbled together with the House Committee on External Affairs and International Trade.2 Buthelezi told the committee that he wanted 'no part of death and destruction, or of power-mongering.' Beyond his reiteration of support for private enterprise, pluralism ('minority rights and cultural autonomies'), and a federal solution, he pleaded for
strict neutrality, complaining that 'influential political elements' in Canada had already taken sides.

In fact, Buthelezi's real purpose was to undermine the ANC and to attack bilateral negotiations between the ANC and de Klerk which left him out. His boasts: 'I'm the one who crushed apartheid by standing against independence [for KwaZulu]' were coupled with warnings that the ANC was attempting to 'seek failed socialist-type solutions for our country, and a highly centralized state.' Buthelezi also blamed Mandela, the ANC, and the South African Communist party for the breakdown of talks in this period.

However, Buthelezi did not get a sympathetic hearing. Opposition MPs challenged his motives and credentials, provoking a temper tantrum which subverted his attempt to present himself as a man of peace: The MPs had onetrack minds, he claimed, and Canadian journalists were trying to 'demonize' him. 'I really hate some of you Canadians,' he said, for 'pontificating' and 'talking glibly' about violence. 'I'm not responsible for the violence in South Africa.'

Buthelezi's support in Canada came less from official circles than from forces within the private sector, allied, in some cases, to ultra-right elements in the Conservative party. Even at this late moment, they still hoped he would emerge as the black leader of a post-apartheid South Africa. The far-right press in Canada insisted that as the representative of the largest ethnic group, the Zulus, he was 'the real black hero of South Africa.'

Prominent among those sustaining Buthelezi's profile was newspaper baron and financier Conrad Black. In November 1990, Black gave a dinner for Buthelezi at the Toronto Club and organized a news conference for him. Given Buthelezi's record, some press commentary questioned 'whether Canada's business elite should be dining in honour of [this] man.' Nevertheless, as late as 1994, Black was still commissioning positive profiles of Buthelezi for his newspapers 46 While figures like Black and the far-right press never abandoned their support, Buthelezi's role in sabotaging the negotiation process cost him credibility in the mainstream press. In the past, the Globe and Mail had distinguished

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itself for its fawning support of Buthelezi. In the mid-1980s, it had lionizec him as 'the most moderate black leader with a claim to mass support,'47 anc again as 'the best hope, if not the only hope, for the emergence of a moderatt black leadership from the ashes of apartheid.'48 Well into the transition in the 1990s, the Globe's editor-in-chief, William Thorsell, continued to boosi Buthelezi and de Klerk and to disparage Mandela.49

By September 1992, however, Buthelezi began to receive a markedly coolei press in Canada. His angry response to de Klerk's commitment to fence in hostels and ban 'cultural weapons' and his insistence at being at the centre od negotiations were treated with growing impatience. An Ottawa Citizen editorial entitled 'Buthelezi's Tactics - Delay, Disrupt and Destroy,' called his approach 'counterproductive in the short-term and potentially disastrous overi time.' The Calgary Herald called his response 'tiresome.'
At this point, the Globe still contended that Buthelezi was a major player but, by June 1993, even Globe editorials had begun to blame Buthelezi for his inability to settle with Mandela and de Klerk. By November, the 'best hope' had become 'the spoiler,' the man who, in trying 'to save his skin,' could wreck the whole process. While Canada's 'national newspaper' was still hoping for a future role for de Klerk, it had finally begun to understand the futility of its encouragement of Buthelezi.

Supping with a Long Spoon
Although Buthelezi’s credibility gradually declined, the ANC's relationship to official Canada continued to be a mixture of warmth and distance. In the euphoria immediately after Nelson Mandela's release from prison, the Mulroney government was quick to reap the rewards of its strong early role in the Commonwealth and to claim credit for South Africa's decision to launch reforms. In February 1990, Clark rushed to Lusaka to greet Mandela on his first trip outside South Africa, the only foreign minister, indeed the only senior member, of a Western government, to do so. Canadian officials also put immense pressure on the ANC to have Mandela include Canada on his first North American tour. He was invited to address a joint session of Parliament in Ottawa in June 1990, and treated as a virtual head of state.

Yet however much the Canadian government was keen to be part of Mandela's first period of freedom, its relationship to the ANC continued to be full of cross currents and ambiguities. Underlying its diffidence was a commitment in principle to non-partisanship in Canadian foreign policy and a continuing uneasiness about the movement's commitment to armed struggle, its perceived socialist bent, and its unrepentant alliance with the South African Communist party. Canadian officials were also quite sceptical about the ANC's capabilities as an organization. Only a year before Mandela was released, a member of the Department of External Affairs Southern Africa Task Force insisted that the ANC had little popular support inside South Africa and was 'not likely to be elected to government, for a long time, if ever.' Efforts by the ANC to think about post-apartheid policies, he added, were 'just wishful thinking.' In August 1988, a Globe and Mail editorial had unequivocally stated that 'there will never be a President Mandela.'

Senior figures from the private sector shared these prejudices. Roy McMurtry found it almost impossible to raise funds for the ANC in the business community. To his astonishment, they were not interested in meeting Mandela either. When pressed, a chairman of one of Canada's leading banks said, 'Meet Nelson Mandela, you have got to be kidding!' It was as if, McMurtry said, the banker was being asked to meet Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi.

Nor, as the transition wore on, was there much understanding of the ANC in the Canadian media. The far-right press in Canada presented the ANC in caricatured terms, but the mainstream press was not far behind. Consider an Ottawa Citizen editorial which described the ANC as *a liberation movement that encourages its youth to stay out of school and burn people as traitors.* From the ultra-right,
Peter Worthington characterized the ANC in power as 'the end of civilization in South Africa.'

Given these strong prejudices, shared in influential circles in the United States and Britain, it is not surprising that Joe Clark regularly felt the need to explain the government's closer relations with the ANC. Clark insisted that contact enabled Canadian officials to exert a moderating influence on the ANC and that Canadian pressure on the ANC to abandon the armed struggle and to distance itself from the Communist party had borne fruit. 'The ANC,' he said in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, 'now talks about the desirability of peaceful, negotiated change rather than of violent revolution. It accepts, for the first time, the desirability of suspending violence prior to negotiations. It also recognizes that there are other legitimate voices of opposition in South Africa, and that discussion and co-operation with them are possibilities worthy of pursuit' (emphasis added).

Given the history of the ANC's preference for peaceful negotiations from 1912 to 1961, its inclusive almost parliamentary nature, and the sophistication of its strategists, such claims were, at the least, historically inaccurate. Prior to Clark's speech, moreover, the ANC and Mandela had been involved for a number of years in complex negotiations with the South African government while Mandela was still in prison.

Therefore, while undoubtedly Clark was playing to the gallery, there was also a whiff of illusion about his influence, reminiscent of his trip to southern Africa in 1987. Take, for example, his attempt in February 1990 in Lusaka to persuade Mandela to suspend the armed struggle in exchange for unqualified support from Canada. At the time, Mandela politely rejected Clark's request, noting that the threat of continued guerrilla war was an important instrument in the battle against apartheid. At any rate, by August the ANC had worked out its own bargain: Mandela formally announced the suspension of 'any activities related to military action,' having secured in return the Pretoria government's pledge to repeal security legislation, end the state of emergency in Natal, release political prisoners, and offer amnesty to exiles.

Beyond the advice, the hugs, and the good wishes, there was very little material substance in the Mulroney government's support of the ANC. When the ANC asked for direct assistance, the government refused on the grounds that there was an all-party consensus in Canada not to provide assistance to political parties in other countries.

However, ANC leaders rejected the contention that, at that point, the ANC was simply a political party like any other. In the initial years of the transition, it considered itself a liberation movement. In June 1990 in New York, for example, Mandela argued that the ANC was primarily an umbrella organization for all those involved in the anti-apartheid struggle: 'Many people regarded us as a political party pure and simple,' he said, 'and they refused to assist because of this approach ... In fact, we have never been a political party. We have always been a political organization. We have always been a parliament of the black people in
this country where from different walks of life and with different political affiliations are members of the organization joined only by the determination to oppose racial oppression. ’64

In 1990, coming out of the wilderness of underground, exile, and prison, the ANC had special needs, at least in the pre-election period. The organization was seriously short of money and faced enormous challenges: it had to reestablish itself inside the country, knitting together leaders from the Mass Democratic Movement, Robben Island, the diaspora, its external wing, and its military command. This, at a time when African communities were under siege and violence escalated. The regime in Pretoria continued to flex its muscles, reneging at first on promises to accept a staged indemnified return of exiled ANC activists and to release political prisoners, even jailing and torturing Mac Maharaj, a senior ANC official. The ANC’s most immediate task was to participate in negotiations, marshalling its forces against the full weight of the apartheid state.

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Clark recognized the comparative disadvantage faced by the ANC when the South African government was ’able to draw on all the wealth, expertise and resources which apartheid has put at its disposal.’65 However, his response was meagre and dispassionate; Clark offered $1.8 million to help all political parties bargain at less of a disadvantage.

In June on the occasion of Mandela's visit to Canada, Mulroney promised an additional U.S.$5 million to assist the ANC in the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and political prisoners.66 At the time, Mandela said that he was sure that before we reach our country, that amount will be there. ’61 Yet, as the ANC soon discovered, nothing was to come directly. The Canadian government channelled its offerings through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the churches, and the National Co-ordinating Committee on the Return of Exiles, a process entailing considerable delay and extra expense.

Within Canada, the government shifted responsibility for direct assistance to the ANC to civil society, promoting the Mandela Fund as a vehicle for individual donations. As we have seen, in the past, Clark had used this tactic in his opposition to sanctions.68 The problem of course was that individual donations could not match the state treasury. The Mandela Fund raised only $544,000 of its $3 million target, a fraction of the $20 million target first suggested by Clark.69

While the end of the Cold War and the ANC’s commitment in 1990 to suspend the armed struggle removed some of the constraints on official support, the government still kept its distance, supping with a long spoon. Indeed, as the transition wore on, the attitude to the ANC became noticeably cooler than it had been on Mandela’s celebrated visit to Canada. In South Africa in 1992, McDougall told ANC representatives that ‘to reassure the West and other nations,’ they must show that they have ‘truly and completely rejected communism,’70 reviving memories of the treatment that Mulroney and Clark had given Oliver Tambo in 1987.

To some extent, the contradictions and ambiguities in the Canadian government’s approach to the ANC, Buthelezi, and the white government in South Africa
reflected the uncertainty of the times. Not only was South Africa going through
the turbulence of revolutionary change, but the Canadian government was also
having to feel its way. Beyond a commitment to the process of ending apartheid,
very little was straightforward.
The Commonwealth Albatross and Sanctions
The issue par excellence that brought competing interests and interpretations of
change into focus centred on the question of when to lift Canadian sanctions.
After February 1990, South African government leaders asked the international

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community to reward and encourage their reforms by ending sanctions. ANC
leaders warned that to reduce international pressure prematurely risked stopping
the transition before it had begun.
In Canada, South African Ambassador J. Hendrik de Klerk conducted a vigorous
campaign, insisting that sanctions worked against the process evolving in South
Africa. He argued that a strong economy was an important prerequisite for
change, conceded now that sanctions had worked, and blamed them for the
declining growth rate in South Africa and the region. He also argued that, as
South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa had more than doubled in the past few
years, it was inconsistent for Canadian sanctions to remain. The longer you wait,
he warned, the more business opportunities you squander.7
On the other side, Mandela argued that expressions of intent from the South
African government were not enough to warrant relaxation of pressure. In his
view, failing to maintain sanctions would undermine all that had been achieved so
far. 'If today Mr de Klerk has agreed to sit down with the genuine representatives
of blacks in South Africa and work out a new political dispensation with them,' he
said, 'this is not because of a change of heart, but because of the pressures that
have been brought to bear.72 Any move at this stage toward lifting or relaxing
international pressure would create a situation in which white South Africa would
feel comfortable with the minimal changes that have taken place and [would]
once more regress.'73
From inside Canada, these competing positions had their local protagonists.
Forces within the private sector, the media,74 and on the right wing of the
political spectrum wanted a speedy return to full trade relations. Richard Gwyn
believed that de Klerk had undermined the moral force behind sanctions,75 and
William Johnson insisted that 'the time for shaking the stick over South Africa's
head is past.'76
However, the view of the churches, trade unions, both opposition parties, and
most of the Canadian press was that the South African government had to be
watched closely and sanctions removed only as the process moved forward.77 A
Toronto Star editorial noted that 'apartheid has not, after all, disappeared yet ... de
Klerk is halfway there; he needs encouragement to go all the way.'78 Until
apartheid laws were off the books, violence diminished, and negotiations started,
the government should not could consider lifting sanctions.79 Even the Globe and
Mail conceded that 'Tempting as it might be to reward the South African
government for its advances ... too much remains to be done before the pressure can be eased.'80

In fact, the Mulroney government did proceed with considerable caution, making clear that it would not drop sanctions until there was unequivocal evidence of irreversible change. While more than willing to give de Klerk his due for inaugurating change, it resisted pressure for quick action. 'We've won

an important step,' Clark said, 'but it is only a beginning of change.'8' Mulroney went so far as to pledge that, on the timing to lift sanctions, he would take his cue from Mandela.12

Along with the original imposition of sanctions in 1985 and 1986, the delay in lifting them provides a second key instance whereby the state exhibited some autonomy from powerful forces within Canadian society and the state. In both cases, crucial conjunctural factors were at play; in this case, the uncertain process of transformation in South Africa and the interest of the international community in seeing an end to apartheid.

However, the position of the Canadian state on sanctions was less a gesture of solidarity in the anti-apartheid struggle than a by-product of its role in the Commonwealth, both in the early initiatives and, after 1987, in decisions of the Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa. Indeed, Joe Clark had proposed the committee to deflate growing pressure for additional sanctions in the late 1980s and had served as its chair. Ironically, once it became possible to think of lifting sanctions, the committee became a key constraint on unilateral action. The road to lifting sanctions became as torturous as the one that had first applied them. Shrewdly, African leaders did not stint in expressing their gratitude for the role that the Canadian government had played. In Toronto, Mandela said that he did not know what gave Mulroney 'such courage to stand up for a cause which ... [was] not so popular amongst his peers,'83 and in Lusaka, Kaunda called Canada a frontline state.4 Partly, they paid tribute to Mulroney's willingness to differ with most of his senior Western partners. However, they were also anxious to keep the Canadian government with them in the uncertain years of the transition.

As a result, much to the annoyance of many within the state, Canada was held hostage to 'African interests' at a time when powerful forces in Canada wanted sanctions lifted, the sooner the better. Canadian corporations watched with growing frustration as investment started to return to South Africa while Canadian sanctions remained in place. Thus, an impatient mood characterized the last years of the Mulroney government. Officials planned a number of times to end sanctions more quickly than circumstances ultimately allowed. 'Far from jumping the gun,' Canada's ambassador to South Africa, Chris Westdal, complained in April 1992, 'we're behind everyone else.'

The discomfort within the Canadian state and civil society about sanctions became palpable. Clark was concerned about isolation and the possible loss of influence if Canada and the Commonwealth were left behind, especially once the European Community and the United States dropped sanctions. He also believed
that de Klerk should be rewarded for his reforms. Clark and the Department of External Affairs advised the ANC that their opposition to the lifting of sanctions would give them diminished credibility once the West began to drop them unilaterally. They urged its leaders to seize the initiative, exploiting the inevitable rollback for their own political advantage.

The government was, nevertheless, in a bind. Although the European Community lifted its ban on new investment as early as December 1990, the Canadian government had to wait until the next meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa. Once the South African government announced its intention to repeal key acts of apartheid legislation in February 1991, however, official Canada was ready to move. For the first time, Mulroney said that de Klerk had placed South Africa 'along what appears to be an irreversible course.' As the governments of Australia and New Zealand shared this view, there was wide speculation that the Commonwealth committee would recommend that at least some sanctions be lifted at its meeting in London in February 1991.

However, the rest of the committee was still cautious, and a strategic presentation by ANC leader Thabo Mbeki won the day. He pointed out that the South African government had not fulfilled its promise to create a climate for negotiations: releasing political prisoners, speeding the return of political exiles, repealing apartheid legislation (the Group Areas, Population Registration, and Land acts); and removing repressive provisions of security legislation. Hence, with the exception of some loosening of sports sanctions, existing measures were to be maintained in their present form until the obstacles to negotiation had been overcome. The consensus was that 'there had been more promises than concrete action.' Clark said simply, 'We think that much more needs to be done.' At the same time, the London meeting set out the principles to guide the removal of sanctions in future, using both the 'carrot,' to 'give credit where credit was due' when the South African government made advances, and the 'stick,' to keep the pressure on when change seemed problematic. Once the conditions to create a climate for negotiations were met, a phased lifting of sanctions would begin with 'people to people' sanctions (cultural, academic, and scientific exchanges; air links; tourism; and consular and visa restrictions). The more important forms of pressure - trade, investment, and financial sanctions - were to be maintained until there had been some further major step taken down the path of constitutional reform in multiparty negotiation, such as the establishment of an interim government, a constituent assembly, or some other agreed constitution-making process. The arms embargo was not to be repealed until a new constitution was in place.

Within Canada, agreement to these conditions was welcomed by both of the main opposition parties, by a minority of the press, and by the NGO corn-
munity. As Carleton University professor Douglas Anglin put it, to reward de Klerk by removing sanctions at this point, would be like 'rewarding a husband for stopping beating his wife.'

However, the decision provoked a storm of protest from sections of the Conservative party, the media, especially the Canadian Exporters' Association (CEA). James Taylor, the CEA President, complained that Canadian firms were 'in danger of being left out in the cold,' while firms from the rest of the world were taking advantage of 'prime market opportunities.' 'We'll be the last caboose on the train,' he said. Particularly galling to him was the fact that African Commonwealth countries had increased their trade with South Africa. Although Canadian exports to South Africa had also increased by 53 per cent in 1990 (moving Canada's balance of trade with South Africa into a surplus for only the second time since 1980), Taylor insisted that exports to South Africa could triple, particularly on high technology goods, once the ban was lifted.

At the same time, portfolio changes within the government, especially the replacement of Joe Clark by Barbara McDougall as secretary of state for external affairs in April 1991, strengthened forces within the state that were opposed to sanctions. Throughout her tenure, McDougall did not hide her distaste for economic sanctions and her desire to have them lifted as rapidly as possible. These pressures began to rise when the EC ignored ANC appeals and lifted sanctions on the import of South African iron, steel, and gold coins in April 1991 and again when U.S. President George Bush decided to end U.S. Congressional sanctions on trade and investment in July 1991. With the successful convening of an ANC convention inside South Africa in July and with the decision of the International Olympic Committee to allow South Africans to compete in the Barcelona games in 1992, a consensus was also developing within the Canadian press that 'the lights seem cautiously green.'

At first, Mulroney continued to hold the line: He said the criteria for lifting sanctions established by the Commonwealth, particularly on the release of political prisoners, had not yet been met. He agreed with Mandela that the U.S. decision was 'premature.' 'We got involved in this thing to try and help leaders like ... Mandela,' he said, and added that 'he was more inclined to accept his assessment of the situation rather than somebody else's.' Canada was among the first nations to impose penalties, he said, and might be among the last to remove them. 'There's nothing wrong with that.'

However, both the Canadian and Commonwealth positions were starting to soften. At a meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa in New Delhi in September 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs McDougall introduced a new set of proposals to reward changes within South Africa: the committee now advocated the lifting of 'people's sanctions' partly, it stated, 'to give external support and encouragement to ... democratic anti-apartheid forces within South Africa.' The committee also agreed to relax the sports boycott.
More striking still was a considerable easing of the conditions to be met before trade and investment sanctions could be ended. The February formulation had talked about 'evidence of progress on constitutional reform in multiparty negotiations such as the establishment of an interim government, a constituent assembly or some other agreed constitution making process.' Now, provisions (drafted with the assistance of Lucie Edwards, then head of Canada's Southern African Task Force in the Department of External Affairs) referred merely to a time 'when appropriate transitional mechanisms had been agreed which would enable all the parties to participate fully and effectively in negotiations.'100 These proposals were accepted, with Mandela's approval, at the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in Harare in October 1991,101 and the first set of 'people to people' sanctions were lifted. The Canadian government added official contacts to the list of peoples sanctions which were to be removed, having bypassed them anyway in 1990 and 1991 when it had invited President de Klerk to visit Canada.

Indeed, by the Harare meeting, there were clear signals of a shift in Canadian policy. Significantly, Mulroney planned to pay an official visit to South Africa after the Commonwealth meeting."2 Given Mulroney's championing of sanctions in his legendary battles with Margaret Thatcher, the visit would have had enormous symbolic value for the South African regime. Also, up to that point, there had been no official bilateral visit to South Africa by a Canadian prime minister. However, the ANC and Mandela strenuously objected03: In their view, Mulroney's visit would have lent legitimacy to the de Klerk government, despite the continued involvement of security forces in violence and particularly after its disgrace in Inkathagate. Hence, Mulroney 'postponed' his trip, explaining that its timing 'would not be helpful.'''4A second sign of change in official thinking emerged from Mulroney's announcement that he wanted to broaden discussions on human rights and democracy beyond South Africa to include countries within the Commonwealth itself.05 He added that, henceforth, Canada would 'increasingly be channeling our development assistance to those countries which show respect for fundamental rights and freedoms.'06 Mulroney singled out the Kenyan regime for criticism and even challenged his host, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, when police put down student demonstrations in Harare during the conference.07 'We happen to be one of the four donor nations [in the Common-
become the criteria for assistance during the 1980s, and there were no indications that this priority was about to change."

Sections of the Canadian press applauded Mulroney, arguing that after 'putting the spotlight on South Africa,' it was 'high time for self-examination in the Commonwealth.'" However, Mulroney's position, with all its contradictions, suggested less a new commitment to democracy and human rights than a gesture to his critics at home and to the larger Western powers. The public attack on Mugabe, especially, seemed designed to placate sections of Canadian public and press opinion irritated by the alliance which had existed between them in the campaign against apartheid."

However, there was a cost. Mulroney's aggressive style provoked a strong reaction from leaders who had lionized him in past meetings: Mugabe said that linking aid to human rights would be 'going too far,' and that it would be wrong 'to try to buy the policies of the government, to try to change them through aid,'" while Hawke said that he did not take the view 'that it is for us to hector and lecture'; that he was 'sensitive to telling others how to conduct their affairs.' "

Mulroney's willingness to distance himself from his former close associates suggested also that, having journeyed outside the traditional confines of Canadian foreign policy in his differences with Thatcher, Reagan, and Bush on sanctions, he was now interested in coming in from the cold. The governments of Britain and France had already stated that, in the post-Cold War era, countries would no longer be assisted regardless of their record on democracy and human rights. At Harare, Mulroney had joined in, turning the spotlight on the Commonwealth.

Moreover, in the twilight of his tenure as prime minister, there was intense speculation that Mulroney had raised this issue in service of his bid to become the next secretary-general of the United Nations. '" For a short period, Mulroney became the West's candidate for this post, nominated by Britain and the United States and supported by France.

Until the constitutional discussions in South Africa fell apart in May 1992, there was every sign also that the Canadian government was waiting for a propitious moment to lift economic sanctions. In early January 1992, the Cana-
Not surprisingly, the ANC representative in Canada opposed the decision, pointing out that there was no effective way to monitor the end use of these strategic goods. The South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha welcomed it as an important step in the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Canadian Exporters' Association was delighted as its members believed that change was long overdue.

Following the South African referendum in March 1992, facing intense pressure to end sanctions both from the media and from backbench Tory MPs, there were indications that the government was prepared to move: Mulroney, for one, wanted to 'send a very positive signal' to de Klerk, while McDougall said that de Klerk needed 'tangible support,' not just congratulations - 'the time is certainly coming very soon when we will see the lifting of sanctions. 24

After consultations with Canada's Commonwealth partners, however, the euphoria evaporated and Canadian leaders came down to earth with a thud. As Mandela pointed out, apartheid remained in place, black South Africans did not have the vote, and the process was still not irreversible. What the referendum had done, McDougall said, was to 'give de Klerk the mandate to increase the momentum. It doesn't give blacks full democracy.'

Much as McDougall might have wished otherwise, as chair of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa, she could not break ranks without losing credibility. Accordingly, the signal of support for de Klerk was reduced to a visit by McDougall to South Africa in April. While Joe Clark had visited briefly in 1987, McDougall was paying the first official visit by a Canadian minister to South Africa in three decades.

Although she did not respond to pressure from de Klerk (heightened at the time by the EC's decision to lift its oil embargo), she made no secret of her distaste for sanctions. They were 'a crude mechanism,' she said, with enormous economic and social costs. 'Now [was the] time to turn the page and get on with the challenges of a new South Africa.' 26 She had 'seen that the need for economic development to go along with political development is urgent,' and she 'would look for an ending of sanctions sooner rather than later.'

This positioning seemed to suggest that the Canadian government was on the verge of resuming full economic relations. However, the approach was premised on progress in constitutional negotiations. When they were suspended in May and abandoned in June following the Boipatong massacre, these plans were again put on hold. Ironically, the Commonwealth-made policy of sustaining sanctions, which had so irked federal government officials, large sections of the press, and the private sector, turned out to be the prudent choice.

Once negotiations started again in South Africa, the Canadian government did maintain sanctions, though with increasing difficulty. In mid-1993, it seemed that the government was again ready to lift them. In May on her second trip to South Africa, McDougall said that Canada was set to drop trade and investment sanctions, a position reiterated by officials in the following months. However, the consensus was to wait a little longer. Although the date for the first non-racial
elections (27 April 1994) was agreed in July 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was still not in place. The level of violence in South Africa, with almost twelve hundred murders in July and August, 130 gave pause. There was no indication either that the rest of the Commonwealth was ready to lift sanctions. Most important, as the ANC representative in Canada pointed out, one could not rule out a political reversal at the last minute. Antiapartheid groups in Western Canada campaigned vigorously against any premature action. 3 When legislation was eventually passed in South Africa in September 1993 to establish the TEC, an independent commission to oversee the elections, and an independent media commission, it was finally time. On 24 September 1993, three months after Mulroney left office, in consultation with the Commonwealth and at Mandela's request, Prime Minister Kim Campbell's government lifted all trade, investment, and financial sanctions against South Africa.a2

Ironically, the fact that Canadian governments saw the sanctions process through to the end was less the highly principled stand that official accounts suggest, than the unintended consequences of a bind in which the state had trapped itself. The Canadian government could not lift sanctions unilaterally without losing face in the Commonwealth. Ultimately, it preferred to deal with the chagrin of the Canadian private sector. Officials anticipated over and again that events in South Africa would move more quickly than they did, and this expectation undoubtedly stayed their hand.

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That the Commonwealth connection won out over underlying interests in the domestic sphere represented something, but the alternative would have damaged Canadian credibility. When Campbell's Secretary of State for External Affairs Perrin Beatty, suggested that the end of sanctions 'was a great day for Canadian foreign policy,' he probably expressed some relief as well as selfcongratulation. As we have seen, the policy on South Africa, with its roots in the Mulroney administration, was always far more complex than Beatty would have it. In the 1990s in the guise of even-handedness, the state in Canada had rushed to reembrace the white regime in Pretoria, to laud de Klerk, to give equal time to Buthelezi, as well as to finance Mandela and the ANC. Yet given the legacy of apartheid, the escalating violence organized to a great extent by state security forces, and the central role of Inkatha in what became a virtual civil war, South Africa was not neutral terrain. The shallowness of political analysis and a discourse that encouraged warmth to all parties, however heinous their past and dubious their present, reflected not only an attempt at impartiality, but also some diffidence about what the future would bring. Along with the rest of the West, the Canadian state was unsure about the transformation under way in South Africa and nervous about the black majority taking power. Without question, sections of the state in Canada also displayed an undignified eagerness to dispense with sanctions and to get on with the 'business' of promoting trade. However, even here, there were cross currents, as the private sector, too, was cautious, waiting to test the waters of the new dispensation.
Thus, the final Mulroney years reflected many of the central complexities of his administration's South Africa policy: honourable in its adherence to Commonwealth unity in maintaining sanctions, yet reluctantly so. That it was able to contain the tension of economic interests straining at the leash imposed by larger political considerations for well over three years reaffirmed the commitment that had produced the policy in the first place.

This restraint also played an important role in muffling the memory of the late 1980s when Canada's increased trade with South Africa, its leaky sanctions, and its role in stalling additional sanctions within the Commonwealth had brought its reputation into disrepute. Thus the general contours and high moments of Mulroney's policy will be remembered long after its shortcomings have faded out of public memory. In such ways are legends born, and the story of the Mulroney government's role on South Africa will undoubtedly enter into Canadian and African mythology. It also positioned the state and the private sector to reap the fruits of its policy in the years to come, as South Africa moved out of the dark nightmare of apartheid.

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Some may regret the sanctions, and all must concede they were unevenly applied. A significant faction in the West continues to whore after white rule, and awaits with mordant anticipation the crises that will certainly beset majority rule. But no serious observer now doubts that sanctions were a decisive agency of change. Hugo Young

Without question, sanctions constituted the axis around which the main thrust of Canadian policy towards South Africa turned in the Mulroney years. Complementing sanctions was a small but growing program of assistance within South Africa. Both instruments of policy became the subject of controversy: sanctions over their appropriateness as a policy instrument; the assistance program over the context in which it operated.

While this chapter will look briefly at the essence of these debates, its primary function is to assess the record on sanctions and assistance. It will show that the government's implementation of sanctions was selective and, in some crucial sectors, quite weak. The rules were leaky and compliance eroded dramatically over time. Particularly as the end of apartheid loomed, the state's interest in seeing that sanctions were observed evaporated.

The program of assistance was better. Much that the Canadian government offered was strategic and imaginative. At the same time, its focus was controversial. During the struggle to end apartheid, giving priority to projects inside the country meant that the liberation movements received almost nothing. In the transition period, ironically, the concern was the reverse, that in helping give the ANC the tools to rule, Canadian assistance had become partial. In any case, it will be shown that the aid program was only a tiny fraction of continued trade and investment.
The weakness of Canadian sanctions was an inevitable product of the climate within which they were adopted. As we have seen, the decision to use sanctions was a product of a particular historical moment when forces within the state were able to override the entrenched resistance that had barred their use during the Trudeau era. When it came to implementation, however, opponents of the policy were able to win back on the roundabout some of what they had lost on the swings.

Thus, in many cases, officials within the state observed sanctions very selectively or found narrow technical reasons to justify non-compliance. The most common of these was that involvement with South Africa through third parties could not be stopped without extra-territorial application of the law. After initially insisting that 'voluntary sanctions' were meant to be taken seriously, officials quietly overlooked those who ignored them. Particularly in the 1990s, breaches of firm commitments were allowed by, with a wink and a nod. For many, the commitment in principle was more than enough; backsliding on observance was quietly tolerated.

The Argument against Sanctions:

The undercurrent of resistance rested on a scepticism about the utility of sanctions. Many believed sanctions to be punitive for Canada and ineffectual in transforming South Africa. The dislike of economic sanctions was also based on opposition in principle to the interruption of the free flow of goods and services for foreign policy ends. In this view, ethical and political issues of concern to the state should not intrude on business decisions taken by the private sector. From a practical point of view, many felt that outsiders could exert only a limited influence, that change must come from within. As Canadian sanctions on their own did not have much of an economic impact, imposing them was comparable to 'rain dancing,' 'an activity that accomplishes very little, but that makes participants feel good because something is being done about a serious problem.'

A related set of arguments stressed the impossibility of a total blockade and argued that, unless sanctions were universally applied, they had failed in their task. Any sign of a breach of the embargo was treated as proof of the futility of imposing sanctions in an era of global communications. Widespread evasions in previous attempts at international sanctions, notably the Rhodesian case, were cited as proof that sanctions were not effective.

Until the end of the Cold War, many also believed in the strategic and economic value of an alliance with the white regime in South Africa, particularly given the dependence of some Canadian companies on strategic minerals. Given the heavy involvement of British, Asian, and U.S. industry in the South African economy and the opposition of the Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl regimes to sanctions, a powerful current of opinion felt that Canada should keep company with its allies.

Beyond these questions, a large part of the debate centred around the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool for bringing about an end to apartheid in South

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African economy and the opposition of the Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl regimes to sanctions, a powerful current of opinion felt that Canada should keep company with its allies.
Africa. Sanctions, many argued, would simply stiffen the resolve of pro-apartheid forces within South Africa to resist international pressure. Just as arms sanctions had led to the development of an arms industry, it was believed that economic sanctions would encourage self-reliance and resourcefulness in South African industry.

In any case, anti-sanctions forces believed that change would come without sanctions as part of a long-term evolutionary process; that economic growth would transform the apartheid economy; and that the development of South Africa's industrial sector would facilitate black political advancement. In this view, partaking in South Africa's 'vicious system' was not immoral if involvement could help mitigate that evil.'

At the very least, Canadian firms considered their involvement to be constructive and positive, providing the oppressed black majority with jobs, advancement, opportunity, and a better standard of living. By contrast, sanctions hurt the poor black majority the most and damaged the economies of neighbouring countries in the region. As the chairman of Falconbridge, William James said in 1985, 'I don't believe in the scorched-earth policy where you have everything break down and have no infrastructure left and no jobs, and put all those people out of work until they settle their question on rule in South Africa ... when you close down a mine, the people who get hurt worst are the blacks. They're the first to feel it. Whitey's going to be around for a long time and he's going to be doing all right. But it's going to be the blacks that are burnt ... And I say our 392 rand a month is better than nothing.'

This point of view was buttressed by regular visits of anti-sanctions leaders, notably Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who argued that economic sanctions would reverse the trend towards increased power for black unionized workers and consumers. Polls were cited selectively to indicate that the majority of black South Africans opposed sanctions.

The Case for Sanctions

By contrast, those who argued for sanctions saw them as an important addition to the pressures that confronted the apartheid regime. In this view, economic and diplomatic linkages were not politically neutral, but contributed to the

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maintenance of the existing order. Accordingly, the fundamental goal of sanctions was to shift the balance of power by weakening the apartheid regime and by supporting those engaged in the struggle for a democratic future. Therefore, in essence, sanctions were more than moral pressure; they were 'a way of taking sides,' a strategic intervention in the process of change.7

This view tended to discount the contention that sanctions did not work unless a blockade was comprehensive, and stressed instead the extra cost and difficulty which sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime. While goods and services continued to enter South Africa, they did so at a price. The South African military could not always obtain the latest technology in the arms industry, and lags in certain areas became critical, as evidenced in the defeat of South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola. Increasingly, too, as South African officials
eventually admitted, sanctions had a negative psychological impact on business confidence.'

As to the view that foreign investment and economic growth would gradually remove the irrationality of apartheid, the intensification of apartheid had coincided almost precisely with peaks of investment and lending from abroad. A billion-dollar IMF loan to Pretoria in the early 1980s was granted just as the budget for the South African police and military increased by the same amount.'

Given the powerful psychological impact that sports and travel sanctions had had on the white community, the view that economic sanctions would lead to increased white intransigence was also discounted as a myth fostered by Pretoria. While the government under P.W. Botha sustained its hard-line opposition to sharing power with blacks, there were clear indications that influential sections of civil society in South Africa, including white Afrikaners, were open to the possibility. As Joe Clark put it, sanctions 'tightened the screws' on white South Africa.'0 'More blacks lost their jobs,' he said, 'but more whites changed their minds' about apartheid.'

At any rate, the most powerful of the arguments for sanctions was that almost all black leaders of stature (excluding Buthelezi), from Mandela to Tutu to Chikane to Boesak, argued passionately in their favour. They dismissed the argument that constructive engagement provided moral grounds for foreign investment. As Archbishop Tutu put it, 'whether you like it or not, whether you intend it or not, to invest in South Africa is to partake in a vicious system.'

They also responded with great indignation to the argument that sanctions should be opposed because of their effect on the black community. Commonwealth Secretary-General Sonny Ramphal recounted that the Eminent Persons Group were told 'over and over again' that 'those outside who say that sanctions will "hurt the blacks" do not know how intense black suffering already is.

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It is, in any case, a judgement they have no right to make, when the blacks themselves see sanctions and any additional suffering they involve as preferable to the far greater tragedy they would otherwise face.'13 Tutu noted that almost all the opposition to sanctions came from whites or blacks who worked within the apartheid system.

As to the debate about Canada joining the international sanctions campaign, the majority opinion, even within the Canadian media, eventually came to support economic sanctions.4 While there was no question that the small amount of Canadian trade with South Africa (never more than 1 to 2 per cent of total trade) had always precluded a significant unilateral effect, joining forces with others in the Commonwealth clearly had a more substantial impact. Some academics, notably Kim Nossal, even argued for diplomatic sanctions. He told a special joint parliamentary committee that when he was a student, 'the primary argument for maintaining diplomatic relations with South Africa was so Canada could have a voice. Well it is now 15 years later and Canada still has a voice; but a voice that is being used to what effect?'5

Canadian Sanctions - Illusion and Reality
Lost in much of the debate about the appropriateness of sanctions was an appreciation of the limited and selective nature of sanctions imposed by the Canadian government. Most strikingly, it was commonly assumed that Canadian sanctions against South Africa had eliminated all economic relations. After the first sanctions were adopted in 1985-6, Canadian officials contributed to this impression by claiming that there was little else that was left to do and most of the Canadian press accepted this proposition.

However, contrary to popular belief, Canadian sanctions were quite modest and the most important ones were voluntary. The gap between what was claimed for the sanctions program and what it actually did was often quite dramatic. During the sanctions period from October 1986 to September 1993, Canada's real two-way trade with South Africa remained substantial: amounting to $1.6 billion, or 44 per cent of the comparable period before sanctions (1979-85), and this in a period of stagnant or negative growth in South Africa. Moreover, contrary to the intent of trade sanctions, Canadians bought more from South Africa than they sold to them, with an overall trade deficit, in real terms, of $84 million.

Equally revealing were the sectors exempted from Canadian commitments on trade sanctions, especially the sale of Canadian sulphur to South Africa and the purchase of dissolving pulp and ingredients for specialty steel manufacture from South Africa. As financial sanctions were largely voluntary, Canadian financial institutions continued to provide loans and to underwrite bonds for South African affiliated interests, even if in a more subdued and indirect fashion than in the past.

Despite its rhetoric, the government, in John Gray's words, had 'neither the stomach nor the guts' for total sanctions. However distasteful apartheid may be,’ he noted, the Cabinet did not need polls to know that business would be enraged by such an intervention. The problem with using this policy instrument was that it had to hurt someone to be effective. In this case, Canadians did not do enough trade with South Africa to inflict significant damage, and the government played to its weakness by being selective about what it banned.

In fact, sanctions were designed to inconvenience as few people as possible and to hurt absolutely no one. As the first head of the Department of External Affairs' Southern Africa Task Force, Eric Bergbusch, explained, the approach was to escalate sanctions carefully, minimizing damage to Canadian interests. In principle, the Department of External Affairs would start with signs of symbolic disapproval, with formal arrangements that had little impact on the economy of either side. The second stage was to ban imports from South Africa where goods could be easily substituted. The third stage was to ban Canadian exports to South Africa and the fourth to promote divestment and disinvestment.

Accordingly, the sanctions that were adopted ranged from soft or 'people to people' sanctions to harder ones on economic relations. As we have seen, the Mulroney government stopped dealing directly with companies with South African links and abrogated the Canada-South Africa double taxation agreement. Consular facilities for non-Canadians in South Africa were withdrawn. Canadian
companies were enjoined not to promote tourism, and Canadian athletes were asked not to conduct sporting relations with South African athletes. The strongest, most concrete measures affected trade - banning (on a voluntary basis) exports of crude oil and refined products and (on a mandatory basis) high technology goods, particularly those that had a dual civilian or military use. Other mandatory bans were placed on imports of agricultural goods, steel, coal, iron, uranium, and (on a voluntary basis) the Krugerrand. Given the strategy outlined by Bergbusch, it followed that the real value of exports would decline less in the sanctions period (about 94 per cent) than imports (160 per cent) as compared with an equivalent period before.

Canadian Sulphur Exports - Keeping the Business Connection 2

While the government prohibited exports of petroleum products (oil and natural gas) to South Africa, these were commodities that Canadians normally did not sell to South Africa. On related goods and services where the export trade was substantial, the Canadian government allowed considerable latitude, permitting energy consulting, the sale of mining equipment, petroleum by-products, and the petroleum by-product, sulphur. Of these, sulphur was by far the most important. Indeed, from 1979 to 1989, sulphur was Canada's top export to South Africa, and, during the sanctions period, constituted just over one-quarter of total exports or $330 million.

Given South Africa's dependence on Canadian sulphur for most of this period, the continued trade filled a strategic need. This was an area where Canadian sanctions could have made a difference. Canadian companies supplied 99 per cent of South Africa's imported sulphur in the late 1980s, and South Africa relied on Canadian imports for about 50 per cent of its total needs.22 South Africa would have had difficulty finding other reliable low cost supplies had sulphur exports been banned.

By contrast, Canadian hardship would have been minimal. Sales to South Africa accounted for only about 5 to 8 per cent of total Canadian sulphur exports during the sanctions era, and world demand was high.23 Sulphur sales to South Africa as a percentage of overall revenues to oil and gas operators in Western Canada were only 0.152 per cent in 1985, though for individual operators it might have been higher.4 Canadian producers could have supported sanctions without eliminating jobs, but neither South African importers nor Canadian suppliers were compelled to find alternatives.5 At the same time, these sulphur exports, used largely to make fertilizers in South Africa, dramatically cut into Canadian fertilizer exports, reducing average annual sales by the end of the 1980s to about one-quarter of those at the beginning.26 South Africa was then able to earn valuable foreign exchange through fertilizer exports to the region. One study contended that the most serious impact of a ban on Canadian sulphur exports would have been on companies importing fertilizer from South Africa.27 Had a Canadian ban on sulphur exports to South Africa been imposed, Canadian assistance could have been used to develop fertilizer industries in neighbouring
countries, including backward linkages through the exploitation of phosphate in Zimbabwe and Angola. In the interim, the Canadian government would have had new markets for sulphur and fertilizers, reducing regional dependence on South Africa. However, the Canadian government refused to reconsider the issue of sanctions on sulphur, though pressed regularly to do so in Parliament. To understand the reasons for the persistence of this trade, three important factors stand out: the location of suppliers in Western Canada, the opposition to sanctions of provincial governments in this region, and the hostility of Western Canadian Conservative MPs and the private sector to trade sanctions.

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In the first place, most (from 70 to 85 per cent) of Canada's sulphur came from sour gas plants in Alberta, with British Columbia providing the rest. While a poll of Albertans showed majority support (54 per cent) for tough sanctions, it is unlikely that it reflected conservative opinion in the west, shaped as it was by the South African embassy and friendly pro-South African networks. At any rate, provincial governments in Western Canada certainly would have opposed any interference with this trade. Producers like Shell Canada, the largest individual company selling sulphur to South Africa, also lobbied hard and successfully for the trade. Shell representatives said they could find other customers, but saw no reason to stop selling sulphur to South Africa, especially as it was used to make fertilizer for a continent that needed to grow food. As an executive of Cansulex, the cooperative that, with Petrosul, marketed almost all of Canadian sulphur put it, South Africans were excellent customers. 'They pay the world price, they pay on time, and they pay in cash ... I say let's keep the business connection.'

Bending the Rules on Imports

While sanctions on exports to South Africa were controversial because of the cost to the private sector in Canada, sanctions on imports were an easier proposition, given alternative sources of supply. In some cases, Canadian companies actually benefited from the introduction of sanctions, a case in point being the 1985 ban on the import of the Krugerrand. By 1990, the Canadian maple leaf gold coin had not only taken over the Canadian market but had an estimated 50 to 55 per cent of the global market as well. Canadian uranium and coal producers were able to supply the local market without difficulty once sanctions were in place. Generally also, buyers were able to find alternative supplies for sugar and fruit, the largest category of banned agricultural imports, though some South African products, notably wine and oranges, slipped in from Swaziland. Although agricultural imports were worth about $850 million in the ten years before sanctions, they came to a complete halt by 1988. Even where there were no formal bans, South African suppliers, sensitive to their growing unacceptability politically, were anxious to disguise the origins of their goods. Thus, clothing and textiles from South Africa were routed through Swaziland - as indicated by an increase of 14,000% in Swazi exports of garments to Canada (up to $2.8 million in 1986). There was also some question that
South African suppliers from the Ciskei were using Mauritius as a transit point for clothing sold through Canadian department stores. Beach

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sandals *made in Lesotho* appeared in Canadian stores, although the Lesotho embassy confirmed that no such sandals were produced in Lesotho.38

The most revealing aspect of the ban on imports was less the odd case of sanctions evasion than the very selective and narrow interpretation of the commitment. As a result, while Canadian imports from South Africa did decline, they still averaged about $122 million annually in real terms, and exceeded exports during the sanctions period. In two cases - rare alloys of special interest to the specialty steel industry in Canada and finished steel products - the state allowed exemptions which contradicted the essence of its policy. In the first, Canadian firms depended on South Africa for ferrochromium (61 per cent), ferromanganese (23 per cent), manganese metal (66 per cent), vanadium pentoxide (72 per cent) and zirconia metal (100 per cent) - ingredients for carbon and alloy steels, including specialty steel.39

Although such items are included by Statistics Canada in the category of iron and steel, one of the items specifically banned in the sanctions legislation in 1986, the Department of External Affairs decided to make an exception, deeming them essential minerals critical to Canada's needs and vulnerable to supply disruption.40 The argument was that there were no alternative high quality, price competitive, reliable suppliers in a period of high world demand. The Canadian Steel Producers Association insisted that, without South African supplies, the steel industry in Canada would be 'wiped out', and estimated that 42,000 jobs would be lost.4

Canadian resources of chromium, manganese, vanadium and zircon were undeveloped; a government program to bring them on to the market would have taken at least five years. Nor was there much interest in diverting the market to South Africa's neighbours. Zimbabwean mineral expert Paul Jourdan argued that, except for chromium, other southern African countries could have supplied the minerals at a cost equal to or cheaper than South Africa.2 With some expanded smelting, he also believed that Zimbabwe's well-developed chrome and ferrochrome mining industry could have become a dependable source cheaper than South Africa.

However, industry lobbyists won out. A Rio Algom subsidiary, Atlas Specialty Steels, bought half the total Canadian imports of ferrochromium from South Africa and relied on South Africa for other ores. As a subsidiary of the transnational corporation, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), Rio Algom was linked to South Africa through its parent company's extensive interests and made no secret of its position. The president of Rio Algom said his company had 'strongly suggested that it [ferrochromium] should not be on the sanctions list.'43 Although Atlas had considered requests from External Affairs to look elsewhere,
its view was that 'South Africa is the major supplier of chromium to the world and it's crucial to have a dependable source.'

Steel producers were also able to beat off an attempt to widen Canadian sanctions in 1989 after increases in imports of these ores had embarrassed the Canadian government. The industry was simply not prepared to go to the trouble and inconvenience of developing new sources of supply, and the Canadian government did not force the issue. In December 1989, a government-industry taskforce concluded that there was 'no satisfactory short-term solution to finding suitable alternative supplies of all the essential minerals currently being imported from the RSA.'

Although Canadian steel producers had sufficient power to secure these exemptions, a smaller Canadian manufacturer was unsuccessful in having the ban on South African steel apply to end products. Within the category of finished steel products, the Department of External Affairs decided to apply sanctions only to intermediate manufacturers. The language in the legal text on sanctions referred to steel products that, the department decided, 'in the conventional sense, mean primary products and steel products, such as ingots, billets, wire, plates, sheet and strip, among others.'

This distinction came to light when a Canadian company manufacturing a rotary-type rock drill spent $15 million expanding its capacity to cover the entire Canadian market, believing that its South African competitor would be eliminated by sanctions. However, as a result of the narrowed and technical interpretation of Canadian sanctions, two subsidiaries of the South African conglomerate, Anglo American Corporation, continued to import a competing product without difficulty. Despite appeals from the company about the benefits which its expansion would have brought to Nova Scotia, the government was not prepared to change its restrictive interpretation.

In both cases, the companies importing from South Africa were linked to highly influential transnational corporations (RTZ and Anglo American) based in Canada, Britain, and South Africa. The alternative of tougher sanctions would have brought the Mulroney government into confrontation with these interests, and it chose instead to shape its policies to meet their needs. The result was that iron and steel, broadly considered by Statistics Canada, constituted the largest category of Canadian imports (25 per cent of the total or $252 million) from South Africa in the sanctions period. Canadian purchases of these commodities even increased slightly (by about $21 million) compared with an equivalent period before.

While the importers of ferroalloys for specialty steel were able to use questions of supply to justify continued imports from South Africa, in a second case, a Canadian company was able to continue importing dissolving wood pulp, a product plentifully available in Canada. Once again, transnational interests with connections in the Canadian state overrode a tighter imposition of sanctions, even though it entailed a direct disadvantage to domestic industry.
The subsidiary in question was the Canadian branch of the British transnational Courtaulds PLC based in Cornwall, Ontario. Wood pulp was brought into Canada from a mill in Natal owned by Courtaulds in partnership with the Industrial Development Corporation, an agency of the South African government. The product was used in the manufacture of textiles, particularly viscose fibre. Price competition seemed to have been the motivation. The pulp mill was not only the world's largest, but it also had the lowest costs - because of cheap labour, the fast-growing eucalyptus tree, and lower construction costs. While in Canada a tonne of paper included approximately $135 of labour value; in South Africa in even more modern mills, the labour cost was only $25.50 Industry sources believed that South African pulp was sold to Courtaulds' Canadian subsidiary in Cornwall for less than the open market price."

The Cornwall firm maintained a long-term supply contract with the South African firm even after its sale by the parent corporation in 1988. Thus Courtaulds Canada bought two-thirds of its dissolving pulp (25,000 metric tonnes a year) from South Africa and only one-third (about 12,000 metric tonnes a year) from a Tembic mill in Quebec. Courtaulds did not want to rely solely on its Quebec source and, at any rate, had tailored its mill in Cornwall to use pulp from the eucalyptus tree. Annual imports of wood pulp from South Africa were estimated at about $30 million in the late 1980s.2

Until South Africa became self-sufficient in the production of wood pulp, Canada had been one of its main suppliers. Now the tables were turned with a vengeance. While annual exports of pulp from British Columbia to South Africa had been about $30 million in 1983, they had dropped to a mere $4 million in 1985.13 Dissolving pulp constituted Canada's third largest import from South Africa (an estimated 12 per cent of total imports or roughly $109 million) in the sanctions period.

Servicing South Africa - a Blind Eye to Transport
While trade sanctions were highly selective, so, too, was the approach taken to the embargo on air transport and on ships chartered to break the embargo on the oil and coal trade with South Africa. Except for a few charter flights, there were, in fact, no direct air links between Canada and South Africa. Moreover, in 1986, the government allowed Wardair to help South African Airways (SAA)

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out of the predicament of overcapacity caused by international sanctions. Its purchase of three Airbuses from SAA for $90 million more than counterbalanced the initial effect of trade sanctions.4 The government's case was that the Wardair purchase was 'a straight commercial deal'55 and that the ban involved only something transported in an airplane but not the airplane itself. A similar narrow interpretation produced an abstention on an International Civil Aviation Organization resolution banning air links with South Africa. Clark insisted the position was part of the policy 'not to allow politicization to interfere with the work of specialized agencies of the United Nations.'56
As time went on, this kind of reasoning delineated the clear limits of the state's sanctions policy, not only in the abstract realm of international resolutions but also in strategic areas of sanctions on oil and coal. On the one hand, the government was prepared to observe the 1986 Commonwealth ban on coal imports from South Africa - a resource which, in any case, Canada has in abundance. However, from 1986 on, two Canadian companies, Canadian Pacific and Montreal-based Fednav, allowed their ships to be used regularly as charters which transported South African coal to Holland.7 There, South African coal was blended with Canadian coal and transshipped to other European countries with the South African link disguised. A Canadian Pacific vessel also broke the international ban on oil exports to South Africa in 1981 and 1987.

A Fednav official said that charters were beyond the company's purview. 'We're a business,' he said, 'and the politics of the world has nothing to do with companies doing business.'8 CP officials said there was nothing illegal about breaking a voluntary U.N. ban as the ships were under charter. An official from the Department of External Affairs added that there were no restrictions to prevent private Canadian companies exporting South African coal to other countries or breaking the international oil embargo.9 Thus, on charters, transshipment, and blended coal, the state preferred to look the other way.

The Oxymoron of Voluntary Financial Sanctions

The state's disinterest in moving beyond a very narrow interpretation of sanctions on trade and transport was quickly evident. But it, nevertheless, was constrained in these sectors by the original Commonwealth agreements. In the financial sector, however, sanctions were entirely voluntary. Compliance, it was argued, would indicate the support of all sections of Canadian society for government measures and not just obedience to government law. In the early period in September 1985, Joe Clark suggested that if voluntary sanctions 'proved ineffective, the Government would have to look for more mandatory ways to achieve our policy.'60

However, Clark was not serious. The state was not willing to antagonize a sector that had made no secret of its opposition to sanctions. Observance became the exception rather than the rule. The approach allowed a tactful collusion: the private sector could disregard the intent of sanctions without penalty on the flimsiest of pretexts. The government could then respond with collegial communication and gentle reproofs over transgressions.

Thus the government asked banks not to extend new loans to South Africa, although most banks had stopped providing new loans to the South African government and its agencies before official sanctions were imposed. Significantly, there was no provision for monitoring against any backsliding. Clark was also slow (it took him three years) to address the issue of international trade credits, a channel for finance used by the South African government after 1985 when new bank loans became difficult to arrange. Even then, he was prepared only to ask Canadian financial institutions not to increase trade credits...
and to secure the shortest possible loan rescheduling terms. However, he did not require an end to trade credits or to a rescheduling of loans. With such signals coming from the state, a range of Canadian institutions ignored the policy and continued to assess financial dealings in South Africa primarily on the basis of commercial risk. In some cases they operated directly with South African partners, but, more typically, they worked through financial institutions outside of Canada. The case that set the tone for government-private sector relations on financial sanctions illustrated both the autonomy of the financial sector and the weakness of government resolve in this sector.

As we have seen, in 1988, the Bank of Nova Scotia offered a $600 million loan to MINORCO, a Luxemburg-based overseas investment arm of two giant interlinked South African conglomerates, Anglo American and De Beers Consolidated Mines. The concentration of wealth and power represented by these corporations made them a central force in the South African economy. Anglo American alone had share holdings in about 70 per cent of the companies listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange and, together with De Beers, owned about 40 per cent of the companies listed there.

The provision of the loan by the Bank of Nova Scotia was consistent with past links between the Canadian financial sector and South African interests. In the early 1980s, the president of the Bank of Nova Scotia, Cedric Ritchie, was a member of MINORCO's board and he made no secret of his strong opposition to Canadian sanctions against South Africa.

Although the news of the loan was extremely embarrassing, Clark defended the loan on geographical grounds (that MINORCO's headquarters were in Luxembourg and not South Africa), and ignored the issue of South African control. In fact, the Department of External Affairs had advised the Bank of Nova Scotia that its financing of MINORCO did not violate Canadian sanctions. Ritchie was called in for consultation with Clark, but it clearly was a pro forma gesture. By contrast, Chemical Bank, a U.S. interest involved in this deal, came under intense pressure to alter its policy, so much so that it agreed not to participate in future loans of this kind. While Clark brought new tougher Commonwealth guidelines to the attention of Canadian banks, there was not much assurance that they would pay any more attention to them than they had to voluntary sanctions in the past. At any rate, it was a case of locking the stable door after the horse had bolted.

Not surprisingly, other sectors of the financial community resumed dealings with South African interests when they judged the conditions were propitious. From 1988 to 1991, Friedberg Mercantile Group in Toronto openly sold over $5 million worth of bonds issued by South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), for a return of about 15 to 16 per cent. In terms of its sanctions policy, the federal government had asked that financial relations not be undertaken with South Africa until agreement was reached on the text of a new constitution.
Federal officials did make representations to Friedberg, but the company argued that the bonds were not new issues nor were they loans, areas proscribed by the government. Friedberg purchased the bonds from dealers in London who bought them directly from South Africa. Proceeds from the initial purchase went to South African interests, while proceeds from sales on the secondary market did not. External Affairs said whether Friedberg bought the bonds directly from South Africa or from middlemen was immaterial; they contravened the spirit of sanctions. However, the voluntary nature of financial sanctions meant that Friedberg Mercantile Group could ignore the government's views without penalty. The only deterrent was the understanding that any investment firm that participated in underwriting South African debt would be removed from the list of those eligible to sell federal government issues. As Friedberg did not sell such issues, it was free to do whatever it wanted.

Canadian companies also resumed direct equity investment in South Africa well ahead of the lifting of sanctions. In March 1992, a Toronto company, Dundee Bancorp, purchased a 25 per cent interest in Johannesburg-based Knights Gold Mining, a gold dump treatment project, for about $17 million, which more than doubled total Canadian direct investment in South Africa decimated by years of disinvestment. This case slipped the attention of federal officials who, at this point, were not really looking anyway.

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When the relationships were more distant, as in the case of Canadian relations with foreign banks involved in South Africa, the government's position was even weaker. In this case, Canadian provincial governments, banks, and companies had extensive dealings with German and Swiss banks involved in major financing of South African government departments and companies. As just one example, the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) provided loans totalling Swiss francs 515 million with the South African government, the Industrial Development Corporation, ESCOM, and the South African Transport Service.66 Canadian clients of UBS included the provincial governments of Alberta, Quebec (through Hydro Quebec), Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Manitoba;67 three of the top Canadian banks (Toronto Dominion, Bank of Montreal, and Bank of Nova Scotia);6 and a range of Canadian utilities, financial institutions, and companies.69 The Ontario government excluded these German and Swiss banks from its financing, but other provinces and the federal government refused to follow suit. The federal government opposed secondary boycotts of financial institutions on the grounds that they constituted 'an unwarranted interference in the policies and practices of other countries.'70 'States and municipalities are free to engage in such boycotts,' Joe Clark explained, 'for they are not party to international obligations and commitments entered into by national governments.'71 However, with no federal government constraints, lower tiers of government mostly ignored the issue of financial sanctions.

The South African Stake in Northern Manitoba
In other areas of sanctions policy, the state used a similar approach, using narrow technical reasons to sidestep its formal commitments when the political or economic cost of sanctions seemed too high. In a second case involving MINORCO, the state bypassed its rule that the federal government should distance itself from South African companies. Once again, it chose not to recognize the nature of South African ownership and control in Anglo American's corporate empire, deciding that anything but direct ownership exempted companies from its policy.

The sanctions in question were measures (announced by Clark in September 1988) to tighten the ban on government contracts with majority South African owned companies to include grants, contributions, and sales, including government assistance under regional development programs. The company involved, Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting (HBMS), asked in 1988 for a $100 million loan package from the Manitoba and Canadian governments to help it comply

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with new environmental legislation in its copper and zinc smelter in Flin Flon. The difficulty was that HBMS was part of the Anglo American-de Beers empire. The chain of ownership began with HBMS as a wholly owned subsidiary of Inspiration Resources Corporation of New York which, in turn, was controlled (42 per cent) by MINORCO, the company controlled by Anglo American and De Beers.72

HBMS insisted that it could not afford the cost of upgrading and building smelters to comply with new mandatory government regulations requiring reduced sulphur dioxide emissions by 1994. Unless the federal and provincial authorities provided financial assistance, the company threatened to close its operations down, and, with them, the main industry of northern Manitoba.

As HBMS was one of Manitoba's ten largest companies, owning six lead and copper mines in the Flin Flon and Snow Lake area, this was no idle threat. Given that HBMS constituted less than 2 per cent of Anglo American's holdings, moreover, the potential damage was much greater to northern Manitoba than to the South African transnationals involved. The cost of closure for the Manitoba economy was about $200 million annually, five hundred jobs, and $22 million in unemployment insurance claims in the first two years after the closing.3

Alternatively, HBMS promised to spend about $300 million in the next ten years on exploration and mine development.

When the question of HBMS's South African origins had been raised hypothetically by Clark in 1985 (he had suggested that it might be possible to close HBMS to protest apartheid), the sensitivity of the issue had become immediately apparent. The mayor of Flin Flon and officials of HBMS and of the union let Clark know, in no uncertain terms, the devastating effect such a move would have, and called for his resignation. The president of HBMS launched a campaign to gain public support and to put pressure on federal politicians. Its general manager also argued that since Anglo American did not exercise its voting privileges, HBMS was not controlled by South African interests.74
At the time, Clark immediately backed off, reminding his critics that he had opposed full economic sanctions because of their cost to the Canadian private sector and to Canadian jobs.75 Howard Pawley, NDP premier of Manitoba, also made clear that he would not touch HBMS. In fact, departments of the federal and provincial government had long regarded HBMS as a trusted corporate partner. Even in the heyday of sanctions, other than Clark's 'gaffe,' the South African origins of its ownership had never been an issue. The federal Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources' Canadian Centre for Mining, Metallurgy and Energy Technology had included HBMS in a $12.5 million dollar research project on waste disposal 'as if they were Canadians.'76 In 1987, the Manitoba government also provided a $9.7 million loan to allow HBMS to buy a mine supplying Flin Flon's smelting operations.

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Given the established nature of these relationships and the high stakes in northern Manitoba, it was not surprising that the federal government found a way to exclude HBMS from its sanctions guidelines. Of the $160 million in project financing, $55 million was to be provided by the Manitoba government, $25 million by the federal government, and $80 million provisionally from the Bank of Nova Scotia."

In this case, as in the Bank of Nova Scotia loan to MINORCO, a rather narrow and technical view of transnational corporate operations helped the Canadian government to get off the hook. If Anglo American and De Beers located their subsidiary MINORCO in Luxembourg, then, for the Canadian government it had become a European not a South African company. If, as Energy, Mines, and Resources Minister Jake Epp explained, MINORCO controlled only 42 per cent of Inspiration Resources, then Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting was not primarily South African and sanctions legislation did not apply.78 This view ignored the ability of transnational companies to exercise control of subsidiaries in other countries through less than 50 per cent ownership. At any rate, the grounds for the government's attempt to circumvent sanctions were further undercut in 1991 when MINORCO bought a 100 per cent interest in HBMS and offered $20 million in interim financing for the project, conditional on the federal and Manitoba governments paying their original share.79 In the transition era in South Africa when sanctions were fading, the federal government was only too happy to help HBMS retool its factories.

As Time Goes By ... 
As the fervour for a tough policy eroded, particularly in the 1990s, considerable slippage occurred. In two sectors of sanctions - arms and tourism - a strong start was complemented by a considerable seepage of energy in later years. In a third, the soft area of people-to-people sanctions, compliance was always observed in the breach.

With the case of Space Research Corporation as a sobering precedent, the Mulroney government started with a forthright observance of the arms embargo. In 1987 the RCMP charged two companies, Lajal Scientifique and Aero Vue Canada, with infractions arising out of the arms embargo.0 They had illegally
exported high technology night vision equipment for helicopter pilots to a South African company which Canadian officials believed was a front for ARMSCOR.1 While the action seemed to usher in a scrupulous approach, the penalties were still not a strong deterrence.82 In the dying days of sanctions, moreover, officials defended a clear breach of the embargo. In theory, sanctions on sales of military or dual-purpose goods to purchasers in South Africa's military,

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police, or intelligence forces continued until after the April 1994 elections. The policy also stated that the Canadian government agreed to 'limit exports of all military goods to military end-users.' However, the policy was more bluster than substance because of the difficulty of controlling intermediary companies in other countries.

The issue of components exported through a third country had surfaced at the February 1989 meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Committee on Southern Africa. At the time, Canadian sources confirmed three cases where Montreal-based Pratt and Whitney had sold engines to foreign manufacturers of planes for sale ultimately in South Africa.13 In 1993, Pratt and Whitney was again involved in the sale of engines to a Swiss company (Pilatus Flugzeugwerke AG) with a contract to sell trainer aircraft to the South African Air Force. The sale was significant, involving sixty PC-7 trainer aircraft for U.S.$165 million.4 Certain features enabling military use (special ejector seats and six special underwing fittings to carry two 125-kilogram bombs, to mount machine guns, or to carry missile launchers) had been built into the planes at the South African government's request.5 At the time, as end user, South Africa was still ultra vires according to U.N. sanctions, and the trainer aircraft had been employed for military purposes in Burma, Iraq, and Angola. Indeed, it was the potential use of such aircraft in the South African military's continuing covert support of UNITA in Angola in the early 1990s that had provoked an international outcry.

Yet Pratt and Whitney's sale went ahead - with Ottawa's full knowledge and approval. In this view, selling the planes to South Africa was still illegal, but Switzerland's purchase of engines was not. As one official explained, the key distinction in this case was whether an item was specially designed for military specifications and not the fact that the end user was the South African armed forces.86 If the engines had gone directly to the South African Air Force, permission would have been denied. However, as the engines were classified as civilian, their export to Switzerland did not require a permit, and 'the responsibility for the sale of the completely assembled aircraft lies with the country of final assembly.' Although the Canadian government *conveyed its concern to the Swiss authorities that the proposed sale by Pilatus violates the U.N. arms embargo,* that was as far as it was prepared to go. Somewhat ingenuously, the official insisted that 'Canada continues to advocate strict observance of both the letter and spirit of the UN arms embargo.'

This approach took advantage of a major loophole in Canadian export controls, the question of ultimate destination. During the 1980s, Abdul Minty, director of
the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, had asked repeatedly that the loophole of sales of compo-

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net parts through a third-party country be closed.87 A considerable body of
opinion within the international community also opposed the sale of the aircraft
and urged suppliers not to participate. In December 1992, the U.N. Security
Council committee on the arms embargo stated that the sale would be contrary to
the spirit and intent of the restrictions, and it made two special appeals to the
Swiss government not to let Pilatus proceed. The ANC warned that it would not
be bound by contracts or assume any responsibility for agreements reached in
violation of the arms embargo." The U.S. State Department expressed strong
opposition, while the British government decided to prohibit the export of ejector
seats to Pilatus for the South African order.

However, External Affairs insisted that attempts to control the final destination of
this sale would involve extraterritorial application of the Export and Import
Permits Act which, in their view, would have no basis in international law. The
approach opened the way for violations of the embargo and this sale to the South
African Air Force just before the end of apartheid. In any case, officials had
moved with the times. By 1993, their interest was no longer in observing the arms
embargo but in putting the corporate case. 'Pratt & Whitney has had a
longstanding contractual relationship with Pilatus to supply civilian engines for a
wide range of aircraft,' the official explained. In the department's view,
regulations controlling re-exports would harm such links and foreign companies
would look elsewhere for their components. The commercial interests of Pratt and
Whitney had encouraged the resort to technicalities by the Canadian state. The
gamble was that the process in South Africa would continue to go forward.89
In the tourist sector, the Canadian government also began briskly, closing the
South African Tourist Board and also offices of South African Airways when they
blatantly ignored government policy. In 1989, six Canadian banks also dropped
Johannesburg and Cape Town as destinations for a contest when Clark said they
were in violation of Canada's voluntary ban on tourist promotion.

However, the industry remained profoundly hostile to the ban, and travel agencies
continued to promote tourism, in some cases along with the Southern Africa
Tourist Association.' While Toronto Star editorials urged a stronger sanctions
policy on the government, its travel editor expressed the industry consensus that
'travel shouldn't be a political weapon, used to punish or reward. Nor should it be
used to make moral judgments or to modify the world.'9'

In time, the government's reaction to the lack of cooperation became considerably
more subdued: it expressed its disappointment, but no longer criticized
newspapers advertising tours to South Africa. When the board of the Alliance of
Canadian Travel Associations arranged to meet in South Africa in November
1990 at the invitation of the South African Tourist Board, all that External

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Affairs required was that ACTA should not promote South Africa when they returned home. With the lifting of people-to-people sanctions at the Harare Commonwealth conference in October 1991, travel between the two countries resumed at a heightened pace. In early 1992, South African Airways reopened its offices, with the South African Tourist Board following suit. Articles promoting tourism in South Africa reappeared in Canadian newspapers.

Although the government's approach to tourism had started well, other 'people-to-people' sanctions had never been taken seriously. In October 1986, it fudged its commitment at Nassau to discourage all scientific cooperation with South Africa when representatives of South African Transport Services, a South African government parastatal, participated in an international Heavy Haul Railway Conference in Vancouver. The government seemed to have been caught off guard, and Clark admitted that it was 'a technical breach' of sanctions.

On three occasions in 1988, South Africans were included in officially sponsored conferences - on tourism, on international financial leasing, and on water. At the first in October in Vancouver, the federal government actually sponsored a conference that included a session on tourist development in South Africa. At the second, an External Affairs spokesman conceded that the government was sidestepping its own rules, but he argued that South Africa was 'a valuable member of an organization which works on the principle of universality.'

However, at the International Water Association Conference opened in Ottawa by the president of CIDA, three of the six South Africa delegates were invited from Pretoria's Department of Water Affairs. The following year, the government also allowed South African attendance at ARMEX, an international conference on arms exports in Ottawa, at which the Department of National Defence participated and had a booth. Clearly, some slippage was apparent on even the softest sanctions.

In sum, the approach adopted by the Canadian state towards sanctions was less the rigorous enforcement of rules in the spirit in which they were originally conceived, than a narrow, technical reading of regulations to minimize damage to specific interests. However much the rhetoric in support of sanctions stayed firm and self-congratulatory, the details of implementation reflected the power of antagonistic forces within the institutions of government and broader civil society. Had the Canadian government been serious about sanctions, it would have banned all imports from South Africa; stopped exports of Canadian sulphur; introduced legislation to make Canadian companies chartering ships responsible for observing sanctions; interpreted existing sanctions more stringently, particularly where they applied to South African transnational corporations; and made voluntary sanctions mandatory, particularly in the financial sector.

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That such measures never became a serious option reflected the consensus in the West that the first strong wave of sanctions in the mid-1980s was enough. A few sanctions followed, but none that compared with the initial round. While the Mulroney government wanted to be part of the international effort and even to claim leadership, the record showed that domestic considerations prevented more
than half-hearted gestures. Except for the odd occasion when the leakiness of
sanctions came to public view, the state was able to get away with claiming far
more for its policy than it ever merited.

Strategic Assistance in South Africa
A major escalation of Canadian assistance inside South Africa served as a second
central instrument to buttress the government's South Africa policy, particularly
when leaky sanctions became an issue. For many, this program became as
important as sanctions in defining Canada's anti-apartheid policy. At the least, it
was an important complement, both in terms of its growth and its quality.
Canadian assistance for South Africa increased dramatically from about $2
million in Mulroney's first year in office to about $18 million in 1992-3.
Throughout his tenure, it amounted to over $81 million as compared with only $7
million for all previous Liberal governments.9° Canadian assistance for the rest of
the region added another $1.5 billion.99

The program in South Africa evolved through three stages: the first involved
support for anti-apartheid groups in the 1980s; the second assisted the transition to
a post-apartheid future in the 1990s, and the third involved special help for the
first non-racial elections in April 1994. Some programs overlapped all three
periods, notably major assistance to education and smaller programs in
community development, small-scale agriculture, water, and health.

In the 1980s, the aggressiveness of the government's general policy towards South
Africa was reflected in a program, administered through the Canadian embassy in
Pretoria, that provided small grants to assist the anti-apartheid struggle inside
South Africa.'° A second major program (about $7 million) offered support for
dialogue and reconciliation.'0' Assistance was granted for the defence of political
prisoners and their families (over $2 million annually) and to counter South
African propaganda and censorship (about $1 million).

These various initiatives supported a range of social institutions under attack from
the apartheid state, especially the alternative press. As one example, Canadian
financial assistance kept Vrye Weekblad (the outspoken anti-apartheid Afrikaans
weekly) afloat at a time when it broke the story of state-linked death squads.'m

Funds were also provided to train black journalists and to provide equipment for
such publications as the New Nation and Saamstaan,

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vehicles for black community opinion and targets for harassment by the apartheid
state. The Canadian embassy also publicly supported the New Nation when the
government tried to close it. Within Canada, the government sponsored a
conference on ways to counter South African propaganda for South African and
Canadian journalists.

When Khotso House, a facility for church groups and other NGOs in
Johannesburg, was bombed in 1988, the Canadian embassy immediately offered
$100,000 to support reconstruction. Support was given to the Rustenburg
Congress of Churches where Dutch Reform churches admitted to black colleagues
their guilt for having supported apartheid. Grants were also given for conferences,
research, professional institutes, human rights groups, church, youth and women's
organizations, and community and cultural associations preparing for a non-apartheid future.

A second major thrust of the aid program was a substantial commitment to educational assistance. Initially, World University Service of Canada implemented a $1.5 million five-year program of scholarships for undergraduate study primarily in South Africa. From 1977 on, the Coady International Institute also worked closely with the Self-Help Associates for Development Economics (SHADE) in a range of training programs.

Educational assistance was united in an expanded initiative (funds of $23 million) under the Canadian Education Programme for South Africa (CEPSA) in 1985. Under the aegis of CEPSA and through the Canada Education Fund (CEF), the Canadian embassy in Pretoria offered assistance to community-based and adult education, teacher upgrading, and bursaries, in part to provide academic-bridging support for black university students. The Canadian Labour Congress and the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux supported labour education. A program of academic scholarships and technical training for students in Canada was administered by the Southern Africa Education Trust Fund.

In 1986, CIDA also established a special development fund for NGOs and churches working at the community level and initiated a program to help the black private sector. Oxfam Canada, for example, offered support for civics, trade unions, township planning, and squatter camps. Canadian churches supported projects unilaterally and through the Inter-Church Fund for International Development (ICFID), the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the YWCA, and World Vision of Canada. On Joe Clark's suggestion, CIDA's Industrial Cooperation division provided $1.1 million to the Canadian Exporters' Association for the Canadian Assistance to Black Business in South Africa (CABBSA) project, to make South African business consultants available to assist black entrepreneurs.

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In the 1990s Canadian assistance changed direction to support the larger processes of transition to a post-apartheid South Africa, especially high level human resource development. The emphasis was on preparing black South Africans for future work in government and the private sector. Funding was provided to help constitutional negotiators and to prepare strategies for the restructuring of the education sector.

In this period, the Trust Fund was instrumental in encouraging the Commonwealth to coordinate human resource development assistance through the Skills for South Africa Network. The Commonwealth initiative expanded Trust Fund activities into new programs of training and institution building from restructuring public broadcasting to reforming the police force. Eminent South Africans were given tours of Canada. The Trust Fund also established a legal and constitutional commission to support organizations negotiating with the South African government and supported public sector training.

Programs coordinated through the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) undertook major surveys of South African needs and capabilities in
macro-economic analysis and policy formulation, public administration at national and local levels, urban planning, science and technology, the environment, and information. A special emphasis was placed on gender equity through the increased participation of women. One of the most imaginative programs brought four ANC premiers of South African provinces to Canada to observe the offices of Canadian premiers. Finally, Canadians were directly involved in the international effort to help prepare South Africans for the first non-racial elections in April 1994 through voter education campaigns and election monitoring. Retired RCMP officers took part in a Commonwealth initiative to monitor the violence in Natal. The Canadian government initially offered $2.5 million for voter education and Canadian election observers.

Canadian Assistance in Perspective

In assessing assistance during the Mulroney years, each phase needs to be dealt with separately. In the early years, much of the assistance, though often in the form of small grants, was dramatic and timely. It was complemented by highprofile diplomatic support at anti-apartheid events, including attendance by Canadian diplomats at trials, church services, and almost every major black funeral and anti-apartheid demonstration. Indeed, Canadian officials defended keeping the Canadian embassy open as a source of comfort, information, and funds for the South African anti-apartheid movement. As Ron MacLean, Canadian ambassador to South Africa,

280 Mulroney, the Commonwealth, and Sanctions explained, it was important to let South Africans know 'that the international community was there, was prepared to do what it could to help.' Not surprisingly, the South African government's response was to threaten to restrict the movement of Western diplomats on the grounds that they were furthering extra-parliamentary politics and to limit foreign funding of South African NGOs, churches, and other anti-apartheid groups. The approach adopted by the Canadian embassy was warmly appreciated by the anti-apartheid community in South Africa. In their willingness to express direct solidarity, Canadian diplomats departed dramatically not only from the norm of earlier periods but also from diplomatic etiquette in the context of full relations with the apartheid state. However, aspects of the overall aid initiative were greeted with mixed feelings in southern Africa. It was feared that Western governments were using assistance as a soft option to muffle the lull in action against the apartheid state in the late 1980s.

No one questioned the critical importance of the projects supported by Canadian assistance, but there was concern that aid would misdirect attention from the larger issue of ending apartheid. On a visit to Canada in October 1989, for example, Frank Chikane, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, said that talk about scholarships in exchange for sanctions was an insult. 'Educating us,' he pointed out 'just makes us educated oppressed blacks ... We do need education, but that you've educated us doesn't make us free ... We
need funding for getting rid of the system. That's the key, not funding for survival within the system.'

There was also scepticism about the way in which individual scholarships from foreign donors complemented the South African government's efforts to win the hearts and minds' of black South African activists. As a student from the University of Zululand noted in 1986, 'One effect of going to university is that you tend to stop thinking about the struggle. You start thinking about your degree, about enjoying your life and becoming a member of the so-called middle class. That takes from you, as a person of struggle, a feeling of militancy. You start to suffer peacefully.' As Tom Sebina, a senior ANC official, pointed out, the education system had not changed 'and the kids are still being educated in a system they reject.'

Moreover, the lack of assistance to the liberation movements struck an apolitical note in a very polarized situation. The initial terms of reference CIDA gave to the Trust Fund, for example, specifically excluded from scholarships students who were members of the liberation movements. Only internal South African candidates were eligible to apply. There was nothing directly either for the United Democratic Front or the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM),

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the umbrella groups that coordinated broad-based opposition to the apartheid regime in the 1980s.121

In this context, programs of assistance to the black private sector seemed an odd priority, particularly as they coincided with the apartheid government's own strategy of creating a black capitalist class as a buffer for white rule. In any case, grants to small black businesses did not alter the balance of power in the country. As Sebina pointed out, black-owned businesses accounted for only 1 per cent of the GDP, and black entrepreneurs were too few and too dependent on the state bureaucracy to constitute an effective force against apartheid.

Therefore, the concern in South Africa about assistance as a soft option was genuine. The top priority for most of South Africa's black leadership was stronger, more comprehensive mandatory sanctions and, for many, direct assistance for South African liberation movements in exile.

In Canada, some of the same misgivings were expressed about the government's programs to combat censorship and propaganda. The conference to bring Canadian and South African journalists together in 1989, for example, was attacked by Michael Valpy, former Africa and Middle East bureau chief for the Globe and Mail. He argued that this initiative was simply part of Ottawa's attempt to deflect attention away from its derelict performance on sanctions.22

During the transition period that followed the sea changes of 1990, the assumption guiding CIDA's programs was that negotiations would go forward to a successful conclusion and the ANC would emerge victorious in the first nonracial elections. While the first proposition was an article of faith during a very turbulent period, the second marked a definite change in official policy. After years of refusing to support the ANC, Canadian programs were now involved in training the main political force that would take South Africa into a post-apartheid future.
23 As Al Johnson, one of the Canadians involved in the process explained, the National party had already had experience in government, and senior officials agreed with him that training ANC officials had priority. The IFP, at 10 per cent of public support, was considered too small to merit special attention. This shift did not pass without critical comment. Some were disturbed by the focus on the ANC and argued that Canadian assistance should be impartial, including, on equal terms, the PAC, AZAPO, Inkatha, and the liberal white community in South Africa.24 Others argued that assistance should go less to preparing black South Africans for senior positions in the state and more to trade unions, civic organizations, community associations, and other groups crucial for democratization and the creation of a strong civil society.25

Given the lack of experience and skills within the black leadership in South Africa and the accurate political intelligence about the ANC as the overwhelming choice of South Africans, Canadian assistance was taking shortcuts, but for good reason. The issue of adequate assistance for civil society, on the other hand, will remain a hardy perennial.

Therefore, in assessing Canadian assistance to South Africa, a very mixed picture emerges. Much that was offered was dramatic and timely. Indeed, the claims for it are strongest in terms of its strategic importance. Assistance was given in solidarity with the anti-apartheid movement and to embattled countries in the region. The performance of the Canadian embassy will always remain impressive; much of the assistance to education, to supporting negotiations in the transition, and to helping the new government move forward reflected the positive side of Canadian involvement in the struggle to end apartheid and to launch the new government.

However, other factors qualify this conclusion. In terms of scale, the program was relatively small in size; the average annual disbursement of Canadian aid to South Africa in the Mulroney years amounted to only about $9 million as compared with the average annual two-way trade of $320 million. Compared with other countries, Canadian assistance was modest, part of the pack but certainly not its leader. In 1990, for example, it amounted to about $12 million; as compared with assistance from Sweden of $17 million, the European Union of $28 million, and the United States of about $35 million.26 During the 1980s, the Norwegian government supported groups inside South Africa, including the ANC and other black parties, with about $300 million. The Swedish government provided $400 million in humanitarian assistance to anti-apartheid activists, primarily the ANC, between the mid-1970s and the early-1990s.127 By contrast, Canadian assistance for the entire period of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments was about one-third to one-quarter of the Nordics, about $90 million, with very little going to the ANC until the 1990s.

Even more, the context for Canadian assistance remains an important part of any assessment. When Western governments paused in the sanctions campaign and international banks and corporations gave South Africa a breathing space on debt refinancing, the Canadian government did not resist the tide. Indeed, it went with
the flow and, as we have seen, actively stalled further Commonwealth sanctions. In this light there was a public relations tinge to the highprofile assistance and diplomatic support given to groups inside South Africa in the late 1980s. It definitely did sweeten the pill. Once conditions changed in 1990, assistance inside South Africa kept the Canadian profile high and ensured that Canadians were well positioned to take advantage of the post-apartheid denouement. Canada was poised, as the cliché goes, to do well by having done good.

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Mandela was a welcome reminder that injustice has its long and hurtful say, but never the last word.'

As South Africa's government of national unity grapples with reconstruction, attention in Canada and the world has necessarily moved on from the long struggle to end apartheid. Relations are now on a more 'normal' footing since the days of diplomatic deep-freeze and sanctions. Yet although change in South Africa has been fundamental and, indeed on some levels, revolutionary, the legacy of the past weighs heavily on the future. Similarly, aspects of the Canadian role in bringing apartheid to an end have a bearing on the nature of the new relationship.

Although this study has traced the highly ambiguous record of a series of Liberal and Conservative governments, it is not surprising that the public memory retains a vision unclouded by its murkier aspects. A mythology of Canadian involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle asserts not only that Canadians led the way but also that their motives were highly principled.2 As Ronald MacLean, a former Canadian ambassador to South Africa, put it, this role was 'based ... not on calculation of national interest, trade interests, or indeed political interests, or geopolitical interests in a stable society, but fundamentally on a moral conviction that what was going on in South Africa was wrong and we had a moral duty to put our weight, inadequate as it might be, on the side of change.'3

As we have seen, the record was always more mixed and the contribution more nuanced than the official hagiography would have it. Although Prime Minister John Diefenbaker did not side with the other white dominions in supporting South Africa's continued membership in the Commonwealth in

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1960-1, he was a reluctant convert to the opposition, regretting to the end that some compromise, even a few token seats for non-whites in Parliament, could not save the day. He also made it clear that this was as far as he was prepared to go: he would not countenance any hindrance to bilateral trade or diplomatic relations with South Africa and opposed Canadian sanctions against Rhodesia. Nor would he accept his own party's opposition to the resumption of British arms sales to South Africa. Diefenbaker felt Cold War issues were more important than the battle against apartheid.

The policy of Prime Minister Lester Pearson was fundamentally flawed by his support for British policy on Rhodesia. While Pearson's legendary mediating skills helped to keep the Commonwealth intact, the terms on which unity was
achieved did a disservice to the interests of its black population. The choice of economic sanctions over prompt military action prolonged the war in Rhodesia; British companies ignored sanctions with the knowledge and full complicity of the British government. The Canadian government did not show much interest in monitoring economic relations either.

In retrospect, the record of Pierre Trudeau's government is the most puzzling: it offered surprisingly little for black South Africans. In the early period of his tenure, Trudeau recognized the inconsistency of existing Canadian policy: 'We should either stop trading or stop condemning,' he said. Yet his policy continued to do both. This was the era when Western governments endlessly expressed their abhorrence of apartheid, while refusing to put significant economic or diplomatic pressure on the South African regime. Defended as a policy of 'balance,' the approach was to give something in theory to questions of social justice and human rights and a lot in practice to the Canadian corporate sector. Even after the Soweto riots, Trudeau was adamant: 'As far as the private sector is concerned,' he said, 'we will not interfere in trade nor investment.'

Indeed, beyond reiterating the basic formula of the 1970 White Paper, Trudeau rarely focused on apartheid, responding with impatience to those who urged a stronger policy. On the one occasion where South Africa fully occupied his attention, at the Commonwealth conference in Singapore in 1971, he slipped into Pearson's role as a 'helpful fixer' with much the same results: Commonwealth unity was preserved, everyone saved face, but, in other respects, African interests were not advanced. While agreement on a declaration of human rights helped prevent a mass exodus over British arms sales to South Africa, it was a weak compromise in a bleak era.

Two years later in Ottawa, Trudeau's lukewarm support for humanitarian assistance to southern African liberation movements at the next Commonwealth conference indicated quite clearly the limits of Canadian policy. For the rest of his tenure, southern African issues were regarded as peripheral to Canadian interests and the views of black southern Africans leading the liberation struggle were largely discounted.

Indeed, the contrasts within the Trudeau era provide a central paradox in this study: on the one hand, Trudeau's interest in the issue of apartheid began early and lasted into his retirement. His liberal internationalist image encouraged African leaders to expect a great deal from him in the struggle for majority rule in South Africa.

Yet, with the exception of a few token reforms in 1977 and sports sanctions, his government's record was undistinguished, considerably less than that of the Nordic countries. It was on Trudeau's watch that Space Research Corporation provided the basis for a South African arms export industry. In this case, Canadian military technology and the new artillery system strengthened the apartheid regime at home and in its genocidal campaign of destabilization in the region. The economic involvement of Canadian banks, investors, and traders
increased throughout this period with the full knowledge and approval of the Canadian state.
One explanation for the weakness of this record is simply to assert that Trudeau was a shallow dilettante in foreign affairs. Take, for example, Stephen Lewis's assessment that 'foreign policy in the Trudeau era reflected [Pierre] Trudeau. It was quixotic and personal and lasted only as long as his passion for it was sustained, and then it frittered away.'" However this study has tried to deepen such analyses by examining the domestic and external forces that shaped the context within which the Trudeau administration operated. Central to the approach was the Western consensus that the demise of white power in South Africa and the region was unlikely; hence the unwillingness to offer more than token gestures.
Trudeau's irritation at those who pushed for a stronger policy emerged, it seems, from the conviction that they were unrealistic, that nothing further could be done, and that his energies would be better used in other areas.
At the one point where the consensus was shaken by the Soweto riots, forces committed to the status quo overruled the movement for reform. Neither Trudeau nor other leaders within the Western community seized upon this conjuncture to turn the tide against the regime. The time was not ripe and the wave of resistance faltered.
Therefore, there is a powerful case for asserting that, in the Trudeau era, the factors that conditioned Canadian policy towards South Africa were primarily structural: at the international level, the interests of larger Western powers, primarily Britain and the United States predominated, tinged as they were with their support of South Africa as a Cold War ally. Complementing these forces were Western banks and corporations which, at this point, weathered each

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phase of anti-apartheid protest and then resumed business with renewed enthusiasm. At the domestic level in Canada, powerful forces within the Canadian state and private sector opposed interference with normal diplomatic and economic relations on ideological, political, and economic grounds. As we have seen, these forces became more powerful once the Canadian economy entered a downturn in the early 1980s.
Until Brian Mulroney came to power, then, official policy was prompted less by a steady and principled opposition to the horrors of apartheid than by a structured response to competing domestic forces, by ideology, and by a desire to stay roughly within a certain band of Western reactions to the cycles of resistance and repression which occurred periodically in South Africa. While prime ministers from Diefenbaker to Trudeau refused to side with Britain and Australia on the South African issue in the Commonwealth, they did little else to support the anti-apartheid cause.
By comparison, Prime Minister Mulroney assumed office at a time of dramatic change. A major uprising in South Africa signalled that, contrary to Western assessments, the apartheid regime was vulnerable, and Western banks and companies began their exodus. The international climate of opinion had begun to harden against white minority rule, and Western governments finally responded to
the brutality of the South African regime with sanctions. This is not to underplay
the element of passionate conviction in Mulroney's approach, but simply to argue
that he was in the right place at the right time.
Thus, one of the principal ironies of this study centres around the paradox that a
neo-conservative government in Canada took measures, including economic
sanctions, which contradicted its general commitment towards free trade. Another
paradox is that, for a few years in the mid-1980s, Mulroney adopted a role on this
issue within the Commonwealth and G-7 that put him at odds with his allies,
especially Reagan and Thatcher. Finally, although the Liberal administration in
the Trudeau era cultivated an image of liberal internationalism, there is no
question that, on this issue, Mulroney's government did far more. While lacking
Trudeau's sophistication, Mulroney, nevertheless, possessed the 'gut' commitment
to fight for stronger measures and to face down critics at home and abroad.
A further irony is that, although Mulroney will be remembered for the strength of
his government's policy on South Africa, its tenure was very brief - a matter of
about two years - before it ground to a halt. Indeed, the stall in Canadian policy on
South Africa from 1987 to 1989 reflected a wider international pause, with the
great powers unwilling to sustain the concerted action of the mid-1980s once the
South African state reasserted control. It also reflected the
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growing opposition within Canada, as forces within civil society, the state, and
the Conservative Cabinet, caucus, and party, aided by the South African embassy,
regrouped in determined opposition to the policy. Although they had been
overruled temporarily when Mulroney rode high on the tide of international action
in the mid-1980s, such interests acted to stall policy once conditions changed. The
doldrums into which Canadian policy fell in the late 1980s began to tarnish the
sparkling reputation earned a few years earlier.
With Mulroney absorbed by domestic issues in this period, southern African
matters came on to the agenda primarily during Commonwealth meetings. To the
end, he could bask in the praise of African leaders who generally chose not to
notice how limited the policy had become. As the years went on, his claims for
Canadian policy became more extravagant, the reality increasingly tawdry. The
contradictions represented in the Conservative government's fading policy began
to pose a significant threat to its self-image and to open the way for major
embarrassment.
The situation was saved at this conjuncture by the dramatic changes in South
Africa which ushered in an end to apartheid. Following Nelson Mandela's release
from prison and the reforms introduced by de Klerk in 1990, the weight of
opinion within the Canadian state and private sector changed to dispensing with
sanctions, the sooner the better.
Yet, despite this consensus, the government stayed the course, and Canada was
one of the last countries to lift sanctions. The difficulty lay in the prominent role
that the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs had assumed as chair of the
Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. Although
Canadian diplomats had proposed this committee as a means to defuse the drive
for additional sanctions, they could not break ranks later without a tremendous loss of face. Therefore, despite considerable impatience, the Tory government did the honourable thing: the state did not end sanctions until requested to do so by Mandela in September 1993.

Pro-sanctions forces within the state, aided by an uncritical press, have largely ignored the shortcomings in Mulroney's policy and have built a legend around its successes. In doing so, they have fallen prey to a self-congratulatory tradition in Canadian foreign policy, reiterating, against all the evidence, that 'Canada led the way' and that Canadian policy on South Africa was 'just right.'

Yet a closer reading will show that, while the Mulroney government's policy had its moments, it also had its weaknesses, compromises, and ambiguities. The record of earlier administrations was even thinner: despite the muchlauded performances of Diefenbaker and Trudeau in the Commonwealth, nei-

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...
competing sections of the state to improve their leverage in the policy process, but
the content of foreign policy will not be greatly affected. I
As the state's primary relationship is held to be with external actors, some have
even argued that domestic involvement in foreign policy is inappropriate. 'It
would help enormously if diplomats and citizens would learn to respect

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each other's legitimate functions,' John Holmes stated, 'because they are distinct.'
12 Where the general public was to be involved, it was to be as onlookers to
debates among those at the top. For Holmes, 'Rationality ... requires for the
general public the spectacle, and for the intellectual elite the practice, of lucid
debate.'3
The concentration on external relationships has gone hand in hand with the use,
by a considerable number of Canadian foreign policy analysts,4 of middlepower
theory5 as a central explanatory concept of Canadian foreign policy.6 Thus,
studies provide a rank ordering of Canada as a state compared with the other few
'great' powers and the myriad 'lesser' ones.7 As John Holmes put it, 'Canadians
were of greater consequence than the Panamanians but could not take on the
obligations of the Americans, or even the French.'
Associated with this notion is the view that the status of middle power gives
Canadian governments freedom and flexibility to act as mediators, consensus and
coalition builders, peacekeepers, or 'helpful fixers.' As Barbara Ward suggested,
'The superpowers are too vast, too unwieldy, too locked in their own
responsibilities. The great mass of new states are too poor and too shaky. It is the
middle powers ... who occupy about the right position on the scale of
influence.'19 Though abandoned officially in the 1970 White Paper on foreign
policy,20 this functional approach continues to resonate in the literature and in the
oft-stated conviction by policy makers that, in playing 'a useful international role'
as a middle power,21 Canada *can make a difference.'22
The strength of this view lies in the experience of Canadian leaders in smaller
international organizations like the Commonwealth or la Francophonie where a
non-colonial past and relative prominence have given Canadian governments
some sway. Memories of the 'golden age' of postwar diplomacy and the
ubiquitous participation of Canadians in U.N. peacekeeping missions have
strengthened this perception of influence and role.
The weaknesses of middle-power theory revolve around its ahistorical nature and
its weak explanatory power. On the first point, middle-power theory assumes
away the very real impact of bilateral and global alliances on Canadian policies,
particularly during the Cold War period.23 As Mark Neufeld pointed out, 'In its
original formulation, the regulative ideal of "middle power" was framed in terms
of dominant class interests and in tune with a hegemonic global order.'24
As often as not, the Canadian state operated less as a neutral mediator than as a
surrogate, helping to promote the core concerns of the great Western powers and
to secure a domestic consensus that supported extensive involvement in the
maintenance of the postwar order.5 As Holmes himself noted, U.S. intolerance of
Canadian criticism of the American role in the Vietnam War in the 1960s graphically demonstrated the illusory nature of middle-power theory.26

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In the case of South Africa, the approach taken by the great powers had a powerful influence in limiting Canadian policy and, ultimately, in halting the impetus behind change.

In a second significant way, the concept of Canada as a middle power does not bear the weight that has been placed upon it. Like any snapshot of ranking, the 'theory' provides little to explain how 'middleness' translates into the dynamics of state action - what prompted who to do what, where, and when. While it provides criteria for differentiating states at a certain point, it offers no sense of the origin, nature, or direction of forces which make the sources of national power active. It remains a static and ahistorical tool of analysis.

Although John Holmes was one of the main exponents of the concept of Canada as a middle power, he recognized that middle-power status was both 'fleeting and intangible' and its concept ambiguous.27 Canada's position, he wrote, was 'something less than a major and something more than a minor power.'28 However, he conceded that 'the more one tries to define middle-powermanship, the more difficult and perhaps pretentious it appears to do so at all.'29 In fact, the concept obscures more than it clarifies. Its utility lies primarily in the realm of discourse where it helped contribute to the longevity of certain beliefs. Many who were involved in policy formulation sincerely believed that Canadian foreign policy was 'selfless' and that the Canadian government was uniquely situated to take a leadership role.30 The power of this perception, however self-serving (the perennial 'vanity factor' in Canadian foreign policy), cannot be entirely discounted in its effect on policy and practice. In other respects, it remains one of the great mythologies of the traditional literature on Canadian foreign policy.

The difficulties with middle-power theory are also related to the central assumptions of mainstream Canadian foreign policy analysis discussed above principally, the proposition that foreign policy is the preserve of actors in the state dealing with the external environment. In both cases, 'Canada' is not deconstructed and the state is seen as a reified, unified, rational actor with interests and expertise that entitle it to fairly exclusive control over foreign policy.

A Political Economy of Foreign Policy
By contrast, this study shows that the political economy tradition offers a rich theoretical alternative, combining dynamic, materialist and historical analysis.3' Central to this perspective is the insight that an adequate understanding of Canadian foreign policy must go beyond relations between the state and external actors to include relations between the state and civil society. To separate the state from the varied and contradictory influences of civil society

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is to bypass a full understanding of what happened and why. Indeed, without this level of analysis, it is difficult to grasp adequately the origins and trajectory of policy on this issue and indeed on many others. Canadian policy on South Africa emerged with much stronger roots in civil society than simply an intra-elite debate. The state served as an arena for struggles not only among its own institutions but also for contending forces within civil society. Its role was to establish and re-establish a shifting equilibrium of compromises.

A political economy approach departs from the existing literature on Canadian foreign policy in a second way in its understanding of the power relations implicit in state-society relations. While it may not dominate the field, a literature on the influence of domestic forces in Canadian foreign policy has grown, especially in the 1980s. However, much of it has operated within pluralist assumptions of state-society relations. By contrast, this study has shown very clearly that the environment of state-civil society relations for policy making was not neutral. Some domestic interests were served more directly than others in the evolution of Canada's policy on South Africa. Power relationships within civil society were reflected both in the political process, particularly in struggles within the state, and in the outcomes in state policy.

Struggles over Meaning
Part of that process was a battle over interpretations of events in South Africa and appropriate Canadian responses to them. As we have seen, the official approach which resulted in the policy of 'balance' was vigorously contested by groups within civil society who argued for a much stronger anti-apartheid policy. Yet until the Mulroney era, the ideas underlying Canada's official discourse on South Africa ruled as a virtual orthodoxy. Until parts of the 'script' changed, policy reform was virtually impossible. Indeed, until Mulroney came to power, the ideas and concepts gained a power of their own which transcended objective reality, becoming 'hyper-real.' The 'accepted discourse' reflected the concrete political project of agents within the state and civil society. The discourse of opposition was sited primarily within sections of civil society.

The Structured Representation of Interests
Thus the form of discourse became the language of power, just as structured alliances within the state and civil society served as its basis. Specific material interests and links between the state and the private sector constituted a second key element in understanding Canada's South Africa policy. Barring moments of crisis and change, the state routinely oriented its policies to serve the direct short-term interests of banks, other financial institutions, and corporations with direct and indirect investments in South Africa. This seemed to be less a conscious act than a product of ideological predispositions which had hardened into a fixed discourse, structured inequalities within the state, and inertia, as a tradition of serving such interests became definitional with the national interest. These patterns and relationships were fundamental in establishing and maintaining the determined opposition to sanctions within the state. They
underlay the long reign of the policy of 'balance,' the emasculation of the 1977 reforms, the significant limitations to the sanctions that were adopted, the stalling on new sanctions in the late 1980s, and the pressure to have sanctions removed early in the 1990s. Such forces operated in three distinct spheres - inside the state, in relations between the state and the private sector and their representatives, and in relations between the state and a range of other organizations within civil society.

The most hidden of these structured relations existed inside the Canadian state, providing a subtle channel for control quite separate from the influence of external pressure groups which directly lobbied state officials. In this case, the institutional commitment to policy on South Africa was coordinated by the Department of External Affairs (now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), but it operated within a consensus shared by the Department of Finance and the former Department of Industry Trade and Commerce (ITC). The incorporation of ITC into External Affairs in 1982 strengthened the importance of economic self-interest in the framing of foreign policy. While other forces within the state, in lower levels of External Affairs and within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), challenged the dominant approach, they were not sufficiently strong on their own to reverse policy.

As we have seen, the Department of Finance brushed aside anti-apartheid considerations in its support for a number of policy initiatives which strengthened economic relations with South Africa. In the 1980s, successive finance ministers defended their backing of South Africa's overtly political bid for loans from the International Monetary Fund. Earlier, it had served Finance's purposes to see that Commonwealth preferences in Canada's trade with South Africa were maintained as a bargaining chip in the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations. Finance also lobbied against the removal of a double taxation agreement that helped Canadian companies operating in Namibia.

The former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce was also central in the defence and promotion of economic relations with South Africa. ITC

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battled successfully to emasculate the first timid attempt at reform of Canadian policy after the Soweto riots, leaving economic relations with South Africa virtually intact. A series of ITC ministers also argued against abrogation of Commonwealth preferences in trade with South Africa as long as the Canadian sugar industry wanted them. In the 1980s when sanctions came, these same forces (now under the institutional umbrella of External Affairs) worked closely with the private sector to ensure that sanctions were limited and largely voluntary.

A network of senior officials in ITC, Defence and External Affairs also showed a remarkable disinterest in the rules of the arms embargo and procedures for its implementation. They ignored and discounted hard evidence in the late 1970s of a significant breach of the rules by Space Research Corporation, and South Africa ended up with the world's most advanced artillery system. Exports of dubious dual-purpose items were allowed through for much of the period under study.
Government agencies such as the Export Development Corporation and, in an earlier period, the long defunct Canada Development Corporation provided additional sites to structure the close connection between the Canadian state and the corporate world on South Africa. They operated with strong representation of the private sector on their boards of directors. While the EDC’s board was split roughly in half between the private sector and senior civil servants from the departments of Finance, ITC, and External Affairs; nineteen of twenty-one members of the CDC board (including the chairman and chief executive officer) came from the private sector.39

A second factor that strengthened the instrumentalist side of Canadian policy was the direct relationship of private corporations from outside the state. Most of these corporations, banks, and underwriters were located in Canada's industrial heartland, in Ontario and Quebec. They operated through organizations like the Canadian Manufacturers Association and the Canadian Exporters' Association to see that the Canadian state continued to represent their interests, particularly in maintaining open economic relations with South Africa. Their power was demonstrated in their ability to gain exemptions from state sanctions for steel producers.40 Although the Commonwealth agreement included a ban on steel imports from South Africa, ingredients for specialty steel, especially ferrochromium, constituted the main Canadian import from South Africa in the sanctions period.

Western Canadian sulphur interests were also able to fend off sanctions for their industry, even though Canadian sulphur exports were the one clear case where sanctions would have made a difference. South African importers were

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dependent on Canadian supplies, and Canadian companies had alternative markets. However, with strong links to Conservative provincial governments, sulphur interests in British Columbia and Alberta and companies like Shell were able to continue their trade unhindered throughout the sanctions period.

A complex network of corporate relations ensured that pressure was exerted not only from the private sector in Canada but also from their allies in the United States, Britain, and South Africa.41 A small but powerful group of transnationals together with a slightly greater number of Canadian investors and exporters had a strategic importance out of all proportion to their aggregate size.

Indeed, it was the small size of Canada's economic stake which encouraged some observers4 to discount entirely the importance of economic factors in Canada's official approach to South Africa. Yet these factors constitute a vital part of the explanation both in this concentrated pattern of corporate investment and in the relationship of the private sector to the state at both provincial and federal levels.

Such corporate views found an echo within other sections of civil society, and these were courted by representatives of the South African embassy. For example, the elite Canadian South African Society worked closely with the embassy. A right-wing church group, the Confederation of Church and Business People, was formed in the 1970s to oppose the church lobby for sanctions. However, elsewhere within Canadian civil society, opposition to apartheid and support for
sanctions was more typical, especially in the media, churches, trade unions, universities, non-governmental organizations, and the anti-apartheid movement. Actions from civil society on this issue tended to be sporadic, emerging in response to events in South Africa itself - the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, strikes in Durban in 1973, the Soweto riots in 1976, and the Vaal uprising from 1984 to 1986. In these moments, the media was central in developing a counterconsensus to official policy, particularly in the period of the Vaal riots. Its power was to create a public constituency for stronger action against South Africa which eventually outstripped the interest of the Canadian government in doing more.

Within Canadian civil society, then, considerable opposition to apartheid kept the issue of Canada's involvement in South Africa alive. However, for many years, it constituted more of an irritant, a prod to guilty consciences than a constituency with real power. The consensus forged between sections of the state, the private sector, and other parts of civil society remained the key internal forces structuring Canadian policy on South Africa until 1985.

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Structuring Interests - the External Dimension

Feeding into this internal debate, external forces, especially within the Commonwealth and the larger Western alliance, provided a key context for the determination of policy. Until the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, Canadian perceptions were directly influenced by Cold War competition in the region. Membership in NATO strengthened relations with South Africa and placed the Canadian government in formal partnership with Portugal during its colonial wars in southern Africa.

Yet the Commonwealth was the central association in which Canadian leaders worked most closely to develop their approach to South Africa.43 This focus was conscious and explicit: in Joe Clark's words, 'Canada has chosen deliberately to base our policy against apartheid on the Commonwealth connection.' Partly, there were opportunities for prominence in the Commonwealth (and, to a lesser extent in meetings of la Francophonie), which were not possible in meetings of the G-7.1 These alliances, Joe Clark explained, 'allow us to exercise a status that is virtually unique to Canada - as a developed country, without colonial antecedents or ambitions, trusted by the developing world ... We are a unique country in the world, and ought to build on all our assets.46 [Also] Canada ... has more real influence in the Commonwealth than in many other agencies.'47 Put more crudely by Stuart Beattie, an External Affairs official, the Commonwealth was 'a place in which we strut. It's a forum in which we are big boys and in which the U.S. is not present.'48 In the Commonwealth, said another, 'We have the muscle and we like to use it.'49

At the same time, the net effect of Canadian relations with the Commonwealth was more complex than suggested here. Once the larger Western powers stopped further action on South Africa in the late 1980s, Canadian leaders picked up on the trend, playing a significant role in stalling further sanctions. Yet, because of its prominent status within the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers
on Southern Africa, the Commonwealth factor became significant in preventing the Canadian government from joining with other Western countries to lift sanctions. Thus, membership in the Commonwealth and in the larger Western alliance constituted key external forces that at one level helped to shape Canada's policy on South Africa. Running parallel to such alliances the approach taken by transnational corporations towards South Africa was also crucial in developing a general Western consensus. Indeed, the coalescence of Western private sector interests with the approach of Western powers was an important factor in apartheid's survival. Following the victory of the National party in 1948 and the subsequent

296 The Ambiguous Champion institution of apartheid, corporate opinion helped to develop the Western consensus supporting diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa.5" This view was shaken temporarily after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and again after the Soweto riots in 1976, but once security forces in South Africa reasserted control, Western corporations and banks resumed their involvement and full support for the status quo. It was not until the Vaal uprising began in 1984 that this approach came into question and the Western consensus about the stability of South Africa began to crumble. Such interests worked not only through direct relations with the state and Canadian corporations, but also through internal actors in a more mediated and complex way, influencing internationalized elements within the Canadian state and civil society.1 For example, when Mulroney moved ahead of the policies of Britain, West Germany, and Reagan's White House on South Africa, forces within the Canadian state loyal to past associations fought a bitter rear guard action. Senior members of the foreign policy establishment in Canada regarded Mulroney's approach as 'adventurist' and worked hard to bring the policy back into the fold. When the great powers themselves abandoned the campaign, Mulroney came to heel. However strong the rhetoric on sanctions remained, the momentum of Canadian action on South Africa virtually ceased in 1987 after a G-7 meeting refused to address the issue. The possibilities for 'middle-power status,' which were supposed to enable mediation and negotiations, did not count for much when the larger powers ruled the issue out of court. The cold wind of great power indifference, together with the receptiveness for such interests within the civil service, had a decisive impact. Thus, except for a few years in the mid-1980s, an instrumentalist interpretation of state-civil society relations, enriched by an analysis of its ideological underpinnings, is powerfully persuasive. Together, these two factors explain the long night of the policy of balance when successive Liberal governments refused to take tough measures against the apartheid regime and the swift end to new initiatives after the brief caesura of the mid-1980s.

Conjunctures and Political Process: The Issue of Determination At the same time, this case does not show that the state was a captive agent, always directly responsive to every whim of dominant social forces in civil
society. Nor does it suggest that deviance from the structured norm meant that the state has substituted the long-term interests of the social formation as a whole for the short-term interests of dominant classes within civil society. The latter proposition would award the state an omniscience belied by much of history, arming it with an eternal trump over the system's aces." As an explanation, it skids dangerously towards the view of the state as a reified rational actor, a perennial *smart state.' At its worst, it precipitates a collapse back into an instrumentalist analysis with a different time frame.

In terms of the former proposition, this case shows that a rigid instrumentalist view of the state would obscure more than it clarifies. For example, one could not explain how a Conservative government in a liberal capitalist country like Canada (the Mulroney government from 1985 on) would choose a program of economic sanctions against a Cold War ally like South Africa which, at the same time, hurt the short-term interests of Canadian exporters and importers. Nor would it show why these sanctions were maintained in the early 1990s, long after they were dropped by other Western countries.

Understanding the occasions when the state acted with a degree of autonomy is an entirely different and more complex matter than when policies reflect the predominant discourse and structures of power within civil society. Ironically, too, in contradistinction to the main neo-institutionalist thrust of the Canadian foreign policy canon, these moments were comparatively rare. The difficulty, then, is to account for the forces which, from time to time, bypass dominant structures within the state and civil society without heading into the pluralist abyss.

Part of the answer comes from focusing on strategic conjunctures - moments when elements of a situation came together in a new way to override pre-existing limitations. In this case, two changes in Canada's anti-apartheid policy needed explanation: the 1977 reforms after the Soweto riots and the fundamental shift in policy in the mid-1980s. In both periods, the force of a new constellation of events prodded key actors within the state and civil society out of the grip of rigid adherence to past policy, precipitating a rethinking and new responses. Changes abroad and at home disturbed the equilibrium of compromises within the state. The moment was ripe; issues were on the agenda and history was made both outside and within Canada.

However, it is important to caution that, while conjunctural analysis alerts us to the forces that come to bear in a moment of change, it cannot predict what will emerge out of the crucible. Its central quality is dynamic; it posits the 'tide in the affairs of man,' but cannot determine a priori whether actors will ride the tide. Thus, though the formal separation of the political from the economic level in liberal democracies opens up possibilities of autonomous action, of deviance from the structured norm, and conjunctures may provide the energy and occasion, the outcome of such moments is never predetermined. As analysts, we can walk to the door with theory and explanation, but there has to be space for agency.
The point, then, becomes to account for the politics of those who grasp the nettle. A nuanced understanding requires an accounting for struggles within the political process itself, the formation and dissolution of the unstable equilibrium of compromises at each stage of the policy process. These are historical questions that allow a rich and complex understanding of the evolution of foreign policy. They show, above all, that politics matter. In this study, the drama of forces and actors at play in the evolving political process was much more dynamic and complex during the Mulroney era than in the previous period of Liberal governments. Except for the reappraisal of policy after the Soweto riots, Canadian policy on South Africa only occasionally became the subject of contest or controversy during the Trudeau years. Once apartheid began to unravel, however, the struggle to define the state's response became intense.

For greater precision, an accounting must be made not only of the forces that come to bear in the process of decision-making, but also in the implementation of policy. The two stages may be quite separate, with a different set of forces emerging in the second stage to confound the intentions of the first. For example, a particular bureaucratic configuration in Canada allowed the Space Research Corporation bungle, despite the state's ostensibly strong prior commitment to the U.N. arms embargo on South Africa. Similar interests in the private sector and the state together torpedoed promises made by Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson in 1977 to end all state promotion of economic relations with South Africa. In the mid-1980s, such forces worked effectively to tame Mulroney's passion and to put in place a sanctions program of such modesty that damage to Canadian economic self-interest was limited. Most of the financial sanctions were voluntary, and Commonwealth commitments were twisted to allow Canadian specialty steel manufacturers to import ferro-alloys from South Africa. Sulphur, the most important Canadian export, indeed the only Canadian export with a potential to affect South Africa negatively, was exempted from sanctions entirely.

The Politics of Two Conjunctural Moments

A review of the two central moments of 'reform' in Canadian policy helps to pull together the main elements of this approach. It shows how factors of discourse, structured representation of interests, and political practice came together to produce two profoundly different outcomes. In the first case in 1977, tentative gestures of reform in Canadian policy towards South Africa were part of a general Western reappraisal following the South African state's brutal suppression of the Soweto riots. However, the prospects for change dissolved fairly quickly. The Vorster regime showed no sign of modifying its approach and the challenge to apartheid inside South Africa faded. Cold War anxiety grew in the West at the implications for South Africa of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.
Inside Canada, support for reform was soft, with opposition coming from Cabinet, key departments of the civil service, and the private sector. Trudeau made it indelibly clear that only state promotion of economic relations was at issue and that his government had no intention of interfering with the private sector. When reforms were announced, Don Jamieson overreached the consensus forged in Cabinet, producing a backlash within the state. New initiatives were emasculated, and the approach returned to the status quo ante. The conjunctural moment had allowed merely the questioning of the accepted wisdom but not its rejection. The Vaal riots in the mid-1980s, by contrast, shattered the basis on which the Western consensus rested and, in particular, the conventional wisdom about the indefinite future of the apartheid regime. Even though it was able eventually to restrict media coverage of black resistance, the South African state was on the run. At this point, the preponderance of opinion within international banking and investment circles was that South Africa had become a bad risk, opening a crack in the agreement underlying past Western policy. Western states, led by the U.S Congress, began to invoke significant sanctions. These events coincided with the advent of a new Conservative government in Canada, one not wedded to the policy of the past, even prepared to respond to the deepening South African crisis with tougher measures. The new approach was promoted at the political level by the new prime minister in concert with a number of Commonwealth countries. It was introduced in the face of strenuous opposition from forces at home and abroad, blinkered by their attachment to the orthodoxy of the past twenty-five years. The equilibrium of compromises on this issue in Canada was about to be renegotiated within the state and with civil society by an entirely new political force. The changed discourse within the Canadian state and the new policy which emerged from it were facilitated by disagreements among Western corporate interests over appropriate action towards the crisis in South Africa. The split in Canada - between proponents of the status quo (a tiny proportion of Canadian-based equity investors who opted to stay on and those Canadian corporations involved in trade with South Africa) and those who had joined in the decision to disinvest and stop supplying financing - made it considerably easier for Mulroney to act. Thus, there was both an element of autonomy in the creation of this new policy and, at the same time, some shared perspectives as both the state and sections of the corporate world reappraised their approach towards South Africa.

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When official policies changed in Canada, the shift reflected a new, somewhat precarious equilibrium and a much more complex structural imperative than the one that had governed Canadian policy for so long. Therefore, in the final period leading up to the end of apartheid, the political process became convoluted, as a series of twists and turns in official policy attempted to respond to the new conjunctures and to the changed balance of forces presented by them. In this analysis of change, then, two simultaneous processes were central: on the one hand, new conjunctures opened up the opportunity for change, but did not
determine change; actors had to seize these moments. At the same time, actors
initiated change, to paraphrase an old saying, but not in conditions of their own
choosing.
Thus the evolution of official Canadian policy on South Africa in the postwar
period requires a much more complex analysis of foreign policy than as an intra-
elite debate of a 'middle power.' At the least, one must look at relations between
the state and civil society over time and the multilayered impact on these relations
of external forces. To confine analysis solely to the perceptions of those making
the policy - be they prime ministers or diplomats - is to mistake the tip for the
whole of the iceberg. Time and again, the structured representation of interests
outside as well as within the state was a crucial factor, broken only by dramatic
conjunctures.
The advantages of this approach are that it is profoundly dynamic and historical
and yet non-determinist. Studies of discourse and structure establish the evolving
language and basis of power. The exploration of key conjunctural moments set
out the coalescence of forces which precipitated change, incorporating struggles
in South Africa, in global fora, and in Canada to account for their origins. Thus,
the structured nature of power inscribed within the state and civil society in
Canada is clear, and yet the factors which allowed change are present. Finally,
attention to the 'nitty gritty' of the history of the political process can show what
the actors actually did when the stage was set.
Understanding Post-Apartheid South Africa
Although the terrain has shifted dramatically, the complexity of post-apartheid
South Africa will require, even more than in the apartheid period, greater
sophistication than conventional foreign policy analysis and middle-power theory
can offer. The new South African government is simultaneously coping with the
legacy of apartheid and the difficulties of competing in the global economy of the
1990s. Its unity is compromised by the bitter history of white rule, the quasi-civil
war of the last decade, and profound divisions based on economic,

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rational, ethnic, and gender difference. South Africa remains one of the most
unequal societies in the world.7 It faces a crisis in education, health, housing, and
water; indeed, in the provision of most basic services for its non-white population.
Criminal and political violence still make life insecure almost everywhere.
The South African economy is only just emerging from a profound recession,
negative growth rates, and the permanent loss of over 400,000 jobs in the
manufacturing sector;8 this in a country with estimates of unemployment ranging
as high as 50 per cent. The economy remains structurally weak - dependent on
imports of capital goods and technology. In the last years of apartheid (from 1985
to 1990), South Africa lost $14 billion in capital outflow.59 The concentration of
ownership is extreme: the four largest conglomerates each own a banking group
and together control 75 per cent of the Johannesburg stock market.60 Pressures
from the private sector to co-opt those who have come to power are immense.
At the same time, the tradition of struggle against apartheid in civil society,
through trade unions, churches, civics, and community groups will not disappear
in the post-apartheid era. Although diminished, important voices continue to be
heard. Consider Archbishop Tutu arguing in 1993 that 'after sanctions are lifted, it
must not be business as usual. There has got to be a code of conduct for business
in South Africa for a kind of investment that seeks to turn around the
dispossession of power and empower the dispossessed.' Such pressures form the
environment within which the first post-apartheid government has begun to
govern.
For those in charge, the goal is to rejuvenate the economy and yet to
give hope of better lives for the majority, without which peace and reconstruction will be
impossible. Allied to this project is the drive to enlist the assistance of
international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and private investors. Yet,
such sources of support quickly identified their preference for neo-liberal
solutions to South Africa's economic and social problems, discouraging even mild
social democratic reforms. Almost immediately the South African administration
faced a Faustian bargain: accepting policies at odds with the principles of the
ANC Freedom Charter or being starved of desperately needed capital. The drift to
the right in discourse and the approach towards economic policy of senior
ministers in the Mandela government, although not entirely uncontested, indicates
how narrow the options are.
Thus the relationship between South Africa and the West has entered a new and
complex phase. Many elements of the previous connection have reappeared,
repositioned in the current denouement. While in Canada the state's primary focus
has changed from the issue of apartheid to the promotion of

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trade and investment, the debates over assistance and conditionality have involved
many of the same actors in the state and civil society that struggled over
appropriate action to end apartheid.
Understanding what happens will again require looking at structures of power
which constrain action in both the international and domestic spheres as well as
the dynamics of an evolving politics. Once again, discourse is central to the
analysis, especially given the shift to the right accompanying Canada's own
experience of global restructuring and national restraint.
This time around, the Liberal government has been, if anything, even more
insistent that the interests of trade and commercialization should take precedence
over questions of democracy and human rights. Constructive engagement is well
and truly back, with Andr6 Ouellet (Prime Minister Jean Chr’ tien's first minister
of foreign affairs) referring to countries such as China, Myanmar (Burma), and
Indonesia in terms identical to those used previously by his predecessors on
apartheid South Africa. Irrespective of whether a country is a dictatorship or its
record on human rights, Ouellet told a Vancouver audience in May 1995, the best
way to promote democratic development is through trade promotion: 'Isolation ...
is not conducive to helping the populations of repressive regimes ... [but] foreign
trade, which creates progress in the economy, is the best way of spreading ...
democracy] to the population.' As the Liberal government's statement on
foreign policy made clear, the brutality of an assortment of regimes will be no impediment to economic relations.63
At least in South Africa, the end of apartheid and the transition to a government of national unity have put the linkage between economic relations, democracy, and human rights to the side for the time being; but the approach of the earlier period is back as a general principle. More directly relevant to the current relationship is a Western consensus on the appropriate nature of socioeconomic policy and the form that reconstruction should take in South Africa. In the past decade, both Conservative and Liberal governments have insisted on conditionality, requiring recipients of Canadian assistance to limit public sector involvement in their economies and to focus instead on increasing their competitive ability in the global market-place.64
Despite the distortions of the apartheid legacy, the attitude towards South Africa is no different. In 1991, the head of the Southern Africa Task Force in the Department of External Affairs stated publicly that the Canadian government supported early IMF planning missions in South Africa, so that the new government would 'get things right' from the start.65 The Canadian state has entered fully in the drive to open South Africa to global forces and to promote the interests of the private sector. One former Canadian high commissioner to South Africa spoke glowingly about the prospects 'across the board' for Canadian exports opened up by trade liberalization. The consensus accepting the

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'rightness' of neo-liberal policies has become the 'hyper-real' discourse of the 1990s.66
Once again, as in the early years of the battle over apartheid, a counterhegemonic discourse has emerged within Canadian civil society in solidarity with the concerns of the dispossessed in South Africa. Generally, this position is promoted in Canada by old allies, remote from the corridors of power churches, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and academics. For many in these circles, market-driven solutions are unlikely to produce sustainable growth in the medium and long term and will certainly not address the needs of the poor. The insistence on trade liberalization, for example, may mean that highly protected inefficient industries of the South African past may disappear, but along with them will go significant industrial capacity and an important segment of the labour force. Should South Africa's rate of unemployment increase significantly, the prospects for political turmoil are intensified. As Carleton University Professor Manfred Bienefeld suggested to a parliamentary subcommittee in Canada, 'Competition is like medicine. It is very good for you in the right doses at the right time; it will kill you if you take too much of it.'67 In this view, the standard policy package ensures that mass expectations will remain unfulfilled and loyalties will be put to a severe test. If experience elsewhere is any guide, the approach is a recipe for political instability.
With the Chrétien government clearly moving towards the right, however, such views will have little purchase. Dissenting voices in Canada and, to some extent in South Africa, have been read out of the debate, while NGOs, here and there,
have been marginalized and cut back. The instrumental nature of the Liberal government's relations with private sector interests on South Africa equals or surpasses any period in the past, with Roy MacLaren, former minister for international trade, declaring his *personal conviction' in its vital importance in developing relations with South Africa.61

A Canadian trade office reopened in Johannesburg a month after sanctions were lifted. MacLaren led a trade delegation early in 1994 and announced the resumption of a full range of trade support measures, including the extension of the General Preferential Tariff to South Africa and sizeable EDC credits. Canadian assistance through CIDA increased (by 44 per cent in the early 1990s), though it has settled at a fairly modest level with annual disbursements of about $20 million, and in 1994 South Africa became eligible for bilateral assistance. (By contrast the renewal of the central vehicle for NGO assistance, the $5 million Special Fund, was cancelled.)

The response of the Canadian private sector to state initiatives has been mixed - with trading interests much more enthusiastic about current relations than equity investors. Two-way trade (averaging $655 million annually in the

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post-apartheid period)69 was almost triple the annual average of the sanctions years, and the chairman of the South African-Canadian Chamber of Commerce is confident that trade will accelerate for the rest of the 1990s.

However, investment is an entirely different matter. Canadian interest has been modest, with commitments mostly from small- and medium-sized companies with annual sales of about $50 million.7% Canadian consultants have won a number of important contracts, notably SNC-Lavalin in the Alusaf project to build the largest aluminum smelter in the world, and SR Telecom to provide microwave communications systems for South Africa's national telephone company. Other Canadian companies provide technical support to the mining sector.

In general, the reaction of Canadian and other foreign investors has been cautious, holding a watching brief. While South Africa received net capital inflows of R30 billion in the first two years after the 1994 elections, most came in the form of portfolio flows (which, as Mexico discovered, can be rapidly reversed), rather than through direct foreign investment.7' The South African economy is only just emerging from a profound recession and negative or low growth rates.72

Reservations have been expressed about the heavy monopoly factor, the relative backwardness of technology, and the problems of adapting a highly protected economy and uncompetitive industry to the global marketplace. Canadian investors do not like the power of South African trade unions. On the political side, uncertainty has accompanied Mangosuthu Buthelezi's erratic campaign to stay afloat politically and the continuing high level of crime, especially violent crime.

The unstable and murky nature of South Africa's medium- and long-term prospects may only deepen once the contradictions in the approach promoted by Western institutions and governments bear their poisoned fruit. Although it is early days, the inability of South Africa's current government to work out
alternative visions or to begin to deliver basic services to its constituents bodes ill for the near future.

Given the profound divisions within South African society, the deformed nature of its economy, and the imponderables of a post-Mandela leadership, the early post-apartheid years are unlikely to ameliorate conditions. Straddling the competing needs of foreign investors and the great majority outside elite circles will involve a host of delicate compromises, compromises which will likely lean towards the more powerful rather than the less.

In the current conjuncture of neo-liberal fundamentalism, dominant forces in Canada and the West seem even more indifferent to the interests of the vast majority than they were in the long battle to end apartheid. However, without some amelioration of old inequities in South Africa, Western interests will also lose out. Reflecting on the history of the struggle to end apartheid and the very mixed record of Canadian involvement, the only hope at this point is that contradictions which emerged in the past to produce change will reappear to produce another miracle. Otherwise, South Africa's many citizens will have gone through one momentous struggle only to face a second, even greater, battle for liberation.

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Notes

Introduction
1 Breyten Breytenbach, The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 73.
2 CHCD, 18 June 1990, 12918-19.
4 'Interview with Ambassador Lewis,' 'Morningside,' CBC Radio, 27 Sept., DEA, PO transcript, FPR-1453, 30 Sept. 1985, 4.
6 See, e.g., Dave Todd's contention that 'in its quiet yet persistent way, Canada did more than any other country to create the political climate that enabled Nelson Mandela to win his freedom.' 'Canada Battles Apartheid,' Ottawa Citizen, 16 June 1990, B 1.
7 This approach concurs with Ellen Wood's definition that 'civil society is that sphere separate from the household and the state, including economic relations,' in her chapter 'The Uses and Abuses of "Civil Society,"' in The Socialist Register 1990: The Retreat of Intellectuals, ed. Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (London: Merlin Press, 1990), 61. For a discussion of the implications of different usages of the concept of civil society, see J. Keane, Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988), and J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988).
8 This definition of civil society does not 'conceptualize away' power relations in

308 Notes to pages 6-16
12 The Soweto riots of 1976-7, sparked by the South African government's insistence that half of the subjects taught to black children be taught in Afrikaans, were put down with great brutality: student organizations were banned and their leaders imprisoned. The repression touched off a strong international reaction against apartheid.
13 Nationwide riots from 1984 to 1986 responded to constitutional reforms which offered a tricameral parliament for whites, Indians, and coloureds, but excluded the black majority.
14 Renamo was a rebel group founded by Rhodesia and supported after 1980 by South Africa to oppose the government in Mozambique.
Chapter 1: The Cooling of the 'Special Relationship'
3 Discriminatory laws in British Columbia, including disqualification of East Indians from the municipal franchise, lasted until 1947. Even then, language qualifications acted to bar most immigrants from the franchise. Strict quotas on non-white immigration ensured that Canada's non-white minority population would remain limited. Tennyson, Canadian Relations, 121-2.
7 Cited in Tennyson, Canadian Relations, 136.
8 Ibid.
9 In 1906-7 and in 1934, South African education administrator Oswin Boys Bull came to Canada to study its residential school system for 'native peoples.' In the 1940s, a leading member of the South African National party, Professor G. Cronje, toured Canada and praised the reserve system. In 1956-7, Frederick van
Notes to pages 16-17 309

Wyk of SAIRR studied the administration of 'native peoples.' Later, in 1962, South African Ambassador W. Dirkse van Schalkwyk toured reserves in Western Canada to study the relationship of band governments to the Department of Indian Affairs. See Tamarack Productions, 'We Have Such Things at Home - Canada, South Africa and the Politics of Apartheid,' prospectus for a documentary film for television, Toronto, 1996, 11-12.

10 As early as 1886, Canada had established an elaborate land reserve system, and its Dominion Land Act was useful in the design of South Africa's 1913 Native Land Act and Land Settlement acts of 1912 and 1913. Under this system, First Nations people were not allowed to own or acquire property or to engage in commerce off the reserves. Until 1951, the Canadian government also used a pass system to control the movement of First Nations people and, until 1960, denied the vote to those living on reserves. Indian religious and cultural practices were outlawed and their political organizations banned. See Ron Bourgeault, 'Canada Indians - the South African Connection,' Canadian Dimension 21, no. 8 (January 1988), 6-10, and Tamarack Productions, esp. 2, 6, 14-16.

11 Ironically, while South Africa repealed its apartheid legislation in the 1990s, Canada still has the Indian Act on its statute books, a document that has been referred to as '62 pages of cold, thin-lipped bureaucratic arrogance and paternalism.' Manuel Escott, 'Canada's Indian Act: An Affront to Human Dignity,' Globe and Mail, 3 Jan. 1994, A15.


14 In March 1954, Pierre Trudeau attended an unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference in Lahore, but remained aloof from the discussion of South Africa on the grounds 'that the problems of South Africa were so complex and difficult that an outsider could sympathize but not criticize or venture to recommend what course should be pursued.' Nicholas Mansergh, The Multi-Racial Commonwealth (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 105. See Tennyson, Canadian Relations, 138.

15 Henshaw, 'South Africa's External Relations,' 272. 16 Opinion within DEA on these issues was not homogeneous. Generally, the Commonwealth and U.N. divisions supported stronger action against South Africa than the official position. Ibid., chap. 3, part 1.

17 From 1946 to 1960, Canadian votes supported only one-quarter of moderate UNGA resolutions dealing with South Africa and South West Africa and abstained on nearly two-thirds. Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 830. See also Douglas G. Anglin, 'Canada and Apartheid,' International Journal 15, no. 2 (Spring 1960), 122-3, and Henshaw, 'South Africa's External Relations,' 197-8.
310 Notes to pages 17-21
18 CHCD, 8 Dec. 1952, 423. 19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 424.
21 Hayes, 'South Africa's Departure,' 461. 22 Tennyson, Canadian Relations, 139-40. 23 Ibid., 141.
24 Statement at a public address in Ottawa. Cited in Anglin, 'Canada and Apartheid,' 132.
26 Anglin, 'Canada and Apartheid,' 128. 27 Cited in ibid., 127.
30 In the late 1940s, the Commonwealth had begun this process of change when India and Pakistan were admitted as republics. Two years later, the South African government unsuccessfully opposed the admission of Ghana into the Commonwealth as 'unthinkable now or in the future.' Henshaw, 'South Africa's External Relations,' 346.
40 In the case of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) permission had been given in advance to re-enter the Commonwealth as a republic.

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41 Diefenbaker, One Canada, vol. 2, 215. 42 Ibid., 216, and Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 174-6. 43 Apparently, Drew had morning coffee with the South African High Commissioner daily throughout the 1961 Commonwealth meeting. Tennyson, Canadian
Relations, 177, n. 77.
51 Ibid., 3323.
52 This phrase was passed unanimously by the national convention of the Liberal party in Jan. 1961. CHCD, 17 March 1961, 3084. 53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 25 March 1960, 2451-3. 55 Ibid., 2452.
57 Ironically, while the Canadian government did not send a formal note of protest to
South Africa after events at Sharpeville, it did after Phillips's arrest. 58 Hayes, ’South Africa's Departure,’ 478. 59 Ibid.
60 CHCD, 17 March 1961, 3083. 61 Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 123. Robinson was a member of DEA and a
special adviser to Diefenbaker on foreign policy. As the liaison between DEA and the PM, he was well placed to observe the dynamics within the state on this issue. 62 Ibid., 124-5.
63 See Hayes, ’South Africa's Departure,’ 471. 64 Ibid., 464, 471.
66 See Luthuli’s telegram to the Times (London) calling on the Commonwealth *to
expel South Africa from membership.’ 7 March 1961, 13.

312 Notes to pages 24-6
69 Ibid.
70 Iain Lang, ’'Risk of a Walk Out' by Verwoerd,' Sunday Times (London), 12 March 1961, 2. However, according to Verwoerd's secretary, Verwoerd arrived at the conference believing and intending that South Africa would remain in the Commonwealth. See Fred Barnard, ’The 1961 Commonwealth Conference,’ 13 Years with Dr H.F. Verwoerd (Johannesburg: Voortrekkerpers, 1967), 84-114.
72 Ibid., 3.
74 Cited in Ingram, Commonwealth Challenge, 252. 75 Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 184. 76 Macmillan had left Diefenbaker out of the weekend meeting at Chequers where the strategy was devised.
80 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 298. 81 Ibid., 304. Diefenbaker made the same point in his report to the HOC. See CHCD, 17 March 1961, 3081-2.
82 See, e.g., Mulroney's rendition of Diefenbaker's role in CHCD, 18 June 1990, 12918-19.

Notes to pages 27-9
93 Robinson, Diefenbaker's World, 186, expresses a similar view, paying tribute especially to Nehru and Macmillan, the latter for his adroit chairmanship in a series of exceedingly delicate situations.
96 'Relief and Sadness,' Guardian (Manchester) 16 March 1961, 12. 97 Cited in (CP) 'Canada's Role in Ouster of S. Africa "Deplorable,"," Montreal Star,
26 April 1962, 52.


99 CCC, 30 May 1961, 4. The Diefenbaker government defended the treaty as a bilateral agreement, even though they were widely regarded as Commonwealth preferences. CHCD, 17 March 1961, 3987-8.

100 In the postwar period up to 1959, Canada's positive trade balance with South Africa of $743 m reflected exports of $832 m and imports of only $89 m. Calculated from DBS, Trade of Canada, 1946-60.

101 While the Cabinet recognized that parts for the Sabre jets 'might be used in repressing the Africans' - they, nevertheless, approved the sale. However, such cases would require export permits and Cabinet approval. CCC, 9 May 1961, 8.

102 Hayes, 'South Africa's Departure,' 483. 103 During the 1960s, the change was registered in support for 60 per cent of stronger UNGA resolutions on South Africa and from 1960 to 1965 of 90 per cent on resolutions on Namibia (then South West Africa). Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 332, 834.

104 CHCD, 7 Sept. 1961, 8102.


106 For an interpretation playing down the substantive issues at stake, see Frank R. Hayes, 'Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue,' in An Acceptance

314 Notes to pages 30-3


107 Southern Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony since 1923, but was not formally independent from Britain.

108 Paul Martin, SSEA, 'The Use of Sanctions against Rhodesia,' statement to the Standing Committee of HOC on External Affairs, 4 April 1966, DEASS, 66/16, 2.

109 Statement by the Canadian delegate, Mr Barton, to a plenary meeting of UNGA, 19 June 1962.


111 Cited in Hayes, 'Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue,' 146. In 1964, Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania.

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Rhodians. He was actively involved in getting the views of the African members of the Commonwealth heard and in mediating this crisis.


129 Munro and Inglis, Mike: Memoirs, vol. 3, 286. 130 Ibid., 285.

131 Cited in Hayes, 'Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue,' 163.

133 The Night They Saved the Commonwealth,' Observer, 18 Sept. 1966, 4.
135 After the meeting, Pearson briefed Kaunda on the meetings, emphasizing the value of the Commonwealth in inducing the British to make 'a real attempt' to meet the views of African members. Munro and Inglis, Mike: Memoirs, vol. 3, 288.
136 Canadian officials to Hugh Nangle, a journalist investigating Canadian corporate investment in southern Africa in 1973.
137 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 727.
139 A report commissioned by the British government in 1973 revealed that, through its Nassau branch, the CIBC had arranged a $2 m loan for a Lonrho subsidiary to purchase a copper mine in Rhodesia. Ibid., 719-22.
141 Ibid., 75.
142 Hayes, 'Canada, the Commonwealth and the Rhodesia Issue,' 166.

316 Notes to pages 36-9
148 For a critical analysis of this perception, see Linda Freeman, Gerald Helleiner, and Robert Matthews, 'The Commonwealth at Stake,' Canadian Journal of African Studies 5, no. 1 (1971), 93-112.
150 The Simonstown Agreement of 1955 between Britain and South Africa involved a joint plan for the defence of a maritime strategic zone from northern Namibia around the Cape to the Mozambique border. The Conservative government also pushed for South Africa's inclusion in NATO.
151 As Arnold Smith pointed out, it was, in fact, 'strategic lunacy' for the British to
try to counter a Soviet build-up by alienating all the states bordering the Indian Ocean, of which 13 were in the Commonwealth. Smith with Sanger, Stitches in Time, 209.

152 See the private policy document prepared by an ad hoc Working Group of the Conservative Commonwealth and Overseas Council, 'Overseas Issues Facing the Next Conservative Government Defence Outside NATO,' CCOC 274, Feb. 1970, recommending the resumption of full political, strategic, and economic relations between Britain and South Africa.


154 Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone threatened either to leave or to press for the expulsion of Britain from the Commonwealth.


156 Cited in 'Canada's Reaction to United Kingdom Policy on Arms to South Africa,' International Canada, 1 (July-Aug. 1970), 156.


158 Ibid., 13 Jan. 1971, 2362.


163 Heath visited Ottawa and Trudeau met Heath again in India en route to Singapore.

Canada's SSEA Mitchell Sharp met the British high commissioner in Canada, the British foreign secretary in New York, and other British officials in London.

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Sharp also met with the foreign ministers of Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana in New York.

164 Some DEA officials were suspicious of Head's role, but his independence enabled him to contribute to the compromise that emerged. W.A. Wilson, 'Behind Trudeau's Singapore Triumph,' Montreal Star, 30 Jan. 1971, 31.

175 The study group consisted of representatives from Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, and Nigeria. 176 See, e.g., Redekop. 'Trudeau at Singapore,' 187. 177 It did not include naval vessels in this transaction, items found particularly offensive by Kaunda and Nyerere. Head and Trudeau, Canadian Way, 114.
178 When the Labour party came to power in Oct. 1964, Harold Wilson reimposed the arms embargo, did not deliver one outstanding Wasp helicopter, and cancelled the Simonstown Agreement. However, he allowed through existing orders, which included 16 Buccaneer aircraft, and spare parts. See Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 164-70.
180 Ibid., 9ff.
181 Bruce Garvey reported a senior member of the British delegation as saying: 'Trudeau has unquestionably emerged as the conservative of the conference thank God.' 'Trudeau, the Grouchy Guru, Cools Commonwealth Radicals,' Toronto Star, 10 May 1975, A3.

318 Notes to pages 41-4
184 'Commonwealth 1977,' Globe and Mail, 8 June 1977, 6. 185 In Melbourne in 1981, he added nothing new on southern Africa, and in his last conference in New Delhi in 1983, Trudeau was more concerned with his personal global peace initiative than with southern Africa. In the mid-1980s, Trudeau turned down an invitation to be part of a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on South Africa. He said he did not believe that Pretoria would wish to see him in the role of conciliator. Letter to Brian Mulroney, cited in Joe O'Donnell, 'Trudeau Won't Join Committee On Apartheid,' Toronto Star, 19 Nov. 1985, Al. 186 In the one Commonwealth conference that Joe Clark attended as Canadian head of state in Lusaka in 1979, the Commonwealth was able to make major progress
in finding a settlement on the Rhodesian issue. As Clark had just become PM, the Canadian contribution was to offer some mediation and, after the Lancaster House agreement, to offer assistance to elections. Patrick Keatley, 'How the Commonwealth United on a Rhodesia Plan,' Manchester Guardian Weekly, 19 Aug. 1979, 7.

187 See, e.g., the remarks of Canada's SSEA Mitchell Sharp on his return from his first trip to Africa in 1971. CHCD, 22 March 1971, 4454-5.

Chapter 2: The Hyper-Real Discourse of 'Balance'


3 Ibid.

4 This use of the concept of 'discourse' is not consistent with post-modern discourse theory. Instead, it looks at the way the construction of meaning in the case of Canadian relations with South Africa constituted another instrument of power and thus became part of the political process.

5 The concept 'hyperreality' comes from Jean Beaudrillard who defined it as 'a condition where reality has lost its referent and models, simulations or scripts of the real become more real than the real itself.' See 6 Tuathail, 'Foreign Policy and the Hyperreal,' 157.


8 'Garfield Weston Defends Apartheid,' Toronto Daily Star, 20 April 1964, 1.

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10 For a sample of this view, see the column by McKenzie Porter, Toronto Sun, 4 Sept. 1981, 11.


12 For an example of this form of discourse, see 'Peace Won't Be Easy in Southwest Africa,' Toronto Star, 31 July 1978, A8.


14 This view reappeared in early 1994 in the Chrétien government's insistence on separating the question of human rights in Mexico and China from the more central question of promoting economic relations. Once again, issues of human rights were to be treated, at most, by quiet and respectful diplomacy.

17 Cited in Terrance Wills, 'Canada Won't Curb Trade with Southern Africa,' Toronto Star, 11 June 1977, A 10. An earlier comment by Trudeau that the policy was not consistent - 'We should either stop trading or stop condemning' - was savaged in 'With Whom Could Such Perfection Trade?,' n15 supra.

18 Cited in John Loxley, 'Canada and South Africa,' Canadian Dimension 15, no. 6 (June-July 1981), 30.

19 Letter from Anthony Hampson, CDC, to Renate Pratt, YWCA, 1 Nov. 1972.


21 See, e.g., R.A. Halpin, 'Canada and Southern Africa - The Namibia Initiative,' paper for the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies, Winnipeg, 2-4 May 1979, 3. In this twist on middle-power theory, officials now argued that limits to Canadian power and influence prevented acting in service of values which dictated assistance to 'the poor, the hungry and the politically abused.' See Mark Neufeld, 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power,' Studies in Political Economy 48 (Autumn 1995), 22-3.


320 Notes to pages 48-50


27 0 Tuathail, 'Foreign Policy and the Hyperreal,' 172. See, e.g., 'Where Sanctions Hit, n24 supra.


30 Cited by Val Sears, 'The Club: Togetherness in a World of Divisions,' Toronto

Joe Clark, 'Urgent Need for Peaceful Reform in South Africa,' DEASS, 29 July 1985, 85/6, 3.


35 Patrick Martin, 'MacEachen Learns Name of Africa's Game,' Globe and Mail, 7 May 1975, 7.

36 Well into the 1980s the Canadian press continued to talk emotively about the ANC's goal being a 'black takeover' by tactics of 'terrorism.' See 'Mr Mandela Speaks,' Globe and Mail, 31 Jan. 1985, 6.

37 Thus in 1976, the government rebuffed the attempt of a delegation from one of these 'independent' homelands, Transkei, to secure recognition of its status. In 1981, the federal government also dissuaded the Ontario government from participating in an exchange program with officials from Natal which would have involved official relations with another homeland, KwaZulu.


39 This approach was also adopted by the Canadian press. See the editorials: 'Diplomatic Waffle,' Ottawa Citizen, 31 Jan. 1987, B2; 'Time's Up,' Toronto Sun, 3 Feb. 1987, 10; 'Mr Clark's Straight-Talking,' Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 15 Aug. 1987, 5.

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40 Cited in John Saul, 'Afterword: Canada and Mozambique,' Canada and Mozambique (Toronto: DEC and TCLPAC, 1974), 72. See also Mitchell Sharp in CHCD, 22 March 1971, 4454.


44 DEA, 'United Nations,' 18.

45 This perception was shared by a series of prominent journalists in the Globe and Mail. See, e.g., Geoffrey Stevens's opposition to the Patriotic Front of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and his support for Bishop Abel Muzorewa shortly before Zimbabwe became independent. 'Clark's Chance to Be the Voice of Sanity
47 DEA, 'United Nations,' 19.
49 Portions of the Black Paper were read into Hansard. See CHCD, 9 Feb. 1971, 3230.
50 Legge et al., Black Paper, 1.
51 Ibid., 2.
52 Ibid., 11.
54 Legge et al., Black Paper, 10.
55 Dr Robert Smith, cited in South Africa Education Project Newsletter 8, no. 1 (March 1986), 1. The same point was made by another former moderator, Bruce McLeod, in 'Is Violence Wrong When Aimed at Oppression?' Toronto Star, 3 Feb. 1987, A15.
56 'Anglican Archbishop Bothwell Urges Stronger Sanctions,' FocuSouth 9, no. 3 (July 1987), 5.
57 Legge et al., Black Paper, 13.

322 Notes to pages 53-7
58 The two organizations providing a centre for analysis were TCLSAC, formed from the original TCLPAC, and the Montreal-based CIDMAA.
60 John S. Saul, 'Both Sides of the Street,' Canada and Mozambique 7-45. 61 Ibid., 14.
62 Ibid.
Chapter 3: The Politics of 'Balance'
1 John S. Saul, 'Both Sides of the Street,' Canada and Mozambique (Toronto: DEC and TCLPAC, 1974), 7-8.
2 For example, the Canadian government endorsed more resolutions on southern Africa in the UNGA in the 6 years from 1970 to 1975 than it had in the previous 24. Clarence George Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa, 1946-1975: The Political Economy of Foreign Policy,' doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 1977, 835.
3 In the 1970s, Canada's policy in Central America was quite similar. See James F. Petras and Morris H. Morley, 'The United States and Canada: State
Policy and Strategic Perspectives on Capital in Central America,' in Frontyard Backyard: The Americas in Global Crisis, revised papers of a workshop for the Programme of Studies in International and National Development, Queen's University, Kingston, May 1984, 164-74.


5 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 263-80.


9 CHCD, 30 May 1973, 4256.

10 Ibid., 22 March 1971, 4455.

11 EDC is the government agency that provides lines of credit, loans, investment guarantees, and export insurance to support the activities of Canadian corporations abroad. CDC was a quasi-autonomous parastatal agency promoting Canadian investment at home and abroad.

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12 Trade percentages calculated from CSC, Trade of Canada - Exports by Countries, vols. 27-36, 4, and CSC, Trade of Canada - Imports by Countries, vols. 27-36, 4. All Canadian trade data are from these sources, unless otherwise noted. 13 CSC, Canada's International Investment Position, 1981-92. 14 TCCR, 'A Few Words from the Canadian Banks about Loans to South Africa,' pamphlet, Feb. 1985, and IDAFSA, 'Canada's Participation in $4000 M Link with South Africa,' Briefing Paper, June 1981, 1.

15 The imbalances included 'very large trade deficits on end-product manufactures; very heavy trade dependence on the United States; extremely high levels of foreign control in Canadian industry; and severe regional inequalities.' Steven Langdon, 'The Canadian Economy and Southern Africa,' in Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa, ed. Anglin et al., 16.

16 DEA, 'Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future,' International Perspectives (special issue), Autumn 1972.

17 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 86. 18 By contrast, a considerable proportion of Canadian exports to Algeria were financed by the EDC and CIDA. Linda Freeman, 'Canada and Africa in the 1970s,' International Journal, 35, no. 4 (Autumn 1980), 811. See also Linda Freeman, 'The Effect of the World Crisis on Canada's Involvement in Africa,' Studies in Political Economy 17 (Summer 1985), 113-20.
19 Over the 30 years from 1946 to 1975, exports of semi- and fully manufactured goods - mainly motor vehicle parts; mining, agricultural, and other industrial machinery; office machinery and wood pulp, and, in the early years, aluminum pigs and ingots - accounted for about 90% of total Canadian exports to South Africa. Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 77.

20 Partly, the nature of Canadian trade with South Africa was related to the pattern of Canadian direct investment. In the 1970s, 70%-80% of Canadian direct investment in South Africa went to the manufacturing industry, a sectoral concentration that led to major exports of Canadian capital equipment.

21 In 1976, e.g., Ford Canada exported motor vehicles and parts to its subsidiary in South Africa at a time of a severe downturn in the North American market. The export of motor vehicles, trucks, and parts to South Africa was worth $205 m in the 1970s, a small but not insubstantial contribution to the Canadian auto industry.

22 John Loxley, 'Canada and South Africa,' Canadian Dimension 16, no. 6 (JuneJuly 1981), 29.

23 At a very conservative underestimate, Canadian direct investment increased from $73 m in 1970 to $151 m in 1978. Brian Douglas Tennyson, Canadian Relations with South Africa (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), 210-11.

24 On this calculation, direct investments in South Africa increased from 28 firms investing $151 m in 1978 to 35 firms investing $200 m in 1982. TCCR, Annual Report 1985-6, 28.

25 SACTU Solidarity Committee, Trafficking in Apartheid - the Case for Canadian Sanctions against South Africa (Toronto: SACTU Solidarity Committee, Jan. 1985), 93. CSC reported that Canadian-controlled investment amounted to $531 m in 1981. TCCR, Annual Report 1984-1985, 29. Added to this were portfolio investments of individual investors for which no reliable figures are available. Canadians had shares in investment funds through the Canadian-South African Gold Fund, CSA Management Ltd, Guardian Trustco International, Guardian-Morton Shulman Precious Metal Inc., and other precious metal investment funds.

26 TCCR, 'A Few Words from the Canadian Banks.' Between 1972 and 1981, three of the five major chartered banks in Canada participated in loans valued at about U.S.$2 b plus 1.7 b Deutschmarks (DM). Investment dealers helped underwrite bond purchases worth another U.S.$1.2 b. These figures do not include private transactions of individual banks with South African clients, interbank lending, and trade-related loans.

27 The most important were Dominion Securities Pitfield (then Dominion Securities
Ames) and McLeod Young Weir. Beate Klein, 'United States and Canadian Involvement in Loans to South Africa from 1979 to May 1984,' U.N. Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents 13/84, Aug. 1984, 23-4. 28 SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, 14. 29 Ibid., 93-4. The proportion of foreign control (roughly 80%) of 'Canadian' investment in South Africa was unchanged from the 1960s and 1970s. See Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 477.

30 American companies had good reasons to launder their economic relations with South Africa through Canada. At first, basing their operations in Canada gave them access to Commonwealth trade preferences and, later, U.S. branch plants sought to avoid anti-apartheid pressure from black workers and tougher legislation in the U.S.

31 Renate Pratt, 'Political, Economic, Social and Humanitarian Implications of Canadian TNCs' Involvement in South Africa and Namibia,' paper for a seminar on the role of Canadian TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, Montreal, 10-12 Dec. 1982, 3.

32 Anglo American interests included Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting (HBMS), MINORCO Canada, Boart Canada, and Hard Materials Research. By 1988, HBMS was the third largest copper producer and fourth largest zinc producer in Canada, operating 8 mines in northern Canada, oil and gas properties in Alberta, and joint mining ventures with the Manitoba government, 'Profiting from Apartheid,' Sanctions Barometer, May 1990, 3.

33 Rembrandt owned 43% of Rothmans International, which in turn owned 100% of Rothmans of Canada and 50% of Carling O'Keefe Ltd. Carling sold a range of beer labels, owned Jordan Wines, the Toronto Argonauts football team, and the Quebec Nordiques hockey team. In 1987, Rothmans sold its 50.1% interest in Carling to Elders of Australia. Dan Turner, 'Boycotted Rothmans Wants to Drop Label as South African-controlled Company,' Ottawa Citizen, 1 Nov. 1986, A4.

34 Pratt, 'Political, Economic, Social and Humanitarian Implications,' 3. Typically, South African investment in Canada was highly leveraged with an emphasis on control rather than outright ownership. Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 422.

35 Also on MINORCO's board was Walter Wriston, then chairman of Citicorp, the largest U.S. lender to South Africa in the 1970s and a vigorous opponent of restrictions on loans to South Africa.

37 Until the mid-1970s, another Canadian bank, the CIBC, also had the chairman of Anglo American Harry Oppenheimer on its board. The CIBC was the largest identified shareholder in the Fluor Corporation, the major contractor for the construction of South Africa's oil from coal conversion plants, SASOL I, II, and III. 38 The majority shareholder of Standard Oil Company of Ohio was British Petroleum of the U.K., a company with major interests in South Africa. 39 RTZ owned about 53% of Rio Algom. With its direct ownership of another 46% of the shares of Rossing, RTZ had a controlling interest in the mine. The rest of the ownership was divided between the IDC (13.2%), Total of France (10%), and General Mining and Finance Corporation of South Africa (6.8%). U.N., Plunder of Namibian Uranium-Major Findings of the Hearings on Namibian Uranium Held by the United Nations Council for Namibia in July, 1980 (New York: U.N., 1982), 9.

40 Inter-Church Uranium Committee, Saskatchewan, 'Canada the Innocent Profiteer?,' June 1982.


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45 Sections of the DEA, esp. branches dealing with the Commonwealth, the U.N., and la Francophonie, supported a more pro-African, anti-apartheid policy on South Africa. Also, individuals in the minister's office, new recruits to DEA, and officials in related agencies like CIDA supported change.


50 In 1980, a second diplomatic mission was established in Harare, and in 1990, a third in Windhoek; however, the Namibian mission was closed again very quickly in 1993.

51 CIDA, Annual Reports, 1970-1 to 1990-1. In addition, significant amounts of aid were also disbursed through multilateral sources and through other governmental and non-governmental sources. The decades are counted on the basis of 1960-1
to 1969-70 and so on.

52 'Canada Reaffirms Its Abhorrence of Apartheid,' Statement to UNSC, 30 March 1977, DEASS 77/3, 5.


54 See Freeman, 'Nature of Canadian Interests.'


58 Jamieson, 'Southern Africa,' 18.


60 For a reiteration of this policy, see the letter from Mark MacGuigan, SSEA, and Ed Lumley, minister of state for international trade, to TCCR, 15 June 1982, 11, and 'Canadian Firms Accused of "Plunder" in Namibia,' Ottawa Citizen, 21 July 1984, 5.

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62 DOF was opposed to any deviation from general principles of universal taxation rulings. Jamieson, 'Southern Africa,' 19-20.

63 In 1975, Mitchell Sharp reported that Canadian corporations had approached the government to have the agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal avoidance extended to Namibia. CHCD, 1 May 1975, 5371.


65 The Hudson's Bay Company's involvement in Namibia dated back to 1938. In 1975, it was the world's largest wholesale dealer in karakul furs. Susan Hurlich, 'Up against the Bay: Resource Imperialism and Native Resistance - The Hudson's Bay Co. in Canada and Namibia,' This Magazine, 9, no. 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1975), 5.

66 Ibid., 6.
68 In the early 1970s, Noranda wholly owned Nu Explorations Pty Ltd, a subsidiary involved in drilling for copper and other minerals.
69 In contradiction to the spirit of Canadian economic sanctions, Falconbridge also operated Blanket Mines, a gold mine in Rhodesia, and turned its Connemara Mine over to the Rhodesian government for use as a detention centre for political prisoners. After 20 years working for Blanket Gold Mines, African workers earned under $50 a month. Hugh Nangle, 'Canadians Exploit Blacks in Africa Says Montreal Editor,' Toronto Daily Star, 19 July 1973, 42. 70 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 540. 71 In 1983, after depleting the mine's resources, Falconbridge sold its interest in Oamites and resumed explorations in the territory.
72 George T.N. Woodrooffe, 'This Corporation Believes It Makes Things Better Wherever It Goes,' Canada and the Third World - What Are the Choices? ed. Dean Walker (Toronto: Yorkminster, 1975), 44.
73 Cited in Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, Annual Survey and Documents, 1971-1972 (London: Rex Collings, 1972), 390. See also Roger Murray, Jo Morris, John Dugard, and Neville Rubin, The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia (Uppsala: Africa Publications Trust, 1974), 1. 74 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 543. 75 Rossing mine, a supplier of uranium to Canada through Rio Algom, was designated a Key Point industry and maintained a weapons arsenal and a militia unit to assist the South African army. David Simpson, 'Namibia Mines Private Army,' Guardian (Manchester), 28 May 1982, 17.
76 Cited in John Deverell and the Latin American Working Group, Falconbridge: Portrait of a Canadian Mining Multinational (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1975), 150. 77 Woodrooffe, 'This Corporation Believes,' 47. 78 CHCD, 17 June 1975, 6838, 6862.
80 See Terrance Wills, 'Canada "Won't Curb Trade with Southern Africa,","' Toronto Star, 11 June 1977, A10, and Geoffrey Stevens, 'On the Third Day of the Conference, Mr Trudeau Comes to Life,' Globe and Mail, 11 June 1977, 6. 81 TCCR, 'Canadian Policy towards Southern Africa,' 30. 82 Brilund Mines wholly owned Etosha Petroleum (Pty) Ltd, a company with exploration rights to 116,000 square miles in Namibia. See Winifred Courtney
85 Cited in Martin Bailey, 'Namibia Spells Uranium,' The Nation, 30 April 1977, 525.
86 Ibid., 526. The household subsistence level (HSL) was monitored by economists at the University of Port Elizabeth. See Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty - The South African Challenge (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), chap. 1, 13-30.
87 U.N., Plunder of Namibian Uranium, 5-9. Half of Namibia's GDP was exported in the form of profits to foreign shareholders.
88 Originally, AECL even considered the possibility of nuclear reactor sales to South Africa, but diverging technologies made such sales impossible. Hence, AECL's involvement in South Africa was limited to sales of Cobalt 60 teletherapy units and irradiation equipment for hospitals. Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 182-3.
89 A company official said that Namibian uranium amounted to between 10% and 50% of the amount processed by Eldorado Nuclear. Patrick Martin, 'AntiApartheid Steps "Minimal."
80 UNGA Resolution 35/227 1, adopted 6 March 1981.

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91 Rio Algom was *pivotal* in influencing Canadian officials to enlist other supplier governments in the formation of a uranium cartel. David Nobbs, 'The Southern African Policy Review: The 1977 Reforms and the Diplomacy of Constraint,' master's research essay, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1983, 171.
92 The uranium cartel also included Australia, France, and Great Britain, along with representatives of uranium mining corporations. Its major objective was to restore the price of uranium, and when the price rebounded from $6 to $42 per pound in 1973, the cartel was disbanded.
1984-5), 89.
95 Eric S. Morse, 'Sport and Canadian Foreign Policy,' in Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), esp. 275-7.
96 The International Olympics Committee banned South Africa from the Olympic Games in 1970.
97 Joanne Naiman, Joan Bhabha, and Guy Wright, 'Relations between Canada and South Africa,' U.N. Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents 10/84, Aug. 1984, 37.
98 Such groups included TCLSAC, CCSA, Oxfam Canada, SU CO, CUSO, and CCODP. In addition, the Lutheran and Anglican churches, the Mennonites, and Oxfam Canada funded development projects within Namibia primarily through the Namibian Council of Churches.
99 In May 1970, a conference in Ottawa called for a stronger and more consistent Canadian policy.
100 Letter from B.J. van der Walt, ambassador of South Africa, to Derek C. Hayes, chairman of the board, Oxfam Canada, 18 Dec. 1969, 16.
102 Linda Freeman, Gerald Helleiner, and Robert Matthews, The Commonwealth at Stake (Toronto: Committee for a Just Canadian Policy towards Africa, 1971). The lack of impact of such publications can be seen in the fact that while the House Committee on External Affairs and National Defence held hearings on the White Paper in summer 1971 to which briefs on southern Africa were presented by the Committee for a Just Canadian Policy, CUSO, the NDP, and the YWCA, its report did not even mention southern Africa.
106 However, in 1981, the Royal Bank acquired subsidiary companies which together had $501 m in outstanding loans to South Africa - mostly to ISCOR, the government-owned Iron and Steel Corporation. TCCR, Annual Report 19811982, 11.
107 See, e.g., among Hilborn's many letters to the editor of the Globe and Mail, 'South West Africa,' 5 Oct. 1978, 7; 'Namibia,' 22 Jan. 1979, 7; 'Africans Don't
108 In Dec. 1977, in a meeting sponsored by CUSO and TCLSAC, 20 support
groups
met to coordinate anti-apartheid strategies.
Morrison, ’40 Protest Ontario Trade Mission to South Africa,’
Varsity (University of Toronto), 26 Oct. 1973, 3.
113 In 1982, however, the Davis Conservative government in Ontario did receive a
delegation of three parliamentarians from South Africa's ruling National party.
114 Redekop, 'Commerce over Conscience,' 86. 115 As they had been in South
Africa since the late 19th century, Canadian companies
were able to secure official representation long before formal diplomatic
representation. The first Canadian trade commissioner was appointed by PM
Wilfrid
Laurier in 1902 in Cape Town, and a second office operated briefly in Durban
from 1909 to 1913. An office was opened in 1934 in Johannesburg. In contrast,
the first Canadian high commissioner to South Africa was not appointed until
1940, following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations the previous
year. Tennyson, Canadian Relations, 26, 91, 100-2. 116 Redekop, 'Commerce
over Conscience,' 87. 117 During the first year of Trudeau's government, nine
articles on South Africa
appeared in Foreign Trade with about one to three articles each year until 1974.
T.A. Keenleyside, 'Canada-South Africa Commercial Relations 1977-1982:
Business as Usual?' Canadian Journal of African Studies 17, no. 3 (1983),
452.
118 Foreign Trade 132, no. 10 (8 Nov. 1969), 5.
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119 This emphasis changed dramatically after 1974 when North Africa became
more
important.
120 Redekop, 'Commerce over Conscience,' 87. 121 Government of Canada,
123 The inclusion of Rhodesia on these tours violated Canadian sanctions. 124
Clair Balfour, 'Air Canada Pact with Africans Called Breach of UN Trade Ban,'
Globe and Mail, 2 June 1971, 4.
125 'Jalna in Johannesburg,' Last Post 4, no. 2 (Aug. 1974), 14-15. 126 Jim
Sinclair, 'Business: A Company Like the Others,' Last Post 4, no. 2
127 Redekop, 'Canada and Southern Africa,' 531. 128 In 1981, the foreign
operations of Texasgulf passed out of CDC control as a result
of transactions with Elf-Acquitaine. Through its wholly owned Connaught
Laboratories, the CDC bought a 75% interest in Dumex, a company operating in
South Africa which it also sold in the early 1980s.

129 In this period, other provincial governments, notably Conservative governments in Ontario, were loath, in principle, to make common cause on an issue which had come to be identified with the NDP and the PQ. Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 120.

130 The Quebec sanctions were by far the strongest of provincial regulations: they prohibited Quebec liquor stores from purchasing South African wine and sherry, even on special orders, although South African brandy and liqueurs were still allowed.

131 I am indebted to David Nobbs, 'South African Policy Review,' 111-14, for many of the insights regarding the genesis and significance of the 1977 review.


133 Stephen Biko, one of the most promising black leaders of the 1970s and the leading exponent of Black Consciousness, was murdered in 1977 while in police custody.


139 Don Jamieson, 'Conference on International Human Rights,' Ottawa, 26 Oct. 1978, DEASS 78/13. 7. Jamieson had to make South Africa a special case to justify not taking any action to stop official promotion of economic relations with Pinochet's Chile.


142 In fact, the debate over the withdrawal from South Africa enabled ITC to bargain to keep its financial allotment and staffing resources for its trade services elsewhere. Nobbs, 'South African Policy Review,' 109-10, and Loxley, 'Canada
and South Africa,' 29.
143 The slump was the result of South Africa becoming self-sufficient in the production of key Canadian exports - aluminum pig ingots, newsprint, and wheat. From 1971 to 1973, Canadian exports to South Africa averaged only $58 m, as compared with a yearly average of about $84 m in the previous three years. 144 EDC, Annual Reports, 1970-79.
146 From the inception of ITC's Program for Export Market Development (PEMD) to mid-1982, it supported 141 visits for general explorations and 39 for bidding on capital projects in South Africa by paying half the return air fare, $70/day living expenses, and half the other costs. Keenleyside, 'Canada-South Africa Commercial Relations,' 453.
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Chapter 4: Taking Care of Business
2 Ibid., 350-1.
3 Ibid., 338.
4 Ibid., 346.
7 Crocker, 'South Africa,' 345.
8 For an ultra-right supporter of South Africa on Cold War grounds, see the column by McKenzie Porter, Toronto Sun, 4 Sept. 1981, 11.
9 By contrast, Thorvald Stoltenberg, then under-secretary of state for foreign affairs in Norway, regarded Canadian policy on South Africa as being at least 10 to 15 years behind Scandinavian countries. Comments at a joint Canadian and Scandinavian conference on southern Africa, Carleton University, 19-22 Feb. 1978.


11 The same use was made of the Namibian issue in the late 1980s when an External Affairs official conceded that Canada had interrupted its struggle against white rule in South Africa as it did not wish to upset the final stages of independence in Namibia. 'It's not an ideal time to disturb the weaning mother,' he said. Cited in Paul Koring, 'Muting of Policy on S. Africa Due to Namibia, Officials Say,' Globe and Mail, 23 Sept. 1989, A5.


13 Margaret P. Karns, 'Ad Hoc Multilateral Diplomacy: The United States, the Contact Group and Namibia,' International Organization 41 (Winter 1987), 118. See also 'Charades for Narnibia,' Globe and Mail, 30 April 1980, 6, an editorial making the same point.


334 Notes to pages 83-5


20 Canada stopped the use of EDC's corporate account lending facility for South African buyers of Canadian goods, a facility that had hardly been used, but maintained its export credits insurance and guarantees to Canadian exporters against non-payment of contracts.
28 For example, Sam Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, and Theo Ben Gurirab, SWAPO's U.N. representative, came to Canada at the invitation of External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen and met also with PM Trudeau and other officials in Feb. 1984.

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31 Even in the Mulroney era, Canada abstained from a UNGA vote in Sept. 1986 that urged sanctions against South Africa for its occupation of Namibia. A Canadian diplomat explained that Canada still needed to maintain neutrality as a member of the Contact Group. 'Canada Abstained at UN on Namibia Sanction Vote,' Globe and Mail, 22 Sept. 1986, A8.
33 Minter, King Solomon's Mines, 279. For the extended period from 1947 to 1984,
South Africa was the second largest African borrower (after Zaire) from the IMF. Padayachee, 'IMF and World Bank,' 16.

34 Minter, King Solomon's Mines, 289, and for the next sentence. 35 Cited in Terrance Wills, 'Canada Won't Curb Trade with Southern Africa,' Toronto Star, 11 June 1977, A10.

36 Nobbs 'Southern Africa Policy Review,' and confidential interviews. 37 The confederation had three Noranda executives on its board and George Woodroffe, a former vice president of Falconbridge, as its secretary.

38 In fact, TCCR's mandate came from elected bodies of its member churches which included the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, the Mennonite Central Committee - Canada, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, the United Church of Canada, several religious orders, and, as consultative members, CUSO and the YWCA.


336 Notes to pages 87-91

44 Canada abstained on this vote.

45 Letter to Brian Fraser, chairman, TCCR, from Marc Lalonde, minister of finance, 8 Nov. 1982, 1.

46 Ibid., 2.

47 IMF, 'South Africa - Staff Report for the 1983 Article IV Consultation and Review under the Stand-by Arrangement,' 19 May 1983.


52 The loan bore a 6.6% annual interest rate with four years grace and four years to repay. Morrell, 'South Africa Reneges,' 2. 53 Ibid., 2-3.
57 See also Cranford Pratt, 'Canadian Policy towards the International Monetary Fund: An Attempt to Define a Position,' Canadian Journal of Development Studies 6, no. 1 (1985), 9-26, esp. 23-5. In addition, narrow political considerations do affect the stringency of conditions attached to multilateral loans and the ease of conditions attached to them. See Loxley, 'The IMF, the World Bank, and Sub-Saharan Africa,' 54.
59 The Canadian government first extended the British Preferential Tariff to British South Africa in 1907. This became the 'Trade Agreement between Canada and the Union of South Africa signed at Ottawa, 20 Aug. 1932, entered into force 30 June 1933,' Canada - Treaty Series, 1933, no. 4 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1935). 60 For South African sugar producers, the Canadian market was important, as they were required by law to sell their sugar at fixed prices at home and so looked to overseas markets for higher profits.

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62 SACTU Solidarity Committee, Trafficking in Apartheid - the Case for Sanctions against South Africa (Toronto: SACTU Solidarity Committee, Jan. 1985), 37.
64 Data from the Farm Labour Project cited in SACTU Newsletter, Dec. 1983, 5, and for the next sentence. About 12,000 small Indian or black farmers grew about 10% of the cane harvested while 2,000 white growers produced 70%, and large corporate estates produced the remaining 20%. HOC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 8, 15 July 1986, 92.
65 Ibid., 100.
The immediate effect of the end of the preferences was a dramatic decline in sugar imports from South Africa from 1982 on and a consequent reduction in Canada's trade deficit with South Africa. Sugar's share of Canada's imports from South Africa plummeted from a high of almost 70% in 1975 to barely 10% in 1983.

CHCD, 22 June 1970, 8407.


Calculated from Trade of Canada - Exports by Countries, vols. 27-36, 4, and Trade of Canada - Imports by Countries, vols. 27-36, 4.


Cited in Michael Valpy, 'Nyerere Chides Canadians on South Africa "Blood Money,"' Vancouver Sun, 10 Aug. 1979, B 1.


Krugerrands were a way of selling one-quarter of South Africa's gold at a premium price and were one of the first targets of the sanctions campaign. As late as 1984 the CBC broadcast a commercial advertising Krugerrands.


For a classic article establishing the nature of this relationship, see Harold Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa,' Economy and Society 1, no. 4 (Nov. 1972), 425-56.

Notes to pages 93-6


YWCA of Canada, Investment in Oppression (Toronto: YWCA of Canada, May 1973), and TCCR, Investment in Oppression, rev. ed. (Toronto: TCCR, 1979). Under this prodding, some companies, like Alcan, did start checking on their practices in South Africa.

Hugh Nangle's seven articles appeared in the Ottawa Citizen from 22 to 29 June 1973 and also in the Montreal Gazette. Nangle found that Alcan paid almost all of its black workers below the poverty datum line; Massey-Ferguson 88% below; and Bata two-thirds below. At the time, Massey-Ferguson had pre-tax returns of 21.5% on its total capital in the previous five years.
89 Renate Pratt, 'Social and Humanitarian Implications of Canadian Transnational Corporate Involvement in South Africa and Namibia,' paper for a seminar on the role of Canadian TNCs in South Africa and Namibia, Montreal, 10-12 Dec. 1982, 3.
90 Cited in John Loxley, 'Canada and South Africa,' Canadian Dimension 15, no. 6 (June-July 1981), 29.
91 HOC, SCHR, 16 July 1986, 49. 92 Letter from MacGuigan and Lumley to TCCR, 7, n74 supra. 93 Removal of this agreement in the U.S. was one of the most effective inducements for getting U.S. companies to leave South Africa.
94 Letter from MacGuigan and Lumley to TCCR, 7, n74 supra. 95 Cited in Bill Levitt, 'Bata Uses Apartheid for Profit,' Ottawa Citizen, 11 June 1982, 27.
AN
Notes to pages 96-8 339
99 Owning only 35% of Transage, a South African company producing magnetic wire, Noranda's Canada Wire and Cable company refused to raise questions with Transage about military or police use of its products. Falconbridge also used its minority interest to disclaim responsibility for the deplorable conditions in its mines. See the revealing testimony of Kilburn, to HOC, SCHR, 16 July 1986 49-50.
105 Falconbridge held a 25% equity investment in Western Platinum Ltd, Superior Oil held 24%, and Lonrho 51%.
107 TCCR, 'Report on the Question Period of the Annual General Meeting of Falconbridge Ltd, 17 April 1985.'
109 Ibid., 49, 52.
110 Therefore, in the early 1970s, the Canadian government regarded Bata Industries Ltd as 100% foreign controlled.
112 In addition, Bata operated a tannery at Uitenhage and 20 retail stores. 113 Hugh Nangle, 'Bata Paying Blacks below Poverty Line,' Ottawa Citizen, 27 June 1973, 47.

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340 Notes to pages 98-101
115 For an indication of Thomas Bata's views on this issue, see 'End to Apartheid Could Bring Bata Back to South Africa,' advertising supplement, Globe and Mail, 31 May 1994, C2.
118 'Report of the National Union of Textile Workers of South Africa.' Cited in TCCR, Annual Report 1981-1982, 21; Valpy, 'Parsing the Poverty in KwaZulu,' and Valpy, 'Bata Contravenes Ottawa Code on South Africa.' Also see Kilgour, 'Real Politics of Bata.'
126 One union organizer was treated so abusively by police that he was able to obtain an out-of-court settlement against them. 127 HOC, SCHR, 17 July 1986, 94-103. 128 DEA, 'Code of Conduct,' 3. 129 In 1973, DEA officials said they could not validate these exports as Canada no longer had a representative in Salisbury. 130 Valpy, 'KwaZulu Chief Minister Gives Press Bata Letter,' and Bissell, 'Canadian Support for Bata Workers.' 131 See Joe Clark's defence of this approach in CHCD, 19 June 1986, 14693-5. 132 Hugh Nangle, 'For Blacks It's Better with Ford,' Province (Vancouver), 3 July 1973, 5. 133 Although it was controlled by the Middle East and African Division of Ford in the U.S., Ford South Africa was a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford of Canada until its divestiture, and Ford of Canada is 88.5% owned by Ford USA. 134 Ken Traynor, 'Pensions and Apartheid,' CUPE - The Facts, Nov. 1984, 29. 135 In 1985, Ford South Africa merged with Amcar Holdings, a unit of Anglo American, to form the South African Motor Co (Samcor), owning 42% of the company. By then, with almost 8,000 employees, the joint venture was the largest South African employer in which a 'Canadian' company had a stake.

Notes to pages 103-6 341
Chapter 5: Arming Apartheid
2 SIPRI. Cited in David B. Ottaway, 'South Africa Arms Embargo Too Late,' Manchester Guardian Weekly, 13 Nov. 1977, 16.
5 Exports of spare parts constituted two-thirds of the value of total arms exports from Canada to South Africa since the Second World War. Ibid.
6 Canadian authorities also did not prosecute a Toronto arms broker who in 1974 arranged for the export of surface-to-air missiles, 41 Centurion tanks, and two squadrons of Hawker-Hunter aircraft from Jordan to Rhodesia via South Africa. Ibid., 791.
7 For the record of Canadian votes on U.N. General Assembly Resolutions on South Africa from 1981 to 1983, see SACTU Solidarity Committee, Trafficking in Apartheid - the Case for Canadian Sanctions against Apartheid (Toronto: SACTU Solidarity Committee, Jan. 1985), 6.
8 Cawthra, Brutal Force, 92-3; and Gert Slob, 'Computerizing Apartheid - Export of Computer Hardware to South Africa,' (Amsterdam: Holland Committee on Southern Africa, May 1990), 32-3.
11 ARMSCOR is a parastatal agency of the South African government that produces and purchases arms.
13 Ultimately, the South African government did sign the non-proliferation treaty in Sept. 1991, some believed as a pre-emptive measure to prevent full disclosure of its true nuclear capability. The decision to dismantle its nuclear capability was influenced by Western concern that it not fall into ANC hands.
15 See Renate Pratt, 'From the Gold Mines to Bay Street: In Search of Corporate Social Responsibility,' in Canadian Churches and Foreign Policy, ed. Bonnie Greene (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1990), 114-17.
16 Ford denied it was a Key Points industry but made arrangements with the South African government, nonetheless, to defend its plant and products with a militia unit.
Massey-Ferguson Nederland, a Dutch subsidiary, owned 18.95% of Fedmech Holdings Ltd and had 2 members on Fedmech's 11-person board of directors. Massey-Ferguson diluted its holdings in Fedmech from a majority share in 1980 to 7% in 1989.

23 'South Africa Driving a Perilous Road to Diesel Self-Reliance,' Business Week, 16 June 1980, 76-7, and 'South Africa - A Drive for Strength to Offset Sanctions,' Business Week, 21 May 1979, 47. Hippos and Rhinos were the vehicles used extensively in South African townships to put down demonstrations.

24 ADE was designated a Key Points industry by the South African government. A Varity official stated that by July 1986 Atlantis Diesel had produced 100,000 Perkins engines. HOC, SCHR, 17 July 1986, 83.


28 Joan Breckenridge, 'Firms Reject Disinvestment,' Globe and Mail, 11 March 1985, B8; Sheldon Gordon, 'Pricking Corporate Consciences,' Globe and Mail.

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29 In 1986, a Varity official claimed that wages had been improved to meet the standards of the Canadian code.

30 The federal government held 2.7% of Varity's common shares and 10.3% of class II shares. The Ontario government acquired 1.6% of its common shares and 6.2% of class II shares. TCCR, 'News Release,' 7 Jan. 1988.

31 It was not until the different era of 1987 and 1988 that the Ontario and federal governments backed an interchurch shareholders' resolution calling for Massey-Ferguson to terminate its investments and all business relationships in South Africa.


34 Letter from TCCR to Don Jamieson, 7 Nov. 1978, 4. 35 David Haslam, 'The Financing of South Africa's Nuclear Programme,' U.N. Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents 17/81, March 1981.

37 SRC was also connected to defence establishments in Holland and West Germany. 'The Dusseldorf Connection,' Africa (U.K.) X28, Facts and Reports 10, no. 10 (Nov. 1980), 7.
39 John Cavanagh, 'The Bronfman Family - Whiskey Barons Smuggle Arms to South Africa,' Counter Spy 7, no. 4 (June-Aug. 1983), 51. In 1975, SRC also sold a computerized system of air traffic control simulation complete with field maintenance engineers to Johannesburg. Simulators were not embargoed items, and there were no restrictions on their export. Bull may actually have organized exports of parts for the G-6 gun in the 1980s. Dale Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors: The Life of Gerald Bull (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1991), 170-4.

344 Notes to pages 110-11
43 Cited in Lowther, Arms and the Man, 142. 44 See Helmoed-Romer Heitman, War in Angola - the Final South African Phase (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1990).
45 Allister Sparks, 'S.A. Arms Industry.' International Herald Tribune, 24 Sept. 1982, and Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 141-2. 46 Cited in Heitman, War in Angola, 343-4. 47 Until the deal with South Africa, First Pennsylvania had received little repayment of loans to SRC worth $14 m. In 1976, moreover, the bank had advanced another $14.5 m to SRC for the production of forgings destined for South Africa. Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 112, 135.
49 Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 144-5. 50 For its export version, the G-6 was mounted on an armoured chassis, travelling at 65 mph on good roads and 25 mph on rough terrain. The vehicle is fitted with grenade launchers and a light anti-aircraft machine-gun; it can fire shells more than 30 miles. For a discussion of the contributions of Bull and South African scientists to this system, see Lowther, Arms and the Man, 141-2.
51 The British arms dealer, Mark Thatcher, son of former PM Margaret Thatcher, had connections with Bull and the South African, American, and Chilean military export of high technology goods to Iraq. Ben-Menashe claims the CIA used

52 ARMSCOR sold 100 155-mm howitzers to Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, South Africa sold the United Arab Emirates 50 to 70 G-6 155-mm howitzers a week after Iraq invaded Kuwait. See 'Error in Bid to Sell Long Range Gun,' SouthScan, 6 April 1990, 99; 'Ferranti Man Key Figure in Gulf Armscor Missile Link,' SouthScan, 1 Dec. 1990, 367; 'G-5s Will Fire from Both Sides,' SouthScan, 25 Jan. 1991, 29.


54 Adams, Bull's Eye, 208.

55 SRC was originally established in 1960 as the Space Research Institute with financial assistance from the Canadian government to do high-altitude space research. In 1967, the company was renamed Space Research Corporation, and in 1971 its research changed to designing and manufacturing weapons. See ibid., chaps. 3-6.

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56 (CP) 'Montreal Firms' Dreams Come to Abrupt End,' Ottawa Citizen, 29 Nov. 1980, 30.

57 Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 115-16. 58 Ibid., 118. Bull said that government assistance was a reward for creating jobs in a depressed area, but he also maintained that officials promised much more financial aid than they ever delivered. Adams, Bull's Eye, 133-4.

59 Bull's experiments gave hope to some U.S. military planners that a nuclear war was winnable or, at least, that orbiting nuclear warheads launched into space using Bull's specially developed gun would provide a cheap and highly effective deterrent against Soviet advances in conventional warfare. Adams, 'South Africa, Israel and the Nuclear Howitzer,' 38-71.

60 Only twice before had the U.S. given foreigners honorary American citizenship to the Marquis de Lafayette after the U.S. War of Independence and to Winston Churchill.

61 At the time, U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird praised Bull's 'excellent technical capability and clear thinking.'


63 Adams, 'South Africa, Israel and the Nuclear Howitzer,' and Bull's Eye, chaps. 9 and 11.

64 For a time, the Bronfman family owned a 49% interest in SRC through its investment firm Great West Saddlery Co. In the early 1970s, the Bronfmans
sold their interest in SRC-Quebec to a family trust controlled by Gerald Bull, but retained their interest in SRC-U.S. and a subsidiary in Barbados.

65 The ammunition dealer, Poudrières R–unies de Belgique (PRB), convinced Bull to establish a joint venture, Space Research (International), based in Brussels in which PRB commanded a controlling interest. 66 See Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 133-5. 67 Ibid., 87, and Cavanagh, 'Bronfman Family,' 51-2. 68 A former company official claimed that in 1976 SRC also routinely shipped small quantities of shells by air from Montreal to Johannesburg labelled as 'small machine parts.' Mark Abley, 'Adventures in the Arms Trade: A Canadian Saga,' Canadian Forum, April 1979, 11.


71 Chief protagonists against SRC were the Antigua Workers Union (AWU) and the Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM).

72 As a result, the Antiguan defence forces were deputized to handle SRC cargo.

73 In Nov. 1978, the Antiguan and Barbadian governments finally suspended all SRC activities in their countries, with the exception of the operation of the airport radar installations at Grantly Adam International Airport in Barbados.

74 The actual sentence was a year's imprisonment each with six months suspended. 75 At any rate, the company filed for bankruptcy shortly after. Lowther, Arms and the Man, 140.

76 Bull was murdered in Brussels in 1990, probably at the hands of Mossad agents in the midst of more arms dealings in the Middle East and in particular the sale of a supergun to Iraq. See Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, 256-9, 305, 309.

77 John Stockwell insisted that both the Department of Defense and the State Department at the highest levels (including Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state) would have known and approved a deal of this nature. 'W5,' CTV, March 1981. Cited in Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 127-8.


80 Published 30 March 1982. Cited in Adams, Bull's Eye, 204-5. 81 Cited in ibid., 206.

82 The trouble was that Nkomo's story was partly incorrect; he said that a Canadian-based company was shipping small arms to Rhodesia. Trudeau ordered an immediate RCMP investigation, but Nkomo's error helped to divert attention from
the larger issue of arms sales to South Africa.
83 Bull referred to groups opposing SRC's activities in the eastern Caribbean as 'Castro-Communists.'
84 The PM's son (who was also the deputy PM) was retained as SRC's legal representative for Antigua. The Antiguan attorney general and minister of education were also reported to be closely involved on SRC's side. In April 1978, the Antiguan government actually published a 48-page booklet staunchly defending SRC. Adams, Bull's Eye, 162.
86 The RCMP did not go to Antigua until late April 1978, almost six and a half months after the story broke in Canada.
87 William Cran produced the story of SRC's arms sales to South Africa on both the BBC's 'Panorama' and the CBC's 'Fifth Estate' on 7 Nov. 1978. See Emery, 'Shipments of Long-Range Shells'; and Ross Henderson and David Taylor, 'Five Nations Probe Arms Deal,' Observer, 12 Nov. 1978, 2.
88 DEA, Dossier 27-16-1-CARIB 1 C0746, Vol. I, 77/01/31 to 78/03/15, and Vol. II, 78/03/16 to 92/11/16.
89 Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 149.
91 CHCD, 8 Nov. 1978, 915.
97 Cited in Moon, 'Ottawa Wants Changes.' In 1980, SRC had a contract with DND worth $5 m. Wallin, 'Ottawa May Be Partner.'
99 During the 1980s, the Canadian government moved quickly to erase this unpleasant history, helping to close Bull's companies and even denying him a passport.
See Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 166-8, 204-5.
100 'Space Research Case Is Closed,' Ottawa Citizen, 19 Aug. 1980, 6. 101 'A moins que les autorités fédérales aient été complètement inéptes, que nos services de sécurité aient été aveugles.' Jean Claude LeClerc, 'La condamnation de Space Research,' Le Devoir, 18 Aug. 1980, 12.
102 Letter to TCCR from SSEA Mark Macguigan and Ed Lumley, the minister of state for international trade, June 1982. 103 CHCD, 25 May 1965, 1612.
105 Ibid., 23-4.
106 Grant, Wilderness of Mirrors, 171. 107 Cited in Stephen Overbury, 'Blood Money,' Today, 12 Dec. 1981, 8. 108 Levy Auto Parts was a Canadian firm that specialized in rebuilding tank engines and transmissions for NATO countries. Adams believes that these particular shipments were also coordinated by Bull. Adams, Bull's Eye, 138. 109 Overbury, 'Blood Money,' 16.
110 Levy Auto Parts went into receivership in 1987, partly as markets for second-hand military surplus goods declined once superpowers provided credits for the sale of their new high technology defence equipment. Kimberly Noble, 'Levy's Saga Built on Scraps and Scrapes,' Globe and Mail, 13 June 1987, B 1, B20. 111 See esp. Slob, 'Computerizing Apartheid.' 112 Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 168. For example, the U.S. and Israel provided the South African government with a program to track and then murder dissidents. This information was then passed on to 'Buthelezi's black death squads.' Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, 139-40.
113 See 'South Africa: Apartheid System Gets Supercomputer Technology,' Southern Africa Chronicle, 3 July 1989, 3. By contrast, such items could not be sold to Warsaw Pact countries if they strengthened a socialist state's strategic capacity. See Slob, 'Computerizing Apartheid,' 37-42.
114 SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, 30, 32. Control Data disinvested from South Africa in 1988.

122 Slob, 'Computerizing Apartheid,' 33. 124 Plessey developed a pilotless plane for military tracking and a mobile radar system used by the South African military. 'Britain, W. Germany "Sending Battlefield Tracking Equipment,"' SouthScan, 9 June 1988, 5.

125 SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, 29. 126 HOC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 16 July 1986, 97. 127 This position was reaffirmed by Monique B6gin as the Canadian representative to the Fourth Committee of the UNGA. Canadian Delegation to U.N., 'Statement on the Problem on Southern Africa,' Communiqui, 5 Nov. 1973, 3.


129 Liberation movements from South Africa were included by a top CIDA officer.


130 Cited in CCIC, 'Canadian Humanitarian Assistance to South Africans,' brief to DEA, n.d., 5.

131 The program began in 1975-76 with a grant to an agriculture training centre and continued with multiyear programs for an ANC school in Morogoro, Tanzania, and an ANC research and information centre in Lusaka.

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132 For CUSO, these proposals included the next phase of the ANC research and information centre (jointly funded with CCODP and European Catholic organizations), the ANC school in Morogoro, and a new request for a child care program in Morogoro, also supported by MATCH, a Canadian NGO specializing in assistance to women. Oxfam Canada had a farm project turned down, and MATCH had a project with ANC women refused.


136 At this point, the government would not grant charitable status to IDAFSA - the Canadian branch of the International Defence and Aid Fund for South Africa, a voluntary organization providing assistance to detainees and their families - on the grounds that its objectives were too political.
137 By contrast, in this period, the Nordic countries established bilateral relations with the ANC and provided substantial humanitarian assistance, despite the fact that they maintained diplomatic relations with the South African government. In 1979, Sweden gave almost $1 m to the ANC. CCIC brief, 'Canadian Humanitarian Assistance,' 7.

138 Calculated from CIDA, Annual Reports, 1966-7 to 1984-5. 139 CIDA provided matching grants for community development projects, assistance to small-scale agriculture, and basic services such as water supplies and health care. The University of Calgary, CCODP, and the Coady International Institute were also involved in projects in KwaZulu.

140 This figure includes Canadian multilateral assistance to UNETPSA and IUEF, where two-thirds of the assistance went to refugees from South Africa, and the UN Trust Fund for South Africa; bilateral assistance, and assistance through CIDA's NGO division, from the beginning of the various programs to half of 1984-5. Additional assistance was granted through contributions to UNICEF and the International Red Cross.

141 Cited in John Saul, 'Afterword: Canada and Mozambique,' Canada and Mozambique (Toronto: DEC and TCLPAC, 1974), 78.

Chapter 6: Forces for Change

1 'Where to Draw the Line?' Globe and Mail, 3 July 1990, A18.

3 In the two years of the uprising, South African police shot and killed more than 300 children and wounded more than 950 with gunfire.
6 Ibid., 6.
7 'South Africa and Its Neighbours,' draft study for CCFMSA (89) 2, Harare, Feb. 1989, 12.
9 Conversion to Canadian dollars is difficult as the rand was fluctuating widely in this period between Cdn.$0.30 and Cdn.$0.65, 'Quarterly Reports,' the South

10 South Africa's short-term debt of $14 b (nearly 60% of the total foreign debt of $24 b) could not be covered by its foreign exchange and gold reserves, plus its estimated $2.5 b trade surplus for 1985. Merle Lipton, Sanctions and South Africa - the Dynamics of Economic Isolation, Special Report No. 1119 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), 58.


15 See Linda Freeman, 'All But One - Britain, the Commonwealth and Sanctions,' Sanctions against Apartheid, ed. Mark Orkin (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), 142-56.

16 Malcolm Fraser, 'No More Talk: Time to Act,' Times (London), 30 June 1986, 16.

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20 Significantly, Lewis drafted parts of Mulroney's Oct. 1985 speech at the U.N., including the sections that promised that, unless South Africa abandoned apartheid, Canada would invoke total sanctions.

21 The term 'frontline states' refers to an informal association of countries within southern Africa - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania - that coordinated resistance to wars of destabilization waged by South
Africa against them in the apartheid era.

23 Testimony of Marc Brault, assistant deputy minister Africa and Middle East branch, DEA, HOC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 6, 19 June 1986, 20.
27 Clark, 'Canada's Role in Southern Africa,' 5. See also this point in the government's defence of its meeting with ANC President Oliver Tambo in Sept. 1987. CHCD, 29 Sept. 1987, 9477.
30 Ibid., 14406.

352 Notes to pages 136-8
33 During this period, QIT carried on with earlier expansion plans in its mining interest in Richards Bay, constructing a smelting furnace and other infrastructure.
35 The reintroduction of a two-tier exchange rate for the rand established a special 'financial' rand for non-resident sellers of South African assets which was intended to discourage disinvestment by imposing generally unfavourable terms.
36 The 1984 figure from SACTU Solidarity Committee estimates the value of assets.

40 The Manitoba government donated proceeds from the sale to the Manitoba Coalition against Apartheid.

41 Just before Ontario imposed its ban, the Ontario liquor board placed a very substantial order (worth nearly $500,000) for South African liquor and wines. Ultimately, though, the Ontario government unloaded this wine, cutting the price by 20%.

42 In British Columbia anonymous threats to poison the wine and acts of civil disobedience, with individuals smashing bottles of South African wine in liquor stores, provided additional incentives. See Stan Persky, 'If I Had a Hammer: Breaking Botha's Bottles,' This Magazine 20, no. 4 (Oct.-Nov. 1986), 33-6. 43 Indeed, in Sept. 1985, South Africa delivered a formal protest about the liquor bans to GATF.

Notes to pages 138-40 353
46 In some respects, the Ontario government was behind state governments in the USA: it was not prepared to shed South Africa related holdings in pension plans (over $441 m) or its direct equity investment of $26.3 m in Varity Corp. 'Ontario Government Involvement in South Africa,' New Democrats News Release, 20 May 1986. See also Robert Sheppard, 'Ontario to Probe South African Holdings,' Globe and Mail, 21 May 1986, A5.
47 While this prohibition affected Ontario jails, hospitals and universities were exempted.
49 Michael Stevenson, 'Divestment Breakthrough in Ontario,' Southern Africa Report, May 1989, 24-5. The new legislation was supported by the Ontario Council of University Faculty Associations.
50 Swiss banks were reported to have made gold swaps and gold loans of over $2 b to South Africa from 1985 to 1989 in addition to loan exposure of an equal amount. Through the Zurich gold market, they also handled gold exports worth $4 b annually from South Africa. Letter to Joseph A Ghiz, Premier of Prince Edward Island, from Sheila Kappler, chairperson, TCCR, 31 Aug. 1989.
51 McLean McCarthy Ltd, a local investment dealer owned by Deutsche Bank,
became ineligible to participate in future underwriting for the province or for Ontario Hydro.

52 Minutes of Regular Council, City of Vancouver, 12 Sept. 1989. 53 The City of Toronto developed a comprehensive policy, discouraging economic or other relations with South Africa, and calling on the federal government to impose total mandatory economic sanctions. City of Toronto, 'Apartheid in South Africa,' statement of Toronto City Council policy, Jan. 1986.

54 However, this policy was not fully implemented as dealings continued with Shell Canada.

55 In developing this policy, Montreal worked closely with anti-apartheid groups like CIDMAA and representatives from the black community.

56 In July 1986, the Canadian Teachers' Federation supported a boycott against South African products and raised funds to help black teachers in South Africa. 57 The United Food and Commercial Workers pressured the Canadian Armed Forces to stop buying South African products months before the government itself decided to embargo them.

58 The United Auto Workers were able to get Chrysler, and later General Motors and Ford, to divest pension funds from Canadian corporations involved in South Africa in Dec. 1982, an action which even the United Church of Canada failed to take. By contrast, the Canadian Medical Association decided not to divest itself of $51.2 m in stocks of companies operating in South Africa.

59 In 1986, most supermarkets (e.g., Safeway, Overwaitea, La Ferme Carnaval, Woodwards, Valdis, Gifford, and Dominion Stores) banned South African products, leaving Loblaws and Steinberg as two conspicuous holdouts. Canada's second largest food distribution company, Provigo, and its fourth, IGA Boniprix, suspended sales of fresh food imports from South Africa after they received a threat that these imports would be poisoned randomly.

60 See Pagan International, 'Shell U.S. South Africa Strategy,' Washington, DC, 6 June 1986, a study advising the Royal Dutch Shell Group on how to oppose such boycotts.

61 CLC, 'Canadian Labour Joins International Boycott of Shell Oil,' Information, 12 May 1987. The CLC also participated in the campaign to expose the maltreatment of Bata's labour force in KwaZulu.

62 With about $400,000 for assistance to South African trade unions from 1984 to 1986, the CLC became a significant actor. Roger Southall, 'The Development and Delivery of "Northern" Worker Solidarity to South African Trade Unions in the 1970s and 1980s,' Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 32, no. 2 (July 1994), 176.

63 Of the more than 100 COSATU officials who came to Canada, a sizeable number
went on to assume important positions in the first post-apartheid government. By 1986, SSC activists had spoken to 25,000 labour activists, raised $150,000 from 230 donors, and received endorsements from the CLC’s provincial federations in Ontario and Alberta, the CSN and teacher’s federation in Quebec, and the Confederation of Canadian Unions. Marv Gandall, 'The CLC Abroad,' This Magazine 19, no. 6 (February 1986), 8.

65 For example, the president of the Brotherhood of Railway Transport Workers drew attention to the fact that loopholes in sanctions regulations allowed Canadian National and Canadian Pacific to purchase steel castings from South Africa in Jan. 1987. See CHCD, 12 Feb. 1987, 3373-4. 66 SACTU, Trafficking in Apartheid, 17. 67 SACTU, a trade union federation formed in 1955, became part of the Congress alliance and, though never formally banned, was forced underground and into exile by 1965. See Baskin, Striking Back, 12-16, 430-1.


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69 See Gandall, 'The CLC Abroad,’ 4-10, and ‘More on the CLC's Affairs,’ This Magazine 20, no. 1 (April 1986), 35-8.

70 As government policy prohibited funding of liberation movements in this period, the CLC was also concerned to establish that its connection did not go beyond expressions of solidarity. 'The CLC and CIDA in Southern Africa,' 1983. See also John Harker, CLC memo, 5 Oct. 1977, cited in Southall, 'Development and Delivery,’ 176-7.


73 ICCAF's constituent members are the Anglican Church of Canada, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, and the United Church of Canada.

74 See, e.g., the letters from the Canadian Council of Churches to Mulroney, 10 July 1986 and 31 July 1987, and CHC, SCHR 7, 14 July 1986, 3-51. A CCC chair, Archbishop Ted Scott, served also as Canada's representative on a Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons.

79 See the correspondence between TCCR and Shell Canada, 14 Nov. 1986 and 10 Dec. 1986. Three groups challenged Shell in the courts in 1989 over its refusal to submit a shareholder resolution from them requiring Shell to disinvest from South Africa. Shell Canada was also one of the largest exporters of sulphur to South Africa. See TCCR, 'Shell Canada,' May 1989.
80 In the mid-1980s, some churches altered their approach, switching from direct pressure on corporations to divestment. In Aug. 1986, e.g., the United Church decided to sell $26 m of shares in companies with direct equity investments in South Africa. The church also held about $180 m in about 50 firms with South African connections. Ann Auman, 'South Africa Still a Dilemma for Church Funds,' Toronto Star, 23 Aug. 1986, C1. The decision was taken with some misgivings about losing the leverage that in the past had enabled churches to pressure corporations themselves to leave South Africa.
81 Trent and York (through the Osgoode Law Society) conferred honorary degrees in absentia to jailed ANC leader Nelson Mandela, Mount Allison University gave an honorary degree to Archbishop Tutu, and the University of Toronto to Sam Ramsamy, the anti-apartheid campaigner who helped coordinate the international sports boycott. The University of Western Ontario gave an honorary doctorate of laws to white anti-apartheid activist Helen Suzman.
82 Protests at such events grew into major confrontations at Dalhousie University, Carleton, Queen's, and the University of Toronto.
83 'The Academic Boycott: Kingston, May 1988,' Southern Africa Report, July 1988, 31-3. At the same time, the Canadian Association of University Teachers protested South African government attempts to require university administrations to police their own campuses.
86 Valerie Shore, 'Debate on Divestment Continues,' University Affairs, Jan. 1986, 4. 87 In April 1989, the University of Windsor went further than other universities in deciding to extend its policy on divestment to its largest pension fund; this entailed the sale of $9.6 m or 10% of the fund.
89 See George Connell, 'Politics, Principles and Vigorous Debate,' Graduate (University of Toronto), Sept.-Oct. 1985, 18.
94 Connell, 'President's Report,' 7.

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96 '72 Professors Support Divestment,' Varsity (University of Toronto), 5 March 1987, 4-5.
97 However, Connell was defended in letters to the Globe and Mail from the university's chancellor, John B. Aird, the chairman of the governing council, St Clair Balfour, and the president of the student's administrative council, Ellen Ladowsky, 2 Dec. 1987, A6, and 5 Dec. 1987, D7.
98 While the university sold $1.26 m in investments in companies that dealt with South Africa in 1988, it stalled on the sale of pension holdings of $22.3 m until 1990 when the era of formal apartheid came to an end. Beverley Smith, 'Students Assail University over Pace of Divestment,' Globe and Mail, 2 Feb. 1990, A8, and Margaret Polanyi, 'University of Windsor Pension Fund to Dump South African Investments,' Globe and Mail, 26 April 1989, A1.
99 Until the mid 1980s, the Toronto-based CCSA also coordinated anti-apartheid action. Prominent in this network were exiled South Africans.
100 In Toronto, the black community was central to the Rally against Apartheid Committee.
101 In Halifax, the black community organized through the Coalition against Apartheid. 102 The conference was held at the Palais de Congr--s, Montreal, 27 Feb. to 1 March 1987 with its full title, 'Taking Sides in Southern Africa - a National Conference on
Canada's Role in International Action to End Apartheid and to Support SADCC.'
103 See Nancy Thede, 'Quebec and Southern Africa: Still Crazy after All These Years,' Southern Africa Report, May 1989, 11-13, 33.
104 Guests included Canada's former ambassador to the U.N. Stephen Lewis; former moderator of the United Church of Canada Lois Wilson; Ontario NDP leader and future premier Bob Rae; former Saskatchewan premier Allan Blakeney; Ontario Federation of Labour President Gordon Wilson; Union of Ontario Indians Chief Gordon Peters; and Archbishop Edward (Ted) Scott.
105 Cited in Don Munton and Tim Shaw, 'Apartheid and Canadian Public Opinion,' International Perspectives, Sept.-Oct. 1987, 10, and 'Canadians Want More Done to Fight Apartheid, Poll says,' Toronto Star, 12 Feb. 1987, A26. 106 Cited in Munton and Shaw, 'Canadians Want More Done.' 107 About one in five Canadians consistently opposed any sort of Canadian action against South Africa, either because they supported the white government or because they opposed any sort of international involvement. 108 As we have seen, this figure represents a dramatic change in Canadian public opinion; in July 1961, about 50% of Canadians favoured continuing friendly relations with South Africa without criticizing its racial policies.

358 Notes to pages 149-52
Chapter 7: Seizing the Moment
7 Stephen Lewis, 'Apartheid - a Violation of Fundamental Human Rights,' statement to UNGA, 20 Nov. 1984, DEASS 84/14, 3.
8 Ibid., 1.
9 However, an Ottawa Citizen editorial blasted Lewis for concentrating too much on 'the many faults of the South African government, rather than trying to find areas of

11 This position was repeated at a session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in March 1985.

12 See CHCD, 1985, for 15 Feb., 2398; 26 Feb., 2536-7; 21 March, 3241; 22 March, 3289; 9 Sept., 6397; 10 Sept., 6459; and 6 Nov., 8399.

13 Ibid., 21 March 1985, 3267-75. See also, Warren Allmand in CHCD, 15 April 1985, 3715-16.

14 CHCD, 21 March 1985, 3270-2.

15 As part of this process, DEA organized a round table for officials to discuss policy on South Africa with representatives from the private sector (with officials from Alcan, Bata, and Falconbridge), TCCR, and the CLC in April 1985.

16 Stephen Lewis, 'The Situation in Namibia,' address to the UNSC, 13 June 1985, DEASS 85/3, 4.

17 Ibid., 2.


19 Joe Clark, 'Statement on South Africa,' Baie Comeau, 6 July 1985, DEASS 85/37.

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20 While Canadians lost their blanket exemption from having to pay Canadian taxes under the double taxation agreement, under the Income Tax Act they still could claim credit for taxes paid in South Africa. Only if the Canadian tax rate was higher than in South Africa would companies pay taxes in Canada. This 'reform' simply meant additional paper work for Canadian companies but no significant loss of benefits.

21 The government also said it would appoint an official to administer the Canadian code of conduct, but reporting was still to be voluntary, and Canadian companies operating in Namibia were exempted.

22 Clark, 'Statement on South Africa,' 2. 23 CHCD, 9 Sept. 1985, 6397.


27 For an editorial approving the Canadian approach and castigating the American delay, see 'An Unconscionable Wait in the Wings,' Ottawa Citizen, 26 Sept. 1985, A8.

28 CHCD, 18 June 1985, 5905.

29 'For a United Protest,' Globe and Mail, 9 Aug. 1985, 6. 30 Larry Hill, 'Economic Sanctions Ruled Out by Clark,' Winnipeg Free Press,
16 Aug. 1985, 1.
33 CHCD, 10 Sept. 1985, 6483. Also NDP MPs Steven Langdon and Howard McCurdy called a news conference to urge stronger action from the government. 'PCs Urged to Act on South African Rhetoric,' Globe and Mail, 30 Aug. 1985, 4.
34 CHCD, 9 Sept. 1985, 6397.
35 Joe Clark, 'Statement in the House Of Commons, 13 September 1985,' DEASS 85/8, 1.
36 See Chapter 9, 'Running on Empty - The Politics of Sanctions Fatigue,' and Chapter 12, "Smoke and Mirrors" - Canada's Sanctions Policy. 
37 The one exception in the largest five Canadian chartered banks, the Bank of Montreal, had provided a 1982 export finance loan. Banks reported $200 m in loans currently outstanding to South African interests but not directly to the South African government. Jeff Sallot, 'Ottawa Adds Pressure on Pretoria Government,' Globe and Mail, 15 Sept. 1985, 1.
38 Ironically, the first administrator of the code, John Small, found that the Canadian embassy in Pretoria fell short of the code's requirements on minimum wages for black gardeners in its employ. Martin Cohn, 'Canadian Embassy in South Africa Underpays Blacks Federal Study Says,' Toronto Star, 28 June 1987, A2.
42 To prepare for the Nassau meeting, Mulroney met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in Ottawa before the conference and despatched a special envoy, Bernard Wood, to meet with other leaders of the frontline states.
47 Cited in Jeff Sallot, 'Thatcher Moves "Tiny Little Bit" to Back Sanctions,'

48 John Harker of the CLC came up with the idea of an EPG in a draft memo to CLC president Dennis McDermott who suggested the idea to Bahamian PM Lyndon Pindling and Australian PM Bob Hawke. Paddy Sherman, 'Afterthought That Was Planned,' Ottawa Citizen, 26 Oct. 1985, B2.

49 An earlier choice, former PM Trudeau, declined an invitation to be Canada's emissary to the EPG.

50 EPG, Mission to South Africa, 137. 51 Ibid., 138.

52 In this action, Mulroney was supported by both the Liberal and NDP parties, whose spokesmen called for stronger economic and diplomatic sanctions. CHCD, 20 May 1986, 13408-9.


54 Ibid., 2 June 1986, 13857-89.

55 The growing impatience in Canada can be seen in the Toronto Star's contention that 'the Botha government has clearly demonstrated that it won't move on.

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56 Bernard Wood was again asked to consult with Commonwealth leaders, and Roy McMurtry represented Canada at the U.N. world conference on sanctions in Paris in June 1986.

57 In addition, the government announced that the Canadian embassy would be closed 16 June to commemorate the Soweto uprising and to permit officials to attend memorial services.

58 CHCD, 12 June 1986, 1425.

59 Ibid., 13 June 1986, 14364.

60 Ibid., 14402.

61 Ibid., 14393-421.

62 Ibid., 14394.

63 Ibid., 14405.

64 Ibid., 14402.

65 Ibid., 14398.

66 Ibid., 14404.

67 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and HOC on Canada's International Relations, Independence and Internationalism, June 1986, chap. 8.


70 In 1985, the Confederation's executive director Charles Plaskett accepted an invitation from the South African ambassador in Canada to visit South Africa. 71 For the general tenor of the Confederation's views, see 'Reflections on South
Africa,' Newsletter - Confederation of Church and Business People 1, 1985, 7-8.
72 Christopher Young, 'Now is the Time to Act Against Apartheid,' Ottawa Citizen,
12 July 1986, B2. However, another Citizen columnist and former Canadian
ambassador to South Africa, George Grande, opposed sanctions: 'Can Mulroney
Resist Lure of Popular Cure-all?' Ottawa Citizen, 12 June 1986, B6; 'Negotiation
the Preferred Route,' Ottawa Citizen, 2 Aug. 1986, B5; and 'We Should Spend
More Time Thinking and Less Talking about South Africa,' Ottawa Citizen,
73 See 'Mulroney Must Lead the Way,' Ottawa Citizen, 2 Aug. 1986, B2. 74 See
Cited in 'Jelinek's Absence Fuels Rumors of Games Boycott,' Globe and Mail,
76 'Press Briefing - Bernard Wood,' 10:00 a.m., 31 July 1986, PMO transcript, 25.
77 Ibid., 26.
78 Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of
Sanctions, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers
on Southern Africa,' confidential draft, April 1989, Tables 2.1 and 6.1.

362 Notes to pages 160-2
79 'One in Five of Firms Has Pulled Out of South Africa,' Weekly Mail
(Johannesburg), 22-8 April 1988, 16.
80 Cited in Paul Koring, 'Britain Turns Back on Commonwealth,' Ottawa Citizen,
81 Cited in Jonathan Manthorpe, 'Meeting of PMs Won't Resolve Apartheid
82 John Fraser, 'Thatcher Defends Policies on Sanctions,' Globe and Mail, 8 July
1986, A1, A5. Manthorpe, 'Meeting of PMs.'
83 Michael Valpy, 'Mulroney Can Persuade Thatcher to Adopt Sanctions, Kaunda
Says,' Globe and Mail, 10 July 1986, A1, A10.
84 Cited in 'Press Briefing - Bernard Wood,' 21, n76 supra. 85 "'Panel - Question
Period," CTV, 1 Aug. 1986,' PMO transcript, 2 Aug. 1986, 4. 86 See, e.g., 'Letter
to Lusaka,' Globe and Mail, 16 July 1986, A8. 87 Cited in Martin Cohn, 'PM
Makes Moral Case for Sanctions to Thatcher,' Sunday
88 Mulroney and Clark stayed an extra hour after the last luncheon at 10 Downing
Street to try to change Thatcher's position.
1986,' 4 Aug. 1986, secret minutes by conference secretary, Commonwealth
Secretariat, C. 152-40/6, 22.
90 Cited in Linda Diebel, 'Isolated U.K. Is Called "Ally of Apartheid,"' Gazette
91 Cited in Linda Diebel, 'Thatcher's Moves Rejected - Commonwealth Summit
92 'Communique,' CHOG review meeting, London, 3-5 Aug. 1986. 93 In 1985, Canada had imported about $73 m in agricultural products and about $12 m of steel.
94 Such contracts had amounted to $900,000 in the 1985-6 fiscal year, and all existing contracts were to be honoured.
95 Other actions adopted in place already in Canada included a ban on air links, an end to double taxation agreements with South Africa, and an end to tourist promotion.
98 Cited in 'Commonwealth Secretary Urges International Aid for S. Africa's Neighbours,' Ottawa Citizen, 30 Sept. 1986, D15. President Kaunda of Zambia said his decision not to leave the Commonwealth was a result of Canada and Australia's decision to stand with Africa in the fight against apartheid.

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Goods in transit or contracts entered into prior to 5 Aug. 1986 were exempted. The government also instructed the Wheat Board that it should not sell wheat to South Africa to take advantage of a U.S. embargo.
103 The Globe and Mail published an article by one of the people on the tour, who returned to criticize sanctions and to present a highly favourable view of South Africa. Kenneth Walker, 'The Good Side of White South Africa,' Globe and Mail, 2 Dec. 1986, A7.
107 Letter to the editor, Globe and Mail, 5 Sept. 1986, A6. 108 Clark initiated discussions with Air Canada after Howard McCurdy discovered that Air Canada knowingly flew 64 Canadians to London on the first leg of their 'see for


110 'South Africa: Falconbridge Investment,' DEA, Communiqui 201, 19 Nov. 1986. 111 Falconbridge reassured Clark that the purchase did not imply a long-term commitment to stay in South Africa, but was a 'defensive corporate move' to retain its seats on the board before an ultimate sale. 112 CHCD, 26 Nov. 1986, 1541.


364 Notes to pages 164-7


123 'Stephen Lewis on South Africa,' 'Morningside,' CBC Radio, 22 May 1986, DEA, PO transcript FPR-0675, 22 May 1986, 10.


125 The most Mulroney was able to obtain was a verbal mention of the issue in the final remarks to the press by the host of the summit, the Italian PM.

Chapter 8: Backlash against Sanctions

1 Cited in Mohamed Adam, 'Mulroney's South Africa Policy,' master's research essay, School of Journalism, Carleton University, 1988, 154.

2 See, e.g., the attack on Mulroney's policy launched by Anthony Griffin, a former DEA official, National Film Board director, and director of 25 companies, in 'Canada Should Back Forces of Reform in South Africa,' Ottawa Citizen, 19 Feb.
3 Cranford Pratt, 'Human Rights and Foreign Policy,' paper for the Conference on Development, Human Rights, and Foreign Policy, Centre for Developing Areas Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 18 March 1988, 4.
6 Michael Valpy, 'Mulroney's Bold African Policy under Fire from External, Caucus,' Globe and Mail, 14 Oct. 1987, A8. In the 1980s, U.S. policy on South Africa was divided, with Congress adopting a much stronger pro-sanctions policy than the White House.
7 Cited in Patrick Martin, 'Pressure on Britain Expected over Inaction on South Africa,' Globe and Mail, 16 Sept. 1985, 2.
8 This term originally comes from the resistance within DEA to changes in Canada's policy on China. See J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
9 This claim was made by Ian Ferguson, deputy director of the Southern African Task Force, DEA. Cited by Joan Breckenridge, 'Firms Reject Disinvestment Tactic,' Globe and Mail, 11 March 1985, B8.
11 Concern about the need to respond to this issue was raised by witnesses and members of the House committee on human rights. HOC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 8, 15 July 1986, 65.
13 'Interview with Bernard Wood,' 'The House,' CBC Radio, 5 July 1986, DEA, PO transcript, BCM 0802, 7 July 1986, 3-4.
14 See David Vienneau, 'PM's Sanctions Vow Leaves Aides Confused,' Sunday Star (Toronto), 1 Feb. 1987, Al, A6, for the conflicting positions.
15 In the mid-1980s, sections of the press shared this view. See 'Glimmer in Africa,' Ottawa Citizen, 2 Feb. 1985, B2, and George Grande, 'Ostracizing South Africa
No Way to End Apartheid,' Ottawa Citizen, 16 Feb. 1985, B8.
16 Cited in Robert Fife and Dan Leger, 'S. African Vote May Postpone New
Sanctions,' Ottawa Citizen, 3 Feb. 1987, Al. 17 Valpy, 'Mulroney's Bold African
Policy.' 18 Michael Valpy, 'Canadian, Briton at Odds in Zimbabwe,' Globe and
Mail, 29 July 1986, A8.
19 Such cases included the news of Canada's 'security assistance' to Mozambique
announced by Mulroney in New York and the decision not to reopen the case of
the top Renamo official admitted as a political refugee in Canada.
20 Stephen Lewis is reported to have written to Ottawa that if his mentors did not
like what he had to say on a previous issue, 'You ain't seen nothing yet!'
21 Although there were 10 backbench MPs on the government delegation, Lewis
had to find a speaking engagement in Vancouver to pay his way.
22 Ross Howard, 'Lewis Steps Down with Strong Words on South Africa,' Globe
and Mail, 8 Aug. 1988, A3.

366 Notes to pages 170-3
23 Cited in Adam, 'Mulroney's South Africa Policy,' 64. 24 Michael Valpy, 'An
1988, 14. See also Hyman Solomon, 'Clark Should Focus on External's Priorities,'
25 Cited in Adam, 'Mulroney's South Africa Policy,' 64. 26 Mulroney's shuffle of
senior DEA officials in Oct. 1989 was understood to be a
product of a similar assessment of the DEA's slow and unimaginative response to,
inter alia, events in southern Africa. Hugh Winsor, 'PM Shuffles Senior
for Ottawa,' Globe and Mail, 18 Nov. 1989, E9, and 'Millions from External
27 'Interview with Barbara Frum,' 'The Journal,' CBC TV, 7 Feb. 1989, transcript,
3. 28 See John Fraser, 'Limp Commonwealth at Crossroads,' Globe and Mail, 19
29 Oakland Ross, 'Canada Reassigns Southern African Diplomat,' Globe and
Mail, 7 Sept. 1989, A5.
30 See Conrad Black, 'On Africa's Front Line,' International Conservative Insight
31 'An Exodus Can Injure,' Globe and Mail, 10 Nov. 1986, A6. 32 Cited in 'Sauv6
Quits Pro-Pretoria Lobby Group,' Globe and Mail, 27 July 1985, 1. 33 Cited in
Paul Knox, 'External Affairs Reviews Conduct Code,' Globe and Mail,
15 Feb. 1985, 10. See also the remarks of the president of Falconbridge, William
Meeting of Falconbridge Ltd, 17 April 1985,' 1-2. 34 HOC, SCHR 8, 15 July 1986, 80.
36 (CP) 'External Wants to Know Who's against Apartheid,' Ottawa Citizen, 26 Oct.
37 Canadian companies joining the council were American Barrick Resources Corp, HBMS, International Corona Resources, Kerr-Addison Mines, Noranda Minerals, and Placer Dome. The last two were represented on the board of directors.
41 Two-thirds of Canadian MPs accepting such invitations came from the Conservative party.

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42 Cited in SACTU Solidarity Committee, Trafficking In Apartheid - the Case for Canadian Sanctions against South Africa (Toronto: SACTU Solidarity Committee, Jan. 1985), 5.
44 CHCD, 10 Feb. 1981, 705.
46 Felix Holtmann, Conservative chair of the HOC Committee on Communications and Culture, also spent a summer holiday in South Africa in Aug. 1989. After the trip he said inadequate attention was being paid to the tribulations of white South Africans.
48 Cited in Adam, 'Mulroney's South Africa Policy,' 154. 49 CHCD, 3 May 1988, 15098.
50 In an attempt to embarrass the Canadian government, Eileen Pressler, president of the right-wing B.C. Free Speech League, released Blenkarn's letter of 20 May 1987 in Pretoria on 14 Aug., the day of Joe Clark's visit.
52 'Marching to Pretoria,' Globe and Mail, 15 Aug. 1987, D6. 53 Also in this camp, Senator Stan Waters of the Reform party argued that the government should not interfere with South Africa's apartheid policy. 'CSIS Probed Liberals, Conservatives in 1980s,' Globe and Mail, 17 Dec. 1994, A6. 54 In July 1986, at the height of international and national pressure for tougher sanctions, an Angus Reid poll showed that 45% of Mulroney's Conservative base was satisfied with the largely symbolic measures that had been taken, and only 40% wanted more action.
55 Carol Goar, 'PM Travels Middle Road on Foreign Policy,' Toronto Star, 18 Oct. 1987, B4.
56 Valpy, 'Interview with Stephen Lewis,' 13. 57 Ibid., 14.
58 CHCD, 15 May 1987, 6143.
59 Letter from Paul Fromm, research director, Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform Inc, 16 Sept. 1987. The video, entitled 'The ANC Method: Violence,' was sent to about 3,000 people, including journalists and media managers.
60 'The ANC Method: Violence - The Liberation Struggle in South Africa,' pamphlet accompanying the video. The ANC representative in Canada said that the video was 'almost identical' to those made by the South African government.

368 Notes to pages 176-7
61 See e.g., an angry letter to the editor protesting Tambo's visit from W.S. Thompson, a vice president of the Progressive Conservative party of Ontario for eight years and a supporter of Joe Clark. Globe and Mail, 9 Sept. 1987, A6.
62 Clark's interest in an anti-propaganda initiative in the CCFMSA stemmed precisely from this new reality.
63 For the right-wing press, Babb was 'a man of courage, conviction and intelligence'. Bob MacDonald, 'Pretoria Pulls a Fast One,' Sunday Sun, 29 March 1987, 14.
64 Vander Zalm wanted to export B.C. lumber and prefabricated housing to South Africa. However, the scheme fell through after Clark warned Vander Zalm that he would be undermining national policy by doing business with South Africa. Kathleen Kenna, 'B.C. Premier Wants Sanctions against South Africa Lifted,' Toronto Star, 5 March 1990, B2.

67 In Sept. 1985, a former president of Rotary in St John's, Newfoundland, was denied a renewed membership on the grounds that his views supporting sanctions would 'split the club right open.' 'Controversy Leaves Former Rotary Head in the Wilderness,' Globe and Mail, 24 Sept. 1985, 2. See also an account of Babb speaking to a Rotary luncheon in Gray, 'South African Envoy's Stay.'

68 Kenneth Hilborn, a professor at the University of Western Ontario and a member of the board of the Canadian South African Society, was a frequent beneficiary of official trips. Others receiving South African hospitality included Gordon Boreham of the University of Ottawa and Lorne Henderson, a journalist at the Catholic Register.


70 See the interview with Ambassador Glenn Babb by senior editors of the Ottawa Citizen and Southam News in 'South Africa: Its Ambassador to Canada Tells His Government's Side,' Ottawa Citizen, 14 Sept. 1985, B1, B5. Also, see Babb's testimony in, HOC, SCHR, 17 July 1986, 21-44, and 'Interview, Question Period,' CTV 'News,' 26 July 1986, DEA transcript.

Notes to pages 177-9
71 'White-Only Rule Won't Last, S. African Ambassador Says,' Ottawa Citizen, 14 Sept. 1985, 1.
72 'Interview with South African Ambassador,' 'Midday,' CBC TV, 16 Sept., DEA, PO transcript FPR-1 373, 16 Sept. 1985, 3. 73 'Interview, Question Period,' 7, n70 supra. 74 'South Africa: Its Ambassador to Canada Tells,' B5, n70 supra. 75 Cited in Gray, 'South African Envoy's Stay.' 76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
84 The South African Broadcasting Corporation used Babb's visit to the Peguis reserve as the basis for a commentary condemning the Canadian government's treatment of aboriginal people.
86 These were Gerald Wuttunee, former chief of the Red Pheasant band, Bryan Tootoosis of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, Lindsay Cyr, chief of the Pasqua band, and Eldon Bellgarde, representative of the Touchwood-File Hills-Qu'Appelle district chiefs organization. Bryan Tootoosis visited South Africa on a similar tour in March 1987.
88 One of the founders of the Indian Business Development Association was Norman Wallace, president of Wallace Construction Specialties in Saskatoon, who was also a member of the pro-South African South African Foundation in Canada. Elizabeth Gray, 'Sunday Morning,' 29 Aug. 1987. Wallace, Matt Campbell, and the four Indians formed a company, Eagle Staff Import Export Ltd, which claimed it had sold 30,600 tonnes of red spring wheat to South Africa in summer 1987. (CP) 'Indians' Wheat Sale to S. Africa in Dispute,' Ottawa Citizen, 4 Sept. 1987, A4.
89 Gerald Wuttunee called the front-line states' opposition to apartheid 'communist.' Bourgeault, 'Canada Indians,' 6, 10. In July 1988, the editor of a major publication for aboriginals, Indian Life, also accepted a trip to South Africa from a rightwing American broadcaster.
94 Cited in 'Indian Chiefs Assail Apartheid,' n91 supra. 95 Earlier in Sept. 1985, following Clark's program of largely voluntary sanctions, Harper had called publicly for 'serious' rather than 'farcical' action against apartheid. 'Words Are Not Enough to Deal with South Africa,' letter to the editor, Winnipeg Free Press, 21 Sept. 1985, 7.
96 All references from De Klerk's speech from 'Canada Backs Rebellion in South Africa Envoy Charges,' Toronto Star, 26 March 1988, A3.
97 See J.H. de Klerk, 'To Blame South Africa Is to Ignore the Facts,' Globe and Mail, 10 Feb. 1989, A7, and his letter to the editor, Ottawa Citizen, 23 Aug. 1989,


99 A screening of the anti-ANC video in Labrador City was followed by pro-South African letters in the local press. The Northern Light from New Brunswick reported favourably on South Africa after a fact-finding mission in South Africa.


102 Cited in Patricia Poirier, 'Bata's Pullout from South Africa Provokes Envoy to Criticize Media,' Globe and Mail, 22 Nov. 1986, A6. CBC Radio's 'Cross ENNNNEENNEr-

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Country Check-Up' accepted the embassy's position and regularly invited ambassador de Klerk to appear as a guest on their program.

103 For example, Seth Masubuko was badly beaten by South African police after an interview with him was broadcast on 'The Journal' in May 1987.

104 In Jan. 1988, the embassy took out a full-page advertisement in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald (at a cost of $5,580) urging city councillors not to support a resolution which called for disinvestment and a boycott of South African goods, calling the measure 'economic terrorism.' See 'Disinvestment Campaigns,' What's the Word! 6 Feb. 1988, 1. Yet the matter was largely a question of principle as Halifax had no investments in companies with dealings in South Africa. See Robert Martin, 'Pretoria Campaigns against Halifax Plan,' Globe and Mail, 29 Jan. 1988, A3.

105 In the South African townships, people who collaborated with the South African government were killed by setting rubber tires around them and lighting them hence necklacing. 'Oliver Tambo - Obstacle to Peace?' Globe and Mail, 28 Aug. 1987, A9, and Ottawa Citizen, 31 Aug. 1987, B8.

106 'Open Letter to the People of Canada,' 2 Aug. 1988: Globe and Mail, BI 1; Vancouver Sun, B5; and Ottawa Citizen, A11.


1989, A14. This poll was used by the right-wing press in Canada. See Bob MacDonald, 'Putting Brakes on Sanctions,' Toronto Sun, 9 Aug. 1989, 27.

109 'Are They Really the Best in the World?', Calgary Herald, 20 Feb. 1988, OB7. 110 For example, during the Commonwealth conference in 1987, Bennett sent a guest editorial to the Valley Times in Port Alberni, B.C., as Aubrey Hulet t, complaining about Mulroney's 'posturing' and praising British PM Thatcher's 'statesmanship.' Other letters and articles appeared in community newspapers throughout southern Alberta, B.C., and Saskatchewan.

Ill In 1986, the embassy had recruited people to inform on the anti-apartheid community. 'CSIS Probed Liberals, Conservatives in 1980s,' Globe and Mail, 17 Dec. 1994, A6.

112 This recruiter helped establish the Friends of South Africa Organization in Edmonton as a network of supporters of the South African government. He also hosted a television program putting the embassy's point of view on South African affairs using footage supplied from South Africa.


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372 Notes to pages 183-4

114 However, Canadian officials did ask de Klerk to explain the embassy's involvement in this case. 'CSIS Probed Liberals,' nIl 1 supra.


116 Ibid., 13. See also George Manz, 'Right-Wing Network Spreads Propaganda in Canada,' 23 Feb. 1989, Southern Africa Chronicle, 6 March 1989, 1. For example, CFAR sponsored a tour of Western Canada by Babb and hosted a lavish farewell party for him at the Sheraton Centre in Toronto when he was recalled to South Africa.

117 Besides his passionate opposition to sanctions against South Africa, Worthington is also known for his strong support of the Angolan guerrilla group UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. See, e.g., Peter Worthington, 'Mulroney Grasps at South African Issue,' Financial Post, 26 July 1986, 9.

118 Paul Fromm, the founder of CFAR and the Edmund Burke Society, is the second in command of the Canadian branch of the WACL, which has links with former Nazis, death squads in Central America, and anti-Semites. See Howard Goldenthal, Glenda Hersh, and Nick Fillmore, 'Right Winging It,' This Magazine, June-July 1988, 14-22, 37.


120 The Empire Club in Toronto, an association representing powerful sections of
opinion in central Canada, was also hostile to views promoting sanctions against South Africa. See the account of their reception of Commonwealth secretary-general, Sir Shridath Ramphal, in Gordon Barthos, 'South Africa Provoking War Canada Told,' Toronto Star, 13 Jan. 1987, A3.
121 Kenneth Hilborn from the University of Western Ontario and John Shingler from McGill University were members of the society's board of directors.
122 'Sauv6 Quits Pro-Pretoria Lobby Group,' 2, n32 supra, and the Canadian South African Society, 'Statement of Operations for the Year Ended Sept. 30, 1984.'
The South African Foundation was founded in 1961 following Sharpeville in an attempt to counter bad international publicity for South Africa through 'good friends and reliable supporters in key positions in power structures around the world.'
123 'Sauv6 Quits Pro-Pretoria Lobby Group,' 2, n32 supra.
124 Together with Hal Jackman, the lieutenant-governor of Ontario, David Scott-Atkinson, and other Conservative organizers embarrassed Mulroney by including Glen Babb, the South African ambassador, in a fund-raising dinner. When Babb ran as a candidate in the South African elections in 1989, Scott-Atkinson travelled to South Africa, at his own expense, to help him.

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126 Both denied Mokoena's claim that he was the life-president of the Reformed Black Independent Churches of South Africa, with a congregation of 4.5 m black Christians, and dissociated themselves from his political views, particularly his opposition to sanctions. Chikane noted that Mokoena had once been employed by the South African Council of Churches, but was fired for forging cheques, a crime to which he had publicly confessed. The council also suggested a linkage to the South African government as Mokoena had been given extensive exposure in the South African media. Carole Cooper et al., Race Relations Survey - 1984 (Johannesburg: SAIRR, 1985), 901, and 'Network Beware!' FocuSouth, Nov. 1987, 3.
127 Mahlatsi even used the same metaphor as South African diplomats had to oppose sanctions - shooting the white stripe of a zebra, he asserted, would cause the whole animal to die.
128 See Owen Turner, 'Changing Perspectives: Canadian Views of South Africa - An Analysis of Reporting in the Montreal Gazette and the Toronto Globe and Mail
130 Representatives of Lantic Sugar, a Canadian company dealing with the Natal-based sugar industry, also used Buthelezi's position to lobby against Canadian sanctions. HOC, SCHR 8, 15 July 1986, 89-90.
133 'Chief Buthelezi's Role,' n132 supra. See also 'ANC Plays Canuck Jokers,' n128 supra.

374 Notes to pages 186-8
139 'Realism and Reform,' Globe and Mail, 21 Aug. 1985, 6. See 'Mr. Mandela Speaks,' n136, supra.
141 In 1988 in Montreal, e.g., Quebec provincial police attempted an investigation of the Free South Africa Committee on the grounds of possible violence and links to 'terrorist groups in Europe'. 'Police Harassment in Québec,' What's the Word? 2, no. 7 (April 1988), 1.


144 See, e.g., the letter from Joe Clark to IDAFSA, 7 March 1990, IDAFSA, Newsletter, Spring 1990, 2.

145 Total CIDA funding from CIDA, Annual Report, 1985-6 to 1991-2. The proportion comes from IDAFSA sources. In 1988, the government of Ontario also made a substantial donation to IDAFSA.

146 In 1956, the ANC adopted the Freedom Charter as its core statement of principles which, inter alia, affirmed that South Africa belonged to all of its inhabitants, black and white, called for a non-racial democratic system of government, and demanded equal protection for all people before the law.

147 Nancy Thede, 'Québec and Southern Africa: Still Crazy after All These Years,' Southern Africa Report, May 1989, 12-13, and François, 'In a Lull,' 11, 33. 148 François, 'In a Lull,' 11.


Notes to pages 190-3 375
Chapter 9: The Politics of Sanctions Fatigue
1 CHCD, 13 June 1986, 14395.
2 In Nov. 1985, the South African government prohibited all but officially approved TV coverage of conflict situations in 38 magisterial districts.
4 Independent Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions, 'Final Report to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa,' April 1989, confidential draft, Table 10.3. These were the countries ranked by percentage change of the first six months of 1988 compared with the first six months of 1987.
6 Linda Freeman, 'All But One - Britain, the Commonwealth and Sanctions,' in ibid., 142-56.
12 Joe Clark, 'Notes for a Speech at the Center for International Studies,' University of Toronto, 22 May 1986, SSEA, Statement, 3.
17 Clark was referring to Nordic countries that were members neither of la Francophonie, the Commonwealth, nor the G-7 group; nor did they have the ear

376 Notes to pages 193-5
of the U.S. HOC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 4 March 1987, 14.
18 HOC, SCEAIT, 8 Nov. 1989, 31.
20 TCCR, 'Widening, Tightening and Intensifying Economic and Other Sanctions against South Africa,' a brief to SSEA, Joe Clark, 20 July 1988.
21 See Chapter 12, "Smoke and Mirrors" - Canada's Sanctions Policy.' 22 See, e.g., 'Interview with Brian Mulroney,' CTV, 11 Oct. 1987, PMO transcript, 1.
23 For example, Dave Todd wrote that 'In its quiet yet persistent way, Canada did more than any other country to create the political climate that enabled Nelson Mandela to win his freedom.' 'Canada Battles Apartheid,' Ottawa Citizen, 16 June 1990, B1.
26 The effect of the Nordics' total trade embargo was more significant than Commonwealth sanctions as a whole. Independent Group of Experts (IGE), South Africa: The Sanctions Report (London: Penguin, 1989), Table 1, 39.
28 The value of U.S. imports from South Africa dropped $921 m in 1987 as
compared with a 1983 to 1985 average. IGE, South Africa: The Sanctions Report, 211.
32 This is an estimate from figures for CUSO programs in the 1970s and 1980s ($306,000) with additional funding in the 1970s going through Oxfam, MATCH, and CCODP.

Notes to pages 195-7 377
36 Mulroney accepted this characterization of Clark's view. See his 'Interview with Prime Minister Mulroney by Peter Trueman and Peter C. Newman,' Global TV, 29 Aug. 1985, PMO transcript, 13-14, and Denis Thibault, DEA, GATT division, 'Canada-South Africa - Economic Relations and Sanctions,' secret briefing note, 4 Sept. 1985.
37 'SSEA Scrum - 13 September,' DEA, PO, transcript MINP-0056, 16 Sept. 1985, 2, and 'South Africa - Interview with SSEA,' 'As It Happens,' CBC Radio, 13 Sept., DEA transcript FPR-1368, 16 Sept. 1985, 3.
39 One Canadian banker returned from a trip to South Africa to argue strongly against sanctions and disinvestment. Letter from Peter A. Crossgrove to Brian Mulroney, 5 Nov. 1987.
40 Company officials left the meeting saying that they had no clear sense of what it meant to *press for change* and few expectations that they could actually influence events. Charlotte Montgomery, 'Canada's Anti-Apartheid Steps Have a Surrealistic Backdrop,' Globe and Mail, 28 Oct. 1985, A2.
42 South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha publicly condemned this 'flagrant interference in the internal affairs of South Africa.' (AP) 'Clark Campaign against Apartheid Criticized,' Globe and Mail. 30 April 1987, A10.
43 Joe Clark, 'Statement on South Africa,' Baie Comeau, 6 July 1985, DEASS 85/37. 44 'Press Conference with Joe Clark at the Royal Commonwealth Society, 29 July 1985,' DEA transcript, 9. See also Hill, 'Economic Sanctions Ruled Out by Clark.'

45 Although widely expected to announce reforms to apartheid in a speech to the National party in Durban on 15 Aug. 1985, President P.W. Botha offered no concessions and warned that even sterner measures might be taken to contain black unrest.


48 'Interview by Global TV,' 29 Aug. 1985, PMO transcript, 14. 49 Ibid., 16.

50 'South Africa - Interview with SSEA,' 2, n37 supra.

378 Notes to pages 197-200

51 CHCD, 16 Sept. 1985, 6644. Much of the press commentary made the same point.

52 CHCD, 28 Oct. 1985, 8070-2. 53 'South Africa - Interview with SSEA,' 2, n37 supra. 54 'Notes for a Speech by Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney for the Opening of the Commonwealth heads of government meeting,' Nassau, Bahamas, 16 Oct. 1985, PMO transcript, 4.

55 'Briefing to the Press by the SSEA, on CHOGM in Nassau,' Lester B. Pearson Building, 9 Oct. 1985, DEA, transcript MINP-0067, 1.

56 CHCD, 20 May 1986, 13408. Clark also refused to cancel the contract that postponed the ban on uranium imports from Namibia until 1988.

57 'Press Conference with Prime Minister Mulroney at Mirabel Airport, 13 July 1986,' PMO transcript, 11.


a speech to CCIC, DEASS 87/11, 3. 64 Ibid., 5.
65 Ibid., 6.
66 Martin Cohn, 'Clark Booed, Hissed by Apartheid Foes,' Toronto Star, 1 March 1987, A13.
67 HOC, SCHR, 4 March 1987, 5. 68 See, e.g., CHCD, 16 June 1987, 7142. 69 Ibid., 12 May 1987, 6010. 70 Cited in Martin Cohn, 'Pressure on PM for a Total Break with South Africa,' Toronto Star, 20 June 1987, B5.
76 After the National party came to power in South Africa, Canadian foreign ministers had been in South Africa on only two occasions. In Oct. 1978, Don Jamieson visited South Africa with the other four Contact Group foreign ministers to encourage South Africa to continue talks on Namibia. In July 1980, Mark MacGuigan transited through the airport in Johannesburg en route from the funeral of the president of Botswana and met the South African foreign minister at the airport.
77 Yet the poll that DEA released at the time indicated that 45% approved Canadian measures (said the government was doing enough), and 37% said Canada should do more, as compared with only 15% that said Canada should do nothing. DEA, 'Canadians' Foreign Policy Attitudes,' Communiqué 162, 14 Aug. 1987, 1.
84 Koring and Van Niekerk, 'Visiting Clark Told by Paper to "Get Lost"' and "Get Lost," S. Africans Tell Clark,' Ottawa Citizen, 14 Aug. 1987, A1-A2. If anything,
media bitterness towards Clark intensified in the following months, with progovernment newspapers referring to him as 'mealy-mouthed,' 'thick-skulled,' and intellectually dishonest. Peter Goodspeed, 'South Africa Gets Jitters over Sanctions,' Toronto Star, 25 Jan. 1988, A14.


88 Cited in Nagle, 'Clark, Botha Cover Key Points.' 89 'Showboating,' Toronto Sun, 15 Aug. 1987, 10. 90 Cited in Jim Sheppard, CP wire service transcript, 12 Aug. 1987. 91 Clark's hastily organized trip precluded a meeting with ANC President Oliver Tambo who was opening a youth conference in Tanzania, and so Clark met with ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo.


380 Notes to pages 202-5


97 See comments by Clark's assistant, Roy Norton, in Mohamed Adam, 'Canada's Foreign Policy in Southern Africa under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, 19841988,' master's thesis, School of Journalism, Carleton University, 1988, 169.


100 Ibid.

101 President Joaquim Chissano had made much the same point when Clark, on his safari, closely questioned him about Soviet involvement in Mozambique.

103 Cited in Gerald Caplan, 'Why Was This "Refugee" Allowed In?' Toronto Star, 19 Feb. 1989, B3.
104 Later, in embarrassment, they regretted this inadvertent sponsorship: 'If someone is caught in the middle of a war, he's a refugee,' his sponsor said. 'But if someone is taking sides in a war, they're on their own. They should take their lumps.' Cited in 'Mozambican Denies Terror Link,' Ottawa Citizen, 18 June 1988, A4.
106 Clark insisted that the UNHCR had given Moises bona fide refugee status, but while the UNHCR in Nairobi kept an extensive file on him, they never classified him as a refugee. CHCD, 17 June 1988, 16544-6. Oakland Ross, 'Mozambique Seeks Expulsion of Renamo Official,' Globe and Mail, 21 June 1988, A10. 107 Ross, 'Mozambique Seeks Expulsion'; Gary Engler, 'Clark Promises Refugee Probe,' Vancouver Sun, 17 June 1988, A2; and David Vienneau, 'Mozambique's Case to Be Studied Clark Tells MPs,' Toronto Star, 18 June 1988, A3. 108 Vienneau, 'Mozambique's Case.'
109 See, e.g., his letter to the Globe and Mail protesting an editorial attacking Renamo as Mozambique's contras, 6 May 1988, A6.
110 Moises's operation in Victoria was financed by James Blanchard III, a wealthy businessman from Louisiana.
111 Cited in Ross, 'Mozambican Terrorists' Spokesman,' A1.

Notes to pages 206-8 381
118 Ibid., 10 Sept. 1987, 8826. The surreal quality of the debate in Canada on violence can be seen in the stormy reaction in Parliament and the press to this suggestion which led to the removal of Pauline Jewett from the post of NDP external affairs critic.
120 CHCD, 9 Sept. 1987, 8777.
A poll conducted by the North-South Institute showed even stronger support for tougher action. Review '87 / Outlook '88 (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988), 12.
122 From 1980 to 1986, Britain provided £819 million in bilateral aid to SADCC countries and £35 million to SADCC projects. U.K., Overseas Development Administration, British Aid to Southern Africa - a Force for Peaceful Change and Development, 1987, 5.
123 Canada pledged $20 m towards rebuilding the Limpopo railway line connecting Zimbabwe to Maputo and forgave debts (about $120 m) from its assistance programs to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Swaziland.
124 Canada added $4.4 m in new programs to the $5 m being spent in 1987 to aid victims of apartheid.
126 See 'Interview with Joe Clark, Media Briefing on the Vancouver Commonwealth Conference, 14 Oct. 1987,' DEA transcript, 6-7.

382 Notes to pages 208-10
131 See Chapter 12, "Smoke and Mirrors" - Canada's Sanctions Policy.' 132 Thatcher called Mulroney's criticism of Britain's anti-sanctions policy 'sanctimonious' and insisted that the figures constituted an 'intrusion of fact upon rhetoric.' In this case, the rhetoric was all on her side. The Downing Street Years, 523-4.
133 See Hugo Young, 'Britain Bequeaths a Benighted Legacy,' Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 May 1994, 12.
136 See, e.g., 'Interview with Mulroney, BBC, 11 Oct. 1987,' PMO transcript, and 'Notes for an Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada at the Opening of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting,' Vancouver, B.C., 13 Oct. 1987,' PMO transcript.


144 The committee was composed of the foreign ministers of Canada (as chair), Australia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, India, and Guyana. An earlier Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa had operated from the Nassau meeting in 1985 to the Vancouver meeting in 1987.

145 'Press Conference with Brian Mulroney,' 35, n139 supra.

Notes to pages 210-15 383


Chapter 10: Stalling on Sanctions

I Cited in 'PM to End Arms Sales to South Africa,' CTV National News, 23:00, 7 Feb. 1989, DEA transcript, 3.

2 Joe Clark, 'Speech to the Opening of the Third Meeting of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa,' Harare, 6 Feb. 1989,
DEASS 89/08, 3.
8 This view was also being argued forcefully in the right-wing press and by antisanctions opinion in Canada. See, e.g., John H. Redekop, 'Pointless Pain,' Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 5 April 1989, AS; John A. McCordick, 'South Africa Sanctions' "Will Breed Stubborness,"' Ottawa Citizen, 16 May 1989, A9; James W. Dean, 'How Canadians Can Invest in a Better Future for South Africa,' Financial Times of Canada, 13 Feb. 1989, 52; and 'Prosperity Can Slay Apartheid,' Ottawa Sun, 21 May 1989, Cl.

384 Notes to pages 215-18
13 'Interview with Joe Clark,' 'Sunday Report,' CBC TV, 31 Jan. 1988, DEA transcript, 1.
14 CHCD, 5 Feb. 1988, 12677. En route to this meeting Clark also increased Canadian assistance to SADCC by 25%, from $32 m to $40 m, and launched a bilateral aid program in Mozambique.
15 CHCD, 5 Feb. 1988, 12678.
16 When the secretariat asked the Canadian government for a researcher to assist in the general study on sanctions, DEA proposed an academic well known for his anti-sanctions views.
17 Clark envisioned a clearing house for data and information and a series of conferences about South Africa and the region. In addition, assistance was to be given to the alternative press and journalist community in South Africa.
18 Harare's Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) claimed...
that two comprehensive studies of international financial links with South Africa (one by the UN Committee Against Apartheid and the other by the U.S. Congressional Research Service) were already in circulation. Also, sanctions evasions were regularly tracked by a range of groups, and the U.S. Department of Commerce and three independent companies monitored international arms shipments to South Africa. 'Commonwealth Sanctions Committee: Re-inventing the Wheel,' Southern Africa Chronicle, 15 Feb. 1988, 1.

19 'Timewasting in Lusaka,' Winnipeg Free Press, 6 Feb. 1988, 6. 20 This legislation, the Promotion of Orderly Politics bill, prohibited all organizations from receiving money from abroad for political purposes and empowered the justice minister to seize foreign funds received by certain groups on a retroactive basis. The South African government also announced the imminent execution of the Sharpeville Six, postponed for a month under intense international pressure.

21 CHCD, 2 March 1988, 13312.

22 For example, in this period while observing a march by Tutu and other church leaders to present a petition to Parliament protesting the virtual banning of 18 anti-apartheid groups, the wife of Canada's ambassador Ron MacLean was hosed by a water cannon.

23 Cited in David Scanlan, 'ANC Urges Cutting Pretoria Ties,' Ottawa Citizen, 9 Nov. 1988, A17.

24 CHCD, 2 March 1988, 13312.


28 The new ban was also one of the factors contributing to Victoria's successful bid for the 1994 Commonwealth Games.

Notes to pages 218-19 385

29 For example, shortly after the Aug. 1986 Commonwealth mini-summit in London, two South African tennis players participated in the Player's International tennis championships at York University in Toronto.

30 This loophole was created by the previous Liberal government but it was enlarged by the Mulroney government.

31 In addition to the three studies commissioned in Lusaka - the Commonwealth Secretariat, 'Interim Report of the Expert Study on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions to the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa,' London, July 1988: the Canadian study on a strategy to combat South African censorship and propaganda; and the Australian study on the potential impact of financial sanctions - two additional papers were
presented - one by Abdul Minty on breaches of the arms embargo, and one by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo on the security and other needs of the front-line states.

32 During these events, Canadian activists who were closely associated with the sanctions campaign were shunted to the side as being 'too political.'


37 Of the 1,501 Canadian adults polled in July, only 11% thought existing measures were too tough. Cited in Ken MacQueen, 'Poll Backs More Sanctions on South Africa,' Vancouver Sun, 2 Aug. 1988, Al, and 'Get Tougher on Apartheid 41 Per Cent Urge in Poll,' Toronto Star, 2 Aug. 1988, A3.

38 (CP) 'Nearly 50% Back Harder Line against Apartheid,' Globe and Mail, 7 Nov. 1988, A8.


386 Notes to pages 219-21

44 Cited in (CP) 'Lewis Calls Apartheid Stance Timid,' Vancouver Sun, 4 Aug. 1988, Al.


46 Major aid flows (about $112 m) were involved. CIDA, Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference - CIDA Program Update - Jan. 1989, 24-

48 Britain had been involved for some time in providing military training for army officers in the region, and the Nordic countries, India, and Algeria had provided logistical support.


51 Canada was competing with Finland and Greece for one of two seats in the 'Western Europe and others' category of non-permanent seats.

52 Brian Mulroney, 'Address before the U.N. General Assembly,' 29 Sept. 1988, DEASS, 3.

53 Clark also asked the banks not to increase trade credits to South Africa and to lobby foreign banks to reschedule loans to South Africa on as short terms as possible.

54 Crown corporations were also included in these sanctions, a decision that ended Petro Canada's sales of sulphur to South Africa, estimated at about $7 m. Andrew Cohen, 'Tories Stick with Gradual Approach on South Africa,' Financial Post, 3 Oct. 1988, 9.


56 Canada won 127 votes of a possible 159. Ironically, after all this effort, the new Canadian ambassador to the UN, Yves Fortier, did little with the council seat that will be remembered. See Eric Reguly, 'Prime Minister's Friend Nestles into U.N. Niche,' Financial Post, 28 March 1990, 19.

Notes to pages 221-3


66 This percentage is based on CSC, Exports by Commodity, 1988 for sulphur exports to South Africa, of which an estimated 25,000 tonnes of sulphur were imported by Zimbabwe.


72 Pratt and Whitney of Montreal sold engines to aircraft manufacturers in Brazil, Switzerland, and Israel, which in turn sold the planes - all of which had military capability - to South Africa. Tim Harper, 'Ottawa Said at Fault as Arms Embargo Broken,' Toronto Star, 8 Feb. 1989, A19.

73 In 1989, MINORCO existed as a shell company with about two dozen employees and few assets other than equity holdings in a wide range of companies.

74 Also involved in the syndicate were the Chemical Bank of the U.S., Swiss Bank Corp., and the Dresdner Bank of West Germany, all of which operated in Canada.
As a shareholder of Consolidated Gold Fields, a Toronto-based mining company, American Barrick Resources, also supported MINORCO's takeover bid. The same sort of reasoning enabled the government to continue to provide assistance to a MINORCO subsidiary in northern Manitoba, HBMS, despite sanctions against assistance to South African-owned companies in Canada. See Chapter 12, "Smoke and Mirrors" - Canada's Sanctions Policy.

Renison, one of the subsidiary companies of Consolidated Gold Fields in Australia, produced 24% of world production of titanium and 41% of zircon, both minerals used in the aerospace and nuclear industries. 'ConsGold under Pressure to Divest as Minorco Takeover Saga Rolls On,' SouthScan, 12 May 1989, 143. Cited by Andrew Meldrum, 'Finding a Meeting Point,' Africa Report, MarchApril 1989, 40.

In Aug. 1989, the committee agreed that, henceforth, financial institutions considering loan requests from any entity outside South Africa with South African connections were requested to determine the source of control of this entity. If South African control was established, the potential lender was to seek assurances that the loan would not circumvent sanctions, would not be transferred to South Africa, that profits would not be remitted to South Africa, and that the loan would not be of net benefit to South Africa.


Ibid., 1 Aug. 1989.


Notes to pages 225-30 389

In Sept. 1988, the ban on sales of high technology items had already been extended to private sector end-users in South Africa at an estimated cost in lost exports of about $4 m. Cohen, 'Tories Stick with Gradual Approach.'

'External Affairs Announces New Export Control Lists,' DEA, News Release 050,
6 March 1989.


93 Shridath Ramphal, 'Foreword,' ibid., xii, and 'Introduction,' 3-9. 94 Ibid., 98.

95 Ibid., 4, 109.

96 Ibid., 110.

97 Joe Clark, 'Speech at the Opening of the Fourth Session of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers,' Canberra, Australia, 7 Aug. 1989, DEASS, 2.


100 This ban prompted Tennis Canada (for many years a welcome host to South African players) to endorse the measures and to support the sports boycott. It refused to let Bill Kempffer, one of Canada's most prominent and experienced tennis umpires, work at a World Tennis tournament in Toronto in Feb. 1990 after Kempffer had acted as an umpire in South Africa in 1989, in knowing violation of Canadian sports sanctions.


390 Notes to pages 230-2


107 Canadian banks held about U.S.$124 m of this short-term debt, but were not involved in the actual negotiations.

108 South Africa was to repay U.S.$1.5 b over three and a half years from June 1990 to Dec. 1993 on terms comparable to the previous rescheduling. Repayment of the

109 South Africa still had to make large payments on medium- and long-term debt ($2 b in early 1990 and $1.6 b in 1991) which squeezed their dwindling gold and foreign exchange reserves.

110 The Canberra terms included substantial capital repayments, the highest possible interest rates, and renegotiation of debts for only one year at a time. CCFMSA, 'Apartheid and International Finance,' Canberra, 8 Aug. 1989.


Notes to pages 232-8 391


Chapter 11: Sea Changes and Transitions
4 Cited in Trevor Lautens, 'In Middle Age, a Statesman,' Vancouver Sun, 10 Feb. 1990, B5.
10 As a good example, see David Van Praagh, 'Good Faith,' Ottawa Sun, 26 April 1990, 12.

392 Notes to pages 238-40
20 One former major in the SADF, Nico Basson, believed that F.W. de Klerk was
central to internal destabilization after Feb. 1990. See Nico Basson, 'De Klerk's Double Agenda,' Work in Progress (Johannesburg) 79 (Dec. 1991), 9-13. The security police gave Inkatha $100,000 to finance rallies and $600,000 to support its trade union wing, the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA), formed in 1986 to combat the largest and most militant centre for trade union activity, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which had been launched in Dec. 1985.

21 The security police gave Inkatha $100,000 to finance rallies and $600,000 to support its trade union wing, the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA), formed in 1986 to combat the largest and most militant centre for trade union activity, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which had been launched in Dec. 1985.


25 Although there were counter studies by the Goldstone Commission and the SAIRR apportioning blame equally between all parties, the origins of such reports and their conclusions were suspect. SAIRR had a history of partiality to Inkatha and Buthelezi and hostility to the ANC. The Goldstone Commission, appointed by

the state after the Boipatong massacre, had a mixed record. See David Beresford, 'Goldstone Got Lost in the Deadly Game of Politics,' Weekly Mail and Guardian, 25-30 March 1994, 13.

26 'Outgoing KwaZulu Police Chief Now Admits to Existence of Hit-Squads,' SouthScan, 29 July 1994, 226.


Notes to pages 240-3 393

28 Both the Amnesty report and the Human Rights Commission found, however, that

the vast majority of the victims were ANC sympathizers and militants.


34 The Canadian government did contribute two observers (Henry Jansen, former deputy commissioner, RCMP, and Robert Simmonds, former commissioner, RCMP) to a Commonwealth team to act as peace monitors - less, it was explained, to determine the origins of the violence, than to encourage the resumption of talks.
36 'A Mandela-Buthelezi Deal,' n35 supra. 37 'Getting at the Truth about Boipatong,' Globe and Mail, 6 July 1992, A20. 38 Eric Margolis, 'Now for the Toughest Part,' Ottawa Sun, 23 March 1992, 11. 39 In the first non-racial national elections in April 1994, the results were 62.6% of the total vote for the ANC and 10.5% for the IFP. In KwaZulu Natal, the IFP won 50.3% and the ANC 32.2%. However, as credible reports indicated serious fraud in Inkatha-dominated areas of KwaZulu, the results overstate IFP's support even in its own area.
40 Barbara McDougall, 'Speaking Remarks Following a Meeting with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of Kwazulu and President of the Inkatha Freedom Party,' Ottawa, 17 Nov. 1992, DEA transcript, 4-5.
394 Notes to pages 243-7

56 Confidential report of meeting of NGO community with SATF, DEA, 8 Dec. 1988.


60 See, e.g., Clark, 'Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations,' 7-8. See also letter from Joe Clark to Chris Bryant, executive director of CUSO, 18 Dec. 1989, 2, 4.


64 'Meeting with Mandela,' with Charlayne Hunter-Gault, WNET, New York, 22 June 1990, WNET transcript, 10. While, ultimately, the ANC did constitute itself as a political party, it only formally registered as one in Feb. 1994 to take part in the first non-racial elections.

65 CHCD, 7 March 1990, 8923.

Notes to pages 247-9 395

66 The offer of $5 m was bumped up to $5.85 m by Mandela's adroit 'assumption' that Mulroney had meant U.S. dollars.

67 'Mandela Address to Canadians,' Amandla!, Feb.-March 1993, 8. 68 In 1985, e.g., he encouraged individual bankers and businessmen to lobby from within South Africa for change as an alternative to stronger government measures.

69 According to Archbishop Ted Scott, the government added matching funds of $136,000 which brought the total of the Mandela Fund to $680,000.

70 Cited in Bill Schiller, 'McDougall Says She Won't Back Down on Sanctions,' Toronto Star, 7 April 1992, A14.


76 Johnson, 'Canada Should Extend Hand.' See also William Johnson, 'Sanctions Undermine Mandela's Goal,' Gazette (Montreal), 19 June 1990, B3.
82 He made this commitment on 'The Journal,' CBC TV, 11 Feb. 1990. 83 'Mandela Address to Canadians,' n67, supra. At the Commonwealth conference in Harare he added that Mulroney's support had 'given us strength and hope.' Cited in Bill Schiller, 'Mandela Hails PM's Support for Sanctions,' Toronto Star, 18 Oct. 1991, A16.

396 Notes to pages 249-52
86 The committee agreed that those sporting organizations within South Africa that had unified sport under non-racial administration should be recognized by the international community.
100 Ibid., 3-4.

Notes to pages 252-4 397
102 An advance team from DEA was sent to South Africa in July to make preparations for Mulroney's trip.
103 They also dissuaded PM Bob Hawke of Australia from similar plans. 104 CHCD, 18 Sept. 1991, 2310. However, Mulroney repeated his invitation to de Klerk to visit Canada which was accepted, much to Canadian embarrassment, during the conference.
107 However, Mulroney did not support an independent Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative led by Flora MacDonald, which called for the establishment of a body to monitor and work against human rights abuses in the Commonwealth.


110 For example, the Indonesian government, infamous for its authoritarian political style and human rights abuses at home and in East Timor, received an average of about $50 m a year from Canada in the late 1980s; it was the second largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid in Asia. En route to Harare, Mulroney had stopped to offer $23.5 m assistance to Gabon, a country with a record of human rights abuse and undemocratic practices.


114 Ross Howard, 'PM Links Aid Giving to Policies on Rights,' Globe and Mail, 15 Oct. 1991, Al. The PMs of India and Malaysia also opposed Mulroney's approach.


116 Neither the Canadian Exporters' Association, the principal lobby group for these changes, nor the ANC representative in Canada were informed of this decision.

398 Notes to pages 254-8


118 Goods in this category included civilian aircraft (including helicopters), aircraft parts and engines, electronic and telecommunications equipment, data processing equipment, software, and four-wheel vehicles.


126 'Notes for an Address to the Cape Town Press Club,' Cape Town, 8 April 1992, SSEA, Statements and Speeches 92/14, 2-3.
128 'Early End to Sanctions,' Globe and Mail, 9 April 1992, Al. 129 In Sept. 1992, a Gallup poll found that 74% of Canadians believed the federal government should not slacken the pressure on Pretoria and 38% wanted stronger pressure. Cited in 'Keep Pressure on Pretoria, Most Say,' Toronto Star, 10 Sept. 1992, A25.
132 The embargo on oil and arms sales was lifted when a democratic government came to power.

Chapter 12: 'Smoke and Mirrors' - Canada's Sanctions Policy

1 'Britain Bequeaths a Benighted Legacy,' Manchester Guardian Weekly, 8 May 1994, 12.
2 See also Chapter 2 'The Hyper-Real Discourse of "Balance."

Notes to pages 258-62 399
3 Kim Richard Nossal, Rain Dancing: Sanctions in Canadian and Australian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), xiii.
7 Dan O'Meara, 'Sanctions as an Effective Instrument for Change in South Africa,' unpublished paper, 3.
8 'Interview with South African Ambassador,' 'Midday,' CBC TV, 16 Sept., DEA, PO transcript FPR-1373, 16 Sept. 1985, 1.
9 Donald Woods, 'Reform in South Africa,' Times (London), 11 Jan. 1985, 13. 10 Cited in Edison Stewart, 'Canada Took Lead in Forcing Reform, Clark Declares,'
15 CHC, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons (HOC) on Canada's International Relations, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 24, 10 Dec. 1985, 25.
17 A caution on these trade data: Canadian exports to the South African Customs Community appear as exports to South Africa until 1991 and export figures do not include services.
19 CHC, SCHR, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 8, 15 July 1986, 63-4. 20 Arms sanctions had been adopted by earlier governments in accordance with U.N. resolutions.

400 Notes to pages 262-4
21 This section benefited greatly from the primary research of Professor Don Ray of the University of Calgary, particularly 'Canada's Hidden Link to Apartheid: Sulphur,' unpublished paper, 20 June 1990, and Don Ray et al., 'Job Creation for Canadians, Ending Hunger in Africa and Fighting Apartheid: Banning Canadian Sulphur Exports to South Africa,' paper for Taking Sides in Southern Africa: A National Conference on Canada's Role in International Action to End Apartheid and to Support SADCC, Montreal, 28 Feb. 1987.
23 DEA estimated that the total potential revenue losses to the Canadian economy of a ban on sulphur exports to South Africa would be about $94 m and the loss of 60 jobs, assuming that alternative markets would not be available. 'Summary of Findings: Industry/Government Working Group on Sulphur Exports to Southern Africa,' Annex II, April 1990, 3.
24 Ray et al., 'Job Creation for Canadians,' 3. 25 Petro Canada continued exports of sulphur to South Africa until specifically required to stop in Sept. 1988, when it had no difficulty finding other buyers. B.C. Petroleum Corporation, a provincial Crown corporation, continued exports of sulphur to South Africa throughout this period.
26 In the first three years of the 1980s, Canada averaged $7.6 m annually in sales of fertilizer to South Africa, but in the last three only $1.8 m. CSC, Exports by Countries, 4, 1980-9.
27 Ray et al., 'Job Creation for Canadians.' See also Memo from Marcia Burdette to Committee Against Racism (Western Region), 'The Ban on Sulphur Exports from Canada to South Africa - the SADCC Picture' (rev.), 6 May 1988.
28 See CHCD, 2 March 1988, 13317. The most the government would do was to ask sulphur suppliers to cap sales at 1988 levels.
29 An Angus Reid poll cited in Ray et al., 'Job Creation for Canadians,' 7-8. 30 George Manz, 'South Africa: Right-Wing Network Spreads Propaganda in Canada,' Southern Africa Chronicle, 6 March 1989, 1.
31 The Alberta government earned a royalty of 16 2/3% on sulphur sales - about an annual $8.4 m in the late 1980s.
32 Other major oil companies - Husky Oil, Gulf Resources, Chevron Canada, Amoco Canada Petroleum, Mobil Oil Canada - were also important suppliers of sulphur to South Africa.
33 'Canadian Interests Still Doing Business with South Africa,' 'World at Six,' CBC Radio, 18:00, 6 Feb. 1989, transcript, 2.
value of its trade by Statistics Canada. Its imports are reported not under the
category of wood pulp but under the category of 'special transactions, trade.' 53
HOC, SCHR, 15 July 1986, 10.
54 In 1986 total exports of airplanes and parts to South Africa from Canada
amounted to $133 m or 40% of total imports. 55 CHCD, 13 June 1986, 14366.
57 Rosie DiManno, 'Canadian Coal Ban Reduced to Ashes,' Toronto Star, 14
Nov. 1988, A6. In 1980 and 1981, Canadian ships were used to deliver oil to South
Africa. Joanne Naiman, Joan Bhabha, and Guy Wright, 'Relations between
Canada and South Africa,' U.N. Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents
58 Cited in DiManno, 'Canadian Coal Ban Reduced to Ashes.' 59 By con trast,
Denmark held captains of vessels legally responsible for ensuring
that none of their cargo violated the South African arms embargo.
60 'South Africa - Interview with SSEA,' 'As It Happens,' CBC Radio, Sept. 13,
DEA PO transcript FPR-1368, 16 Sept. 1985, 3.
61 The loan was for MINORCO's unsuccessful takeover bid of a British mining
company, Consolidated Gold Fields. See Chapter 10, 'Stalling on Sanctions: The
Twilight Years.'
62 Together, these interests owned 71% of MINORCO. 63 The Oppenheimer
empire of 600 corporations had assets in 1989 of more than
$20 b and employed 800,000 people. Peter C. Newman, 'Apartheid and the
64 Christopher Wilson, 'Secretive Hand Still Has the Golden Touch,' Globe and

Notes to pages 270-3 403
65 See, e.g., Friedberg's advertisement to sell South African rand denominated
bonds
66 'The Canadian-Swiss Bank Connection,' Sanctions Barometer 2, Feb. 1990, 2,
and TCCR, 'Swiss Bank Continues Loans to South Africa,' March-April 1990,
7-10.
67 In this case, with bonds and notes worth Swiss francs (SF) 1.072 b and $100 m
respectively.
68 They held notes and bonds worth $465 m. 69 These held bonds and notes
worth another $525 m and SF 400 m. 70 Letter from Joe Clark, SSEA, to Ann
Daniel Gennarelli, 31 July 1990. 72 A majority interest in HBMS had been held
by South African companies since
1962.
B8. By 1990 HBMS revenue amounted to $423.2 m, and it employed 2,650
people. Allan Robinson, 'Minorco Makes Bid for Hudson Bay Mining,' Globe
79 This move was necessitated by the Bank of Nova Scotia's refusal to supply its share of the loan to Inspiration and HBMS without a third-party guarantee. Following the change in ownership, MINORCO guaranteed the loan. The purchase price was $100 m; the cost of rebuilding the smelter, $187 m. Robinson, 'Minorco Makes Bid.'
80 In 1987, two B.C. firms were discouraged by DEA from selling a sophisticated border defence system, Datsat, to the South African military. In March 1988, the government also discouraged the export by COMINCO of materials for infrared weaponry (night sights for rifles) that had missed the export control list. 81 The sale was worth $1.6 m.
82 Although the companies were found guilty, the sentence was only a $10,000 fine of a maximum possible of $25,000. Shortly before the trial, their president declared personal bankruptcy and received a suspended sentence with two years probation.
84 'Now Pilatus Sack Director,' SouthScan, 2 April 1993, 101. 85 'ANC Says It Will Not Pay for Arms Deals,' SouthScan, 26 Feb. 1993, 61. 86 Letter to Dr Ray Hodgson, chair, TCCR, from John Schram, director, DEA, Eastern and Southern Africa Relations Division, 21 April 1993.
87 The parliamentary Sub-committee on Arms Exports picked up this issue in 1992, responding to long-term lobbying by the interchurch task force.
89 The strength of international pressure did cause Pilatus to stop the modifications of the aircraft for combat use and to meet ANC demands that delivery would occur only after the 1994 elections.
Canadian company, Wings of the World, offered three-week tours of southern Africa, including 17 stops in South Africa.

91 George Bryant, 'Don't Be a Pawn of Media Frenzies or Pressure Groups,' Toronto Star, 2 Sept. 1989, F2.

92 For example, Wallace Immen wrote a series of articles for the Globe and Mail in April-May 1992.

93 CHCD, 8 Oct. 1986, 195. While he did order some government officials from Transport Canada to withdraw, others from Canadian National Railways stayed so that the conference would not have to be cancelled. The government also did not expel the South African delegates.

94 In July 1990, eight South Africans attended a world sugar farmers conference in Winnipeg, but left after complaints from anti-apartheid groups.

95 Clark gave a speech at the opening night reception, and Tourism Canada provided $25,000 for the conference.

96 The Department of Justice had advised that entry could be allowed under treaty obligations to the U.N. The Tanzanian delegate left in protest, and the decision to accept South Africa was put to the credentials committee by the other African delegates who also threatened to boycott the conference. In the end, the South African delegates were asked to leave.


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99 CIDA, Annual Report, 1984-5 to 1992-3. In 1987, the government also announced it was forgiving about $120 m in aid debt obligations from Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Zambia.

100 Assistance through the Canada Fund 1986-7 to 1992-3 amounted to $3.4 m. CIDA, Annual Report, 1986-7 to 1992-3.

101 CIDA also provided $200,000 for humanitarian assistance for victims of the conflict in Natal province.

102 The Canadian embassy bought the paper's computers on Christmas Eve 1988 when a company was about to repossess them. The Canada Fund also supported its defence against a suit for defamation brought by Lieutenant-General Lothar Neethling. In 1994, Vrye Weekblad closed as it was not financially viable.

103 The WUSC program lasted until 1990, sponsoring 177 students, all but six in South Africa or neighbouring countries. WUSC also supported INTERFUND, a body channelling funds to grass-roots anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa and Namibia.

Before 1991, the organization's official name was the South Africa Education Trust Fund. Other organizations involved in the education program were the Canadian Teachers' Federation (involved in labour training), the Association of Community Colleges of Canada (helping vocational institutions), and the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada.

106 The churches included Canadian Lutheran World Relief, Canadian Friends Service Committee, the Anglican Church of Canada, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, and the United Church of Canada.

107 Some assistance was also provided for the training of diplomats. 108 Trust Fund board member John Harker was a moving force and chairman of the expert group that produced Beyond Apartheid - Human Resources for a New South Africa - Report Prepared for the Heads of Government Meeting at Harare (London: Commonwealth Secretariat and James Currey, 1991).

109 Assistance was also given to South African NGOs, trade unions, middle and senior officials in industry, economic planners, early childhood education teachers, and scientists. From its inception in late 1987, SAETF spent over $8 m from CIDA funds and an additional $500,000 of in-kind support matching academic scholarships. John Harker, 'Southern Africa Education Trust Fund (SAETF),' final report, n.d., 2.

406 Notes to pages 279-81
110 Ibid., 5-8.
111 In the early 1990s, SAETF supported academic linkages, short-term attachments of South African civil servants in Canada, seminars, workshops, and study tours.
112 Al Johnson, a senior Canadian civil servant and former head of the CBC, offered technical assistance for the establishment of a post-apartheid civil service and also organized training for the Department of Foreign Affairs.
114 Smaller programs for civil society included assistance for legal resource centres to present court challenges and the building up of capacity in South African NGOs.
115 Ron Gould, the assistant chief electoral officer in Canada, was one of five international members to sit on South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission, the body overseeing the elections.
116 HOC, SCEAIT, 26 March 1991, 11. 117 See, e.g., the letter from Robin Briggs, Anglican Dean of Pretoria, to Ambassador

120 At the end of 1988, the Trust Fund was able to obtain permission from the government to override this stipulation.
121 However, candidates for internal scholarships under the Canada Education Fund required an endorsement from the Mass Democratic Movement, and those wanting to train in Canada required the support of NGOs (women's groups, churches, trade unions, and black professional groups) in South Africa which ultimately included liberation movements.
123 Initially, this involved supporting a series of workshops to help South African trainees examine comparative transitions in Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe; other executive centres of government in Canada, Sweden, and the U.S.; regional governments; and public services.

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Conclusion and Epilogue
1 Bruce McLean, 'Seeing Mandela Was to Glimpse True Freedom,' Toronto Star, 26 June 1990, A17.
2 For a recent contribution to the mythology, see Nona Grandea, 'Choosing the Right Policy Levers - Drawing Lessons from Canada's Interventions in South Africa' (Ottawa: North-South Institute, rev. draft, 1995).
6 In the book co-authored with Ivan Head, beyond an account of the Singapore meeting, South Africa and even the 1977 reforms in Canadian policy are not mentioned. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way - Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 1968-1984 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995).
8 See, e.g., 'Canada, the Commonwealth and Nigeria's Generals,' Globe and Mail, 10 Nov. 1995, A18.
11 Tom Keating, 'The State, the Public and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy,' paper for the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, June 1985, 22. See also Denis Stairs, 'Interest Groups in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process: A Changing Role?' in Groups and Governments in

The francophone literature on foreign policy includes some work on Canadian diplomacy but a larger emphasis on the international role of Quebec. See Paul Painchaud, De Mackenzie King à Pierre Trudeau: Quarante Ans de Diplomatie Canadienne (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1989) for the former emphasis; and Gérard Hervouet and Hélène Galarneau et al., La Présence Internationale du Québec 1978-1983 (Québec: Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1984) and Albert Legault and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., eds., 'Le Nationalisme Québécois à la Croisée des Chemins,' Choix 7 (Québec: Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, 1975), for the latter.

For a useful discussion of this concept, see Mark Neufeld, 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power,' Studies in Political Economy 48 (Autumn 1995), 7-29; and Maureen Appel Molot, 'Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature,' International Journal of Canadian Studies 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1990), 77-96. See also essays by R.A. Mackay, James Eayrs, and John W. Holmes in Towards a New World - Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992), 65-105.


John W. Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle,' in Towards a New World, ed. Granatstein, 90. The comparison with Panama was made earlier by PM Mackenzie King to a meeting of Commonwealth PMs, 11 May 1944. Cited in James Eayrs, 'Defining a New Place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Power,' in Towards a New World, ed. Granatstein, 84.


See Head and Trudeau, The Canadian Way, x and 7; and Holmes, 'Most Safely in the Middle,' 94-8. Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal also attempt to relate Canadian foreign policy initiatives in the 1980s to the issue of 'national interest,' in Relocating Middle Powers.

See, e.g., 'Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at the Inauguration Dinner for the Lester B. Pearson Chair of International Relations, Oxford University, Toronto, 22 Feb. 1996,' PMO transcript.


See Neufeld, 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy,' 7-29. See also David Black and Claire Turenne Sjolander, 'Multilateralism Re-constituted and the Discourse of Canadian Foreign Policy,' Studies in Political Economy 49 (Spring 1996), 12-13.


33 This study joins with recent work in Canadian foreign policy and international relations theory in an attempt to fill a gap in Canadian political economy, where debates on state policy and, in particular, on the relationship of the state to civil society have concentrated on domestic issues of economic and social policy and, until quite recently, have neglected foreign policy. Exceptions to this are found in Neufeld, 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,' and Sjolander and Cox, Beyond Positivism.


35 As noted in the introduction, this definition of civil society encompasses dominant forces within the private sector as well as the media, churches, trade unions, universities, and other groups which emerged to contest this issue. See Cranford Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the
Counter-Consensus,' International Journal 39 (Winter 1983-4), 99-135, for an early formulation of this point and for a similar critique of neo-realist interpretations of Canadian foreign policy of the kind put forward in David B. Dewitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: Wiley, 1983).

36 This case supports a Gramscian interpretation of struggles in civil society which goes beyond strictly economic issues to include cultural and ideological matters.

37 As Keyman puts it, 'Political struggles are always articulated with economic factors and discursive practices within a society, which can be understood only as historically changing through a complex interrelationship with the state,' 'Problematizing the State,' 172.

38 See Freeman, 'Effect of the World Crisis,' 109-10.

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39 The two government representatives, the deputy ministers of finance and ITC, were non-voting directors whose position was to be abolished when government holdings in CDC fell below 50%.

40 Atlas Steel was located in Ontario and Quebec, but Sydney Steel Corp was located in Nova Scotia.

41 As just one example of such linkages, see the way Gavin Relly, chairman of the giant Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, argued against sanctions in a speech to the Empire Club in Toronto. 'Sanctions Hinder Reform, Exec Says,' Toronto Sun, 24 Nov. 1989, 52.


44 Joe Clark, 'Notes for a Speech at the University of New Brunswick,' 24 Nov. 1986, SSEA Statement 86/70, 1.

45 Even in 1960 Howard Green talked about the value of Commonwealth membership providing 'far more influence' than Canada could possibly have on its own. See CHCD, 10 Feb. 1960, 934.

46 Joe Clark, 'Address to the Empire Club of Canada,' Toronto, 12 Nov. 1986, DEA transcript, 4.

47 Joe Clark, 'Domestic Priorities and International Policy,' Statement to the Canadian Club, Winnipeg, 19 Sept. 1985, DEASS 85/9, 5.

51 For a similar conceptualization, see Barry Gills and Ronen P. Palan, 'Introduction: The Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations,' Transcending the StateGlobal Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 2-8.
52 For an article putting the case for 'dominant class theory,' see Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory.' Also see Neufeld, 'Hegemony and Foreign Policy,' 11.
53 This image comes from Professor Allan Jeeves, Department of History, Queen's University.

412 Notes to pages 297-303
54 Therefore, this approach is sceptical about claims that any approach has ultimate predictive power.
55 As James Manor put it, 'If we pay a little more attention to history - to recent political trajectories and longer-term patterns of change - it conditions us to make, in Hirschman's words, "a little more allowance for the unexpected."' Rethinking World Politics (London: Longman, 1991), 8.
56 While such outcomes may be unintended, the end results, as James Ferguson points out, may, nevertheless, have 'a kind of political intelligibility.' See James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development,' Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17-21.
57 In 1995, 53% of the population accounted for less than 10% of the country's consumption, while 5.8% of the population was responsible for 40% of consumption. Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa, cited in 'SA Income Gap Among Worst,' SouthScan, 26 Jan. 1996, 28.
60 Vella Pillay of the National Institute of Economic Policy. Cited in 'Mbeki Clears Out Opponents to His Macro-economic Line,' SouthScan, 12 April 1996, 107.
63 Canada in the World - Government Statement (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1995).
65 HOC, SCEAIT, Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights 6, 27 November 1991, 32.
66 Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli develop this point in their Faith and Credit The World Bank's Secular Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994).
67 HOC, Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights 17, 30 March 1992, 28-32.

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Canada to promote trade, and Canadian agencies are finalizing a Southern and Eastern Africa Regional Action Plan (SERAP) to facilitate South Africa's emerging role as an African trade hub.
70 Newbridge Microsystems is developing computer networks and Cott Corporation makes colas and soft drinks from concentrates imported from Canada. A subsidiary of Molson, Diversey Corporation, bought a South African chemical company, primarily as a base for operations in the region, and Canada's largest generic drug manufacturer, Apotex, purchased a controlling interest in a South African pharmaceutical company. Earlier in the 1990s, Dundee Bancorp purchased a 25% interest in a small gold-mining company in South Africa and Lardel Holdings cooperated with Thebe Investment Corp to develop a regional airline. Quebec Iron and Titanium, one of the diehard Canadian corporations that stayed on through the apartheid era, has stirred up a national protest of environmentalists in its intention to strip-mine ecologically fragile sand dunes on the northern coast of Natal. 71 Independent analysts contend that South Africa would have to deliver an over
50% rate of return to entice direct investment away from other emerging economies. 'SA Economy: Deep Concerns about Fragile Economy Underlie Blueprint,' SouthScan, 21 June 1996, 186.
72 In 1995 and 1996, annual growth rates each year improved to about 3%.
'Growth Rate Will Flatten Out,' SouthScan, 26 April 1996, 125, and 'Economists Counter Optimistic Reserve Bank View on Growth,' SouthScan, 13 Dec. 1996, 371.

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Pierre Elliott Trudeau 1968-79
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M. Brian Mulroney 1984-93
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J. Jean Chretien 1993
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Sidney Smith 1957-8
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Paul Martin 1963-8
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Allan J. MacEachen 1974-6
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Mark R. MacGuigan 1980-2
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Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom 1954-8
Dr Hendrik Verwoerd 1958-66
Dr Balthazar Johannes Vorster 1966-78 Pieter Wilhelm Botha 1978-89
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