The Labour Party

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so long as the Government of the Country remains under the control of
a white minority
2 QC TOBER 1964

LABOURS RECORD
ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA
An examination of Attitudes before October 1964 and actions since by Anne
Darnborough
Ani-Apartheid -Movement

Foreword
'I AM DELIGHTED to contribute the foreword to this booklet ..' So many might
begin. I am not delighted, for this document makes sad reading. I should have
preferred that no booklet and therefore no foreword were required.
These pages contrast -the attitude of the Labour Government to Southern Africa
since they came to power in 1964 with their statements when in opposition. It is a
record of disappointment, retraction and evasion.
It would be easy for me as a Liberal MP to criticise and to score Party points. But
the issues involved transcend the trivia of Party bickering, and those who are most
disillusioned are those who have in fact supported the Labour Party in the belief
that their coming to power would see an end to Conservative policy towards the
future of Southern Africa. Yet Britain's own financial interests remain paramount
over the rights of our fellow human beings.
Today the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain and throughout the world remains
the only effective rallying point for men and women of all political parties and of
more, who believe in the essential equality of man and the creation of multi-racial
societies.
The policies of the present Labour Government as outlined here are not even in
the long run expedient. Trade with black Africa will grow and that with South
Africa will diminish in importance. The West cannot complain of any increase in
Communist support in Africa if the Communist world appears to be the only one
sympathetic to the demands of the oppressed peoples of Africa.
Even if the present policies were expedient they would still be wrong. Shortly
after his election as leader of the Labour Party, Mr Harold Wilson addressed a
rally of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Trafalgar Square in these terms: 'I have
spoken of the issues which are raised, human freedom, Britain's standing in the world, the economic arguments. But this is more. This is a moral issue. And we are prepared to fight on this moral issue.'
This booklet is published by those who believe these words to be true.  
DAVID STEEL  
President  
Anti-Apartheid Movement.

The Commitments

WHEN THE Labour Party came to power in October 1964, it was as firmly committed to a policy of opposition to white supremacy in Southern Africa as any British party could be.  
The commitment was rooted in the Party's long history of principled belief in the right of all peoples to self-determination—a belief first translated into action by the post-war Attlee Government when it agreed to Indian independence.  
Although the Labour Government lent itself to shabby or inept moves in Southern Africa before bowing out to 13 years of Conservative rule in 1951 (the banishment of Seretse Khama from Bechuanaland and the idea of a settler-dominated Central African Federation, for example), the years in opposition which saw the great sweep to independence of so many former colonial countries, consolidated the Party's determination to work for the benefit of all people in Southern Africa on a basis of militant anti-racism.  
Statements and pledges made by both the Leader of the Party, Mr Harold Wilson, and many of its members, some later to become prominent in Cabinet and Government, showed that this work was in no way meant as marginal to the Party's policy when in power.  
Arms supplies and the High Commision Territories

THE LABOUR MANIFESTO for the General Election of 1964 included a pledge to cease the supply of British arms to South Africa. This pledge was first made by Harold Wilson, shortly after assuming the leadership of the Party, at a rally in Trafalgar Square on 17 March, 1963, organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement of which he was a member.  
'Act now,' he pleaded publicly with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 'and stop this bloody traffic in the weapons of oppression'.  
Mr Wilson pledged a Labour Government to ceasing the supply of arms for 'as long as apartheid continues'.  
Harold Wilson also appeared as champion of the rights of the protected peoples of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and particularly of the political refugees from South Africa who fled to these territories, when life became impossible in their own country.  
In 1962, he was prominent among British Members of Parliament pushing the Colonial Administration into action for the return of Anderson Ganyile, a South African refugee who was kidnapped by South African police from his home across the border in Basutoland. The determination with which he and other Labour Members of Parliament pursued the then Government for action over Ganyile made it unsurprising that the following year, the Labour Party Conference passed unanimously a motion, part of which urged the next Labour
Government to make a special contribution towards the economic development of the Protectorates to 'reduce their economic dependence on South Africa and additionally to guarantee the independence and exercise of democratic rights by these Protectorates.'

John Stonehouse, later to become Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office told the conference: 'These territories must be protected against political domination by the fascists. They must be kept open for those fleeing from oppression in South Africa.'

At the conference Mrs Barbara Castle spoke for the Executive on the composite Southern African resolution, which amalgamated nine tabled resolutions on the problem, more than on any other aspect of foreign policy. Dealing with the arms embargo Mrs Castle said Labour would cancel the current South African order for Buccaneer bomber planes. Reading to the conference a telegram from the Angolan resistance, she said Labour backed 'the struggle against Portuguese repression'.

On South West Africa, she agreed with Denis Healey that it was a day to look forward to when the United Nations officially took over the mandated territory. On the High Commission Territories, the present Transport Minister said the escape routes for South African refugees must be kept open. She said the amount spent in the area meant that 'Oxfam is doing more for the economic development of the territories than the British people... under a Labour Government that kind of neglect would never have been tolerated'.

Economic links with South Africa

She went on to deal with economic links with South Africa. She said Labour was 'determined to weaken' the South African regime in every way it could. She warned British investors and emigrants that 'if they choose to build their future in a slave state, they should not call for help when the powder barrel blows up under them'. Mrs Castle found it scandalous that the British ambassador Sir Hugh Stephenson should invite British capitalists to invest in South Africa. Later, Mrs Castle, speaking for the Anti-Apartheid Movement of which she was then President, told members of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid on 14 April, 1964, that: 'British businessmen who invest in South Africa are providing the economic sinews of apartheid.'

That same day, the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa, sponsored inter alia by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, opened in London.

In a message to the conference Mr Wilson said 'Sanctions which hit at the people of South Africa without influencing its Government would be futile and tragic'-a noteworthy comment now, after nearly two years of unsuccessful sanctions against Rhodesia initiated by himself.

The day before, on 13 April, Mr Wilson had told leaders of West European socialist parties meeting in London that he was not in favour of a trade embargo on South Africa. 'If it was effective', he said, 'it would harm the people we are
most concerned about, the Africans and those whites fighting to maintain some standards of decency'. He said that the only kind of economic sanction that should be considered was an oil sanction, if South Africa took aggressive action.

Earlier still, on 19 September, 1963, the Daily Telegraph reporting the eighth Socialist International meeting, said: 'The Labour Party delegation has refused to support general economic sanctions against South Africa.'

On Rhodesia, soon to become a major cause for dissension within the Party and willy-nilly linked to South African issues, there was little disagreement during the days in opposition.

The Rhodesian Independence Constitution
In March 1963, the new Labour leader said: 'We have said that no constitution is defensible which fails to allow the people of those territories to control their own destinies. We have bitterly attacked the Southern Rhodesian Constitution for that, and a Labour Government would therefore alter it- we've made that very, very plain. But we would go further. When these questions are debated at the United Nations, you would not find us voting in a collection of now, to some extent, discredited Imperial Powers.'

On 11 April, 1963, Mr Wilson questioned Mr R A Butler, then Foreign Secretary: 'Will he give the House a clear assurance that there will be no question of granting independence to Southern Rhodesia until the country has a constitution which enables the mass of people to govern themselves? Is he aware there should be no question of granting independence under a constitution where 250,000 have the right to rule three million people?'

Following Ian Smith's takeover as Prime Minister from Winston Field in April 1964, and the widespread talk of UDI, the Sunday Times of 19 April reported that 'the Labour Party is insisting on major constitutional reform leading to majority rule before independence'.

At a September 1964 briefing for Labour Party candidates in the impending general election, Harold Wilson said that so long as Sir Alec Douglas Home, then Prime Minister, kept up his insistence on a fair African representation in any question of independent government when negotiating with the Rhodesian Government, Labour would be unlikely to introduce any dramatic changes of policy.

On 2 October, 1964, the Labour leader wrote a letter to Dr E Mutasa, a member of the Committee Against European Independence, in Salisbury, Rhodesia, who released it publicly just after Labour gained power. The Prime Minister had written: 'The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the Government of the country remains under the control of a white minority. We have repeatedly urged the British Government to negotiate a new constitution with all the African and European parties represented, in order to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule.'

Sympathetic attention
ON ASSUMING POWER, then, in October 1964, the Labour Government, generally opposed to apartheid and pledged to action in specific
spheres of British responsibility towards South Africa, enjoyed the sympathetic attention of all those people who wanted to see the end

of white supremacy in South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese African colonies, and to see the British High Commission Territories as sovereign countries independent of white supremacist neighbours.

But now, nearly three years later, all sympathy has vanished. Labour's concessions on Southern Africa, far from bringing nearer the end of white supremacy in the area, have entrenched the status quo.

The Labour Government has only been prevented from granting independence to a minority government in Rhodesia by the white Rhodesians' own stupidity in refusing proposals offered at the 'Tiger Talks' in December 1966.

Far from dissociating from South African apartheid, the Labour Government has encouraged greatly increased trade and investment in the Republic, has allowed loopholes in its arms embargo, has reaffirmed the importance of the mutual defence arrangements outlined in the 1955 Simonstown Agreement, and has promised not to extend economic sanctions to the Republic.

The Labour Government in granting hasty independence to Lesotho and Botswana without making adequate arrangements for their economic aid and development has increased their dependence on South Africa and their inability to participate in sanctions on Rhodesia.

The Labour Government has refused to cooperate with the world community at the United Nations in attempting to remove the mandated territory of South West Africa from South African control.

So great has been the retreat of the Labour Government in actual deeds from its declared principles in all aspects—but the one most significant: opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa—of its Southern Africa policy, that the question arises whether the real objective in British policy is not a deliberate intention to preserve apartheid, and to prevent a dramatic change in the radical balance of power in Southern Africa.

An examination of the record of Labour attitudes and actions since 1964 establishes the validity of this question.

The Erosion

THE EROSION of Labour's policy of opposition to white supremacy in Southern Africa began on all fronts almost immediately after the new Government assumed office.

Faced at once with an extreme financial crisis, the new Government chose to give priority to maintaining the external value of the pound.

All its Southern Africa policies seemed to follow from there, and right away Labour's militant anti-apartheid stand was tempered afresh with the realisation that South Africa was Britain's fourth best customer, that British companies had some £1,000 invested in the Republic, that South Africa sold its gold through London and was a particularly important member of the sterling area reserve system.

As in Tory days, this meant that Britain would do nothing in
Southern Africa which would prejudice South Africa's interests or Anglo-South African relations. The British Ambassador in Pretoria was assuring the then Verwoerd Government that Britain continued to hold with South Africa common interests of strategy, trade and investments and that the outcome of the British general elections should not be seen as inaugurating a new British policy towards Southern Africa.

Thus the announcement of the embargo on arms sales to South Africa made by the Prime Minister on 17 November was hedged about with qualifications. Over Rhodesia, the Prime Minister could write to Ian Smith on 27 November: 'we have an open mind on the timing of independence in relation to progress towards majority rule', where only a month previously he was writing to an African compatriot of the Rhodesian premier: 'The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the Government of the country remains under the control of a white minority'.

Later the Prime Minister could pledge that no force would be used to solve the problem of a Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence and furthermore that mandatory economic sanctions invoked to cope with this problem would not be extended to South Africa-busily violating them.

The Prime Minister's statements in the days of Opposition against a trade boycott of South Africa (independent of the Rhodesia problem) were expanded fulsomely not long after the new Government's accession to power, when Lord Rhodes, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, told the House of Lords on 11 February, 1965, 'We are proud to trade with South Africa, make no mistake about that'.

The High Commission Territories, for whose people the Prime Minister was reported in May 1963 as being 'increasingly fearful', were soon after the British elections sent hustling along the road to an ill-prepared and impecunious independence, in the knowledge that they were obliged to turn more and more to South Africa for the aid Britain was taking good care not to proffer.

The vexed question of the mandated territory of South West Africa was mercifully sub-judice at the International Court of the Hague when Labour took office.

It soon re-appeared as a major issue, however, and Labour fitted it into the pattern of South African appeasement already established in other spheres. At the United Nations General Assembly vote to revoke South Africa's mandate for the territory and to assume it for the United Nations in October 1966, Lord Caradon abstained for Britain, although only a few days previously he had told the Assembly that South Africa had forfeited all rights to administer South West' under the mandate. Britain, France and Malawi, Zambia and Somalia abstained and South Africa and Portugal voted against, while 114 states voted in favour of the resolution. Britain also declined to participate in the 'work of a special ad hoc committee set up to recommend ways by which South

West Africa can be taken to self-determination and independence.
A close look at British Government actions on each of these questions since October 1964 will trace the course of the Labour retreat from the principle of opposition to apartheid to the point of positive support for it. The 'scuttle' of the Protectorates

OPENING BASUTOLAND'S final constitutional conference in London, in June 1966, Mr Fred Lee, Colonial Secretary, acknowledged that the strength of opposition to early independence might be a bad omen. (Observer, 12 June, 1966.)

In January 1967, three months after independence, riots throughout the Kingdom led to the Head of State, King Moshoeshoe II, becoming a powerless prisoner of his government, and to the jailing of the two chief leaders of the opposition on charges of incitement to sedition. Many of their followers are now in jail after facing charges ranging from murder to public violence and more have been deported, some to South Africa.

Mr Fred Lee had indeed spotted a bad omen. But it did not stop him deciding to grant Basutoland its independence under what Colin Legum in the Observer (19 June, 1966) called a 'minority and unrepresentative government'. Legum went on: 'the decision ... is the most dishonest transaction in the recent history of the handover of British power in her colonies'.

In a major piece on the High Commission Territories on 17 July, 1966, Legum continued: 'What is in fact happening is that we are abandoning (the territories) without any of the defences they need to stay independent of Dr Verwoerd's Republic.

'The policy of Mr Wilson's Government was initiated by the Tories in 1963. It was then, as can now be seen so clearly in retrospect, that Britain decided to pull out of Southern Africa. Partly it was feared that the alternative policy of propping up the Protectorates would become increasingly messy and expensive: partly it was felt that such a course would lead to increasingly strained relations with Dr Verwoerd and might ultimately involve us in a direct confrontation with him.... 'So the decision was taken to abandon the High Commission Territories-a decision that Mr Wilson's Government is faithfully -carrying on.'

The Labour Government's attitude towards the High Commission Territories follows on the policies of abject neglect which have dogged the three territories since Britain agreed to take responsibility for them when South Africa became independent of colonial rule in 1910. Until 1950, the assumption was always that they would eventually become part of South Africa, and the major effort of the Colonial Administration was turned to other colonies.

This justified the provision of no development funds at all for the territories before 1945, and grants-in-aid allowing for social services of some significance, to begin were given to Bechuanaland only from 1956, to Basutoland from 1960 and to Swaziland from 1962.

As late as 1960, the Morse Mission recommended to Duncan Sandys, then Commonwealth Secretary, that a mere £7 million be spent on all three territories
over five years. This would supplement the £30 million spent in all three territories since 1945. (See: Lord Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories.) Sir John Maud, retiring High Commissioner to South Africa and the Protectorates, in 1962 suggested a 'retreat with credit' from the Protectorates, calling for a £27 million budget over the next ten years. In November 1963, however, Lord Lansdowne, then Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, quietly announced Britain's intention to get out with no such budget in mind.

By 1966, when arrangements for Basutoland's independence had been made, the Labour Government had forgotten the call made by the Party Conference in 1963 for a special contribution towards the economic development of the Protectorates. Ten weeks before Basutoland's independence, the Government had made no financial arrangements about the Basutoland budget, post-independence. (In 1964 Britain was finding half the total of £4,547,000.)

On 12 June, 1966, the Sunday Times said: 'The Basutos have been outflanked by the Colonial Office on the very issue crucial to Basutoland's survival-finance'. £2.5 million was needed to develop the Oxbow project which would allow the Basuto to generate power, ease irrigation and develop small scale industrialisation while still leaving power and water for sale to South Africa at a third or less of present prices. The British wanted a prior commitment from the South Africans (unforthcoming) to buy (See Fabian pamphlet, The Unprotected Protectorates, for details of scheme.)

The Sunday Times said: 'The British Government, seemingly intent on getting out of Basutoland as cheaply as possible has refused to put up the money, or even promise grants-in-aid to balance the budget. The combination of the Colonial Office's skilful lack of commitment to Basutoland and Dr Verwoerd's canny waiting game seems likely to squeeze (the Basuto Premier) into a completely subservient policy of "neighbourliness".'

The United Kingdom's financial let-down of Basutoland was mirrored in Bechuanaland, and both territories, now independent, have been forced to lean even more heavily on South Africa than they would have expected to, given their geographical positions and comparatively poor resources. (Following pre-independence negotiations, the Botswana Government will receive £13 million worth of aid for the three years 1967/1970 as against the £30 million they asked for to kick off their five-year plan.)

Thus both countries have been obliged to take up 'good-neighbour' postures, and have made clear that they cannot allow their countries to be used for action against the South African Government, nor as places of refuge for South African political refugees.

Basutoland is in the doubly humiliating position of having to submit to South Africa's control of the access to and transit through her territory now that she is independent, because the British Government failed to secure routes into the country, when responsible for it.

In Swaziland, slowest of the three territories in political advance, and best-off economically, the Labour Government had a last chance to arrest the 'scuttle'.


But its latest constitutional moves there were called by the Sunday Times (30 October 1966) the third step in the current British withdrawal from Southern Africa. The Sunday Times said that no constitutional conference was to be called, though there had been bitter protest from groups other than the ruling King Sobhuza and his white allies.

When the Labour Government came in, King Sobhuza was offered control of Swaziland's not inconsiderable mineral rights in return for having accepted the principle of 'one man, one vote'. This was an offer contrary to all efforts the colonial administration had been making over seven years to keep the mineral rights firmly in the hands of the Swazi people.

Later, John Stonehouse, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, negotiated the White Paper which puts mineral control back with the legislature, but, as the Sunday Times says, the last laugh is on Sobhuza.

For, to amend the provision on minerals requires only a two-thirds vote of Swaziland's 32 proposed legislators. Twelve of these are the King's nominees, and he has so successfully adapted to 'one man, one vote' electoral procedures that he can easily and always find the rest.

Thus Britain leaves the power to sell off the Swazi people's wealth in the hands of an elderly man already closely allied with the white residents of this country, nearly all of them South Africans.

Helping Portugal arm in Africa

PLEDGING to cease South African arms supplies on acceding to Government, Mr Harold Wilson, addressing the vast crowd in Trafalgar Square in 1963, did not forget the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, labouring under an extension of Portugal's own repressive rule. 'Conservative elements who do support South Africa—and in like manner Salazar's African policies—are supporting not a bulwark against Communism, but a bulwark against human freedom ...', Mr Wilson said. He went on to promise not to supply South Africa with arms and added, 'And, lest there be any doubt, we shall apply the same policy in respect of arms supplied to the Portuguese Government for use in territories they control in Africa.'

However, four years have passed since that pledge was made, and for nearly three of them the Labour Government has wielded power. Yet Portugal remains a NATO partner, a recipient of arms from the NATO pool, and she continues to use these weapons in her efforts to suppress the nationalist movements struggling for an existence in Guinea, Mozambique and Angola.

Despite a UN resolution calling on NATO member countries to avoid sending arms to Portugal, the flow is in no way drying up, and Portugal's military and defence expenditure for 1967 is greater than in previous years, amounting to 42% of the national budget, according to the 1967 OECD report on Portugal. In April 1967 it was announced that £131 million was added to this budget for 'extraordinary military forces overseas'.

- In 1965, a British firm was permitted to sell £3 million worth of motor lorries to Portugal, which were despatched to the African colonies, and also that year, the British Motor Corporation won an order for 200 'Gypsies', a small jeep type vehicle, to be used for the Portuguese Army. (Times report, 2 February, 1965.)
British aero-naval forces use the Montijo airport near Lisbon as a supporting base, under NATO commitments, and on February 22, 1967 a NATO mixed fleet included the British frigate Berwick on a visit to Lisbon, celebrating the inauguration of a NATO headquarters there. As well as continued military links through NATO with Portugal, Britain retains its close commercial links. A few examples give an idea of the growing British involvement in Portuguese Southern Africa.

The British-owned firm of Sena Sugar Estates Ltd produced 70% of Mozambique's sugar output for the period 1965-66. In June last year, the British-owned Marconi Company, which has a monopoly of telecommunications in Portugal, renewed its permit for a further 25 years. The British-owned company, Gill and Duffus, opened a plant for dehusking cashew nuts in Inhambane, Mozambique, on December 10, 1966.

Examples of British links with Portugal itself in support of Portugal's colonial policy are numerous. They are continuing and even growing. They bring comfort to Salazar, as he pursues in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea the ruthless repression of the nationalist movement's struggle for self-determination and independence.

Tempering the arms embargo
ANNOUNCING THE arms embargo to a packed House of Commons on 17 November, 1964, Mr Wilson concluded that this move now brought the United Kingdom 'into line with United Nations resolutions'. But the Prime Minister was interpreting the most recent of several Security Council resolutions on the subject rather loosely. For in clear terms the resolution of 18 June, 1964, for which Britain voted, called on member states to 'cease forthwith the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa'.

The Prime Minister's statement was an immediate qualification of this. Current contracts with South Africa were to be fulfilled and the Prime Minister specified that spare parts for 'certain equipment sent there' would continue to be supplied. On 25 November, Mr Wilson repeated his statement that 'existing contracts would be honoured' and

he sanctioned the shipment of the 16 Buccaneer low flying naval strike bombers ordered and partly paid for by the South African Government. Mr Wilson also repeated that no further South African contracts for arms supplies would be entered into, but very significantly he added: 'Her Majesty's Government will of course, allow the shipment of spares for the 16 Buccaneers as and when required'.

There could be no doubt of South Africa's gratification at this move. The Guardian's air correspondent had said of the Buccaneer bomber on 12 October, 1962: 'there can be no doubt that it would be a useful instrument in the hands of the South African Government for internal security. Both for reconnaissance and ground attack it offers excellent performance'.
Even as Mr Wilson hesitated over the contract, Christopher Johnson wrote in the Financial Times of 17 November, 1964: 'There is no doubt that the Buccaneer can be used for internal security as well as naval defence. It is a subsonic aircraft with bombing capacity which would in fact be more suitable for use against African locations than the supersonic strike aircraft which are already bidding to replace the Buccaneer in its naval role'.

Now these aircraft have been delivered to South Africa, and Britain is obliged to maintain deliveries of spare parts for them 'as and when required'—a direct violation of the Security Council resolution.

As the British Council of Churches has pointed out, 'Britain will be involved militarily with South Africa into the 1970s because of the undertaking to supply spare parts' (The Future of South Africa, 1965). The British Council of Churches said of the decision to let the Buccaneers through the embargo: 'If South Africa is regarded as the possible object of United Nations police action, then these self-same planes supplied by Britain could be used against any United Nations force.'

In June 1965, the Labour Government permitted a second major breach of the arms embargo. A permit was granted to Vauxhall Motors to sell £400,000 worth of four-wheel drive motor chassis for armoured cars or lorries to the South African Army. The United States and Canadian Governments had already refused licenses for the export of similar vehicles to local firms approached on the order. Thus not only was the Government allowing the South African Government to extend its military equipment, but it was undermining the efforts made by other governments to comply with the United Nations resolutions, and so lending strength to those counting the cost in orders lost to the United Kingdom because of the ban (estimated by the Daily Telegraph on 21 July, 1966, at £280 million), who call for greater use to be made of loopholes in the embargo, or even for its complete withdrawal.

The Government has also refrained from plugging another major but more subtle leak in the ban on military supplies to South Africa.

This takes place through British companies in South Africa which are helping the development of the Republic's home-based arms manufacturing industry--Government expenditure on which went up from £157,612 in 1960-61 to £16,501,250 in 1965.

In 1962, Imperial Chemical Industries participated in a £10 million project involving the establishment of three armaments factories in South Africa, owned by African Explosives and Chemicals Industries, which it owns together with the Anglo-American Corporation. These factories were designed to produce tear gas, ammunition for small arms, anti-tank and aircraft rockets.

The British Miles Aircraft Company has registered a South African subsidiary plans to establish a factory to manufacture the Mark 11 Student Plane. The Atlas Aircraft Corporation, set up in South Africa in 1964, with foreign aid, to manufacture South Africa's first jet trainer aircraft, gave a demonstration flight on 11 May last year of the Macchi MB 326 jet trainer assembled locally. It is an Italian plane manufactured with Bristol Siddeley Viper engines built under license from Britain and transferred to South Africa. (The export of the engines from
Britain direct would be banned under the arms embargo.) Manufacture of the plane is due to begin this year.
The emigration of skilled British personnel to South Africa in the wake of strong recruiting campaigns launched in this country is also aiding the South African arms manufacturing industry-no official discouragement of either such recruiting or such emigration has taken place.
Finally, and, as the June war in the Middle East has shown, crucially, the Government continues to lay great stress on the importance of the Simonstown Agreement to Britain, although the permanent British presence there was vacated this year within the framework of Government plans to reduce defence expenditure overseas.
Defence Secretary Denis Healey vigorously defended the need for Britain to preserve its pact with South Africa for use of the Simonstown base, when Labour Members of Parliament criticised the Government's decision to send warships to visit Cape Town, in June this year.
The Prime Minister reiterated this defence of the Simonstown Agreement in a letter replying to David Steel, MP, President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, on the warships' visit.
He said: 'While I recognise the reasons which prompted you to write, you will know that the Government maintain under the Simonstown Agreement, certain defence facilities in South Africa, which are useful to us and which involve liaison with the South African Navy...
'Finally I can assure you that naval visits to South Africa do not affect the Government's fundamental dislike of the policy of apartheid, and I do not think there can be any misunderstanding about that.'
But ever since Dr Verwoerd threatened to abrogate the Simonstown Agreement just prior to the announcement of the British embargo on arms sales to South Africa in November 1964, the real value of the Agreement, which now allows for British use of the naval base facilities, has been disputed.
As far back as, November 22, 1964 the Observer said: 'To regard South Africa as a potential military ally against the Communists

betrays a fantastic idea of the realities of the situation. The contest for influence between the West and the Communists in Africa is much less likely to be settled by war than by a political contest for friendly alliances. The West can under no circumstances win this struggle in association-no matter how tenuous-with a regime such as Dr Verwoerd's....
'One can argue whether the (South African) threat to world peace is actual or still only potential. What is clear is that nowhere in the world is there a more fertile breeding ground for racial conflict that could become an international war. This postulates a threat not only to British interests but to the interests of the international community as a whole. These are obviously of much greater importance than Britain's interests in Simonstown, or its trade with South Africa.
'To rest British defence needs on Simonstown is to leave this country open to continuous political blackmail by the South African Government . . . it will no doubt be used whenever South Africa wishes to oppose British policy. No
Government wishing to carry out an independent policy can leave itself open to this kind of blackmail. Expanding economic relations BRITAIN'S TRADE relations with South Africa were, as we have already seen, felicitous at the time of the October 1964 elections. And as early as October 1963, Cyril Lord, the textile manufacturer, not otherwise well-known for political prophecy, was reported as saying that he thought 'Harold Wilson would do nothing to undermine trade relations with South Africa'. The textile manufacturer, himself a big trader with South Africa, had picked on the one aspect of the Labour leader's declared attitudes on Southern Africa which was to show a consistency right through the period of Opposition and Government up till now.

A look at the economic picture shows why.

In 1965 the United Kingdom held 60% of all foreign investments, in the Republic, the earnings on which have been running at some £60 million a year. In 1965 South African exports to Britain (excluding gold) had risen to £180 million, from £124 million in 1955. But British exports to South Africa in 1965 totalled £261.4 million, a rise of nearly £81 million a year over 1955 figures, making a favourable balance for Britain of nearly £82 million in that year. (Board of Trade figures.)

By 1966, South Africa was Britain's fourth best customer, and Britain South Africa's biggest supplier. Major British exports are cars (£11.9 million in the first nine months of 1966); textiles (£11.5 million); and electrical power machinery (£8.7 million). From South Africa, Britain buys mainly metal ores (£16 million) and canned fruit (£12.8 million). (All figures from Financial Times, 22 November, 1966.)

By January 1966, after only 15 months of a Labour Government, British trade with South Africa had risen by £12 million, nearly 7%. From United Kingdom export figures for January 1967, showing that exports to South Africa rose by nearly £5 million over those of January 1966, we can see that this trend is continuing.

Since the Labour Government's access to power, at least two organisations have been established to promote South African trade. In January 1966, the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association was set up privately to protect and promote British investment in South Africa. It was also designed to develop trade. The Association's president is Sir Nicholas Cayzer, Chairman of the British and Commonwealth Shipping Co. Ltd., which includes the Union Castle Line, and its chairman is Mr W E Luke, Chairman of Lindustries Ltd., and of the Southern African section of the British National Export Council, a government-sponsored body, set up in 1964. The Southern African section was established in February 1966 and enjoys the close cooperation of the Government.

In May this year the British Ambassador to South Africa, Sir John Nicholas, addressed a meeting in Johannesburg of the new South Africa-Britain Trade Association (SABRITA).
'The BNEC enjoys government support,' he said, 'and clearly cannot tackle politico-economic problems with quite the same uninhibited zest as the UK-SA Trade Association.'

He also said that care should be taken to avoid duplication of work by the Board of Trade, the Foreign service, the British National Export Council and SABRITA. Announcing 'substantial increases' in UK-SA trade in the first quarter of 1967 compared with that of 1966, he referred to trade being affected by political considerations.

An example of the close trade links the United Kingdom enjoys with South Africa was presented by the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce which sent a team to the Republic in November 1966 led by Oscar Hahn, now a member of the Race Relations Board.

In November 1966, when British Government intentions to call on the United Nations for mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia were made known, the feeling was widespread that for them to be effective some move would have to be made against South Africa. The Republic had made its intention to continue trading with Rhodesia quite clear, and Mr Ben Schoeman, Transport Minister, warned Britain of steps South Africa might take to hurt her.

If ever the time had come for the-Labour Government to go back on previously stated commitments, this was it. Its whole declared policy towards Rhodesia, it claimed, hinged on the complete success of economic sanctions. A clearer warning could not have been given by the South Africans of their intention to ignore the United Nations call for compulsory cessation of trade with Rhodesia. Several well-informed articles in the British press at the time pointed out 'How Britain could ride out sanctions' (Alan Day, Observer, 11 December, 1966). 'On the figures,' said Christopher Johnson (in the Financial Times, 22 November, 1966), 'South Africa is far more dependent on her trade with Britain, than Britain is on her trade with South Africa. South Africa sells one-third of her total exports-excluding gold-to Britain, and buys 28% of her total imports from Britain.'

Yet George Brown was able to say on his return from the United Nations that there was no need yet to cease thinking that South Africa and Portugal might comply with the international resolution. 'South Africa is involved', he told a London Airport press conference on 11 December, 1966, 'She is a member state, and mandatory sanctions are mandatory upon every member state.'

And Harold Wilson, in the face of anguished queries from some of his own backbenchers, could make what amounted to a promise not to extend the mandatory sanctions to South Africa no matter what. (Hansard, 5 December, 1966.)

A letter from the anxious President of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, David Steel MP, to the Prime Minister on this topic elicited a reply masterly in its phrasing, which managed to suggest a reassurance that bad deeds would not be done, without, nonetheless, withdrawing the pledge to South Africa: 'You will recall,' he wrote, 'that I myself said on 5 December in my statement on Rhodesia, that this must not be allowed to develop ... into a confrontation, whether economic or
military, involving the whole of Southern Africa. This is a clear expression of intention; but it is important to distinguish between an intention that something should not happen and an assurance that it will not.'

The turn now taken in the Rhodesia crisis demonstrated clearly what many had been trying to discount, the inextricability of South Africa from the dispute between Britain and its stubborn colony.

The way in which the Labour Government handled this aspect of the crisis lends support to the theory which we have already suggested, and will discuss in more detail later, of a consistent British policy of understanding and acceptance of South Africa's countersanctions moves with the intention of preserving the status quo in the whole Southern African area.

Handling the Rhodesian rebels

WE KNOW TURN TO an examination of the British record vis-d-vis Rhodesia. A look first at the sanctions policy, designed to bring down the Smith regime in 'weeks rather than months', as the Prime Minister told the Lagos conference of his Commonwealth colleagues in January 1966, leads us on to the history of the Wilson Government's negotiations with the Smith regime, from the 'talks about talks' to the meeting on HMS Tiger.

Sanctions:

IN THE SECOND phase of its voluntary economic sanctions against Rhodesia, in December 1965 the British Government imposed a ban on the supply of oil to the rebel colony. One year later, it reluctantly included this commodity in the resolution submitted to the United Nations Security Council which became the mandatory sanctions programme for the rest of the world.

The colony has no oil supplies of its own and relies entirely on imported quantities of petrol, oil and lubricants, amounting to some £5.8 million in 1964.

Yet from the beginning, it has been clear that oil has been reaching Rhodesia in quantities sufficient for survival.

How has this happened?

Quite simply, the South Africans, and to a lesser extent the Portuguese, both on record from the date of UDI as against the Rhodesian boycott, have lent their services.

A well-substantiated report in the Sunday Telegraph of 19 February, 1967, explained how the South Africans have been boosting the Smith oil supply both before and since the mandatory resolution.

The report says that the Smith regime's front organisation, Genta, responsible for oil supplies, has built a huge depot close to Messina, a small Transvaal town ten miles from the Rhodesian border.

This depot has been supplying over 700,000 gallons of petrol and other fuel a week. The depot, completed early this year, has meant that the previous high cost of bringing oil fuel into Rhodesia by road, has been reduced by at least half for the Smith regime, with South African Government acquiescence.

A survey at the border shows that about 21 tankers, carrying 110,000 gallons, are passing over Beit Bridge every 24 hours. (An estimated 125,000 gallons are needed daily by Rhodesia, under rationing.)
About 20 (8,000 gallon) railway tankers bring the oil by rail from South African ports or the Johannesburg oil pipeline, to the Genta depot. The fuels are then pumped into huge static tanks and later loaded into the unmarked road tankers. From the depot the oil is carried by road ten miles to the border, and another 79 miles to the nearest Rhodesian railway siding at Rutenga, where again it is transferred into railway tankers.

To supplement the oil lift, tankers with Rhodesian registration numbers are also crossing the border to the Genta depot. At least one belongs to the Shell Oil Company, a British concern with a Rhodesian subsidiary. The American oil company Caltex, with a South African subsidiary, is mainly responsible for the initial supply of petrol and another American company, Mobil Oil, is supplying aviation fuel. Before the Genta depot became operational early this year, Caltex had been carrying the oil, most of Rhodesia's supply, in road tankers to a lonely farm about 300 miles south of the border, some 11 miles north of Pretoria.

There it was transferred to unmarked 5,000 gallon road tankers under contract from South African transport firms to Genta. Big underground tanks were sunk and camouflaged among thick trees off a sand road about half a mile from the main Rhodesia road.

As early as February 1966, only two months after the oil embargo was imposed, the supplies coming into Rhodesia by this route, and also through Mozambique, were brought to the notice of the British public and Government through press and diplomatic reports from the area. A flow of press reports in all papers in mid-February suggested that even then 70,000 gallons a day were going into Rhodesia. The British Embassy in Pretoria sent two second secretaries to watch the border with Rhodesia. They kept up a round the clock vigil and Commonwealth Office officials have since confirmed that they reported similar amounts to those mentioned in the press.

Yet at the time Whitehall preserved a cool public front, estimating that at most 8,000 gallons a day were crossing the border.

'Both the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office', said the Times on 17 February, 1966, 'continue vigorously to deny that any supplies of petrol on a scale to undermine the world-wide oil embargo against Rhodesia were getting into that country overland either from Portuguese sources in Mozambique or from South Africa.'

The British Government appears throughout this period to have been convinced by the late Dr Verwoerd, who told his Parliament that his government was not prepared to interfere with the oil embargo. They do not seem to have credited other remarks he made at the time to the effect that he would not prevent private concerns sending fuel to Rhodesia, and that South Africa was not willing to join in any boycott of Rhodesia.

The British Government, while making much play over the arrival off Beira of one oil tanker, Joanna V, took no public step against British oil companies participating in the illegal running of petrol supplies to Smith, and has so far made
no public appeal to the United States Government to call Caltex and Mobil Oil to account.
Finally, as we have already noted, when the sanctions programme against Rhodesia became mandatory, the Prime Minister took care to state that sanctions would not be extended to South Africa, thus ensuring a steady flow of oil to Rhodesia, and the consequent failure of his own sanctions policy.

TOBACCO IS by far Rhodesia's chief export, accounting in 1964 for £39.2 million of her overseas income, against £10 million for her asbestos exports. It is also the aspect of sanctions which have caused the country most pain, for while some 80 million pounds of tobacco harvested in the 1966 crop have reportedly been sold--(through: South Africa, 20 million pounds; Portugal, two million pounds; Switzerland, three million pounds; and United States, West Germany and Netherlands outlets)--over 160 million pounds have had to be stored secretly in Rhodesia itself.

The 1967 crop estimated at some 200 million pounds has to be added to this figure, and the fact that the Rhodesian Government which is purchasing tobacco from the farmers, had to build extensions to a huge hangar on a disused airport near Salisbury now--being used as a tobacco store, shows that difficulties in getting rid of the bulk of the crop are still present. This was admitted by the rebel regime itself in June this year.

Although in 1965 the United Kingdom took £18.7 million worth of tobacco from Rhodesia (her largest client), British capital is hardly visible in the Colony's tobacco plantations. 'Imperial Tobacco has a stake estimated at anything up to £4 million in processing and other facilities, however, and Gallaher is putting £500,000 into a new threshing floor', the Financial Times reported on 9 October, 1965.

IN OTHER aspects of trade with Rhodesia, however, Britain's role is major. In 1964, Rhodesia took less than 1% of British exports but Britain took nearly 26% of Rhodesian exports. 30% of Rhodesian imports came from Britain but Rhodesian goods formed only 2% of British imports.

Britain has some £200 million invested in Rhodesia, followed by South Africa with £175 million, according to the Times of 11 November 1965. Britain's investment is partially composed of nearly £70 million outstanding on the Rhodesian share of the Federal debt, split up between Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia when the Federation broke up.

The rest of the United Kingdom investment is in tangible assets in Rhodesia, in farms, mines, property, communications and factories. The relationship, however, between intertwining British, South African, and Rhodesian capital is so complex, that it is virtually impossible to trace precisely--much British capital reaches Rhodesia not directly in a Rhodesian subsidiary, but through a South African company which in turn has investment in Rhodesia.

This complex financial situation involving South Africa has been the chief reason for Rhodesia's ability to withstand British sanctions so far, and for British subsidiaries in Rhodesia surviving. In many instances these subsidiaries have
been managed through the South African-based affiliate companies in order to avoid any offence to the sanctions regulations.
Over 180 British manufacturing companies and trading companies have between them over 290 subsidiaries in Rhodesia. Banks and insurance companies also have subsidiaries. Further British interests there are in mines and plantations owned by companies registered in South Africa or Rhodesia, but in which British and United States capital participate.
The Financial Times of 9 October, 1965, gave details of overseas capital in Rhodesia, from which the South African/British interest can be clearly seen. British companies include the household names of Woolworths, J Lyons and Co, Leyland Motor Corporation, Marley Tile, Norvic Shoes, Rover, BMC, property companies, steel and advertising firms, Gestetner, ICI and Unilever, for example. Indeed Unilever announced in May 1967 its intention to permit the expansion of its Rhodesian subsidiary at a capital cost of £135,000. This expansion was reported as being designed to 'help to stimulate many sectors of the Rhodesian economy'. The fact that the British government took no steps to prevent this breach of sanctions must have given pause for thought to many of the British firms paying at least lip-service to the sanctions policy.
Although Unilever have stated that the resources for their expansion will be found locally, it is in practice not impossible for British companies with interests in Rhodesia to organise the flow of British funds to South Africa (where they would and do control locally registered companies) and from there to channel the funds to Rhodesia. South Africa is a member of the sterling area and no' controls bar British financing of South African ventures apart from those voluntarily undertaken for British balance of payments reasons.
Under the terms of the Security Council resolution for mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia passed in December, the Secretary-General had to present the Council with a report on how member states were dealing with the problem by 1 March. U Thant told the Council then that several states, including some having significant trade with Rhodesia, had not complied with instructions to report their progress with sanctions policy.
Amongst them were South Africa, and several other African countries, who did not reply on the assumption that it was known they had no trade with the Smith regime.
Malawi and Zambia, Rhodesia's closest neighbours, historically bound up with the rebel colony, asked for special treatment.
Zambia:
ZAMBIA'S ROLE in the entire Rhodesia situation has been uniquely perilous. Britain's decision to choke the Smith regime slowly through economic sanctions has had an enormous economic repercussion in Zambia, recipient of nearly one-third of Rhodesia's exports.
Throughout the UDI period, Zambia, while amongst the countries most violently opposed to Smith on political grounds, has had to continue trading with him. Britain's offers of aid, and its help with the lift of oil by air and road, when the normal Rhodesian route was cut off, have not been sufficient to tide Zambia
through the dark period when her own copper exports have been severely affected.
Nor have they been sufficient to assuage Zambia's fears that despite the hardships she is suffering because of the sanctions policy, Britain will nonetheless do a deal with Smith allowing him to remain in power.
Her offers, early in the crisis, to allow British troops to use Zambia as a base for operations against Smith were turned down, and Zambian suspicion of Britain grew to near-certainty that a deal would be done when the 'talks about talks' were opened.
The Zambian Government's difficulties because of UDI and its hostile attitude to the British Government were spelt out clearly to Mrs Judith Hart, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, on two trips she made to Zambia in June 1966.
This attitude was a principal reason for Harold Wilson's remark, announcing on 5 July, a 'pause in the talks' with the Smith regime, that Britain was 'carrying the can and sheltering Rhodesia, while remaining powerless to get the solution that we in the House would consider right'.
Zambia's stern line on the British handling of the question, despite her tricky economic position was a significant factor in the strength of African feeling at the Commonwealth conference which took place in September 1966 in London.
President Kaunda boycotted the conference, but sent as his deputy the Foreign Minister, Simon Kapwepwe, whose jibes of 'racist' at the British Prime Minister caused the angriest scenes of a turbulent conference.

Negotiations:
AFTER THE ignominious collapse of Mr Wilson's first belligerent prophecies about what his sanctions policy would do to Rhodesia (chiefly, his famous pronouncement that the rebel regime would be on its knees .in 'weeks rather than months'), it was perhaps inevitable that his Government would turn its thoughts towards negotiating with Smith. There was, as we have seen, in February 1966, a strange period when civil servants -presumably under orders from the government -tried to maintain the absurd lie that oil was not going across Beit Bridge from South Africa in significant quantities. After that, however, acknowledged pessimism became the predominant mood in Whitehall.
But nerves were also being frayed in Salisbury, and perhaps the most curious and even sinister thing about Mr Wilson's attitude to the Rhodesian question is that when Mr Smith's nervousness became apparent, no attempt was made to exploit it. The first move came in mid-April, when Smith approached the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and asked whether it might be possible to arrange talks with the British.
Smith's offer was met at once-unconditionally. To the amazement of civil servants working on the Rhodesian problem, no attempt was made by the British Government to lay out a set of demands, even as negotiating positions. Mr Oliver Wright, the Prime Minister's private secretary, was instantly diverted from a trip to South Africa and sent to Salisbury to arrange the 'talks about talks'. (This ludicrous title, adding yet another dimension to the double-talk of power politics,
was dreamed up in order to square the conversations in Salisbury with Mr Wilson's frequent assertions that he would never negotiate with the rebel regime.) Details of the 'talks about talks' were kept painstakingly secret by the British and Rhodesian Governments: but some details about the second session held in July were obtained and published by newspapers. The evidence they produced indicated that the talks were really attempts to conciliate the Rhodesians: and by no means all of the civil servants involved in them thought they were either worthwhile or that they accorded with Britain's stated policies.

The team of four British officials was formally led by Mr Duncan Watson of the Commonwealth Office. But Wilson's secretary, Oliver Wright, in fact played a major part in the discussions, and sent long cables daily to Mr Wilson separately from the efforts of his colleagues. The junior-but conceivably most expert-member of the party, Mr Kenneth Neale, head of the Rhodesian political section in the Commonwealth Office, is known to have become swiftly convinced that no basis for negotiation existed, chiefly because the Rhodesians showed no interest in making even the slightest concessions. However, he is reported to have had great difficulty in persuading his colleagues that they should return to London at the end of July.

In London, great pressure is known to have been applied to Mr Wilson, chiefly by Lord Caradon, ambassador to the United Nations, and Mrs Judith Hart, junior minister at the Commonwealth Office, designed to prevent further 'talks about talks'. It was pointed out that the talks, by restoring business confidence in Salisbury, were cancelling out any effect the sanctions policy was having on Rhodesian economic prospects. Britain was giving Smith something for nothing.

But these moves did not affect Mr Wilson's determination, and in August, Mr Wright and Mr Watson were sent back to Salisbury on their own. But this attempt was completely wrecked by the Smith Government's brutal, tactless and arbitrary assumption of a fresh set of repressive powers under the Constitutional Amendment Bill. This made their position intolerable.

These somewhat frantic attempts to reach an accommodation with the Smith regime were now overtaken by the September Commonwealth Conference in London: at which, inevitably, the anger of the black Commonwealth countries boiled up. It was, however, met by a skilled and intensive British diplomatic campaign of an energy and effectiveness far greater than anything deployed against Rhodesia, and was largely blunted. The black Commonwealth came to the conference with the determination to get a NIBMAR pledge (No independence before majority rule). But this was turied into a very equivocal commitment indeed: and by June this year it was already possible for Mr Wilson to indicate to the Rhodesians that he might be able to 'discuss' the NIBMAR pledge with the African leaders, clearly with a view to reducing it.

Almost as soon as the Commonwealth Premiers left London, it seems that Mr Wilson's advisers were at work on meeting the Rhodesians again. And by the end of September, the new Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Herbert Bowden, was on his way to Rhodesia to meet Mr Smith. The 'package' he took with him had little to
do with the NIBMAR pledge: it was simply a re-working of the repressive 1961 constitution. The British attitude was that the 1961 Constitution - which the Conservative Government had rejected for independence - would be acceptable, providing some 'safeguards' were built in. (The arrangements for this visit had actually been made during the Commonwealth Conference, during which Sir Morrice James of the Commonwealth Office went to Salisbury to see Mr Smith.)

Commonwealth Secretary Bowden has never been counted among the most determined opponents of 'Smithy's' regime. But after further investigations in Salisbury in November he seems to have come to the conclusion that there was so little 'give' in Smith's position that there was no point in further negotiation. The Prime Minister, all the same, insisted on meeting Smith on board HMS Tiger early in December, 1966. It cannot be said that the British side on board the cruiser adopted a firm line with the rebel leader. Just before departing for Gibraltar Mr Wilson told Mrs Hart that the British delegation would insist on a British military presence in Rhodesia during the transition period from the rebel regime to whatever new form of government might be agreed. This pledge was abandoned in the face of Smith's intransigence.

The deal that was offered to Mr Smith on board the Tige was by no means an onerous one. The Sunday Times on December 11 enumerated the advantages it offered him: 'Police state powers, embedded in the 1961 Constitution, would not be annulled. Nothing in the proposed (ie Tiger) constitution could prevent Smith from banning an African opposition or interning opponents. 'Nowhere in the proposals are demands made for improvements in African income and educational qualifications which are a prerequisite of an enlarged African A roll vote and therefore majority rule. The proposed constitution does not make progress towards majority rule "inevitable". 'But most comforting of all was the consideration that time and legal independence would erode Britain's concern for African rights. Ultimately, all the "entrenched clauses" and "external safeguards" depend on the sanction of force. Would a Britain that had failed to use force over UDI consider using it to prevent all the subtle brakes that a determined white executive could apply to African development?' In the end, the Africans of Rhodesia - and the remnants of the Labour Party's integrity - were saved by the crude belligerence of Ian Smith's colleagues in the 'cowboy cabinet'. Smith himself went back to Rhodesia in favour of acceptance. But, animated by a bitter distrust of Wilson and a blind desire to 'hold what we have', his colleagues refused to have anything to do with the Tiger settlement. They stuck on the two concessions it did make to giving protection to the Africans of Rhodesia: (one) that there should be a 'broadbased' interim government, and (two) that a Royal Commission should set out to discover a new constitution acceptable to Rhodesians as a whole.

In their paranoid state, they ignored the obvious loopholes in the Royal Commission stipulation. The first of these was that as they had a veto over
membership of the Commission they could control its attitudes. The second was that, even if the Commission came up with the wrong kind of constitution, from their point of view, there would not be any British military presence to forestall a second UDI. They rejected the Tiger terms with 'repugnance'.

The Conclusion

TWO AND A HALF years have been a sufficiently long period in which to discern the underlying features of Labour Government policy towards Southern Africa. If mistakes were initially made in coping with the Rhodesian rebellion, Mr Wilson has had ample time and many opportunities to rectify them. Two and a half years should have been sufficient to win a public consensus in support of forceful assertions of Britain's responsibility in Rhodesia, and of British obligations under the several resolutions of the United Nations on apartheid and on South West Africa.

Yet this period has seen no forward movement in British policy in these areas. They have been years of retreat from commitments made in opposition, or of attempts to evade or ignore commitments forced upon the British Government's attention by the Commonwealth or the United Nations.

Mr Wilson's Government has been seen to improve upon the established policy of preserving a status quo in Rhodesia while protecting South Africa from external pressure. Some sincere opponents of apartheid in the Labour Party and in the Government may well dispute this interpretation of the record so far unfolded. They will point to progress in the shape of the embargo on arms supplies to South Africa, and will ignore the loopholes in it; they will remind us of Mr. Wilson's 'six principles' over Rhodesia, his agreement to mandatory sanctions against the rebel regime and they will forget how near the 'Tiger Talks' with all they conceded, came to success. While the Government has continued to declare its dislike of apartheid in South Africa, and of white supremacy in Rhodesia, its actual practice has been to support South Africa economically, politically, and morally, thus endangering any economic policies designed to fell the Smith regime.

The record underlines the increases in trade, the growth of investment and the emphasis placed by the Government- on the development of economic relations with South Africa. Political support has been forthcoming at the United Nations where Britain refused to participate in that body's schemes to end the Republic's mandate over South West Africa, thus undermining the international organisation's prestige and authority. In opposition, the British Labour Party made support for the United Nations an important plank in its international policy. In power, the Labour Government has treated the international organisation with the same lack of respect that marked the previous Conservative Government's attitude. The Labour Government's moral support for apartheid is most clearly shown by the decision to allow British warships to pay a courtesy call to Cape Town, in June this year, even though Coloured crew members had to be warned to comply with apartheid regulations ashore.
In Rhodesia the Government's policy has appeared to be twofold, based on the
tenacious effort to keep the outside world from interfering in the matter and the
attempt to find a solution which would legitimise a white minority government.
In the first instance the period following UDI saw not an attack on the rebellious
regime, but the movement of troops to Zambia to seal Rhodesia from other,
African, pressures. In the United Nations, Britain at first fought against
international involvement in the problem, and when involvement became
unavoidable, insisted that sanctions be selective, and gave advance notice that she
was not prepared to bring to book the country which had already announced its
intention to flout the boycott.
In negotiating with the Smith regime throughout the period between UDI and the
'Tiger Talks', the Labour Government showed itself to be more concerned with a
return to constitutional rule than with the fate of Rhodesia's four million Africans.
The major stumbling
block between the British and Rhodesian Prime Ministers became the question of
legal independence. Mr Smith wanted the British Parliament to grant
independence, de jure. Mr Wilson wanted a return to the 1961 constitution under
which white Rhodesians have enjoyed the full self-government they were first
granted in 1923, with a quick progression to the 'Tiger' constitution, which itself,
as we have seen, enshrined the possibility of white supremacy ad infinitum.
For Rhodesia's African Nationalists, UDI was the result of a conspiracy to which
the British Government was privy. For them, the Anglo-Rhodesian dispute has
had little to do with the fundamental issues of human rights and equality. The
Africans conclude that the dispute centres around methods of reaching an agreed
objective: the establishment in Rhodesia of another independent apartheid regiie
capable of withstanding the force of the liberatory and nationalist movement.
A success Mr Wilson can chalk up against the many Rhodesian ignominies he has
so far suffered, is the way in which economic sanctions as an instrument of
international coercion have been discredited.
Having opposed sanctions against South Africa at the United Nations on several
occasions on the grounds of impracticability, the British Government suddenly
elevated the policy into a major instrument for meeting the UDI challenge.
As we have seen however, South Africa was exempted from retaliatory measures
after demonstrating her unwillingness to go along with the British sanctions
policy. It could be argued that this counter-sanctions activity has been tolerated,
not because the Labour Government is unwilling to challenge the South African
Government, but because it wants to show that economic sanctions do not work.
By allowing the sanctions policy to be undermined, and by insisting on selective
and not comprehensive embargoes, the Wilson Government has succeeded in
destroying whatever beliefs there may have been in the usefulness of economic
sanctions as a means of asserting international responsibility and authority.
The fact that economic sanctions against South Africa have been under discussion
at the United Nations since 1962 is not irrelevant here. Their apparent failure to
deal with the Rhodesian problem, so much smaller than that of South Africa, will
not help the argument for their eventual use as a means towards an end to apartheid.
'Mr Wilson's great achievement', wrote the Economist recently, 'was to separate his government from his party in the minds of the electorate'. On the issue of apartheid in South Africa and white supremacy in Rhodesia, this separation is now complete. Mr Wilson has confirmed that moralising about the evils of apartheid and racial oppression are the permitted luxuries of a Labour Party in Opposition.
Governments, on the other hand, (and 'Labour Government works') are concerned with pursuing the 'national interest'. in Southern Africa the national interest is seen as safeguarding the profitability of trade and investments and protecting the regimes in the region which manage these profitable systems on a basis of racial segregation and cheap labour.
As this record suggests, Mr Wilson's Government has done no more than confirm the status quo, and where and when necessary has repaired the dykes against change. In this, the British Labour Government has shown itself no different from Conservative Government.
Appendix
IT IS just three years since the news reached the civilised world of the brutal shooting at a peaceful demonstration in Sharpeville which caused the death of 67 Africans. Today we pay tribute to their memory and to the cause of freedom in South Africa for which they stood.
Since then, in spite of protests from all parts of the world and resolutions of the United Nations Assembly, things have gone from bad to worse in South Africa. Dr Verwoerd's regime now has all the odious trappings of a police state. The Job Reservation Act, the Group Areas Act, the General Law Amendment Act, and now a new one, the Publications and Entertainment Bill which will give powers of censorship held only by fascist governments. Even in the past year we have seen more and more brave believers in liberty restricted to their homes, put behind bars or in one case condemned to death. The great leaders of South Africa, Luthuli, Sobukwe, Mandela, all are denied their liberty. Others, such as Duma Nokwe and Oliver Tambo, have been forced into exile.
Week by week the screws are being tightened. Every vestige of human freedom is being suppressed-or so they think-but we are here today to proclaim that human freedom cannot be suppressed and that those who attempt to do so will in the end suffer.
The Nationalist Government is attempting by every means to consolidate its position, not only by oppressive measures at home, but by tightening the bonds within that unholy alliance-the links between Verwoerd and Salazar are closer today than ever before. Sir Roy Welensky was part of the triumvirate, but his power and influence is on the wane. As the frontier comes closer to the homeland
of South Africa, their military potential is rapidly growing. There are more men under arms in South Africa today than ever before. In two years their Defence Budget has doubled. French Mirage jet fighters, Fouga jet aircraft, Lockheed Hercules transport planes, British Buccaneer military aircraft, and many other means of destruction have either been delivered or are on their way to South Africa. At the end of last year a South African scientist was quoted as saying 'It is within the bounds of our resources to make an atom bomb' and to top it all we learn that the possibilities of co-operation between France and South Africa on nuclear experiments and the setting up of a French testing base on South African soil are now under discussion.

What we, here gathered today, cannot tolerate, and we believe we are speaking in the name of the British people, is the help that Western countries are giving in building up the forces of a country which by its actions has put itself beyond the pale of human civilisation, and earned the censure and condemnation of the civilised world. The South African State President in opening their Parliament in January of this year said these words: 'the Conservative elements in the west are beginning to accept South Africa as the real bulwark against Communist penetration' Conservative elements who do support South Africa-and in like manner Salazar's Africa policies-are supporting not a bulwark against Communism but a bulwark against human freedom.

We know there are those in this country who fought and schemed against the UN in the Congo, who have struggled to deny freedom and human rights in Southern Rhodesia and who praise the regimes in Angola and Mozambique. We have fought them in the House of Commons and we shall fight them until the verdict of the electorate sweeps them from positions of power and influence.

But we meet today to condemn a specific policy of Her Majesty's Government which not only involves condoning South African policies but provides the South African Government with the screws of oppression. We know of the role played by British-made Saracen armoured cars in the brutality we condemn today.

I have repeatedly sought in the House of Commons for details of the quantity and types of equipment supplied. I have asked for a full disclosure. Last year I pressed for details of the export of tear gas and equipment for making tear gas to South Africa. I was refused. 'It would not be,' they said, 'in the public interest.' It is not in the public interest that there are any details to give.

Let me repeat where the Labour Party, for whom I am speaking today, stands on this issue. Under Hugh Gaitskell's leadership we condemned the supply of arms to South Africa as long as apartheid continues. That is the policy of the Labour Party today. It will be the policy of the Labour Party when we are called upon to form the Government of this country. And, lest there be any doubt, we shall apply the same policy in respect of arms supplied to the Portuguese Government for use in territories they control in Africa.

But this issue is urgent. It cannot wait until Mr Macmillan finally summons up the courage to submit the entire record of his Government to the verdict of the British electorate. I say to Mr Macmillan today, 'Act now and stop this bloody traffic in
the weapons of oppression.' How can he speak of the wind of change and supply arms to those who are brutally resisting change?

Has he no conception of the blot on Britain's name when he continues with this policy. All of us who have cast off the last clinging attachments of the Edwardian era know that Britain's standing in the world depends not on diplomatic lunches in Paris or the futile attempts to maintain a no-longer independent nuclear deterrent. It depends on the influence we can exert, in the United Nations and elsewhere, with newly emerging nations which have come from the darkness of centuries into the light. And that influence cannot be exerted as long as we continue this inhuman traffic in arms. Many of these weapons can be used-have been used-against Africans in South Africa. Have the British Government considered that they may be used against other nations, for instance against Southern Rhodesia -when that country finally achieves a democracy which really represents the Southern Rhodesian population. Let Her Majesty's Ministers announce that it will be stopped forthwith.

Of course, knowing their quality, we must be prepared to see them going to the constituencies where the manufacture of arms for South Africa is carried on and dropping dark hints that Labour's policy will mean unemployment. This is the game the South African Minister of Defence is playing in issuing his threats about this rally today. I will give him and Her Majesty's Government our answer. If after 12 years of Conservative Government, full employment cannot be maintained in these areas except on the basis of supplying arms to South Africa, then here we have the final condemnation of their economic policy. So if this is the Government's reason, let us have it out in the open. We will submit this issue to public debate

I will go further, we shall undertake to bring employment to the areas affected-not excluding the placing of Government orders for the equipment needed, all over Africa, for the war against hunger and poverty.. Their policy is based on exporting the munitions of death. Ours will be based on exporting the munitions of life. And let me say this to the South African Minister of Defence, if he threatens us with cancelled contracts-contrasts the British Government ought to have vetoed, a Labour Government, through UN and elsewhere, will do everything in our power by international action to see that he does not place these contracts anywhere else. I have spoken of the issues which are raised, human freedom, Britain's standing in the world, the economic arguments.

But this is more. This is a moral issue. And we are prepared to fight on this moral issue.

One of the formative influences in my life was a sermon I heard preached at a scout service by a colleague, now a leading Nonconformist Minister. He took as his text 'He hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth. That is the faith in which we stand.'

And we shall be judged as hypocrites if that faith is for export only.

One of the greatest of the many inspiring acts of Hugh Gaitskell's leadership was his fight against the Commonwealth Immigration Act. It was followed more
widely by the campaign all of us fought under his leadership against racial intolerance.

If Parliament under its present Conservative majority continues to reject the private member's Bill to outlaw racial intolerance and racial discrimination, Parliament, when we have a Labour majority, will enact it as a Government measure.

We stand for freedom of speech, but under present laws that does not allow freedom of obscenity. Racial incitement and provocative attacks on a man for his race or his colour, these things are an obscenity and we shall legislate to deal with them.

But legislation is not enough. We shall need the most tremendous and dedicated campaign against racial intolerance in areas where, let us be frank, there are tremendous problems. Yes, we know there are bad coloured landlords-as there are bad white ones. Let them all be dealt with as bad landlords, not on the basis of their colour. And if there are-and there are-acute problems of housing, of social squalor, in some areas of unemployment, let the attack be on these evils-and do not let our opponents create coloured alibis for their failure to make this attack.

There is no problem of racial prejudice against young children. It is a vice which comes later, and which evil men stand ready to exploit. This is why the problem is one primarily of education and of example.

We must oppose discrimination wherever it is met. In a West End hotel or in a Midlands Club. The Labour Party is not responsible for the management or conduct of Labour Clubs, but lest there be any doubt, let me unequivocally and specifically dissociate the Labour movement from any act or posture of race discrimination by any Labour Club. And may I here refer to the position of Labour Clubs in my own constituency where membership is open to all, regardless of colour, and where West Indians and Africans are honoured members.

Madam Chairman, I am honoured to have been asked to speak in this demonstration. I hope the message we have all of us proclaimed will be a message of hope to those who fight the fight in South Africa and elsewhere.

The work of Anti-Apartheid is inevitably concentrated on the problems of the African continent. To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, Africa cannot endure half-slave and half-free. And the world must take its stand. Britain's next Government will play its full part. Meanwhile I trust that the work your Movement is doing will continue to instruct and inspire the hearts of men and women of goodwill everywhere.

Anti-Apartheid Movement, 89 Charlotte Street, London, W.I. (580 5311)
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